Dfgethd

SPOUSES ERNESTO and
EVELYN SICAD, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUDY CRISTINA M. VALDERRAMA
and JESUS ANTONIO VALDERRAMA, respondents.
Quiason, Makalintal, Barot, Torres & Ibarra for petitioners.

Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The late Aurora Virto Vda. de Montinola executed a deed entitled

"DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS" on December 11, 1979. It named as
donees her grandchildren, herein private respondents, namely; Catalino
Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama. The
donated property consisted of a parcel of land located at Brgy. Pawa, Panay
Capiz covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105 in the
name of Montinola. The deed was presented for recording in the Property
Registry, and the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-16105 and, in its place,
issued TCT No. T-16622 in the names of the donees. Montinola, however,
retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title, as well as the property itself,
until she transferred the same to herein petitioners, the spouses Ernesto and
Evelyn Sicad ten (10) years later, on July 10, 1990. On March 12, 1987, Aurora
Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the donation. She filed a petition with
the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16622
and the reinstatement of TCT No. T-16105. Montinola's petition was founded on
the theory that donation to her (three) 3 grandchildren was one mortis
causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not,
the donation was void. The donees opposed the petition. They averred that the
donation in their favor was one inter vivos which having fully complied with the
requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly valid
and efficacious. The trial court rendered judgment holding that the donation was
indeed one inter vivos and dismissing Montinola's petition for lack of merit.
Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. She, however, died pending
the appeal. The appellate court, upon motion, ordered the substitution of Ofelia
de Leon, Estela M. Jaen, and Teresita M. Valderrama as plaintiffs-appellants in
place of the late Aurora Montinola, as well as the joinder of the spouses Ernesto
and Evelyn Sicad as additional appellants. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court. The issue raised in this appeal centers on
the character of the deed of donation executed by Montinola, whether inter
vivos or mortis causa. SCaDAE
The Supreme Court ruled that the donation in question, though
denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; it is void because the
essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with. A donation which
purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to
dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis
causa. In the case at bar, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the
deed of donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees.
They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the
right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More
importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property. They were
simply "paper owners" of the donated property.
SYLLABUS
CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; DONATION; A

DONATION WHICH PURPORTS TO BE ONE INTER VIVOS BUT WITHHOLDS
FROM THE DONEE THE RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF THE DONATED
PROPERTY DURING THE DONOR'S LIFETIME IS IN TRUTH ONE MORTIS
CAUSA; CASE AT BAR. — The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by
both its language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the
circumstances attendant upon its execution. In this respect, case law has laid
down significant parameters. Thus, in a decision handed down in 1946,
this Court construed a deed purporting to be a donation inter vivos to be in truth
one mortis causa because it stipulated (like the one now being inquired into)
"that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the
exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, Margarita David, during her lifetime;
and that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties
could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any
other way possible." On these essential premises, the Court said, such a
donation must be deemed one "mortis causa, because the combined effect of the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation and of the
above-quoted clauses thereof . . . (was that) the most essential
elements of ownership — the right to dispose of the donated properties and the
right to enjoy the products, profits, possession — remained with Margarita David
during her lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only after Margarita David's
death." So too, in the case at bar, did these rights remain with Aurora Montinola
during her lifetime, and could not pass to the donees until ten (10) years after her
death. In another case decided in 1954 involving a similar issue, Bonsato
vs. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized that the decisive
characteristics of a donation mortis causa, which it had taken into account
in David vs. Sison, were that "the donor not only reserved for herself all the
fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important,
specially provided that 'without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the
donated properties could not be disposed of in any way; thereby denying to the
transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the
properties." A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from
the donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime
is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is
not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. " In the instant case,
nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question
to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get
possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits
thereof. or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they
did not acquire the right to dispose of the property — this would accrue to them
only after ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid
hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper
owners" of the donated property. All these circumstances including, to repeat, the
explicit provisions of the deed of donation — reserving the
exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or
encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death — ineluctably
lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa,
contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's
demise. caIEAD
DECISION
NARVASA, C .J : p
(Spouses Sicad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125888, [August 13, 1998], 355
|||
PHIL 616-628)

Dfgethd

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Dfgethd

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Dfgethd

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SPOUSES ERNESTO and

Quiason, Makalintal, Barot, Torres & Ibarra for petitioners.

The late Aurora Virto Vda. de Montinola executed a deed entitled

CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; DONATION; A

You might also like

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.