Case Digest of Go v. Sandiganbayan

GO V.
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2017
Callejo, Sr., J.
Topics : Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 and its Elements; Applicable to Private

Persons in Conspiracy; and Application of Section 3 (h) of RA 3019
by analogy
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Henry Go, then Chairman and President of the Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), along with Vicente Rivera, then Secretary
of Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), were charged with
violation of Section (g) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in
relation to the nullification of the PIATCO contracts entered into between the
Government, through the DOTC and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA),
and PIATCO for reasons that PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest was not a qualified
bidder as it failed to meet the financial capability requirement under the Build-Operate-
and-Transfer (BOT) Law and for being contrary to public policy. These voided contracts
were for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
The Information alleged that sometime in 1998, the petitioner conspired with
Rivera when he signed the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) which
ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the said
construction with terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Petitioner Go then filed before the Sandiganbayan his Motion to Quash on the
grounds, among others, that he could not be charged under Section 3 (g) of RA 3019
because he is not a public officer, which is an essential element of the crime, thus
neither is he capacitated to enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government.
The Sandiganbayan, however, denied his motion. Hence, this instant petition for
certiorari before the Court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 embraces a private person within its
proviso thereby indicting petitioner Go with a violation of said offense.
(2) Whether or not the conviction of a private person with a violation of Section 3
(h) of the same law may likewise be applied to the case of petitioner Go by
analogy.
ABRENICA, M7
RULING:
(1)Yes, Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 embraces a private person within its proviso
thereby indicting petitioner Go with a violation of said offense.
Section 1 of RA 3019 stipulates the purpose of the law which is the repression of
certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices
or which may lead thereto. Such that, Section 3 (g) of said law enumerates the corrupt
practice of entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer
profited or will profit thereby. To be charged with this offense, the following elements
must concur:
1) that the accused is a public officer;

2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government;
and
3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.
In this case, the fact that petitioner Go is not a public officer but is charged with
conspiracy with a public officer in the commission of the said offense deemed the first
requirement satisfied for to do otherwise would go against the letter and spirit of the
avowed policy of the law. Simply put, the petitioner not being a public officer does not
necessarily take him out of the ambit of Section 3 (g). It then follows that the remaining
elements are also satisfied since the petitioner conspired with Rivera when he signed
the ARCA which provides that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in
the event of the latter’s default which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO and
manifestly grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Verily, Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 embraces a private person within its proviso
thereby indicting petitioner Go with a violation of said offense.
(2)Yes, the conviction of a private person with a violation of Section 3 (h) of

the same law may likewise be applied to the case of petitioner Go by
analogy.
In the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan1, Diosdado Garcia, then proprietor of
D.T. Garcia Construction Supply, together with Jaime Domingo, then municipal mayor of
San Manuel, Isabela, was charged with Section 3 (h) of RA 3019 as it appeared that he
was used by Domingo as a dummy to cover up his business transaction with the
municipality.
1
G.R. No. 149175, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 203
ABRENICA, M7
Section 3 (h) of the anti-graft law provides for the corrupt practice of directly or
indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction
in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which
he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having an interest. The elements
of this offense are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction; and
(3) he either:
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such
interest, or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Despite the first element mentioned above, the Court affirmed the conviction of
Garcia, a private individual, as well as that of Domingo, who was then a municipal
mayor, for violation of Section 3 (h) of RA 3019. In so holding, the Court established that
Domingo and Garcia acted in conspiracy with one another in the commission of the
offense. Domingo thus also serves to debunk petitioner Go's theory that where an
offense has as one of its elements that the accused is a public officer, it necessarily
excludes private persons from the scope of such offense.
The rule laid down from the cited jurisprudence that applies to the present case
of petitioner Go is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses
under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in consonance
with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act, or which may lead
thereto.
Thus, the conviction of a private person with a violation of Section 3 (h) of RA

3019 may likewise be applied to the case of petitioner Go by analogy.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ABRENICA, M7

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GO V.

Topics : Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 and its Elements; Applicable to Private

1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2)Yes, the conviction of a private person with a violation of Section 3 (h) of

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

Thus, the conviction of a private person with a violation of Section 3 (h) of RA

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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