Corpuz Vs People PDF

G.R. No. 180016. April 29, 2014.*

LITO CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Estafa; The gravamen of the crime of estafa

under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter
fatally defective.—The CA
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* EN BANC.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. People
did not err in finding that the Information was substantially

complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of
form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the
first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the
RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter
fatally defective.
Same; Same; Estafa With Abuse of Confidence; Elements of.—
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a)
that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that
there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
Same; Same; Demand; No specific type of proof is required to
show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it
may be verbal.—No specific type of proof is required to show that
there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be
verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show
that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even
a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case,
property], would be tantamount to a demand.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Settled is the rule that in
assessing the credibility of witnesses, the Supreme Court gives
great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their
deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.—
Anent the credibility of the prosecution’s sole witness, which is
questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the
rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives
great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the
unique opportunity to observe the
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demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness

stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely
rely on the records of the case. The assessment by the trial court
is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of
their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of
evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; There seems to be a
perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed
today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of
money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation.—There seems to be a perceived injustice
brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue
to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on
the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty
years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said
range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure in amending
the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied
through this Court’s decisions, as that would be encroaching upon
the power of another branch of the government. This, however,
does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5,
which reads: ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts
which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law,
and in cases of excessive penalties.—Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress
and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act should be made
the subject of penal legislation. In the same way, the court
shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed
proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence,
when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice

and the injury caused by the offense.
Same; Penalties; For acts bourne out of a case which is not
punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the
remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation.
—For acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law
and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render
the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act
should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that
a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal
legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive
of the need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for
the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The
remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the
execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the
reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked
to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a
legislation to provide the proper penalty.
Same; Courts; The primordial duty of the Court is merely to
apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise
legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise,
amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms.—Verily, the
primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a
way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under
the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which
is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially
when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put,
the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary
function of a co-equal
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branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an

inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by
means of judicial legislation.
Same; Civil Indemnity; In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is
awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was
done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the
civil aspect.—In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the
offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation
to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of
money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to
the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the
value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the
imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the
reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in
some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the
adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article
2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a
ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award
cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil
indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under
Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of
damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court,
depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private
offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to
civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the
award of civil indemnity.
Same; Penalties; Even if the imposable penalty amounts to
cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in
the present action.—Even if the imposable penalty amounts to
cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in
the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the
Corpuz vs. People
State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to
comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
collaterally, more so in the present controversy wherein the issues
never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Cruel and Unusual Punishment; It has long
been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather
than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or
obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like.—It has long been held that the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed
at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or
obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in
the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not
thus be within the prohibition. It takes more than merely being
harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and
unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly
oppressive,” “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the community.” Cruel as it may be,
as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time.
Same; Same; The Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and
lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor
studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised
Penal Code (RPC).—The solution to the present controversy could
not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values
to the present value of money based only on the current inflation
rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken
into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the
said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects
on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic
impact,
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and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon

in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe
should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-
equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to
conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to
validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This
function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress.
Same; Same; It is truly beyond the powers of the Court to
legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the
Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide.—With
due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief
Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to
prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as
extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the
Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress
and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide.
With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to
civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The
same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated,
penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several
other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum
amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum,
increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not
proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Sereno, CJ., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that I concur with the

ponencia in affirming the conviction of petitioner but vote to apply
the penalty for estafa adjusted to the present value of the thing
subject of the offense.—I concur with the ponencia in affirming the
conviction of petitioner but vote to apply the penalty for estafa
adjusted to the present value of the thing subject of the offense.
Considering that the penalty has remained untouched for eighty-
three years, the Court cannot adhere to its literal imposition
without first revisiting the assigned values on which such penalty
was based. The Legislature of 1930 pegged the penalties at the
prevailing value of money at the time of the enactment of the
Revised Penal Code. Apart from its representation as a basket of
goods or as a means of exchange,
Corpuz vs. People
money has no independent value by itself, and that is how the law
has always seen it. Even this outlook must then necessarily affect
our views regarding the liberty of persons and how money affects
it.
Same; Same; Same; View that the legislative intent behind
provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is to create prison
terms dependent upon the value of the property subject of the
crime.—The legislative intent behind provisions of the Revised
Penal Code is to create prison terms dependent upon the value of
the property subject of the crime. A prison term is virtually
monetized, while an individual’s life and well-being hang in the
balance. It is incumbent upon the Court to preserve the intent of
Congress while crucially ensuring that the individual’s liberty is
not impinged upon any longer than necessary. This is distinct
from the situation contemplated under Article 5, par. 2 of the
Penal Code, in which the Court would need to delve into the
wisdom of the law, i.e., the appropriateness of the penalty taking
into account the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense. Thus, the crux of the present case is simple judicial
application of the doctrines that in cases of doubt: 1) the law must
be construed in favor of the accused; 2) it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This duty of
judicial construction is understood to permeate every corner
where the Court exercises its adjudicative function, specifically in
how it expounds on criminal rules. To assume that the Court
would be changing the penalty imprudently leads to a misplaced
apprehension that it dabbles in judicial legislation, when it is
merely exercising its constitutional role of interpretation.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is axiomatic that laws,
customs, public policy and practice evolve with the passage of time;
so too, does monetary valuation.—It is axiomatic that laws,
customs, public policy and practice evolve with the passage of
time; so too, does monetary valuation. Money has no value in and
of itself except that which we assign, making it susceptible to
construction and interpretation. Money is not real in the sense
that it is capable of being indexed. Viewed in this way, human
lives and liberty cannot be made dependent on a mere index of
almost a century ago. I submit that in the present case, the Court
is not even delving into questions of validity of the substance of
the statute. This is no different from the Court’s adjustment of
indemnity in crimes against persons or the determination of
valuation in expropriation cases. We have
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continually checked penalties in criminal cases, adjusted the

amounts of damages and indemnities according to the
appropriateness thereof in light of current times. We have done so
with eyes open, knowing that the adjustments reflect a realization
that the value of the peso has changed over time. If the
purchasing power of the peso was accepted as a “judicially
manageable standard” in those cases, there is no reason for the
Court not to apply it in favor of the accused herein, especially
because it is mandated to do so.
Same; Same; Same; View that I agree with the view of Justice
Roberto A. Abad that while Article 2206 of the Civil Code sets only
a minimum amount, the Court since then has regularly increased
amounts awarded by the lower courts; Pantoja’s recognition of
inflation as a reality — among other instances when the Court has
acknowledged “changed conditions” — only shows that criminal
rules, especially the implementation of penalties, must also evolve.
—I agree with the view of Justice Roberto A. Abad that while
Article 2206 of the Civil Code sets only a minimum amount, the
Court since then has regularly increased amounts awarded by the
lower courts. Tellingly, these decisions and resolutions are not
mere suggestions or guidelines for the trial courts’ exercise of
discretion, but are actual findings of error. Pantoja’s recognition
of inflation as a reality — among other instances when the Court
has acknowledged “changed conditions” — only shows that
criminal rules, especially the implementation of penalties, must
also evolve. As societies develop, become more enlightened, new
truths are disclosed. The Court as an institution cannot ignore
these truths to the detriment of basic rights. The reality is that
property-related crimes are affected by external economic forces,
rendering the penalties vulnerable to these forces.
Same; Same; Same; Pro Reo Rule; View that the rationale
behind the pro reo rule and other rules that favor the accused is
anchored on the rehabilitative philosophy of our penal system.—
The rationale behind the pro reo rule and other rules that favor
the accused is anchored on the rehabilitative philosophy of our
penal system. In People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933), the Court
explained that it is “necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an
individual and, second, as a member of society. This opens up an
almost limitless field of investigation and study which it is the
duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly
possible, with the end in
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view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is

possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative
necessity of protecting the social order.”
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Power;
View that establishing a policy or a rule of preference towards the
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness has always been within the scope of judicial power.—
The imposition of a policy on penalties is not far removed from the
judicial construction exercised in the present case. Establishing a
policy or a rule of preference towards the unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness has
always been within the scope of judicial power.
Statutory Construction; View that in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.—Article 10
of the Civil Code states: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.” The Code Commission
found it necessary to include this provision to “strengthen the
determination of the Court to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized in some way of interpreting the law.”
Constitutional Law; Due Process; View that fear of clogged
dockets and the inconvenience of a perceived distortion are
operational concerns that are not sufficient justification to re-tilt
the scales to the prejudice of the accused.—Fear of clogged dockets
and the inconvenience of a perceived distortion are operational
concerns that are not sufficient justification to re-tilt the scales to
the prejudice of the accused. It does not impact on the fact that by
adjusting the questioned amounts to the present value of money,
the Court would merely be following the mandate of Article 10
and fulfilling its proper constitutional role.
Carpio, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Cruel Punishment Clause; Penalties;
View that the Filipino people who ratified the present Constitution
could not have intended to limit the reach of the Cruel Punishment
Clause to cover torture and other forms of odious punishments
only because
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nearly four decades before the present Constitution took effect, the
Philippine government joined the community of nations in
approving the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in
1948 which bans “torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”—Indeed, the Filipino people who
ratified the present Constitution could not have intended to limit
the reach of the Cruel Punishment Clause to cover torture and
other forms of odious punishments only because nearly four
decades before the present Constitution took effect, the Philippine
government joined the community of nations in approving the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 which
bans “torture or x x x cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.” In 1986, shortly before the Constitution took effect,
the Philippines ratified the International Covenant for Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) containing an identically worded
prohibition. These international norms formed part of Philippine
law as generally accepted principles of international law and
binding treaty obligation, respectively.
Same; Same; Same; View that impermissible
disproportionality is better gauged by testing punishments against
the following alternative parameters: (1) whether more serious
crimes are equally or less severely punished; or (2) whether the
punishment reasonably advances the state interest behind the
penalty.—Impermissible disproportionality is better gauged by
testing punishments against the following alternative
parameters: (1) whether more serious crimes are equally or less
severely punished; or (2) whether the punishment reasonably
advances the state interest behind the penalty. These parameters
strike the proper balance of providing practical tools of
adjudication to weigh claims of cruel punishment while at the
same time affording Congress discretionary leeway to craft penal
statutes addressing societal evils.
Same; Same; Same; View that by imposing a level of
punishment for estafa equal to more serious crimes such as
homicide and kidnapping, Article 315’s system of calibrating the
maximum penalty based on the amount of fraud is plainly
arbitrary and disproportionate to the severity of the crime
punished.—Article 315 of the Code calibrates the maximum
penalty for estafa on an escalated basis once a threshold amount
of fraud is crossed (P22,000). The penalty escalates on a ratio of
one year imprisonment for every P10,000 fraud, with 20 years as
ceiling. Accordingly, for a fraud of P98,000, the trial
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court sentenced petitioner to a maximum term of 15 years. This

punishment, however, is within the range of the penalty
imposable on petitioner under the Code had he “killed the [private
complainant] jeweler in an angry confrontation.” The same
penalty would also be within the range prescribed by the Code
had petitioner kidnapped the private complainant and kept him
detained for three days. By any objective standard of comparison,
crimes resulting in the deprivation of life or liberty are
unquestionably more serious than crimes resulting in the
deprivation of property. By imposing a level of punishment for
estafa equal to more serious crimes such as homicide and
kidnapping, Article 315’s system of calibrating the maximum
penalty based on the amount of fraud is plainly arbitrary and
disproportionate to the severity of the crime punished.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Cruel Punishment Clause
ensures that the state interest is advanced without sacrificing
proportionality between the crime and punishment. In short, the
Clause acts as constitutional brake whenever Congress enacts
punishment whose severity is gratuitous, wholly unconnected to
the purpose of the law.—The penalties of imprisonment and/or
fine attached to each crime are meant to deter and incapacitate
criminals from infringing such right. The Cruel Punishment
Clause ensures that the state interest is advanced without
sacrificing proportionality between the crime and punishment. In
short, the Clause acts as constitutional brake whenever Congress
enacts punishment whose severity is gratuitous, wholly
unconnected to the purpose of the law.
Same; Same; Same; View that the breach of the Cruel
Punishment Clause by Article 315’s system of calculating the
maximum penalty for estafa in excess of P22,000 means that only
the minimum term of imprisonment provided under Article 315 for
such crime can be imposed on petitioner, namely, prisión
correccional in its maximum period.—The breach of the Cruel
Punishment Clause by Article 315’s system of calculating the
maximum penalty for estafa in excess of P22,000 means that only
the minimum term of imprisonment provided under Article 315
for such crime can be imposed on petitioner, namely, prisión
correccional in its maximum period. This level of penalty is
covered by the Indeterminate Sentence Law which renders the
next lower penalty, namely, prisión correccional in its medium
period, as the minimum of the sentence. The entirety of the
sentence will be anywhere within the range of these maximum
and
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minimum penalties. Hence, petitioner’s term of imprisonment

should be modified to three (3) years, one (1) month and eleven
(11) days of prisión correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prisión correccional, as
maximum.
Same; Same; Same; Syndicated Estafa (P.D. No. 1689); View
that the penalty for the felony of syndicated estafa under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689 is an altogether different
matter. PD 1689 amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) by adding a new mode of committing estafa and imposing
the penalty of “life imprisonment to death” or “reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds
P100,000.”—The penalty for the felony of syndicated estafa under
Presidential Decree No. 1689 (PD 1689) is, however, an altogether
different matter. PD 1689 amended Article 315 of the Code by
adding a new mode of committing estafa and imposing the penalty
of “life imprisonment to death” or “reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds P100,000.” Unlike
Article 315, PD 1689 does not calibrate the duration of the
maximum range of imprisonment on a fixed time-to-peso ratio (1
year for every P10,000 in excess of P22,000), but rather provides a
straight maximum penalty of death or reclusion perpetua. This
places PD 1689 outside of the ambit of the proscription of the
Cruel Punishment Clause on the imposition of prison terms
calibrated based on the value of the money or property swindled,
unadjusted to inflation.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Cruel Punishment Clause,
on the other hand, is the constitutional yardstick against which
penal statutes are measured using relevant standards unrelated to
questions of criminal malice and injury.—Testing Article 315
against the Cruel Punishment Clause under the standards
espoused in this opinion does not make a dead letter law of the
second paragraph of Article 5 of the Code. Such provision,
mandating courts to recommend executive clemency — when a
strict enforcement of the provisions of th[e] Code would result in
the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense. (Emphasis supplied) operates within the realm of criminal
law, requiring fact-based judicial evaluation on the degree of
malice of the accused and the injury sustained by the victim or his
heirs. The Cruel Punishment Clause, on the other hand, is the
constitutional yardstick against which penal statutes are meas-
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ured using relevant standards unrelated to questions of criminal

malice and injury. Far from overlapping, the conclusions yielded
by analyses under these two rules are distinct — a penal statute
may well avoid the taint of unconstitutionality under the Clause
but, applying such statute under peculiar set of facts, may justify
a recommendation for the grant of clemency.
Same; Same; Same; View that the constitutional infirmity not
only of Article 315 but also of related provisions in the Code calls
for a comprehensive review by Congress of such 82-year old
legislation.—The constitutional infirmity not only of Article 315
but also of related provisions in the Code calls for a
comprehensive review by Congress of such 82-year old legislation.
Pending such congressional review, this Court should decline to
enforce the incremental penalty in Article 315 because such
continued enforcement of the incremental penalty violates the
Cruel Punishment Clause.
Brion, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; View that what they

propose to do involves an undue and unwarranted invocation of
the Supreme Court’s judicial power — an act that cannot be done
without violating the due process rights of the Republic.—In my
view, what they propose to do involves an undue and
unwarranted invocation of the Court’s judicial power — an act
that cannot be done without violating the due process rights of the
Republic. Notably, the Republic focused solely and was heard only
on the matter of estafa. In fact, the present case is only about
estafa, not any other crime. To touch these other crimes in the
present case likewise involves acts of policy determination on the
substance of the law by the Judiciary — a violation of the highest
order of the limits imposed on us by the Constitution.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; View that in
reviewing criminal cases, we recognize our duty to correct errors as
may be found in the judgment appealed raised by the parties as
errors, regardless of whether they had been made the subject of
assignments of error or not.—I am not unaware that an appeal in
criminal cases throws the case wide open for review, and allows
the reviewing tribunal the power to correct errors or to reverse
the trial court’s decisions on the grounds other than those raised
by the parties as
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errors. In reviewing criminal cases, we recognize our duty to

correct errors as may be found in the judgment appealed
regardless of whether they had been made the subject of
assignments of error or not. This discretion, however, is limited
to situations where the Court intends to correct the trial
court’s errors in applying the law and appreciating the
facts. A quick survey of jurisprudence shows that this includes
reevaluating factual questions presented before the trial court,
weighing the credibility of witnesses and other pieces of evidence
presented before the trial court, or applying the proper penalty.
Same; Same; Same; View that at most, the Supreme Court’s
wide discretion in reviewing criminal cases allows it to motu
proprio provide a proper interpretation of the penal law being
applied.—At most, the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in
reviewing criminal cases allows it to motu proprio provide a
proper interpretation of the penal law being applied. This
discretion, however, does not extend to the power to adjust the
penalty defined in the law, based on the monetary value of the
property involved in the crime of estafa. More than this, the
Court’s discretion does not allow it to similarly adjust the
penalties defined in other crimes, similarly based on the monetary
values of the property involved in these other crimes, as these
other crimes are not involved in the present case. These
crimes and their penalties have neither been adjudicated upon by
the trial court nor by the CA; neither is the “judicial
interpretation” of their penalties necessary to determine whether
Corpuz committed the crime of estafa in the present case.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; View that within
their respective spheres of influence, each department is supreme
and the exercise of its powers to the full extent cannot be
questioned by another department.—Underlying the doctrine of
separation of powers is the general proposition that the whole
power of one department should not be exercised by the same
hands that possess the whole power of the other departments.
Within their respective spheres of influence, each department is
supreme and the exercise of its powers to the full extent cannot be
questioned by another department. Outside of their defined
spheres of action, none of the great governmental departments
has any power, and nor may any of them validly exercise the
powers conferred upon the others.
16
Corpuz vs. People
Same; Same; Judicial Power; View that Section 1, paragraph

2, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judicial power
“includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” as well as to “determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”—Section 1, paragraph 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that judicial power “includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,” as well as to
“determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Traditionally, judicial power has been defined as “the right to
determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,
duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.” It is “the
authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights.”
Same; Same; Same; View that no court can exercise judicial
power unless real parties come before it for the settlement of actual
controversy and unless the controversy is of the nature that can be
settled in a manner that binds the parties through the application
of existing laws.—No court can exercise judicial power unless real
parties come before it for the settlement of actual controversy and
unless the controversy is of the nature that can be settled in a
manner that binds the parties through the application of existing
laws. This traditional concept of judicial power, as the
application of law to actual controversies, reflects the
constitutional imperative of upholding the principle of separation
of powers, such that the Judiciary has no power to entertain
litigations involving the legality, wisdom, or the propriety
of the conduct of the Executive; neither has it the power to
enlarge, alter or repeal laws or to question the wisdom,
propriety, appropriateness, necessity, policy or
expediency of the laws.
Same; Same; Same; View that judicial interpretation of penal
laws should be aligned with the evident legislative intent, as
expressed primarily in the language of the law as it defines the
crime.—On the legislature’s exclusive domain, through
lawmaking, lies the
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Corpuz vs. People
authority to define what constitutes a particular crime in this

jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as representative of the
sovereign people, that determines which acts or combination of
acts is criminal and what the ordained punishments shall be.
Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned with the
evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the language
of the law as it defines the crime.
Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; View that the cardinal
canon in statutory construction — the plain meaning rule or verba
legis — requires that “the meaning of a statute should, in the first
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed; if
the language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.”—The cardinal canon in statutory
construction — the plain meaning rule or verba legis — requires
that “the meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed; if the language
is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms.” In interpreting any statute in the exercise of its
judicial power of applying the law, the Court should always turn
to this cardinal canon before all others. “Courts should always
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there,” and that the legislature
knows “the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly,
and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are
found in the statute.” Thus, when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, and does not yield absurd and
unworkable results, the duty of interpretation, more so of
construction, does not arise; the Court should resort to the canons
of statutory construction only when the statute is ambiguous.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that as the words of
Article 315 are clear, the Court cannot and should not add to or
alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the
face of the law or from legislative history.—The language of the
penalty clauses of Article 315 of the RPC is plain and clear; no
reservation, condition or qualification, particularly on the need for
adjustment for inflation, can be read from the law, whether by
express provision or by implication. The clear legislative intention
to penalize estafa according to the “amount of fraud” as
enumerated in the law, therefore, should be deemed complete —
Article 315 embodies all that the legislature intended when the
law was crafted. As the words of Article 315 are
18
Corpuz vs. People
clear, the Court cannot and should not add to or alter them
to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face
of the law or from legislative history, i.e., to remedy the
perceived grossly unfair practice of continuing to impose on
persons found guilty of estafa the penalties that the RPC
Commission pegged on the value of money and property in 1930.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; View that the
equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances;
The equal protection, however, does not demand absolute equality
under all circumstances.—Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertinently provides: “nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.” The equal protection clause
means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes
in the same place in like circumstances. It demands that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The equal
protection, however, does not demand absolute equality under all
circumstances. The protection recognizes that persons are not
born equal and have varying handicaps that society has no power
to abolish. Thus, the equal protection clause permits reasonable
classifications provided that the classification: (1) rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies
equally to all members of the same class.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that that there has
been no change in the way the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines
fraud and, hence, there should be no reason for a change in the
way a fraudulent act is penalized; A fraud committed in the 1930s
should be punished in the same manner as a fraud committed in
the present day.—The key element in estafa is the fraudulent act
committed that has caused harm to others. Estafa penalizes the
fraudulent act. I submit that there has been no change in
the way the RPC defines fraud and, hence, there should be no
reason for a change in the way a fraudulent act is
penalized. A fraud committed in the 1930s should be punished in
the same manner as a fraud committed in the present day. That
the consequences of the fraudulent act constituted the basis for
determining the gradation of penalties
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Corpuz vs. People
was a policy decision that Congress had the prerogative to make.

