Civil Procedure - Atty.

Custodio
AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

1. La Naval Drug Corp v. CA and Yao [UPPERBATCH DIGEST] effect of preventing recovery by plaintiff) may be had as if a motion to dismiss had
been filed.
FACTS:
- Yao is present owner of a commercial bldg a portion of which is leased to P It appears that it is not the invocation of any of such defenses, but the failure to so
under a contract of lease which expired year 1989. raise them, that can result in waiver or estoppel.
- P exercised its option to lease same bldg for another 5 years but P & R
disagreed on the rental rate. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever
- P, to resolve controversy, submitted to arbitration pursuant to RA 876. it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be
- R appointed Alamarez as arbitrator while P chose Sabile as its arbitrator. dismissed (Sec. 2, Rule 9). However, jurisdiction over the nature the action, in
The confirmation of the appointment of a third arbitrator Tupang, was held in concept, differs from jurisdiction over the subject matter. Lack of jurisdiction over the
abeyance because P instructed Sabile to defer the same until the BoD could nature of the action is the situation that arises when a court, which ordinarily would
convene approve Tupang’s appointment. This was accdg to R, P’s dilatory have the authority and competence to take a case, is rendered without it either
tactic in violation of the Arbitration Law and the governing stipulation. because a special law has limited the exercise of its normal jurisdiction on a particular
- R prayed that after summary hearing pursuant to Sec. 6 of the A.Law, Sabile matter or because the type of action has been reposed by law in certain other courts
and Alamarez be directed to proceed with the arbitration in acc with Sec. 7 or quasi-judicial agencies for determination.
of the Contract and the applicable provisions of the law; and that the Board
of Three Arbitrators be ordered to convene and resolve controversy. (1) Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is
- P denied the averments of petition theorizing that such petition is premature pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an
since there was failure of notice on the part of R requiring both arbitrators to answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense.
appoint third member of the BoA. It gave the arbitrators a free hand in The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as
choosing the third arbitrator, thus, R has no cause of action against it. an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
- R filed an amended petition for “Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement with (2) Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
Damages;” praying that petitioner be ordered to pay interest on the unpaid the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any
rents (prevailing interest) and exemplary damages. time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that
- P answered, contending among others, that amended petition should be rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in
dismissed OTG of non-payment of requisite filing fees; and it being in the character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such
nature of an ordinary civil action, a full blown and regular trial is necessary. P as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply.
presented a “Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing” of its special and
affirmative defenses which are grounds for a motion to dismiss. In the case at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable, given the
- Resp Court announced that the two arbitrators chose Narciso as third nature of the controversy. The arbitration law explicitly confines the court's authority
arbitrator. It also ordered the parties to submit position papers re: w/n resp only to pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no agreement in writing
Yao’s claim for damages may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute ordains that the court shall
for enforcement of arbitration agreement. issue an order "summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in
- P argued that respondent court sits as a a special court exercising limited accordance with the terms thereof." If the court, upon the other hand, finds that no
jurisdiction and not competent to act on R’s claim for damages which poses such agreement exists, "the proceeding shall be dismissed." The proceedings are
an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action. summary in nature.
- Appellate court considered P in estoppel from questioning the competence
of the court to additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings R’s All considered, the court a quo must then refrain from taking up the claims of the
claim for damages, it (P) having itself filed similarly its counterclaim with the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in
court a quo. separate regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue.
ISSUE: W/N the submission of other issues in a motion to dismiss, or of an affirmative
defense in an answer, would necessarily foreclose and have the effect of a waiver of,
the right of a defendant to set up the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant?

RULING: Not inevitably. Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules provides the grounds for a
motion to dismiss. Any of these grounds, except improper venue, may be pleaded as
an affirmative defense (admits the material allegations of the complaint but has the
2. EUSTACIO ATWEL, LUCIA PILPIL and MANUEL MELGAZO v. CONCEPCION Facts:
PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION, INC. [G.R. No. 169370. April 14, 2008.] 1. Assemblyman Emiliano Melgazo founded Concepcion Progressive
Association (CPA). The organization aimed to provide livelihood to
Civil Procedure - Atty. Custodio
AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

