Discovery and Verification of Neighbor Positions in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

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Discovery and Verification of Neighbor Positions in Mobile

Ad Hoc Networks

ABSTRACT:

A growing number of ad hoc networking protocols and location-aware services


require that mobile nodes learn the position of their neighbors. However, such a
process can be easily abused or disrupted by adversarial nodes. In absence of a
priori trusted nodes, the discovery and verification of neighbor positions presents
challenges that have been scarcely investigated in the literature. In this paper, we
address this open issue by proposing a fully distributed cooperative solution that is
robust against independent and colluding adversaries, and can be impaired only by
an overwhelming presence of adversaries. Results show that our protocol can
thwart more than 99 percent of the attacks under the best possible conditions for
the adversaries, with minimal false positive rates.

AIM:

To verify the position of its communication neighbors without relying on a priori


trustworthy nodes.

SYNOPSIS:

In absence of a priori trusted nodes, the discovery and verification of


neighbor positions presents challenges that have been scarcely investigated in the
literature. In this paper, we address this open issue by proposing a fully distributed
cooperative solution that is robust against independent and colluding adversaries,
and can be impaired only by an overwhelming presence of adversaries. Geographic
routing in spontaneous networks, data gathering in sensor networks, movement
coordination among autonomous robotic nodes, location-specific services for
handheld devices, and danger warning or traffic monitoring in vehicular networks
are all examples of services that build on the availability of neighbor position
information.
The correctness of node locations is therefore an all important issue in
mobile networks, and it becomes particularly challenging in the presence of
adversaries aiming at harming the system. In these cases, we need solutions that let
nodes 1) correctly establish their location in spite of attacks feeding false location
information, and 2) verify the positions of their neighbors, so as to detect
adversarial nodes announcing false locations.

EXISTING SYSTEM:

The correctness of node locations is therefore an all important issue in mobile


networks, and it becomes particularly challenging in the presence of adversaries
aiming at harming the system. In these cases, we need solutions that let nodes 1)
correctly establish their location in spite of attacks feeding false location
information, and 2) verify the positions of their neighbors, so as to detect
adversarial nodes announcing false locations.

Secure neighbor discovery (SND) deals with the identification of nodes with which
a communication link can be established or that are within a given distance. SND
is only a step toward the solution we are after: simply put, an adversarial node
could be securely discovered as neighbor and be indeed a neighbor (within some
SND range), but it could still cheat about its position within the same range. RF
signal doesn’t support for to discover the neighbor position.
DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:

Although the literature carries a multitude of ad hoc security protocols addressing a


number of problems related to NPV, there are no lightweight, robust solutions to
NPV that can operate autonomously in an open, ephemeral environment, without
relying on trusted nodes.

PROPOSED SYSTEM:

In this paper, we focus on the latter aspect, hereinafter referred to as neighbor


position verification (NPV for short). Specifically, we deal with a mobile ad hoc
network, where a pervasive infrastructure is not present, and the location data must
be obtained through node-to-node communication. Such a scenario is of particular
interest since it leaves the door open for adversarial nodes to misuse or disrupt the
location-based services.

We deal with a mobile ad hoc network, where a pervasive infrastructure is not


present, and the location data must be obtained through node-to-node
communication. Such a scenario is of particular interest since it leaves the door
open for adversarial nodes to misuse or disrupt the location-based services. It is
designed for spontaneous ad hoc environments, and, as such, it does not rely on the
presence of a trusted infrastructure or of a priori trustworthy nodes. It leverages
cooperation but allows a node to perform all verification procedures autonomously.

This approach has no need for lengthy interactions, e.g., to reach a consensus
among multiple nodes, making our scheme suitable for both low- and high
mobility environments; It is reactive, meaning that it can be executed by any node,
at any point in time, without prior knowledge of the neighborhood. It is robust
against independent and colluding adversaries. It is lightweight, as it generates low
overhead traffic. To our knowledge, our protocol is the first to provide a fully
distributed, lightweight solution to the NPV problem that does not require any
infrastructure or a priori trusted neighbors and is robust to several different attacks,
including coordinated attacks by colluding adversaries.

ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM:

NPV protocol that has the following features:

 It is designed for spontaneous ad hoc environments, and, as such, it does not


rely on the presence of a trusted infrastructure or of a priori trustworthy
nodes;
 It leverages cooperation but allows a node to perform all verification
procedures autonomously. This approach has no need for lengthy
interactions, e.g., to reach a consensus among multiple nodes, making our
scheme suitable for both low- and highmobility environments;
 It is reactive, meaning that it can be executed by any node, at any point in
time, without prior knowledge of the neighborhood;
 It is robust against independent and colluding adversaries;
 It is lightweight, as it generates low overhead traffic.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE:

Poll Message
request

Poll Message
response

Node A

Node B

Node C Node D
BLOCK DIAGRAM:

MODULES:

 POLL message Sending


 Position Verification
 The Direct Symmetry Test (DST)
 The Cross-Symmetry Test (CST)
 The Multi-Lateration Test (MLT)

MODULES DESCRIPTION:

POLL message Sending

The verifier starts the protocol by broadcasting a POLL whose transmission time
is stores locally. The POLL is anonymous, since 1) it does not carry the identity of
the verifier, 2) it is transmitted employing a fresh, software-generated MAC
address, and 3) it contains a public key K0S taken from S’s pool of anonymous
one-time use keys that do not allow neighbors to map the key onto a specific node.
We stress that keeping the identity of the verifier hidden is important in order to
make our NPV robust to attacks. Since a source address has to be included in the
MAC-layer header of the message, a fresh, software-generated MAC address is
needed.
Position Verification

Once the message exchange is concluded, verifier can decrypt the received data
and acquire the position of all neighbors that participated in the protocol. The
verifier also knows the transmission time of its POLL and learns that of all
subsequent REPLY messages, as well as the corresponding reception times
recorded by the recipients of such broadcasts. Applying a ToF-based technique,
verifier thus computes its distance from each communication neighbor, as well as
the distances between all neighbor pairs sharing a link.

The Direct Symmetry Test (DST)

In the DST, verifier verifies the direct links with its communication neighbors. To
this end, it checks whether reciprocal ToF-derived distances are consistent 1) with
each other, 2) with the position advertised by the neighbor, and 3) with a proximity
range. The latter corresponds to the maximum nominal transmission range, and
upper bounds the distance at which two nodes can communicate.

The Cross-Symmetry Test (CST)

The CST ignores nodes already declared as faulty by the DST and only considers
nodes that proved to be communication neighbors between each other, i.e., for
which ToF-derived mutual distances are available. The CST verifies the symmetry
of the reciprocal distances, their consistency with the positions declared by the
nodes, and with the proximity range. For each neighbor, verifier maintains a link
counter and a mismatch counts. The former is incremented at every new
crosscheck on neighbor, and records the number of links between neighbors and
other neighbors of verifier.

The MultiLateration Test (MLT)

In MLT, it ignores nodes already tagged as faulty or unverifiable and looks for
suspect neighbors in WWS. For each neighbor that did not notify about a link
reported by another node a curve is computed and added to the set ILX . Such a
curve is the locus of points that can generate a transmission whose Time
Difference of Arrival (TDoA) at verifier and neighbor matches that measured by
the two nodes.

ALGORITHMS USED:

 Message exchange protocol: verifier.


 Message exchange protocol: any neighbor.
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION:-
HARDWARE CONFIGURATION:-

 Processor - Pentium –IV


 Speed - 1.1 Ghz
 RAM - 256 MB(min)
 Hard Disk - 20 GB
 Key Board - Standard Windows Keyboard
 Mouse - Two or Three Button Mouse
 Monitor - SVGA
SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION:-

 Operating System : Windows XP


 Programming Language : JAVA
 Java Version : JDK 1.6 & above.

REFERENCE:

Marco Fiore, Member, IEEE, Claudio Ettore Casetti, Member, IEEE, Carla-
Fabiana Chiasserini, Senior Member, IEEE, and Panagiotis Papadimitratos,
Member, IEEE, “Discovery and Verification of Neighbor Positions in Mobile Ad
Hoc Networks”, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL.
12, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2013.

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