Pua V Spouses Tiong
Pua V Spouses Tiong
Pua V Spouses Tiong
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR. , J : p
Under consideration is the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by petitioner Ting Ting
Pua (Pua) of our Resolution dated April 18, 2012 effectively af rming the Decision 1 and
Resolution 2 dated March 31, 2011 and September 26, 2011, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93755, which, in turn, reversed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Manila, Branch 29 in Civil Case No. 97-83027.
As culled from the adverted RTC Decision, as adopted for the most part by the CA, the
antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:
The controversy arose from a Complaint for a Sum of Money 3 led by petitioner Pua
against respondent-spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong (Benito) and Caroline Siok Ching Teng
(Caroline). In the complaint, Pua prayed that, among other things, respondents, or then
defendants, pay Pua the amount of eight million ve hundred thousand pesos
(PhP8,500,000), covered by a check. (Exhibit "A," for plaintiff)
During trial, petitioner Pua clari ed that the PhP8,500,000 check was given by respondents
to pay the loans they obtained from her under a compounded interest agreement on
various dates in 1988. 4 As Pua narrated, her sister, Lilian Balboa (Lilian), vouched for
respondents' ability to pay so that when respondents approached her, she immediately
acceded and lent money to respondents without requiring any collateral except post-dated
checks bearing the borrowed amounts. 5 In all, respondents issued 17 6 checks for a total
amount of one million nine hundred seventy- ve thousand pesos (PhP1,975,000). These
checks were dishonored upon presentment to the drawee bank. 7 DcITHE
The trial court, however, refused to order respondents to pay petitioner the amount of
PhP8,500,000 considering that the agreement to pay interest on the loan was not
expressly stipulated in writing by the parties. The RTC, instead, ordered respondents to pay
the principal amount of the loan as represented by the 17 checks plus legal interest from
the date of demand. As rectified, 3 6 the dispositive portion of RTC's Decision reads:
Defendant-spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng, are
hereby ordered jointly and solidarily:
Aggrieved, respondents went to the CA arguing that the court a quo erred in nding that
they obtained and are liable for a loan from petitioner. To respondents, petitioner has not
suf ciently proved the existence of the loan that they supposedly acquired from her way
back in the late 1980s by any written agreement or memorandum.
By Decision of March 31, 2011, as reiterated in a Resolution dated September 26, 2011,
the appellate court set aside the RTC Decision holding that Asiatrust Bank Check No.
BND057550 was an incomplete delivered instrument and that petitioner has failed to
prove the existence of respondents' indebtedness to her. Hence, the CA added, petitioner
does not have a cause of action against respondents. 3 7
Hence, petitioner came to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari 3 8 alleging
grievous reversible error on the part of the CA in reversing the ndings of the court a quo.
HcDaAI
As adverted to at the outset, the Court, in a Minute Resolution dated April 18, 2012,
resolved to deny the petition. 3 9
In this Motion for Reconsideration, 4 0 petitioner pleads that this Court take a second hard
look on the facts and issues of the present case and af rm the RTC's case disposition.
Petitioner argues, in the main, that the nding of the appellate court that petitioner has not
established respondents' indebtedness to her is not supported by the evidence on record
and is based solely on respondents' general denial of liability.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued in their Comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 6, 2012 that the CA correctly ruled that Asiatrust Check
No. BND057550 is an incomplete instrument which found its way into petitioner's hands
and that the petitioner failed to prove respondents' indebtedness to her. Petitioner, so
respondents contend, failed to show to whom the 17 1988 checks were delivered, for
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what consideration or purpose, and under whose account said checks were deposited or
negotiated.
Clearly, the issue in the present case is factual in nature as it involves an inquiry into the
very existence of the debt supposedly owed by respondents to petitioner.
The general rule is that this Court in petitions for review on certiorari only concerns itself
with questions of law, not of fact, 4 1 the resolution of factual issues being the primary
function of lower courts. 4 2 However, several exceptions have been laid down by
jurisprudence to allow the scrutiny of the factual arguments advanced by the contending
parties, viz.: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible ; (3) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the ndings
of fact are con icting ; (6) there is no citation of speci c evidence on which the factual
ndings are based; (7) the ndings of absence of fact are contradicted by the
presence of evidence on record ; (8) the ndings of the CA are contrary to those
of the trial court ; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion ; (10) the ndings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
ndings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. 4 3 At the very least, therefore, the
inconsonance of the ndings of the RTC and the CA regarding the existence of the loan
sanctions the recalibration of the evidence presented by the parties before the trial court.
