Private documents (rule 132 sec.

20 to 22, 32 to 33) by the heirs of Rufo Manuel; on the west by a portion of the
same Lot No. 11165; and on the south by Lot No.11164;
the remaining portion to the heirs of Doroteo Bartolome,
bounded on the east by the portion of Lot No. 11165
G.R. No. 76792 March 12, 1990 adjudicated to the heirs of Epitacio Batara and heirs of
Rufo Manuel; on the north by Eugenio Andrada; on the
RESURRECCION BARTOLOME, ET AL., petitioners, west by Nieves Caday or Lot No. 11166; and on the south
vs. by Lot No. 11164.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of Appeals)
and HEIRS OF SPOUSES BERNABE BARTOLOME and URSULA Likewise, the heirs of Epitacio Bartolome Batara are hereby
CID, respondents. ordered to reserved (sic) the road right of way for the
necessary expansion of the road adjacent to the eastern
Rafael B. Ruiz for petitioners. side of said lot, subject, however, to just compensation.
E.L. Peralta for private respondents. Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding
Decree be issued accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The record shows that a 725-square meter portion of said Lot No.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision   of the then
1
11165 located in Barrio 11, Laoag, Ilocos Norte, was first declared as
Intermediate Appellate Court "adjudicating the whole Lot No. 11165 in his property by Epitacio Batara under tax declaration No. 5708 dated
favor of" Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid, thereby reversing the May 23, 1906.   The property was described therein as bounded on the
3

decision   of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte, Branch XII at
2
north by the property of Pedro Manuel, on the east by the road, on the
Laoag City. The dispositive portion of the latter decision states: south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome and on the west by the
property of one named Esteban, and as having "una casa de tabla de
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered adjudicating dimension 5 x 4 metros" as improvement. Tax declaration No. 5708
the eastern portion to the heirs of the late Epitacio Batara was superseded by tax declaration No. 37576 labelled as a "revision of
measuring 27 meters from south to north by 32 meters declaration of real property (urban)" dated April 23, 1914.   The
4

from east to west, with an area of 864 square meters, residential lot described in the latter tax declaration contained an area
bounded on the east by the Provincial Road; on the north
of 772 square meters with a "casa" and a "granero" as improvements the property of Doroteo Bartolome, and on the west by the property of
thereon. Nieves Caday and Eugenia Andrada, and with a house as improvement
thereon. The land was allegedly acquired by Ursula Cid through
Epitacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales, had two children: inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome, the father of Ursula's deceased
Catalina and Pedro. The latter died a bachelor and without issue. husband, Bernabe.  10

Catalina, who married someone surnamed Bartolome, bore five

children named Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta. In More than three months later or on January 30, 1934, Resurreccion
1912, before he left Laoag to settle in Culalabo, Gamo (Burgos), Bartolome also filed an answer in the same cadastral case claiming
Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his cousin, Doroteo Bartolome, ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 864 square
who owned the lot bounding Epitacio's property on the south.   Maria
5
meters described as bounded on the north by the property of the heirs
Gonzales remained in the lot for sometime. When she later followed of Rufo Manuel, on the east by Blumentritt Street, on the south by the
Epitacio to Isabela, she allowed Doroteo Bartolome to continue taking property of Doroteo Bartolome, and on the west by the property of
charge of the property. 
6
Bernabe Bartolome. No improvements on the lot were indicated in the
answer which also stated that said portion of Lot No. 11165 was
In 1916, Epitacio Batara died in Isabela. Five years later or in 1921, acquired by claimant Resurreccion Bartolome "by inheritance from my
Maria Gonzales and her grandchildren, Calixto and Resurreccion grandfather and grandmother . . . Epitacio Batara and Maria
Bartolome, returned to Laoag. As they found that the house on their lot Gonzales."  11

was destroyed by fire, they boarded in someone else's house. Calixto

constructed a bamboo fence around his grandfather's lot and he and From then on, no further proceedings were held in the cadastral case.
Resurreccion, who was studying in Laoag, cleaned it. Resurreccion Meanwhile, in 1934, Resurreccion Bartolome verbally entrusted the
went back to Isabela after Maria Gonzales' death in 1926.   It was also
7
portion she had claimed to Maria Bartolome, whom she later described
in that year when Doroteo Bartolome, to whom Epitacio had entrusted as the daughter of Doroteo Bartolome.  12

his land, migrated to Davao City. Doroteo died there two years later. 
8

In 1939, Ursula Cid and her children also migrated to Davao City
Thereafter, the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over leaving their house on Lot No. 11165 to a lessee, Severino Ramos.
the land involved herein (Cadastral Case No. 53). On October 23, 1933, Ursula and her son, Dominador Bartolome, instructed Maria Bartolome,
Ursula Cid, the widow of the son of Doroteo Bartolome, Bernabe, who the sister of Bernabe, to receive the rentals for the house from Severino
died in 1928,   filed an answer in Cadastral Case No. 53, claiming
9
Ramos.   Maria Bartolome also paid the taxes on the property until
13

ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an area of 1660 square meters, 1948, when Dominador took over the task.   But on September 22,
14

described as bounded on the north by the property of Rufo Manuel and 1950, Maria Bartolome, as "administrator of the parcel of land situated
Eugenia Andrada, on the east by the provincial road, on the south by at Bo. 11, Laoag, Ilocos Norte," leased Lot No. 11165 to the Philippine
United Trading Co., Inc.   The rentals for the property were paid by the
15
from Bernabe Bartolome, who together with her, purchased the . . . lot
lessee to Dominador Bartolome until the edifice housing the company which used to be three adjoining lots from their respective owners;" and
was burned down in 1968.   Resurreccion Bartolome, who had been
16
that Lot No. 11165 had been declared for tax purposes in the name of
residing in Isabela, was given by Maria Bartolome a small amount, her late husband Bernabe Bartolome.  22

which could have been about P50, in consideration of the lease

contract.  17 No hearing was conducted in the case until 1974. To buttress her claim
that she and her husband purchased Lot No. 11165, Ursula Cid
In June, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sent out presented at the trial three deeds of sale: [a] one dated March 1, 1917
notices for the "continuation of the hearing" on June 13, 1968 in showing that Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid bought a 374-square
Cadastral Case No. 53.   It should be remembered, however, that from
18
meter lot for fifteen pesos from the spouses Domingo Agustin and
the time Ursula Cid and Resurreccion Bartolome filed their answers to Josefa Manrique;   [b] another document dated February 18, 1913
23

the petition in the cadastral case, there had been no progress in the executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of Bernabe Bartolome
proceedings. evidencing the sale of another lot also for fifteen pesos;   and [c] still
24

another deed executed by Maria Gonzales y Paguyo on February 9,

A year later or in 1969, Maria J. Bartolome filed in Cadastral Case No. 1917 in favor of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid ceding to the latter
53 a "motion to admit answer in intervention," alleging that she is one of 772 square meters of land for P103.75.   The last-mentioned piece of
25

the children of Doroteo Bartolome and that she and her co-heirs had land is the one being claimed by Resurreccion Bartolome.
been excluded in Ursula Cid's answer to the petition. She therefore
prayed that the answer On May 10, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte rendered a
of Ursula Cid be amended so as to include the rightful heirs of Doroteo decision the dispositive portion of which is quoted above. The court
Bartolome.   At the same time, she filed an answer claiming co-
19
entertained only the answers of Ursula Cid and Resurreccion
ownership over Lot No. 11165 with Clemente, Julia and Rosario Bartolome. It found that the lots described in Exhibits 2 and 3 presented
Bartolome and Ursula Cid, the widow of Bernabe. She likewise alleged by Ursula Cid "are not within Lot 11165" and that said exhibits "are
therein that she and her siblings inherited the 1660-square meter lot defective as the vendors are not the real owner(s)" of the lots described
from Doroteo Bartolome.  20
therein. As to Exhibit 4, the court ruled that it has "no probative value as
the same is incomplete and unsigned." The court also held that Ursula
Three months later, Ursula Cid filed a motion to amend her answer to Cid's possession of the land "after the claimants had filed their
reflect the complete "ground or basis of acquisition" of Lot No. respective answer(s) or after the declaration of a general default," did
11165.   In her amended answer, Ursula Cid stated that she was the
21
not confer ownership on her because said possession was interrupted
absolute owner of Lot No. 11165; that she had been the possessor of and merely tolerated by all the parties during the pendency of the
Lot No. 11165 for over fifty years; that she "acquired by inheritance case. 26
Ursula Cid appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its together.   However, when the document was entrusted to him by his
27

decision reversing the lower court, the appellate court held that the mother in 1947 as he was then representing the family in litigation
deeds of sale presented by Ursula Cid are ancient documents under concerning the land, the document's fourth page was already
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It also ruled that Ursula missing.   He stated that his mother told him that the fourth page was
28

Cid's continuous possession of the lot from its acquisition and her lost during the Japanese occupation while they were evacuating from
exercise of rights of ownership over it vested her with the legal Davao City.  29

presumption that she possessed it under a just title.

Dominador Bartolome also presented in court a sworn statement in
Her motion for the reconsideration of said decision having been denied, Ilocano executed by Ursula Cid on February 19, 1937.   In her
30

Resurreccion Bartolome filed the instant petition for review statement, Ursula Cid declared that the sale of the lot to her and her
on certiorari based on two principal issues: [a] whether the provisions of husband by Maria Gonzales was evidenced by a written instrument;
Rule 132 on ancient documents are applicable with respect to Exhibit 4, that the land had been transferred in the name of her husband; that she
and [b] whether acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of a had been paying taxes therefor, and that they had been in continuous
cadastral case. possession of the land for more than twenty years.  31

Exhibit 4 consists of three pieces of paper. The first piece is a blank Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
sheet which apparently serves as a cover page. The two other pages
contain the handwritten document in Ilocano stating that in Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. — Where a
consideration of the amount of P103.75, Maria Gonzales y Paguyo sold private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced
to the spouses Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid 772 square meters from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
of land bounded on the north by the property of Pedro Manuel, on the genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
east by the Bacarra road, on the south by the property of Doroteo circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
Bartolome and on the west by the property of Bernabe Bartolome. The execution and authenticity need be given.
third sheet or page 2 thereof contains a warranty against eviction and
other disturbances with the last three lines indicating the date of the We agree with the appellate court that the first two requirements
execution of the instrument. ordained by Section 22 are met by Exhibit 4. It appearing that it was
executed in 1917, Exhibit 4 was more than thirty years old when it was
According to Dominador Bartolome, he first saw Exhibit 4 in the offered in evidence in 1983.   It was presented in court by the proper
32

possession of his mother, Ursula Cid, when he was just eleven years custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep
old. He noticed that the document had a fourth page containing the it.   We notice, however, that the Court of Appeals failed to consider
33

signature of Maria Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn
and discuss the third requirement; that no alterations or circumstances 1937   do not fall within the purview of Section 21. The signature of
34

of suspicion are present. Maria Gonzales on the missing fourth page of Exhibit 4 would have
helped authenticate the document if it is proven to be genuine. But as
Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred by there can be no such proof arising from the signature of Maria
alteration. We hold, however, that the missing page has nonetheless Gonzales in the deed of sale, the same must be excluded.  35

affected its authenticity. Indeed, its importance cannot be

overemphasized. It allegedly bears the signature of the vendor of the Even if Exhibit 4 were complete and authentic, still, it would
portion of Lot No. 11165 in question and therefore, it contains vital proof substantially be infirm. Under Article 834 of the old Civil Code, Maria
of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the sale. Gonzales, as a surviving spouse, "shall be entitled to a portion in
Without that signature, the document is incomplete. Verily, an usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the
incomplete document is akin to if not worse than a document with legitimate children or descendants who has not received any
altered contents. betterment." And, until it had been ascertained by means of the
liquidation of the deceased spouse's estate that a portion of the
Moreover, there is a circumstance which bothers the Court and makes conjugal property remained after all the partnership obligations and
the genuineness of the document suspect. If it is really true that the debts had been paid, the surviving spouse or her heirs could not assert
document was executed in 1917, Ursula Cid would have had it in her any claim of right or title in or to the community property which was
possession when she filed her answer in Cadastral Case No. 53 in placed in the exclusive possession and control of the husband as
1933. Accordingly, she could have stated therein that she acquired the administrator thereof.   Hence, in the absence of proof that the estate of
36

portion in question by purchase from Maria Gonzales. But as it turned Epitacio Batara had been duly settled, Maria Gonzales had no right to
out, she only claimed purchase as a mode of acquisition of Lot No. sell not even a portion of the property subject of Exhibit 4.
11165 after her sister-in-law, Maria J. Bartolome and the other
descendants of Doroteo Bartolome sought intervention in the case and On the issue of whether acquisitive prescription runs during the
demanded their rightful shares over the property. pendency of a cadastral case, we hold, as this Court held in Cano
v. De Camacho,   that the institution of cadastral proceedings, or at
37