This included the value behind each threshold and its
corresponding penalty. What was true then is still true today.
Thus, the disparity between the monetary values of things and
property in the 1930s and the prevailing monetary values of like
things and property do not amount to distinctions so substantial
that they would require this Court to treat and classify Corpuz
differently from persons who committed estafa in 1930.
Statutory Construction; View that resorting to judicial
legislation by construction encroaches into the exclusive domain of
the legislature — a course that clearly violated the constitutional
separation of powers principle.—Even granting arguendo that the
penalty the CA imposed on Corpuz is “grossly unfair” from the
economic and pragmatic point of view (as Justice Abad has
carefully crafted), the solution to this “gross unfairness” is not for
this Court, by itself, to provide. Article 315 of the RPC is plain and
unambiguous and Corpuz’s case falls clearly within its provisions.
Hence, under the circumstances and within the context of this
case, the Court’s duty is simply to apply the law. Resorting to
judicial legislation by construction encroaches into the exclusive
domain of the legislature — a course that clearly violated the
constitutional separation of powers principle.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; Cruel and Unusual
Punishment; View that in determining whether a penalty is cruel
or unusual, we have considered not just the amount taken from the
private injured party, but also considered the crime’s impact on
national policy and order.—In this case, the Solicitor General has
adequately provided the reason for the penalties behind the
estafa, i.e., to protect and encourage the growth of commerce in
the country and to protect the public from fraud. This reason, to
my mind, is sufficient to justify the penalties for estafa. That the
amount taken from the private injured party has grown negligible
through inflation does not ipso facto make the penalty wholly
disproportional. In determining whether a penalty is cruel or
unusual, we have considered not just the amount taken from the
private injured party, but also considered the crime’s impact on
national policy and order. It cannot be gainsaid that the
perpetuation of fraud adversely impacts on the public’s confidence
in our financial system and hinders as well the growth of
commerce.
20
Corpuz vs. People
Abad, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Criminal Law; Penalties; View that as a general principle,
crimes found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) carry with them the
same penalties whatever year the accused commits them.—As a
general principle, crimes found in the Revised Penal Code carry
with them the same penalties whatever year the accused commits
them. For example, one who mutilates a Philippine coin in 1932,
when the code took effect, would go to jail for 2 years and 4
months maximum, exactly the same penalty that another who
mutilates a coin in 2014 would get. The correspondence between
the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty does not
change with the passage of time. But, unwittingly, the penalties
for crimes involving property under the Revised Penal Code are in
breach of that principle. Although these penalties are meant to be
proportionate to the harm caused, they are not described in
specific and constant terms like the number of days of incapacity
for work of the offended party in physical injuries cases.
Same; Same; Incremental Penalties; View that it is not only
the incremental penalty that violates the accused’s right against
cruel, unusual, and degrading punishment. The axe casts its
shadow across the board touching all property-related crimes. This
injustice and inhumanity will go on as it has gone on for decades
unless the Court acts to rein it in.—It is not only the incremental
penalty that violates the accused’s right against cruel, unusual,
and degrading punishment. The axe casts its shadow across the
board touching all property-related crimes. This injustice and
inhumanity will go on as it has gone on for decades unless the
Court acts to rein it in.
Same; Same; Same; View that it may be assumed that those
who enacted the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in 1930 did not foresee
the onslaught of inflation in the second half of the century.—It
may be assumed that those who enacted the Revised Penal Code
in 1930 did not foresee the onslaught of inflation in the second
half of the century. They had an agricultural economy and,
presumably, the purchasing power of the peso at that time had
not changed perceptibly in the years that they had known. It
would be imprudent to believe that, if those legislators had an
inkling of the shape and value of money and things would take
down the years to 2014, they would have still pegged those
penalties to their 1930 economy. But they
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Corpuz vs. People
did. Clearly, they were uninformed and, therefore, their intent

must have been to match the penalties written in the law to the
values of money and property as they understood it at that time.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) need
not rewrite the penalties that the law provides. Rather, the clear
intent of the law can be given by “harmonizing” the law or
“aligning the numerical figures” to the economic realities of the
present.—The Court need not rewrite the penalties that the law
provides. Rather, the clear intent of the law can be given by, to
borrow a phrase from Atty. Mario L. Bautista, counsel for Corpuz,
“harmonizing” the law or “aligning the numerical figures” to the
economic realities of the present. To put it another way,
ascertaining the facts of the case in order to faithfully apply to it
the law as the legislature intended it is a judicial function. Dean
Candelaria of Ateneo shares this position.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Civil Code stands on the
same footing as the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in terms of force
and effect. One is not superior to the other.—Some would say that
Article 2206 of the Civil Code merely governs civil indemnity
whereas Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on penalties for
estafa governs criminal liability, implying that the latter is quite
different. But the Civil Code stands on the same footing as the
Revised Penal Code in terms of force and effect. One is not
superior to the other. The point is that prudent judicial
construction works equally on both codes.
Same; Same; Same; View that in any event, the rule is that in
case of doubt the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are to
be construed in favor of the accused.—In any event, the rule is
that in case of doubt the provisions of the Revised Penal Code are
to be construed in favor of the accused. What has happened,
however, is that the Court has beginning in 1964 construed the
minimum amount set in Article 2206 as subject to adjustment to
cope with inflation although this worked against the accused in
murder and homicide cases. The Court has not come around to
give the same construction to the inflation-affected penalty
provisions of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which would
be favorable to him.
22
Corpuz vs. People
Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Statutory Construction; View that our duty is to interpret the

law. It is a duty reposed on us by the Constitution. We provide
meaning to law’s language and make laws written in a different
historical context relevant to present reality.—I concur with the
ponencia of Justice Diosdado M. Peralta in affirming the
conviction of Lito Corpuz. However, I dissent on the penalty
imposed by the majority. I do not agree that it is judicial
legislation for us to reconsider the range of penalties created by
Congress in 1932. The range of penalties for the crime of estafa
should be recomputed based on present value. Our duty is to
interpret the law. It is a duty reposed on us by the Constitution.
We provide meaning to law’s language and make laws written in
a different historical context relevant to present reality.
Criminal Law; Penalties; View that the purchasing power of
the peso has significantly changed after eight decades, and it is
time that we interpret the law the way it should be: to reflect the
relative range of values it had when it was promulgated. In doing
so, we are not rewriting the law, just construing what it actually
means.—Viewed in this way, I must dissent in the penalty
imposed upon the accused. The pecuniary values that provided
the basis for the range of penalties for the crime of estafa
(swindling) were the values in 1932. It is clear that the gravity of
a crime where someone was defrauded of fifty pesos (P50.00) of
property in 1932 is not the same as the gravity of the same
offense for property worth fifty pesos (P50.00) in 2014. The
purchasing power of the peso has significantly changed after eight
decades, and it is time that we interpret the law the way it should
be: to reflect the relative range of values it had when it was
promulgated. In doing so, we are not rewriting the law, just
construing what it actually means.
Same; Same; View that an interpretation of a legal provision
more beneficial to an accused or a person who is convicted will
have a retroactive effect.—Definitely, an interpretation of a legal
provision more beneficial to an accused or a person who is
convicted will have a retroactive effect. This should be because
such interpretation is corrective in nature. This should not
present extremely debilitating difficulties, and we do not have to
have special rules. The convicted prisoner could simply file habeas
corpus as a post-conviction remedy whenever he or she would
have served more than what would be
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Corpuz vs. People
required based on our new interpretations. It is also possible for

the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Corrections and Parole and
Probation Administration to adopt its own guidelines on the
release of prisoners. This difficulty is not insurmountable.
Same; Same; View that I am not convinced that a ruling that
will affect penalties in other crimes where the gravity is measured
in pesos will present difficulties too debilitating so as to amount to
being unimplementable.—Law has never been a discipline too
autonomous from the other disciplines. The points of view of those
that inhabit the world of economics and finance are not strange to
lawyers. The eyes through which the law views reality should not
be too parochial and too narrow. Our understanding should
instead be open enough to allow us to see more by borrowing from
other disciplines. Doing so enhances rather than weakens judicial
rigor. I am not convinced that a ruling that will affect penalties in
other crimes where the gravity is measured in pesos will present
difficulties too debilitating so as to amount to being
unimplementable. I do not see why courts of law cannot simply
adopt the universally acceptable formula for present value.
Same; Same; View that an interpretative methodology for
penalties is proposed because of the extraordinary lapse of time
from the date of promulgation of the law (1932) to the present.—
An interpretative methodology for penalties is proposed because
of the extraordinary lapse of time from the date of promulgation
of the law (1932) to the present. Definitely, we will not be
recomputing the penalties for all statutes. I am of the view that
the approach for computing the penalties in this case will only be
applicable to statutes that have been promulgated and have not
been amended for no less than the past eight decades. The world
was very different then. A world war intervened. Four different
Constitutions with their corresponding amendments were
promulgated and took effect. There are now more types of
property than could have been imagined at that time.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nini D. Cruz and Mario Luza Bautista for petitioner.
24

Corpuz vs. People
The Solicitor General for respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari,
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5,
2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007
and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b)
of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met
at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime
in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the
business of lending money to casino players and, upon
hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale,
petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same
casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a
consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following
items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman’s bracelet;
one (1) men’s necklace and another men’s bracelet, with an
aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of
even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same
items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired
without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a
member of the Supreme Court), with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico
and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of the Supreme Court),
concurring; Rollo, pp. 31-41.
2 Rollo, p. 43.
3 Id., at pp. 48-52.
25
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 25
Corpuz vs. People
or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private

complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter
promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the
crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received
from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men’s diamond ring, 18k, worth
P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men’s bracelet, 22k, worth
P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies’ bracelet, 22k, worth
P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand
Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed
obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the
sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said
accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to
defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far
from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and
despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to
return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety-Eight
Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage
and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of

his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts,
presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the
other hand, the
26

Corpuz vs. People
defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which

can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting
agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the
financing business of extending loans to Base employees.
For every collection made, they earn a commission.
Petitioner denied having transacted any business with
private complainant. However, he admitted obtaining a
loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was
made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same
receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence
against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject
pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary
mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND
TWO (2) MONTHS of Prisión Correccional in its medium period
AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy
the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
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Corpuz vs. People
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter

denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of
the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed

Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City
(P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on
the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prisión correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prisión mayor, as
maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of
7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for

reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition
stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY
THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE
COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY
DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE
OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE IN THAT —
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE
RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE
REMITTED, IF SOLD;
28

Corpuz vs. People
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME

ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS
MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT
DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD
— AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE — WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION’S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH —
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2)
VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER — ACCUSED IS
MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT
WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN
AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following counter-
arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner

failed to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently
established the designation of the offense and the acts complained
of.
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Corpuz vs. People
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the

crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any

merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are
conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court
affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing
that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the
opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings
of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both
procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the
ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt
dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit “A” and its
submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy,
thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records
show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of
the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and
testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also
correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer
of evidence and even admitted having signed the said
receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed
to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered
as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by
petitioner, the formally defective Information filed against
him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be
returned and
_______________
4 Libuit v. People, 506 Phil. 591, 599; 469 SCRA 610, 618 (2005).
5 Blas v. Angeles-Hutalla, 482 Phil. 485, 501; 439 SCRA 273, 286
(2004).
30

Corpuz vs. People
that the date when the crime occurred was different

from the one testified to by private complainant. This
argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that
the Information was substantially complete and in
reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and
substance in the Information cannot be made for the first
time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of
the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that
the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the
crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong
date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The
CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states

the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject
Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the
time of the commission of the offense was stated as “on or about
the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991” is not likewise fatal to the
prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule
requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a
material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside
from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essen-
_______________
6 Quinto v. People, 365 Phil. 259, 270; 305 SCRA 708, 718 (1999).
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Corpuz vs. People
tial element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the

prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the
Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also
near the due date within which accused-appellant should have
delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance
with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be
allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges
proferred against him.7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of
the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall

defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x x x x
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by
the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of
or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as

follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 37. (Citations omitted)
32

Corpuz vs. People
to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be

misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that
such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made
by the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that
there is a demand by the offended party on the offender,
was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony,
private complainant narrated how he was able to locate
petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he
gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the
same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
Q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this
transaction could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is
what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
A I went looking for him, sir.
Q For whom?
A Lito Corpuz, sir.
Q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
A I looked for him for a week, sir.
Q Did you know his residence?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you go there?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you find him?
A No, sir.
Q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
A I talked to him, sir.
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Corpuz vs. People
Q How many times?

A Two times, sir.
Q What did you talk (sic) to him?
A About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
Q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
A Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I
asked him where the items are and he promised me that he
will pay these amount, sir.
Q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him
partially or full?
A No, sir. 9

No specific type of proof is required to show that there
was demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be
verbal.11 The specific word “demand” need not even be used
to show that it has indeed been made upon the person
charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of
the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to
a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA

that demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or
written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with
regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315, 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a
written demand be necessary, the law would have stated so.
Otherwise, the word “demand” should be inter-
_______________
8 Diaz v. People, 585 Phil. 318, 332; 563 SCRA 322, 335 (2008), citing
Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 670, 675; 321 SCRA 51, 57 (1999).
9 TSN, December 17, 1992, pp. 9-10. (Emphasis supplied)
10 Tan v. People, 542 Phil. 188, 201; 513 SCRA 194, 207 (2007).
11 Id., citing Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250; 455 SCRA 256, 267 (2005).
12 Id.
13 555 Phil. 106; 528 SCRA 114 (2007).
34

Corpuz vs. People
preted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral

demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written
demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally
inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, we held that
the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition
precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so
happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by
other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the

prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the
elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner
the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as
shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation
to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit
the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale
took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry
within or after the agreed period despite demand from the
private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution’s sole witness,
which is questioned by petitioner, the same is
unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to
the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their
deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied
the appellate courts, which
_______________
14 Id., at p. 114; pp. 122-123. (Citations omitted)
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Corpuz vs. People
merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by

the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence, especially when such finding is
affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their
testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of
evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court’s Third Division
was deliberating on this case, the question of the continued
validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes
involving property came up. The legislature apparently
pegged these penalties to the value of the money and
property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code.
Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on
this question and since the issues are of first impression,
they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for
consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae
were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
academic opinions on the matter. Among those that
graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the
Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral
arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L.
Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments
presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:
_______________
15 Cosme, Jr. v. People, 538 Phil. 52, 66; 508 SCRA 190, 206 (2006),
citing People v. Garillo, 446 Phil. 163, 174-175; 398 SCRA 118, 126 (2003).
16 Id., citing Sullon v. People, 500 Phil. 39, 45; 461 SCRA 248, 253
(2005); People v. Bulan, 498 Phil. 586, 598; 459 SCRA 550, 562 (2005).
17 Id., at p. 67; p. 207, citing People v. Gaspar, 376 Phil. 762, 779; 318
SCRA 649, 665 (1999).
36

Corpuz vs. People
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by

the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on
crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty
years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the
said range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure
in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes
cannot be remedied through this Court’s decisions, as that
would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of
the government. This, however, does not render the whole
situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately
presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5,
which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which

should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in
cases of excessive penalties.—Whenever a court has knowledge
of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which
is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be made the subject of
penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.18
_______________
18 Emphasis supplied.
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Corpuz vs. People
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states

that for acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable
by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy
is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is
present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus,
the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the
need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first
except for the situation wherein the act is already
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed
by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the
first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons
why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is
tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need
for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19
Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of
the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the
legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim “nullum crimen,

nulla poena sige lege,” that is, that there can exist no punishable
act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal
statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body
does not deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal
sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish
such act.
_______________
19 Third edition, 1940.
38

Corpuz vs. People
Under the provisions of this Article the Court cannot

suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that
the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could
do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief
Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be
harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the

sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and
retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their
book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited
commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the

humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered with
mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the
wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. “Whether
or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe
enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may
fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the
will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears
that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of
excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment.” A
petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief
Executive.22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in
crimes against property be based on the current inflation
rate
_______________
20 Id., at p. 16. (Emphasis supplied)
21 1997 edition.
22 Id., at p. 93, citing United States v. Valera Ang Y, 26 Phil. 598
(1914); People v. Salazar y Gabriel, 102 Phil. 1184 (1958); Tiu Ua, 51 O.G.
1863; People v. Limaco, 99 Phil. 35 (1956), and People v. Del Rosario y
Natividad, 62 Phil. 824 (1936). (Emphasis supplied)
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Corpuz vs. People
or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00. However, it

would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties,
as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It
must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if
the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against
property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change,
thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited
Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why
the present legislature has not made any moves to amend
the subject penalties in order to conform with the present
times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the
same penalties in order to deter the further commission of
those punishable acts which have increased tremendously
through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the
coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of
Plunder, from its original minimum amount of
P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to
P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered
the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money
Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to
P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and
Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be excessive
compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding
penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties.—Any person guilty of theft shall be

punished by:
1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be im-
40

Corpuz vs. People
posed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than
200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in
its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50
pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos
but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such
value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is
committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of
the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does
not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the
provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding
50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos,
and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger,
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.
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Corpuz vs. People
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is

P6,000.00, the above provision states that the penalty is
prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the
proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the
penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prisión correccional minimum period (2 months
and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that
under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the
same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law,
the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence,
the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium
period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6
months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole
after serving the said minimum period and may even apply
for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum
penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in
its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far
from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it
would seem that the present penalty imposed under the
law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the
crime of Estafa.23
23 Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud

another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to
prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the provisions of this Code,
42

Corpuz vs. People
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to

the valueA of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the
_______________
the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión
correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does
not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud
be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality or anything of
value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so,
even though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal
consideration.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
A(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended
party in blank, and by writing any document above such signature in
blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or of any third person.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property,
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Corpuz vs. People
damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between

the minimumB and the maximum amounts, which is the
basis of
_______________
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits.
(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining
to his art or business.
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without
prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended party may deem
proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty.
(d) [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack of insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence
of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by
R.A. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)]
B(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel,
inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house and
the like without paying therefor, with intent to defraud the proprietor or
manager thereof, or by obtaining credit at hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding
house, lodging house, or apartment house by the use of any false pretense,
or by abandoning or surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from
a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house or apartment
house after obtaining credit, food, refreshment or accommodation therein
without paying for his food, refreshment or accommodation.
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.
(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a
gambling game.
44

Corpuz vs. People
determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too

wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be
commensurate to the act committed and the value of the
thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value
would be modified but the penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to
P2,200,000.00, punished by prisión mayor minimum to prisión
mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to
P1,200,000.00, punished by prisión correccional medium and to
prisión correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to
P600,000.00, punishable by prisión correccional minimum to
prisión correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor medium to prisión correccional
minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor
minimum to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the
value would also be modified but the penalties are not changed, as
follows:
_______________
(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court
record, office files, document or any other papers.
24 May be entitled to Probation.
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Corpuz vs. People
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to

P2,200,000.00, punishable by prisión correccional maximum to
prisión mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to
P1,200,000.00, punishable by prisión correccional minimum to
prisión correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to
P600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prisión
correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one

of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental
penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the
Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among
equals, which is determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four
requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
_______________
25 May be entitled to Probation if the maximum penalty imposed is 6
years.
26 May be entitled to Probation.
27 Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22,
2010, 613 SCRA 385, 414.
28 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).
46

Corpuz vs. People
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty

Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as
P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is
not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was
devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher
amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is
no longer achieved, because a person who steals
P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone
who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second
requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering
that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time
the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist
today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of
Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in
Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be
applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of
the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the
proposition poses more questions than answers, which
leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate
remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to
exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court
declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to
Congress. Thus:
x x x x
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental
penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional because
it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel
and unusual punishment.
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Corpuz vs. People
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if
the amount is more than Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will
declare the incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then
that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at
One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in
excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you
were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I
get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of
statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal
wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as
unconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...
48

