Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics

2019 Bar Examinations

Prof. Victoria V. Loanzon

PART ONE – LEGAL ETHICS

I –The Attorney’s Oath

Q. Write the Attorney’s Oath

A. “I, ________________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, neither give aid nor
consent to the same;
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and
I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God.” (Rules of Court, Form 28)

Q. What is the four-fold duty of a lawyer?

A. The four-fold duty of a lawyer involves his duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and clients.

Q. What is the practice of law?

A. The practice of law is the act of performing “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.” (Paguia v. Office of the President, 621 SCRA
600)

Q. What is the privilege of the practice of law?

A. The practice of law is a mere privilege and not a right. The admission of lawyers and the rules governing
the practice of law is a constitutional mandate given to the Supreme Court. (Section 5 (5), Article VIII,
Constitution)
The elements of the legal profession are: organization, learning, and the spirit of public service.
Cayetano v. Monsod (G. R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 210): The practice of law is not
limited to appearances in court as a litigator but also the work of a corporate lawyer in preparation of
documents and the giving of legal advice.
Paguia v. Office of the President (621 SCRA 600): A lawyer suspended from the practice of law is precluded
from applying his knowledge of law in and out of court while undergoing his suspension. A suspended lawyer
cannot even appear on behalf of a relative as a “friend” because he would inevitably apply his knowledge of
the law.

Q. What is included in the practice of law?

A. The practice of law includes: the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings; conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds; and the giving of all legal advice
to clients.

Q. A group of businessmen decided to incorporate a stock corporation with the primary objective of
giving legal guidance to their clients who regularly invest in publicly listed companies. They intend to
hire at least 25 lawyers who will perform the work. If you were the Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, will you approve the registration of the subject company?
A. As Chairman of the SEC, I will not approve the registration of a stock company which will engage in the
practice of law. The practice of law is not a business and lawyers cannot form stock corporations to practice
the profession. It is likewise prohibited for lawyers to allow non-lawyers to practice law nor are lawyers
allowed to share their legal fees with non-lawyers. (Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc., Bar Matter No. 550, June
17, 1993)

Q. How may one pursue the practice of law?

A. The practice of law as a profession may only be exercised by natural persons, who are lawyers, either as
solo practitioners or in partnership with other lawyers.

Q. What are the primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business?
A. The primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. The practice of law involves a duty of public service of which the emolument is a by-product and one may
obtain eminence without making much money.
2. The practice of law creates a relation as an officer of the court whose primary role is to assist in the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability.

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3. The practice of law creates a relation with clients with the highest fiduciary degree.
4. The practice of law creates a relation with other lawyers which requires candor, fairness and decency
avoiding any kind of encroachment upon other’s practice.

Q. What is the nature of a law partnership?

A. A partnership in the practice of law is a mere relationship or association of lawyers with the sole purpose
of rendering legal services. It is not a legal entity and is not even a taxpayer and any lawyer in the partnership
is considered a solo practitioner who is the tax payer. (Tan v. Del Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA324)

Q. What is the rule of use of Firm Name?

A. A law firm may continue to use the names of its deceased partners provided that there is a symbol
employed to indicate that the partner is already dead. Normally a crucifix is used after the name of a deceased
partner.
In the Petition For Authority To Continue Use Of The Firm Name "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, HERNANDEZ &
CASTILLO" AND IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM
NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." [G.R. NO. X92-1. JULY 30, 1979], the Court held
that: “It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service.’ A trade’ x x x’aims
primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind.’ x x x. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not
bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells
wheat or corn. x x x The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a
trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no
expectation of reward. This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised
is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession,
namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that
spirit.”
In ADRIANO E. DACANAY v. BAKER & MCKENZIE (A.C. NO. 2131 MAY 10, 1985), the S.C. held that Baker &
McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment"

Q. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Balauitan. The basis of the complaint was a Deed of Sale
executed between the lawyer and the complainant. Atty. Balauitan moved for the dismissal of the case
arguing that the matter does involve any lawyer-client relationship. Is his legal argument tenable?
A. The argument of Atty. Balauitan is not tenable. A lawyer cannot have a dichotomy between his private life
and his professional responsibility as a lawyer. He can be disbarred even if there is no lawyer-client
relationship between him and a complainant in a disbarment case and if the transaction involves his sale of a
portion of his real property. (Gacias v. Balauitan, 507 SCRA 8, 2006)

Q. Can an individual practicing before the Shai’ra court affix the prefix “ATTY.” before his name?
A. No, an individual practicing before the Shai’ra court affix the prefix “ATTY.” before his name unless he is a
lawyer. While the Supreme Court administers the examinations for one to practice before the Shari’ a courts,
any one admitted is not allowed to use the prefix “ATTY.” unless he is also a member of the Philippine bar.
Shari’ a courts have limited jurisdiction particularly on matters related to personal, family and property law
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and national laws. (Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P,
February 24, 1997)

II. Qualifications for Admission to the Practice of Law

Q. What are the requirements for admission to the practice of law?
A. Sec. 2, Rule138 of the Rules of Court provides for the following qualifications for admission to the practice
of law: One must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least 21 years of age, must be a resident of the Philippines,
must have obtained his law degree in a local school (refer to B.M.1153), and one must possess good moral
character.
Proof of good moral character requires a certification of a lawyer in good standing who personally knows the
bar candidate that the latter is fit to be admitted to the practice of law. It also includes a certification that one
does not have any pending charges or have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
If the bar candidate has a pending administrative and/or criminal case, he must attach a certification of the
status of each pending case.

Q. Mr. Roberto Lo was born in Australia of Filipino parents. After he completed his college degree in
Business Administration in Sydney, Australia, he enrolled in one of the universities in Metro Manila to
obtain his law degree. He successfully graduated with a Doctor in Jurisprudence degree and is now
processing his documents to be able to take his bar examinations. Can he qualify to take the bar
examinations? Justify your answer.

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A. Yes, Mr. Roberto law can qualify to take the bar examinations. Under the 1987 Constitution, Roberto Lo is
considered a natural-born Filipino since both his parents remain Filipino citizens at the time of his birth. He
also completed his law degree from a local school in Metro Manila.

Q. Can a Filipino citizen be allowed to take the bar when he obtained his law degree from Columbia
University in New York?
A. Every person intending to be admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines must meet all the
qualifications under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138. (In Re: Application of Adriano M. Hernandez, July 27,
1993)
In Bar Matter No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations
through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010), the Supreme Court once again
allowed Filipino graduates of foreign law schools to take the Philippine Bar, subject to certain conditions, and
amended Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Section 5 of the Rule now provides that before being admitted to the examination, all applicants for admission
to the bar shall satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the
degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree in a law school or university officially recognized by the
Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been
granted.

Q. Christian San Juan passed the bar with a passing grade of 80.50%. He was not allowed to take his
oath because Cristina Garcia, his childhood sweetheart with whom he has a child without benefit of
marriage, filed a timely motion to exclude him from the oath taking ceremonies. Was Cristina justified
in preventing San Juan from taking his Attorney’s Oath? Why?
A. Yes, Cristina was justified in enjoining San Juan to take his Oath as a lawyer because he does not possess
good moral character which is a requirement for admission to the bar.
Barba v. Pedro, 61SCRA 484, 1974: A bar passer who sired a child with a public school teacher was not
allowed to take his oath for lack of good moral character but was allowed to do so after 18 years based on
testimonials of his reformation when he worked as a community social development worker after passing the
bar.

Q. Santiago Go was conditionally allowed to take the bar examinations because he indicated in his
application for admission that there are only two pending civil cases against him at that time and no
criminal charges were filed against him at the time of his application for admission to the practice of
law. Santiago Go successfully passed the bar examinations and landed 5 th in said examinations. Before
taking his oath, Leticia Sia asked the Supreme Court not to allow Go to take his oath because she actually
filed a rape case against him which case remains pending but which information Go withheld in his
application. Will her request be given due course?
A. Yes, the Supreme Court can withhold the oath-taking of Santiago Go. If it can be established that the bar
passer does not possess good moral character, he will not be allowed to take his oath.
Zaguirre v. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003: Good moral character is required for admission to law
and misrepresentation about his true legal status will be a ground for a bar passer to be suspended
indefinitely upon passing the bar.