All these negate the appellate court's conclusion that Exhibit 4 is an least the publication of the notice therein issued, has the effect of
ancient document. Necessarily, proofs of its due execution and suspending the running of the prescriptive period. Hence, the appellate
authenticity are vital. Under Section 21 of Rule 132, the due execution court erred in ascribing acquisitive prescription in favor of Ursula Cid
and authenticity of a private writing must be proved either by anyone "up to the present."  38

who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the

handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness. The testimony of Neither can Ursula Cid successfully assert that prior to the institution of
Dominador Bartolome on Exhibit 4 and Ursula Cid's sworn statement in the cadastral proceedings, she and her husband had gained acquisitive
prescription over the property. Until Doroteo Bartolome migrated to Similarly, what remains of Lot No. 11165 after the portion herein
Davao City in 1926, he was in possession of the whole lot including the adjudicated to Resurreccion Bartolome and her co-heirs has been
portion entrusted to him by Epitacio Batara. Granting that the 1520- determined, may not be granted to the heirs of Bernabe Bartolome and
square meter lot Bernabe Bartolome had declared as his own in Ursula Cid exclusively. The two other deeds of sale presented as
1925   is within Lot No. 11165, still, the period from 1925 until the filing
39
Exhibits 2 and 3 having been found worthless by the trial court as they
of the cadastral case in 1933 failed to give him an advantage. It is short involve parcels of land not within Lot No. 11165 and the vendors of
of the 10-year actual, adverse and uninterrupted period of possession which were not the real owners of the property, which findings of facts
mandated by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order that a are binding on this Court, the law mandates that the property, having
full and complete title could be vested on the person claiming to be the been inherited from Doroteo Bartolome, must be shared in equal
owner of a piece of land. portions by his children or their heirs.

Furthermore, while it is true that the property had been declared for tax WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate
purposes by Bernabe Bartolome and that, subsequent to his death, Appellate Court is hereby reversed and set aside.
taxes thereon were paid in the name of his son,
Dominador,   ownership thereof had not been acquired by Ursula Cid or
40 The eastern portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 772 square meters
her heirs. Aside from the fact that said declarations and payments were is hereby adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Epitacio Batara who are
made during the pendency of the cadastral case, a tax declaration in herein represented by Resurreccion Bartolome while the remaining
the name of the alleged property owner or of his predecessor-in- area of Lot No. 11165 is hereby adjudicated in favor of the heirs of
interest, does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of Doroteo Bartolome.
ownership.   In the same manner, neither does the payment of taxes
41

conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for. Petitioners shall pay the cost of the survey and subdivision of Lot No.
11165. No costs.
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, the Court is unprepared to
decree 824 square meters of Lot No. 11165 in favor of Resurreccion SO ORDERED.
Bartolome and her co-heirs to the estate of Epitacio Batara. The revised
declaration of real property in the name of Epitacio, which petitioners
presented as Exhibit B, reveals that Epitacio Batara owned only 772
square meters of the lot involved. Certainly, petitioner and her co-heirs
may not be entitled to an area greater than what their grandfather
claimed as his own.
G.R. No. 137944             April 6, 2000 the rightful owner and possessor of the parcel of land which is the
subject of this appeal.

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA and RUPERTA MENDOZA The Facts

LIRIO, petitioners,
vs. The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent. Bangad, Binangonan, Province of Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square
meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 26-0027. The undisputed
antecedents of this case are narrated by the Court of Appeals as
follows: 
4

PANGANIBAN, J.: The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado.
possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito
Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name
become the basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and
possession in the concept of owner — public, adverse, peaceful and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito
uninterrupted — may be converted to ownership. On the other hand, and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the
mere possession and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership. land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel Mendoza,
another brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a
The Case dispute on [the] ownership of the land. 1âwphi1.nêt

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the March 19, 1999 During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the following facts:
Decision  of the Court of Appeals  (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 43423. The
1  2 

assailed Decision disposed as follows:  3 1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza prior to 1954 but is
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court now declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring . . . Honorata Mendoza Bolante 2) The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject of
instant case.
 3) [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the 3. Ordering the [respondent] to indemnify the [petitioners] in the
[respondent] is the only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza. sum of P10,000.00, as actual damages.

4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were] brothers, 4. Ordering the [respondent] to pay the costs.
now deceased.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
5) During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15,
1979 there was already a dispute between Honorata M. Bolante The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness
and Miguel Mendoza, brother of [petitioners]. and the due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the
respondent and her mother had not been sufficiently established. The
6) [Respondent was] occupying the property in question. notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the execution of the
affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony or competent witness
The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner and ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.
possessor of the land subject of the case.
The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the
After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners], denial of respondent and her mother. The former testified that the latter,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: never having attended school, could neither read nor write. Respondent
also said that she had never been called "Leonor," which was how she
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby was referred to in the affidavit.
rendered for the [petitioners] and against the [respondent]:
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of
1. Declaring that the parcel of land situated in Bangad, petitioners' tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with
Binangonan, Rizal covered by tax declaration no. 26-0027 in the respondent's proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical,
name of Margarito Mendoza belong to his heirs, the [petitioners] exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed
herein; gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code.

2. Ordering [respondent] to vacate the property subject of the Hence, this Petition. 
5

case and deliver possession thereof to the heirs of Margarito

Mendoza. Issues
Insisting that they are the rightful owners of the disputed land, the We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court's ruling:  7

petitioners allege that the CA committed these reversible errors:  6

While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before
1. . . . [I]n not considering the affidavit as an exception to the a notary public, the general rule is that affidavits are classified as
general rule that an affidavit is classified as hearsay evidence, hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on the witness
unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand; stand (People's Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonidas, 207
SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if
2. . . . [I]n holding that respondent has been in actual and affiants are available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals,
physical possession, coupled with . . . exclusive and continuous 163 SCRA 587). The due execution of the affidavit was not
possession of the land since 1985, which are evidence of the sufficiently established. The notary public or others who saw that
best kind of circumstance proving the claim of the title of the document was signed or at least [could] confirm its recitals
ownership and enjoys the presumption of preferred possessor. [were] not presented. There was no expert testimony or
competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the
The Court's Ruling questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied the
genuineness of her signature and that of her mother . . .
The Petition has no merit. [Respondent] testified that her mother was an illiterate and as far
as she knew her mother could not write because she had not
First Issue: attended school (p. 7, ibid). Her testimony was corroborated by
Ma. Sales Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent's] mother was
Admissibility of the Affidavit illiterate.
Petitioners dispute the CA's ruling that the affidavit was not the best The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document
evidence of their father's ownership of the disputed land, because the offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and
"affiant was not placed on the witness stand." They contend that it was authenticity must be proved first.  And before a document is admitted as
8 

unnecessary to present a witness to establish the authenticity of the an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the
affidavit because it was a declaration against respondent's interest and offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to
was an ancient document. As a declaration against interest, it was an testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the
exception to the hearsay rule. As a necessary and trustworthy declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware
document, it was admissible in evidence. And because it was executed that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances
on March 24, 1953, it was a self-authenticating ancient document. render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify.  9
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is dispute this ruling. They contend that she came into possession through
still alive and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is
available to testify as a witness.  Such declarant should be confronted
10  We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did
with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement. not lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired
through force or violence.  To all intents and purposes, a possessor,
12 

The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. Indeed,
13 

ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character,
the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any may recover such possession.  14

circumstance of suspicion.  It must on its face appear to be genuine.

11 

The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how the purported However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the
signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject respondent.  Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive,
1âwphi1

affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who as the latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the
never had any formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent and her
its authenticity. mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.

Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the
authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a respondent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners'
public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore, father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425.  When
15 

the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and
land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her
By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership. mother continued residing on the lot.

Second Issue: When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the
years 1932-1948.  Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in
16 

Preference of Possession 1953  and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952.  When he died, Miguel
17  18 

continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the respondent and
The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under her mother were living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel
Article 538 of the Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent.  19

exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985. Petitioners

Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in
possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her
subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother.
period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside
only in 1952. the disputed lot for their livelihood. 
24

Third Issue: Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the
petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which
Possession of Better Right was in the concept of owner — public, peaceful, and uninterrupted  —25 

had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her
Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual and physical father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land.
coupled with the exclusive and continuous possession [by respondent] Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled
of the land since 1985" proved her ownership of the disputed land. The with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a
respondent argues that she was legally presumed to possess the claim for ownership through prescription.  26

subject land with a just title since she possessed it in the concept of
owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be obliged to show In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the
or prove such title. subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership
cannot be acquired by mere occupation.  Unless coupled with the
27 

The respondent's contention is untenable. The presumption in Article element of hostility toward the true owner,  occupation and use,
28 

541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession.
is proven.  That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall,
20 
Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public,
under this provision, be restored thereto by the means established by peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably
law.  Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and
21 
acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their
possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985),  this supposed
29 

be established in one of the ways provided by law. ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited
to the portion that they actually farmed.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between
the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription.  22
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the
disputed land was established before the trial court through the series
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito
through possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father,
23 
Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title
thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and
other interested parties. 30
G.R. No. 138084            April 10, 2002

However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,
ownership.  At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of
31 
vs.
ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been PHILIPPINE NAILS AND WIRES CORPORATION, respondent.
paid.  In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the
32 

declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In
33  QUISUMBING, J.:
sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal
basis.1âwphi1.nêt
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated
September 30, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547,
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and affirming the decision dated December 10, 1993, of the Regional Trial
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 163, and the resolution dated
March 25, 1999, of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioner's motion
SO ORDERED. for reconsideration. 1

Respondent Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation insured against all

risks its shipment of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300 with petitioner Malayan Insurance Company Inc. The
shipment delivered was short by 377.168 metric tons. For this shortage,
respondent claimed insurance for P2,698,637.04, representing the
value of undelivered steel billets, plus customs duties, taxes and other
charges paid by respondent. Petitioner refused to pay.

