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68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-24281. May 16, 1967.

ROSITA C. TALEON and MIGUEL SOLIS, petitioners-

appellants, vs. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE DISTRICT ENGINEER,
Province of Davao, and LUCIA O. TOLENTINO,
respondents-appellees.

Administrative law; Waters; Republic Act No. 2056; No trial is

necessary when only legal issues are raised.—In a certiorari and
prohibition proceeding against the Secretary of

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70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications

Public Works and Communications to review his decision,

ordering the demolition of fishpond dikes, which had closed a
navigable river, only legal issues are involved. Reception of
evidence is not necessary especially considering that the
administrative records f orm part of the record of the court.
Same; Jurisdiction of Secretary of Public Works and
Communications under Republic Act 'No. 2056.—The Secretary of
Public Works and Communications is empowered, under Republic
Act No. 2056, to declare as a public navigable stream any alleged
depression or bodies of water even though they are inside titled
properties. Such fact-finding power is merely incidental to his
duty to clear all navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions.
It does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power.
Same; Streams inside titled land are not subject to
appropriation.—Although a Torrens title is silent as to the
existence of any stream inside private land, that did not confer a
right to the stream since it is of a public nature and not subject to
private. appropriation even by prescription.
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Administrative Law; Judicial review of findings of

Department Secretary.—The review of an administrative finding
is limited to the evidence already presented before the
administrative body. Trial de novo is not allowed. This rule bars
the presentation of evidence aliunde and limits the trial court's
functions to determining whether there is evidence in the
administrative records substantial enough to support the findings
therein.
Same; Proof of nonexistence of decision of Department Head.—
The certification by the Chief of the Records Division of the
Department of Public Works and Communications, that an
alleged second decision of the Department Secretary does not
exist, is sufficient proof that there is no such second decision.
Same; When alleged second decision has no force and effect.—
An alleged second decision by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications has no force and effect where it appears that he
had no jurisdiction to render it because the f irst decision was
under appeal to the President of the Philippines. And, even if he
had jurisdiction, said second decision was deemed revoked when
it was invoked in support of a motion for reconsideration filed in
the Office of the President and the motion was denied. A
unconstitutionality.5 to prove the existence of said second decision
would therefore be a pointless waste of time.
Certiorari; Dismissal after filing of answer.—A petition for
certiorari may be dismissed, even after an answer is filed, where
said petition is found to be patently without merit.
Pre-trial; Judgments.—The trial court may render judgment
on the pleadings or a summary judgment as justice may

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Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications

require, if at the pre-trial it finds that facts exist which would

warrant such judgment.

APPEAL from an order of dismissal rendered by the Court

of First Instance of Manila.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners-appellants.
Tolentino, Amoguis & Madrazo for respondent-appellee
L. O. Tolentino.

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Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor

General Pacifico de Castro and Solicitor C. S. Gaddi for
respondent-appellee Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.

BENGZON, J.P., J,:

Petitioner-appellant Rosita Taleon is the registered owner

of a parcel of land in Lupon, Davao, which she acquired
from her co-petitioner-appellant Miguel Solis who. had
constructed therein man-made canals and fishpond dikes.
On. April 17, 1961, respondent-appellee Lucia Tolentino
wrote a letter-complaint to the Secretary of Public
Works stating that several fishpond operators and/or
owners in Lupon, Davao have built dams across and closed
the Cabatan River, a public navigable stream, thereby
depriving her and the residents therein of passageway,
fishing ground and water supply. This letter-complaint was
formally amended on June 9. 1961, wherein Tolentino
specified appellants Taleon and Solis, and another
neighbor, one Humberto de los Santos, as those responsible
for the closing of the alleged Cabatan River, on the banks
of which their lands abutted. On June 13, 1961, Taleon
filed her answer denying the existence of the alleged river
and claiming that the dams were constructed inside her
registered property and that her water source was a man-
made canal connected to the sea.
An administrative hearing was thereafter held. On July
11, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works, through the
department undersecretary, rendered a decision finding
that appellants were indeed obstructing the Cabatan River,
a public navigable stream which used to pass inside their
lands, with the dams they constructed thereon. and
ordering their demolition. Appellants filed a motion to
recon-
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72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications

sider claiming that the ruling was contrary to the facts

established and that the Secretary had no jurisdiction
over the case. This was denied.
Appellants elevated the case to the Office of the
President on October 11, 1961. After reviewing the records,
said office affirmed on November 10, 1961 the decision of
July 11, 1961. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider based
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on an alleged decision of Public Works Secretary