Q. Is possession of good moral character required only for admission to the practice of law?
A. Maintenance of good moral character is required to retain continued membership in the bar.
Mecaral v. Velasquez, A.C. No 8392, June 29, 2010: The Supreme Court disbarred a lawyer who founded a
religious cult and made his secretary a sex slave.
Cordon v. Balicanta, Adm. Case No. 2797, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 299, 2002: The S.C. disbarred a
lawyer who used his knowledge of the law to commit fraud against his client by forming a corporation out of
the estate of the deceased husband of the complainant. The lawyer made himself the sole signatory of said
company which allowed him to mortgage several properties of the corporation which were eventually
foreclosed by the creditor bank.
Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, 605 SCRA 93, 2009: The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who admitted in his
Affidavit in the disbarment case against him that he asked for “facilitation fee” to bribe the Vice Mayor of
Manila in the course of his engagement as counsel. The S.C. referred the case to the Ombudsman against the
Vice Mayor and the lawyer for the crime of bribery. The Court held that a lawyer’s professional fee does not
include “facilitation fee.”

Q. What is the coverage of the annual bar examinations?

A. The coverage of the annual bar examinations under Sec. 9, Rule 138, Rules of Court include: Political Law,
Labor and Social Legislation, Civil Law, Taxation, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law and Legal and
Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises.

Q. What is the essence of bar examinations?

A. The essence of bar examinations is anchored on public interest. Public policy demands that any person
seeking admission to the bar in the Philippines be required to furnish satisfactory proof of his knowledge of

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the law and ethical standards and of his possession of such degree of learning and proficiency in law as may
be deemed necessary for the due performance of the duties of lawyer.

Q. Candido completed his law degree in October 2015. He wanted to become a lawyer but he realized
that it was too late for him to take the November 2015 bar examinations. Can he file a petition to the
Supreme Court to be allowed to take his special bar examinations?
A. No, Candido cannot file a petition to the Supreme Court to be allowed to take his special bar examinations.
The Supreme Court administers the bar examinations only once a year.

Q. Fernando, a Filipino citizen, completed his study of law in Spain and was allowed to practice law in
Spain. He sought permission from the Supreme Court that he be allowed to be admitted to Philippine
bar. In his petition he invoked the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and Professions
between the Philippines and Spain. How will you rule on the petition of Fernando?
A. I will deny Fernando’s petition. Fernando has remained a Filipino citizen and he cannot invoke the
provisions of the treaty which is founded on reciprocity of the nationals of each country and the grant of the
privilege is always subject to the domestic laws of both countries. He must complete the requirements for
admission to practice and show proof of his qualifications. (In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 985)

Q. Define the following:

1. Attorneys-at Law: the class of persons who are by license, officers of the court, empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as
a consequence. (Cul v. Cul, 120 Phil. 729)
2. Attorney-in-Fact: an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the instrument appointing him. His
authority is provided in a special power of attorney or a general power of attorney or letter of authority. An
attorney-in-fact is not necessarily a lawyer.
3. Counsel de oficio: a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court, from among such members of the bar in
good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. The person
need not be a member of the bar if no lawyer is available in a given locality. (Sec. 7, Rule 116, Rules of Court)
A counsel de oficio is appointed to defend an indigent in a criminal action (Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 116; Sec.
32, Rule 138); or to represent a destitute party in a case (Sec.31, Rule 138).
4. Attorney Ad Hoc: a person named and appointed by the court to defend an absentee defendant in a suit in
which the appointment is made.
5. Attorney of Record: a member of the bar appointed by a client to represent in cause of a court and upon
whom service of papers may be made.
6. Of Counsel: a member of the bar who is associated with a law office but does not normally appear as
counsel of record of cases handled by the law office.
7. Lead Counsel: a member of the bar who charged with the principal management and direction of a party-
litigant.
8. House Counsel: a member of the bar who acts as attorney for a business company as an employee of such
company and renders legal advice on matters necessary in the ordinary course of its business.
9. Amicus Curiae: a friend of the court. A person with strong interest in or views on the subject matter of the
action. One who is considered as an experience and impartial attorney to help in the disposition of issues
submitted to the Court. (Sec. 36, Rule 138)
10. Amicus Curiae par Excellence: bar associations who appear in court as amici curiae or friends of the
court. Like an individual amicus curiae, amicus curiae par excellence do not represent any party to the case but
act as consultant in a doubtful issue for resolution of the court. They do not receive any compensation for
their legal services to the court.
11. Counsel de parte: a lawyer retained by a party litigant, usually, for a fee, to prosecute or defend his cause
in court. The term implies freedom of choice either on the part of the lawyer to accept the employment or on
the part of the litigant to continue or terminate the retainer at any time.
12. Pro bono Counsel: a lawyer who renders legal services without charging any professional fees but does
not shoulder the costs of litigation on behalf of his client.
13. Advocate: a lawyer who pleads on behalf of a third party.
14. Barrister: In England, a person entitled to practice law as an advocate or counsel in superior courts.
15. Solicitor: In England, a person prosecuting or defending suits in a Court of Chancery. A Court of Chancery
is a court which administers equity and proceeding according to the forms and principles of equity.
16. Proctor: In England, an attorney in the admiralty and ecclesiastical courts whose duties and business
correspond exactly to those of an attorney-at-law or solicitor in a Chancery.

Q. What is barratry?
A. Barratry is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels in suits. It is frowned upon as it is
against public policy.

Q. What is ambulance chasing?

A. Ambulance chasing is a practice which originated in New York, where through a lawyer or his agent, cases
are literally solicited in hospitals or in police precincts. The evils sought to be prevented by this practice are:

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fomenting litigation; subornation of perjury; mulcting of innocent persons upon manufactured causes of
action; defrauding injured parties.

III. Appearance of Non-Lawyers

Q. What is the Student Practice Rule?
A. Law Student Practice Rule: The Supreme Court promulgated on June 25, 2019, A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Rule
138-A Law Student Practice or Revised Law Student Practice Rule (Revised Rule).
Under Section 3 of the revised rule, law students who have completed first-year law courses may apply for
Level 1 certification from the executive judge of a regional trial court. Students enrolled for a second semester
of their third year may apply for Level 2 certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator.
The subject administrative matter revises Rule 138-A which previously allowed only law students who have
completed their third year of study to appear in any case before a court, tribunal, board or officer.
Level 1 certification is valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies within the judicial
region where the law school is located while Level 2 certification is valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.
Under the revised rules, those in Level 1 may give legal advice to clients, draft legal documents, and provide
legal public orientations, among others. Those in Level 2 can perform all activities under Level 1, assist in the
taking of sworn evidence and prepare judicial affidavits of witnesses, appear on behalf of the client at any
stage of trial, among other tasks that are subject to approval of the supervising lawyer.

> In Bar Matter No.730 dated June 10, 1998, the Supreme Court required that law student practice before the
Regional Trial Court must be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
> Under Section 34 of the Rules of Court, a law student may appear before the first level court as an agent or
friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Q. Under what circumstances can non-lawyers represent parties?

A. Under the present practice, non-lawyers may appear in the following:
1. Non-lawyers and law students with Level 1 Certification may appear in first level courts.
2. Law students with Level 2 Certification under the revised rules on law student practice may now appear in
regional trial courts under the supervision of a lawyer in good standing.
3. Non-lawyers may appear in quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals subject to compliance of the rules of
procedure of the tribunals.

Q. When may lawyers not appear in proceedings which are contested by adverse parties?
A. Lawyers not appear in proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa unless the lawyer is the complainant
or the respondent. Lawyers are also prohibited from representing parties in court ordered mediation.

Q. What are the sanctions for practice or appearance without authority?

A. The following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Lawyers without authority may be found guilty of Contempt of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 71)
Note: Acts constituting contempt include: Misbehavior as an officer of the court, disobedience or resistance to
a lawful order of the court, abuse or unlawful interference with judicial proceedings, obstruction in the
administration of justice, misleading the court or making false allegations, criticisms, insults or veiled threats
against the court, aiding in the unauthorized practice of law, unlawful retention of clients, advising a client to
commit a contemptuous act, publications which tend to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence courts may
degrade the court; disrespectful pleadings.
2. Persons who are not lawyers may be found guilty of Indirect Contempt (Sec. 3 (e), Rule 71)
Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao, 674 SCRA 13: The Court found Karaan guilty of indirect contempt. Karaan would
always appear in court and he even files pleadings without indicating any Roll of Attorney No., PTR, MCLE and
IBP O.R.No. After investigation, OCA found out that the 71 year old Karaan was not in fact a lawyer. He was
fined P10,000.00 without imprisonment.