In the main, petitioner asserts that respondents owed her a sum of money way back in
1988 for which the latter gave her several checks. These checks, however, had all been
dishonored and petitioner has not been paid the amount of the loan plus the agreed
interest. In 1996, respondents approached her to get the computation of their liability
including the 2% compounded interest. After bargaining to lower the amount of their
liability, respondents supposedly gave her a postdated check bearing the discounted
amount of the money they owed to petitioner. Like the 1988 checks, the drawee bank
likewise dishonored this check. To prove her allegations, petitioner submitted the original
copies of the 17 checks issued by respondent Caroline in 1988 and the check issued in
1996, Asiatrust Check No. BND057750. In ruling in her favor, the RTC sustained the version
of the facts presented by petitioner. IHCacT
Respondents, on the other hand, completely deny the existence of the debt asserting that
they had never approached petitioner to borrow money in 1988 or in 1996. They
hypothesize, instead, that petitioner Pua is simply acting at the instance of her sister, Lilian,
to le a false charge against them using a check left to fund a gambling business
previously operated by Lilian and respondent Caroline. While not saying so in express
terms, the appellate court considered respondents' denial as worthy of belief.
After another circumspect review of the records of the present case, however, this Court is
inclined to depart from the findings of the CA.
Certainly, in a suit for a recovery of sum of money, as here, the plaintiff-creditor has the
burden of proof to show that defendant had not paid her the amount of the contracted
loan. However, it has also been long established that where the plaintiff-creditor
possesses and submits in evidence an instrument showing the indebtedness, a
presumption that the credit has not been satis ed arises in her favor. Thus, the defendant
is, in appropriate instances, required to overcome the said presumption and present
evidence to prove the fact of payment so that no judgment will be entered against him. 4 4
Consequently, the 17 original checks, completed and delivered to petitioner, are suf cient
by themselves to prove the existence of the loan obligation of the respondents to
petitioner. Note that respondent Caroline had not denied the genuineness of these
checks . 5 3 Instead, respondents argue that they were given to various other persons and
petitioner had simply collected all these 17 checks from them in order to damage
respondents' reputation. 5 4 This account is not only incredible; it runs counter to human
experience, as enshrined in Sec. 16 of the NIL which provides that when an instrument is
no longer in the possession of the person who signed it and it is complete in its
terms "a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is
proved."
The appellate court's justi cation in giving credit to respondents' contention that the
respondents had delivered the 17 checks to persons other than petitioner lies on the
supposed failure of petitioner "to establish for whose accounts [the checks] were
deposited and subsequently dishonored." 5 5 This is clearly contrary to the evidence on
record. It seems that the appellate court overlooked the original copies of the bank return
slips offered by petitioner in evidence. These return slips show that the 1988 checks
issued by respondent Caroline were dishonored by the drawee bank[s] because they were
"drawn against insuf cient funds." 5 6 Further, a close scrutiny of these return slips will
reveal that the checks were deposited either in petitioner's account 5 7 or in the account of
her brother, Ricardo Yulo — a fact she had previously testi ed to explaining that petitioner
indorsed some checks to her brother to pay for a part of the capital she used in her
financing business. 5 8
As for the Asiatrust check issued by respondent Caroline in 1996 to substitute the
compounded value of the 1988 checks, the appellate court likewise sympathized with
respondents' version of the story holding that it is buttressed by respondents' allegations
describing the same defense made in the two related cases led against them by
petitioner's brother-in-law, Vicente Balboa. These related cases consisted of a criminal
case for violation of BP 22 5 9 and a civil case for collection of sum of money 6 0 involving
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three (3) of the ve (5) consecutively numbered checks she allegedly left with Lilian. 6 1 It
should be noted, however, that while respondents were exculpated from their criminal
liability, 6 2 in Sps. Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng v. Vicente Balboa , 6 3
this Court sustained the factual ndings of the appellate court in the civil case nding
respondents civilly liable to pay the amount of the checks.
It bears to note that the Decision of the appellate court categorically debunked the same
defense advanced by respondents in the present case primarily because of Caroline's
admission to the contrary. The Decision of the appellate court found without any reversible
error by this Court reads, thus: DSATCI
The claim of Caroline Siok Ching Teng that the three (3) checks were part of the
blank checks she issued and delivered to Lilian Balboa, wife of plaintiff-appellee,
and intended solely for the operational expenses of their mahjong business is
belied by her admission that she issued three (3) checks (Exhs. "A", "B" "C")
because Vicente showed the listing of their account totaling P5,175,250.00 (TSN,
November 17, 1997, p. 10). 6 4 . . .
