American Airlines Flight 1420 1

Running Head: American Airlines Flight 1420

American Airlines Flight 1420

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Date
American Airlines Flight 1420 2

American Airlines Flight 1420

Flight Details

American Airlines flight 1420 took off on June 1, 1999, without a stopover from Dallas

in Texas to Arkansas in Little Rock National Airport. That flight was the final stage of the main

day in three-day order for a group of flights. The flight group checked in at half-past ten (CDT)

at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, Illinois. The flight operation began at 11:43 a.m.

from Chicago to Salt Lake City in Utah. The next step was to leave Salt Lake City for Dallas,

Texas. Flight 1420 was booked to withdraw at 20:28 CDT and show up at 21:41. But the plane

originally proposed for the flight was delivered to Dallas only later due to bad weather

conditions. The delay was a problem for the crew of the flight, whose limited time for the

continuous duration of the flight was to exceed shortly if the flight delayed more. To reduce the

delay, American Airlines subsidized flight 1420 and eventually departed at 22:40, much late than

the original flying time. The captain was a pilot, and the first officer was the non-flying pilot.

Accident’s Details

According to Proseus (2000, September), Before and during flight 1420, weather warnings were

being received by the crew in the severe storms on the agreed route. An alternative option was

not discussed by the crew which includes to postpone or take a seat in Little Rock due to weather

conditions. A weather warning was being received b the crew during the flight from SIGMET

National Weather Service for the area affected by the severe storm, which included the territory

of Little Rock airport. The Cabin Recorder (CVR) showed that then the weather conditions were

being discussed by the crew and they discussed the need to support the methodology.
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Figure 1 Weather at the time of takeoff

Following the arrival of a flight in the Little Rock area, the Little Rock Tower Air Traffic

Controller (ATCT) informed the crew of the flight that the storm is crossing the north-western

part of the airport and that the wind is 280 degrees. The senior officer told the air traffic

controller that the flash has been sawed by him and the controller. The air traffic controller

informed the crew of the flight to rely on the instrument landing system (ILS) for runway 22L.

The senior officer admitted that at the time of the crash he and the captain felt that they have a

chance to make some approach as the weather was some far away from the airport.

The CVR showed that the commander and first official talked about restriction for crosswind

landing set by American Airlines. The captain showed that there was a crosswind limit of 30

knots, but he found out that the limit on the dry runway has been given to him. The captain then

indicated that the crosswind limit on the wet runway was 20 knots, but his companion explained

that the limit was 25 knots. The failure report indicated that both the captain and the chief pilot

didn’t check the actual crosswind limit in the manual of the American flight. The senior officer

pulled out the instruction, but the captain asked him to check it as the chief officer was confident

that the crosswind limit was 20 knots.

From the study of Condit (2006), About 11 minutes before the start of the landing, the controller

of the air traffic informed flight 1420 that a wind alarm had been activated in the scissors. The

flight team referred to the 4R runway so that at the landing there won’t be a tailwind rather they

will have to face the headwind. The air traffic controller transferred the carriers of flight 1420 to

the final ILS route on runway 4R. The carriers checked the aircraft in from the airport and

escorted it away from the storm recently announced by the air traffic controller. In the meantime,

the Director-General issued a summary methodical instruction in which he presented a repetition

of the location and route, the chosen altitude, the basic safety altitude and part of the missing

methodical strategy for runway 4R.

When eight minutes was left for landing, the air traffic controller informed the crew if the flight

regarding the second part of the storm crossed the territory and that the wind was 340 degrees

out of 16 of the 34 knots. The team in the flight confronted the decision to recognize the short

methodology and record it. It was difficult for the captain to see the airport, but it depended on

whether the superior made eye contact with it. After the senior officer informed the air traffic

controller about the clear visibility of the airport, the air traffic controller proposed a visual

technique for the 4R runway to which the senior officer confirmed. The controller allowed the

landing of flight 1420. At that time the crew of the flight informed the air traffic controller that

they had left the airport from behind the cloud between the aircraft and the airport. At that time

the air traffic controller was transmitting ILS radar media to 4R runway control. The vectors

placed the aircraft convincingly close to the external ILS marker, which is located about six

miles from the runway.

About three minutes earlier as indicated by Pooley, Pignata, & Dollard (2019), the air traffic

controller had announced that it was raining on the air terminal, they could not even see one-mile
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distance and visibility on runway 4R was 3 000 feet. The air traffic controller confirmed this

information. The air traffic controller again allowed the landing of flight 1420. About two

minutes before the landing began, the dispatcher officer issued a second wind warning at the

airport and reported that the wind in the center of the airport was 350 degrees, the wind at the

northern border was 310 degrees, and the wind at the upper eastern border was 320 degrees. The

flight crew didn’t recognize this transmission. The captain ordered his superior to increase the

reference arrival speed by 20 knots.

The air traffic controller determined that the RVR for runway 4R which was then1600 feet. The

captain showed the senior officer that the flight was conducted consistently. He drew the

attention of the controller of the air traffic to the fact that the flight was built on the incoming

ILS segment. The air traffic controller restored freedom of landing, indicated that the wind was

340 degrees, the wind at the northern border was 300 degrees, and the wind at the upper eastern

border was 320 degrees and restored the RVR. The Chief Officer confirmed this information.

Any further information was not received by the controller from the crew of the flight.

Sometime before the trial the senior officer asked if he needed the folds set at 40 degrees. The

chief showed that according to him, he needed folds only on arrival, to which the senior officer

set the folds at 40 degrees. At this point, the crew was informed by the air traffic controller that

the wind was 330 degrees. At this point, the information from the CVR showed that the captain

said, This is the situation.

Figure 2 Weather Before the landing

Around 23:50, after a GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System) radio broadcast, the aircraft

made contact on the runway. Within seven seconds of landing, both thrusters were rejected and

as a result, the thrusters were set in the open position. The air spoilers were not sent to the

landing position.

Flight 1420 crashed when it exceeded its target on runway 4R. After removing the target from

the runway, the aircraft hit several cylinders that stretched outwards from the left edge of the

instrument landing system (ILS), leaned 411 feet behind the target from the runway, crossed the

steel fence, descended from a stone embankment into a flooded plain about 15 feet below the

runway’s level and crashed into the supporting structure of the 22L runway lighting frame. 800

feet from the end of the runway 4R was the position where the aircraft stopped. The chief pilot

and 10 passengers died. the first officer, airline stewards, and 105 passengers were actually or
American Airlines Flight 1420 7

slightly injured and 24 passengers were not injured. The aircraft was knocked down from the

inertia forces even after the crash.

Figure 3 Crash of the plane

Role of Airline

The airline didn’t manage the flight operation well. Both the pilots were closer to the

limit of flying airplane continuously. The airline didn’t want to delay the flight as it could lead to

defamation and this cost them as the pilot and 10 passengers lost their lives.

Role of Airport Managers

Airport managers are responsible for assuring that safety is followed, regulations are

maintained and the flight operation is done on time. The managers didn’t check the safety and

regulations and let the flight completes its operation irrespective of the weather and the pilot’s

position to fly the airplane.

Role of Flight Dispatchers

Flight dispatchers are responsible for checking all the necessary details that can harm the

flight including weather, the load on the airplane, etc. one of the biggest responsible of this
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accident are the flight dispatchers who didn’t saw the upcoming weather condition on the path of

the 1420 and allowed the flight to take off which results in huge damage.

Role of Air Traffic Controllers

The role of air traffic controllers is to instruct the pilots related to the landing and takeoff,

and to monitor the whole flight by using radar, etc. air traffic controllers are the main responsible

of the accident that happens with 1420 as they were on the ground and know that the weather is

not ideal for landing. Hence, despite allowing the captains to land and taking risk the air traffic

controllers should have instructed the captains to change the path and land at some other airport

so that the lives of the people can be saved.

Role of Pilots

The pilots were very confused when the situations happen. They didn’t remember the

manual for American airlines which carries the things allowed and restricted for the pilots. They

were also not sure regarding the air’s speed at which they can try landing which created more

chaos between the captain and the first officer. The pilots should have known all the rules and

regulations and if they would have patiently landed the aircraft, there would have been no losses

of lives. the pilots are also responsible because they were tired as there limited hours of flying

continuously were almost nearer to completion and they would have asked the management to

arrange another flight as they are not feeling that they can complete the flight. They forgot to arm

the spoilers of the aircraft that resulted in this huge accident.

Role of Aircraft Manufacturers

Aircraft manufacturers are responsible for designing and building the aircraft. During the

whole accident, aircraft manufacturers shouldn’t be blamed for anything or it shouldn’t be said
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that the aircraft manufacturers also have a role in the accident. It was the pilot’s failure who

didn’t arm the spoilers and because of that, the airplane lost control after landing.

Role of Mechanics

The role of mechanics is to check the aircraft before allowing it to take off. the mechanics

did their job perfectly as the aircraft 1420, didn’t had any technical issue.

Role of Weather Forecast

The weather forecast should have been done properly before sending the flight for

operation. The flight was already delayed due to bad weather, if the forecasting would have been

done properly, the flight wouldn’t have gone to operation and the accident wouldn’t have had

happened.

Role of Weather Condition

Weather conditions are the biggest culprit of the whole accident. It was bad weather

conditions that tested the pilot's eligibility who failed to deliver in a crucial scenario. The bad

weather condition played the main role as if the weather wasn’t bad, the flight would have

carried out smoothly.

References

Condit, B. (2006). A crisis communication case study of American airlines flights 965, 1420, and

587 (Doctoral dissertation).

Proseus, E. A. (2000, September). A Meteorological Analysis of The American Airlines Flight

1420 Accident. In Conference on Aviation, Range, and Aerospace Meteorology, 9 th,

Orlando, FL (pp. 209-211).

Pooley, T., Pignata, S., & Dollard, M. F. (2019). The case for the psychosocial safety climate to

be recognized in mining disaster investigations. In Increasing Occupational Health and

Safety in Workplaces. Edward Elgar Publishing.