Q: What are the remedies against unauthorized practice?

A: The available remedies against unauthorized practice are:
(1) Petition for Injunction
(2) Declaratory Relief
(3) Contempt of Court
(4) Disqualification and complaints for disbarment
(5) Criminal complaint for estafa against the person who falsely represented himself as a lawyer to the damage of
another.

IV. Public Officials and Practice of Law

Q. Are government lawyers covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility (“CPR”)?

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A. Yes, government lawyers covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility. CANON 6 of the CPR
provides:“These Canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their tasks.”
(Rules 6.01-6.03, Code of Professional Responsibility).

Q. Can a Senator be subject of disciplinary powers of the S.C. during his term of office?
A: Yes, Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the sole authority to discipline
the members of the bar. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and the Court, may its discretion, proceed
with the investigation. The proceedings are strictly confidential in nature so the member of Congress can still
attend to his congressional duties without fear that the proceedings will be discussed in public.

Q. Can a member of Congress be held liable for libel for utterances made during a press conference?
A. Yes, a member of Congress cannot invoke parliamentary immunity for utterances made outside the plenary
hall of Congress. He will be held accountable under the relevant provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Q. Can a member of Congress be a subject of an order of suspension issued by the Sandiganbayan for
work done while he was a Mayor?
A: Yes, a member can be a subject of an order of suspension for work done as a Mayor. The order of
suspension is not a penalty but is issued to protect the integrity of the evidence against him.

Q. Can a member of Congress refuse service of sentence by final conviction for the crime of rape on the
defense that the constituents who voted for him are denied representation?
A: No, a member of Congress convicted of the crime of rape, a crime which is penalized by more than 6 years
of imprisonment, must serve his sentence as soon as his conviction becomes final and executory.

Q. What is the one-year ban rule on government lawyers?

A: The one-year ban rule on government lawyers provides that former government attorneys are prohibited
or disqualified from the representing any interest adverse to the government within the one-year period
when they were separated from service.

Q. Who are the public officials not allowed to practice law?

A. The following public officials not allowed to engage in the practice of law during their tenure of office:
Under the Constitution: The President, Vice President, members of the Constitutional Commissions,
members of the judiciary, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Under Civil Service Rules: government lawyers in government departments/offices/bureaus, in
government owned and controlled corporations, government financial institutions and those with local
government units
Under Special Laws: Governors and Mayors (Local Government Code); Solicitors and trial lawyers of the
Office of the Solicitor General, lawyers of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, Government
prosecutors under the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman

Q. What is the concept of limited practice of law among public officers?

A. The concept of limited practice of law among public officers provides that with prior written authorization
of the heads of office, some government lawyers may be authorized to practice law provided they will not
represent any party who has an adverse claim against the government.
In Lorenzana v. Fajardo ( 462 SCRA 1, 2005), the Court held that a lawyer is guilty of violating the Civil
Service rule on double compensation when he accepted an appointment as a lawyer of the Urban Affairs
Office of the City of Manila and a member of the PLEB of Quezon City.

Q. Who are the lawyers who represent the government?

A. The lawyers tasked to represent government are OSG, OGCC, lawyers in regular departments, bureaus,
offices, lawyers in the government financial institutions, lawyers in government owned and controlled
corporations, lawyers who serve the government’s interest under special contracts/or engagements, lawyers
under the local government units.

Q. Who are the lawyers who represent the interest of the state in criminal cases?
A. Government lawyers tasked to prosecute and represent the interest of the state are the Public Prosecutors
from the DOJ and Office of the Ombudsman.

Q. Who are the government lawyers who represent indigent litigants?

A. Lawyers who work with the Public Attorneys’ Office represent the indigent litigants.

Q. Can the Supreme Court motu proprio discipline lawyers?

A. Yes, the Supreme Court may motu proprio discipline lawyers.
In People of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et al.(G.R. No. 208290, December 11,
2013) , the Court motu proprio sanctioned the Bureau of Customs lawyers. The CTA in conformity with the
Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG) of the BOC tried

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the private respondents for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. The
government lost the case.
S.C. said that it could not countenance the following patent violations of the government prosecutors: failure
of the prosecution failed to present certified true copies of the documentary evidence under Section 7, Rule
130 and Section 127, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the petition for certiorari was filed beyond the
reglamentary period. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses the Court’s vigilance
against inefficiency in the administration of justice and the presumption that the case was doomed by design
from the start was doomed by design from the start. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the
executive branch should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of
competence and fervor is expected. The Court reminded the lawyers in the BOC that the canons embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks.

Q. May a labor arbiter apply a principle in corporation law to support his decision in a labor dispute?
A. Yes, a labor arbiter may apply a principle in corporation law to support his decision in a labor dispute. In
YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES v.ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI (A.C.
No. 7158, March 09, 2015), the Court held that a Labor Arbiter may apply the principle of piercing the
corporate veil. This is a Complaint for Disbarment filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar v. Nambi
(respondent) on the ground of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of Execution
against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its incorporators, the herein complainants, who are not parties to the case.
The Court held that the labor arbiter had legal basis to pierce the corporate veil to serve the ends of justice.
He was, however, reprimanded for not complying with the lawful orders of the IBP and the Court.

Q: F lodged a complaint for qualified theft against M before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Prosecutor A, the investigating prosecutor, forwarded the case records recommending the prosecution
of M to Prosecutor B, the Provincial Prosecutor, for approval and signature. However, the resolution of
the case was delayed because finding investigation it was established that B removed the case records
from the office and brought them to his residence, where they were kept in his custody. Can Provincial
Prosecutor B be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official?
A: Yes, Prosecutor B can be disciplined by the Supreme Court because the Code of Professional Responsibility
applies to government lawyers. Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as
a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, he may
be disciplined by the Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. Here, Barcelona violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the CPR which is particularly directed to
lawyers in the government service, enjoining them from using one's public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. Private
interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. (FACTURAN V.
BARCELONA, A.C. NO. 11069, JUNE 8, 2016, J. PERLAS-BERNABE)

VI. Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers (Rule 139-B, Rule of Court)

Q. What is the nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyers?

A: A disbarment proceeding is sui generis in nature. It requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish
the violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is imprescriptible. The
complainant need not be the injured party. It can even be filed through a person covered by a Special Power
of Attorney. All matters related to the proceedings are strictly confidential. Once filed, it must be fully
investigated and not subject to dismissal because every case is clothe with public interest.
Bengco v. Bernardo, 672 SCRA 352 (2012): S.C. said that administrative cases against lawyers do not
prescribe. Despite the considerable lapse of time between the commission of the infraction and the time of
filing, there is need to determine the administrative liability of lawyers.
Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 677 SCRA 352(2012): A lawyer cannot escape “the disciplining arm of the Court”
despite any delay in the filing of an administrative case against a lawyer.

Rules on Disbarment (Rule 139-B)

Initiation of a Complaint
By the Supreme Court motu propio
By the IBP Board of Governors motu propio
Upon referral by the S.C.
Upon referral by the IBP Chapter Board
Upon verified complaint by any person

IBP Board of Governors

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 Chairman, CBD

REPORT
Commissioner
May uphold the findings

May reverse the findings

May amend the findings

No motion for Reconsideration before the Commissioner.

Motion for Reconsideration before the Board of Governor is allowed.
Decision of IBP Board of Governors is reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Q. Describe the proceedings before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
A. The initial stage of any disciplinary proceeding is its referral of the Board of Governors to the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The following steps are observed:

The complaint is referred to the Investigating Commissioner.

The Investigating Commissioner presides over the disbarment proceedings allowing complainant to prove his
allegations and for the lawyer to establish his defense.
After evaluation, the Investigating Commissioner submits his findings and recommendation to the Chairman
of the Commission on Bar Discipline (“CBD”).
No Motion for Reconsideration is allowed before the Investigating Commissioner
The Chairman of the CBD submits the report of the Investigating Commissioner to the Board of Governors.
In a meeting called for the purpose, the Board of Governors evaluates the report and renders its own
resolution.
Motion for Reconsideration before the Board of Governors is allowed.
The decision of the Board of Governors (reviewed by SC) must be in writing supported by facts and evidence
presented during the hearing and the applicable provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Q. Who may initiate disbarment proceedings?