Corpuz vs. People
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in
excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1)
year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x 29
_______________
29 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 192-195.
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Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the

Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Citing,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United
States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the
application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the
penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that
three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is
proportional to a specific crime, viz.: (1) Compare the
nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less
serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in
the present case, because in Solem what respondent
therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state
court of South Dakota after it took into account the latter’s
recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a
“no account” check. Normally, the maximum punishment
for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and
a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under
South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior
felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem
are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it
is true that the imposable penalty for the offense is high.
Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher
penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the
commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely
abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a
member of the
_______________
30 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
50
Corpuz vs. People
household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection

and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and
properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so
repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher
penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of the
crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create
serious implications. For example, in the crime of
Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount
of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property;

Presumption of malversation.—Any public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property,
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount
involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than
twelve thousand pesos
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Corpuz vs. People
but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount

exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer
the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the
total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use.
The above provisions contemplate a situation wherein
the Government loses money due to the unlawful acts of
the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount
now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years
4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be
commensurate to the act of embezzlement of P20,000.00
compared to the acts committed by public officials
punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically
Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the gov-
_______________
31 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the
official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced,
or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
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Corpuz vs. People
ernment is not generally defined by any monetary

amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32
under the
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,

present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between
the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in
his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for
another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any
manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or
obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the
help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of
this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept
employment in a private enterprise which has pending official
business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year
after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request,
without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on
any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter
some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the
purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in
favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract
or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
(h) Directly or indirectly having financing or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection
with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or
in which he is
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Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be

the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public
official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle
the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of
Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited)
where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act
of unlawful
_______________
prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or
having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval
of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises
discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not
participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public
officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or
irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they
belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or
benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to
such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or
dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character,
acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to
unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its
authorized release date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit
referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public
officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the
divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in
subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public
officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be
permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court,
from transacting business in any form with the Government.
32 R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 9.
54

Corpuz vs. People
entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in

Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or
fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole
basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing
unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force
employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an
inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to
Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery
because the former is punishable by prisión correccional in
its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00
(P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to
the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the
main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of
Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a
penalty of prisión mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if
the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine
despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is
the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under
Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed is
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2
months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage
caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the
value of the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100),
and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day
to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property
does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a
fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and
not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not
exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal,
P200.00 will now become P20,000.00, which simply means
that the fine of P200.00 under the existing law will now
become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this
situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature
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despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light

felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there
will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but
changing the same through Court decision, either expressly
or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally
feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling
in the RPC that may also be affected by the proposal, such
as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a
penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit:
Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library
and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real
property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article
313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316
(Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a
minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special
cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or
damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other
crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected,
such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury
and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited
Transactions), Article 216 (Possession of prohibited
interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219
(Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts
before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes
under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are
punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or
Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting
and possessing timber
_______________
33 Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.—A fine,
whether imposed as a single of as an alternative penalty, shall be
considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional
penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos;
and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.
34 REVISED FORESTRY CODE, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277, SERIES OF 1987.
56

Corpuz vs. People
or other forest products without license as an offense as

grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35
Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the
Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty
imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of
the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now,
if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will
this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in
so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is
dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer
is in the negative because the soundness of this particular
law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under
the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and other
related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and
necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that
should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no
position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of
the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the
applicability of the penalties imposable in the present
times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but
of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public
hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who,
after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend
or to revise the questioned law or
_______________
35 Taopa v. People, 592 Phil. 341, 345; 571 SCRA 610, 614 (2008).
36 Art. 310. Qualified theft.—The crime of theft shall be punished by
the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of
the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
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other laws, or even create a new legislation which will

adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent
need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During the oral
arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that
at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate
seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one
proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws
that were promulgated decades ago when the political,
socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different
from today’s conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to
apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp
legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the
course of such application or construction, it should not
make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or
rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is
repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in
a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit,
especially when the law is clear as to its intent and
purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from
encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch
of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers
by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is,
technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a

crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
_______________
37 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, p. 167.
38 People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505, 548; 259 SCRA 191, 227-228 (1996).
58

Corpuz vs. People
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating

circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to
the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person
causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the

offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction
that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense
only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity.
Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the
penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the
accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to
the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin
to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the
basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain
crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil
indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same
reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested
ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law
only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil
indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide
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Corpuz vs. People
for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the
award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded
as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased
when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily,
moral damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also
does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It
is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The
amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil
indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the
award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law
for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh,
being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive
or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be
left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to
apply the law, especially when they are clear and not
subject to any other interpretation than that which is
plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice
Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the incremental penalty
provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the
courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the
amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however, from
now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all
crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the
appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted
of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from
the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic
twist in the application of the law
_______________
39 Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
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Corpuz vs. People
has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the

law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was
reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the
Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940
in December 1993. The said law has been questioned before
this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel
than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death
penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by
Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede the
imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a
“cruel punishment” within the purview of Section 19(1),42
Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through
an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death
penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the
intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel
punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates
unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it
violative of due process, considering that the State and the
concerned parties were not given the opportunity to
comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be
pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the
present contro-
_______________
40 AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES,
AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
41 AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
42 Section 19.
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x.
43 Gutierrez v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. Nos.
153266, 159007, 159029, 170084, 172713, 173119, 176477, 177990, A.M.
No. 06-4-02-SB, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 1, 25.
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versy wherein the issues never touched upon the

constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the
form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel
or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping
post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the
wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and
plainly oppressive,” “wholly disproportionate to the nature
of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.”45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the
Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern
time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be
solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values
to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that
need to be taken into consideration, researched, and
deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately
and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the
injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and
the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed
upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us
believe should be made to our
_______________
44 People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 (1953); People v. Tongko, 353
Phil. 37, 43; 290 SCRA 595, 601-602 (1998).
45 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 (1953); People v. Dionisio, No. L-
15513, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1299, 1301-1302.
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Corpuz vs. People
existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no

resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public
hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect
these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function
clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even
Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
x x x x
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to
determine the value of Peso you have to take into
consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine
those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine
Peso can be determined utilizing all of those economic
terms.
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JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme
Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred
(P100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in
order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a power that
belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria

Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of the
Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active
duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent
injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not
impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago,
but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply
compensating for infla-
_______________
46 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 183-185.
64

Corpuz vs. People
tion. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into

consideration “changed conditions” or “significant changes
in circumstances” in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court
is not delving into the validity of the substance of a statute.
The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of
indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had
previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the
case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil
Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced
by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals
ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of
being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is
truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such
immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should
refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to
civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil
liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of
money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as
earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of
money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law
is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded
and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount
granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be
adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present
case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC
imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisión correccional in its medium period,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
However, the
_______________
47 No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468.
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Corpuz vs. People
CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and

two (2) months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prisión mayor, as maximum, plus one (1)
year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of seven (7)
years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this
Court’s ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly
instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the

Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall
be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum
period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two,
not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code
requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three
equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming
one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter
provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
penalty prescribed are:
_______________
48 Supra note 15.
66

Corpuz vs. People
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20
days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10
days49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor
minimum should be divided into three equal portions of
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one
period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the
present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, which
exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable
should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years of prisión mayor. Article 315 also
states that a period of one year shall be added to the
penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess
of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which
may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is
P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law,
then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prisión mayor minimum would be increased by 7
years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty,
which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum
of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
_______________
49 Id., at pp. 71-72; p. 212.
50 ART. 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of
Three Periods.—In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not
composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in
the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions the time included
in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three
portions.
51 People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574
SCRA 258, 284.
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Corpuz vs. People
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the

penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against
petitioner is prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be
prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance
to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court
should not preempt Congress and usurp its inherent
powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the
most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on
prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby
DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22,
2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prisión correccional, as
minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a
Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of
Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
68

Corpuz vs. People
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., Perez,

Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Brion, J., See: Concurring Opinion.
Bersamin, J., I take no part due to prior action in the
CA.
Del Castillo, J., I join the dissent of J. Abad.
Abad, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., No part.
Leonen, J., I Dissent re penalties, see Separate
Opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, CJ.:
The measure of a just society depends not only on how it

apprehends and punishes the guilty. It also lies in the
dignity and fairness it collectively accords convicted
persons who, irrevocably, are still members of that society.
The duty of the Court in this case is not only to dispense
justice, but to actively prevent injustice wrought by
inaction on the question of the continued justness of the
penalties under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
I concur with the ponencia in affirming the conviction of
petitioner but vote to apply the penalty for estafa adjusted
to the present value of the thing subject of the offense.
Considering that the penalty has remained untouched for
eighty-three years, the Court cannot adhere to its literal
imposition without first revisiting the assigned values on
which such penalty
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Corpuz vs. People
was based. The Legislature of 1930 pegged the penalties at

the prevailing value of money at the time of the enactment
of the Revised Penal Code. Apart from its representation as
a basket of goods or as a means of exchange, money has no
independent value by itself, and that is how the law has
always seen it. Even this outlook must then necessarily
affect our views regarding the liberty of persons and how
money affects it.
My colleagues have presented differing approaches
supported by equally keen arguments. However, were we to
take the convenient route of mechanical application, we
would be perpetuating an erroneous result from lamentable
inaction. Would this Court abdicate its duty at the risk of
endangering the right to liberty of the accused? In the past,
the Court has never shirked from its role of interpreting
the law, always with a careful consideration of its
minimum burden: to prevent a result that is manifestly
unjust. That the fundamental right to life and liberty is
made to depend solely on Congress or the mere passage of
time with respect to an omission is a result the Court
should not be prepared to accept.
The legislative intent behind provisions of the Revised
Penal Code is to create prison terms dependent upon the
value of the property subject of the crime. A prison term is
virtually monetized, while an individual’s life and well-
being hang in the balance. It is incumbent upon the Court
to preserve the intent of Congress while crucially ensuring
that the individual’s liberty is not impinged upon any
longer than necessary. This is distinct from the situation
contemplated under Article 5, par. 2 of the Penal Code,1 in
which the Court would need to delve into the wisdom of the
law, i.e., the appropriateness of
_______________
1 “In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed
proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition
of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.”
70

Corpuz vs. People
the penalty taking into account the degree of malice and

the injury caused by the offense.
Thus, the crux of the present case is simple judicial
application of the doctrines that in cases of doubt: 1) the
law must be construed in favor of the accused; 2) it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. This duty of judicial construction is
understood to permeate every corner where the Court
exercises its adjudicative function, specifically in how it
expounds on criminal rules. To assume that the Court
would be changing the penalty imprudently leads to a
misplaced apprehension that it dabbles in judicial
legislation, when it is merely exercising its constitutional
role of interpretation.
Adjusting the amounts to the pre-
sent value of money recognizes that
money is simply an assigned repre-
sentation, similar to the Court’s
ruling in People v. Pantoja.
Ruling in accordance with “felt necessities of the time”2
or in recognition of considerably changed circumstances is
not a novel judicial approach. In Central Bank Employees v.
BSP, the Court posed this question: Can a provision of law,
initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional on
the ground that its continued operation would violate the
equal protection of the law? The Court thus considered the
legal effect of the passage of time, stating:
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary

or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former
adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of
changed conditions. x x x.
_______________
2 From the first of 12 Lowell Lectures delivered by Oliver Wendell Holmes on
November 23, 1880.
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Corpuz vs. People
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued

enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a “consequence
of significant changes in circumstances.” In Rutter v. Esteban, We
upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law — despite its
enactment and operation being a valid exercise by the State of its
police power — but also ruled that the continued enforcement of
the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive.
The Court noted the subsequent changes in the country’s
business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside
because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory
and lead to the oppression of the creditors.”3
It is axiomatic that laws, customs, public policy and

practice evolve with the passage of time; so too, does
monetary valuation. Money has no value in and of itself
except that which we assign, making it susceptible to
construction and interpretation. Money is not real in the
sense that it is capable of being indexed. Viewed in this
way, human lives and liberty cannot be made dependent on
a mere index of almost a century ago.
I submit that in the present case, the Court is not even
delving into questions of validity of the substance of the
statute. This is no different from the Court’s adjustment of
indemnity in crimes against persons or the determination
of valuation in expropriation cases. We have continually
checked penalties in criminal cases, adjusted the amounts
of damages and indemnities according to the
appropriateness thereof in light of current times. We have
done so with eyes open, knowing that the adjustments
reflect a realization that the value of the peso has changed
over time. If the purchasing power of the peso was accepted
as a “judicially manageable standard” in those cases, there
is no reason for the Court not to apply it in favor of the
accused herein, especially because it is mandated to do so.
_______________
3 487 Phil. 531, 564; 446 SCRA 299, 348-349 (2004).
72

Corpuz vs. People
In People v. Pantoja, concerning compensatory damages

for death, the Court explained this adjustment in
uncomplicated terms:
In 1948, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso was one-

third of its pre-war purchasing power. In 1950, when the New
Civil Code took effect, the minimum amount of compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict was fixed in
Article 2206 of the Code at P3,000. The article repealed by
implication Commonwealth Act No. 284. Hence, from the time the
New Civil Code took effect, the Courts could properly have
awarded P9,000 as compensatory damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict. It is common knowledge that from 1948 to
the present (1968), due to economic circumstances beyond
governmental control, the purchasing power of the Philippine
peso has declined further such that the rate of exchange now in
the free market is U.S. $1.00 to almost 4.00 Philippine pesos. This
means that the present purchasing power of the Philippine peso is
one-fourth of its pre-war purchasing power. We are, therefore, of
the considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now
be P12,000.”4
I agree with the view of Justice Roberto A. Abad that

while Article 2206 of the Civil Code sets only a minimum
amount, the Court since then has regularly increased
amounts awarded by the lower courts. Tellingly, these
decisions and resolutions are not mere suggestions or
guidelines for the trial courts’ exercise of discretion, but are
actual findings of error.5
Pantoja’s recognition of inflation as a reality — among
other instances when the Court has acknowledged
“changed conditions” — only shows that criminal rules,
especially the implementation of penalties, must also
evolve. As societies develop, become more enlightened, new
truths are disclosed.
_______________
4 134 Phil. 453; 25 SCRA 468 (1968).
5 Decision, p. 137.
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Corpuz vs. People
The Court as an institution cannot ignore these truths to

the detriment of basic rights. The reality is that property-
related crimes are affected by external economic forces,6
rendering the penalties vulnerable to these forces.
It is a basic constitutional doc-
trine that the slightest doubt must
be resolved in favor of the accused.
The constitutional mandate is that the Court must
construe criminal rules in favor of the accused. In fact, the
slightest doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused.7
This directive is moored on the equally vital doctrine of
presumption of innocence.8 These principles call for the
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient.9 Time
and again, courts harken back to the pro reo rule when
observing leniency, explaining: “The scales of justice must
hang equal and, in fact should be tipped in favor of the
accused because of the constitutional presumption of
innocence.”10
This rule underpins the prospectivity of our penal laws
(laws shall have no retroactive application, unless the
contrary is provided) and its exception (laws have
prospective application, unless they are favorable to the
accused).11 The pro reo rule has been applied in the
imposition of penalties, specifically the death penalty12 and
more recently, the proper
_______________
6 Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Comment, 30 September 2013.
7 People v. Milan, 370 Phil. 493, 506; 311 SCRA 461, 474 (1999).
8 1987 CONSTITUTION, Sec. 14(2) states, “In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.”
9 Mediatrix Carungcong as Administratrix v. People of the Philippines,
et al., G.R. No. 181409, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 272.
10 People v. Opida, 226 Phil. 218, 226; 142 SCRA 295, 303 (1986).
11 Boado, Leonor, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, p. 7
(2008).
12 For a crime committed in 1987, the Court refused to reimpose the
death penalty under Republic Act 7659. (People v. Bracamonte, 327 Phil.
160; 257 SCRA 380 [1996]).
74

Corpuz vs. People
construction and application of the Indeterminate Sentence

Law.
The rationale behind the pro reo rule and other rules
that favor the accused is anchored on the rehabilitative
philosophy of our penal system. In People v. Ducosin, the
Court explained that it is “necessary to consider the
criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of
society. This opens up an almost limitless field of
investigation and study which it is the duty of the court to
explore in each case as far as is humanly possible, with the
end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but
fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard
to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order.”13
Thus, with the same legislative intent to shorten a
defendant’s term of imprisonment embodied in the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, I believe the adjustment of
penalties considered in the present case forwards the
State’s concern “not only in the imperative necessity of
protecting the social organization against the criminal acts
of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the
individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.”14
This approach would be more in accord with the pro reo
rule and the overarching paradigm of our penal system.
In past instances, the Court has
not only laid down guidelines but
made actual policy determinations
for the imposition of penalties.
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing
Checks Law imposes the penalty of imprisonment of thirty
days to one year OR a fine double the amount of the check,
or both, at the court’s discretion. In Vaca v. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court deleted the penalty of
imprisonment meted
_______________
64 59 Phil. 109 (1933).
65 Id., at p. 117.
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Corpuz vs. People
out by the trial court and imposed only the penalty of fine,
reasoning:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino

entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national
economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all
good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have
accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation
to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal
justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion
allowed by Section 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due
regard to the protection of the social order. In this case, we believe
that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check
involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the
petitioners.15
The Court did not expressly make a finding that the

trial court erred in exercising its discretion, but stated that
correcting the penalty would best serve the ends of criminal
justice. This policy was applied in Lim v. People,16 which
imposed only the fine under B.P. Blg. 22. The Court then
issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which states:
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of

the foregoing policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the
imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The Court
Administrator shall cause the immediate dissemination of this
Administrative Circular to all courts and judges concerned.
_______________
15 359 Phil. 187; 298 SCRA 656 (1998).
16 394 Phil. 844; 340 SCRA 497 (2000).
76

Corpuz vs. People
This Administrative Circular, referred to and approved by the
Supreme Court En Banc, shall take effect upon its issuance.17
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 further clarifies

that: “The clear tenor and intention of Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in
the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22
x x x such that where the circumstances of both the offense
and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition
of a fine alone should be considered as the more
appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of
whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
alone rests solely upon the Judge.”18
Hence, the imposition of a policy on penalties is not far
removed from the judicial construction exercised in the
present case. Establishing a policy or a rule of preference
towards the unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness has always been within
the scope of judicial power.
Article 10 of the Civil Code
mandates a presumption that
the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.
Article 10 of the Civil Code states: “In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.” The Code Commission found it necessary to
include this provision to “strengthen the determination of
the Court to avoid an
_______________
17 Issued on 21 November 2000.
18 The issuance of this Administrative Circular was authorized by the
Court En Banc in A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC at its session on 13 February
2001.
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Corpuz vs. People
injustice which may apparently be authorized in some

way of interpreting the law.”19
In Salvacion v. Central Bank, the Court warned: “In our
predisposition to discover the “original intent” of a statute,
courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little
do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are
bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers.
Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be
out of tune and irrelevant to our day.” Salvacion involved
the rape of a minor by a foreign tourist and the execution of
the final judgment in the case for damages on the tourist’s
dollar deposit accounts. The Court refused to apply Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or
any other order or process of any court, because “the law
failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing
outright injustice and inequality such as the case
before us.”20 Applying Article 10, the Court held: “In fine,
the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. x x x Simply stated, when the statute is silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that
would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.”21
The majority view states that to embark on this
formulation is dangerous, uncertain, or too taxing. Yet even
counsel for the House of Representatives admits that
inflation can be taken into consideration, and that the
values to be used in the conversion are easily available.
There is sufficient basis — through the efforts of the
authorized statistical organizations22 and Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, who collect data year to year — that viably
establish the purchasing power of the peso.
_______________
19 Report of the Code Commission, p. 78.
20 343 Phil. 539; 278 SCRA 27 (1997).
21 Id., citing Padilla v. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377 (1943).
22 Pursuant to Republic Act 10625, the National Statistics Office
(NSO) is now incorporated into the Philippine Statistical Authority, along
with the National Statistical Coordination Board and other agencies.
78

Corpuz vs. People
More importantly, fear of clogged dockets and the

inconvenience of a perceived distortion are operational
concerns that are not sufficient justification to re-tilt the
scales to the prejudice of the accused. It does not impact on
the fact that by adjusting the questioned amounts to the
present value of money, the Court would merely be
following the mandate of Article 10 and fulfilling its proper
constitutional role.
I therefore vote to affirm the conviction of petitioner, but
to impose the penalty adjusted to present value, as
proposed by Justice Abad.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I vote to grant the petition in part by declaring
unconstitutional that portion of the first paragraph of
Article 315 of Act No. 3815, as amended (Code), mandating
the imposition of maximum penalty based on the amount of
the fraud exceeding P22,000. I do so on the ground that
imposing the maximum period of the penalty prescribed in
Article 3151 of the Code in such a manner, unadjusted to
inflation, amounts to cruel punishment within the purview
of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution.2
_______________
1“Swindling (estafa)—Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to
prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
2 “Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x.”
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Cruel Punishment Clause Bans