and generate income for his supporters. 2. Upon the enactment of RA 8799, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-
2. Melgazo bought a parcel of land in behalf of the association. The property corporate controversies, among others, was transferred to the courts of
was later on converted into a wet market. It also housed a cockpit and an general jurisdiction.
area for various forms of amusement. The income generated from the 3. RTC Tacloban, acting as a special commercial court, deemed the mandatory
property, mostly rentals from the wet market, was paid to CPA. injunction case filed by CPAI an intra-corporate dispute as it involved the
3. When Melgazo died, his son, petitioner Manuel Melgazo, succeeded him as officers and members thereof.
CPA president and administrator of the property. Atwel and Pilpil were 4. However, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy. The
elected as CPA vice-president and treasurer, respectively. (CPA group). records reveal that petitioners were never officers nor members of CPAI.
4. While CPA was in the process of registering as a stock corporation, its other CPAI itself admitted this in its pleadings. Petitioners were the only remaining
elected officers and members formed their own group and registered members of CPA which, obviously, was not the CPAI that was registered in
themselves in the SEC as officers and members of Concepcion Progressive the SEC.
Association, Inc. (CPAI). CPAI objected to petitioners’ collection of rentals 5. Moreover, the issue in this case does not concern the regulation of CPAI (or
from the wet market vendors. even CPA). The determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed
5. CPAI filed a case in the SEC for mandatory injunction. With the passage of property entitled to the income generated therefrom is civil in nature and
RA 8799, the case was transferred to Branch 24 of the Southern Leyte RTC should be threshed out in a regular court.
then to Branch 8 of the Tacloban City RTC. Both special commercial courts. a. Cases of this nature are cognizable by the RTC under BP 129.
a. CPAI alleged that it was the owner of the property and the Therefore, the conflict among the parties here was outside the
petitioners, without authority, were collecting rentals from the wet jurisdiction of the special commercial court.
market vendors. 6. The doctrine of estoppel did not bar petitioners from questioning the
6. Special commercial court: the deed of sale covering the property was in jurisdiction of the special commercial court?
the name of CPA, not Emiliano Melgazo; CPA is one and the same as CPAI. a. The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
7. Petitioners went to the CA and contested the jurisdiction of the special depends on whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not.
commercial court over the case. i. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided
a. That they were not CPAI members, hence the case did not involve upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
an intra-corporate dispute "between and among members" so as to barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the
warrant the special commercial court's jurisdiction over it. same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
8. CPAI argued that the petitioners were already in estoppel as they had conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel."
participated actively in the court proceedings. ii. If the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard
9. CA: the special commercial court should not have tried the case since there and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as
was no intra-corporate dispute among CPAI members or officers, it that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it
nonetheless held that the petitioners were already barred from questioning to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
the court's jurisdiction based on the doctrine of estoppel. assume an inconsistent position — that the lower court
10. Petitioners argue that estoppel cannot apply because a court's jurisdiction is had jurisdiction . . .
conferred exclusively by the Constitution or by law, not by the parties' b. Estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none
agreement or by estoppel. over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.
7. CPAI cannot wrest from petitioners the administration of the property until
Issue: Whether the special commercial court has jurisdiction over the dispute? - NO. after the parties' rights are clearly adjudicated in the proper courts.
Whether petitioners were barred by estoppel from questioning said court’s a. It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party to the result of a suit or
jurisdiction? - NO. proceeding in a court with no jurisdiction.
b. The decision of a tribunal not vested with the appropriate
Held: Petition Granted. jurisdiction is null and void.
1. Originally, PD 902-A 13 conferred on the SEC original and exclusive
jurisdiction over: … intra-corporate controversies …
3. VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES v. PEOPLE [G.R.147406. July 14, 2008.] 3. Notes: Cervantes immediately stopped the bus, running at 40 km/hr for the
purpose of avoiding a person who, allegedly, unexpectedly crossed the road.
Facts:
1. An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed Issue: Whether Cervantes is estopped by laches (for raising issue for the first time on
against the Cervantes. RTC convicted him. In his appeal before the CA, the appeal and actively participating in trial) from assailing RTC’s jurisdiction? - NO.
Cervantes questioned for the first time, RTC’s jurisdiction.
2. CA considered the Cervantes to have actively participated in the trial and to Held: Petition Granted.
have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already 1. The rule is that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
estopped by laches from asserting the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless
Civil Procedure - Atty. Custodio
AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. below or on appeal, and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the
2. In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu.
resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land 6. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter … is given only by law and in the
Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32 (2) of BP 129 had manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such
already been amended by RA 7691. The said provision thus reads: jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties.
a. Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs in Criminal 7. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory
Cases. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive original that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing
jurisdiction of RTCs and the SB, the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel.
b. (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with 8. However, according to a case decided by the SC, an appellant who files his
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the brief and submits his case to the CA for decision, without questioning the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or latter's jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the
or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount jurisdiction of said Appellate Court.
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to 9. In a case decided by the SC, it has been held that a party cannot invoke the
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
original jurisdiction thereof. after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
3. As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional jurisdiction. The party is barred to do so for reasons of public policy.
in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months 10. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and 1 day to 6 years, jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
the MTCs. Clearly the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. It is not right for a
Criminal Case. party who has affirmed the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
4. As for the argument that the principle of estoppel by laches has already secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
precluded Cervantes from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC — the trial escape a penalty.
went on for 4 years with Cervantes actively participating therein and without 11. Here, Cervantes is not estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the
him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity: RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the CA.
5. It has been ruled that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some a. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to
legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it. It has attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the
been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the
and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the
condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so
changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights
be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes.
b. Estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It
is to be applied rarely — only in extraordinary circumstances.
Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject
matter is void. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null
and void for want of jurisdiction.