A.The S.C. held that a complainant need not suffer any injury to institute a disbarment case and will have the
personality to file the disbarment case. It may even be filed by a person covered by a Special Power of
Attorney.
In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu propio  may initiate
disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings
being sui generis, the procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-
in-interest must initiate the suit will not apply. (cited in NESTOR FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR.
v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014)

Q. Can a lawyer move for dismissal of a disciplinary case against him on the ground that the
complainants are not the injured party to the case?
A. No, a lawyer cannot move for dismissal of a disciplinary case against him on the ground that the
complainants are not the injured party to the case. The Court has consistently held that the practice of law is
imbued with public interest and institution of complaints against lawyers is not predicated on a lawyer-client
relationship alone. It is sufficient that the complainant is able to establish the culpability of the erring lawyer
through preponderance of evidence.

Q. Can a disbarment case be dismissed upon motion of the complainant?

A. No, a disbarment case cannot be dismissed upon motion of the complainant.
In SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA AMATORIO v. ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP AND ATTY. WHELMA
F. SITON-YAP (A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015), the Court said that it cannot simply yield to complainants’
change of heart by refuting their own statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint for
disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the lawyer not

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only hurts the client’s cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal profession itself. Thus,
for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be disciplined notwithstanding the
complainant’s pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to support any finding of
culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed “regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.” It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the case,
or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an erring
lawyer.

Q. Can a lawyer move for dismissal of the disbarment case against him based on prejudicial question?
A. No, a disbarment proceeding being sui generis can proceed independently of any criminal action instituted
against the lawyer.
ANTONINA S. SOSA v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA, A.C. No. 8776, March 22, 2015: This is a complaint
for the disbarment/suspension of Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) filed on October 22, 2010 by
Antonina S. Sosa (Ms. Sosa), for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising from
non-payment of debt.
The Court said that a proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is
a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. For violation of Rule 1.01, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Q. Can a lawyer set up the defense of double jeopardy in a disbarment case against him?
A. No, the defense of double jeopardy cannot be invoked in a disbarment proceeding.
Garrido v. Garrido, 611 SCRA 508 (21010): S.C. reiterated the rule that “laws dealing with double jeopardy or
with procedure . . . do not apply in the determination of lawyer’s qualifications or fitness for membership in
the Bar. . .” The S.C. said first, that for admission a candidate must meet all the requirements because the
practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and involves service to the public; and second,
admission qualifications are also required for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice and lack of
qualifications is a matter of public concern and S.C. may inquire into them.

Q. What is the effect of conviction upon the practice of law of a lawyer?

A. In Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, (677 SCRA 352, 2012), the Court held that a lawyer convicted of direct bribery can
be a subject of disbarment proceedings. Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The defense that
his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer but as a public officer betrays the unmistakable lack of
integrity in his character.
In In Re: Atty. Rodolfo D.Pactolin (670 SCRA 366, 2112), the Court held that the conviction of Atty. Pactolin
before the Sandiganbayan for the crime of Falsification of Public Document is contrary to justice, honesty and
good morals. This is a crime involving moral turpitude. Even if the IBP recommended dismissal of the case,
S.C. disbarred him because “disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude.”

Q. Can a judge who has been dismissed from the judiciary still be a subject of a disbarment proceeding?
A. Yes, a judge who has been dismissed from the judiciary still be a subject of a disbarment proceeding.
In OCA v. Liangco (662 SCRA 103, December 10, 2011), the Court held that the dismissal of a judge from
service will not preclude the filing of a disbarment case against him before the IBP. The disbarment was based
on the same grounds for his dismissal: gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance. He failed to make a
distinction between a Resolution and an Ordinance and that as judge, he cannot render an Opinion but rather
he must receive evidence and make a decision after termination of trial. It will be the IBP which will
investigate a judge who has retired from the judiciary and not the Supreme Court.

Q. What is the proof required to establish the culpability of a lawyer in a disbarment proceeding?
A. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required
to establish liability.  As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the
Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition
of disciplinary sanction is justified. The Court has required that a complainant has the onus of proving the
charges against respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.

Q. Does the lawyer have the burden of proof in a disbarment case?

A. No, the lawyer does not have the burden of proof in a disbarment case.
Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin III,  A.C. No. 7686, July 31,
2013.The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the
complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint
by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. In this case,
complainants failed to discharge their burden of proving that respondents ordered their secretary to stamp a
much later date instead of the actual date of receipt for the purpose of extending the ten-day period within
which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the NLRC Rules of Procedure. Such claim is merely anchored

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on speculation and conjecture and not backed by any clear preponderant evidence necessary to justify the
imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar. 
Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014: The S.C. said in when it comes to
administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires
clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was
without factual basis. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held
administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default
rule is presumption of good faith. 

Q. What is the effect of the withdrawal of a disbarment case?

A. Adelia V. Quiachon v. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014: The S.C. held that the
withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and
of the Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate penalty should be imposed despite the
desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges

Q: May a lawyer be subject of a disbarment proceeding ex parte?

A: Yes, a lawyer may be subjected to disbarment proceeding ex parte provided he has been notified of the
administrative complaint and yet he continues to submit his pleading to refute the allegations. (Stemerick v.
Atty. Mas)

Q. What are the grounds for suspension (Disbarment)?

A. Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court provides the following grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a
member of the bar: deceit or any gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of crime involving
moral turpitude, violation of lawyer’s Oath, wilful disobedience of any lawful order, or corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party in a case without authority, malpractice which includes practice of
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers..
Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014: The Court ordered
Celera disbarred for contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still
subsisting. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the disbarment proceeding, the Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of Atty. Celera are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. Atty. Celera exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and is grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court. 
Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014: This case involves a PAO
who advised her clients –“Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon.”Thus, a complaint was lodged against her for violation of the attorney’s oath, deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. S. C. held that Atty.
Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.  It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that “a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Rule 15.07 states that “a lawyer
shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.” However, while her
remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment was not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause
dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. Thus, she was only reprimanded and sternly warned. 
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. v. ATTY. ISIDRO L.CARACOL, A.C. No. 7325, January 21,
2015,VILLARAMA, JR., J. The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a
lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence: “SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion
of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right
to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as
justice requires.  An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave
of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.”
An attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer. Thus, a lawyer must be
more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system.
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015, Leonen, J. An
administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension was filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez against
Atty. Trina De Vera. The Court found Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of several post-dated checks. She was suspended from the
practice of law for one year

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Q. What are the guidelines in lifting of the order of suspension of the lawyer?
A. MANIEGO v. DE DIOS, 617 SCRA 142 (2010): The Court held that after the period of suspension, the
resumption to practice is not automatic. The Court issued the following guidelines for the reinstatement of a
suspended lawyer:
1. After a finding that the respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision rendering the penalty.
2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
shall render the decision final and executory.
3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court,
through the Office of the Bar Confidant that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not
appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the local chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge
of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and where he or she has appeared
as counsel;
5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension; and
6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the respondent under oath shall be a ground for
imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
To summarize:
(i) File a Sworn Statement with the Office of the Bar confidant that the respondent lawyer has served the
period of suspension stating that he/she desisted from the practice of law and never appeared in any court
during the period of suspension.
(ii) Copies of the Sworn Statement must be furnished the chapter of which the respondent lawyer is a
member and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and first level courts where respondent lawyer
has pending cases.
(iii)If satisfied, the Court will lift the order of suspension and reinstate the erring lawyer

Q. What is the effect of an adverse disciplinary action instituted abroad against a Filipino lawyer?
A. A decision in a disciplinary action against a Filipino lawyer practicing abroad may also be a basis for a
disbarment proceeding against the same lawyer in the Philippines.
Velez v. De Vera, 496 SCRA 345 (2006): A finding of fact by the California State Bar can be a basis of an
administrative complaint against a Filipino lawyer before the IBP.

Q. Can the penalty of a lawyer be mitigated by virtue of relationship?

A. Yes, the penalty of a lawyer undergoing an administrative case can be mitigated by virtue of relationship.
ALVIN S. FELICIANO v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA,A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015: On
December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled “Bobie Rose V. Frias
vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada” suspending Atty. Lozada for two years for violation of Rules 15.03 and
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
During her period of suspension, she represented her husband where complainant Feliciano was a party. The
Supreme Court said it recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families
will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus,
considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence,
she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her
penalty.