On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for

sum of money with the RTC of Pasig representing said lost and/or
undelivered cargo. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that it failed to state a cause of action, and that it was filed in
the wrong venue. The motion was denied. It thus filed a petition for
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. This was also denied. Upon
motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated. However, it was 3. Cost of suit.
eventually dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and its dismissal became
final and executory. SO ORDERED. 2

On September 8, 1993, respondent filed a motion to admit an amended Respondent moved to execute judgment pending appeal. The trial court
complaint which the trial court granted. It sent petitioner summons and granted the motion. Meanwhile, petitioner filed its notice of appeal
a copy of the complaint on October 13, 1993 and also gave petitioner which was given due course.
until October 31, 1993 to file its answer.
Pursuant to the grant of the motion for execution, the trial court issued
On November 4, 1993, respondent moved to declare petitioner in the corresponding writ. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
default. The trial court granted and allowed the presentation of prayer for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the implementation of
evidence ex parte before the branch clerk of court. Respondent the writ. The Court of Appeals granted the prayer for the temporary
presented its lone witness, Jeanne King. restraining order. The writ of execution was likewise stayed by the trial
court which favorably considered petitioner's urgent motion to stay
On November 11, 1993, petitioner filed its answer with compulsory execution pending appeal and to approve the supersedeas bond.
counterclaim. Upon motion by the respondent, the trial court expunged
from the records the answer for late filing. Pursuant to the notice of appeal, the entire records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, where petitioner argued that the trial
On December 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a judgment by default court erred in rendering judgment by default notwithstanding that issues
which reads: were joined by petitioner's filing of an answer; in awarding damages to
respondent based on unauthenticated documentary evidence and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby hearsay; and in admitting documentary evidence which is irregular in
rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the nature and not in accordance with the Rules of Court.
latter to pay the following:
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court and disposed the
1. P2,532,926.53 representing the insured value of the lost case thus:
and/or not delivered 377.168 metric tons of steel billets plus legal
rate of interest from date of filing of this complaint until fully paid; WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible
error committed by the lower court, the judgment appealed from
2. Fifteen (15) percent of the amount awarded to plaintiff as is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. 3

attorney's fees; and

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion For resolution now are the following issues: Was Jeanne King's
nor err when it expunged the answer from the records because testimony hearsay, thus without any probative value? Should
petitioner answered way beyond the prescribed period. It further held respondent authenticate the documentary evidence it submitted at the
that respondent's witness, Jeanne King, was a competent witness trial?
because she personally prepared the documentary evidence and had
personal knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. In addition, the On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that
appellate court said that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial Jeanne King's testimony was hearsay because she had no personal
courts were entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting respondent's
disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons, which were not present cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of
in this case. Lastly, the absence of a written report by the branch clerk lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that
of court on the ex parte proceedings did not necessarily deny petitioner even though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the
due process. Nothing in the Rules of Court stated that the absence of importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein
the commissioner's written report nullified a judgment by default. The respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the
appellate court observed that if there was a defect, such was only facts which gave rise to respondent's cause of action. Further, petitioner
procedural that can be waived. Besides, petitioner was declared in asserts, even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of
default because of its own failure to answer within the prescribed steel billets received by respondent, she did not have personal
period. It cannot claim denial of due process because it was given the knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
opportunity to be heard.
At the outset, we must stress that respondent's cause of action is
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of
alleging that the Court of Appeals erred and acted contrary to existing imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove,
law and jurisprudence in: first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and
I. …GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE PURELY HEARSAY received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King,
TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT'S SOLE WITNESS. who was assigned to handle respondent's importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel
II. …AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her
WHICH WAS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule
ADMITTED WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED. 4
130 of the Rules of Court.5
However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent's documentary exhibits
the imported steel billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the are private documents. They are not among those enumerated in
actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved
the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts before they can be admitted in evidence. With the exception concerning
prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected to at the trial.
6
presented no supporting evidence concerning their
authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the
10 

On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In
authenticate respondent's documentary evidence. Under Section 20, sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioner's
Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
7 
liability.
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it,
the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it Appeals dated September 30, 1998 and its resolution on March 25,
and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. In this case, In lieu thereof, Civil Case No. 63445 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.No
respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons. pronouncement as to costs.
She merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets based on
the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the SO ORDERED.
summary of steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and
King's testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in giving imprimatur

to the trial court's ruling with regard to the admission of documentary
evidence submitted by respondent. On this score, we find petitioner's
contention meritorious. Under the rules on evidence, documents are
either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall
under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. Section 20 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any
8  9 

private document is received in evidence, its due execution and

authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature
G.R. No. 140472            June 10, 2002 "WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated September 20,
1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered
NORA T. JIMENEZ, JOSEFINA T. GAVINO, LIBRADA T. DINO and sustaining the validity of the Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1936 and
SUSAN T. JOVEN, petitioners, of TCT No. 90689 issued in the name of UCCP as owner thereof,
vs. and DISMISSING the Complaint."2
COMMISSION ON ECUMENICAL MISSION AND RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.3
OF AMERICA, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES
and POLICARPIO CARUNGIN, respondents. The Facts

PANGANIBAN, J.: The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

The well-settled rule that factual findings of trial courts deserve respect, "The [petitioners] are sisters and the children of x x x Nicanor
sometimes even finality, is based on the postulate that they had the Teodoro and Francisca Ciriaco. They filed their complaint in 1982
distinct opportunity, not available to the reviewing courts, to hear the alleging that their mother was the owner of the subject property
testimonies of witnesses and to observe their conduct and demeanor which was titled in her name under OCT No. 11757. Said
on the stand. But where the factual assessments refer to documents property is now covered by TCT No. 90689 in the name of
that are available to the scrutiny of appellate courts in the same manner [respondent] United Church of Christ in the Philippines (or UCCP)
that they were to the lower courts, this reliance does not apply. In the for this was donated to it by the Commission on Ecumenical
present case, the controversy revolves around the allegedly forged Mission in that Deed of Donation dated July 1, 1977. [Petitioners]
signatures on documents that could be examined by the Court of claim that their parents never sold the lot to the Board of Foreign
Appeals (CA). In any event, since there was a conflict in the factual Missions nor any one else, and that their purported signatures on
assessments made by the trial and the appellate courts, we have opted the impugned Deed of Sale have been found to be forgeries by
to pass upon the issue as an exception to the general rule. government handwriting experts. Relying on this [respondents]
filed this suit [imputing] the fraudulent act upon [respondents] and
The Case thus asked for the declaration of nullity of the subject deed and of
TCT No. 90689 issued in the name of UCCP, the reconveyance
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, of the subject property in their favor, and for the award of
challenging the January 29, 1999 Decision and the September 7, 1999 damages.
Resolution the Court of Appeals1 in CA-GR CV No. 48877. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"In their answer, [respondents] denied that there was forgery and property by virtue of a valid deed of sale signed by their parents.
insisted that the said spouses legally conveyed their property [Petitioners] also discovered that a petition for reconstitution of
under a valid deed of sale. They likewise averred that the action transfer of certificate of title involving the same property had been
was already barred by prescription and/or laches for [petitioners] filed way back in 1975 by the UCCP, and in fact, in 1979 this
filed this suit after sleeping on their alleged rights for forty-five petition of UCCP was granted and TCT No. 90689 was issued in
(45) years. its name. Entertaining doubts as to the truthfulness of the deed of
sale, [petitioners] secured a copy of it and showed it to their
"At the trial [petitioners] submitted various exhibits as father who denied having signed the deed. Consequently they
documentary evidences and presented five (5) witnesses, asked for signature verification of the said deed of sale by the
namely: [petitioners] Susan T. Joven and Nora T. Jimenez, NBI and the PC. In its ‘Questioned Document Report No. 241-
handwriting experts Arcadio Ramos of the National Bureau of 780’ the NBI made the finding that the sample and questioned
Investigation and Francisco Cruz, Jr., of PC Crime Laboratory, signatures of Francisca were not written by the same person,
and [respondent] pastor Policarpio Carungin. On the other hand, while no definite opinion was given as to Nicanor’s signatures
[respondents] proffered as their evidences four (4) documents because of the insufficiency in numbers of his sample signatures.
and the testimonies of [Respondent] Pastor Policarpio Carungin The PC Crime Laboratory examination came to the conclusion
and that of his wife Felicula. that the signatures of both Francisca and Nicanor were written by
persons other than the said spouses.
"According to [petitioners], their father and mother died
respectively on September 30, 1979 and April 3, 1943, and they "On the other hand, the evidence of [respondents] shows that the
were then only minors when their mother died. In 1975 they Board of Foreign Missions (now the Commission on Ecumenical
learned for the first time about the subject property from Irene Mission) bought the subject property from the Teodoro spouses
Cruz, their aunt and the caretaker of their mother’s said property. in 1936. A church building was constructed on it that same year
They had no copy of the original title to the property and the only by the Presbyterian Protestant Church which was then under the
documents they possessed proving their mother’s ownership ecclesiastical auspices of the Board of Foreign Missions. From
were the Application for Registration of Title filed by their mother then on, the church has remained on the property and has been
in 1929 docketed as G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 35469 and the Court regularly used for religious worship by its members. Sometime in
Order for the issuance of Decree No. 381166 in 1930 1947, several protestant church bodies, including the
commanding the registration of the subject property in their Presbyterian Church, were merged into a one incorporated union
mother’s name. With these papers on hand, [petitioners] then - the UCCP. In order that the title to the subject property would be
filed a petition for reconstitution of original certificate of title in transferred in the name of UCCP, a deed of donation was
1977. This was opposed by UCCP arguing that it owned the executed by the Board of Foreign Missions in its favor in 1977.
Way back in 1975, UCCP filed a petition for reconstitution of The said undisposed issues were (a) the validity of the subject
Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-14785 of the subject lot in the deed of sale, (b) the nature of the subject property, whether it be
name of the Board of Foreign Missions, which was granted in conjugal or paraphernal, and (c) the liability for damages.
1979. In 1980, the UCCP registered the lot in its name and TCT
No. T-90689 was issued canceling TCT No. T-14785. "This ruling was not appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon
remand, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
"On March 17, 1989, the court a quo rendered its first decision of respective memoranda concerning the three unresolved issues,
the case dismissing the complaint of [petitioners] on the grounds and on September 20, 1994 rendered the herein assailed
of prescription and laches, and as such it did not anymore see it judgment in favor of [petitioners] declaring the nullity of the deed
fit [to] resolve the other issues of the case, The pertinent portion of sale and the TCT No. 90689 due to forgery but finding
of the judgment reads as follows: [respondents] builders in good faith so no damages was
awarded. x x x.
‘[Petitioners’] claim being barred by prescription and
laches, the other issues need no longer be discussed. ‘WHEREFORE, PREMISED ON THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, Judgment is hereby rendered in the
‘WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.’ following manner:

"Dissatisfied [petitioners] challenged the ruling by filing an appeal 1. Declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated July 7,
with this Court docketed as CA-G.R. No. 21704. On October 31, 1936 and supposedly executed by Spouses Nicanor
1991, this Court rendered its decision reversing the lower court’s Teodoro and Francisca Ciriaco over the lot in question in
judgment holding that the case had not been barred by laches or favor of the defendant Church;
prescription, and thereupon:
2. Declaring the nullity of TCT No. 90689 in the name of
‘PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby resolves to [respondent] Church;
remand the instant action to the court a quo for the said
court to dispose of the undisposed issues specified in its 3. Declaring [petitioners] to be the rightful owners of the lot
Order dated January 4, 1983, such disposition to be made in question as the legal heirs of Francisca Ciriaco who is
on the basis of the evidence on record.’ hereby declared to be the previous owner of said Lot as
her paraphernal property;
 4. Declaring [respondents] to be a builder in good faith and analyzing the subject signatures, the CA concluded: "We x x x
whose rights and obligations over the Church and found no substantial indicia or reason to suspect their authenticity.
improvements it had constructed on the lot in question Contrary to the findings of the NBI and the PC, x x x we find
should be governed by the provisions of Art. 448 of the resemblances but no stark and distinguishing difference. The slight
Civil Code. dissimilarities do not indicate forgery for these are natural, expected
and inevitable variations in genuine signatures made by one and the
5. No pronouncements as to damages and costs.’" same person. x x x."8

x x x           x x x           x x x4 (Citations omitted) The CA relied on the validity of the Deed of Sale, because it was
notarized. Moreover, Francisca Ciriaco, during her lifetime, never
Ruling of the Court of Appeals protested the building of the church in 1936. Her nonchalant attitude
towards the "intrusion" on the subject property was likewise displayed
The CA reversed the RTC, which had "placed unquestioning faith and by her husband and her sister who was the administrator/caretaker of
reliance on the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) her properties.
and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Crime Laboratory Service."5 The
appellate court held that the trial court had misconstrued the former’s Hence, this recourse.9
Decision in CA-GR CV No. 21704. The CA denied having ever made a
finding that the alleged forgery in the questioned Deed of Sale had The Issues
never been rebutted by respondents when they failed to raise the
matter in their Brief or Memorandum. Rather, the appellate court In their Memorandum,10 petitioners raise the following issues:
supposedly confined itself to determining whether petitioners’ Complaint
was barred by prescription and laches. "The case would not have been "Whether in reversing the new Decision of the RTC dated
remanded to the court a quo if there ha[d] been a finding that September 20, 1994 and in rendering the questioned Decision
[respondents] had indeed admitted the fact of forgery."6 dated January 29, 1999 and the questioned Resolution dated
September 7, 1999, the Court of Appeals departed from the usual
The appellate court doubted the findings of the NBI and the PC and accepted course of judicial proceedings and disregarded
handwriting experts, because "the documents from which the sample precedents and rulings of the Supreme Court, particularly - -
signatures were taken were either mere photocopies, or dated years
away from the questioned Deed of Sale of 1936."7 The police findings "I. Whether the Court of Appeals defied the rule that findings of
were not conclusive upon the courts, which could totally disregard them the trial court are conclusive on the appellate court when the
and make their own separate finding for themselves. After examining Court of Appeals overturned the trial court’s finding of forgery
 despite the fact that the trial court was in a better position to documents that are available to appellate magistrates and subject to
resolve the issue of forgery and despite the fact that the evidence their scrutiny, reliance on trial courts finds no application. In the present
showing forgery is unrebutted, overwhelming and preponderant. case, the CA had the same opportunity as the RTC in examining and
analyzing the questioned signatures.
"II. Whether the Court of Appeals disregarded the rule of
preponderance of evidence applicable in civil cases."11 In any event, since the CA reversed the RTC primarily because of their
conflicting findings of fact, we now opt to pass upon the factual
This Court’s Ruling antecedents.13 After a review of the records and the pleadings of the
parties, we hold that the CA did not err in overturning the RTC.
The Petition is not meritorious.
It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts,
First Issue: even those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This
No Finding of Forgery principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere
handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a
Petitioners claim that the CA erred when it disregarded the factual visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those
findings of the RTC which had given weight, credibility and reliability to of the currently existing ones.14
the handwriting experts from both the NBI and the PC. These experts
had declared the signatures of Francisca Ciriaco and Nicanor Teodoro Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged
in the 1936 Deed of Sale as forgeries. documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing
them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to
We clarify. As a rule, this Court accords great weight and respect, the examination or the comparison of handwriting.15 A finding of forgery
sometimes even finality, to findings of fact of trial courts, especially does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
when affirmed by the CA. However, where the factual findings of the because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the
courts a quo are contrary to each other, this Court may intervene to questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to
resolve the conflict.12 its authenticity. In an earlier case, this Court explained as follows:

The reliance of appellate tribunals on the factual findings of the trial "x x x. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
court is based on the postulate that the latter had firsthand opportunity testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may
to hear the witnesses and to observe their conduct and demeanor be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the
during the proceedings. However, when such findings are not anchored issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny. The judge
on their credibility and their testimonies, but on the assessment of cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. In
 the case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals (citing the case of Alcon the question of the former’s authenticity. The result of
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 833), the Court held examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of
that the authenticity of signatures aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive.
There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The
‘x x x is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the
questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his
molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or
technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of
genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case,
less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial
a specialist on a highly technical issue.’ competent evidence on the character of a questioned
handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic
"A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned
the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion handwriting and an authentic one."
as to its authenticity x x x."16
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and
Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies in the party alleging
authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed forgery. Did petitioners succeed in proving that the signatures of
handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party Francisca Ciriaco and Nicanor Teodoro had been forged?
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge." After comparing the questioned signatures, the CA concluded that they
were not forged. We affirm its finding. Indeed, the best evidence of a
In Lorenzo v. Diaz,17 the factors involved in examining handwritings forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself showing the
were identified and explained in these words: alleged forgeries. The fact of forgery can be established by comparing
the allegedly false signature with the authentic or genuine one.
"x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be
determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or This was exactly what the appellate court did. After comparing the
dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as allegedly forged signature of Francisca on the 1936 Deed of Sale with
regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the her authentic or genuine specimen, the CA made its independent
strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the signature on the
the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on questioned document. This right -- nay, duty -- of the RTC judge was
exercised by the justices of the appellate court when they overturned Company dated February 11, 1949). In sum there were actually
the former’s findings. In the words of the CA: nine (9) documents (Exhs. ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘R-2’, ‘T’, ‘U’, ‘V’. ‘W’, and
‘X’) from which the standard signatures of both spouses came
"The findings of the handwriting experts from the NBI and PC are from. Three of these (Exhs. ‘R-2’, ‘T’ and ‘U’) however were but
of doubtful correctness because the documents from which the machine copies, and neither the originals nor the certified true
sample signatures were taken were either mere photocopies, or copies were offered as evidence. As such no probative value
dated years away form the questioned deed of sale of 1936. In its should be accorded to them and they should be disregarded in
‘Questioned Document Report No. 241-780’ (Exh. ‘E’), the NBI the appreciation of signatures. While the remaining six (6)
concluded that the questioned signatures and sample ones of documents cannot be a good basis for accurate examination and
Francisca ‘were NOT WRITTEN by one and the same person’, comparison of signatures because these standard signatures
but made no conclusion as to the signature of Nicanor due to the were not close in point of time to the questioned signatures.
need for additional sample signatures as ‘the sample signatures Some of these documents were executed in 1930, 1932 and
submitted are in different style, which cannot be used as basis for 1933 and the others in 1946 and 1949, apparently several years
a scientific analysis.’ The questioned signatures on the deed of apart from the 1936 subject deed of sale. The passage of time
sale were compared by NBI with the sample/standard signatures and a person’s increase in age may have decisive influences in
on three documents, to wit: 1) Exhibit ‘F’ (Kasulatan ng Bileng one’s (his) writing characteristics. Thus, authorities are of the
Mabibileng Muli dated April 15, 1932), 2) Exhibit ‘G’ (Kasulatan opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and
ng Bileng Mabibileng Muli dated April 23, 1933), and 3) Exhibit analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as
‘H’ (Marriage Contract dated January 12, 1930). On the other possible in point of time to the suspected signature. (Causapin vs
hand, the PC Crime Laboratory in its ‘Questioned Document CA 233 SCRA 615)
Report No. 196-84’ (Exh. ‘S’) found that the sample and
questioned signatures of both spouses were written by two "The findings of the handwriting experts are not conclusive upon
different persons. In its examination it used the standard the court. On the contrary, courts can totally disregard them and
signatures of Francisca on three documents, namely: Exhibits ‘F’, make their own separate independent finding for themselves on
‘G’, and ‘R-2’ (Contract of Surety dated March 16, 1933), while the matter. As this Court has once observed, the authenticity of
the sample signatures of Nicanor came from eight (8) documents, signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that
to wit: Exhibits ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘R-2’, ‘T’ (consisting of two pages from a questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or
book entitled ‘Yearbook of Agriculture, 1936’), ‘U’ (consisting of molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical
two pages from a book entitled ‘An Enumeration of Philippine nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert is certainly much less
Fungi’, printed in 1937), ‘V’ (Secondary Report Card for the compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist
school year 1946-1947), ‘W’ (An Order Blank of E.R. Moore of a highly technical issue. The signatures on a questioned
 document can be sighted by a judge who can and should NBI and the PC as well as from reports of their respective laboratories
exercise independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of -- all of which far outweigh the testimonies of Respondent Carungin and
such signatures (Gamido vs. CA 251 SCRA 101). And this his wife.
exactly what we have done here. We have examined and
analyzed the subject signatures, and have found no substantial We are not persuaded. First, the 1936 Deed of Sale -- a notarized
indicia or reason to suspect their authenticity. Contrary to the document -- carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon duly
findings of the NBI and PC, upon comparison of the questioned executed instruments provided by law.19 As discussed earlier,
signature of Francisca with her sample signatures on Exh. "F’, ‘G’ petitioners did not succeed in assailing the authenticity of the signatures
and ‘H’ we find resemblances but no stark and distinguishing of their parents on the notarized Deed.
difference. The slight dissimilarities do not indicate forgery for
these are natural, expected and inevitable variations in genuine Second, the CA, which had the same opportunity as the RTC to
signatures made by one and the same person. Even the sample decipher the signatures, found no reason to doubt their authenticity.
signatures of Nicanor submitted by the appellees show clear
variations in structure, flourish, and style. Those found in Exhibits Third, it is the quality, not the number, of witnesses that will tilt the scale
‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘V’ and ‘W’ are markedly different from that in Exhibit of evidence. Although the number of witnesses may be considered a
‘X’. It must be pointed out that the crux of the matter here is factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance does not
forgery and any positive assertion of it can not just be accepted necessarily lie in the greatest number.20
blandly. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. Those who make the allegation of Fourth, after reviewing the evidence on record, we hold that it
forgery have the burden of proving it since a mere allegation is sufficiently supports the CA Decision.
not evidence (Tenio-Obsequio vs. CA 230 SCRA 550). The
evidence of the appellees’ failed to prove the forgery they Finally, the fact that petitioners waited until 1982 to file their Complaint
claim."18 assailing the validity of the 1936 Deed of Sale detracts from their
credibility. To repeat, petitioners’ mother, father or aunt (who was the
Second Issue: administrator/caretaker of their mother’s properties) had not done
Disregard of Evidence anything to protest the building of the church on the subject property.

Petitioners contend that the CA disregarded the doctrine in civil cases WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
regarding preponderance of evidence, which allegedly weighed heavily Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
in their favor. Supposedly, such inference can be drawn from the
testimonies of their father and of the handwriting experts from both the SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125283             February 10, 2006 The second cause of action is for the rescission of another agreement
with an alternative prayer for specific performance. Capistrano alleged
PAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC., Petitioner, that he agreed to sell another parcel of land in the same vicinity to Cruz.
vs. According to Capistrano, Cruz only paid ₱100,000.00 of the stipulated
COURT OF APPEALS and NICOLAS CAPISTRANO, Respondents. purchase price, thereby leaving ₱250,000.00 still unpaid.9

DECISION The operative facts follow.