Note: Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
4. SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND ITS BOARD OF electric service in Samar, individual petitioners passed a Resolution.
DIRECTORS, et al. v. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR. [G.R. No. 173840. April 25, 2012.] a. Resolution disallowed Seludo to attend succeeding meetings of
the BOD effective until the end of his term as director. It also
Facts: disqualified him for 1 term to run as a candidate for director in
1. Individual petitioners are members of SAMELCO II's Board of Directors. the upcoming district elections.
Seludo was also a member of the SAMELCO II BOD. 3. Seludo filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against SAMELCO II,
2. As members of the BOD of SAMELCO II, an electric cooperative providing impleading individual petitioners as directors in the RTC. He prayed for
Civil Procedure - Atty. Custodio
AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

the nullification of the Resolution. 4. It is erroneous for CA to rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
4. Individual petitioners raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of apply in the present case. It is true that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
the RTC over the subject matter of the case. That, since the matter involved petition for prohibition filed by Seludo.
an electric cooperative, SAMELCO II, primary jurisdiction is vested on the 5. However, the basic issue in the present case is not whether the RTC has
National Electrification Administration (NEA). jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by Seludo; rather, the issue
5. RTC: sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the petition for prohibition is who between the RTC and the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the
and barred the petitioners from enforcing the Resolution. question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II.
6. CA: dismissed petitioners' petition and affirmed RTC. 6. NEA is granted the authority to conduct investigations and other similar
7. SAMELCO II argue that it is wrong for the CA to rule that there is nothing actions, as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations with respect to all
under the law creating NEA, which grants the said administrative body the matters affecting electric cooperatives.
power to ascertain the validity of board resolutions unseating any member of a. Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by
the BOD of an electric cooperative. the BOD of SAMELCO II, which practically removed Seludo from
a. Citing P.D. Nos. 269 and 1645, NEA is empowered to determine his position as a member of the Board and further disqualified him
the validity of resolutions passed by electric cooperatives. to run as such in the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the
said electric cooperative and, thus, comes within the ambit of the
Issue: In its application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, did CA commit an error powers of the NEA.
in limiting the doctrine to “certain matter in controversies involving specialized 7. While the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by
disputes”? - YES. Whether the technical expertise of NEA is required? - YES. Seludo, the NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has
primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the Resolution.
Held: Petition Granted. 8. The prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a
1. Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of P.D. No. claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
1645, provides: enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. — In the exercise regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other administrative agency.
borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue 9. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may
orders, rules and regulations and motu proprio or upon petition of third suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
parties, to conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions … administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
2. In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269, as disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
amended by Section 7 of P.D. No. 1645, states: 10. Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion
Section 24. Board of Directors. — (a)The Management of a of administrative remedies. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
Cooperative shall be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative
control of NEA … processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
3. The intention of the framers of the amendatory law is to broaden the powers machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every
of the NEA. It expressly provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
supervision and control over electric cooperatives. such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial
review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's
cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the
case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
11. The availability of an administrative remedy via a complaint filed before the
NEA precludes Seludo from filing a petition for prohibition before the court.
Thus, Seludo’s failure to le a complaint before the NEA prevents him from
filing a petition for prohibition before the RTC.
5. BELLE CORPORATION v. ERLINDA DE LEON-BANKS, et al. property.
[G.R. No. 174669. September 19, 2012.] 3. The disputed property was a 13.29 hectare parcel of unregistered land in
Paliparan, Talisan, Batangas originally belonging to Late Sps. De Leon.
Facts: 4. A Deed of Absolute Sale (1979 DEED) was executed between the LATE
1. This case stemmed from a Civil Case where Plaintiffs - De Leons (herein SPS. and NELFRED, represented therein by Nelia De Leon-Alleje, wherein
respondents) were 7 of the 8 children of the Late Sps. De Leon, while the ownership of the property was conveyed to Nelia.
last plaintiff was the daughter and sole heir of the eighth child. 5. In 1997, BELLE, on one hand, and NELFRED and SPS. ALLEJE on the
2. Defendant Alfredo Alleje was the husband of Nelia De Leon-Alleje (Sps. other, executed a Contract to Sell for 4 installments. A Deed of Absolute
Alleje), both were officers of defendant Nelfred Properties Corp. Sale (1998 DEED) was executed wherein NELFRED transferred ownership
Meanwhile, defendant Belle Corp. was the purchaser of the disputed of the disputed property to BELLE.
Civil Procedure - Atty. Custodio
AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