Odious and Disproportionate Punishments
The Cruel Punishment Clause first appeared in the

English Bill of Rights of 16893 which mandated that
“excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
The prohibition restrained the King from punishing
convicts in ways inconsistent with human dignity.4 Over a
century later, the Americans adopted the Clause as the
Eighth Amendment5 to their Bill of Rights of 1791. When
the United States acquired these Islands in 1898 under the
Treaty of Paris (following the defeat of Spain in the
Spanish-American War), the Eighth Amendment was
extended to this jurisdiction, first under President
McKinley’s Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission and later under the Organic Acts passed by
the US Congress.6 The Clause was retained as part of the
Bill of Rights of succeeding Philippine Constitutions during
the Commonwealth and post-independence eras.
Early on, the question arose whether the Clause serves
only to limit the legislature’s power to inflict certain forms
of punishment (e.g., torture) or whether it also prohibits
the legislature from imposing punishments whose extent is
excessive or disproportionate to the crime.7 It did not take
long for the US Supreme Court to settle the debate. In
reviewing a 1902 ruling of this Court sentencing an
accused to 15 years of
_______________
3 Enacted on 16 December 1689.
4 Thus, it is thought that “the principle it represents can be traced back
to the Magna Carta.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
5 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
6 The Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Autonomy Act of 1916.
7 For an exhaustive historical treatment of the subject, see Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258-269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
80
Corpuz vs. People
cadena temporal with fine and accessory penalties8 for

falsification of a public document, the US Supreme Court
set aside the judgment, holding that the punishment was
“cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which
accompanies and follows the imprisonment.”9 In refusing to
give a narrow interpretation to the Clause, that court
observed that the “meaning and vitality of the Constitution
have developed against narrow and restrictive
10
construction.” Proportionality is now a staple analytical
tool in the US jurisdiction to test claims of cruel
punishment under penal statutes imposing the death
penalty.11
Our own jurisprudence subscribe to such construction of
the Cruel Punishment Clause. During the US colonial
occupation, this Court was expectedly bound by the US
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
as “the exact language of the Constitution of the United
States [in the Eighth Amendment] is used in the Philippine
Bill [of 1902]”12 and later, in the Autonomy Act of 1916.
Hence, in its rulings interpreting the Clause, the Court
read the provision as a
_______________
8 Deprivation of civil rights during service of sentence and post-service
perpetual deprivation of political rights.
9 Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910).
10 Id., at p. 373.
11 In the sense that aggravating circumstances (qualifying a class of
criminals for the death penalty) and mitigating circumstances (tempering
sentences) must be legislated and carefully weighed. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) and progeny, e.g.,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Buchanan v.
Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
12 U.S. v. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279, 286 (1923). In Weems, the US
Supreme Court was more direct to the point: “[T]he provision of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment, was taken from the Constitution of the United States and
must have the same meaning.” Weems v. U.S., supra note 9 at p. 367.
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Corpuz vs. People
limitation on the power of the colonial legislature not

only on the form but also on the extent of punishments it
can enact.13
During the Commonwealth period, the text of the Eighth
Amendment was substantially adopted as Section 1(19),
Article III of the 1935 Constitution.14 Owing in no small
measure to the dearth of discussion on the meaning of the
Clause during the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention, the Court saw no reason to deviate from its
colonial-era jurisprudence.15
_______________
13 U.S. v. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279 (1923); People v. Constantino,
No. L-19290, 11 January 1923 (Unrep.); U.S. v. Pico, 18 Phil. 386
(1911). Pico and Constantino dwelt on the question of extent
(severity) of the punishment as criterion for breaching the Clause.
After reviewing extant relevant authorities we observed in
Borromeo:
In view of these authorities, and the fact that the legislature
invariably endeavors to apportion a penalty commensurate with
the offense, and that course, in the exercise of such discretion as
is conferred upon them in fixing penalties within minimum and
maximum degrees, adhere to the same rule, it seems to us that to
assert, when the question assumes the dignity of a constitutional
inquiry, that courts should not concern themselves with the
relative magnitude of the crime and the penalty, is wrong, both in
logic and in fact. A contrary view leads to the astounding result
that it is impossible to impose a cruel and unusual punishment so
long as none of the old and discarded modes of punishment are
used; and that there is no restriction upon the power of the
legislative department, for example, to prescribe the death
penalty by hanging for misdemeanor, and that the courts would
be compelled to impose the penalty. Yet such a punishment for
such crime would be considered extremely cruel and unusual by
all right-minded people. (U.S. v. Borromeo, supra at p. 289
[emphasis supplied]).
14 “Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted.”
15 People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 (1953); People v.
Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 (1953); People v. Dionisio, 131 Phil. 409; 22
SCRA
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Corpuz vs. People
The 1973 Constitution, replacing the 1935 Charter,

retained the Clause as part of the Bill of Rights.16 The
Court, however, had no occasion to pass upon any matter
calling for the interpretation of the Clause until after the
new Constitution, which carried over the Clause as Section
19(1) of Article III, took effect in February 1987. In its post-
1987 jurisprudence, the Court continued to rely on its
rulings rendered under the 1935 Constitution.17
Clearly then, the proposition that the Cruel Punishment
Clause limits the legislature’s power to inflict certain forms
of punishments only, allowing it to impose penalties
disproportionate to the offense committed, runs counter to
the grain of decades-old jurisprudence here and abroad.
Such interpretation, which rests on a strict originalist
reading of the Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution,18
never gained traction in the United States19 and it makes
no sense to insist that such view applies in this
jurisdiction.
_______________
1299 (1968). In his commentary on the 1935 Constitution, Dean Sinco
considered the Clause as “fobid[ding] punishments greatly
disproportionate to the offense.” V. SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, p. 674
(1954).
16 Under Section 21, Article III (“Excessive fines shall not be imposed,
nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.”)
17 Baylosis v. Chavez, 279 Phil. 448; 202 SCRA 405 (1991); People v.
Tongko, 353 Phil. 37; 290 SCRA 595 (1998); and Lim v. People, 438 Phil.
744; 390 SCRA 194 (2002) all citing People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 (1953)
and People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 (1953) (for Lim and Tongko).
Although these cases emphasize the “form only” school of thought, all
relied on pre-1973 jurisprudence recognizing disproportionality as ground
for breaching the Clause.
18 Adherents of this school of thought insist that the Eighth
Amendment forbids only “those modes or acts of punishment that had
been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted” in 1791. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 339 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also D. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
19 Consistent with its interpretative approach in Weems, the US
Supreme Court considers the Eighth Amendment to “draw its mean-
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In the first place, the US Constitution, unlike our

present Constitution, has essentially remained unchanged
since its adoption in 1787 (save for the inclusion of the Bill
of Rights in 1791 and other later piecemeal amendments).
The 1987 Constitution is already the third in the 20th
century, following the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution
and the 1973 Martial Law Constitution.20 When the
present Constitution was ratified in 1987, nearly two
millennia after the US adopted the Eighth Amendment,
the Filipino people who voted for its approval could not
have intended Section 19(1) of Article III to embody the US
originalists’ interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. It is
more consistent with reason and common sense to say that
the Filipino people understood the Clause to embrace
“cruel, degrading and inhuman” punishments in its 20th
century, Filipino conception, grounded on their collective
experiences and sense of humanity.
Indeed, the Filipino people who ratified the present
Constitution could not have intended to limit the reach of
the Cruel Punishment Clause to cover torture and other
forms of odious punishments only because nearly four
decades before the present Constitution took effect, the
Philippine government joined the community of nations in
approving the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) in 1948 which bans “torture or x x x cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”21 In
1986, shortly before the Constitution took effect, the
Philippines ratified the International Covenant for Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) containing an identically
_______________
ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, supra note 4 at p. 101.
20 At the close of the 19th century, the Philippine revolutionary
government adopted the Malolos Constitution in 1899 which, however,
was short-lived and largely symbolic.
21 Article 5 of the UDHR, approved by the UN General Assembly on 10
December 1948.
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Corpuz vs. People
worded prohibition.22 These international norms formed

part of Philippine law as generally accepted principles of
international law23 and binding treaty obligation,
respectively.24
Standards to Determine Impermissible
Disproportionality
This Court has had occasion to devise standards of
disproportionality to set the threshold for the breach of the
Cruel Punishment Clause. Punishments whose extent
“shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of
reasonable people”25 or
_______________
22 Article 7 of the ICCPR, ratified by the Philippines on 23 October
1986.
23 Although the UDHR is a nonbinding instrument, this Court treated
the UDHR as embodying generally accepted principles of international
law, hence, forming part of the law of the land under the 1935
Constitution’s Incorporation Clause (Section 3, Article II of the 1935
Constitution, reiterated in Section 3, Article II of the 1973 Constitution).
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951); Borovsky v. Commissioner
of Immigration, 90 Phil. 107 (1951); Chirskoff v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 90 Phil. 256 (1951). The provision was retained in the 1987
Constitution (Section 2, Article II).
24 These norms are buttressed by the Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment which
entered into force on 26 June 1987 and to which the Philippines acceded
on 18 June 1986. The Convention binds states parties to “take effective
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction” (Article 2) and “prevent in
any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture” as
defined in the Convention (Article 16).
25 Supra note 12 at p. 286. A variation sets the standard at
disproportionality which “shock[s] the moral sense of all reasonable men
as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.” (People v. De la
Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 [1953], citing Am. Jur. 178) or which “shock[s] the
moral sense of the community” (People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 [1953]
[Res.] citing 24 C.J.S. 1187-1188).
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“[are] flagrantly and plainly oppressive”26 are considered

violative of the Clause.27 Other than the cursory mention of
these standards, however, we have made no attempt to
explore their parameters to turn them into workable
judicial tools to adjudicate claims of cruel punishment.
Even if we did, it would have been well-nigh impossible to
draw the line separating “cruel” from legitimate
punishments simply because these standards are overly
broad and highly subjective.28 As a result, they ratchet the
bar for the breach of the Clause to unreasonably high
levels. Unsurprisingly, no litigant has successfully
mounted a challenge against statutes for violation of the
Clause.29
_______________

26 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 (1953) (Res.) citing 24 C.J.S.
1187-1188, cited in People v. Dionisio, 131 Phil. 409; 22 SCRA 1299 (1968);
Baylosis v. Chavez, 279 Phil. 448; 202 SCRA 405 (1991); People v. Tongko,
353 Phil. 37; 290 SCRA 595 (1998) and Lim v. People, 438 Phil. 749; 390
SCRA 194 (2002).
27 The following passage from Estoista, relying on the American legal
encyclopedia Corpus Juris Secundum, has become the template for
rejecting claims of cruel punishment using these standards:
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. “The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.” (24 C.J.S.
1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly
oppressive,” “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community.” (Idem.) Id.
28 The standard of public outrage (“shock[ing to the] public sentiment”
or “shock[ing to the] moral sense of the community”) is no different from
that which “shocks the most fundamental instincts of civilized man.”
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 473 [1947]) (Burton,
J., dissenting) which “[invites] the danger of subjective judgment x x x
acute[ly],” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972), (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
29 The following typifies the analysis for rejecting claims of cruel
punishment using the standards laid down in Estoista and related cases:
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Corpuz vs. People
Impermissible disproportionality is better gauged by

testing punishments against the following alternative
parameters: (1) whether more serious crimes are equally or
less severely punished; or (2) whether the punishment
reasonably advances the state interest behind the
penalty.30 These parameters strike the proper balance of
providing practical tools of adjudication to weigh claims of
cruel punishment while at the same time affording
Congress discretionary leeway to craft penal statutes
addressing societal evils.
Value-based, Maximum Penalty Calibration Under
Article 315 Disproportionate to the Crime of Estafa
More Serious Crimes Equally
Punished as Estafa
Article 315 of the Code calibrates the maximum penalty
for estafa on an escalated basis once a threshold amount of
fraud is crossed (P22,000). The penalty escalates on a ratio
of one year imprisonment for every P10,000 fraud, with 20
years as ceiling.31 Accordingly, for a fraud of P98,000, the
trial court sentenced petitioner to a maximum term of 15
years.
_______________
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel,
degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is
flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes
more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the
Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the
penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel
and degrading. Lim v. People, 438 Phil. 749, 754; 390 SCRA 194, 198
(2002) (internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied).
30 Save for some modification, these are drawn from the “principles”
crafted by Mr. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. in his Concurring Opinion
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274-277, 279-282 (1972), to aid in the
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
31 See note 1.
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This punishment, however, is within the range of the

penalty imposable on petitioner under the Code had he
“killed the [private complainant] jeweler in an angry
confrontation.”32 The same penalty would also be within
the range prescribed by the Code had petitioner kidnapped
the private complainant and kept him detained for three
days.33 By any objective standard of comparison, crimes
resulting in the deprivation of life or liberty are
unquestionably more serious than crimes resulting in the
deprivation of property.34 By imposing a level of
punishment for estafa equal to more serious crimes such as
homicide and kidnapping, Article 315’s system of
calibrating the maximum penalty based on the amount of
fraud is plainly arbitrary and disproportionate to the
severity of the crime punished.
Maximum Penalty for Estafa
Unrelated to its Purpose
The felonies defined and penalized under Title 10, Book
Two of the Code, as amended, as crimes against property,
including estafa under Article 315, are legislative measures
safeguarding the right to property of private individuals
and the state.35 The penalties of imprisonment and/or fine
at-
_______________
32 Decision, pp. 39-40. Under Article 249 of the Code, homicide is
punishable by reclusion temporal which ranges from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years, with the medium term ranging from
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months.
33 Under Article 268 of the Code, Slight Illegal Detention is also
punishable by reclusion temporal.
34 This merely reflects the ordering of rights under our constitutional
system with the right to life and liberty occupying a higher tier of
protection than the right to property (thus claims of infringement of each
right are subjected to different levels of scrutiny). See Ermita-Malate
Hotel & Motel Operations, Ass’n., Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, 127
Phil. 306, 324; 20 SCRA 849, 860 (1967).
35 Save for the crime of estafa by issuing underfunded or unfunded
checks which has been recognized as serving to ensure the
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Corpuz vs. People
tached to each crime are meant to deter and incapacitate

criminals from infringing such right. The Cruel
Punishment Clause ensures that the state interest is
advanced without sacrificing proportionality between the
crime and punishment. In short, the Clause acts as
constitutional brake whenever Congress enacts
punishment whose severity is gratuitous, wholly
unconnected to the purpose of the law.
Of the more than two dozen crimes originally defined by
Congress in Title 10, Book Two of the Code,36 only two
crimes, estafa and theft, consider the amount of the
property involved to calibrate the maximum range of the
penalty. All the rest either impose penalties irrespective of
the amount of the property involved37 or provide a
threshold amount based on the property involved for the
imposition of a straight (as opposed to calibrated)
penalty.38 Crucially, the calibration does not take into
account the real value of the peso.
Admittedly, Congress has ample discretion to fix
penalties in the Code according to its best light. At the time
the Code took effect in 1932, when US$1.00 was equivalent
to P1.00, the system of calibrated penalty under Article 315
based on the amount appropriated arguably stayed clear of
the Cruel Punishment Clause. After 82 years, however,
when the real value of the peso has depreciated
substantially with the current rate of US$1.00 to P40.00,
an estafa of P142,000 in 1932, meriting a 20-year penalty,
should today require P5.6 million
36 The provisions relating to the crime of arson were superseded by

Presidential Decree (PD) Nos. 1613 and 1744.
37 E.g., robbery and related crimes (Articles 294, 295 and 297);
brigandage (Article 306) and arson and related crimes (Articles 320-323,
as amended by PD 1613 and PD 1744).
38 E.g., occupation of real property (Article 312); swindling of a minor
(Article 317); removal, sale, or pledge of mortgaged property (Article 319)
and special cases of malicious mischief (Article 328).
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to merit a 20-year penalty. Put differently, P142,000 in

1932 is worth only P3,55039 today, which should merit only
a maximum penalty of six months and one day to two years
and four months imprisonment.40 The enormous disparity
in the values of fraud between these points in time
(exceeding 100%) and the imposition of the same level of
maximum punishment in both instances remove any
semblance of reasonability in the manner by which the
punishment is derived and its connection to the purpose of
the law. The arbitrary differential treatment of estafa (and
theft) crosses the line separating the exercise of valid
legislative discretion and the Cruel Punishment Clause.
This conclusion stands notwithstanding our holding in
People v. Tongko41 and Lim v. People42 that the system of
calculating the maximum penalty under Article 315 does
not offend the Cruel Punishment Clause. Those cases
involved paragraph 2(d) of Article 315, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 818 (PD 818),43 penalizing as
estafa the issuance of unfunded or underfunded checks (not
paragraph 1(b), the provision violated by petitioner). Our
conclusion in those cases was grounded on the fact that
criminalizing the issuance of bouncing checks reasonably
advances the state interest behind the law, that is,
ensuring the stability of commercial and banking
transactions.44 Such state interest is not
_______________
30 P142,000÷40=P3,550.
40 Article 315, paragraph 3.
41 353 Phil. 37; 290 SCRA 595 (1998).
42 438 Phil. 744; 390 SCRA 794 (2002).
43 Increasing the maximum penalty for such estafa to 30 years.
44 From Tongko:
The legislature was not thoughtless in imposing severe penalties for
violation of par. 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The history
of the law will show that the severe penalties were intended to stop the
upsurge of swindling by issuance of bouncing checks. It was felt that unless
aborted, this kind of estafa “. . . would erode the people’s confidence in the
use of negotiable in-
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Corpuz vs. People
implicated here. The clause in Article 315 petitioner
violated, penalizing the failure to return property delivered
in trust for disposition, secures the entirely different
government interest of protecting private property. To
consider Tongko and Lim as binding precedents, precluding
a different conclusion, is to expand their ratio decidendi
beyond the facts presented in those cases.
Penalty Imposable under Article 315
The breach of the Cruel Punishment Clause by Article
315’s system of calculating the maximum penalty for estafa
in excess of P22,000 means that only the minimum term of
imprisonment provided under Article 315 for such crime
can be imposed on petitioner, namely, prisión correccional
in its maximum period. This level of penalty is covered by
the Inde-
_______________
struments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result
in the retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the
banking system of the country.” [Citing the “Whereas” Clauses of PD 818].
People v. Tongko, supra note 41 at p. 44; p. 602 (emphasis supplied).
From Lim:
Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and
degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the
repression of an evil that undermines the country’s commercial and
economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people
from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not increase the
amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount
is immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the
proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks.
Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed,
we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the
Constitution. Lim v. People, supra note 42 at p. 755; p. 199 (emphasis
supplied).
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terminate Sentence Law45 which renders the next lower

penalty, namely, prisión correccional in its medium period,
as the minimum of the sentence.46 The entirety of the
sentence will be anywhere within the range of these
maximum and minimum penalties. Hence, petitioner’s
term of imprisonment should be modified to three (3) years,
one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prisión correccional,
as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven
(11) days of prisión correccional, as maximum.
The same range of penalty applies to all other persons
found guilty of violating Article 315. Thus, whether an
estafa involves money or property worth P22,000 or P1
million, the minimum term of imprisonment under Article
315 — prisión correccional in its maximum period — will
be imposed on the accused.
The penalty for the felony of syndicated estafa under
Presidential Decree No. 1689 (PD 1689) is, however, an
altogether different matter. PD 1689 amended Article 315
of the Code by adding a new mode of committing estafa47
and imposing the penalty of “life imprisonment to death” or
“reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of
the fraud exceeds P100,000.” Unlike Article 315, PD 1689
does not calibrate the duration of the maximum range of
imprisonment on a fixed time-to-peso ratio (1 year for every
P10,000 in excess of P22,000), but rather provides a
straight maximum penalty of death or reclusion perpetua.
This places PD 1689 outside of the ambit of the
proscription of the Cruel Punishment Clause on the
imposition of prison terms calibrated based on the
_______________
45 Republic Act No. 4103, as amended.
46 Article 61(2), Code.
47 “[B]y a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out” estafa involving “money contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, ‘samahang
nayon(s),’ or farmers association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.” (Section 1)
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Corpuz vs. People
value of the money or property swindled, unadjusted to

inflation.
Effect of Ruling on Convicts

Serving Time under Article 315
This opinion relieves petitioner of the harsh effect of the

penalty for estafa under Article 315 by lowering the entire
range of imprisonment and monetary liability of petitioner
or imposing only the minimum range of imprisonment,
respectively. It is akin to our 1956 ruling in People v.
Hernandez48 decriminalizing rebellion complexed with
ordinary crimes to the benefit not only of the accused in
that case but also of those already serving time for
rebellion complexed with other crimes.49 Hernandez and
today’s ruling amount to laws favoring convicts, which,
under Article 22 of the Code, have retroactive effect.50
Convicts benefitting from such ruling and falling within
the terms of Article 22 may invoke it in their favor and, if
proper, avail of remedies to secure their release from
detention.
Conclusion not Precluded by Article 5 of the Code
Testing Article 315 against the Cruel Punishment
Clause under the standards espoused in this opinion does
not make a dead letter law of the second paragraph of
Article 5 of the
_______________
48 People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956); People v. Lava, 138 Phil.
77; 28 SCRA 72 (1969).
49 Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 147 Phil. 362; 37
SCRA 420 (1971).
50 “Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who
is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.”
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Code. Such provision, mandating courts to recommend