Moreno rendered on November 24, 1961, reversing the
former ruling of July 11, 1961. On January 10, 1962, the
Office of the President denied the motion, on two grounds:
(1) An official examination of the records of the case
showed that said decision of Secretary Moreno did not
form part thereof, and (2) even if it were genuine, it had no
legal effect since the Secretary had already lost
jurisdiction when appellants filed their appeal to the
President.
On February 9, 1962, Taleon was informed by the
District Engineer of Davao that her dams would be
demolished on February 16, 1962, upon orders of the
Executive Secretary, the administrative decision having
become final and executory. To stop the threatened
demolition, appellants filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Davao against the Public Works Secretary
and the Engineer of Davao. They were able to obtain a writ
of preliminary injunction on February 15, 1962.
On September 1, 1962, appellants filed a similar petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the herein respondents-appellees in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. After the latters' respective
answers were filed and the case in Davao was dismissed,
upon appellants' motion, said Manila court issued the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for, altho in form a
temporary restraining order with bond.
The issues having been joined, a pre-trial conference
was held and the Court of First Instance of Manila allowed
respondents to file a motion to dismiss the petition. Upon
orders of said court, the administrative records were sent
up. On January 11, 1965, acting on the respective
memoranda submitted by the parties in support of and in
opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, the court a quo
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Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications

ruled that appellants were given a fair hearing in the

administrative case and that the decision therein was
supported by the evidence adduced and dismissed the
petition stating:

"WHEREFORE, finding merit in the respondents' Motion to

Dismiss, GRANTED. Let this petition be, as it hereby,
DISMISSED, with costs against petitioners.

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"The temporary restraining order issued on 17 December 1962

is hereby dissolved and the bond filed by petitioners, cancelled."

Taking issue with this ruling, the petitioners instituted the

present appeal, raising questions purely of law. They
submit that the court a quo erred in dismissing the case
without giving them a full trial, thereby depriving them of
the opportunity to prove that the alleged extension of the
Cabatan River passing across their property is but a
depression and that the decision rendered by Secretary
Moreno on November 24, 1961, is genuine. Appellants also
reiterate that the Secretary of Public Works has no
jurisdiction over the case, since the dams and the body of
water in question were located inside registered private
property.
Appellants' contentions are without merit. First of all, a
full trial was not needed. The issues raised before the court
a quo were all purely legal and thus could be resolved on
the basis of the pleadings and memoranda filed and the
administrative records sent up to it. No necessity was there
for further reception of evidence.
Anent the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public
Works, this point has been squarely covered
1
in Lovina v.
Moreno, L-17821, November 29, 1963. There We upheld
the power of the Public Works Secretary under Republic
Act 2056 to declare as a public navigable stream any
alleged depression or bodies of water even inside titled
properties. That case involved a creek, located inside a
titled land, which was alleged to be privately owned. The
Public Works Secretary declared it as part of a public
stream which plaintiffs therein had blocked with their
dams. In sustaining the Secretary, We there ruled that
such fact-finding power on his part was merely incidental
to his duty to clear all navigable

________________

1 See also Borja v. Moreno, L-16487. July 31, 1964.

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Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications

streams of unauthorized obstructions and, hence, its grant

did not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power.
And we remarked there that although the title was silent
as to the existence of any stream inside the property, that
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did not confer a right to the stream, it being of a public

nature and not subject to private appropriation, even by
prescription. 2
Appellants would offer affidavits—which are hearsay —
and testimonies aliunde to show that the alleged Cabatan
River inside their property is really a mere depression, As
also enunciated in Lovina v. Moreno, supra, however, there
cannot be a trial de novo in cases of this nature, since a
review of an administrative finding is limited to the3
evidence already presented before the administrative body.
This rule bars presentation of evidence aliunde and limits
the trial court's functions to determining whether there is
evidence in the administrative records substantial enough
to support the findings therein. Here, the records of the
administrative case were actually brought up and
submitted to the court a quo and it held that the
administrative f inding that the alleged depression was
really a part of the navigable Cabatan River was supported
by substantial evidence. ;Said court fully did its duty, to
have gone further would have been exceeding its power.
Regarding the alleged second decision of the Secretary,
its non-existence has been officially certified by the Chief
of the Records Division of the 4
Department of Public
Works, the official custodian.5 This alone is proof enough
that there is no such decision. But even granting that there
is really such a decision, it would not help appellants' cause
any. Said decision would still be wanting of legal force and
effect since Secretary Moreno had already lost jurisdiction
to revoke the former ruling because of the appeal then
already taken by appellants themselves to the Office of the
President, which affirmed the former ruling. And even

_______________

2 Ismael v. Guanzon, 2 Phil. 347.

3 See also Timbancaya v. Vicente, L-19100, Dec. 27, 1963.
4 Records, p. 221.
5 Sec. 29, Rule 132, Rev. Rules of Court; People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil.
564.

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Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications

conceding jurisdiction, the second decision could still affect

nothing since it was actually revoked and reversed by the
ruling of the Office of the President, dated January 10,
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1962, which denied the motion to reconsider filed by

appellants wherein they invoked said new decision. So, a
full trial to prove the authenticity of the Moreno decision
would be a pointless waste of the court a quo's time.
It is recognized that the trial court may dismiss a
petition for certiorari even after an answer is filed upon a
motion to dismiss, where 6
said petition is found to be
patently without merit. But the court a quo did not
summarily dismiss the petition. It conducted a pre-trial
conference and even ordered the records in the
administrative
7
case to be elevated to it. Now the Rules of
Court authorizes the trial court to render judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment, as justice may require,
if at the pre-trial it finds that facts exist which would
warrant such judgment. All the necessary facts being
already before the court a quo, no further trial was
required. Its decision rendered at that stage was therefore
sanctioned by the Rules.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against petitioners-appellants. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala,

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

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