Reinstatement after Disbarment

Readmission to the Bar and Resumption to Practice Law
Q. Can a bar passer convicted of a homicide still be admitted to the practice of law?
A. Yes, a bar passer convicted of a homicide can still be admitted to the practice of law.
IN RE: OATH TAKING OF ARGOSINO, B.M. 712, July 13, 1995 and En Banc Resolution dated March 19, 1997. A
lawyer who was involved in the fatal death of a neophyte in the initiation rites of his fraternity was finally
allowed to take his oath after he showed several proofs of testimonial of good character.

Q. Can a disbarred lawyer be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys?

A. Yes, a disbarred lawyer can still be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS (ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN), 586 SCRA 372: A lawyer who leaked the bar
questions in Mercantile Law prepared by a founding partner in his law firm was reinstated upon proof of
good moral character during his period of suspension.

MACARUBBO v. MACARUBBO, A.M. 6148, January 22, 2013: Macarubbo was disbarred for contracting three
marriages. While the disbarment case was pending, Macarrubo resorted to filing separate civil actions to
annul two of said marriages. Eight years after his disbarment, he filed a Petition for Extraordinary Mercy for
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. In granting his Petition, the Court considered the following guidelines
set forth in Re: Letter of Augustus C. Diaz, MTC Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency (533 SCRA 534,
2010):
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1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the IBP, judges or judges’ associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he has still productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution
to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as
well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency
The Court concluded with a reminder that to enjoy continued member in the legal profession, one
must be a person of good moral character.

Q. Can a former Filipino resume his practice of law in the Philippines?

A. Yes, a former Filipino can still resume his practice of law in the Philippines.
In RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES (EPIFANIO B.
MUNESES), 677 SCRA 364 (2012): The S.C. said that a Filipino lawyer who has been naturalized in another
country does not automatically enjoy the right to resume his practice of law when returns to the Philippines.
It held that under the Rules of Admission to the Philippine bar, one must be a Filipino citizen. Thus, when he
assumed another citizenship, he ipso facto lost his Filipino citizenship. The returning Filipino lawyer must
repatriate himself under the provisions of R.A. 9225. Said law says that “all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of (R.A. 9225).”
R.A. 9225 provides that if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions’ (he shall apply with the proper authority for
a license or permit to engage in such practice.”

Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin M. Dacanay, 540 SCRA 424: To reacquire, the
authority to resume his practice of law, the repatriated Filipino must:
1. Update and pay in full his annual membership dues in the IBP;
2. Pay his professional tax;
3. Complete his 36 credit hours of MCLE to refresh him of his knowledge of Philippine laws, rules of practice,
recent jurisprudence and update him of recent legal developments (MCLE will be from the time he was absent
in the Philippines up to the time he resumes his practice);and
4. Retake his oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also to renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Resumption to Practice of a Balikbayan Lawyer

Requisites - Updating and full payment of all IBP membership dues; Payment of Professional Tax;
Completion of MCLE credit units; and Retaking of the Lawyer’s Oath

VII. Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer

A. Duty to Society
1. Respect for law and legal processes
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes. (Rules 1.01-1.04)
Q. What does respect for rule of law include?
A. The lawyer must at all times in the protection of the rights of client ensure compliance with the law
governing the issues of the pending case.
FERNANDO W. CHU v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015, PER CURIAM: Fernando
W. Chu invokes the Court’s disciplinary authority in resolving this disbarment complaint against his former
lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr., whom he has accused of gross misconduct. Atty. Guico was
disbarred for having had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu which constituted an act of extortion and misrepresentation
that caused dishonor to and contempt for the legal profession.

RULE 1.02. A LAWYER SHALL NOT COUNSEL DEFIANCE OF THE LAW.

Q. Atty. NC advised client, GC, that instead of resorting to extrajudicial partition of the estate, they should
just directly register the properties of the estate to the heirs. Is the advice of Atty. NC correct?
A: No, Atty. NC’s advice is not correct. A lawyer who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is
contrary to law, public policy, public order and public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal
system is guilty of gross misconduct, and should be suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred.
(Gabriela Coronel v. Atty. Nelson A. Cunanan, A.C. No. 6738, 12 August 2015)

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Q. What are the standards of morality required of a lawyer?
A. The standards of morality required of a lawyer would include his uprightness as a member of society and
as an officer of the court.
MELVYN G. GARCIA v. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO, A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 03, 2015, PER
CURIAM: Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H.
Sesbreñ o. The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court’s
Resolution dated 30 September 2014. The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273.
The parties agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for
homicide. The Court held in the affirmative and ordered Sesbreno disbarred.

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, A.C. No. 5816, March 10,
2015, PER CURIAM: Complainant charged the two lawyers with gross immoral conduct. Atty. Catindig was
disbarred for contracting a second marriage with the complainant while his first marriage was still subsisting.
The charge against Atty. Baydo was dismissed for lack of evidence.

TIONG v. FLORENDO, 662 SCR A 1, Perlas-Bernabe (2011): The S.C. held that a lawyer’s “act of having an affair
with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital
vow of fidelity.” His illicit relationship with the wife of his client showed that he violated Canon 17 of the CPR
for abuse of the trust and confidence reposed in him. An Affidavit of Desistance or any other sworn statement
with the same effect will not excuse the lawyer because any disciplinary proceeding is clothed with public
interest.

Garrido v. Garrido, 611 SCRA 508 (2010): A charge of immorality was brought before the lawyer for having
contracted three marriages. He left his first wife to pursue his study of law. He contracted his second marriage
upon misrepresentation that he is single. He engaged in an extra marital affair with a lawyer whom he
eventually married in Hongkong while his second marriage was subsisting. Such conduct betrayed his moral
depravity for which he was disbarred. The lady lawyer was eventually disbarred for knowing that Garrido
had other two subsisting marriages when she had her romantic relationship with him even before she
became a lawyer.

Q. What constitutes deceitful conduct on the part of the lawyer?

A. Deceitful conduct would involve acts of the lawyer which tend to bring dishonor to the legal profession.
The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Brennisen v. Contawi, 670 SCRA 358(2012): The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who acted “with deceit when,
through the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his client’s
property for his personal benefit.
Bueno v. Raneses, 687 SCRA 711(2012): The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who practically asked the client to sell
everything for the sake of winning the case, only to end up not really doing anything. By asking money from
his client for a purportedly bribery to the judge to win a case, the lawyer tarnished the image of the judiciary
and put a black mark in the legal profession as well.

Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero v. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014:
The Court held that Atty. Solidum, Jr. violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conduct, as
used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Atty. Solidum, Jr. was held guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in
his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro.  Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed Atty.
Solidum, Jr. to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Atty. Solidum, Jr. drafted the subject documents with
full knowledge that the interest rates were exorbitant. Taking advantage of the provisions in the instruments,
he later assailed the validity of the same agreements which he personally prepared. He issued checks that
were drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar to his without informing complainants.   Further,
the records do not indicate any undertaking on his part to pay the loans he obtained from complainants. The
fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Atty. Solidum, Jr. failed to fulfil
this duty. 

2. Efficient and convenient legal services

CANON 2 - A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible
with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. (Rules 2.01-2.04
Q. When is a lawyer guilty of encroaching on another lawyer’s practice?

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A. A lawyer who solicits and causes the transfer of representation of existing clients of another lawyer is
guilty of encroaching on the practice of another lawyer.
Lisangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009: A lawyer who allowed his paralegal/secretary to
solicit the clients of a fellow lawyer with a promise of financial assistance was suspended by the S.C. and
reminded lawyers that their calling cards must only contain their name, fields of practice, contact details and
nothing more. The prohibition applies to the non-legal staff in order to curb any abuse of the privilege of the
law.

3. True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on legal services

CANON 3 – A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only the true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. (Rules 3.01-3.04)
Q: Cite examples which are considered permissible ways to make a lawyer’s services known.
A: A lawyer may make his services known without violating the Code Professional Responsibility in the
following manner:
1. Publication in reputable law lists of brief biographical and honest informative data;
2. Use of an ordinary professional business card indicating only one’s name, office address and
contact details;
3. Announcements of specialization and availability of service in legal journal for lawyers;
4. Announcement of vacancy and Invitation to public office requiring lawyers;
5. Offering free legal service to indigents through radio broadcasts or printed matter;
6. Announcement of opening of a law firm, changes of personnel, firm name or office address;
7. Listing in a telephone directory; and
8. Posting of an official website of a law firm indicating the directory of its lawyers and fields of
expertise.