executive clemency —
when a strict enforcement of the provisions of th[e] Code would

result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense. (Emphasis supplied)
operates within the realm of criminal law, requiring

fact-based judicial evaluation on the degree of malice of the
accused and the injury sustained by the victim or his heirs.
The Cruel Punishment Clause, on the other hand, is the
constitutional yardstick against which penal statutes are
measured using relevant standards unrelated to questions
of criminal malice and injury. Far from overlapping, the
conclusions yielded by analyses under these two rules are
distinct — a penal statute may well avoid the taint of
unconstitutionality under the Clause but, applying such
statute under peculiar set of facts, may justify a
recommendation for the grant of clemency.51
Legislative Review of Article 315

and Related Provisions Overdue
The constitutional infirmity not only of Article 315 but

also of related provisions in the Code calls for a
comprehensive
_______________
51 The Court made such recommendation in People v. Monleon, 165
Phil. 863; 74 SCRA 263 (1976), where the accused, while inebriated,
unintentionally killed his wife in the course of disciplining their child. We
explained: “[C]onsidering that Monleon had no intent to kill his wife and
that her death might have been hastened by lack of appropriate medical
attendance or her weak constitution, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
appears to be excessive. A strict enforcement of the provisions of the Penal
Code means the imposition of a draconian penalty on Monleon.” Id., at p.
870; p. 270. Under Article 246 of the Code, parricide is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.
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Corpuz vs. People
review by Congress of such 82-year old legislation.52
Pending such congressional review, this Court should
decline to enforce the incremental penalty in Article 315
because such continued enforcement of the incremental
penalty violates the Cruel Punishment Clause.
Accordingly, I vote to (1) GRANT the petition in part by
modifying the sentence imposed on petitioner Lito Corpuz
to three (3) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of
prisión correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of prisión correccional, as
maximum; and (2) DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
that portion of the first paragraph of Article 315 of Act No.
3815, as amended, mandating the imposition of maximum
penalty based on the amount of the fraud exceeding
P22,000, for being violative of Section 19(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I agree with the ponencia’s conclusion that Lito Corpuz

is guilty of the crime of Estafa as the facts and the evidence
sufficiently established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I also support the majority’s decision not to “judicially
interpret” the penalties imposed under Article 217
(Malversation of Public Funds or Property), Articles 299-
303 (Robbery), Articles 308-309 (Simple Theft), Article 310
(Qualified Theft), Articles 315-318 (Estafa and other forms
of Swindling), Articles 320-325 (Arson), and Articles 327-
329 (Mischiefs) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), by
adjusting, for inflation, the value of the money or property
(subject of the crime) to its 1930 value.
My reasons for supporting the ponencia are as follows:
_______________
52 The Code was approved on 8 December 1930 but took effect on 1
January 1932.
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First, the Court has no jurisdiction to determine the

propriety of imposing the penalties prescribed under the
other crimes in the RPC.
Second, modifying the penalties, as several of my
esteemed colleagues have proposed, is not judicial
interpretation that simply looks at the letter and spirit of
the law; it is judicial legislation that unconstitutionally
(and thus, illegally) breached the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Third, the present day application of the 1930 values
will not result in the denial of Corpuz’s right to equal
protection of the law.
Fourth, the constitutionally and legally permissible
solution to the perceived disparity between the prescribed
penalty and the crime in light of the present values of
money and property is the grant, by the President of the
Philippines, of executive clemency through pardon or
parole.
Fifth, the minority’s position can, in effect, lead to
repercussions that could potentially destabilize the
application of our penal laws and jurisprudence, as well as
further clog the Court’s already congested dockets.
Lastly, I cannot agree with the expressed opinion that
the incremental penalty imposed on estafa is
unconstitutional for being a cruel and unusual punishment;
like the rest of the majority, I believe that no such effect
occurs under the present law and its application.
I. The Court has no jurisdiction to de-
termine the propriety of imposing the
penalties prescribed under other crimes
in the RPC
The dissenting opinion of Justice Abad, as supported by
several other justices, sought to adjust for inflation the
amounts involved in estafa; by so doing, he also sought to
“judicially interpret” the subject matter of the crimes of
malversation, theft, qualified theft, arson and mischiefs.
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Corpuz vs. People
In my view, what they propose to do involves an undue

and unwarranted invocation of the Court’s judicial power
— an act that cannot be done without violating the due
process rights of the Republic. Notably, the Republic
focused solely and was heard only on the matter of estafa.
In fact, the present case is only about estafa, not any other
crime. To touch these other crimes in the present case
likewise involves acts of policy determination on the
substance of the law by the Judiciary — a violation of the
highest order of the limits imposed on us by the
Constitution.
I am not unaware that an appeal in criminal cases
throws the case wide open for review, and allows the
reviewing tribunal the power to correct errors or to reverse
the trial court’s decisions on the grounds other than those
raised by the parties as errors.1 In reviewing criminal
cases, we recognize our duty to correct errors as may be
found in the judgment appealed regardless of whether they
had been made the subject of assignments of error or not.
This discretion, however, is limited to situations
where the Court intends to correct the trial court’s
errors in applying the law and appreciating the
facts. A quick survey of jurisprudence shows that this
includes re-evaluating factual questions presented before
the trial court,2 weighing the credibility of witnesses and
other pieces of evidence presented before the trial court,3 or
applying the proper penalty.4
_______________
1 People of the Philippines v. Salva, 424 Phil. 63, 75; 373 SCRA 55, 64-
65 (2002).
2 Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 253, 272; 266 SCRA 281, 301
(1997).
3 Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil. 650, 663; 419 SCRA 514, 522
(2004).
4 Quemuel v. Court of Appeals, et al., 130 Phil. 33, 35-36; 22 SCRA 44,
46 (1968).
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Corpuz vs. People
Thus, at most, the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in

reviewing criminal cases allows it to motu proprio provide a
proper interpretation of the penal law being applied. This
discretion, however, does not extend to the power to adjust
the penalty defined in the law, based on the monetary
value of the property involved in the crime of estafa.
More than this, the Court’s discretion does not allow it
to similarly adjust the penalties defined in other crimes,
similarly based on the monetary values of the property
involved in these other crimes, as these other crimes
are not involved in the present case. These crimes and
their penalties have neither been adjudicated upon by the
trial court nor by the CA; neither is the “judicial
interpretation” of their penalties necessary to determine
whether Corpuz committed the crime of estafa in the
present case.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, the validity of
Justice Abad’s arguments regarding the disproportionality
of the penalties defined in these crimes (as the intrinsic
value of the money in properties involved have significantly
dropped), we still cannot ipso facto apply the adjustments
he seeks in the present estafa case, to the other crimes. The
proportionality issue in estafa is different from the
proportionality issue in these other crimes, as each crime is
different from another.
Let me point out that there are considerations in
determining whether a penalty is proportional to crimes
other than the monetary value of the property involved.
The perpetration of fraud, the key element in estafa, is not
present in theft or arson, while the abuse of public office is
a unique key element in malversation. We cannot make a
uniform ruling adjusting the amounts involved in these
crimes simply based on inflation and without considering
the other factors that Congress considered in imposing the
values of the property involved in these crimes. This
conundrum again shows that the judicial interpretation
espoused by the minority is actually a judicial usurpation
of Congress’ prerogative to define crimes and to determine
their penalties.
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Corpuz vs. People
II. The enduring constitutional and

jurisprudential imperative upholding the
separation of powers completely abhors
any unwarranted intrusion and imper-
missible usurpation of the authority and
functions of a co-equal branch
A characteristic and cardinal principle that governs our
constitutional system is the separation of powers.5 The
Constitution does not expressly provide for the principle of
separation of powers. Instead, it divides the governmental
powers among the three branches — the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary. Under this framework, the
Constitution confers on the Legislature the duty to make
the law (and/or alter and repeal it), on the Executive the
duty to execute the law, and on the Judiciary the duty to
construe and apply the law.6
Underlying the doctrine of separation of powers is the
general proposition that the whole power of one
department should not be exercised by the same hands that
possess the whole power of the other departments.7 Within
their respective spheres of influence, each department is
supreme and the exercise of its powers to the full extent
cannot be questioned by another department. Outside of
their defined spheres of action, none of the great
governmental departments has any power, and nor may
any of them validly exercise the powers conferred upon the
others.8
Section 1, paragraph 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that ‘‘judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and such lower courts as may be established by law.”
_______________
5 See Defensor-Santiago, M., Constitutional Law, Text and Cases, Vol.
I, p. 163 (2000).
6 Id., at pp. 169-170, citing U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922).
7 Id., at p. 164.
8 Id., at p. 194, citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
(1936).
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Corpuz vs. People
Simply stated, what the Constitution confers on the Court

is only “judicial power” and it is this judicial power that
serves as the measure of the permissible reach of the
Court’s action.9 In short, the Judiciary can neither make
the law nor execute it, as its power is strictly confined to
the law’s interpretation and application, i.e., to what is
aptly termed “judicial” power.
II.A. Judicial power; its scope and limitations
Section 1, paragraph 2, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that judicial power “includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable,” as well as to
“determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Traditionally, judicial power has been defined as “the
right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
jurisdiction.”10 It is “the authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or
the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights.”11
In this light, no court can exercise judicial power unless
real parties come before it for the settlement of actual
controversy and unless the controversy is of the nature that
can be settled in a manner that binds the parties through
the application of existing laws.12 This traditional concept
of judicial power, as the application of law to actual
controver-
_______________
9 Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines:
A Commentary, p. 946 (2009).
10 Id., at p. 946, quoting Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
11 Id., quoting Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).
12 Id., at pp. 946-947.
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Corpuz vs. People
sies, reflects the constitutional imperative of upholding the

principle of separation of powers, such that the Judiciary
has no power to entertain litigations involving the
legality, wisdom, or the propriety of the conduct of
the Executive; neither has it the power to enlarge,
alter or repeal laws or to question the wisdom,
propriety, appropriateness, necessity, policy or
expediency of the laws.13
While the Constitution has now extended the scope of
judicial power beyond the mere application of law and the
settling of disputes (as it now includes the duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government),
this expanded scope does not still permit any inquiry into
the conduct or act of either of the executive or the
legislative branch other than to determine whether either
branch violated the Constitution or gravely abused its
discretion in a manner amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
II.B. The power to define crimes and
their penalties lies in the legisla-
ture as an imperative of the prin-
ciple of separation of powers
On the legislature’s exclusive domain, through
lawmaking, lies the authority to define what constitutes a
particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as
representative of the sovereign people, that determines
which acts or combination of acts is criminal and what the
ordained punishments shall be.14 Judicial interpretation of
penal laws
_______________
13 See Defensor-Santiago, M., Constitutional Law, Text and Cases, Vol.
I, pp. 586-587 (2000).
14 See Valenzuela v. People, 552 Phil. 381, 414; 525 SCRA 306, 342
(2007); and Laurel v. Judge Abrogar, 518 Phil. 409, 432-433; 483 SCRA
243, 266 (2006).
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Corpuz vs. People
should be aligned with the evident legislative intent, as

expressed primarily in the language of the law as it defines
the crime.15
As the Constitution vests the power to enact laws on the
legislature, the courts cannot arrogate the power to enlarge
the scope of the crime, introduce matters that the
legislature clearly did not intend, redefine a crime in a
manner that does not hew to the statutory language,16 or
modify the penalty to conform to the courts’ notion (out of
the innumerable number of notions) of justice and fairness.
A becoming regard for the prerogative of Congress in
defining crimes/felonies should prevent the Court from
making any broad interpretation of penal laws where a
“narrow interpretation” is appropriate.17 “The Court must
take heed to language, legislative history and purpose, in
order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the
conduct the law forbids.”18
II.C. “Plain meaning rule” in statutory
construction should be applied in
reading Article 315 of the RPC
The cardinal canon in statutory construction — the
plain meaning rule or verba legis — requires that “the
meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be sought
in the language in which the act is framed; if the language
is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.”19 In interpreting any statute in the
exercise of its judicial power of applying the law, the Court
should always turn to this cardinal canon before all others.
“Courts should always pre-
_______________
15 Valenzuela v. People, supra at p. 414; p. 342.
16 Id., at pp. 414-415; id.
17 Id., at p. 415; id.
18 Laurel v. Judge Abrogar, supra note 14 at p. 433; p. 267, citing
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985); and Valenzuela v. People,
supra note 14 at p. 415; p. 342.
19 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
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Corpuz vs. People
sume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and

means in a statute what it says there,”20 and that the
legislature knows “the meaning of the words, to have used
them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of
such words as are found in the statute.”21
Thus, when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity,22 and does not yield absurd and unworkable
results,23 the duty of interpretation, more so of
construction, does not arise;24 the Court should resort to
the canons of statutory construction only when the statute
is ambiguous.25
Interpretation, as understood in the rules of statutory
construction, refers to the art of finding out the true sense
of any form of words, or the sense which their author
intended to convey.26 Construction, on the other hand,
refers to the art of drawing conclusions from matters
beyond the direct expressions of text, from elements known
from and given in the text,
_______________
20 Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, (1992); and
Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. Hon.
Inciong, etc., et al., 217 Phil. 629, 642-643; 132 SCRA 663, 673 (1984).
21 Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v.
Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI), G.R. No. 177333,
April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 658, 665.
22 Cebu Portland Cement Company v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, et
al., 133 Phil. 695, 699; 24 SCRA 708, 712 (1968).
23 Funa, Dennis B., Canons of Statutory Construction, p. 215 (2011),
citing CONN. GEN. STAT. Par. 1-2z, 2007.
24 See Catiis v. Court of Appeals (17th Division), 517 Phil. 294, 303-
304; 482 SCRA 71, 82 (2006).
25 Funa, Dennis B., Canons of Statutory Construction pp. 214-215
(2011), citing CONN. GEN. STAT. Par. 1-2z, 2007.
26 Id., at pp. 4-5, citing Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the
Construction and Interpretation of the Laws (1896). See also Black’s Law
Dictionary (Fifth edition), p. 734.
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Corpuz vs. People
or conclusions that are in spirit, but not within the

text,27 where the intention is rendered doubtful, among
others, because the given case is not explicitly provided for
in the law28 or because the words used are obscure or
susceptible to numerous interpretations. Both these two
terms, however, have no place in the present case as
the meaning of the penalties imposed is clear and
needs neither construction nor interpretation.

II.D. The ‘‘plain meaning rule” and
the principle of separation of
powers prevent this Court from
modifying, by adjusting for in-
flation, the penalties under Arti-
cle 315 of the RPC
The language of the penalty clauses of Article 315 of the
RPC is plain and clear; no reservation, condition or
qualification, particularly on the need for adjustment for
inflation, can be read from the law, whether by express
provision or by implication. The clear legislative intention
to penalize estafa according to the “amount of fraud” as
enumerated in the law, therefore, should be deemed
complete — Article 315 embodies all that the legislature
intended when the law was crafted.
As the words of Article 315 are clear, the Court cannot
and should not add to or alter them to accomplish a
purpose that does not appear on the face of the law
or from legislative history,29 i.e., to remedy the
perceived grossly unfair practice of continuing to impose on
persons
_______________
27 Id., citing Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction
and Interpretation of the Laws (1896). See also Black’s Law Dictionary
(Fifth edition), p. 283.
28 Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar, No. L-19650, September 29,
1966, 18 SCRA 247, 256.
29 See Burden v. Snowden, 2 Cal. 4th 556 (1992).
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Corpuz vs. People
found guilty of estafa the penalties that the RPC

Commission pegged on the value of money and property in
1930.
Notably, in his approach in the present case, Justice
Abad labors under the presumption that the RPC
Commission intended that the penalties under Article 315
of the RPC should adopt and reflect the values of money
and property prevailing at the time of the commission of
the crime; hence, his position that the “amount of fraud”
should be adjusted for inflation.
I find this approach and the resulting position
manifestly flawed; Justice Abad effectively posits that the
“amount of fraud” as the basis of the penalty will
significantly vary at each instance as this will depend on
such factors as the kind or type of the thing or property
subject of the crime, and its corresponding monetary value
at the time of the commission of the crime. The monetary
value, in turn, will depend on several variables affecting
the economy. To my mind, these are clearly matters of fact
and policy determination that are far beyond the scope of
judicial power.
In fact, a review of several amendatory statutes of
Article 315 of the RPC reveals a legislative intent contrary
to Justice Abad’s proposition that the RPC Commission
intended that the “amount of fraud” as basis for the
penalties should account for the inflation.
In point are the following: (1) Presidential Decree No.
818 (enacted in October 22, 1975) increased the penalties in
cases of estafa resulting from bouncing checks under
Article 315(2)(d); and (2) Presidential Decree No. 1689
(enacted on April 6, 1980) increased the penalty for certain
forms of estafa under Articles 315 and 316. These statutes
increased the penalties for estafa under certain conditions
despite the then already declining monetary value on
account of inflation.
Arguably, the Court had in the past (as in the cases
cited by Justice Abad) resorted to interpretation of
monetary values to cope with inflation. These instances,
however, con-
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Corpuz vs. People
cerned awards of civil liability and moral damages for

death.30 These cases involved civil damages awards that
are in stark contrast with the penalty issue that faces this
Court in the present petition. In fact, the Historical Notes
of the RPC Commission31 shows the law’s concern for the
heirs of the deceased (victim) as the force that impelled the
legislature to increase the civil indemnity by statute;32 the
Court simply took judicial notice of this concern in
interpreting the monetary values in the cited cases.
Moreover, Justice Abad’s presumption patently deviates
from the rule of progressive interpretation that “extends by
construction the application of a statute to all subjects or
conditions within its general purpose or scope that come
into
_______________
30 Justice Abad cited the following cases to support its position: People
v. Amanses, 80 Phil. 424, 435 (1948); M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 120 Phil. 102, 106; 11 SCRA 98, 100 (1964); People v.
Pantoja, 134 Phil. 453, 458; 25 SCRA 468, 473 (1968); People v. De la
Fuente, 211 Phil. 650, 656; 126 SCRA 518, 524 (1983); People v. Anod, G.R.
No. 186420, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 205, 213; and People v.
Tubongbanua, 532 Phil. 434, 454; 500 SCRA 727, 743 (2006).
Note that all of these cases involve the award of civil indemnity and
moral damages for crimes and quasi-delicts resulting in death. In these
cases, what the Court increased, through interpretation of the monetary
values, was the civil indemnity awarded to the victim of the crime and not
the penalty imposed on the offender.
31 See Pineda, Ernesto L., Torts and Damages, p. 139 (2004). As
quoted:
“Human life has heretofore been very cheap, in law and the practice
thereunder. Before the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 284 in June
1938 the practice was to allow P1,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased in
case of death caused by crime. Later, by virtue of that special law, a
minimum of P2,000.00 was fixed, but the court usually awarded only the
minimum, without taking the trouble to inquire into the earning capacity
of the victim, and regardless of aggravating circumstances.”
32 Referring to Commonwealth Act No. 284.
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Corpuz vs. People
existence subsequent to its passage[.]”33 The rule

requires that “a word of general signification employed in a
statute should be construed, in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, to comprehend not only peculiar
conditions obtaining at the time of its enactment but those
that may normally arise after its approval as well.”34
Thus, Article 315 of the RPC should be understood as
embracing all things and property that may be subject of
the crime of estafa regardless of the changes in their
monetary value, and that the “amount of fraud” as basis for
the penalty (and as enumerated under Article 315) should
be applied without reference to these changes.
Then, too, Justice Abad’s position departs from the
theory of originalism that he used as supporting argument.
Originalism is generally employed in relation with the
Constitution and has its roots in the “original” intent of the
framers of the Constitution. It is a theory or a framework of
principles used in interpreting and understanding the texts
of the Constitution. It is premised on the idea that the
original meaning of the Constitution is relatively fixed, and
the originalist enterprise is fundamentally committed to
discerning the fixed meaning the framers gave to the
Constitution.35
_______________
33 Orceo v. Commission on Elections, Concurring Opinion, Associate
Justice Brion, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010, 616 SCRA 684, 703,
citing Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, pp. 177-178 (2003).
34 Ibid.
35 See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism 2.0: The Twenty-Ninth
Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium On Law And
Public Policy — 2010: I. Originalism: A Rationalization For
Conservativism or A Principled Theory Of Interpretation?: Is Originalism
Too Conservative? Copyright (c) 2011 Harvard Society for Law & Public
Policy, Inc., 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 29. (www.lexisnexis.com)
See also Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 2009
Duke Law Journal, 59 Duke L.J. 239. (www.lexisnexis.com)
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Corpuz vs. People
Originalism, as a theory of constitutional interpretation,
has so far evolved into numerous versions, the more
common of which are original understanding and
original intent.36
Originalism as original understanding seeks the
meaning of the words themselves as understood at the
time,37 or the meaning of the words to the society that
adopted it — regardless of what the framers might secretly
have intended.38 In contrast, originalism as original intent
seeks the meaning of the words according to what the
framers had in mind39 or the meaning that the framers
attached to the words that they employed in the
Constitution.40
As a theory of constitutional interpretation, I submit
that originalism cannot properly be applied to interpret
and modify Article 315 of the RPC because this is a statute,
not a constitutional provision to which the theory of
originalism generally applies.
Granting that originalism can be permissibly adopted to
interpret statutes, the theory — whether viewed as original
understanding or original intent — commands that Article
315 be read and interpreted according to its fixed and
original meaning. Thus, in the same manner that the rule
of progressive interpretation bars reference to the changes
in the monetary values of the things and property subject
of the crime,
_______________
36 See Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 2009
Duke law Journal, 59 Duke L.J. 239. (www.lexisnexis.com)
37 See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism 2.0: The Twenty-Ninth
Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium On Law And
Public Policy — 2010: I. Originalism: A Rationalization For
Conservativism Or A Principled Theory Of Interpretation?: Is Originalism
Too Conservative? Copyright (c) 2011 Harvard Society for Law & Public
Policy, Inc., 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 29. (www.lexisnexis.com)
38 See Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 2009
Duke law Journal, 59 Duke L.J. 239. (www.lexisnexis.com)
39 Ibid.
40 Id.
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Corpuz vs. People
under the theory of originalism, the “amount of fraud” as