6. In 1998, the De Leons filed a Complaint for "Annulment of Deed of Sale, Held: Petition Denied.
Reconveyance of Property…" against the SPS. ALLEJE, NELFRED and 1. Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines cause of action as the acts or
BELLE wherein they sought the annulment of the Contract to Sell. omission by which a party violates a right of another.
a. They alleged that the 1979 DEED was simulated; that the disputed 2. A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to
property was to be held in trust by Nelia De Leon-Alleje, through, a remedial right. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of
NELFRED, for the equal benefit of all of the LATE SPS’ children; action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the
b. that in the event of any sale, notice and details shall be given to all defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the essential facts
the children who must consent to the sale and that all amounts paid constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Failure to make a sufficient
for the property shall be shared equally by the children; allegation of a cause of action in the complaint warrants its dismissal.
c. that SPS. ALLEJE gave the De Leons P10,400,000 (only a portion 3. The essential elements of a cause of action are:
of the proceeds of the sale of the property); that it was only then (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
that they were given notice of the sale… whatever law it arises or is created;
7. In 1998, SPS. ALLEJE and NELFRED filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging the (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
De Leons’ cause of action, the existence of an implied trust between them not to violate such right; and
and NELFRED on the one hand and the LATE SPS. on the other, was (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of
barred by prescription and laches because more than 10 years had passed the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
since the execution of the 1979 DEED. the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
8. BELLE also filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging no cause of action because it action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
was an innocent purchaser for value; that assuming that the cause of action 4. Here, the allegations of the De Leons in their Amended Complaint are:
was based on an implied trust, the same had already been barred by laches.
a. LATE SPS., during their lifetime, transferred to their daughter, Nelia
9. The De Leons filed an Amended Complaint wherein they added the Alleje, the Paliparan Property, through NELFRED under a Deed of
allegations that NELFRED did not effect the registration of the property; that Absolute Sale. They did this, without consideration, for the purpose
at the time of the execution of the 1997 Contract to Sell, the property was of protecting the interests of their children.
still unregistered land; that a Deed of Absolute Sale (1998 DEED) had
b. Hoever, SPS. ALLEJE surreptitiously sold the Paliparan Property to
already been executed in favor of BELLE.
BELLE. SPS. ALLEJE clearly deprived the De Leons of their lawful
10. RTC: ruled in favor of BELLE. distributive share in the proceeds. Moreover, Nelia Alleje
11. CA: ruled in favor of the De Leons. repudiated the trust created over the Paliparan Property when said
property was sold to BELLE.
Issue: Whether the De Leon’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to c. On the other hand, BELLE knowingly purchased unregistered land
state a cause of action? - NO. covered only by tax declarations and knew that persons other than
the SPS. ALLEJE were paying for the land taxes. It should not have
disregarded such knowledge, as well as other circumstances which
pointed to the fact that its vendors were not the true owners of the
property. Since the Paliparan Property is unregistered, BELLE
should have inquired further into the true ownership of the property.
d. BELLE was likewise in bad faith when, despite having had notice of
the De Leons’ claim over the Paliparan Property in 1998 when it
was impleaded as a co-defendant, BELLE still entered into a Deed
of Absolute Sale with SPS. ALLEJE & NELFRED.
5. It is evident from the allegations that the De Leons alleged that they are
owners of the property, and that BELLE acted in bad faith when it bought the
property knowing that the De Leons claim ownership over it.
6. Assuming the allegations to be true, the De Leons can, therefore, validly
seek the nullification of the sale of the subject property to BELLE because
the same effectively denied them their right to give or withhold their consent
if and when the subject property is intended to be sold.
7. The Court, thus, finds that the allegations are sufficient to establish a cause
of action for the nullification of the sale of the property to BELLE.
6. THE CITY OF BACOLOD v. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC. 1. In 1949, the City Council of Bacolod passed an Ordinance imposing
[G.R. No. L-25134. October 30, 1969.] upon "any … corporation engaged in the manufacture or bottling of
coca-cola… and other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of
Facts: Bacolod, a fee of (1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a
Civil Procedure - Atty. Custodio
AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