TINGA, J.: On 10 September 1982, Capistrano executed a Special Power of

Attorney10 authorizing Cruz to mortgage the subject lot in favor of
Petitioner Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. (Pan Pacific) filed the Associated Bank (the Bank) as security for the latter’s loan
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 4 accommodation.11
June 1996 of the Court of Appeals Fourteenth Division in C.A. G.R. No.
CV-41112. The challenged Decision affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated Shortly, by virtue of the Special Power of Attorney, Cruz obtained a loan
24 April 1992 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 in in the amount of ₱500,000.00 from the Bank. Thus, he executed a Real
Civil Case No. 88-46720. Estate Mortgage12 over the subject lot in favor of the Bank.13

The case arose when on 22 December 1988, private respondent Capistrano and Cruz then executed a letter-agreement dated 23
Nicolas Capistrano (Capistrano) filed an Amended Complaint 4 before September 1982 whereby Cruz agreed to buy the subject lot for the
the RTC of Manila against Severo C. Cruz III (Cruz), his spouse price of ₱350,000.00, of which ₱200,000.00 would be paid out of the
Lourdes Yap Miranda, and Atty. Alicia Guanzon,5 pleading two causes loan secured by Cruz, and the balance of ₱150,000.00 in eight (8)
of action.6 quarterly payments of ₱18,750.00 within two (2) years from 30 October
1982, without need of demand and with interest at 18% in case of
The first cause of action is for the nullification, or alternatively, for the default.14
"rescission," of a Deed of Absolute Sale7 covering a parcel of land that
Capistrano owned, located at 1821 (Int.), Otis Street (now Paz
Guanzon Street), Paco, Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 143599 to Cruz.8 This is the subject lot. Capistrano
denied having executed the deed.
On 15 March 1983, Capistrano executed the Deed of Absolute lot in favor of Pan Pacific, attaching thereto the previous Deed of
Sale15 over the subject lot in favor of Cruz. Two (2) days later, on 17 Absolute Sale executed by Capistrano in favor of Cruz.
March 1983, Notary Public Vicente J. Benedicto (Benedicto) notarized
the deed. However, it was earlier or on 9 March 1983 that Capistrano’s Surprisingly, on 20 October 1988, Capistrano filed a Revocation of
wife, Josefa Borromeo Capistrano, signed the Marital Special Power of Attorney22 with the Register of Deeds of Manila. Less
Consent16 evidencing her conformity in advance to the sale. The Marital than a week later, Capistrano sent the Register of Deeds another letter
Consent was also sworn to before Benedicto. informing said officer of his having come to know of the sale of the
subject lot by Cruz to Pan Pacific and requesting the officer to withhold
Following the execution of the deed of sale, Cruz continued payments any action on the transaction.23
to Capistrano for the subject lot. Sometime in October 1985, Capistrano
delivered to Cruz a Statement of Account17 signed by Capistrano, Before long, in November 1988, Capistrano filed the precursory
showing that as of 30 October 1985, Cruz’s balance stood at complaint before the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. 88-46720.
₱19,561.00 as principal, and ₱3,520.98 as interest, or a total of
₱23,081.98. Pan Pacific, which bought the subject lot from the Cruz spouses, was
allowed to intervene in the proceedings and joined Cruz, et al. in
Thus, in May 1987, with the mortgage on the subject lot then being in resisting the complaint insofar as the first cause of action on the subject
danger of foreclosure by the Bank, Cruz filed a case with the RTC of lot is concerned.24
Manila, Branch 11, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-40647, to enjoin the
foreclosure. Cruz impleaded Capistrano and his spouse Josefa Then on 24 April 1992, a Decision was rendered by the trial court in
Borromeo Capistrano as defendants, the title to the subject lot not favor of Capistrano on both causes of action, the dispositive portion of
having been transferred yet to his name.18 which reads as follows:

Cruz also devised a way to save the subject lot from foreclosure by WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
seeking a buyer for it and eventually arranging for the buyer to pay the against the defendant, Severo E. (sic) Cruz III, his spouse, Lourdes
mortgage debt. Towards this end, Cruz succeeded in engaging Pan Miranda Cruz, and the intervenor, Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc.,
Pacific. Thus, on 22 September 1988, Pan Pacific paid off Cruz’s debt as follows:
in the amount of ₱1,180,000.00.19 Consequently, on 23 September
1. Declaring the Letter-Agreement, dated September 23, 1982,
1988, the Bank executed a Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage.  On20 Exhibit "C", as resolved and/or rescinded;
even date, Cruz executed a Deed of Absolute Sale21 over the subject
2. Declaring both the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "H", and the The counterclaims of both Severo C. Cruz, III and spouse, and of the
document entitled, "Marital Consent", Exhibit "K", null and void; intervenor, Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc., are both dismissed, for
lack of merit.
3. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the spouses
Severo C. Cruz, III and Lourdes Miranda Cruz in favor of the Double costs against the defendants-Cruz spouses.
intervenor, Pan Pacific Industrial Sales, Co., Inc., Exhibit "8", null
and void; SO ORDERED.25

4. Making the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on To arrive at the conclusion that the first Deed of Absolute Sale and the
November 23, 1988, permanent; Marital Consent are spurious, the trial court mainly relied on
Capistrano’s disavowal of his signature and that of his wife’s, together
5. Ordering the intervenor, thru its legal counsel and corporate with extrinsic factors which in its opinion evinced the spuriousness.
secretary, Atty. Senen S. Burgos, who has possession of the
owner’s copy of TCT No. 143599 of the Register of Deeds of Pan Pacific and the Cruz spouses interposed separate appeals to the
Manila, in the name of the plaintiff, to surrender the same to this Court of Appeals, their common concern being the trial court’s finding
Court within ten days from finality of the decision for turn over to that the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Marital Consent were
the plaintiff; spurious.26

6. Ordering Defendant Register of Deeds of Manila to reject and In assailing this finding, Pan Pacific and the Cruz spouses contended
not give due course to the documents submitted to it, which have that Capistrano failed to present clear and convincing evidence to
for their purpose the transfer of the real estate property covered overturn the presumption of regularity of public documents like the
by TCT No. 143599 from the name of the plaintiff to Defendant documents in question.27
Cruz and/or to the intervenor; and
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. Concerning the
7. Ordering the spouses Severo C. Cruz, III and Lourdes Miranda subject lot, it held that while a notarial document cannot be disproved
Cruz to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱69,561.00 as net amount by the mere denial of the signer, the denial in this case should be taken
due to the latter as per the computation in the end-part of this together with the other circumstances of the case which in sum
decision. constitute clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity of the documents.28
The Cruz spouses did not elevate the Court of Appeals’ Decision to this Pan Pacific disputes the common conclusion reached by the courts
Court. Thus, the RTC Decision became final as to them. below that the presumption of regularity of the Deed of Absolute
Sale and the Marital Consent, which in its estimation are both public
Pan Pacific, however, filed the instant Petition solely concerning the first documents, has been rebutted by Capistrano’s countervailing evidence.
cause of action in the Amended Complaint. Pan Pacific contends that The correctness of the conclusions on the alleged spuriousness of the
the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and documents in question drawn by the courts below from the facts on
Marital Consent cannot be overridden by the self-serving testimony of record is before this Court. The issue is a question of law cognizable by
Capistrano. It stresses that the trial court cannot rely on irrelevant the Court.32
extrinsic factors to rule against the genuineness of the deed.29 Finally, it
points out that Capistrano cannot contest the sale of the subject lot to Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that notarial
Cruz, as the sale had already been consummated.30 documents celebrated with all the legal requisites under the safeguard
of a notarial certificate is evidence of a high character and to overcome
For his part, Capistrano posits in his Memorandum31 that Pan Pacific is its recitals, it is incumbent upon the party challenging it to prove his
not an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith as Cruz was claim with clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant
never the registered owner of the subject lot. Pan Pacific was bound at evidence.33
its peril to investigate the right of Cruz to transfer the property to it.
Moreover, Capistrano asserts that the legal presumption of regularity of A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
public documents does not obtain in this case as the documents in with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the presumption
question were not properly notarized. He adds that the parties never of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong
appeared before the notary public as in fact the deed had only been and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the
delivered by Capistrano to the house of Cruz’s mother. certificate. Absent such, the presumption must be upheld. The burden
of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarial
Furthermore, Capistrano maintains that his spouse’s signature on the document lies on the one contesting the same. Furthermore, an
Marital Consent is a forgery as it was virtually impossible for her to allegation of forgery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
have signed the same. Lastly, Capistrano disputes Cruz’s assertion that and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same.34
the sale had been consummated, pointing out that the Amended
Complaint consisted of two (2) causes of action pertaining to two (2) Evidently, as he impugns the genuineness of the documents,
separate lots, and Cruz had only paid ₱100,000.00 of the total price of Capistrano has the burden of making out a clear-cut case that the
the lot subject of the second cause of action. 1avvphil.net documents are bogus. The courts below both concluded that
Capistrano had discharged this burden. However, this Court does not
The petition is imbued with merit.
share the conclusion. Indeed, Capistrano failed to present evidence of Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. At the very least, he should present
the forgery that is enough to overcome the presumption of authenticity. corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should
present an expert witness.
To support the allegation of the spuriousness of his signature on the
Deed of Absolute Sale and that of his wife on the Marital Consent, On the other hand, the Court cannot understand why an unfavorable
Capistrano relied heavily on his bare denial, at the same time taking inference arose not from Capistrano’s but from Cruz’s failure to have
sanctuary behind other circumstances which supposedly cast doubt on the documents examined by an expert witness of the National Bureau
the authenticity of the documents. Capistrano did not bother to present Investigation (NBI) and to present the notary public as witness.
corroborating witnesses much less an independent expert witness who Specifically, the courts below took Cruz’s inability to obtain the NBI
could declare with authority and objectivity that the challenged examination of the documents as he had somehow undertaken as an
signatures are forged. It befuddles the Court why both the courts below indication that the documents are counterfeit.38
did not find this irregular considering that the Court has previously
declared in Sy Tiangco v. Pablo and Apao,,35 "that the execution of a The courts below may have forgotten that on Capistrano lies the burden
document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be to prove with clear and convincing evidence that the notarized
disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer." documents are spurious. Nothing in law or jurisprudence reposes on
Cruz the obligation to prove that the documents are genuine and duly
The case of Chilianchin v. Coquinco36 also finds application in this executed. Hence it is not incumbent upon Cruz to call the notary public
regard wherein we stated that: or an expert witness. In contrast, Capistrano should have called the
expert witness, the notary public himself or the witnesses to the
As the lower court correctly said, the plaintiff did not even present a document to prove his contention that he never signed the deed of
sample of his authentic signature to support his contention that it is not sale, that its subscribing witnesses never saw him sign the same, and
his the (sic) signature appearing in said document. He did not call a that he never appeared before the notary public before whom the
handwriting expert to prove his assertion. His attorney, at the beginning acknowledgment was made.
of the trial, made it of record that if the defendant present an expert in
hand-writing to show that the signature in question is genuine, the In fact, there is no evidence that the notarization of the documents did
plaintiff will also present an expert to the contrary, as if it were not take place. All that Capistrano could say on this matter was that he
incumbent upon the defendant to show that the signature of the plaintiff had not seen Benedicto, the notary public.39 The assertion that the
in Exhibit A is genuine . . . .37 parties to the deed never appeared before the notary public is not
supported by evidence either. The courts below drew an inference to
Corollarily, he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public that effect from Cruz’s testimony that the deed of sale was dropped or
document bears the responsibility to present evidence to that effect. delivered to his mother’s house.40 That is not a reasonable deduction to
make as it is plainly conjectural. No conclusion can be derived Apart from Capistrano’s abject failure to overcome the presumption of
therefrom which could destroy the genuineness of the deed. The regularity and genuineness with which the Deed of Absolute Sale is
testimony means what it declares: that the copy of the deed was impressed as a public document, Capistrano’s cause is eviscerated by
dropped at the house of Cruz’s mother. That is all. his own acts in writing before and after the execution of the deed. Said
written acts constitute indelible recognition of the existence and
Nor can the Court lend credence to the thinking of the courts below that genuineness of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
since Cruz had a balance of ₱132,061.00 owing to Capistrano as of the
date of the deed of sale, the latter could not have possibly executed the First is the letter-agreement41 dated 23 September 1982 made and
deed. This is plain guesswork. From the existence of Cruz’s signed by Capistrano in favor of Cruz, which the latter also signed
outstanding balance, the non-existence of the deed of sale does not subsequently, stating that Cruz will, as he did, purchase the subject lot
necessarily follow. for ₱350,000.00 to be paid according to the terms provided therein.