basis for the penalty (as enumerated under Article 315),
should likewise be applied without reference to the changes
in the monetary values.
Accordingly, I find Justice Abad’s proposition in this
case to be improper and inappropriate because: (1) the
modification of the penalty transgressed the clear intent of
the legislature as the adjustment for inflation is not
supported by the letter of Article 315 of the RPC nor by its
intent; (2) in adjusting for inflation the monetary values to
modify the penalties under Article 315, the Court resorted
to construction that the law and the circumstances clearly
did not require; and (3) in modifying the penalty by
construction, the Court manifestly usurped, by
judicial legislation, the power that rightfully belongs
to the legislature.
III. The application of the penalties
prescribed under Article 315 of the RPC,
as written, would not violate Corpuz’s
right to equal protection of the law
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
pertinently provides: “nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.” The equal protection clause
means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place in like circumstances.41 It
demands that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.42
_______________
41 City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 326-327; 455 SCRA
308, 347 (2005).
42 Ibid. See also Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 330 Phil. 678, 719; 262
SCRA 122, 156-157 (1996), citing Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37
SCRA 420 (1971).
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Corpuz vs. People
The equal protection, however, does not demand

absolute equality under all circumstances. The protection
recognizes that persons are not born equal and have
varying handicaps that society has no power to abolish.43
Thus, the equal protection clause permits reasonable
classifications provided that the classification: (1) rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) applies equally to all members of the same class.44
The application of the penalties under Article 315 of the
RPC, as written, to the present situation does not violate
Corpuz’s right to the equal protection of the law. The
circumstances prevailing when the RPC Commission fixed
the penalties for estafa in 1930, vis-à-vis the circumstances
presently obtaining, hardly differ, and the considerations
that impelled the RPC Commission in fixing the mode and
duration of these penalties persist and continue to justify
their application to the present conditions.
The key element in estafa is the fraudulent act
committed that has caused harm to others. Estafa
penalizes the fraudulent act. I submit that there has
been no change in the way the RPC defines fraud
and, hence, there should be no reason for a change in
the way a fraudulent act is penalized.
A fraud committed in the 1930s should be punished in
the same manner as a fraud committed in the present day.
That the consequences of the fraudulent act constituted the
basis for determining the gradation of penalties was a
policy decision that Congress had the prerogative to make.
This in-
_______________
43 People v. Ching Kuan, 74 Phil. 23, 24 (1942).
44 Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
487 Phil. 531, 560-561; 446 SCRA 299, 344 (2004); and Quinto v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009, 606 SCRA
258, 291.
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Corpuz vs. People
cluded the value behind each threshold and its

corresponding penalty. What was true then is still true
today.
Thus, the disparity between the monetary values of
things and property in the 1930s and the prevailing
monetary values of like things and property do not amount
to distinctions so substantial that they would require this
Court to treat and classify Corpuz differently from persons
who committed estafa in 1930.
In fact, the converse proposition, i.e., to treat Corpuz
and others who will, from here on, commit the crime of
estafa differently from those who committed the same
crime in the 1930s up to and prior to the decision in this
case, by modifying the penalty according to what it
perceived as the correct inflation rate, will inevitably
violate the constitutional right of the latter group of
persons to the equal protection of the law.
This modification of the penalty effectively
dictates a classification that does not rest on
substantial distinctions; is irrelevant to the purpose
of the law punishing estafa, i.e., to punish and
discourage dishonesty and unfaithfulness in the
administration or care of money, goods or other personal
property received for the purpose;170 and applies only to
those who commit the crime subsequent to the decision.
IV. The grant, by the President of the
Philippines, of executive clemency
through pardon or parole, when war-
ranted, would sufficiently address the
perceived disparity, in the context of the
present values of money and property,
between the prescribed penalty and the
crime committed
_______________
45 Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, p. 953 (2008).
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Corpuz vs. People
I further submit that the law, in its wisdom, already

provides a constitutionally and legally permissible solution
to what Justice Abad perceived as the “grossly unfair
practice of continuing to impose on persons found guilty of
certain crimes the penalties [that had been] pegged on the
value of money and property more than 80 years ago in
1930.”
These solutions are the exercise, by the President of the
Philippines of his clemency powers under Section 19,
Article VIII of the Constitution,46 and the exercise by this
Court of its recommending power under Article 5,
paragraph 2, of the RPC.
Article 5, paragraph 2, of the RPC states that when the
strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
considering the degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense, “the [C]ourt shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper[.]”
The factual and legal conditions that some members of
this Court feel badly about can be addressed through the
exercise of this recommendatory power. This course of
action may adequately address whatever perceived
disparity there might be, created by inflation, between the
crime and the penalty while preserving and upholding, at
the same time, the cardinal principle of the separation of
powers. The Court is not likewise barred from calling the
attention of Congress to the perceived disparity so that any
problem there can be addressed through legislation.
_______________
46 Section 19, Article VIII of the Constitution pertinently reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
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Corpuz vs. People
In sum, even granting arguendo that the penalty the CA

imposed on Corpuz is “grossly unfair” from the economic
and pragmatic point of view (as Justice Abad has carefully
crafted), the solution to this “gross unfairness” is not for
this Court, by itself, to provide. Article 315 of the RPC is
plain and unambiguous and Corpuz’s case falls clearly
within its provisions. Hence, under the circumstances and
within the context of this case, the Court’s duty is simply to
apply the law. Resorting to judicial legislation by
construction encroaches into the exclusive domain of the
legislature — a course that clearly violated the
constitutional separation of powers principle.
V. The effect of Justice Abad’s “judicial
interpretation” could have destabilizing
repercussions on the application of our
penal laws and jurisprudence. It will as
well further clog the Court’s already con-
gested dockets
I believe that Justice Abad’s proposition, while grounded
on noble intentions, could destabilize the application of our
penal laws. I submit the following practical considerations
against it:
First, Justice Abad’s proposal, in effect, postulates that
the monetary value of the money and property subject of
the crime should be kept at its value at the time the crime
was legislated. This prompted his demand to adjust the
present day values of the amounts involved in
distinguishing the penalties for estafa, qualified theft,
malversation, among others, to keep their values at the
1930’s level. This argument applies not just to the crimes it
has enumerated, but to other crimes which use the value of
the property involved in the criminal act as an element of
the crime, or as a standard for determining the penalty of
the crime.
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Corpuz vs. People
Examples of these offenses include plunder47 (which

includes as an element of the crime the acquisition of at
least P50 million in ill-gotten wealth) and the failure by a
covered institution to report covered transactions as
defined in the Anti-Money Laundering Act.48
_______________
47 Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.—Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million
pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any
and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
48 Section 3. Definitions.—x x x
(b) “Covered transaction” is a single, series, or combination of
transactions involving a total amount in excess of Four million Philippine
pesos (Php4,000,000.00) or an equivalent amount in foreign currency
based on the prevailing exchange rate within five (5) consecutive banking
days except those between a covered institution and a person who, at the
time of the transaction was a properly identified client and the amount is
commensurate with the business or financial capacity of the client; or
those with an underlying legal or trade obligation, purpose, origin or
economic justification.
It likewise refers to a single, series or combination or pattern of
unusually large and complex transactions in excess of Four million
Philippine pesos (Php4,000,000.00) especially cash deposits and
investments having no credible purpose or origin, underlying trade
obligation or contract.
SEC. 9. Prevention of Money Laundering; Customer Identification
Requirements and Record Keeping—
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Corpuz vs. People
Should the amounts involved in these crimes be

automatically adjusted now, to keep them within their
value at the time the crimes were defined and penalized?
Both the crimes of plunder and money laundering, for
instance, are of relatively recent enactment. The Act
Defining the Crime of Plunder was passed in 1991 and the
Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2001.
When do we adjust the value of these amounts so that
they would remain in keeping with the intent of Congress
at the time of its enactment? Do we adjust these for
inflation every year, from the time of enactment, or after
ten, or twenty years when the value of the peso has
significantly changed?
The lack of any specific answer to these questions
reaffirms that the prerogative to value the money or
property involved in a crime lies with Congress and is not
for the courts to make through “judicial interpretation.”
Second, the proposition would open the floodgates for
habeas corpus petitions for the adjustment of the penalties
imposed on convicts now in prison for estafa. These
petitions would be based on equal protection grounds,
swamping the courts with pleas for the reduction of
sentences. Significantly, in undertaking adjustments, it
would be inaccurate to apply
_______________
x x x
(c) Reporting of Covered Transactions.—Covered institutions shall
report to the AMLC all covered transactions within five (5) working days
from occurrence thereof, unless the Supervising Authority concerned
prescribes a longer period not exceeding ten (10) working days.
SEC. 4. Money Laundering Offense.—Money laundering is a crime
whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted, thereby
making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources. It is
committed by the following:
x x x
(c) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is
required under this Act to be disclosed and filed with the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so.
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Corpuz vs. People
the 1:100 adjustment ratio that Justice Abad uses as base

because these convicts committed their respective crimes in
different years. Effectively, all these petitions would be
resolved on a case-to-case basis as proper proportionality
would have to be determined based on inflation in these
different years.
VI. The penalties in estafa do not violate
the constitutional prohibition against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
I cannot agree that the disproportionality in terms of the
length of imprisonment and the amount involved in the
estafa is within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishments.
First, I submit that the issue of a statute’s
constitutionality, including those of criminal statutes,
should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. The
ponencia’s summation of the case’s antecedents does not
show that the constitutionality of the estafa’s penalty had
been raised in the trial court, or in the CA, and even in the
present petition in the Supreme Court.
As I earlier discussed, we have a wide latitude of
discretion in reviewing criminal cases, especially in
comparison to our approach in reviewing the civil and labor
cases appealed before us. But this wide latitude, to my
mind, does not authorize us to disregard the requirements
of constitutional litigation.
Even assuming that the Court may, on its own, raise the
issue of constitutionality of the penalty of estafa, the
principle of stare decisis bars us from relitigating an issue
that has already been decided.
The Court has had, on two occasions, upheld the
constitutionality of the penalty imposed on estafa. In Lim v.
People,49
_______________
49 438 Phil. 749; 390 SCRA 194 (2002).
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Corpuz vs. People
the Court En Banc reiterated a prior ruling by the

Court’s Second Division in People v. Tongko,50 which ruled
that the increase in the penalty for estafa, committed
through bouncing checks under Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 818, does not violate the constitutional prohibition
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
The petitioners in Lim argued that PD No. 818 is a
cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment for the following
reasons: first, the penalty of reclusion perpetua under PD
No. 818 for estafa involving the amount of P365,750.00 is
too disproportionate to the crime it punishes; and second,
the penalties for estafa through false pretenses or
fraudulent acts (committed through bouncing checks)
increased without a corresponding increase in the original
amounts for estafa defined in the RPC, when these
amounts have become negligible and insignificant
compared to the present value of the peso.
The Court in Lim held that the increase in penalties
provided by PD No. 818 is neither the cruel nor degrading
punishment that the Constitution contemplates. Affirming
this ruling in Tongko, the Court held that “the prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the
form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount[.]”51
According to Lim v. People,52 “it takes more than merely
being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.” The impugned
penalty must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive and
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community.”53
The Court also noted that while PD No. 818 makes the
penalties for estafa more severe, this severity alone does
not
_______________
50 353 Phil. 37, 43-44; 290 SCRA 595, 601 (1998).
51 Id., at p. 43; p. 601.
52 Supra note 49 at p. 754.
53 Ibid.
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make it the cruel or degrading punishment that the

Constitution prohibits. The Court observed that the
increase of the penalties is not without justification: the
increase in penalty was intended to repress the crime of
swindling through bouncing checks, as it erodes the
people’s confidence in using negotiable instruments and
results in the “retardation of trade and commerce and the
undermining of the banking system of the country.”54
The present case involves arguments similar to those
the Lim petitioners presented, and I find that no basis
exists for the Court to deviate from its earlier ruling.
Notably, the Court En Banc arrived at this ruling without
any reservations or dissenting opinions.
I submit that the Court should respect and recognize the
principle of stare decisis in this case, as Lim stands as
precedent against the arguments raised in the current
case. They both involve the same issues and arguments;
the penalty imposed by PD No. 818, which was contested in
Lim and Tongko, was even higher than the penalties
contested in the current case (which involves estafa without
the qualifying circumstance of having been committed
through bouncing checks).
These considerations, to my mind, effectively refute the
arguments regarding the severity and disproportionality of
the penalties under estafa presented in the current case. If
we have twice respected and recognized the legislative’s
prerogative to increase the penalty of estafa committed
through PD No. 818, why should we now deny them this
prerogative and assert for ourselves the authority to
determine the penalty of estafa itself?
Neither is a perceived disproportionality in the penalties
and its comparison with the penalties of other crimes
sufficient to establish the questioned penalty as cruel or
degrading.
_______________
54 Supra note 49 at p. 755.
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Corpuz vs. People
In Baylosis v. Hon. Chavez, Jr.,55 the Court En Banc

upheld the constitutionality of Section 1 of PD No. 1866,
which penalizes with reclusion perpetua “any person who
shall unlawfully manufacturer, deal in, acquire, dispose, or
possess any firearm,” “in furtherance of, or incident to, or
in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion.” The petitioners in Baylosis questioned the
constitutionality of the penalty, pointing out, among other
arguments, that the crime of possessing a firearm in
furtherance of rebellion is even more severe than the crime
of rebellion itself.
The Court in Baylosis interestingly ruled that the
difference in the penalty between PD No. 1866 and the
RPC does not necessarily establish that the heavier penalty
under PD No. 1866 is excessive, disproportionate, or cruel
or unusual. The Court noted that it could be argued the
other way around — that the penalty of the crime of
rebellion is too light; and that the remedy for this situation
is through law, and not judicial interpretation.
Thus, Baylosis established that in determining the
severity and disproportionality of a penalty, the Court
should look only at the crime and penalty in question and
avoid its comparison with other crimes. And in determining
whether a penalty is wholly disproportional to the crime it
punishes (so that it shocks the community’s moral
standards), we must examine whether the penalty imposed
is justified by the evil sought to be prevented by Congress
in penalizing the crime.
In this case, the Solicitor General has adequately
provided the reason for the penalties behind the estafa, i.e.,
to protect and encourage the growth of commerce in the
country and to protect the public from fraud. This reason,
to my mind, is sufficient to justify the penalties for estafa.
That the amount taken from the private injured party has
grown negligible through inflation does not ipso facto make
the penalty wholly disproportional. In determining whether
a penalty is cruel or
_______________
55 279 Phil. 448, 455; 202 SCRA 405, 408-409 (1991).
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unusual, we have considered not just the amount taken

from the private injured party, but also considered the
crime’s impact on national policy and order.56 It cannot be
gainsaid that the perpetuation of fraud adversely impacts
on the public’s confidence in our financial system and
hinders as well the growth of commerce.
As a final point, I note that the 1987 Constitution has
changed the language of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions to “cruel, degrading or inhuman.” This
change of wording is not without reason — it was designed
to give Congress more leeway in formulating the penalties
it deems fit to the crimes that it may decide to penalize in
the future.
As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., who sponsored the draft Bill of
Rights, the word unusual was replaced with the words
“degrading or inhuman” because Congress, in the future,
may create a penalty not yet known or imposed; and the
fact of its novelty should not be a ground to question its
constitutionality.57
_______________
56 See Lim v. People, supra note 49 at p. 755; People v. Tongko, supra
note 50 at p. 44; and Baylosis v. Hon. Chavez, Jr., supra note 55 at pp.
458, 465-466; p. 418.
57 During the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations on the Bill of
Rights, Commissioner Maambong noted the change in language of the
draft Constitution from “cruel, degrading or inhuman” to “cruel and
unusual,” thus:
MR. MAAMBONG: I will just ask one more question, Mr. Presiding
Officer. On Section 22, the original phrase used in the 1935 Constitution
was “cruel and unusual punishment.”
FR. BERNAS: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: In the configuration of the 1973 Constitution, the
phrase became “cruel or unusual punishment.”
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Corpuz vs. People
I submit that we, as interpreters and enforcers of the

Constitution, should not go against the general spirit and
intent of the Constitution to recognize the prerogative of
Congress to create penalties. Immediately equating
disproportionality and severity to a cruel, degrading
punishment unduly limits this prerogative, as it would
open the floodgates for the review of penalties on the mere
contention or belief that the imprisonment imposed is too
long or that the fines assessed are too high. These, to me,
are policy questions that should be best addressed by the
political branches of government, not by the Supreme
Court.
In these lights, I fully concur with and join the ponencia
of Justice Peralta.
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
The Court is apparently not prepared at this time to
reexamine and change the existing practice of imposing the
pen-
_______________
FR. BERNAS: That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG: In the United States Constitution as it stands now,
it is still “cruel and unusual punishment.” But now in the present
submission that we are going over, it is “cruel or inhuman.”
FR. BERNAS: “Cruel, degrading or inhuman.”
MR. MAAMBONG: I just want to find out, Mr. Presiding Officer, why
the Committee changed the word “unusual” to “inhuman.”
FR. BERNAS: The reason for the change, Mr. Presiding Officer, is this:
We avoided the use of the word “unusual” because it tended to give the
interpretation that one cannot innovate therefore as far as penology is
concerned — that, if a penalty is something that was never used before,
then it would be invalid. So, in order to allow for the development of
penology we decided that we should not prohibit unusual punishments in
the sense that they are new or novel. Record of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. I, Jul. 17, 1986, R.C.C. No. 32.
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alty for estafa based on the amount of the fraud committed

in terms of the 1930 values of money and properties.
The Facts and the Case
On May 2, 1991 Danilo Tangcoy entrusted P98,000

worth of jewelry items to petitioner Lito Corpuz for the
latter to sell on commission. If sold, Corpuz was to turn
over the proceeds to Tangcoy and, if not, he was to return
the items after 60 days. But Corpuz neither remitted the
stated proceeds nor returned what he got. Consequently,
the Public Prosecutor of Olongapo charged him with estafa
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of that city.1
On July 30, 2004 the RTC found Corpuz guilty as
charged and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from 4 years and 2 months of
prisión correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to
14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, as maximum.2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed3 Corpuz’s
conviction but modified the penalty to 4 years and 2
months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of
prisión mayor, as maximum, plus incremental penalty of
one year for each additional P10,000 for a total maximum
of 15 years.4 Corpuz filed a motion for reconsideration of
the appellate court’s Decision but the CA denied the same,
thus, the present petition for review.
While the Court’s Third Division was deliberating on the
case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on
persons convicted of crimes involving property came up.
The
_______________
1 Docketed as Criminal Case 665-91.
2 Rollo, p. 52.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a
member of the Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P.
Bersamin (now a member of the Court) and Rodrigo V. Cosico.
4 Rollo, p. 40.
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Corpuz vs. People
legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the

value of money and property in 1930 when it enacted the
Revised Penal Code.5 Since the members of the Division
reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues
are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the
Court En Banc for consideration and resolution.
In view of the far reaching effects of any ruling in the
case and the great number of accused who may be affected
by it,6 the Court required the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) and counsel for Corpuz to file their comments on the
issues that the Court raised. Further, it invited a number
of amici curiae for their views.
The following amici graciously submitted their papers:
a) De La Salle University College of Law Dean and head of
the Free Legal Assistance Group, Jose Manuel L. Diokno;
b) Ateneo de Manila School of Law Dean, Sedfrey M.
Candelaria; c) University of the Philippines Professor
Alfredo F. Tadiar; d) the Senate President; and e) the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.7 The Court heard
the parties and
_______________
5 AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE AND OTHER PENAL LAWS [REVISED
PENAL CODE], ACt 3815 (1932).
6 As of 2014, 6509 people have been convicted of and are serving
sentence for estafa, qualified theft, theft, robbery, arson, and malicious
mischief. Out of this population, 4480 are slated to spend half a decade or
more in prison. (Nora Corazon T. Padiernos, Chief of Planning and
Management Division, Bureau of Corrections, Statistics on Crimes
Against Property, February 14, 2014) These people are just some of those
who would have been affected by this decision. There is an overwhelming
number of detainees around the country with similar fates. Manila City
Jail alone has 630 men in detention for robbery and 249 for theft. (Manila
City Jail, February 2014) To say that they are living in cramped quarters
is a great understatement. See Maria Luisa Isabel L. Rosales, Cruel
Detentions: Subhuman Prison Conditions — A Form of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 54 Ateneo L.J. 568 (2009).
7 The Court also invited the Dean and some professors of the
University of the Philippines School of Economics and the President
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Corpuz vs. People
the amici on oral arguments on February 19, 2014, with