Q. Can a lawyer be held liable for the allegations set forth in a pleading which has been verified by his
client?
A. No, a lawyer cannot be held liable for the allegations set forth in a pleading which has been verified by his
client.
De Leon v. Castelo, 639 SCRA 237 (2011): The S.C. held that “with the cloak of privilege, lawyers can freely and
courageously speak for their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or actions for damages .” Once the
client, attests to the preparation of a pleading, the lawyer cannot be held liable on the disclosures of his client.

4. Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system

CANON 4 – A lawyer shall participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting
efforts in law reforms and in the improvement of the administration of justice.
A lawyer is encouraged to participate in the formulation of amendments in the Rules of Court to improve the
administration of justice.
A lawyer may attend congressional hearings involving changes in substantive laws; creation of new courts; and
redefining jurisdiction of trial and appellate courts.

5. Participation in legal education program and other related activities

CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating the law and jurisprudence.
A lawyer is expected to comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education and to
participate in the activities of the IBP and other legal professional organizations.
Purpose: MCLE, what it is; who enforces the MCLE

Q. What is the composition of constitution of the MCLE Board?

A. The MCLE Board is composed of a retired justice of the Supreme Court is the Chairman, with the following
as members: an incumbent dean of a recognized law school, a representative from a designated law center,
the Chancellor of the Philippine Judicial Academy and the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Q. What are the requirements to complete the MCLE?

A. The completion of MCLE would include 36-unit requirement with the corresponding units: 6 for Legal
Ethics; 6 for prescribed courses as approved by the MCLE Board, 4 for trail and pre-trial techniques, 4 for
legal writing and oral advocacy, 5 for alternative dispute resolution, 2 for international law and conventions
and 9 for updates on substantive and procedural laws.

Q. What is the period of compliance for one’s MCLE?

A. A lawyer has a period of three years to fully comply with his MCLE 36-unit requirement.

Q. Who are exempted from the MCLE requirement?

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A. The following public officers are exempted from the MCLE requirement: President, Vice President,
Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
Governors, Mayors, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, Cabinet Secretaries and their
undersecretaries, OSG lawyers, OGCC lawyers, Ombudsman and all Deputies of the Ombudsman, Professor
and Reviewers of law for a period of ten years.

Q. What the penalties for non-compliance?

A. The penalties for non-compliance of the MCLE would include the imposition of fines, pleadings may be
expunge from records of the court. A lawyer be can a subject of suspension or disbarment if he continues to
comply with the MCLE requirement despite notice to comply because this will be a violation of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

B. Duty to the Legal Profession

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A): A lawyer cannot be a full-fledged member of the
bar, he has not signed the Roll of Attorneys after taking his Oath as a lawyer.

Q. When does one become a full-fledged attorney?

A. In re: Petition of Atty. Medado to sign Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013: Petitioner
Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979. He took the Attorney’s Oath thereafter, and was scheduled to
sign the Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so. It was only in 2005 that he realized that he did not sign the Roll
after being asked his Roll number when he attended his MCLE. Thirty (30) years after passing the bar,
Medado filed a Petition to allow him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Supreme Court held that while an
honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates
malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such Canon also applies to law students and
bar candidates. Medado was imposed a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign one (1) year after
receipt of the Court’s Resolution. 

Q. What is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?

A. Purposes of the IBP: To elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Elective Officers: President, Executive Vice President and concurrently a Governor of a Region (chosen by the
Board of Governors who will succeed the national President), Board of Governors from: Northern Luzon, Central
Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and
Western Mindanao.
Other officers: The IBP shall have a Secretary, Treasurer and such other officers as well as employees the
President may appoint with the consent of the Board of Governors under such terms and conditions specified in
the appointment of each officer and/or employee.
Membership and Dues: Non-payment of dues may subject the lawyer to disciplinary action including removal
of the name of the delinquent lawyer from the Roll of Attorneys. (Sec. 9, Rule 139-A)LIFETIME DUE: P25,000
after 10 years of practice of law and ANNUAL DUE: P1,000
In the Matter of Brewing Controversies in the IBP Elections(A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, A.C. No. 8292, April 2013):
Lawyers seeking positions in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines must respect the rotational rule. The
rotational rule is adopted to allow equal opportunity for all lawyers in different regions to have access to
positions of leadership in the IBP. The S.C. also reminded IBP officers that they should not use the Court as
“referee” for their intramurals.

2. THE LAWYER AS A NOTARY PUBLIC (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, effective August 1, 2004, as amended)
Q. What are the purposes of the Notarial Rules?
A. Promote, serve and protect public interest; to simplify, clarify and modernize the rules governing notaries
public; and to foster ethical conduct among notaries public.
Please take note the relevant provisions of the 2004 Notarial Rules: (Take particular attention of the
date when a document was notarized. A document notarized before the effectivity of the 2004
Notarial Rules will be governed by the relevant provisions of the Revised Administrative Code where
the “cedula” will suffice as proof of identity.)
HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO v. ATTY. ROBERTO E. EXAMEN, A.C. No.
10132, March 24, 2015. The complainants charged Atty. Examen of notarizing Deeds of Sale where his brother
was the vendee. In his defense, Atty. Examen said that at the time of the execution of the subject Deeds of Sale the
Notarial Rules of 2004 were not yet in effect. Under the Revised Administrative Code which governed the notarial
practice there was no prohibition on notarizing documents of relatives up to the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity and affinity. The Court, however, held Atty. Examen liable for not ascertaining the details of the
“cedulas” of the affiants. He relied on the entries made by his secretary. The Court suspended Atty. Roberto E.
Examen from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS.  In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, was
likewise REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years from finality of this decision.

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(1). Commissioning of a Notary Public
WILBERTO C. TALISIC v. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014: A lawyer’s notarial
commission was revoked and he was not allowed to renew the same for one year for failure to ascertain the
identities of the parties who executed an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to Spouses
Durante of a parcel of land. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
(2). Qualifications (Section 1, Rule III)
(3). Manner of Obtaining a Commission (Sections 2, 3, 4, 5,6,7,8, 9 and 10 Rule III); and Renewal of
Commission (Sections 13 and 14, Rule III)
(4). Powers and Limitations
Powers (Section 1, Rule IV; Sections 1-4, Rule VII)
Prohibitions (Section 2, Rule IV; Section 1, Rule XII)
Disqualifications (Section 4, Rule IV)
(5). Instances when a Notary Public may refuse to notarize, issue certification (Sections 4, 5 & 6, Rule
IV)
(6). Jurisdiction and Period of Validity of Commission (Section 11, Rule III; Section9, Rule IX)
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICEA.M. No. 09-6-1-SC,
January 21, 2015, MENDOZA, J.:A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants show that
Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the
complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with
an expired notarial commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section 11,
Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides:
“Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the
first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.”
(7). Reportorial Requirement (Section 12, Rule III; Sections 1-6, Rule VI; and Sections 1-2, Rule VIII)
CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO v. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO, A.C. No. 10695, March 18, 2015, Leonen, J:
For not faithfully reflecting the notarial deeds in his registration book, Atty. Joselito Troy Suello was found
GUILTY of violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.  Accordingly, he was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months; his notarial
commission was immediately revoked; and was DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for
one (1) year
(8). Disciplinary Sanctions/Death of a Notary Public
Revocation of commission ((Section 1, Rule XI)
Suspension from practice as a lawyer
Death of a Notary Public (Section 4, Rule XI)

Q. Can a notary public dissolve marriage?

A. No, a notary public may not dissolve marriage.
Espinosa v. Atty. Julieta A.Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011: The S.C. revoked the notarial
commission of a lawyer and she was likewise suspended from the practice of law for notarizing a document
which effectively dissolved the marriage of the complainants.

Q. Is a lawyer required to recall the identity of the affiants after a lapse of five years?
A. No, a lawyer is not required to recall the identity of affiants after lapse of five years.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Arguelles, 679 SCRA 348 (2012): The S.C. held that it is sufficient for
the Notary Public to ascertain the identities of the affiants and the witnesses at the time of the execution of the
document. The Notary Public must rely on the presumption that the proofs of identity of the parties were issued
by the public agencies in the regular course of the discharge of their responsibilities. It is also not practical for a
notary public to recall the affiants 12 years after they personally appeared before him.