Indeed, a vendor may agree to a deed of absolute sale even before full Second is the Statement of Account42 signed by Capistrano, which he
payment of the purchase price. Article 1478 of the Civil Code states that delivered to Cruz, showing that as of 30 October 1985, Cruz’s balance
"the parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to of the stipulated purchase price consisted of ₱19,561.00 as principal
the purchaser until he has fully paid the price." A sensu contrario, the and ₱3,520.98 as interest, or a total of ₱23,081.98.
parties may likewise stipulate that the ownership of the property may
pass even if the purchaser has not fully paid the price. Third is Capistrano’s Amended Complaint itself which illustrates his
own manifest uncertainty as to the relief he was seeking in court. He
The courts below also assigned an adverse connotation to Cruz’s demanded that the Deed of Absolute Sale be nullified yet he prayed in
impleading of the Capistrano spouses as party-defendants in the action the same breath for the "rescission" of the same43 —evidently, a self-
against the Bank to enjoin the foreclosure of the mortgage on the defeating recognition of the contract. In asking for "rescission,"
subject lot. Cruz’s move is congruent with both his strong desire to Capistrano obviously was invoking Article 1191 of the Civil Code which
protect his interest in the subject lot and the reality that there was an provides that the "power to rescind," which really means to resolve or
existing deed of sale in his favor. Precisely, his interest in the lot is cancel, is implied in reciprocal obligations "in case one of the obligors
borne out and had arisen from the deed of sale. As purchaser of the lot, should not comply with what is incumbent upon him." When a party
he had to avert the foreclosure of the mortgage thereon. And to ensure asks for the resolution or cancellation of a contract it is implied that he
against the dismissal of the action for failure to join a real party-in- recognizes its existence. A non-existent contract need not be cancelled.
interest, he had to implead Capistrano in whose name the title to the
subject lot was registered still. These are unmistakable written admissions of Capistrano that he really
intended to sell the subject lot to Cruz and that he received payments
for it from the latter as late as the year 1985. It is thus a little baffling (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
why in 1988, he decided to disown the Deed of Absolute Sale. The
most plausible explanation for his sudden change of mind would be his (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
belated realization that he parted with the subject lot for too small an handwriting of the maker.
amount (₱350,000.00), compared to the price pegged by Cruz
(₱1,800,000.00) in the sale to Pan Pacific. Any other private document need only be identified as that which is
claimed to be.
Now, to the Marital Consent. The fact that the document contains a
jurat, not an acknowledgment, should not affect its genuineness or that The requirement of proof of the authenticity of the Marital Consent was
of the related document of conveyance itself, the Deed of Absolute adequately met, in this case, through the testimony of Cruz to the effect
Sale. In this instance, a jurat suffices as the document only embodies that, together with the other witnesses to the document, he was present
the manifestation of the spouse’s consent,44 a mere appendage to the when Capistrano’s wife affixed her signature thereon before notary
main document. public Benedicto.47 Viewed against this positive declaration,
Capistrano’s negative and self-serving assertions that his wife’s
The use of a jurat, instead of an acknowledgement does not elevate the signature on the document was forged because "(i)t is too beautiful"
Marital Consent to the level of a public document but instead consigns it and that his wife could not have executed the Marital Consent because
to the status of a private writing.45 The lack of acknowledgment, it was executed on her natal day and she was somewhere else,
however, does not render a deed invalid. The necessity of a public crumble and become unworthy of belief.
document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over
immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is That the Marital Consent was executed prior to the Deed of Absolute
only for convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability.46 Sale also does not indicate that it is phoney. A fair assumption is that it
was executed in anticipation of the Deed of Absolute Sale which was
From the perspective of the law on evidence, however, the presumption accomplished a scant six (6) days later.
of regularity does not hold true with respect to the Marital Consent
which is a private writing. It is subject to the requirement of proof under With respect to whatever balance Cruz may still owe to Capistrano, the
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which states: Court believes that this is not a concern of Pan Pacific as the latter is
not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale between Capistrano and Cruz.
Section 20. Proof of private document.- Before any private document But of course, Pan Pacific should enjoy full entitlement to the subject lot
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and as it was sold to him by Cruz who earlier had acquired title thereto
authenticity must be proved either: absolutely and unconditionally by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Otherwise laid down, Cruz had the right to sell the subject lot to Pan
Pacific in 1988, as he in fact did. Thus, the question of whether or not
Pan Pacific is a purchaser in good faith should be deemed irrelevant. 1avvphil.net

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 4 June TINGA, J.:

1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41112 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Respondent Nicolas Capistrano is ordered to The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a
surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of Transfer of Certificate of single document, a deed of sale involving interest over real property,
Title No. 143599 to the Register of Deeds of Manila to enable the notarized by a person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of
issuance of a new title over the subject lot in the name of petitioner Pan the Court of Appeals, which overturned the findings of fact of the
Pacific Industrial Sales, Inc. Costs against respondent Nicolas Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the presumption of regularity
Capistrano. attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution. We
conclude instead that the document has not been duly notarized and
SO ORDERED. accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.

The facts are as follow:

On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina

Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a complaint for enforcement of contract and
damages against Isidro Bustria (Bustria). The complaint sought to
1 

G.R. No. 129416             November 25, 2004 enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred
twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond located in Dasci,
ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land
TIGNO, petitioners, Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, though registrable
vs. under Act No. 3344. The conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale
2 

SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO and the dated 2 September 1978.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise
agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale,
and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to
repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven (7) years.
DECISION
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent document
VII, approved and incorporated the compromise agreement in a which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its
Decision which it rendered on 7 September 1981. existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously
unknown, and not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed
Bustria died in October of 1986. On 1 December 1989, petitioner
3 
Tigno's previous Motion for Consignation. 10

Zenaida B. Tigno (Tigno), in substitution of her deceased father Isidro

Bustria, attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for
4 
In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of
Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Sale in evidence. A Motion for Reconsideration praying for the
11 

Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial court, now Regional Trial admission of said exhibit was denied in an Order dated 27 April 1994. 12

Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December

1989, the Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing that the right to Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor
repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to make of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of
a tender of payment. In an Order dated 10 October 1999, the RTC the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and
denied the Motion for Consignation. 5 Cariño as conflicting. The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the
13 

alleged deed of sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged
In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was by Bustria; that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or
14 

likewise opposed by the Aquinos, and denied by the RTC. Then, on 6 represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation and
September 1991, Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment, seeking
6 
execution of the deed of sale or that Aquino had raised the matter of
15 

the revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257, so that it could be the deed of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion for
executed accordingly. The Aquinos filed an answer, wherein they
7 
Consignation. The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion for
16 

alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to Execution lodged by Tigno had to be denied since more than five (5)
them in a deed of sale dated 17 October 1985. 8
years had elapsed from the date the judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257
had become final and executory; but the judgment could be revived by
Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus action such as the instant complaint. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the
De Francia (De Francia), the instrumental witness to the deed of sale, revival of the judgment dated 7 September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-
and former Judge Franklin Cariño (Judge Cariño), who notarized the 1257.17

same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution

and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. In the
18 

Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as meantime, the RTC allowed the execution pending appeal of its
their Exhibit No. "8," the deed of sale (Deed of Sale) purportedly
9 
Decision. On 23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division
19 

executed by Bustria. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected promulgated a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision.
20 
The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no material or The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cariño and De
Francia that would taint the document with doubtful authenticity; that the ACKNOWLEDGMENT
absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat did
not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
and ineffective. It was noted that a notarized document carried in its
21  MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution,
and that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of
preponderant evidence to contradict the same. Accordingly, the Court October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties known to me
of Appeals held that the RTC erred in refusing to admit the Deed of to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.
Sale, and that the document extinguished the right of Bustria's heirs to
repurchase the property. FRANKLIN CARIÑO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
After the Court of Appeals denied Tigno's Motion for Judge, M.T.C.
Reconsideration, the present petition was filed before this Court. Tigno
22 
Alaminos, Pangasinan
imputes grave abuse of discretion and misappreciation of facts to the
Court of Appeals when it admitted the Deed of Sale. He also argues There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the
that the appellate court should have declared the Deed of Sale as a document is certified by way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A
false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An
consideration at all. acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually
deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies
based. As such, they could normally lead to the dismissal of this
that the same was sworn before him. Under Section 127 of the Land
25 

Petition for Review. However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier of
Registration Act, which has been replicated in Section 112 of
26 

facts, factual review may be warranted in instances when the findings

23 

Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Deed of Sale should have been
27 

of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court are contrary to
acknowledged before a notary public. 28

each other. Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial argument

24 

regarding the capacity of the notary public, Judge Cariño, to notarize

the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately silent on that
matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness.
But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize
which is determinative of this petition. This pertains to the authority of documents involving private transactions and sign the document in this
Judge Franklin Cariño to notarize the Deed of Sale. wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge"
(p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of Complaint). In doing so, he obliterated the
It is undisputed that Franklin Cariño at the time of the notarization of the distinction between a regular notary and a notary ex officio. 36

Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of

Alaminos. Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis, that municipal
29  30 
There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter,
judges may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to
private documents, contracts, and other acts of conveyance which bear perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public
no relation to the performance of their functions as judges. In response,
31 
provided that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting
respondents claim that the prohibition imposed on municipal court to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.
judges from notarizing documents took effect only in December of Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the
1989, or four years after the Deed of Sale was notarized by Cariño. 32
exception applies. The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed
37 

attitude towards Judge Cariño's improper notarial activity. There was no

Respondent's contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform would be hard put to accept the veracity of its contents, considering that
the functions of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city, was even then not an isolated
38 

Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of backwater town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, 33 

as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya, the Court explicitly declared that
34 
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cariño, who
municipal court judges such as Cariño may notarize only documents ceased being a judge in 1986, for his improper notarial activity. Perhaps
connected with the exercise of their official duties. The Deed of Sale
35 
though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate considering
was not connected with any official duties of Judge Cariño, and there Judge Cariño's advanced age, assuming he is still alive. However, this
39 

was no reason for him to notarize it. Our observations as to the errant Decision should again serve as an affirmation of the rule prohibiting
judge in Borre are pertinent in this case, considering that Judge Cariño municipal judges from notarizing documents not connected with the
identified himself in the Deed of Sale as "Ex-Officio Notary Public, exercise of their official duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in
Judge, MTC:" Circular No. 1-90.

[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not
practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing having been notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification
business. necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary
public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is
anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized. The rule nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the time-honored
may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal
parties in good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary effects between the parties. 43

public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise

would render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid
Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial commission. Without notarization of the Deed of Sale from the perspective of the law on
such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary evidence. After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of
public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non- Sale.
lawyer engaged in pretense.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Appeals no longer holds true since the Deed of Sale is not a notarized
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a document. Its proper probative value is governed by the Rules of Court.
public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its Section 19, Rule 132 states:
authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary,
40 

it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of Section 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of their
that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and
the courts and administrative offices generally. 41 Public documents are:

On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
not notarized? True enough, from a civil law perspective, the absence sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires
that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an wills and testaments; and
accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not
render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or required by law to be entered therein.
enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for
convenience. We have even affirmed that a sale of real property
42 
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold
enumeration of public documents; hence, it must be considered a that it did not. Section 20, Rule 132 provides ample discretion on the
private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization trier of fact before it may choose to receive the private document in
performed by Judge Cariño is sufficient to exclude the document in evidence. The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed of Sale, taking
question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its veracity. The RTC
Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a was not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the
private document, since it was not properly acknowledged, but merely exercise of its sound discretion as the primary trier of fact warrants due
subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat. respect.

Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the
requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132, which states: very first time respondents alleged the existence of the Deed of Sale
when they filed their answer to petitioner's current action to revive
Section 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document judgment. Prior to the initiation of the present action, Tigno had tried to
44 

offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and operationalize and implement the Compromise Agreement through two
authenticity must be proved either: judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The Aquinos
duly opposed these prior attempts of the petitioner to exercise the right
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or to repurchase, but they did not raise then the claim that such right to
repurchase was already extinguished by the Deed of Sale. Tigno
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or attempted to exercise the right to repurchase only a few years after the
handwriting of the maker. execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents themselves were
signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the
Any other private document need only be identified as that which is Deed of Sale when they opposed in court petitioner's successive
claimed to be. attempts at consignation and execution of judgment. The Deed of Sale,
if in existence and valid, would have already precluded Tigno's causes
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, of action for either consignation or execution of judgment. The only
who likewise insist that its enforceability militates against Tigno's claim. believable conclusion, as drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale
Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its had yet to be created when petitioner moved in 1990 for consignation
authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in and execution of judgment—an existential anomaly if we were to agree
not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a private document and in with the respondents that such document had been signed and
applying the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly notarized back in 1985.
notarized documents, as distinguished from private documents.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that persons of
other observations of the RTC. It also pointed to certain incredible Bustria's age are typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist
aspects in the Aquinos' tale of events. It noted that no receipts were on traveling significant distances alone.
ever presented by the respondents to evidence actual payment of
consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the
respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts. The 45  alleged signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise
Aquinos claimed that Bustria kept all the receipts, an assertion which appears on the judicial record. Bustria's signature in the 1981
the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary human nature to ask for Compromise Agreement is noticeably shaky which is not surprising,
receipts for significant amounts given and to keep the same. In itself,
46  considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine (89)
the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration, would not be years old. However, Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale, which if
conclusive since consideration is always presumed. However, given the genuine was affixed when he was already ninety-three (93) years old, is
totality of the circumstances surrounding this case, the absence of such remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other evident
proof further militates against the claims of the Aquinos. differences between Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale and on
other documents on the record.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of
Appeals that Bustria did not bother to seek his lawyer's assistance as Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation
regards the execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject of circumstantial evidence. These have to be weighed against the
property had previously been fiercely litigated. Although the Court of findings of the Court of Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed the
Appeals was correct in ruling that the document would not be rendered Deed of Sale was established by the respective testimonies of
null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel, the witnesses De Francia and Judge Cariño. In its own appreciation of
implausibility of the scenario strikes as odd and therefore reinforces the these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their
version found by the RTC as credible. testimonies. As a final measure of analysis, the Court shall now
examine whether the appellate court was in error in reversing the
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
the doubts raised by the Court of Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would die
in 1986, was already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that
signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos asserted before the Judge Cariño himself prepared and typed the Deed of Sale in his office,
RTC that Bustria traveled unaccompanied from his home in Dasol, where the document was signed, while Judge Cariño testified that he
47 

Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute the did not type the Deed of Sale since it was already prepared when the
Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the accomplishments of parties arrived at his office for the signing. On this point, the Court of
48 

nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it should be Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record
revealed no material or substantial inconsistencies between the document itself that is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on that
testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia. point by the material witnesses properly raises questions about the due
execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the of Judge Cariño and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is not possible to
inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to who prepared the Deed of affirm the testimony of either without denigrating the competence and
Sale. If the only point of consideration was the due execution of the credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge Cariño was truthful in
Deed of Sale, then the Court of Appeals should have properly come out testifying that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then doubt can be cast
with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no contradictions in the as to the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia. It takes a leap of
testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia on the question of whether imagination, a high level of gumption, and perverse deliberation for one
or not Bustria signed the Deed of Sale. to erroneously assert, under oath and with particularities, that a person
drafted a particular document in his presence.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private
document. Thus, not only the due execution of the document must be However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of
proven but also its authenticity. This factor was not duly considered by the notary public, Judge Cariño, would be obviously compromised.
the Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia Assuming that Judge Cariño had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it
now become material not only to establish due execution, but also the would indeed be odd that he would not remember having written the
authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies document himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing the same. If his
pointed out by the RTC become crucial. testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then
there is all the reason to make a similar assumption as to his testimony
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.
identity of the progenitor of this all-important document is a material
evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to
respondent offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each indubitably establish the author of the Deed of Sale. They are important
other on the basis of their own personal and sensory knowledge. because they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of the
Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the due execution and
drafted the document, notwithstanding the contrary testimony grounded authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in
on personal knowledge by the documentary witness. error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the RTC.

Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute
would not ordinarily be necessary to establish the validity of the conclusive value to the testimonies of de Francia and Judge Cariño.
transaction it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the The totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the
Deed of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The
Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of
Sale, since its due execution and authenticity have not been proven.
The evidence pointing to the non-existence of such a transaction is so
clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut the typical G.R. No. 187752               November 23, 2010
presumption of regularity arising from the due execution of notarial
documents. However, for the reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is IRENE K. NACU, substituted by BENJAMIN M. NACU, ERVIN K.
ineluctably an unnotarized document. And the lower court had more NACU, and NEJIE N. DE SAGUN, Petitioners,
than sufficient basis to conclude that it is a spurious document. vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, AUTHORITY, Respondents.
Tigno's right to repurchase was not extinguished at the time of the filing
of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the DECISION
RTC. The Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise,
NACHURA, J.:
the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is warranted.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated December 24,
23 December 1996 and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of
2008 and Resolution2 dated May 6, 2009. The assailed Decision held
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and the Decision
that Irene K. Nacu (Nacu), Enterprise Service Officer III at the Philippine
dated 18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), assigned at the Bataan Economic
Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED.
Zone (BEZ), was guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
Costs against respondents.
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposed upon her the
SO ORDERED. penalty of dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties.

The case arose from the following facts:

On December 17, 1999, PEZA issued Memorandum Order No. 99-003,

prohibiting its employees from charging and collecting overtime fees
from PEZA-registered enterprises. The pertinent portions of the said
regulation read:
Effective immediately, PEZA shall provide processing/documentation On November 21, 2001, Atty. Procolo Olaivar (Atty. Olaivar) of PEZA
services required by economic zone export-producers for incoming and Legal Services Group requested the National Bureau of Investigation
outgoing shipments x x x FREE OF OVERTIME FEES/CHARGES x x x. (NBI) to verify the genuineness of Nacu’s signatures appearing on the
Statements of Overtime Services (SOS).4 Original copies of 32 SOS
xxxx and a specimen of Nacu’s signature were then sent to the NBI for
comparison.
Economic zone export producers, customs brokers, freight forwarders,
truckers and other service providers and enterprises are strictly On January 25, 2002, the NBI informed Atty. Olaivar that "no definite
prohibited from offering financial and/or non-financial tokens, opinion can be rendered on the matter" since "the standards/sample
compensation, etc. to any PEZA official and/or personnel, in connection signatures of the subject submitted [we]re not sufficient and appropriate
with PEZA overtime services rendered and/or other transactions. to serve as basis for a specific comparative examination." The NBI then
requested that, should PEZA still want it to conduct further examination,
In addition, economic zone export-producers, customs brokers, freight it be furnished with additional standard/sample signatures, in the same
forwarders, truckers and other service providers and enterprises are style and pattern as that of the questioned document, appearing in
enjoined to notify ranking PEZA officials (Administrator, Manager, official/legal documents on file, executed before, during, and after the
Officer-in-Charge, Deputy Director Generals and the Director General) date of the questioned document.5
on any difficulties or problems they encounter, particularly those
pertaining to lack of service-orientation or improper behavior of any PEZA referred the 32 SOS, together with the same standard specimen
PEZA officer and/or personnel.3 of Nacu’s signatures/initials, to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory (PNP Crime Lab) for determination of the genuineness of
Sometime in September 2001, Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Nacu’s signature appearing therein.
Corporation (EBCC) filed a complaint against Nacu for allegedly
charging it overtime fees, despite Memorandum Order No. 99-003. In Questioned Document Report No. 052-02 dated May 3, 2002,
Rosario C. Perez, Document Examiner II of the PNP Crime Lab, stated
Acting on the complaint, PEZA immediately conducted a preliminary her findings, thus –
investigation, during which Atty. Norma B. Cajulis, PEZA’s lawyer,
interviewed Rey Ligan (Ligan), a document processor at EBCC. Ligan 1. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the
attested, among others, that the overtime fees went to Nacu’s group, questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked "Q-
and that, during the time Nacu was confined in the hospital, she pre- 1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19, Q-20, Q-21, Q-23, Q-24,
signed documents and gave them to him. Q-25, Q-27 to Q-32" and the submitted standard
initials/signatures of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19" inclusive
 reveal significant divergences in the matter of execution, line Best Interest of the Service. It was alleged that Nacu unlawfully charged
quality and stroke structure. ₱3,500.00 overtime fee from EBCC on ten occasions (covered by the
ten SOS which the PNP Crime Lab found to have been written by
2. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the Nacu), for a total amount of ₱35,000.00.
questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked "Q-
7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26" and the submitted Nacu denied that the signatures appearing on the ten overtime billing
standard signatures/initials of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19" statements were hers. She averred that it was impossible for her to
inclusive reveal significant similarities in the manner of execution, charge EBCC overtime fees as the latter was well aware that PEZA
line quality and stroke structure. employees may no longer charge for overtime services; that she had no
actual notice of Memorandum Order No. 99-003; and that she caused
xxxx no damage and prejudice to PEZA and EBCC.

CONCLUSION During the hearing, PEZA presented the following witnesses: Rosario
Perez, the document examiner who examined the SOS; Atty. Dante
1. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU Quindoza, Zone Administrator of BEZ, who testified that Nacu was one
marked "Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19 to Q-21, Q-23 of the officials authorized to sign the documents; Romy Zaragosa,
to Q-25, Q-27 to Q-32" appearing in the twenty-two (22) pieces Corporate Relations Manager of Covanta Energy, who attested that
[of] Statement of Overtime Services and the submitted standard meetings were held on November 17, 2001 and January 25, 2002,
initials/signatures of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19" inclusive wherein Ligan testified that he gave the payment for overtime fees to
WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON. Nacu; Roberto Margallo (Margallo), Enterprise Service Officer III of
PEZA, who testified that he knows Nacu’s signature and that he was
2. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU certain that the signatures appearing on the SOS were hers; Omar
marked "Q-7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26" appearing Dana, EBCC plant chemist, who testified that EBCC paid, through
in the ten (10) pieces of Statement of Overtime Service and the Ligan, overtime fees to Nacu and some other persons; Elma Bugho,
submitted standard initials/signatures [of] Irene K. Nacu marked PEZA Records Officer, who testified on the issuance of PEZA
"S-1 to S-19" inclusive WERE WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE Memorandum Order No. 99-003;7 and Miguel Herrera, then Division
SAME PERSON.6 Chief of PEZA at the BEZ, who testified that he was responsible for the
implementation of PEZA rules and regulations and for assigning
Finding a prima facie case against Nacu, PEZA Director General Lilia examiners upon the request of zone enterprises and brokers.8
B. de Lima (Director General De Lima) filed a Formal Charge against
her for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
On February 8, 2005, the PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation, WHEREFORE, the appeal of Irene K. Nacu, former Enterprise Service
and Discipline (CBIID), with the approval of Director General De Lima, Officer III, Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), is hereby
found Nacu guilty of the acts charged, thus: DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 08, 2005 issued
by Director General Lilia B. de Lima finding Nacu guilty of Dishonesty,
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Central Board of Inquiry, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Investigation and Discipline (CBIID) – Service and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the
service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility,
1. resolves – that Irene K. Nacu committed an act which forfeiture of retirement benefits, and disqualification from being re-
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action and finds her guilty of employed in the government service is AFFIRMED.10
dishonesty, grave misconduct[, and conduct] prejudicial to the
best interest of service pursuant to Section 46(b)(1), (4) and (27), Nacu filed a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 070327,
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and hereby but the motion was denied in Resolution No. 071489 dated August 1,
2007.11
2. recommends that – respondent be dismissed from service
pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV, Revised Uniform Rules in Nacu forthwith filed a petition for review with the CA, assailing the CSC
Administrative Cases in Philippine Civil Service with accessory resolutions. On September 17, 2007, while the case was pending
penalties of: resolution, Nacu died and was substituted by her heirs, Benjamin Nacu
(husband), Nejie N. de Sagun (daughter), and Ervin K. Nacu (son),
a) cancellation of eligibility; herein petitioners.