Atty. Mario L. Bautista, entering his appearance as counsel
de officio for Corpuz, and arguing the case on the latter’s
behalf.8
The Issues Presented
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether or not, procedurally, the Court may
determine the constitutionality of the penalty that the CA
imposed on Corpuz even when he did not raise such
question in his petition for review;
2. Whether or not the penalty of 4 years and 2 months
to 15 years that the CA imposed on Corpuz for a P98,000
fraud based on the penalty that the legislature pegged on
the value of money or property in 1930 violates his
constitutional right to equal protection of the law;
3. Whether or not that portion of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code that imposes on Corpuz in addition to
the basic penalty of 8 years and 1 day of imprisonment an
additional incremental penalty of 1 year for each additional
P10,000 of the amount of fraud in excess of P22,000
violates his constitutional right against cruel, unusual, and
degrading punishment; and
4. If the answers to the second or third issues are in
the affirmative, whether or not, applying the rules of
statutory construction, the Court may, rather than declare
the relevant statutory penalties unconstitutional,
determine the legislative intent with respect to them and,
accordingly, adjust the amount of the present fraud to its
1932 equivalent and impose the proper penalty.
_______________
of the Philippine Judges Association to submit their views but they opted
not to.
8 Corpuz v. People of the Philippines (Minute Resolution), G.R. No.
180016, February 25, 2014, p. 382.
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Corpuz vs. People
Discussion
1. Issues Raised Motu Proprio
The OSG points out that it is not right for the Court to
decide the issue of the correctness of the penalty imposed
on Corpuz since he did not raise such issue.9
But the Court, like the CA, has always regarded it as a
duty to the accused in every criminal case that comes
before it to review as a matter of course the correctness of
the penalty imposed and rectify any error even when no
question has been raised regarding the same.10 That the
error may have a constitutional dimension cannot thwart
the Court from performing such duty.
Besides, as Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, one of the
amici, noted in his comment, the Court has in previous
cases, when fundamental issues are involved, taken
cognizance of the same despite lack of jurisprudential
requirements for judicial review.11 Indeed, the Court said
in People v. Hon. Judge Vera,12 that “courts in the exercise
of sound discretion, may determine the time when a
question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should
be presented x x x [t]hus, in criminal cases, although there
is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the
question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal.”13
_______________
9 Office of the Solicitor General, Oral Arguments, TSN.
10 See Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010, 626 SCRA 48,
49; People v. Laguerta, 398 Phil. 370, 375; 344 SCRA 453, 458 (2000),
citing People v. Balacano, 391 Phil. 509, 525-526; 336 SCRA 615, 629-630
(2000).
11 Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Comment, p. 3 (September 30, 2013).
12 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
13 Id., at p. 88.
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In Government Service Insurance System, Cebu City

Branch v. Montesclaros,14 while the respondent manifested
loss of interest in pursuing the case, the Court through
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, said, that “social justice and
public interest demand that [x x x] the constitutionality of
the proviso [be resolved]” since “the issue involves not only
the claim of [respondent] but also that of other surviving
spouses who are similarly situated and whose claims GSIS
would also deny based on the proviso.”15 To the same effect
is the Court’s ruling in Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.16 Here in
Corpuz, the ruling of the Court will affect thousands of
persons who are presently charged or in the future may be
charged with crimes the penalties for which are pegged to
the value of the money or property involved.
Moreover, the Court has itself raised these issues
because of their importance and has heard the parties both
on written comments and on oral argument. The due
process requirement for hearing and adjudicating the
issues now before the Court has been met.
Now to address the substantive issues:
2. Criminal Penalties and Inflation
As a general principle, crimes found in the Revised
Penal Code carry with them the same penalties whatever
year the accused commits them. For example, one who
mutilates a Philippine coin in 1932, when the code took
effect, would go to jail for 2 years and 4 months maximum,
exactly the same penalty that another who mutilates a coin
in 2014 would get. The correspondence between the gravity
of the offense and the severity of the penalty does not
change with the passage of time.
_______________
14 478 Phil. 573; 434 SCRA 441 (2004).
15 Id., at p. 580; p. 445.
16 487 Phil. 531; 446 SCRA 299 (2004).
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Corpuz vs. People
But, unwittingly, the penalties for crimes involving

property under the Revised Penal Code are in breach of
that principle. Although these penalties are meant to be
proportionate to the harm caused, they are not described in
specific and constant terms like the number of days of
incapacity for work of the offended party in physical
injuries cases.
Rather, the harm done in property crimes are made to
depend on the “amount of the fraud” committed,17 on the
“value of the property taken,”18 on the “value of the thing or
property stolen,”19 or on “the value of the damage
caused.”20 As it happens, money and property values are in
a state of constant change, and sways with the wind of
economic change, primarily with the rate of inflation from
year to year. The objects of commerce like bread and fish do
not change but their prices or monetary values change in
the course of time.
For instance, in 1932 when the Revised Penal Code took
effect, rice was priced at an average of P4.50 per cavan.21 If
one steals a sack of rice in 1932, he would be imprisoned for
4 months maximum corresponding to the value of what he
stole. At present, that sack of rice is priced at about
P1,800.00 per cavan.22 If one steals a sack of rice today, he
would be imprisoned for 4 years and 2 months maximum.
In other words, in a
_______________
17 The term used in the REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 315.
18 Id., Arts. 299 and 302.
19 Id., Arts. 309 and 310.
20 Id., Art. 328.
21 1 cavan is equivalent to 25 gantas (See Barreto v. Reyes, 10 Phil.
489, 491 [1908]). A ganta of rice is approximately 2.5 kilos when computed
at 3 quarts to a ganta. (See United Nations. Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, World Weights and
Measures, Handbook for Statisticians, Statistical Papers, Series M No. 21
Revision 1 [ST/STAT/SER.M/21/rev.1] New York: United Nations [1966]);
Wordnik, Ganta available at http://www.wordnik.com/words/ganta (last
accessed April 23, 2012).
22 Updates on Palay, Rice, and Corn Prices, Vol. IV, No. 34 (August
2012), available at http://www.bas.gov.ph/?ids=amsad_prices.
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crime involving property the penalty depends on when it is

committed.
Since the price of rice in 1932 (P4.50 per cavan) is a
mere 0.25% of today’s price (P1,800.00 per cavan), does this
mean that the P100 today is the equivalent of only P0.25 in
1932? It is uncertain since the government did not yet
conduct a statistical survey of the prices of key
commodities in 1932 that would provide empirical support
for such a conclusion.23 The first of such a statistical survey
was made only in 1949, enabling the government after
comparison with recent surveys to determine that the
purchasing power of P1 in 1949 is the equivalent of about
P100 today — P1 is to P100.24
For want of reliable 1930 economic data, it will be
assumed for the purpose of this discussion that the
purchasing power of the peso then did not vary much from
that of 1949 which, as already stated, has been officially
established. This assumption is based on the Court’s own
observation in the case of People v. Pantoja25 that the
purchasing power of the peso in 1949 was “one-third of its
pre-war purchasing power,” meaning P1 as against P3.
This currency movement is minimal and may, for
convenience, be considered absorbed in the massive erosion
of the purchasing power of the peso by about 100 times
from 1949 to the present. Consequently, this discussion will
use this reference rate — the P1 is to P100 — in comparing
the prices of the past (1930-1949) with the present.
_______________
23 Carmen N. Ericta, OIC National Statistician, Philippine Statistics
Authority, SUBJECT: Update on the Value of the Present Day Peso as
Compared to its Prevailing Value in 1932 (February 10, 2014).
24 Id., citing Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (formerly known as Central
Bank of the Philippines), Statistical Bulletin, Vol. IX, No. 4.
25 134 Phil. 453; 25 SCRA 468 (1968).
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Corpuz vs. People
3. Escalation of Penalties and

the Equal Protection Clause
The Revised Penal Code of 1930 pegs the penalties for
estafa to the amount of fraud committed as follows:
Amount of
Penalty
the Fraud
1) P22,001 8 yrs. & 1 day plus 1 year for every additional
=
and above P10,000.00 (but not more than 20 years)
2) P12,001
=4 yrs., 2 mos. & 1 day to 8 yrs.
to P22,000
3) P6,001 to
=6 mos. & 1 day to 4 yrs. & 2 mos.
P12,000
4) P201 to
=4 mos. & 1 day to 2 yrs. & 4 mos.
P6,000
5) P0.01 to
=4 mos. & 1 day to 6 mos.
P200
Unmindful of the immense erosion of the purchasing

power of the peso, courts have persisted in literally
applying the above table of penalties in fraud cases. As a
result, they in effect mete out heavier penalties from year
to year for the commission of exactly the same offense.
For instance, if the accused defrauds another of 79
cavans of rice in 1930-1949, then valued at only P1,422.00
(P18.00 per cavan), she would be imprisoned for 2 years
and 4 months maximum. This would cause her pain but
tolerable pain. Yet, if another commits exactly the same
fraud today when that 79 cavans of rice is now valued at
P142,200.00 (P1,800.00 per cavan), she would be
committed to prison for 20 years maximum. She would
leave prison an old woman, irreversibly deprived of the
company of her family for the greater part of her life. This
is a gross denial of her right to equal protection since the
first offender got off after 2 years and 4 months whereas
she got off after 20 years.
Her 20-year prison term is of course enormous because
the penalty for fraud amounting to P22,000.00 is already 8
years and 1 day maximum but, since the amount of her
fraud (P142,200.00) exceeds that figure, she would suffer
additional
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Corpuz vs. People
incremental imprisonment of 1 year for every P10,000.00 in

excess of the P22,000.00 for a total of 20 years.
This uneven treatment is true in Corpuz’s case. The
P98,000.00 jewelry items subject of his offense would have
a value of only P980 in 1932. Consequently, had he
committed his crime that year, he would have been
imprisoned for only 2 years and 4 months maximum. But
since he committed it 43 years later in 1991 when the
jewelry items are now valued at P98,000.00 due to
inflation, he would be imprisoned for 15 years maximum —
the same crime, the same law, yet a shockingly higher
penalty. This result would undoubtedly deny Corpuz his
constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
4. Incremental Penalty and
the Cruel, Unusual, and De-
grading Punishment Clause
Justice Antonio T. Carpio expressed the view, joined by
Dean Diokno,26 that insofar as Article 315 imposes on
Corpuz in addition to the basic penalty of 8 years and 1 day
an additional incremental penalty of 1 year for each
additional P10,000.00 of the amount of fraud in excess of
P22,000.00, such law violates his constitutional right
against cruel, unusual, and degrading punishment. Putting
a price of P10,000.00, about the cost of five sacks of rice, for
each additional year of imprisonment makes the penalty
grossly disproportionate to the wrong committed. This view
would thus have the incremental penalty voided. Professor
Tadiar and Dean Diokno appear to be sympathetic to it.27
_______________
26 Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, Comment (September 21, 2013).
27 “Section 5 of the Revised Penal Code x x x violates the bedrock
principle of a democratic and republican government x x x [and] may
outrightly be struck down as unconstitutional in the present petition by
the power of judicial review. x x x Article 39 x x x must be struck down as
unconstitutional for its imposition of a cruel punishment that has long
been outdated by currency devaluation. Thus, the
130

Corpuz vs. People
The incremental penalty is of course grossly

disproportionate to the wrong committed. But that penalty
would not have been regarded as such if the offense had
been committed in 1932 when P10,000.00 was a hefty sum.
Indeed, if it were to be adjusted for inflation, that
P10,000.00 would be the equivalent of P1,000,000.00 today.
An incremental penalty for each P1,000,000.00 would not
have been that bad. Anyway, the point is that it is the
curse of inflation, not the idea of an incremental penalty,
which is the culprit.
If Justice Carpio’s view is adopted, the Court would
annul the incremental penalty but maintain the validity of
the basic penalties for fraud. But those penalties are just as
disproportionate to the wrong committed.
For instance, half a gallon of coconut cooking oil would
cost about P2.03 in 1930-1949. If Alex gives Ben P2.03 in
1949 to buy for him such half-gallon but Ben instead
pockets the P2.03, he would be imprisoned 6 months
maximum for estafa. On the other hand, if Carlos gives
Dante P203 today to buy for him also a half-gallon of
coconut cooking oil but Dante instead pockets the P203, he
would be imprisoned for 2 years and 4 months maximum.
To be imprisoned and separated from family for 2 years
and 4 months for the taking of the price of a half-gallon
cooking oil, what it will cost a hungry couple and their
child their meal, is just as cruel, unusual, and degrading. It
is an outrage to a democratic society even if no incremental
penalty is involved.28
_______________
condition for the exercise of the power of judicial review is that the
questionable statute must be closely intertwined with the principal issue
of the case, that is the disproportionateness of the penalty imposed based
on a devalued currency. x x x Thus, it is imperative for this Supreme
Court to declare through its power of judicial review that these statutory
provisions are unconstitutional.” (Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar,
Constitutional Challenge in the Sentencing Process, pp. 14-16, August 16,
2013).
28 Prof. Tadiar agreed to this statement.
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Corpuz vs. People
The harshness of this antiquated 1930 scheme for

punishing criminal offenders is doubly magnified in
qualified theft where the offender is a domestic helper or a
trusted employee. Qualified theft is a grievous offense since
its penalty is automatically raised two degrees higher than
that usually imposed on simple theft. Thus, unadjusted for
inflation, the domestic helper who steals from his employer
would be meted out a maximum of:
a) 6 years in prison for a toothbrush worth P5;29
b) 12 years in prison for a lipstick worth P39;30
c) 14 years and 8 months in prison for a pair of female
slippers worth P150;31
d) 20 years in prison for a wristwatch worth P19,000;32 or
e) 30 years in prison for a branded lady’s handbag worth
P125,000.33
_______________
29 Angola Toothbrush available at http://www.ebay.ph/itm/ANGOLA-
Toothbrush-/221195152522?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_211&
hash=item3380422c8a (last accessed March 6, 2014).
30 Taupe Lipstick available at http://www.ebay.ph/itm/taupe-
lipstick/271167294212?
pt=LH_DefaultDomain_211&hash=item3f22d48b04 (last accessed March
6, 2014).
31 Authentic Brand New Old Navy Slippers available at
http://www.ebay.ph/itm/Authentic-Brand-New-OLD-NAVY-Womens-
Lippers-Size-7-Color-White
/261178377863?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_211&hash=item3ccf71c687 (last
accessed March 6, 2014).
32 Authentic Philip Stein Large Black Calfskin Strap Brandnew
available at http://www.ebay.ph/itm/AUTH-Philip-Stein-Large-Black-
Calfskin-Strap-Brand-New-/261176803770?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_
211&hash=item3ccf59c1ba (last accessed March 6, 2014).
33 Authentic Louis Vuitton Lumineuse available at
http://www.ebay.ph/itm/BNEW-Authentic-Louis-Vuitton-LV-Lumineuse-
PM-Aube-140923515015?
pt=LH_DefaultDomain_211&hash=item20cfb23087 (last accessed March
6, 2014).
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Corpuz vs. People
Unless checked, courts will impose 12 years maximum

on the housemaid who steals a P39 lipstick from her
employer. They will also impose on her 30 years maximum
for stealing a pricy lady’s handbag. This of course is grossly
obscene and unjust, even if the handbag is worth
P125,000.00 since 30 years in prison is already the penalty
for treason, for raping and killing an 8-year-old girl, for
kidnapping a grade school student, for robbing a house and
killing the entire family, and for a P50-million plunder.
It is not only the incremental penalty that violates the
accused’s right against cruel, unusual, and degrading
punishment. The axe casts its shadow across the board
touching all property-related crimes. This injustice and
inhumanity will go on as it has gone on for decades unless
the Court acts to rein it in.
5. Judicial Construction of Statutes
But annulling Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code or
portions of it slaps the hand of the legislature that enacted
it in 1930 when the economy of the time warranted the
amounts stated in those penalties. Allowing courts to
adhere to that law but construe it instead in a way that
would attain its purpose, an alternative based on long
precedents, presents a more moderate remedy.
It may be assumed that those who enacted the Revised
Penal Code in 1930 did not foresee the onslaught of
inflation in the second half of the century. They had an
agricultural economy and, presumably, the purchasing
power of the peso at that time had not changed perceptibly
in the years that they had known. It would be imprudent to
believe that, if those legislators had an inkling of the shape
and value of money and things would take down the years
to 2014, they would have still pegged those penalties to
their 1930 economy. But they did. Clearly, they were
uninformed and, therefore, their intent must have been to
match the penalties written in the
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Corpuz vs. People
law to the values of money and property as they understood
it at that time.
As it turned out, the passage of time altered what the
1930 legislature intended respecting those penalties. Time
made those penalties toxic and this is exemplified in the
case of Corpuz. On the one hand, if the Court were to
adjust the penalty imposed on him to compensate for
inflation, using the government’s P1 to P100 equation,
Corpuz should be deemed to have defrauded Tangcoy of
only P980 rather than P98,000. He would then be meted
out a penalty of only 2 years and 4 months maximum. This
is about the same penalty imposed for the crimes of
offending religious feelings,34 tumultuous disturbance,35
and slander,36 which are correctional penalties.
On the other hand, if the amount of fraud is made to
depend on the false assumption that the value of P1 in
1930-1949 is the same as the value of P1 today, Corpuz
would be liable for fraud amounting to P98,000 and draw a
penalty of 4 years and 2 months to 15 years maximum, an
afflictive penalty. These 15 years would be within the
range of the penalty for homicide37 or for intentional
abortion thru violence against a pregnant woman,38 which
means meting out to Corpuz a penalty equivalent to the
taking of human life.
About seven years ago, a lawyer accused his houseboy,
Reynaldo Bayon, of stealing from him watches and jewelry
worth P540,000.00.39 For this, the trial court imposed on
Bayon the penalty of imprisonment for 30 years maximum.
Ironically, the trial court meted out to Bayon the same
penalty that another trial court imposed on Ricardo
Solangon and Apolonio Haniel who kidnapped Libertador
Vidal and de-
_______________
34 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 133.
35 Id., Art. 153.
36 Id., Art. 174.
37 Id., Art. 249.
38 Id., Art. 256.
39 People v. Bayon, G.R. No. 168627, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 702.
134