surcharge of 2% every month…" upon "such local manufacturers or controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid
bottlers who will be delinquent on any amount of fees due" under the the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
ordinance. 5. It comes from that old maxim nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem
2. In 1959, the Ordinance was amended by increasing the fee to (1/8) of a causa (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause.)
centavo for every bottle. [Fee increased from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft 6. SMB's failure to pay the bottling charges or taxes and the surcharges for
drinks]. SMB refused to pay the additional fee and challenged the validity of delinquency in the payment thereof constitutes but one single cause of
the whole ordinance. action which under the above rule can be the subject of only one complaint,
3. City of Bacolod sued SMB (Civil Case 1) before the CFI. under pain of either of them being barred if not included in the same
4. CFI: SMB is ordered to pay to City of Bacolod P26,306.54 and the tax at the complaint with the other.
rate of 3 centavos per case. SC affirmed CFI. 7. Elements of a cause of action: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2)
5. However, City of Bacolod wanted to include the penalties and surcharges. a corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right;
Failing in its attempt to collect the surcharges, City of Bacolod filed a second and (3) an act or omission of the plaintiff which constitutes a violation of the
action (Civil Case 2) for surcharges amounting to P36,519.10). plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to respect.
6. SMB filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that: 8. A cause of action is basically an act or an omission or several acts or
(1) the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, and omissions. A single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the
(2) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several
action. separate and distinct legal obligations.
9. On the other hand, it can happen also that several acts or omissions may
Issue: Whether the second suit filed by the City of Bacolod should be dismissed? violate only one of right, in which case, there would be only one cause of
action. The violation of a single right may give rise to more than one relief.
Held: YES. City of Bacolod’s complaint is Dismissed. 10. In other words, for a single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff
1. There is no question that the City of Bacolod split up its cause of action may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints for
when it filed the first complaint in 1960, seeking the recovery of only the these several reliefs that constitutes splitting up of the cause of action. This
bottling taxes or charges plus legal interest, without mentioning in any is what is prohibited by the rule.
manner the surcharges. 11. In the case at bar, when SMB refused to pay the difference in bottling
"SECTION 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. — A single charges, such act in violation of the right of the City to be paid said charges
cause of action cannot be split up into two or more parts so as to be made in full under the Ordinance, was one single cause of action, but under the
the subject of different complaints. Ordinance, the City became entitled, as a result of such non-payment, to two
"SECTION 4. Effect of splitting. — If separate complaints were reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic charges; and (2)
brought for different parts of a single cause of action the ling of the rst may the payment of the corresponding surcharges, the latter being merely a
be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in consequence of the failure to pay the former.
either is available as a bar in the others." 12. Stated differently, the obligation of SMB to pay the surcharges arose from
2. It is well recognized that a party cannot split a single cause of action into the violation of SMB of the same right of the City from which the obligation to
parts and sue on each part separately. pay the basic charges also arose.
3. A contract to do several things at several times is divisible in its nature, so as 13. It is obvious that the City has filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs
to authorize successive actions; and a judgment recovered for a single related to the same single cause of action, thereby splitting up the said
breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to suit for a cause of action.
subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is entire, 14. When a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the same violation of a
and the breach total, there can be only one action, and plaintiff must therein right, the filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born of the said
recover, all his damages. violation constitutes a bar to any action on any of the other possible reliefs
4. The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended 'to prevent arising from the same violation, whether the first action is still pending, in
repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of which event, the defense to the subsequent complaint would be litis
pendentia, or it has already been finally terminated, in which case, the
defense would be res adjudicata.
15. Indeed, litis pendentia and res adjudicata, on the one hand, and splitting up
a cause of action on the other, are not separate and distinct defenses, since
either of the former is by law only the result or effect of the latter, or, better
said, the sanction for or behind it.
7. AMADO P. JALANDONI and PAZ RAMOS v. ANGELA MARTIR-GUANZON, in her Facts:
own behalf and as Judicial Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late spouses 1. In 1947, Sps. Jalandoni began a suit (Case No. 573) against
Hilarion and Ligoria Martir, and ANTONIO GUANZON [G.R. L-10423. Jan. 21,1958.] Guanzon, et al., for partition of several lots in Murcia Cadastre, and
in Bogo Cadastre, and for recovery of damages caused by their
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AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

unwarranted refusal to recognize Sps. Jalandonis’ right and partition said 8. LUIS JOSEPH v. HON. CRISPIN BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ,
lots, as well as to account for and deliver their share in the crops obtained ANTONIO SIOSON, et al. [G.R. No. L-41423. February 23, 1989.]
during the agricultural years.
2. CFI: ruled in favor of Sps. Jalandoni and ordered the partition of the lands, Facts:
but denied their claim for damages because of failure to "prove the exact 1. Joseph is a plaintiff in a Civil Case entitled "Luis Joseph vs.
and actual damages suffered by them." Decision became final. Patrocinio Perez, eto al.", filed before CFI Bulacan, presided over
3. In 1955, Sps. Jalandoni instituted the present action (Case No. 3586 of the by Judge Bautista. Herein private respondents Perez et al. are four
same CFI), seeking recovery from Guanzon moral and exemplary damages, of the defendants in said case.
share of the products of the property, land taxes, and attorneys' fees. 2. Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and
Guanzon filed a motion to dismiss this second case. passengers. Joseph, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo
4. CFI: dismissed the second complaint for failure to state a cause of action. truck at Dagupan City after paying P9 as one-way fare to Bulacan.
3. While said cargo truck was on the National Highway, Villa (driver)
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the second complaint was correct? - YES. tried to overtake a tricycle. At about the same time, a pick-up truck,
supposedly owned by respondents Sioson and Pagarigan, then
Held: Complaint Dismissed. driven by respondent Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck
1. Except as concomitant to physical injuries, moral and corrective damages which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby
(allegedly due to suffering, anguish and anxiety caused by the refusal of forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and
Guanzon in 1941 to partition the common property) were not recoverable to ram a mango tree. As a result, Joseph sustained a bone fracture
under the Civil Code of 1899 which was the governing law at the time. in one of his legs.
2. Recovery of such damages was established for the first time in 1950 by the 4. Joseph filed a complaint for damages against Perez, as owner of
new Civil Code, and can not be made to apply retroactively to acts that the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and
occurred under the prior law in view of their punitive character. against respondents Sioson and Villanueva, as owner and driver,
3. As to the value of the Sps. Jalandoni’s share in the products of the land respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
during the time that the former action was pending (which are the damages 5. Respondents Villanueva, Cardeno, Sioson and Pagarigan, thru
claimed under the second cause of action), their recovery is now barred by their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid
the previous judgment. Joseph’s claim for injuries for P1,300. By reason thereof, Joseph
4. These damages are but the result of the original cause of action, viz., the executed a release of claim releasing them from liability.
continuing refusal by Guanzon in 1941 to recognize the Sps. right to an 6. Respondents Villanueva, Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance
interest in the property. Corporation of the Philippines, paid Perez' claim for damages to her
5. In the same way that the Sps. claimed for their share of the produce, these cargo truck for P7,420.61.
later damages could have been claimed in the first action, either in the 7. Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and
original complaint (for their existence could be anticipated when the first Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs./Cross
complaint was filed) or else by supplemental pleading. defs. Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan on the Instant
6. To allow them to be recovered by subsequent suit is a violation of the rule Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already
against multiplicity of suits, and specifically against the splitting of causes of paid P7,420.61 by way of damages to Perez, and alleging further
action, since these damages spring from the same cause of action. that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid
7. That the former judgment did not touch upon these damages is not material P1,300 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement.
to its conclusive effect: between the same parties, with the same subject 8. Perez filed her "Opposition to Crossdefs.' motion and Counter
matter and cause of action, a final judgment on the merits is conclusive not Motion" to dismiss. The counter motion to dismiss was premised on
only on the questions actually contested and determined, but upon all the fact that the release of claim executed by Joseph in favor of the
matters that might have been litigated and decided in the former suit. other respondents inured to the benefit of Perez, considering that
all the respondents are solidarity liable to Joseph.
9. CFI (Judge Bautista): dismissed the case.
10. Joseph contends CFI erred in declaring that the release of claim
executed by Joseph in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and
Pagarigan inured to the benefit of Perez.

Issue: Whether Joseph only had a single cause of action? - YES.

Held: Complaint Dismissed; CFI affirmed. breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.
1. The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in Joseph’s 2. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission
complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff.
cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for a. A single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the
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AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of 9. PNB v. HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO MILITAR AND DEOGRACIAS MILITAR,
several separate and distinct legal obligations. represented by TRANQUILINA MILITAR [G.R. No. 164801. August 18, 2005.]
b. However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a SPOUSES JOHNNY LUCERO AND NONA ARIETE v. HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO
single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may MILITAR, DEOGRACIAS MILITAR, and TRANQUILINA MILITAR (deceased), now
have been violated belonging to one person. represented by AZUCENA MILITAR, et al. [G.R. No. 165165. August 18, 2005.]
3. The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or
wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury Facts:
resulted from several wrongful acts only one cause of action arises. 1. Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad, all surnamed Militar, were heirs
4. In the case at bar, Joseph sustained a single injury on his person. That and the registered co-owners of Lots 3011 and 3017 covered by OCTs.
vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of 2. 1941: Deogracias sold his undivided share in Lot 3011 to Pedro Golez.
action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies Deogracias sold his undivided share in Lot 3017 to Sps. Lumagbas.
allowed by law. a. Sps. Lumagbas caused the subdivision of Lot 3017 into Lot 3017-A
5. CFI is correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved and B, with Lot 3017-A registered in their names.
although the bases of recovery invoked by Joseph against the 3. Notwithstanding the sale, Deogracias continued to occupy a portion of Lot
defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents No. 3011 and Lot No. 3017-B until his death in 1964. Glicerio (1939), Tomas
were not identically circumstanced. (1959), Caridad (1957) all died.
6. However, a recovery by Joseph under one remedy necessarily bars 4. However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale (1975), Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas
recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the and Caridad purportedly sold Lot 3011 to Sps. Jalbuna. In another deed,
proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission they purportedly sold Lot 3017-B to the same Sps.
which stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment. 5. Subsequently, Lot 3011 was subdivided into Lot 3011-A and B, with Lot
7. There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to 3011-A registered under Sps. Jalbuna and Lot 3011-B under Golez.
Joseph. Having been found to be solidarily liable to Joseph, the full payment 6. 1975: Sps. Jalbuna mortgaged Lot 3017-B to PNB as security for a loan.
made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from When they defaulted, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold
any and all liability to Joseph resulted in the extinguishment and release Lot 3017-B at public auction, with PNB as the highest bidder.
from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein respondent Perez.
7. PNB sold Lot 3017-B to Sps. Johnny and Nona Lucero. They filed an
ejectment case against Tranquilina, Azucena, Freddie and Eduardo, all
surnamed Militar, the actual occupants therein.
8. 1989: Tranquilina, Azucena, Freddie and Eduardo as surviving heirs of
Teodorico and Deogracias Militar, filed a complaint against Sps. Jalbuna,
PNB, and Sps. Lucero for Reconveyance of Title, Annulment of Sale,
Cancellation of Titles and Damages.
9. Sps. Jalbuna invoked among others, non-inclusion of indispensable parties
and lack of cause of action since their predecessor, Deogracias, no longer
had interest over the properties having sold them to third parties.
10. PNB claimed that it was a mortgagee in good faith and for value; that the title
of Sps. Jalbuna was free from all liens and encumbrances when they
secured the loan; and that it conducted verification and inspection of the
property before granting the loan.
11. Sps. Lucero alleged that the complaint was commenced without the real
party in interest, among others.
12. TC: dismissed the complaint and claim of PNB.
13. CA: reversed TC; the ultimate issue is the propriety of reconveyance and not
the shares of the respective heirs which is proper in a case for partition.
Thus, a final determination of the case can be had despite non-inclusion of
other heirs because their interests may be severed and proceeded with
separately.

Issue: Whether the case was brought by all indispensable parties? - YES.
Held: Petition Denied. 2. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's
1. PNB's claim that the case was not brought by all indispensable parties as action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case
other heirs of Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad have not been named as parties can be had.
therein does not have merit. 3. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought
Civil Procedure - Atty. Custodio
AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence 10. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS -
as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., et al., and PANTRANCO
cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO [G.R. No. 171701. February 8, 2012.]
effective, complete, or equitable.
4. Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the Facts:
controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the 1. After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, Pres. Cory created PCGG
other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which to look into P200B of the Marcoses’ alleged accumulated ill-gotten wealth.
does complete justice to the parties in court. He is not indispensable if his
2. One of the civil cases filed before the Sandiganbayan to recover the
presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth was Civil Case No. 0002, now subject of
already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation.
this Petition.
5. There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: 3. PCGG filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution,
(1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later
other party?; and, substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein
(2) can the case be decided on the merits without prejudicing the respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong
rights of the other party? Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.
6. In this case, the ultimate relief sought by the action is the reconveyance of 4. PCGG filed several Amended Complaints to add Constante Rubio, Nemesio
titles to their rightful owners. The records reveal that prior to the forgery, the G. Co, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho, and Yeung Chun Fan, Imelda
disputed properties were registered in the names of the co-owners, Cojuangco, the estate of Ramon Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc.
Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad, whose interests remained undivided. 5. PEA-PTGWO moved to intervene before the SB. It alleged that the trust
7. Thus, if reconveyance of the titles is granted, the titles will revert back to the funds in the account of Pantranco North Express, Inc of P55M rightfully
estates of the deceased co-owners and not to their individual heirs, whose belonged to the Pantranco employees, pursuant to the money judgment of
interests are divisible and may properly be ventilated in another NLRC against Pantranco. Thus, the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten.
proceeding. 6. SB granted their demurrers to evidence, except that of Imelda R. Marcos’.
8. Therefore, a co-heir may bring such action without necessarily joining all the
other co-heirs as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for
Issue: Whether the Marcos siblings should be maintained as respondents? - YES.
the benefit of all.
9. The ultimate issue herein is the propriety of reconveyance and not the
Held:
shares of the respective heirs of the co-owners, the latter being determined
1. Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of
in a case for partition. An action for partition is the action where
Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the estate be duly
co-ownership is declared and the segregation and conveyance of a
represented.
determinate portion of the property is made.
2. Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in
10. The heirs of the co-owners, (Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad), if there are any,
favor of the state their right to defend or protect the estate or those
including the appellants herein may claim their respective shares in an
properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or ownership,
action for partition.
then they may not be dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before
11. Any claim of interest, by way of succession, from the co-owners may be
the Sandiganbayan.
severed and proceeded with separately and a final determination in the
3. Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those
action for reconveyance can be had despite the non-inclusion of other heirs
parties-in- interest without whom there can be no nal determination of an
because the interest of the heirs of the co-owners, may be severed.
action. They are those parties who possess such an interest in the
12. Corollary, the instant case, may proceed without the other heirs, if there are
controversy that a nal decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the
any, because they are mere necessary parties.
courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are indispensable if
their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is
inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties.
4. In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos — that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth — the present case must be maintained against Imelda Marcos and
Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr., as executors of the Marcos estate
pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
a. According to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover
from the estate, real or personal property, or an interest therein, or
to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an 5. We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced Marcos-Manotoc and Irene Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the
against the executors. non-exhaustive list, which states that the listed properties therein were
Civil Procedure - Atty. Custodio
AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

owned by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their immediate family. principal defendants; and (2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for
a. Thus, while it was not proven that they conspired in accumulating lack of legal personality to sue.
ill-gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or control of 6. It appeared that the respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died on April 12, 2005.
such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the 7. Te, through her lawyer, Atty. Carpentero, filed an Opposition, contending
Marcos couple. Te's death did not render functus officio her right to sue since her
6. Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, had long testified on the complaint in
of the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. 1998 for and on her behalf and, submitted documentary exhibits in support
a. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the of the complaint.
inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the
decedent's death. Issue: Whether the death of the complainant during the course of the proceedings
b. In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their effectuate the dismissal of the case? - NO.
right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their
legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or Held: Petition Denied.
the distribution of the estate.
1. Atty. Sarsaba argues that, since Sereno died before summons was served
7. In sum, the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because (1) the on him, the RTC should have dismissed the complaint against all the
action pending before the Sandiganbayan is one that survives death, and, defendants and that the same should be filed against his estate.
therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly 2. However, Sereno could not be served with copy of the summons, together
control, possess or own ill-gotten wealth, although their direct involvement in
with a copy of the complaint, because he was already dead. The court's
accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been proven. failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a defense which is
personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno
to invoke the same.
11. ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA v. FE VDA. DE TE, represented by her 3. Failure to serve summons on Sereno's person will not be a cause for the
Attorney-in-Fact, FAUSTINO CASTAÑEDA [G.R. No. 175910. July 30, dismissal of the complaint against the other defendants, considering that
2009.] they have been served with copies of the summons and complaints and
have long submitted their respective responsive pleadings.
Facts: 4. Hence, only the case against Sereno will be DISMISSED.
1. NLRC Case entitled, Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck Operator,
was decided finding Sereno to have been illegally dismissed and ordering 5. Atty. Sarsaba moves that Atty. Castañeda, be discharged as he has no more
Gasing to pay him his monetary claims of P43,606.47. legal personality to sue on behalf of Te, who passed away during the
2. An Alias Writ of Execution was issued; NLRC Sheriff Lavarez accompanied pendency of the case before the RTC.
by Sereno and his counsel, Atty. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck, which at that 6. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the
time was in the possession of Gasing. The truck was sold at public auction, Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. In such cases, a
with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder. counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the
3. Meanwhile, Fe Vda. de Te, filed with the RTC a Complaint for recovery of name and address of the latter's legal representative.
motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite 7. It appears that Te’s counsel did not make any manifestation before the RTC
against petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC. as to her death. He even actively participated in the proceedings. However,
4. Te alleged: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered owner of such failure of counsel would not lead Us to invalidate the proceedings.
the truck, (2) Gasing merely rented the truck from her; and (4) since neither RTC’s jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party.
she nor her husband were parties to the labor case between Sereno and 8. The deceased litigants are themselves protected as they continue to be
Gasing, she should not be made to answer for the judgment award, much properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
less be deprived of the truck as a consequence of the levy in execution. representative of their estate.
5. October 17, 2005: Atty. Sarsaba filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the
Case on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the
co-respondents from enforcing their "Grant of an Authority and
12. RAMON A. GONZALES v. PAGCOR, et al. [G.R. No. 144891. May 27, 2004.] Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gambling",
Grant of Authority to Operate Computerized Bingo Games",
Facts: "Agreement" to conduct jai-alai operations, respectively.
1. At bar is a special civil action for prohibition assailing the constitutionality of 3. In Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., et al., this Court
the creation of PAGCOR as well as the "grant of franchises" by PAGCOR. enjoined PAGCOR, BELLE, and FILGAME from managing, maintaining
2. Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine and operating jai-alai games, and from enforcing the agreement entered
Bar, filed on September 28, 2000 the instant Petition as a class suit seeking into by them.
to restrain PAGCOR from continuing its operations and prohibit it and its a. PAGCOR has a valid franchise to, but only by itself (i.e.,
Civil Procedure - Atty. Custodio
AY 2018 - 2019 (1st sem)
Joan Pernes

not in association with any other person or entity) operate, 1. The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff
maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai… or petitioner:
4. Only PAGCOR and SAGE submitted their Memoranda. a. The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on
5. Gonzales having failed to file his Memorandum within the prescribed period, the nature of the action and the damage sued for.
this Court which, in the meantime, was informed of the alleged demise of b. If the causes of action which survive the wrong complained of
Gonzales, required parties to manifest whether they were still interested in affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the
prosecuting the petition, or whether supervening events had rendered it injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of
moot and academic. action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person
6. Attys. Manuel B. Imbong and Jo Aurea M. Imbong filed a Motion for the property and rights of property affected being incidental. . . .
Substitution stating, among other things, that (1) Gonzales died; (2) his heirs 2. In claiming standing to bring the instant suit, Gonzales necessarily asserted
are not interested to pursue and prosecute the present special civil action or "a personal and substantial interest in the case" such that he "has sustained
be substituted as petitioners herein; and (3) the petition was instituted by or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
Gonzales as a class suit in behalf of "all Filipino citizens, taxpayers and challenged."
members of the Philippine Bar" and, as such, survives his death. 3. A reading of the allegations in the petition readily shows that Gonzales'
7. PAGCOR and SAGE both argue that movants Attys. Imbong and Imbong alleged interest does not involve any claim to money or property which he
may not be substituted for Gonzales as the former are neither legal could have assigned to another or transmitted to his heirs. Rather, he
representatives nor heirs of the latter within the purview of Section 16, Rule claimed to be vindicating his rights as a citizen, taxpayer and member of the
3 of the Rules of Court. bar. Being personal and non-transferable in nature, any interest that he
“ … The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for might have had in the outcome of this case cannot be deemed to have
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or survived his death.
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the 4. Movants are not asserting any right or interest transmitted to them by the
minor heirs. …” death of Gonzales, but are seeking to protect their own individual interests
8. Both further argue that neither Gonzales nor movants have substantiated the as members of the classes alleged to have been represented by Gonzales.
allegation that the instant case is a class suit as defined under Section 12, 5. As such, the more proper procedure would have been for them to le a
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the petition should be considered a Motion for Intervention as expressly provided for in Section 12, Rule 3 of the
personal action which was extinguished with the death of Gonzales. Rules of Court, and not a Motion for Substitution under Section 17 of the
same rule.
Issue: Whether persons, not heirs of the petitioner, may substitute the
decedent-petitioner? - NO.

Held: Petition Dismissed.