Clearly, respondents' defense that Caroline left blank checks with petitioner's sister who, it
is said, is now determined to recoup her past losses and bring nancial ruin to
respondents by falsifying the same blank checks, had already been thoroughly passed
upon and rejected by this Court. It cannot, therefore, be used to support respondents'
denial of their liability.
Respondents' other defenses are equally unconvincing. They assert that petitioner could
not have accepted a check worth PhP8.5 million considering that she should have known
that respondent Caroline had issued several checks for PhP25,000 each in favor of Lilian
and all of them had bounced. 6 5 Needless to state, an act done contrary to law cannot be
sustained to defeat a legal obligation; repeated failure to honor obligations covered by
several negotiable instruments cannot serve to defeat yet another obligation covered by
another instrument.
Indeed, it seems that respondent Caroline had displayed a cavalier attitude towards the
value, and the obligation concomitant with the issuance, of a check. As attested to by
respondents' very own witness, respondent Caroline has a documented history of issuing
insuf ciently funded checks for 69 times, at the very least. 6 6 This fact alone bolsters
petitioner's allegation that the checks delivered to her by respondent Caroline were
similarly not funded.
In Magdiwang Realty Corp. v. Manila Banking Corp. , We stressed that the quantum of
evidence required in civil cases — preponderance of evidence — "is a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability to truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto ."
6 7 Based on the evidence submitted by the parties and the legal presumptions arising
therefrom, petitioner's evidence outweighs that of respondents. This preponderance of
evidence in favor of Pua requires that a judgment ordering respondents to pay their
obligation be entered. CTDacA
As aptly held by the court a quo, however, respondents cannot be obliged to pay the
interest of the loan on the ground that the supposed agreement to pay such interest was
not reduced to writing. Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest,
speci cally mandates that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated
in writing. 6 8 Thus, the collection of interest in loans or forbearance of money is allowed
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only when these two conditions concur: (1) there was an express stipulation for the
payment of interest; (2) the agreement for the payment of the interest was reduced in
writing. 6 9 Absent any of these two conditions, the money debtor cannot be made liable for
interest. Thus, petitioner is entitled only to the principal amount of the loan plus the
allowable legal interest from the time of the demand, 7 0 at the rate of 6% per annum. 7 1
Respondent Benito cannot escape the joint and solidary liability to pay the loan on the
ground that the obligation arose from checks solely issued by his wife. Without any
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the
bene t of their family. Hence, the conjugal partnership is liable therefor. 7 2 The
unsupported allegation that respondents were separated in fact, standing alone, does not
persuade this Court to solely bind respondent Caroline and exempt Benito. As the head of
the family, there is more reason that respondent Benito should answer for the liability
incurred by his wife presumably in support of their family.
WHEREFORE , the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED . The Resolution of this Court
dated April 18, 2012 is set aside and a new one entered REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the Decision dated March 31, 2011 and the Resolution dated September 26, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93755. The Decision in Civil Case No. 97-83027
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Manila, Branch 29 is REINSTATED with
MODIFICATION . HDTSIE
Accordingly, respondents Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng are ordered
jointly and solidarily to pay petitioner PhP1,975,000 plus 6% interest per annum from April
18, 1997, until fully paid, and P200,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 47-65. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by
Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Ramon A. Cruz.
2. Id. at 67-68.
3. Records, pp. 1-4, dated April 11, 1997.
4. TSN, February 5, 1998, pp. 5, 8-9, 11-13.
5. Id. at 16.
6. Exhibits "C" to "C-16"; TSN, February 5, 1998, pp. 12-14, 19.
29. TSN, June 22, 2000, pp. 5-6; TSN, August 23, 2000, p. 3; TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 8, 14,
16.
30. TSN, June 22, 2000, p. 6.
31. TSN, June 22, 2000, p. 11; TSN, August 23, 2000, pp. 3, 5-6; TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 15-
16.
36. By Order dated April 10, 2007 to re ect the exact date from which to reckon the
computation of the interest. Records, pp. 621-622.
