G.R. No.

L-24022             March 3, 1965 has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its
gravity, constitutes a national emergency, and acting in pursuance
thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after consulting his
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET
cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to
AL., petitioners,
immediately undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the
vs.
impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible reason why the
HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.
disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.

Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.

The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the light of the divergent provisions
obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act 3452
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly." The question may now be asked: what is the
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General nature of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing
Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are
the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (1943)
of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended
pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against
implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is
cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet presumed to know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the
approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v.
agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific
Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing
importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the
new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.
Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452
which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no
law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to
Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his different methods applicable to different circumstances. Thus, the total
capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this Court seeking banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for in
to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and General Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency
Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid program of the Administration. The philosophy behind the banning is
scheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a
that may result in the contemplated importation until further orders of minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and
this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of depress the local price which may discourage them from raising said
Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-respondents. crop. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of
rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step
adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach
writ of preliminary injunction, which, in due course, this Court granted are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by
upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during
having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965. normal period.

Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations There is another area where the two laws find a common point of
of the petition though they adduced reasons which justify the reconciliation: the normalcy of the time underlying both laws. Thus,
importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers
importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their three different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient
opinion, still stand. to supply local consumption; (2) when the local produce falls short of
the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a national
It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of
undertaken by the government even if there is a certification by the such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Under the first two
National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply situations, no importation is allowed whether by the government or by
of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal the private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law
because the same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its authorizes importation, by the government.
Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to
private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and
that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any other government 2, but not with. Nowhere in said law can we discern that it covers
agency, is prohibited from doing so. importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such gravity as
to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is a
rice and corn exclusively to private parties thereby prohibiting from shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national
doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws
agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
which permits the government to undertake the importation of rice into
the Philippines. And this we say because, in our opinion, the provision Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation
of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of during normal times is bolstered by a consideration of the discussion
said Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was
an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such presented in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be
gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by given a standby power to import rice in the Philippines. On this matter,
the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and Almendras:
authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may
designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic Council
 SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act 3848 the
is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof "that the Rice and Corn implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That
Administration or any government agency is hereby provision is merely a safeguard placed therein in order that the
prohibited from importing rice and corn." prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with the
enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal
provisions which call for lesser penalty. The intention is to except them
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.
from the rule that penal statutes can be given retroactive effect if
favorable to the accused.
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the
importation of rice, and corn is left to private parties upon
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not
payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position
been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 3452, we wish to briefly quote
of the Committee as expressed by the distinguished
hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the
sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is
discussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be
applicable under normal conditions.
here repeated that said bill was presented to accede to the request of
the President for a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, view of the uncertainty of the law, but that during the discussion thereof
1964). it was strongly asserted and apparently upheld that such request for
authority was not necessary because Republic Act 2207 was still in
force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 approved by the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that
which gives to the President authority to declare a rice and corn considered it. These views, while not binding, are of persuasive
emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest and, authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of
during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of Republic Act 2207.
rice and corn hoarded in any private warehouse or bodega subject to
constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans
importation on the part of the government even in case of an SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of
emergency. The contention is predicated on a misinterpretation of the the Committee that in the case of emergency, in case of an
import and meaning of said provision. Note that the section refers to an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions
emergency where there is an artificial shortage because of the of R.A. No. 2207?
apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or
businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage of the commodity
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your
because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or
Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2, page 2, that when we
confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency.
say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring to
Congress by no means could have intended under such a situation to
R.A. No. 2207.
deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and
starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is
no rice to be found in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in xxx     xxx     xxx
fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce the
rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice
SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2
stocked in the private warehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step
paragraph (c) of the amendment by substitution reads:
cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case we have to turn to
Republic Act 2207.
Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in
cases of extreme and under the provisions of existing law.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the
legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program.
And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of this Court I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act
to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does this section in
Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by implication, the litter statute the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued
must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing existence of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No.
law [United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation ?
Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal.
App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, p.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your
462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible
Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power on the part of
(Compañia General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A
the President to import rice.
mere difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is not
sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be such a
positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new xxx     xxx     xxx
statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together
(Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearest case
possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee,
be drawn [Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never Your Honor, because of the existing law — that is, Republic
presumed. Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 — that is the
reason your Committee eliminated that stand-by power of
the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor,
Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice what is the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under
During the Calendar Year Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 the
Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifying value, as it is President can designate any government agency to import
pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as rice?
provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the
Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." The
reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear
year. As its title reads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the because in the decision of the Supreme Court, as I said,
year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at least on the there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-
matter of importation. existence or implied repeal between these two Acts.

Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the
provides that pending prosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag, informed me
that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.
 SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
we want to make that clear ... .
It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold the Government's power to
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the import rice, under Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, the majority opinion
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon seems to have overlooked that the repeal of statutes is primarily a
payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the matter of legislative intention; and that on its face, Republic Act No.
position of the Committee, as expressed by the distinguished 3452 was plainly intended to supersede the prior law, Republic Act No.
sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is 2207.
applicable under normal conditions.
The specific issue, in brief, is whether the extraordinary emergency
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes. power to import rice and corn, granted to the President by Section 2 of
Republic Act 2207, may still be considered as subsisting at present,
notwithstanding the terms of Section 10 of the subsequent Republic
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in
Act No. 3452.
existence.

For convenience, we present in parallel columns the specific provisions

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
of the respective acts:

SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.

REP. ACT NO. 2207 REP. ACT NO.
xxx     xxx     xxx (1962)

SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any SEC. 10. ... Provided, that the Rice and
already expressed on whether Republic Act No. 2207person, has association, corporation or government Administration or any other government ag
been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains agency to import rice and corn into any point in is hereby prohibited from importing rice
the theory that there has been a repeal of Republic Actthe No.Philippines: Provided, however, That should corn: Provided, further, That the importatio
2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation there
is be an existing or imminent shortage in the rice and corn is left to private parties u
concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal.local The supply of the abovementioned payment of the corresponding taxes. (Emph
Supreme Court does not state clearly which side prevails. commodities
I of such gravity as to constitute a Supplied)
take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... . national emergency, upon certification to this
effect by the National Economic Council, based
on the studies of the Office of Statistical
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I
Coordination of said body, the President of the
maintain that they are not totally repugnant to each other,
Philippines may authorize the importation of the
that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain
commodities, through any government
points: First, is importation in case of a national emergency that he may designate in such quantities
certified by the National Economic Council permissible? as Bythe National Economic Council may
reading the two provisos together I would say yes because determine necessary to cover the shortage,
there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Actsubject
No. to the taxes, duties and/or special
3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a
charges as now provided by
shortage amounting to a national emergency. Provided, further, That contracts for such
importation shall be only on straightsales basis,
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when and saidawarded only after a public bidding, with
House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved by the Senate, it carried sealed
a bids. (Emphasis supplied)
clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No. 2207
(Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the
conference committee. This attitude clearly reveals that Congress It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions contradict each other.
preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future First, in policy; because under Republic Act No. 2207, the general rule
importations. is that no person or entity, public or private, shall import rice and corn;
while under the later Act, Republic Act No. 3452, the importation of rice
Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to and corn is left to private parties, with no restriction other than the
finance the importation in question, suffice it to state that under payment of tax. Second, in procedure; under Republic Act 2207, the
Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized President, in case of emergency, may import rice and corn in quantities
to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry certified by the National Economic Council as necessary, through any
out its objectives. We refer to Section 3 (e) of said Act which empowers government agency that he may designate; while by Act 3452 any
said corporation to secure money and to encumber any property it has government agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn, said
as a guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and prohibition being express, absolute, total, and unconditional. Not only
Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, this, but violation of the prohibition is sanctioned by a P10,000 fine and
including the power to borrow money under Section 3(e). This imprisonment for not more than 5 years (sec. 15, Act 3452).
provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the
importation in question. We cannot see how the majority opinion can contend that the
presidential power to make importations of rice and corn still subsists,
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction in view of the unqualified terms of Republic Act 3452.
issued by this Court is hereby dissolved. Costs against petitioners. If any government agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn by
the later law, and the violation of the prohibition is penalized by fine
and imprisonment, in what manner can the President make the
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. importation? He cannot do so directly, since Act 2207 specifically
requires that it be done "through any government agency". How, then,
may he import?