Corpuz vs. People
manded ransom from his tormented family.40 After

lengthy negotiations, they settled for P50,000.00, got the
money, and killed their victim. Since the police recovered
only his bones, no one knew just how much Libertador
suffered before being killed.
Did Reynaldo, the houseboy, deserve the same severe
penalty imposed on Ricardo and Apolonio for their brutal
crime? Reynaldo did not rape his employer’s wife, torture
his children, or murder any of them. If the prosecution
were to be believed, his employer merely lost some of his
collection of watches and jewelry. In the present case, the
wealthy jeweler did not lose his life to Corpuz. All that he
supposedly lost to him were a few jewelry worth P98,000.00
today, the equivalent of but P980.00 in 1930-1949. Still, the
Court would, literally applying the law, sentence Corpuz to
a maximum of 15 years in prison like he already killed the
jeweler in an angry confrontation.
Again, the key to solving the problem that this case
presents lies in ascertaining the will of the legislature that
enacted the Revised Penal Code in 1930 and give its
language the construction that will honor that will. Some,
like the Office of the Solicitor General, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
hold the view that adjusting the penalties to compensate
for inflation will amount to judicial legislation.41
But the Court need not rewrite the penalties that the
law provides. Rather, the clear intent of the law can be
given by, to borrow a phrase from Atty. Mario L. Bautista,
counsel for Corpuz, “harmonizing” the law or “aligning the
numerical
_______________
40 People v. Solangon, 563 Phil. 316; 537 SCRA 746 (2007).
41 Office of the Solicitor General, Supplemental Comment (August 22,
2013); Senate President, Memorandum (September 26, 2013); and
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Memorandum (October 21,
2013).
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Corpuz vs. People
figures”42 to the economic realities of the present. To put it

another way, ascertaining the facts of the case in order to
faithfully apply to it the law as the legislature intended it
is a judicial function. Dean Candelaria of Ateneo shares
this position.43
This would not have been the first time that the Court
would have given a construction to the fixed monetary
values set by law to take into account the problems caused
by inflation. When the Code Commission drafted the Civil
Code in 1949, it fixed the new minimum civil indemnity for
death to P3,000.00.44 Article 2206 of the Code reads:
_______________
42 Mario L. Bautista, Compliance 2 (March 12, 2014).
43 “Applied to the present case, while Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code appears on its face as constitutionally valid, the manner by which it
is applied by the Court of Appeals to petitioner’s case will result into an
unreasonable consequence for the petitioner. Instead of being qualified for
probation based on an interpretation that takes into account adjustment
for inflation, petitioner would be made to suffer the penalty of from four
(4) years and two (2) months as minimum to fifteen (15) years as
maximum. This interpretation is plainly discriminatory, unreasonable
and oppressive. x x x The mechanism suggested by the undersigned
through judicial interpretation is not antithetical to the established rule
that this Court in the exercise of the power of judicial review cannot
encroach upon the power of the Legislature.” (Dean Sedfrey M.
Candelaria, Comment, pp. 4, 11-12 [September 30, 2013]).
“It is well settled that a court may consider the spirit and reason of a
statute, and even resort to extrinsic aids, when its literal application
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, impossibility, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the law makers. x x x This Court, therefore,
can go outside the four corners of the law to give it meaning.” (Dean Jose
Manuel I. Diokno, Free Legal Assistance Group, De La Salle University
College of Law, Comment, p. 3 [September 21, 2013]).
44 AN ACT TO ORDAIN AND INSTITUTE THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Republic Act 386, Art. 2206 (1950).
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Corpuz vs. People
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a

crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances.45
The Civil Code sets the minimum compensation for

death at only P3,000.00. Ordinarily, this legislative
judgment has to be obeyed no matter if it already becomes
harsh or unfair to the victim’s heirs as inflation sets in. For
the law is the law. Yet, following past precedents, the
Court would, construing the law in the light of the
inflationary movement of money values, set a new
minimum of P6,000 in 1964,46 P12,000 in 1968,47 P30,000
in 1983,48 P50,000 in 1990,49 and most recently, P75,000 in
2009.50 It regarded as inequitable on account of inflation
the award of a measly P3,000 to the victim’s heirs.
Justice Jose C. Vitug observed that the Court increases
the minimum civil indemnity “to such amounts as the peso
value might actually command at given times and
circumstances.”51 This is not judicial legislation but taking
judicial notice of the relentless rise in money and property
values over the years and construing the law in the light of
such circumstances.
The Court emphasized in People v. Pantoja52 that these
judicial adjustments are dictated by: “the difference
between
_______________
45 Id., Art. 2206.
46 M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 120 Phil. 102,
106; 11 SCRA 98, 102 (1964).
47 People v. Pantoja, supra note 25 at p. 458; p. 473.
48 People v. Dela Fuente, 211 Phil. 650, 656; 126 SCRA 518, 524 (1983).
49 Supreme Court of the Philippines, En Banc, Minutes (August 30,
1990).
50 People v. Anod, G.R. No. 186420, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 205,
213; People v. Tubongbanua, 532 Phil. 434, 454; 500 SCRA 727, 742
(2006).
51 Vitug, Jose C., Civil Law, Vol. 4, 2nd ed. 2006.
52 Supra note 25.
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Corpuz vs. People
the value of the present currency and that at the time

when the law fixing a minimum indemnity” was passed.53
Pantoja explained that, at its writing, “due to economic
circumstances beyond governmental control, the
purchasing power of the Philippine peso has declined
further such that the rate of exchange now in the free
market is US$1.00 to P4.00 Philippine pesos.”54
None of the justices of the Court, which included
renowned Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jose B.L.
Reyes, Arsenio P. Dizon, Querube C. Makalintal, Fred Ruiz
Castro, and Enrique M. Fernando, regarded as amounting
to judicial legislation the decision interpreting the P3,000
minimum for death compensation established by law in
1949 as P12,000 in the economy of the late 60s. There is no
record of Congress disagreeing with them. It makes no
sense for the Court to refuse to use the same reasoning and
not employ it to the judicial construction of the penalty
provisions in crimes involving property.
It is of course said that Article 2206 of the Civil Code
merely sets the minimum civil liability for death at P3,000,
implying that courts are free to grant benefits to the
victim’s heirs upwards of that minimum. This is true but
the Court’s decisions were not in the nature of mere
suggestions regarding how the courts below are to exercise
their discretions when awarding such benefit. The Court
has actually been raising the minimum civil liability for
death. Proof of this is that when the trial court or the CA
orders the payment of only P50,000 to the victim’s heirs, an
amount already well above the minimum of P3,000 set by
law, the Court would readily find the order erroneous and
raise the award to P75,000.
Some would say that Article 2206 of the Civil Code
merely governs civil indemnity whereas Article 315 of the
Revised
_______________
53 Id., at pp. 457-458; p. 473.
54 Id., at p. 458; id.
138

Corpuz vs. People
Penal Code on penalties for estafa governs criminal

liability, implying that the latter is quite different. But the
Civil Code stands on the same footing as the Revised Penal
Code in terms of force and effect. One is not superior to the
other. The point is that prudent judicial construction works
equally on both codes.
In any event, the rule is that in case of doubt the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are to be construed in
favor of the accused. What has happened, however, is that
the Court has beginning in 1964 construed the minimum
amount set in Article 2206 as subject to adjustment to cope
with inflation although this worked against the accused in
murder and homicide cases. The Court has not come
around to give the same construction to the inflation-
affected penalty provisions of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code which would be favorable to him.
Incidentally, it is not the severity of the penalty written
in the law that the Court has to adjust in order to
compensate for inflation but the amount of the fraud or the
damage that was proved at the trial. For instance, if an
offender defrauds another of P20,000 worth of jewelry
items today and he is found guilty, the trial court could
make a finding that he had committed fraud in that
amount. During sentencing, however, it would just
determine, applying the P1 to P100 equation stated above,
that such P20,000 is the equivalent of P200 in the economy
of the 1930 table of penalties. The court would then apply
the penalty provided by law for such reduced amount: 4
months and 1 day to 6 months. It would have been that
simple.
It is pointed out that the Court’s remedy in Corpuz’s and
similar cases lies in Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
the pertinent portion of which provides:
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending
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Corpuz vs. People
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the

provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice
and injury caused by the offense.55
But the above applies to a specific case before the court

that tried it where, “taking into consideration the degree of
malice and injury caused by the offense,”56 the penalty to
be imposed on the accused appears to be excessive. This is
best exemplified in a case where the trial court regarded as
excessive the lawful penalty it imposed on a father and his
son who stole 10 tender coconut fruits from a plantation
solely for the family’s consumption.57
Here, however, the penalty has become excessive, not
because of the unusual circumstances of Corpuz’s case but
because the penalty has become grossly iniquitous through
time, affecting not just Corpuz but all those charged with
crimes the penalties for which depend on the value of
money or property involved.
It is said that this decision would cause numerous
difficulties one of which is that the Court does not have the
means for ascertaining the purchasing power of the peso at
any given time.
But it has the means. The Philippine Statistical
Authority (PSA), formerly the National Statistics Office is
the “highest policy making body on statistical matters.”58 It
regularly gathers from the marketplace the average prices
of a basket of
_______________
55 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 5.
56 Id.
57 People v. Montano and Cabagsang, 57 Phil. 598 (1932); People v.
Canja, 86 Phil. 518 (1950), (see Dissenting Opinion of J. Montemayor, pp.
522-523).
58 Arsenio M. Balisacan, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and
Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority (April
23, 2014).
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Corpuz vs. People
consumer items like rice, sugar, fish, meat, school

supplies, and other products.59 The PSA then determines
based on these the purchasing power of the peso in a given
year in relation to other years. “[O]nce the data generated
by the PSA staff is approved and released by the National
Statistician, it is deemed official and controlling statistics
of the government.”60 It is the PSA that provided the
official finding that the P1 in 1949 is the equivalent of
about P100 in 2013.61 This information is used by
government planners, international rating agencies,
economists, researchers, businessmen, academicians, and
students. The rules allow the Court to take judicial notice
of this fact.62
The OSG claims that there are many ways of
determining the present value of money, not just through
its purchasing power as the PSA determines. This may be
true but it is presumed that the legislature intended the
term “value” in reference to money based on how money is
commonly understood, not on how it might be understood
by theoreticians or moralists. Everyone knows that the
value of money of any amount depends on what it can buy
— its purchasing power. People do not earn and keep
money for its own sake.
_______________
59 National Statistics Office, Consumer Price Index Primer available at
http://www.census.gov.ph/old/data/technotes/Primer%20on%20Consumer%20Price%20Index.pdf
(last accessed March 21, 2014); Philippine Statistics Authority, Consumer
Price Index for Bottom 30% Income Households, Reference No. 2014-005
(January 30, 2014).
60 Balisacan, supra note 58.
61 Ericta, supra note 23.
62 Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that a court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the official
acts of government. It may also take judicial notice as provided in Section
2 of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions. Indeed, the Court has in the past consistently
taken note of and acted on the inflationary movement of the purchasing
power of the peso.
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Another concern is that if the Court adjusts the penalty

to cope with inflation, such adjustments may have
unintended effects on other crimes where the penalties
depend on the value of the damage caused or the property
unlawfully taken. Any adjustment of penalty in Corpuz
would of course directly affect most of these crimes. That is
inevitable if justice is to be served in those other cases as
well since the same reasoning applies to them.
For instance, if a poor woman steals four small cans of
corned beef from the supermarket worth P280, which
would be only P2.80 in 1932, she will be jailed for 4 years
and 2 months maximum. If a poor employee pockets P250
in government money entrusted to him, which would be
only P2.50 in 1932, he will be jailed for 10 years maximum.
If one armed with a knife but commits no violence or
intimidation robs a public building by forcibly opening a
window and stealing two brooms worth P300, which would
be only P3.00 in 1932, he will be jailed for a maximum of 20
years. The absurdity in the literal application of the 1932
penalties equally applies to these crimes.
The uniform adjustment in the base amounts using the
PSA formula of P1 to P100 will maintain uniform levels of
legislative indignation or outrage over the wrongs
committed in these crimes. The harshness of the
incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every
P10,000.00 would be obviated since the adjustment would
make that one year imprisonment for every P1,000,000.00
illegally taken, which would be quite reasonable already.
For this reason, no distortion can ever result in the
application of the decision in similar cases.
To repeat, from this dissent’s point of view, it is the
amount of money or value of the thing defrauded, taken,
malversed, or damaged that undergoes adjustment or
correction resulting from a realistic appreciation of the
facts of the case. The law is not amended or changed.
Finally, there is concern that if this dissent were to be
adopted, the same would result in the lowering of the
penal-
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Corpuz vs. People
ties that courts have these past years been meting out for
crimes involving property. It is pointed out that the ruling
fails to take into account its effect on the victims.
But the dissent is not advocating the lowering of the
penalties for those crimes; it merely seeks the restoration
of the correct penalties. The adjustments sought would
merely compensate for inflation in order to accomplice
what the legislature intends regarding those crimes. The
victims of crimes today are not entitled to retributions that
are harsher than what the law provides. They have no
right to exact more blood than the victims of yesterday.
For all the above reasons, I vote to AFFIRM Lito
Corpuz’s conviction with MODIFICATION of the
indeterminate penalty to 2 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 1 year and 8 months of prisión correccional,
as maximum, entitling him to probation under the ruling
laid down in Colinares v. People.63
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
“Since we cannot change reality,

let us change the eyes which see reality.”
Nikos Kazantzakis1
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta in affirming the conviction of Lito Corpuz.
However, I dissent on the penalty imposed by the majority.
I do not agree that it is judicial legislation for us to
reconsider the range of penalties created by Congress in
1932. The range of penalties for
_______________
63 G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 266.
1 Greek writer, poet, playwright, and philosopher, known for his novels
such as Zorba the Greek (1946) and The Last Temptation of Christ (1953).
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Corpuz vs. People
the crime of estafa should be recomputed based on present

value.
Our duty is to interpret the law. It is a duty reposed on
us by the Constitution. We provide meaning to law’s
language and make laws written in a different historical
context relevant to present reality.2
The meanings of the text of the law limited by the facts
presented in the cases that come to us are not arbitrarily
determined. We arrive at such meanings as a collegial
court aware that we should keep faith in the spirit that the
laws have been promulgated. Our ideal should be that we
can reflect the political consensus contained in the words
approved by Congress and the President but always framed
by the fundamental principles and values of our
Constitution. Political consensus is not independent of
reality. It is there to address that reality.
My sense of the law’s spirit is that it is always motivated
by what is relevant and what is just under the
circumstances.
Viewed in this way, I must dissent in the penalty
imposed upon the accused. The pecuniary values that
provided the basis for the range of penalties for the crime of
estafa (swindling) were the values in 1932. It is clear that
the gravity of a crime where someone was defrauded of fifty
pesos (P50.00) of property in 1932 is not the same as the
gravity of the same offense for property worth fifty pesos
(P50.00) in 2014. The purchasing power of the peso has
significantly changed after eight decades, and it is time
that we interpret the law the way it should be: to reflect
the relative range of values it had when it was
promulgated. In doing so, we are not rewriting the law, just
construing what it actually means.
_______________
2 Ours is the duty to “interpret the law and apply it to breathe life to
its language and give expression to its spirit in the context of real facts.”
(Emphasis supplied). Tecson v. COMELEC, 468 Phil. 421, 643; 424 SCRA
277, 441 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], Dissenting Oinion, J. Carpio-
Morales.
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Corpuz vs. People
Of course, every interpretation we make on any

provision of law occasioned by actual cases will have their
own share of difficulties when implemented. This is true
when we declare law relied upon by many as
unconstitutional, or interpret the provisions of a tax code,
or even when we clarify the requirements prescribed by the
General Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM). We
have always, however, proceeded with the right
interpretation and dealt with the difficulties accordingly.
Definitely, an interpretation of a legal provision more
beneficial to an accused or a person who is convicted will
have a retroactive effect. This should be because such
interpretation is corrective in nature. This should not
present extremely debilitating difficulties, and we do not
have to have special rules. The convicted prisoner could
simply file habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy
whenever he or she would have served more than what
would be required based on our new interpretations. It is
also possible for the Department of Justice’s Bureau of
Corrections and Parole and Probation Administration to
adopt its own guidelines on the release of prisoners. This
difficulty is not insurmountable.
I disagree that it will be difficult to find the correct
present value for the amounts involved. In Heirs of the
Spouses Tria v. Land Bank of the Philippines3 and
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
v. Spouses Tecson,4 we identified the correct formula in our
concurring and dissenting opinions. The formula for
present value is known and has been relied upon in the
business community. Inflation rates may be discovered
using the latest statistics extrapolating for the years when
there had been no available values. I agree with the
approach of Justice Roberto A. Abad in his dissent-
_______________
3 G.R. No. 170245, July 1, 2013, 700 SCRA 188, Separate Opinion, J.
Leonen.
4 G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013, 700 SCRA 243, Separate Opinion, J.
Leonen.
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Corpuz vs. People
ing opinion in approximating the value already so that we

do not need to get unnecessarily entangled in the niceties of
the science and art of determining inflation rates.
Even the inflation rate should not present an
extraordinarily insurmountable problem even if it should
be computed from 1932. Inflation is only the change in
price of the same index from one year to the next. Price
index is the “measure of the average level of prices,”5 while
inflation is the “rise in the general level of prices.”6 As long
as there is a price index, inflation rate can be derived from
comparing one year’s price index with another year’s price
index.
The most commonly used price index is the Consumer
Price Index. The Philippines began recording the
Consumer Price Index in 1948, together with the creation
of the Central Bank of the Philippines.7
However, even before the creation of the Central Bank,
the Philippines had been recording other price indices that
could be used to approximate inflation and give a more
precise picture of the price level in 1930, the year the
Revised Penal Code was approved. A sectoral price index
can be used to substitute the consumer price index. A
dominant sector in the Philippines, agriculture, has a price
index which pre-dates
_______________
5 P. A. SAMUELSON AND W. D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS, p. 439 (Eighteenth
Edition).
6 Id.
7 The Central Bank was created by law under Republic Act No. 265 in
1949. Sections 22 to 24 refer to the Department of Economic Research in
the Central Bank, mandated, among other responsibilities, to collect
“statistics on the monthly movement of the money supply and of prices
and other statistical series and economic studies useful for the
formulation and analysis of monetary, banking and exchange policies.”
Because of this, the Central Bank started recording national income
estimates in the 1948-1950 period. See K. Nozawa, History of the
Philippine Statistical System <http://www.ier.
hit-u.ac.jp/COE/Japanese/Newsletter/No.13.english/Nozawa.html> (visited
April 29, 2014).
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Corpuz vs. People
World War I and covers the years 1902 until 1946.8 Hence,
even before the war, for as long as the index compared with
one from another is the same index, an inflation rate can be
derived.
Law has never been a discipline too autonomous from
the other disciplines. The points of view of those that
inhabit the world of economics and finance are not strange
to lawyers. The eyes through which the law views reality
should not be too parochial and too narrow. Our
understanding should instead be open enough to allow us
to see more by borrowing from other disciplines. Doing so
enhances rather than weakens judicial rigor.
I am not convinced that a ruling that will affect
penalties in other crimes where the gravity is measured in
pesos will present difficulties too debilitating so as to
amount to being unimplementable. I do not see why courts
of law cannot simply adopt the universally acceptable
formula for present value.
An interpretative methodology for penalties is proposed
because of the extraordinary lapse of time from the date of
promulgation of the law (1932) to the present. Definitely,
we will not be recomputing the penalties for all statutes. I
am of the view that the approach for computing the
penalties in this case will only be applicable to statutes
that have been promulgated and have not been amended
for no less than the past eight decades. The world was very
different then. A world war intervened. Four different
Constitutions with their corresponding amendments were
promulgated and took effect.
_______________
8 Agricultural statistics are collected to monitor production volume and
prices of agricultural products, among others. A statistics division was
created for the Bureau of Agriculture as early as 1902. See K. Nozawa,
History of the Philippine Statistical System <http://www.ier.hit-
u.ac.jp/COE/Japanese/Newsletter/No.13.english/
Nozawa.html> (visited April 29, 2014).
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Corpuz vs. People
There are now more types of property than could have been
imagined at that time.
I hesitate to agree with Justice Carpio’s approach to
declare the incremental penalties as unconstitutional only
because it violates the proscription against cruel and
unusual punishments. The approach creatively addresses
the unjustness of the present situation but does not have
the same elegance of principle that is proposed in the
dissent of Justice Abad. Both lead to pragmatic results, and
I think that between these two possibilities, we should lean
on that which is more consistent with the principle of
reflecting the spirit of the law when it was promulgated.
A decision that recomputes penalties to account for
present value should not be seen as a judgment of the
achievements of Congress. That this was not its priority is
a matter that should not concern us. Congress is an
entirely separate and autonomous branch of government,
and it would be violative of the constitutional fiat of
separation of powers for us to imply that updating penal
statutes should have been its priority.
Regardless, it is this actual case that confronts us. In my
view, adjusting penalties to account for the purchasing
power of the peso is entirely within our power. It is not
judicial legislation, it is merely interpreting the word
“peso” in these range of penalties. It is quintessentially a
judicial activity to interpret. We should not default on this
duty. We cannot wait another century before a just
outcome is to be realized.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to affirm the conviction of the
accused. However, I vote that the penalty imposed be two
months of arresto mayor as minimum, to one year and
eight months of prisión correccional, as maximum, in
accordance with the computation proposed by Justice
Roberto Abad in his dissenting opinion.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with

modification.
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Corpuz vs. People
Notes.—Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC,

the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as
follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended
party to the offender. (Jandusay vs. People, 698 SCRA 619
[2013])
Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the
prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence. (Id.)
——o0o——
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G.R. No. 180016. April 29, 2014.*

Criminal Law; Estafa; The gravamen of the crime of estafa

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corpuz vs. People

did not err in finding that the Information was substantially

VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 3

Corpuz vs. People

demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness

penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice

Corpuz vs. People

branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corpuz vs. People

VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 7

Corpuz vs. People

and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon

Sereno, CJ., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that I concur with the

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corpuz vs. People

VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 9

Corpuz vs. People

continually checked penalties in criminal cases, adjusted the

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corpuz vs. People

view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is

Carpio, J., Dissenting Opinion:

VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 11

Corpuz vs. People

Corpuz vs. People

court sentenced petitioner to a maximum term of 15 years. This

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Corpuz vs. People

minimum penalties. Hence, petitioner’s term of imprisonment

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corpuz vs. People

ured using relevant standards unrelated to questions of criminal

Brion, J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; View that what they

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Corpuz vs. People

errors. In reviewing criminal cases, we recognize our duty to

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corpuz vs. People

Same; Same; Judicial Power; View that Section 1, paragraph

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Corpuz vs. People

authority to define what constitutes a particular crime in this

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corpuz vs. People

Corpuz vs. People

was a policy decision that Congress had the prerogative to make.

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corpuz vs. People

Abad, J., Dissenting Opinion:

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Corpuz vs. People

did. Clearly, they were uninformed and, therefore, their intent

22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED