THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 208181. August 31, 2016.]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY , petitioner, vs. N.E. MAGNO

CONSTRUCTION, INC. , respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ , J : p

For resolution of the Court is this Petition for Review on Certiorari led by
petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 dated 23 October 2012 and the Resolution 2 dated 26 June 2013 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113883. The assailed decision and resolution
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari of the petitioner for having been led beyond the
60-day reglementary period.
The Facts
Petitioner Meralco is a domestic corporation duly authorized by the Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC) to distribute electricity to its consumers for a fee.
Petitioner entered into a Service Contract with respondent N.E. Magno Construction,
Inc. wherein it was agreed that petitioner will supply electricity to respondent's ice plant
located in Rosario, Cavite under Service Identification No. 800100701.
Sometime in October 2002, petitioner's representatives went to respondent's ice
plant operation site in Rosario, Cavite to conduct an inspection of its metering facilities
and they found that the electric meters installed to record the energy usage of the
respondent on the site were tampered. The suspected theft of electricity was later on
con rmed by the petitioner when a comparison of the previous electric consumption of
the respondent was made. To avert further pilferages of electricity, petitioner
temporarily severed the electric supply it was providing for the respondent. The
disconnection was made in the presence of respondent's representative. To recover its
lost income from the purported pilferages, petitioner sent a differential billing to
respondent demanding for the payment of its unpaid electric consumption computed
on the basis of the previous billings. Due to the failure of respondent to settle its
account, its electric services were permanently removed after it was served a notice of
disconnection.
Aggrieved by the turn of events, respondent initiated an action for Mandatory
Injunction with Damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacoor, Cavite. 3 The complaint mainly prayed that petitioner be ordered to restore its
electric services on the ground that the disconnection was effected in an unlawful
manner causing grave damage to respondent's business operations. 4 To elaborate,
respondent averred that the disconnection was made without prior notice and in the
absence of the respondent or its representatives. 5 Respondent maintained that it was
faithfully complying with its obligation under the service contract by religiously paying
its monthly bill and insisted that it committed no manipulation of metering facilities
within the premises of its ice manufacturing site. 6

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 For its part, petitioner contended that it has a contractual right to discontinue
providing electric services to the respondent after it was found that petitioner's
metering installation has been tampered with; the manipulation resulted in the incorrect
registration of the actual energy usage of the respondent to the damage and prejudice
of the petitioner. 7 Petitioner asserted that it is not true that no notice was served prior
to the disconnection neither was there truth to respondent's claim that the removal of
electric services was made without the presence of its representatives. 8 As a matter
of fact, petitioner claimed, that the discontinuance of electric supply was only made
after respondent failed to settle its differential billing despite several demands. 9
In an Order 10 dated 1 February 2005, the RTC granted respondent's application
for preliminary injunction upon posting of the bond in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The
dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a mandatory preliminary
injunction be issued in favor of the [respondent] and against the [petitioner].
[Petitioner] Meralco is hereby ordered to re-connect the electrical supply of the
[respondent] upon posting of an injunction bond in the amount of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00)."
During the date scheduled for Pre-Trial Conference on 8 April 2005 , neither
petitioner nor its counsel appeared before the RTC. Their absence impelled the court to
receive the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and issued the foregoing Order 11 of an
even date:
"This is the second call of this case and it is now 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, despite notice to [petitioner] and counsel, this being pre-trial, let
[respondent] be allowed to present evidence ex-parte before the clerk of court of
this court.
As prayed for by [respondent] thru counsel, let the evidence introduced in
the petition for injunction by the [respondent] be considered as reproduced in
this case.
As prayed for by [respondent] thru counsel, let [respondent] be given ve
(5) days from today within which to le its comment to the Motion for
Reconsideration led by defendant thru counsel. After which time, consider the
same submitted for the resolution of this court."
The 8 April 2005 RTC Order was received by the petitioner on 19 April 2005 .
From the said adverse Order of the court a quo, a Motion for Reconsideration (First
Motion for Reconsideration) was led by the petitioner on 5 May 2005 , which in turn,
was opposed by the respondent on the ground that it failed to comply with the three-
day notice rule on motions as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court. 12
Finding merit on the argument of the respondent, the RTC, in an Order 13 dated
28 July 2008 , denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner and likewise
ordered that it be expunged on the record, viz.:
"For failure to [attach] the Af davit of Mailing and the registry receipts
which, as held by the honorable Supreme Court in the case of Vede Cruz v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, constitutes [']no proof of service['].
And likewise, for grossly violating the [']three (3) day rule['] which is a
mandatory requirement in Section 4 of [R]ule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure thus rendering or comparing it as [']a worthless piece of paper.[']
(Meralco v. La Campana food Products, 247 SCRA 77)
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 Let the instant motion for reconsideration on the Court order dated April
8, 2005 be EXPUNGED and DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED." (Boldface omitted)
Petitioner received a copy of the 28 July 2008 RTC Order on 5 August 2008 . It
has therefore 60 days from the receipt of the Order denying its Motion for
Reconsideration to le a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. Instead of ling a petition
f o r certiorari, however, petitioner led a "Very Respectful Motion for Leave to File
Second Motion for Reconsideration" 14 (Second Motion for Reconsideration) on 20
August 2008 which was again denied by the RTC in an Order 15 dated 23 February
2010 . A copy of the said Order was received by the petitioner on 8 March 2010 .
Finding no other recourse before the trial court, petitioner elevated the denial of
its Second Motion for Reconsideration by ling a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
(With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) 16
before the CA on 6 May 2010 . In the main, the petitioner assailed the RTC Orders
dated 8 April 2005, 28 July 2008 and 23 February 2010 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
On 23 October 2012, the CA issued a Decision 17 dismissing the petition of the
petitioner for having been led beyond the 60-day reglementary period from the receipt
of the order of the RTC denying its First Motion for Reconsideration. According to the
CA, it was admitted by the petitioner that it received the RTC Order dated 28 July
2008 denying its initial Motion for Reconsideration on 5 August 2008 ; it has,
therefore, 60 days from 5 August 2008 or until before 4 October 2008 to assail
the unfavorable ruling under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In conclusion, the appellate
court held that when the petitioner impugned the unfavorable RTC Orders for grave
abuse of discretion only on 6 May 2010 or seven months after the denial of its First
Motion for Reconsideration, the petition was clearly filed out of time.
For lack of merit, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner
in a Resolution. 18
The Issue
Undeterred, petitioner is now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari 19 assailing the CA's Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION; AND
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDERS RENDERED BY THE RTC DATED 8 APRIL
2005, 28 JULY 2008 AND 23 FEBRUARY 2010 SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL
AND VOID AND SHOULD BE SET ASIDE. 20
The Court's Ruling
The core issue here is whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal for
petitioner's failure to file its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seasonably.
Petitioner insists that its petition was led within the 60-day reglementary period
and should therefore be allowed by the CA. In justifying its position, petitioner urged the
Court to reckon the counting of the 60 days from the denial of the Second Motion for
Reconsideration based on its postulate that issues raised on the First Motion for
Reconsideration is totally different from the ones ventilated on the second motion.
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 The Court resolves to deny the petition.
Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC, an aggrieved party has sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed decision, order
or resolution within which to file a petition for certiorari, viz.:
Sec. 4. When and where to le the petition. — The petition shall be led
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely led, whether
such motion is required or not, the petition shall be led not later than
sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or
of a corporation, a board, an of cer or a person, it shall be led with the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as de ned by
the Supreme Court. It may also be led with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a
regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
It is explicitly stated in the above rules that certiorari should be instituted within a
period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed. 21 The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that
would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
22 While there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. 23
Aside from ardently insisting that the 60-day period for the ling of certiorari
petition should be reckoned from the denial of its second motion for reconsideration
which found no basis in the rules and jurisprudence, petitioner offered no other
arguments that would compel us to relax the technical rules to allow the petition of the
petitioner to proceed. In its dire effort to bend the rules for its bene t, petitioner harps
that the issues raised on its rst motion for reconsideration is entirely different from
the second one, and because the latter motion is not a mere rehash of the previous one,
then it is from the denial of the succeeding motion for reconsideration that the 60-day
period should be counted.
We do not agree.
The unmistakable import of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, mandates that in case of denial of the motion for
reconsideration, the petition shall be led within 60 days from the receipt of
the notice of such denial. That the second motion for reconsideration raised fresh
arguments that need to be addressed anew by the court is of no moment, otherwise,
there will be no end in the litigation. The nality of a decision is a jurisdictional event
which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of the parties. 24 To rule
otherwise would completely negate the purpose of the rule on completeness of service,
which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and processes beyond the
power of the party to determine at his pleasure. 25
In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 26 we categorically ruled that
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 the present rule now mandatorily requires compliance with the reglementary period.
The period can no longer be extended as previously allowed before the amendment,
thus:
"As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases
indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion
would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in
the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be
given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant
extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such
authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under
the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that
there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to le a
petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is
essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule
65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph
allowing extensions to le petition on compelling grounds did away with the
ling of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be
led strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a
motion for reconsideration." (Emphasis omitted)
Clearly, allowing a petition for certiorari, even if belatedly led, should never be
taken lightly. The order attains nality by the lapse of the period for taking an appeal
without such assailing the said order. Decisions or resolutions must attain nality at
some point and its attainment of nality should not be made dependent on the will of a
party. 27
It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. In deciding a case, the appellate court has the discretion whether
or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must be exercised soundly and in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account the
circumstances of the case. 28 No one has a vested right to le an appeal or a petition
for certiorari. These are statutory privileges which may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by law. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not
be discarded with by the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. 29
Having established that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of the
petitioner has been led beyond the reglementary period which inevitably resulted in
the attainment of nality of the RTC Orders dated 8 April 2005 and 28 July 2008, the
Court finds it no longer necessary to delve into the merits of the said RTC Orders.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is DENIED . The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Brion, * J., is on leave.
Footnotes

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 * (On Leave). Designated as additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H.
Jardeleza per Raffle dated May 25, 2016.
1. Rollo, pp. 164-170; penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez with Associate
Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring.

2. Id. at 185-186; id.

3. Id. at 91-105.

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.

7. Id. at 106-123.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 124-126.
11. Id. at 188.

12. Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice.

13. Rollo, p. 78.

14. Id. at 79-86.
15. Id. at 87.
16. Id. at 39-77.
17. Id. at 164-170.

18. Supra note 2.

19. Id. at 16-33.
20. Id. at 23.
21. Tan, Jr. v. Matsuura, et al., 701 Phil. 236 (2013).

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Building Care Corp./Leopard Security & Investigation Agency, et al. v. Macaraeg , 700 Phil.
749, 757 (2012).
25. Silliman University v. Fontelo-Paalan, 552 Phil. 808, 821 (2007).
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 26. 611 Phil. 530, 536-537; as cited in Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. v. Ledesma, G.R.
No. 197556, March 25, 2015, 754 SCRA 400, 407-408.
27. Layug v. Comelec, 683 Phil. 127, 138 (2012).

28. Tan, et al, v. Ballena, et al., 579 Phil. 503, 521 (2008).
29. Naguit v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 188839, June 22, 2015.

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