It is unnecessary to resort to legal gymnastics in order to realize why

this must be so. Suffice it to note that the Administration's power to
Separate Opinions import rice in certified emergencies under Act 2207 was but a mere
corollary to the total ban on rice and corn imports under that Act, and
the existence of such exceptional import power necessarily depended THAT THE IMPORTATION OF RICE AND CORN IS LEFT
on the continuation of that total prohibition.1äwphï1.ñët TO PRIVATE PARTIES UPON PAYMENT OF THE
CORRESPONDING TAXES.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2207 clearly shows how intimate was
this dependence between the emergency importing authority granted Mr. OCAMPO. Suppose there is a calamity, Mr. Speaker.
to the government and the maintenance of the normal non-import
policy.
Mr. CUENCO. Leave that to private parties.

SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person,

Mr. OCAMPO. Accepted, Mr. Speaker.
association, corporation or government agency to import rice
and corn into any point in the Philippines, provided,
however, that should there be an existing or imminent The SPEAKER. Is there any objection? (After a pause). The
shortage in the local supply of the above-mentioned chair does not hear any. The amendment is approved.
commodities, of such gravity as to constitute a national (Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, p. 1360)
emergency, upon certification to this effect by the National
Economic Council, based on the studies of the Office of
The Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962, also contains the following
Statistical Coordination of said body, the President of the
illuminating remarks:
Philippines may authorize the importation of these
commodities, through any government agency that he may
designate, in such quantities as the National Economic SENATOR LEDESMA: So it is on the understanding then,
Council may determine necessary to cover the shortage, Your Honor, that we could proceed with the discussion.
subject to taxes, duties and/or special charges as now
provided by law; provided, further, that contracts for such
importation shall be only on straight sales basis, and Your Honor, House Bill No. 339, as I have already stated,
awarded only after a public bidding, with sealed bids. specifically provides that appointment of personnel should be
(Emphasis supplied) in accordance with the Civil Service Law as well as with the
WAPCO. It seems to me that this provision is very laudable
and very, very reasonable. The second important feature in
So closely linked were the policy and the emergency import power that this proposed measure is that it prohibits importation by the
the latter was not even set apart in a section. Therefore, repeal of the government. I think this should be clarified in the sense that,
absolute ban on imports, prescribed in the opening portion of the at the same time, it allows importation by private parties but
section quoted, necessarily entails the disappearance of the with the payment of the corresponding duties. Or rather,
emergency power to import rice and corn established by the later part under House Bill No. 339, the general policy which is being
of the same legal provision. Where the basic rule disappears, the set in the proposed measure is that the government should
exception thereto must necessarily cease to operate, since the not resort to importation but that importation of the cereal is
exception becomes automatically functus officio for lack of basis. open at all times to any citizen of this country so long as he
pays the corresponding duties and other taxes which are
imposed by our government. (Senate Journal, No. 59, May
The total banning of cereal imports logically, under Act 2207, meant
8, 1962)
that whenever the domestic crop became insufficient to satisfy the
demand for rice and corn, the latter had to be brought from outside to
fill the gap; and the legislature decided (in Act 2207) that it should be It is thus clear that if section 16 of Republic Act 3452 providing that —
done through governmental agencies. But under Republic Act 3452,
the total prohibition to import disappeared, and private parties were
authorized to bring in the cereals at any time; hence, the exceptional All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
importing power of the Government lost all reason for its existence, this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly",.
because the private imports allowed by Act 3452 were contemplated
and intended to make up for the difference between demand and intended to refer to any preceding statute at all, it must have referred to
supply, without necessity of government intervention. In truth, the Republic Act No. 2207. Hence, the Presidential power to import no
expression in Section 10 of Act 3452 — longer exists.

SEC. 10. ... Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration In arguing in favor of the Government's power to import even now, the
or any other government agency is hereby prohibited from majority opinion avers that Republic Act No. 3452 is designed to apply
importing rice and corn; Provided, further, That the only to normal times and conditions. This is plainly absurd, for in
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon normal times, when production equals consumption, no importation
payment of the corresponding taxes. (Emphasis supplied) need be authorized, for none will be required.

can only mean that the Administration must desist from importing, The majority opinion stresses that Republic Act 3452 does not repeal
and leave to private parties the task of bringing such cereals from Act 2207 in express terms. Granting arguendo that this were true,
without in order to make up for whatever shortages in production despite the express prohibition of government imports in section 10 of
should occur. the later Act, yet it does not elucidate why the legislature found it
necessary, or expedient, to enact an entirely different law, instead of
That only private parties, and not the government, can import the merely providing for the amendment of the prior statute (R.A. 2207). If
cereals finds confirmation in the legislative journals. In the both laws were designed to attain the same end, rice and corn
Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, page 1360, containing sufficiency for our country, and only a change of method was intended,
the transcript of the Senate debates on the bill that later became why enact two statutes not only unconnected with each other, but
Republic Act No. 3452, the following appears: actually contradictory?

CUENCO AMENDMENT That the two laws are inconsistent with each other cannot be gainsaid.
Under Act 2207, no person or entity, public or private, could import rice
or corn, since under Section 2 thereof "it shall be unlawful for any
Mr. CUENCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 3, line 16, change the person, association, corporation or government entity to import rice
period (.) to colon and add the following: PROVIDED, THAT and corn"; while under Act 3452, on the contrary, "importation of rice
THE RICE AND CORN ADMINISTRATION OR ANY OTHER and corn is left to private parties" (sec. 10) at any time, with no other
GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM restriction than the payment of taxes. How can it be said that the two
IMPORTING RICE AND CORN: PROVIDED, FURTHER,
laws, with so diametrically opposite philosophies, were intended to co- Government) shall sell and dispose of these commodities to
exist? the consumers ... .

Because the two laws covering the same field are plainly incompatible Section 3 of Act 3452 — With a view to regulating the level
with each other (since private importation of rice and corn cannot, at of supply of rice and corn throughout the country, the
the same time, be unlawful under Act 2207 and lawful under Act 3452), Administration is authorized to accumulate stocks as a
it is inescapable to conclude that the later statute (3452) is, and must national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper
have been, intended to revise, supersede, and replace the former law and necessary to meet any contingencies. ...
(Act 2207).The established rule in this jurisdiction in such a case is that
—
Section 12, Act 3452 — "The President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized to declare a rice and corn emergency any
While as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by time he deems necessary in the public interest. During the
a later one is not favored, yet if the later act covers the whole emergency period, the Rice and Corn Administration, upon
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a the direction of the President, shall, subject to constitutional
substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act limitation, conduct raids, seizures, and confiscation of rice
(Posadas vs. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, and con hoarded in any private warehouse or bodega:
80 Law Ed. 351) (quoted and applied in In re Guzman, 73 Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration shall pay
Phil. 52). such confiscated rice and corn at the prevailing consumer's
price of the Rice and Corn Administration. (Emphasis
supplied)
pines adopted the American doctrine that in such a revision of the
law, whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed (In re
Guzman supra, at pp. 52-53).1 Certainly the words used by the statute, "any
cause, natural or artificial", "any contingencies", "rice and
corn emergency" are broad enough to cover all contingencies, natural
It has been held that "where the legislature frames a new
deficiency due to insufficient production, as well as artificial shortages
statute upon a certain subject-matter, and the legislative
due to hoarding. The terms employed exempt the legislature from the
intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new
accusation that it still has left some emergency unprovided for. What it
scheme in relation to such subject-matter and make a
did deny the Government was the power to import rice and corn
revision of the whole subject, that whatever is embraced in
whenever it so chooses; instead, the law expressly prescribed "that the
the new statute shall prevail, and that whatever is excluded
Rice and Corp. Administration or any government agency is
is discarded". (People v. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 173, 75 N.E.
hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn" (sec. 10, R.A. 3452), a
841.)
command that, as previously observed, squarely contradicts and
vacates that permission to import previously granted under Republic
And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the Act 2207. The Government, therefore, may not now bring in rice and
same subject, passed at different dates, and it is plain from corn from abroad, unless special legislative authorization is first
the frame-work and substance of the last that it was intended obtained, as was done for 1964 by Republic Act No. 3848.
to cover the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect
system or provision in itself, the last must be held to be a
The very fact that the Administration went to and obtained from the
legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in it shall
Legislature permission to import 300,000 metric tons of rice during the
prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed."
calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act No. 3848), and made use of that
permission, is the best proof that the Executive felt that its former
Or, as more tersely put in Madison vs. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 10 power under Republic Act No. 2207 no longer existed after the
A. L. R. 910, at page 915: passage of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the
Administration in estoppel to assert the contrary. Why should it seek
authority to make importation during 1964 if it still possessed that
6. A subsequent statute, evidently intended as a substitute granted by Republic Act 2207?
for one revised, operates as a repeal of the latter without any
express words to that effect; and so any distinct provision of
the old law, not incorporated into the later one, is to be, Note that, in consenting the Government's importing 300,000 tons of
deemed to have been intentionally annulled. Smith, Stat. rice in 1964, the Legislature once more re-affirmed the prohibition of
Constr. sec. 784; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass. 537, 7 Am. Dec. further government imports in section 6 of the enabling law, Republic
99: Act No. 3848:

This rule, expressly adopted by this very Supreme Court, utterly SEC. 6 — Except as provided in this Act, no other agency or
destroys the contention of the majority opinion that because the instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to
Government's power under Republic Act 2207, to make imports of rice purchase rice from abroad." (Emphasis supplied)
and corn in case of certified emergency, is nowhere expressly repealed
by Republic Act 3452, such power must be still deemed to exist. No
which is a virtual repetition of the restraint imposed by Republic Act
such power can now exist for the reason that the Act conferring it was
3452. In addition, the law imposed the further condition that the
totally and unconditionally superseded and repealed by Act 3452. The
importation be made only upon two-thirds vote of the National
contradictory philosophies of both Acts testify to that effect.
Economic Council, where Republic Act 2207 specified no particular
majority.
The majority also avers that Republic Act No. 3452 does not
contemplate situations where the shortage in local supply is of such
The main opinion seeks to minimize the effect of these reiterated
gravity as to constitute a national emergency. It also asserts that Act
prohibitions by claiming that said section 6 was intended to operate
3452 refers only to artificial shortages through hoarding, and does not
only for 1964. If that had been the intention, then section 6 was
cover natural shortages where the rice and corn crops do not suffice to
absolutely unnecessary because the authority given by Act 3848 was a
meet the demands of consumption. Unfortunately, the opposite of
limitation in itself, as it only permitted the importation of 300,000 metric
these assertions is precisely true. Thus,
tons for the calendar year 1964. Under such a grant, any excess
beyond the quantity fixed, and any import after 1964, were
Section 1 of Act 3452 provides: The Government shall automatically forbidden. The enactment of section 6 of Act 3848,
engage in the purchase of these basic foods from tenants, therefore, was an actual reassertion of the policy of outlawing
farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Government imports, as declared in Republic Act 3452. If anything, it
Philippines ... and whenever circumstances brought about meant that to import rice now, the Executive must first obtain an
by any cause, natural or artificial, should so require, (the enabling law.
Moreover, the financing by the Government of its foreign purchase of
rice would violate the Constitutional restraint against paying money out
of the Treasury, "except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law"
(Art. VI, sec. 23, par. 3), and no law making such appropriation has
been enacted. Under the Revised Administrative Code, sections 606
and 607, no contract involving the expenditure of public funds can be
made without previous appropriation therefor, duly certified by the
Auditor General. Nor can these inhibitions be evaded by the ruse of
causing a Government agency to borrow the funds required for the
purpose, considering that any and all government agencies are flatly
forbidden to import rice (Republic Act 3452, sec. 10), and the
borrowing of funds to finance importation is essential for the execution
thereof.

Finally, we see no point in the quotations from statements made in the

Senate during the deliberations on House Bill No. 11511. That bill
never became law, and is not before the Court. The statements quoted
are not binding, this Court having the exclusive prerogative of
construing the legislative enactments.

The effect in the majority decision is, after the Legislature had
expressly prohibited government agencies to import rice and corn, and
after the lawmaking body refused to pass the bill (House Bill No.
11511) granting the Executive a stand-by authority to import, a
decision of this Court now reverses this clear policy of the Legislature,
and hands the Executive a blanket power to do what the laws have
expressly forbidden.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.