Q. Can a lawyer continue to notarize documents with an expired commission?

A. No. Tenoso v. Echanez, A.C. No. 8384, 11 April 2013: By performing his duties without renewing his notarial
commission, the S.C. said that he committed acts of falsehood and must be punished.

Q. Can a lawyer notarize the statement executed by his sister-in-law?

A. No, he cannot notarize the document.
Jandoquile v. Revilla, A.C. No.9514, 10 April 2013: The Notarial Rules of 2004 disqualifies lawyers from
notarizing documents of relatives up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The defense of Atty.
Revilla that he notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of his relative by his virtue of the fact that he was the counsel in
the criminal case is not availing according to the Court. The S.C. held that since he signed it with the details of his
notarial commission leads to no other conclusion that he signed it as a Notary Public and not as counsel. The S.C.
reiterated the rule that where the affiants are personally known to the Notary Public, the jurat must state so,
otherwise, parties must show proof of competent identity.

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Q. Can one’s notarial commission included in the conduct of the disbarment of the lawyer although the
same was not raised in the complaint?
A. Yes, this can be included in the proceeding.
Virtusio v. Virtusio, 680 SCRA 1(2012): The IBP Investigating Commissioner discovered in the course of the
disciplinary proceeding against Virtusio that she failed to renew her notarial commission in 2006 and 2007.
While it was not a subject of the complaint, the S.C. held that the infraction can be scrutinized in the
investigation. The S.C. revoked the notarial commission of the lawyer, did not allow her to renew the same and
suspended her from the practice of law for deliberate falsehood for holding out to the public that she has been
properly commissioned to notarized documents.

Q. What is the culpability of a lawyer for failure to ascertain the identity of an affiant?
A. Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen,  A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014: A lawyer’s notarial
commission was revoked and he was not allowed to renew the same for one year for failure to ascertain the
identities of the parties who executed an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to Spouses
Durante of a parcel of land. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014:The Supreme Court held that Atty.
Gupana’s revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for
a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in order for failure to require the
personal presence of the affiant in an Affidavit of Loss purportedly executed in 1994.
Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr., A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014. The S.C. held that as a notary
public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person
executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party’s free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was found violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law for three months. His notarial
commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two years. 

Q. What is the liability of a lawyer for notarizing a document when the affiant is already dead?
A. Atty.Florita S. Linco v. Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebral, A.C. No. 7241, October 17, 2011: A notary public who
notarized a Deed of Donation of another lawyer one day after his death to the detriment of the interests of the
surviving lawyer-spouse, was suspended by the S.C.

Important matters to consider:

Jurat (Section 6, Rule II) and Acknowledgment (Section1, Rule II), distinguished
Competent Evidence of Identity (Section 12, Rule 2)
JIMMY ANUDON AND JUANITA ANUDON v. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, A.C. No. 5482. February 10, 2015,
Leonen, J. Without the ascertaining the personal presence of the affiants, the Court imposed upon the errant
lawyer the perpetual disqualification for notarial commission, revocation of notarial commission and suspension
from the practice of law. The lawyer was found to have notarized a Deed of Sale of a property while the
complainants were abroad.

Q. Can a notary public delegate his duties as a notary public?

A. No, a notary public may not delegate his duties as a notary public.
MELANIO S. SALITA, v.ATTY. REYNALDO T. SALVE.A.C. No. 8101, February 04, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are
stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they
have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should
appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same. As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary
public, Atty. Salve is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful observance and utmost respect for
the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat.

Affirmation or Oath(Section 2, Rule II) and Signature Witnessing (Section 14, Rule II), distinguished

3. Upholding the dignity of the legal profession

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the integrated bar. (Rules 7.01-7.03)

Q. What is the liability of a lawyer for failure to uphold the dignity of the legal profession?
A. The lawyer may be disbarred by the Supreme Court which he tarnishes the image of the legal profession
which tends to erode public trust in the administration of justice.
Keld Stemmerik v. Atty. Leonuel N. Mas, A.C. 8010, June 16, 2009: A lawyer was disbarred by taking
advantage of the lack of knowledge of Philippine laws by a foreigner. Atty. Mas drew up a Deed of Sale of a
property in Subic which is part of public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man.

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OCA v. Liangco, supra: S.C. said: “We are appalled by the respondent’s ignorance of the basic rules of procedure.
His wanton use of court processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of
others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar.”
In Re: Pactolin, supra: The S.C. ruled: “As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with caution. x x yet
this Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. x xx His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he
falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.”

Q: Discuss the lawyer’s duty under Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession.
Rule 7.01 states that shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.02 provides that a lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person
known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

4. Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues

CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. (Rules 8.01-8.02)

Q: Dr. B alleged that Atty. G wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account insulting and verbally
abusing her. His posts included remarks about the Dr. B’s alleged quack doctoring and bribery allegedly
to pin him down. The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook
account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI’s medical personnel and the posts were sexist,
vulgar, and disrespectful of women. Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were
made with the object to extort money from her. She lodged an administrative complaint against Atty. G.
Will the case prosper?
Answer: Yes, the case will prosper. Respondent’s inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly
insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore,
in complete and utter violation of the provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility. By posting the
subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a
lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked
the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and
decent. (MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES v. ATTY. ROBERTO “ARGEE” C. GUEVARRA, A.C. No. 11394,
FIRST DIVISION, December 1, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)

Q: The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner holding
that non-compliance with MCLE requirement is not a ground for disbarment. Was the recommendation
to dismiss the case proper?
A: Yes, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to dismiss the administrative case against Atty. OA
was correct. The Court that with regard to Atty. OA’s alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with
the IBP that his failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for
damages he had filed against his brother MA is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only
be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records. (MAXIMINO
NOBLE III v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, A.C.No. 10628, July 1, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)

Q: Atty. N alleged Atty. OA filed a complaint for damages against his own brother, MA, whom Atty. N
represented, together with other defendants, therein. Atty. N claimed that at the time of the filing of the
said complaint, Atty. AO’s IBP O.R. was not current and he had complied with his MCLE.
MA informed Atty. N that Atty. OA filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa against him. After
sometime, MA informed him that his brother was willing to enter into a compromise agreement with
him. MA showed to Atty. N the text messages of Atty. OA which evidently maligned him and sought to
persuade MA to terminate their lawyer-client relationship.
Atty. N filed an administrative complaint charging Atty. OA with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the
entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 1922,
and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages. Will the case prosper?
A: Yes, the case will prosper. As members of the bar, lawyers should be more circumspect in their words,
especially when being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is
owed. Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to present
his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering the
circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Atty. OA transgressed the CPR when he maligned Atty. N to his client.
Atty. OA violated Canon 8 which provides-
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“Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.” (MAXIMINO NOBLE III v. ATTY. ORLANDO O.
AILES, A.C. No. 10628, July 1, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)
Note: In Buatis Jr. v. People, the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English,"
"stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which
effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing counsel
is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession.

Q: Atty. R filed a complaint against Atty. B intimidating, harassing, blackmailing, and maliciously
threatening him into withdrawing the case filed by his client. According to Atty. R, Atty. B would make
various telephone calls and send text messages and e-mails not just to him, but also to his friends and
other clients, threatening to file disbarment and/or criminal suits against him. Further, and in view of
R’s "high profile" stature, Atty. B also threatened to publicize such suits in order to besmirch and/or
destroy Atty. R’s name and reputation. Does Atty. R have a basis to file the administrative case against
Atty. B?
A: Yes, Atty. R has a basis to file the action against B. Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are
empowered to appear, prosecute, and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities
are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the Bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. To this end, Canon 8 commands: A
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy,
dignity[,] and civility.”
In this case, respondent's underhanded tactics against complainant were in violation of Canon 8 of the
CPR. As aptly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, instead of availing of remedies to contest
the ruling adverse to his client, respondent resorted to personal attacks against the opposing litigant's
counsel, herein complainant. Thus, it appears that respondent's acts of repeatedly intimidating,
harassing, and blackmailing complainant with purported administrative and criminal cases and
prejudicial media exposures were performed as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client.
His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal processes available to him and his client, especially
considering that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not
to harass them. More significantly, the foregoing showed respondent's lack of respect and despicable
behavior towards a colleague in the legal profession, and constituted conduct unbecoming of a member of the
bar. (ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR. v. ATTY. RIZAL P. BALBIN, A.C. No. 7088, December 4, 2018,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)

Q. Can a lawyer share his professional fees with a non-lawyer?

A. No, as a general rule a lawyer is not allowed to his professional fees with a non-lawyer. (See relevant
discussion under Attorney’s Fees)