b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and The CA, in the assailed Decision dated December 24, 2008, affirmed
the CSC resolutions. The CA could not believe Nacu’s claim that she
c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the was not aware of Memorandum Order No. 99-003, considering that the
government service.9 order was issued almost two years earlier. According to the CA, as a
PEZA employee, Nacu had the obligation to keep herself abreast of
Nacu moved for a reconsideration of the CBIID’s findings, but the everything that transpires in her office and of developments that
motion was denied. By way of appeal, Nacu elevated the case to the concern her position. It stressed that even if Nacu had not actually
Civil Service Commission (CSC). received a copy of the memorandum order, such circumstance will not
foreclose the order’s effectivity; and that it is merely an internal
On February 19, 2007, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 070327, regulation which does not require publication for its effectivity.12
affirming the CBIID’s resolution, viz.:
The CA brushed aside Nacu’s objections to (a) Ligan’s written SO ORDERED.13
statement because it was not made under oath and Ligan was not
presented as witness during the hearing; (b) the PNP Crime Lab’s A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners, but the CA denied
findings for being unreliable in light of the NBI’s own finding that the the motion in its Resolution14 dated May 6, 2009. They then elevated the
samples were not sufficient; and (c) Margallo’s testimony identifying case to this Court through this petition for review on certiorari.
Nacu’s signatures on the SOS, on the ground that he was not
presented as an expert witness. The CA pointed out that proceedings in Petitioners submit to this Court the issue of whether the finding that
administrative cases are not strictly governed by technical rules of Nacu is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial
procedure and evidence, as they are required to be disposed of to the best interest of the service is supported by substantial evidence.
summarily.
Petitioners’ arguments focus largely on the weight given by the CA to
In particular, the CA found pointless Nacu’s criticism of the PNP Crime the PNP Crime Lab’s report, which, they insist, should not be given
Lab’s findings based on the NBI’s opinion on the samples given. To credence as it is unreliable. Firstly, it was not shown that the questioned
counter the same, the CA highlighted the fact that the NBI’s opinion did document examiner who examined the SOS was a handwriting expert.
not conclusively state that the signatures were not that of Nacu. It Secondly, the signature samples were, according to the NBI, insufficient
stressed that Nacu failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to references for a comparative examination. Thirdly, the sample
contradict the PNP Crime Lab’s findings, relying merely on the NBI’s signatures used were obtained in violation of Nacu’s right against self-
opinion which, to the mind of the CA, did not actually absolve petitioner. incrimination. And lastly, the report merely states that there were
similarities in the manner of execution, line quality, and stroke
According to the CA, Memorandum Order No. 99-003, the PNP’s structures of the signatures, and that such conclusion does not
findings, and the witnesses’ testimonies, taken together, were sufficient translate to a finding that the signatures appearing on the SOS are
to hold Nacu administratively liable for the acts complained of. Nacu genuine.
was not denied due process, considering that she was given the
opportunity to explain her side and present evidence, and that she had, Petitioners also object to the CA’s reliance on the statements made by
in fact, participated in the hearing. Ligan during the preliminary investigation, which were not given under
oath. They contend that Nacu was denied due process when Ligan was
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads: not presented as witness during the trial, and that there were
inconsistencies in Ligan’s statements.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. And finally, as an affirmative defense, they reiterate that Nacu was not
aware of the issuance and implementation of Memorandum Order No.
99-003. They point out that there was, in fact, no showing that the said NBI did not actually make a determination of the genuineness of the
order had been published in a newspaper, posted at the BEZ, or a copy signatures. While the NBI may have found the samples to be
thereof furnished to Nacu. insufficient, such finding should not have any bearing on the PNP Crime
Lab’s own findings that the samples were sufficient and that some of
We find no merit in this petition. the signatures found on the overtime billings matched the sample
signatures. The difference of opinion with respect to the sufficiency of
Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required in the samples could only mean that the PNP Crime Lab observes a
administrative proceedings, means such relevant evidence as a standard different from that used by the NBI in the examination of
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a handwriting.
conclusion.15 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when
there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for Instead of just discrediting the PNP Crime Lab’s findings, Nacu should
the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be have channeled her efforts into providing her own proof that the
overwhelming or even preponderant.16 signatures appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries. After all,
whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same by clear
Overall, the testimonies of the witnesses, the statements made by and convincing evidence.17 Nacu could not simply depend on the
Ligan during the preliminary investigation, and the findings of the PNP alleged weakness of the complainant’s evidence without offering
Crime Lab on its examination of the signatures on the SOS, amounted stronger evidence to contradict the former.
to substantial evidence that adequately supported the conclusion that
Nacu was guilty of the acts complained of. Petitioners’ allegations of In any case, the CA did not rely solely on the PNP Crime Lab report in
unreliability, irregularities, and inconsistencies of the evidence neither concluding that the signatures appearing on the ten SOS were Nacu’s.
discredited nor weakened the case against Nacu. Margallo, a co-employee who holds the same position as Nacu, also
identified the latter’s signatures on the SOS. Such testimony deserves
For one, petitioners cite the PNP’s findings as unreliable in light of the credence. It has been held that an ordinary witness may testify on a
NBI’s opinion that the samples utilized by the PNP Crime Lab—the signature he is familiar with.18 Anyone who is familiar with a person’s
same samples submitted to the NBI—were not sufficient to make a writing from having seen him write, from carrying on a correspondence
comparative examination. with him, or from having become familiar with his writing through
handling documents and papers known to have been signed by him
We do not agree. The PNP and the NBI are separate agencies, and the may give his opinion as to the genuineness of that person’s purported
findings of one are not binding or conclusive upon the other. Moreover, signature when it becomes material in the case.19
as pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment, the
NBI’s finding referred only to the insufficiency of the samples given; the
Petitioners also posit that Nacu was denied her right against self- controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the
incrimination when she was made to give samples of her signature. We action or ruling complained of.22
do not agree. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed; otherwise, the protection The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals
does not come into play. Moreover, the right must be claimed at the allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
appropriate time, or else, it may be deemed waived.20 In the present compromised. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable or violative of
case, it does not appear that Nacu invoked her right against self- due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based
incrimination at the appropriate time, that is, at the time she was asked solely on position papers, affidavits, or documentary evidence
to provide samples of her signature. She is therefore deemed to have submitted by the parties, as affidavits of witnesses may take the place
waived her right against self-incrimination. of their direct testimonies.23

Next, petitioners assail the credibility of Ligan’s statement because it In addition, petitioners claim that there were inconsistencies in Ligan’s
was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as witness statement. While Ligan allegedly stated that Nacu gave him pre-signed
during the hearing. Nacu was allegedly denied due process when she documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that these
was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Ligan. pre-signed documents referred to the ten overtime billings referred to in
the formal charge, the record does not show that Nacu was confined in
It is settled that, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of the hospital on the dates indicated in the said billings.
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial To set the record straight, Ligan did not specifically mention that the
sense.21 In a recent case, a party likewise protested against the non- dates indicated in the pre-signed documents were also the days when
presentation of a witness during trial and the lack of opportunity to Nacu was confined in the hospital. He merely said that Nacu pre-signed
cross-examine the said witness. Addressing the issue, the Court held some documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that
that the contention was unavailing, stating that - she gave these documents to him. Neither did he state that these pre-
signed SOS were the same ten SOS cited in the formal charge against
In another case, the Court addressed a similar contention by stating Nacu. It was petitioners’ own assumption that led to this baseless
that the petitioner therein could not argue that she had been deprived of conclusion.1avvphi1

due process merely because no cross-examination took place. [Citing

Casimiro v. Tandog, 459 SCRA 624, 633 (2005)]. Indeed, in In Nacu’s defense, petitioners contend that she (Nacu) was not aware
administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties of the existence of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. They aver that
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the there was no evidence showing that Memorandum Order No. 99-003
was posted, published, and promulgated; hence, it cannot be said that
the order had already taken effect and was being implemented in the direct payments for overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises
BEZ. Petitioners claim that Nacu had, in fact, no actual knowledge of under Office Order No. 99-0002 dated March 8, 1999. The latter
the said order as she was not furnished with a copy thereof. specifically provides that "overtime shall be paid only through the
regular payroll system," and that overtime claims shall be supported by
Nacu cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the said order. As the required documents.26 This was followed by PEZA General Circular
correctly opined by the CA, it is difficult to believe that Nacu, one of the No. 99-0001 (Prescribing New Rates of Overtime Pay Payable by Zone
employees of PEZA affected by the memorandum order, was not in any Enterprises, Customs Brokers And Other Entities Concerned) dated
way informed—by posting or personal notice—of the implementation of August 10, 1999, providing that –
the said order, considering that over a year had lapsed since it had
been issued. From the testimonies of the other witnesses, who were 4.5. All payments to be made by requesting parties shall be
employees of PEZA and PEZA-registered enterprises, it was evident covered by official receipts. IN NO CASE SHALL PAYMENT BE
that the prohibition against charging and collecting overtime fees was MADE DIRECTLY TO ZONE/PCDU PERSONNEL.
common knowledge to them.
4.6 No additional charges or fees shall be paid by requesting
At any rate, no publication is required for such a regulation to take parties, nor shall they offer gifts, "tips" and other financial/material
effect. Memorandum Order No. 99-003 is an internal regulation that favors to PEZA employees rendering overtime services.
clearly falls within the administrative rules and regulations exempted
from the publication requirement, as set forth in the prevailing case 4.7 At the end of the month, all claims of personnel for payment
of Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera:24 of overtime services shall be supported by the following
documents:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the 4.7.1. Copies of written requests by enterprises and other parties;
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors 4.7.2. Certificate of service or DTR;
concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.25 4.7.3. Authority to render overtime services; and

At the very least, Nacu should have been aware that collecting 4.7.4. Certificate of accomplishment.27
payments directly from PEZA-registered enterprises was strictly
prohibited. Months before Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was Petitioners desperately argue that Nacu could not have charged and
promulgated, PEZA had already put a stop to the practice of collecting collected overtime fees from EBCC as it was well aware of
Memorandum Order No. 99-003. The contention is puerile. Petitioners
are, in effect, saying that knowledge of the existence of a rule
prohibiting a certain act would absolutely prevent one from doing the
prohibited act. This premise is undeniably false, and, as a matter of
fact, judicial institutions have been founded based on the reality that not
everyone abides by the law.

All told, Nacu was rightfully found guilty of grave misconduct,

dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
and penalized with dismissal from the service and its accessory
penalties. The general rule is that where the findings of the
administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence, such
findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding
on this Court. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute
its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency
of evidence.28

Nacu’s length of service or the fact that this was her first offense has
not been clearly established. We cannot reasonably take them into
consideration in reviewing the case. At any rate, these circumstances
cannot serve to mitigate the violation, considering the gravity of the
offense and the fact that Nacu’s act irreparably tarnished the integrity of
PEZA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court

of Appeals Decision dated December 24, 2008 and its Resolution dated
May 6, 2009 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.