Discovery and Verification of Neighbor Positions in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Discovery and Verification of Neighbor Positions in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Discovery and Verification of Neighbor Positions in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Ad Hoc Networks
ABSTRACT:
AIM:
SYNOPSIS:
EXISTING SYSTEM:
Secure neighbor discovery (SND) deals with the identification of nodes with which
a communication link can be established or that are within a given distance. SND
is only a step toward the solution we are after: simply put, an adversarial node
could be securely discovered as neighbor and be indeed a neighbor (within some
SND range), but it could still cheat about its position within the same range. RF
signal doesn’t support for to discover the neighbor position.
DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:
PROPOSED SYSTEM:
This approach has no need for lengthy interactions, e.g., to reach a consensus
among multiple nodes, making our scheme suitable for both low- and high
mobility environments; It is reactive, meaning that it can be executed by any node,
at any point in time, without prior knowledge of the neighborhood. It is robust
against independent and colluding adversaries. It is lightweight, as it generates low
overhead traffic. To our knowledge, our protocol is the first to provide a fully
distributed, lightweight solution to the NPV problem that does not require any
infrastructure or a priori trusted neighbors and is robust to several different attacks,
including coordinated attacks by colluding adversaries.
Poll Message
request
Poll Message
response
Node A
Node B
Node C Node D
BLOCK DIAGRAM:
MODULES:
MODULES DESCRIPTION:
The verifier starts the protocol by broadcasting a POLL whose transmission time
is stores locally. The POLL is anonymous, since 1) it does not carry the identity of
the verifier, 2) it is transmitted employing a fresh, software-generated MAC
address, and 3) it contains a public key K0S taken from S’s pool of anonymous
one-time use keys that do not allow neighbors to map the key onto a specific node.
We stress that keeping the identity of the verifier hidden is important in order to
make our NPV robust to attacks. Since a source address has to be included in the
MAC-layer header of the message, a fresh, software-generated MAC address is
needed.
Position Verification
Once the message exchange is concluded, verifier can decrypt the received data
and acquire the position of all neighbors that participated in the protocol. The
verifier also knows the transmission time of its POLL and learns that of all
subsequent REPLY messages, as well as the corresponding reception times
recorded by the recipients of such broadcasts. Applying a ToF-based technique,
verifier thus computes its distance from each communication neighbor, as well as
the distances between all neighbor pairs sharing a link.
In the DST, verifier verifies the direct links with its communication neighbors. To
this end, it checks whether reciprocal ToF-derived distances are consistent 1) with
each other, 2) with the position advertised by the neighbor, and 3) with a proximity
range. The latter corresponds to the maximum nominal transmission range, and
upper bounds the distance at which two nodes can communicate.
The CST ignores nodes already declared as faulty by the DST and only considers
nodes that proved to be communication neighbors between each other, i.e., for
which ToF-derived mutual distances are available. The CST verifies the symmetry
of the reciprocal distances, their consistency with the positions declared by the
nodes, and with the proximity range. For each neighbor, verifier maintains a link
counter and a mismatch counts. The former is incremented at every new
crosscheck on neighbor, and records the number of links between neighbors and
other neighbors of verifier.
In MLT, it ignores nodes already tagged as faulty or unverifiable and looks for
suspect neighbors in WWS. For each neighbor that did not notify about a link
reported by another node a curve is computed and added to the set ILX . Such a
curve is the locus of points that can generate a transmission whose Time
Difference of Arrival (TDoA) at verifier and neighbor matches that measured by
the two nodes.
ALGORITHMS USED:
REFERENCE:
Marco Fiore, Member, IEEE, Claudio Ettore Casetti, Member, IEEE, Carla-
Fabiana Chiasserini, Senior Member, IEEE, and Panagiotis Papadimitratos,
Member, IEEE, “Discovery and Verification of Neighbor Positions in Mobile Ad
Hoc Networks”, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL.
12, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2013.