5-GO V CRUZ (172 SCRA 247) Facts:: Ruling
5-GO V CRUZ (172 SCRA 247) Facts:: Ruling
5-GO V CRUZ (172 SCRA 247) Facts:: Ruling
FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying among others the records of
cases therein kept, including that filed by California against Dante
Go. California filed another complaint asserting the same cause of action
against Dante Go, this time with the Court of First Instance at Caloocan
City. This second suit was docketed as Civil Case No. C-9702 and was assigned
to the branch presided over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz.
Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order. Dante Go filed the present
petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its nullification and
perpetual inhibition. This Court, in turn issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining California, Judge Cruz. The scope of the injunction was
subsequently enlarged by this Court's Resolution to include the City Fiscal of
Manila, who was thereby restrained from proceeding with the case of unfair
competition filed in his office by California against Dante Go.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The petitioner is in error. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to
cause dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's
answer with the Court (either personally or by mail) but the service on the
plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment. This is the plain
and explicit message of the Rules. "The filing of pleadings, appearances,
motions, notices, orders and other papers with the court," according to Section
1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the delivery thereof to the clerk of the
court either personally or by registered mail. Service, on the other hand,
signifies delivery of the pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby
through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is ordered
by the court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal
service, service by mail, or substituted service.
Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila
Court after the filing of Dante Go's answer but before service thereof. Thus
having acted well within the letter and contemplation of the afore-quoted
Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto brought about
the dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, without need of
any order or other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected
without regard to whatever reasons or motives California might have had for
bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, "without
prejudice," the contrary not being otherwise "stated in the notice" and it being
the first time the action was being so dismissed.
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in
the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same claim. The filing of the
complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the
action. In truth, and contrary to what petitioner Dante Go obviously believes,
even if the first action were still pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance
would not affect the jurisdiction of the Caloocan Court over the second suit.
The pendency of the first action would merely give the defendant the right to
move to dismiss the second action on the ground of auter action pendant or litis
pendentia.