FILAMER vs.

CA
FACTS:
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr (Kapunan)., an 82 old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was struck by the Pinoy
jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas
Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries
for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days.

Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was functioning.
Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized
driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The two fled from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious
victim to the hospital.

Thereafter, Kapunan, Sr. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in the City Court of Roxas City for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Kapunan, Sr. reserved his right to file an independent civil action. The inferior court
found Funtecha guilty as charged and on appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the then Court of First Instance of Capiz.

Pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages before the RTC. Named defendants in the complaint
were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha. Also included was Agustin Masa, the director and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in
his personal capacity "in that he personally authorized and allowed said Daniel Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the
incident, to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or
permit to drive said vehicle. His son, Allan Masa, who was with Funtecha at the time of the accident, was not impleaded as a co-
defendant.

RTC Ruling:
 On December 14, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be
at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party the payment of the amount of damages.
 And without prejudice to the right of defendant Filamer Christian Institute to demand from co-defendant Daniel Funtecha
part time employee and/or Allan Masa a full time employee reimbursement of the damages paid to herein plaintiff.
 Defendant Agustin Masa as director of defendant Filamer Christian Institute has also failed to exercise the diligence
required of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employee Allan Masa, being his son.
 The court absolved defendant Agustin Masa from any personal liability with respect to the complaint led against him in his
personal and private capacity, cause he was not in the vehicle during the alleged incident.
 The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant has failed to prove that there was a policy violation made by
the defendant Filamer Christian Institute which absolves them from liability under the aforesaid insurance policy. The
record shows that the defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle was having a student drivers license and
accompanied by Allan Masa who is the authorized driver of said vehicle with a professional drivers license as shown. (As
third party defendants they are ordered to pay Filamer.)
 Court finds that defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle is considered as authorized driver
in accordance with the policy in question.

CA Ruling:
 Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower court's judgment to
the Court of Appeals and as a consequence, said lower court's decision became final as to Funtecha.
 For failure of the insurance to pay the docket fees, its appeal was dismissed on September 18, 1984.
 It affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC basing it in Art. 2180 of Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha.

RULING: CA is set-aside. The complaint for damages is ordered DISMISSED as against petitioner Filamer Christian
Institute for lack of cause of action.

In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, 7 specifically Section 14,
Rule X of Book III which reads:
Sec. 14. Working Scholars— There is no employer-employee relationship between students on the one hand, and schools,
colleges or universities on the other, where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge;
provided the students are given real opportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to finish their
chosen courses under such arrangement."

It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer.
Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition. Funtecha
worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to
6:00 a.m. with sufcient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not
included in the company payroll.

The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. To dismiss the implementing rule as one which
governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not where there is already a third person involved,
as espoused by private respondents, is to read into the law something that was not legislated there in the first place. The provision
of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks to dene in categorical terms the
precise status of working scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education.

But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his
wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has
been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was
to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the
authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third
person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words, at the time of the injury, Funtecha was not
engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair
therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the
damages he had caused.

Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily answerable to the injured party under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code would have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa, the authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and
undisputably an employee of petitioner. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced
Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan, Sr. But under the
present set of circumstances, even if the trial court did find Allan guilty of negligence, such conclusion would not be binding on
Allan. It must be recalled that Allan was never impleaded in the complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as
far as the trial court's judgment is concerned. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a
stranger.