Torts – Defenses – Fortuitous Events

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)

Cases:

Roberto Juntilla V. Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and Berfol Camoro GR No. L-45637 May 31,
1985

Facts: Juntilla was a passenger of a public utility in the course of a trip from Danao to Cebu City. The
jeepney was driven by Berfol Camoro, registered under the franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar
but was actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon. During the trip, the right rear tire exploded
causing the vehicle to turn over and Juntilla was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness. When
he came to his senses, he found that he suffered injuries and that his “Omega” wrist watch was lost. He
went to the hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to look for the watch at the
place of the accident, but it was no longer found.

Juntilla filed a civil case against respondents for breach of contract. The respondents averred
that the losses to the petitioner was beyond their control taking into account that the tire that exploded
was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. CFI reversed the decision, finding that
the accident was due to a fortuitous event.

Issue: WON the cause of the accident was a fortuitous event

Held: No. The CFI relied its ruling in the case of Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation Co., CA G.R. No.
8136, December 29, 1954, where the Court of Appeals ruled that: A tire blow-out does not constitute
negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. Indeed, this would be a
clear case of fortuitous event.

In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The evidence
shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with
the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not
jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger
jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner stated that there were three (3)
passengers in the front seat and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear.

In Lasam V. Smith, the Court laid down the following essential characteristics of caso fortuito: (1) The
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the
human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of
mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles,
not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows
up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. 

(Namention din sa case na to yung Art. 1755 – liability of common carriers)

Facts: Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of
the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. As such, he went to the main office of the Authority in Manila
to encash two checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project.
For some reason, however, the processing of the checks was delayed, he decided nevertheless to encash
them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day. And so, he
collected the cash value of the checks and left the main office with not an insubstantial amount of
money in his hands. Instead of returning to Cavite, he decided to go to his house and leave to Cavite in
the morning.

On his way to his house, two persons boarded the jeepney he was riding, with knives in hand and
robbed him. The two robbers jumped out of the jeepney and Hernandez immediately pursued them. He
caught up with one, Virgilio Alvarez. Petitioner suffered injuries. Alvarez was subsequently charged with
robbery and pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper who escaped is still at large and the stolen money he
took with him has not been recovered.

Petitioner filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But the Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr.
denied the petitioner's request. The Commission on Audit insists in this memorandum that the
petitioner should not be relieved from his money accountability because it was his own negligence that
led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to Ternate in Cavite but to Marilao. Petitioner
claims that Commission on Audit acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in
holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money. He avers he has done only what any reasonable
man would have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no
control.

Issue: WON petitioner’s acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the
petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money.

Held: No. The petitioner was moved only by the best of motives when he encashed the checks so his co-
employees in Ternate could collect their salaries and wages the following day. Significantly, although this
was a non-working day, he was intending to make the trip to his office the following day for the
unselfish purpose of accommodating his fellow workers.

As for Hernandez's choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one could easily agree that
the former was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in the trips
to the two places. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected
of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in broad
daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other passengers, it cannot
be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous
event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although
it could have happened, and did.
Gotesco Investment VS Gloria and Lina Chatto GR No. L-87584 June 16, 1992

Facts: Gloria and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Chatto went to see the movie “Mother Dear” at
Superama I Theater owned by Gotesco Investment. hey bought balcony tickets but even then were
unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. 10 minutes after entering
the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. They were able to crawl under the fallen ceiling and
walked to the nearby FEU Hospital. The next day, they were transferred to UST Hospital.

Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA and was
treated at the Cook County Hospital In Chicago 5 or 6 times.

Gotesco argued that that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It
maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. 

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent, awarding actual or compensatory and moral
damages and attorney's fees.

Issue: WON the collapsing of the ceiling of the balcony was due to construction defects and not force
majeure

Held: Yes. It was the burden of Gotesco to prove hat its theater did not suffer from any structural defect
when it was built and that it has been well maintained when the incident occurred. Considering the
collapse of the ceiling of its theater's balcony barely four (4) years after its construction, it behooved
defendant-appellant to conduct an exhaustive study of the reason for the tragic incident. Jesus Lim Ong
testified as witness for Gotesco.

Clearly, there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on
the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling, Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer, He is a graduate of
architecture from the St. Louie (sic) University in Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the
government examination for architects. In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the collapse
of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated, as an act, of God. To sustain that proposition is to
introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence. Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the
theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr.
Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having
interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force
majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does
not imply force majeure. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it
were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or
reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court
impliedly held, incompetent.

On force majeure, for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised
care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
Amparo Servando and Clara Uy Bico VS Philippine Steam Navigation Co. GR No. L-36481 Oct 23, 1982

Facts: Servando and Bico loaded on board Philippines Steam’s vessel, FS-176, their cargoes (cavans of
rice, toys, general merchandise) as evidenced by bills of lading, from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental. In the bills of lading , however, the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for
the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment by inserting therein the following stipulation:

Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless
such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage
caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire 

Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order,
unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. The same day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of
unknown origin, destroying petitioners' cargoes. Their claims for the value of the said goods were
rejected by Philippine Steam.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, ordering respondent to pay the value of the goods, in
accordance with Article 1736 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon common carriers the duty to
observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in their
possession "until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to
the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738. The
court held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is
not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before
actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant.

Petitioners contend that the stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier does not bind them because it
was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign the same.

Issue: WON carrier shall be liable

Held: No. A 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes
the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the
obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor." In
the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened
independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event.

There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier ,incurred in delay in the performance of its
obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but
had demanded that the same be withdrawn. Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with
negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the
appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to
and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the
latter having no control whatsoever over the same.

National Power Corp. et al VS CA, Gaudencio Rayo et al GR Nos. 103442-43 May 21, 1993

Facts: Respondents sought to recover damages for the destruction of their property caused by the
inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan. They alleged that despite NPC’s knowledge of the
impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level
at the dam; and when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of
the typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's
spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River; and
5) as a consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned,
and their properties were washed away.

NPC argued that it exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the
hydroelectric plant; that written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the
residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon
"Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions; and that the damages incurred by the
private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and
character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that
the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function.

The trial court dismissed the complaints "for lack of sufficient and credible evidence." CA reversed the
decision and ordered NPC to pay for damages.

Issue: WON NPC shall be liable for the losses incurred by respondents

Held: Yes. To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an
obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the
injury to the creditor. 

Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided
for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or
entering into the cause of the mischief.

Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for
the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of
negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human
factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question
may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole
occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.
Southeastern College VS CA GR No. 126389 July 10, 1998

Facts: Private respondents are owners of a house at Pasay City while petitioner owns a 4 storey school
building along the same road. After a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila, the roof of petitioners
building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of
private respondents house. An ocular inspection was conducted after the typhoon by a team of
engineers. The report imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the building and
improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams which caused the roof be ripped off the building,
thereby causing damage to the property of respondents. Respondents filed an action before the RTC for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana. Petitioner contested that it had no liability, attributing
the damage to a fortuitous event. RTC ruled in favor of respondents which was affirmed by the CA.
Hence present petition.

Issue: WON the damage can be attributed to a fortuitous event

Held: Yes. The court ruled that petitioner is not liable, the damage being attributable to a fortuitous
event.

Art 1174 of the Civil Code states that: “Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable”

To be liable for a fortuitous event, the respondent must prove that petitioners were negligent, with
which they fall short, merely relying on the report of the city building official. This is the same official
that have approved the building plans of petitioner, who made clear that there were no prior complaints
regarding the building. Since storms are common in the country, the part of the building in question
should have failed against stronger typhoons that preceded said storm, which it had not. Furthermore,
petitioner was able to present evidence that regular maintenance was carried out. Respondents also
failed to support the claim of the actual loss they suffered, merely relying on estimates without
considering that wear and tear of respondents’ home which may have had a contributory effect to the
damage. Petition is granted and challenged decision is reversed.
Torts – Defenses – Assumption of Risk

Cases:

Margarita Afialda VS Basilio and Francisco Hisole GR No. L-2075 Nov. 29, 1949

Facts: Petitioner is the elder sister of the now deceased Loreto Afialda. It was alleged that Loreto was
employed by defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos. That while tending the animals, he was
gored by them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his
own fault nor to force majeure. Petitioner seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil
Code, which reads:

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even
if such animal should escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of
the person who may have suffered it.

Issue: WON the defendant spouses are liable as the owner of the carabao which killed Loreto

Held: No. Art. 1905 applies only when an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. In the
present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his
work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury
or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances,
was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
Ilocos Norte Electric Company VS CA GR No. L-53401 Nov. 6, 1989

Facts: A strong typhoon “Gening” engulfed the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and
flooding in its wake. The deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house
towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, a commercial establishment. While wading in waist-
deep flood, Nana Belen, in an unfortunate accident, had suffered and died in a circulatory shock
electrocution. An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased. Petitioner, on the
other hand, contended that the deceased could have died either by drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself and not to the electric company. That the deceased installed an
electrical wire enclosing the iron gate and fence to deter the area from burglars.

CFI dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision.

Issue: WON private respondents is barred to recover damages due to the assumption of risk on the part
of the deceased.

Held: No. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave
the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida
Bulong  , the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store
"to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to
protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from
the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when
he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's
property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at
the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as
heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's
negligence.
Torts – Defenses – Due Diligence

Cases:

Placido Ramos and Augusto Ramos VS Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. and Andres Bonifacio GR No. L-22533
February 9, 1967

Facts: The car of Placido Ramos collided with a tractor-truck and trailer of Pepsi Cola. The car of Placido,
at that time, was driven by his son, Augusto Ramos and the truck was driven by Andres Bonifacio. The
Ramoses sued Pepsi Cola for damages.

The CFI rendered judgment, finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. CA affirmed insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by absolving
defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA
sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.

The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to the
effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production
department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background,
asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to
the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination and
second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant
company was a member of the Safety Council. In view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant
company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant
driver'.

Issue: WON Pepsi exercised due diligence in the selection of employee

Held: Yes. PEPSI-COLA did in fact carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to his qualifications,
experiences and record of service. Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA
exercised the required due diligence in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court in Campo vs.
Camarote 53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all
diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record of service."

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia:

... The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

xxx     xxx     xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after the selection, or both; and (2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
Metro Manila Transit Corp. VS. CA and Nenita Custodia GR No. 104408 June 21, 1993

Facts: Nenita Custodio boarded a public utility jeepney then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and
owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work at Dynetics Incorporated located in
Taguig. While the jeepney was travelling, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. driven by defendant Godofredo
C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Roadfor its terminal at Bicutan. As both vehicles approached the
intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed;
neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between
them occurred. The collision caused Nenita to be thrown out of the vehicle. She was brought to the
Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was
confined for twenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and one
half months (31/2).

A complaint for damages was filed against petitioner following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred
by Nenita. Metro Manila Transit presented its training officer and its transport supervisor who testified
that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings, but was
also strict and diligent in supervising employees.

The trial court found both drivers concurrently negligent. As joint tortfeasors, both drivers, as well
as Lamayo (owner of the jeepney) were held solidarily liable for damages sustained by Custodio. MMTC
was absolved on the ground that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising its employees.

CA modified TC’s decision by holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants on the ground
that the testimonies of the training officer and transport supervisor were not enough to overcome the
presumption of negligence; they were not able to present any evidence that its driver has complied with
all the clearances and trainings, and evidence as to the alleged written guidelines of the company.

Issue: WON MMTC exercised due diligence

Held: No. The Court has ruled that due diligence in (the) selection and supervision of employee(s) are
not proved by mere testimonies to the effect that its applicant has complied with all the company
requirements before one is admitted as an employee but without proof thereof.

A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this case reveals that the conclusion of respondent
Court of Appeals is more firmly grounded on jurisprudence and amply supported by the evidence of
record than that of the court below.

It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree
of evidence required by law. 34 In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to
support his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff who is
claiming a right to prove his case. Corollarily, defendant must likewise prove own allegation to buttress
its claim that it is not liable.

While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by
documentary evidence, or even subject evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses'
testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof
that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees. 38 Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and
supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any
other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the
testimony.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed
sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and
policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not
only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation
of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not
sufficient to overcome presumption.
Torts – Defenses – Prescription

Cases:

Ernesto Kramer Jr and Maria Kramer VS CA and Trans-asia Shipping Lines Inc. GR No. L-83524 Oct. 13,
1989

Facts: On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and
Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. The boat collided with an inter-island
vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a
consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.

The captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of
the Philippine Coast Guard. After investigation, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea
and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who
were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The second mate of the M/V Asia
Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.

On May 30, 1985 (9 years after), the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private
respondent before the RTC. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription.
That under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages
arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years.

Petitioners contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons
with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly
analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the
filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when
the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and
that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the
said date.

The trial court went on to say that the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil
Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of the M/V
Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. CA: Withing 4 years from marine accident

Issue: WON the prescriptive period for the filing of complaint has prescribed.

Held: Yes. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.

In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, The right of action accrues when there
exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of
defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law
that a cause of action has arisen ... .

From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element
occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of
the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four
(4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
Allied Banking Corporation VS CA and Joselito Yujuico GR No. L-85868 Oct 13, 1989

Facts: On April 1, 1976, private respondent Joselito Z. Yujuico obtained a loan from the General Bank
and Trust Company in the amount of P500,000. He issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK. At
the time private respondent incurred the obligation, he was then a ranking officer of GENBANK and a
member of the family owning the controlling interest in the said bank.

On March 25,1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 675 forbidding
GENBANK from doing business in the Philippines. This was followed by an order for liquidation. It
appears in the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking and the liquidator, ALLIED acquired
all the assets and assumed the liabilities of GENBANK, which includes the receivable due from private
respondent under the promissory note.

Upon failing to comply with the obligation under the promissory note, petitioner ALLIED filed a
complaint against private respondent for the collection of a sum of money. Private respondent sought to
implead the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano as third-party defendants. It was alleged in the third-
party complaint that by reason of the tortious interference by the Central Bank with the affairs of
GENBANK, private respondent was prevented from performing his obligation under the loan such that
he should not now be held liable thereon.

The trial court denied the third party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer. CA
found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge.

Issues: Is there a proper ground to admit the third-party complaint? assuming that there is, has the
cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed?

Held: The declaration that the liquidation of GENBANK was null and void prompted private respondent
herein to file a third-party complaint against the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano on the theory that
he has a right to proceed against them in respect of ALLIED's claim. In the words of private respondent,
he "[s]eeks to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed
third-party defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his
obligations.10 Thus, if at the outset the issue appeared to be a simple maker's liability on a promissory
note, it became complex by the rendition of the aforestated decision.

As to the issue of prescription, it is the position of petitioner that the cause of action alleged in the third-
party complaint has already prescribed. Being founded on what was termed as tortious interference,"
petitioner asserts that under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delict 15 the action
against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of
action accrued.

Thus, while technically the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed,
however, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the
General Bank to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed
only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be
admitted.
Torts – Defenses – Double Recovery

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)