37. The Court of Appeals held: For one, Ting Ting has not established defendants-
appellants' indebtedness to her. She failed to establish this alleged
indebtedness in writing. No proof of any sort, not even a memorandum or a
jotting in a notebook that she released money in favor defendants-appellants
sometime in 1988 was presented . Thus, the RTC erred when it failed to consider this
fact in giving credence to Ting Ting's testimony.
Moreover, the seventeen (17) checks, though they may prove to have been
issued for valuable considerations, do not suf ciently prove [respondents']
indebtedness to Ting Ting . While now in her possession, Ting Ting failed to establish
for whose accounts they were deposited and subsequently dishonored. If at all, they
bolster [respondents'] position that the seventeen (17) checks were issued and delivered
to different people and not [petitioner]. Especially so that some of these checks were not
even deposited nor dishonored, but remained stale under circumstances that are not
attributable to the fault of [respondents].
Ting Ting's handicaps — her having no contract that proves indebtedness; her lack of
memorandum, journal, or evidence proving that money was actually released to
[respondents] with a needed note on the amount involved — more than suf ciently prove
the absence of consideration to support the check. And in so failing to dispense with her
burden of proving [respondent'] indebtedness, Ting Ting consequently has no cause of
action to pursue here. Necessarily therefore, her Complaint led on April 18, 1997 must
be dismissed. Rollo, pp. 63-64 (Emphasis supplied.)
38. Dated November 17, 2011; rollo, pp. 8-42.
43. Cereno v. CA , G.R. No. 167366, September 26, 2012, 682 SCRA 18, citing International
Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation , G.R. No. 161539, June
28, 2008, 556 SCRA 194, 199; Abalos and Sps. Salazar v. Heirs of Vicente Torio , G.R. No.
175444, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 450, 456-457, citing Spouses Andrada v. Pilhino
Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 1, 10.
44. Francisco, Ricardo J., EVIDENCE: RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, RULES 128-134
(3rd ed., 1996), pp. 386-387; citations omitted.
54. Id.
55. Rollo, p. 64.
56. See Exhibits "E" to "E-11."
57. Under the name Ting Ting Yulo, as acknowledged by respondents.
58. TSN, October 9, 2002, pp. 19-20; TSN, August 13, 2003, pp. 9-10.
59. These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 277576 to 78 in the MTC of Manila. On
appeal, the RTC docketed the case as Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46.
60. Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-82225 in the RTC of Manila. On appeal, it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 61457. See Exhibit "G."
Third, a separate civil case was led against defendants-appellants involving three
(3) of the ve (5) checks referred to by Caroline as those which she pre-signed and left
with Lilian on account of their mahjong business.
Fourth, Caroline's allegation that she pre-signed ve (5) blank checks and left with
Lilian was further bolstered in her Counter-Af davit she led relative to a preliminary
investigation on a case led by Vicente Balboa, Lilian's husband. Indicated therein were
the Asia Trust Bank blank checks bearing the numbers BNDO57546, BNDO57547,
BNDO57548, BNDO57549, and BNDO57550, the last check being the same check
offered in evidence in this case. Rollo, pp. 61-62.
62. The MTC acquitted Caroline of the offenses charged for failure of the prosecution to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The MTC, however, found Caroline civilly liable in
favor of respondent for the amounts covered by these checks. On appeal to the RTC, the
civil liability was deleted on the ground that a civil case for collection of money involving
the same checks were led prior to the ling of the criminal case. See Respondents'
Exhibit "2."
63. 566 Phil. 492, 501 (2008). The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: "WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 20, 2002 and
Resolution dated April 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED."
64. CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 61457, pp. 7-8; exhibit "G."
68. See also Pan Paci c Service Contractors, Inc. and Ricardo Del Rosario v. Equitable PCI
Bank, formerly The Philippine Commercial International Bank, G.R. No. 169975, March
18, 2010, 616 SCRA 102.
69. Prisma Construction and Development Corporation and Rogelio S. Pantaleon v. Arthur
Menchavez, G.R. No. 160545, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 590; citing Tan v. Valdehueza ,
160 Phil. 760, 767 (1975) and Ching v. Nicdao , G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007, 522
SCRA 316, 361.
70. See Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234
SCRA 78, 95; citing Article 1169 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Those obliged to
deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation."
71. See Circular No. 799 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas which took effect on July 1, 2013.
72. Article 121, Family Code: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been bene ted . . . . See also Carlos v. Abelardo , G.R. No.
146504, April 9, 2002, 380 SCRA 361.