5. No assistance in the unauthorized practice of law

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. (Rules 9.01-
9.02)

Q. What constitutes unauthorized practice of law?

A. Tapay et al v. Attys. Charlie L. Bancolo et al, A. C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013: A lawyer who allowed his
secretary to sign his pleading in the Office of the Ombudsman is guilty of violation of Canon 9.Only lawyers are
allowed to sign pleadings and the same cannot be delegated.
Atty. Edita Noe – Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamente (A.C. No. 7269, November
23, 2011: A lawyer who allowed a paralegal to attend court hearings on his behalf has violated Canon 9 because
only lawyers are allowed to undertake representation clients before the regional trial courts.
Q: T alleged that Atty. P undertook to give him 20% commission, of the attorney's fees. Their agreement
evidenced by a letter. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission. He then demanded
the payment of his commission which respondent ignored.
T further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required
of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife with whom he has two children, and cohabited
with another woman with whom he has four children. Did Atty. P cross ethical lines?
A: Yes, Atty. P crossed ethical lines. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency,
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
19 | P a g e
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.
Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their
professional or in their private capacity. He is guilty of -
(1) Violating Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating
to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar;
(2) Violating Canon 1 of the CPR because it is settled rule that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or
sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON , A.C. No. 6116,
THIRD DIVISION, August 1, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

C. Duty to the Courts

1. Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. (Rules 10.01-10.02)
Read also Rule 138, Section 20(c) and (d), Rules of Court, Duties of Attorneys

Q. Can a Senator be exonerated from any liability for calling the Supreme Court as a “court of idiots”?
A.  Antero J. Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009. S.C. exonerated the
respondent for calling the S.C. justices as a “court of idiots”. She invoked parliamentary immunity.

Q. Is a lawyer liable for resorting to a fraudulent order of the court to gain custody of his minor
children?
A. Yes, the lawyer is liable for resorting to a fraudulent order to gain custody of his minor children.
Natasha Hueysuwan-Florido v. Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, Jan.20, 2004). S.C. suspended
lawyer for resorting to a fraudulent order purportedly issued by the Court of Appeals awarding custody of his
children pending the annulment case filed by his complainant-wife.

Q: Complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. DV and were asked by
the latter to pay his acceptance fee plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses.
A year later, when the deadline was looming, Atty. DV rushed the preparation of the necessary
documents and attachments for the election protest. Atty. DV attached two affidavits in order to beat the
deadline but the presiding excluded the two affidavits because they were falsified based on the
testimonies of the affiants. Did Atty. DV violate any duty as a lawyer?
A: Yes, Atty. DV violated his oath as a lawyer and his duty of candor and respect to the court.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical
burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath
that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession.
Atty. DV sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit before the court in his desire to beat the deadline
for filing the election protest of his client. (MELANIO S. SALITA v. ATTY. REYNALDO T. SALVE, A.C. No. 8101,
FIRST DIVISION, February 4, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)

2. Respect for courts and judicial officers

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others (Rules 11.01-11.05)

Q. Are professors of law considered engaged in the practice of profession and are therefore subject to
disciplinary action of the Supreme Court? De Castro, J.
A. Yes. Re: Letter of the U.P. Law Faculty on Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation of the S.C., A.
M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011. The S.C. reminded the faculty members of the U.P.College of Law to be more
circumscribed with the filing of similar complaint against the members of the judiciary. It noted that the
concerned justice already admitted the lapse and that it was not done with malice. His good faith relieved him
from any kind of administrative liability.

3. Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. (Rules 12.01-12.08)
Read also Rule 138, Section 20(g) Rules of Court – Duties of Attorneys; and
Article III, Section 16, Constitution – Right to speedy disposition of cases.

4. Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to influence the
appearance of influence upon the courts
CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence or gives the appearance of influencing court. (Rules 13.01- 13.03)

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Q. Can a lawyer be held liable for drafting the decision on behalf of a judge in an effort to help declog
court dockets?
A. Yes, a lawyer may be held liable for drafting the decision on behalf of a judge.
Lantoria v. Bunyi, A.M. Case No. 1769, June 8, 1992. A lawyer should not take it upon himself to prepare a draft
decision on behalf of a judge. Such an action of the counsel undermines the competence of the judiciary and will
tend to erode confidence in the judicial system.

Q. Is it proper for a lawyer to make pronouncements in the media regarding a pending case?
A. No, it is not proper to make pronouncements in the media regarding a pending case.
Cruz v. Salva, G. R. 12871, July 25, 1959, 105 Phil. 115. The S.C. cautioned lawyers from attracting media
attention over a pending case.

Q. Are court decisions subject to criticism?

A. Yes, court decisions are subject to criticism.
In Re: Almacen G.R. No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970. Lawyers as part of free speech may criticize decisions of the
Court but such post litigation utterances must never be resorted in order to malign the Court.

D. Duty to Clients

(i) Services regardless of a person’s status

CANON 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy. (Rules 14.01-14.04)
Read: Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court on Duties of Attorneys (h) and (i)
Rule 138, Section 31, Rules of Court on Attorneys for Destitute Litigant
(ii) Services as counsel de oficio primarily in CRIMINAL CASES
- Appointment as Counsel de oficio (to represent accused in criminal proceedings)
Read: Rule 116, Section 6, Rules of Court, Right to Counsel of an Accused
Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court, Appointment of Counsel de oficio during trial

Q. Who may be appointed as counsel de oficio?

A. A lawyer in good standing; or any person who reside where the case is filed, of good repute for probity and
ability where there is no lawyer in the jurisdiction.

Q. What factors are considered in the appointment of a counsel de oficio?

A. The following factors are considered: gravity of the offense, difficulty of the issues involved and experience
and ability of the appointee.

Q. What is the rule of the designation of Counsel de officio before an appellate court?
A. Rule 124, Section 2, Rules of Court: Conditions for appointment: accused is in prison, there is no counsel de
parte on appeal and accused signed notice of appeal himself.

Q. What are valid grounds for refusal to be engaged as counsel?

A. The following grounds may be invoked: where engagement may result into conflict of interest, when
lawyer is unable to represent a party due to pressing professional matters that need his attention, when what
the client wishes the client to undertake is patently illegal, when the client agrees in writing to retire his
representation or where after due notice and hearing, the court allows the counsel to withdraw his
appearance in an action or special proceeding, other similar grounds.

2. Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients

CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated.
(i) Confidentiality rule: Rule will cover partners in legal profession and non-legal staff working for
the lawyer.
(ii) Privileged communications. Sec.21 (b), Rule 130 will apply.
(iii) Conflict of interest: Disclose matters that would give rise to representation of two adverse
interests. Conflict of Interest, concept; when lawyer may lawyer may held accountable; liability
Q: What are covered the privilege communication rule?
A: The privilege communication rule covers the following matters:
1. Where legal advice of any kind is sought by the client;
2. When the information is from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such;
3. When the communication covers a matter relating to that purpose;
4. When communication is made in confidence;
5. When disclosure is made by the client;
6. When the disclosures are at his client’s instance permanently protected; and
7. When the information is derived from disclosure by the client or by legal advisor.
Except when the protection is waived by the client. (HADJULA V. MADIANDA, A.C. NO. 6711, JULY 3, 2007)
The following exceptions are allowed:

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1. When there is consent or waiver of client;
2. When the law requires disclosure;
3. When disclosure is made to protect the lawyer’s rights (i.e. to collect his fees or defend himself, his
employees or associates or by judicial action); and
4. When such communications are made in contemplation of a crime or the perpetuation of a fraud:
5. A communication relating to a fraud already commenced is privileged
6. Payment of a retainer fee is not essential before an attorney can be required to safeguard a prospective
client’s secret acquired by an attorney during the course of consultation with the prospective client, even if
the attorney did not accept the employment
7. The essence of the veil of secrecy is that the communication between attorney and client is that the
communication between attorney and client is that the communication is intended by the client not for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his agents or obligations (Sec. 24[b], Rule 130, Revised
Rules on Evidence).

Q: Is the counsel required to divulge the identity of his client?

A: The general rule in is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity
of this client. However, it is qualified by some important exceptions:
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice;
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged;
3. Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged;
4. When the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant
to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance;
5. Where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged,
since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. (REGALA V.
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 105938, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996)

Q: What is the rule on conflict of interests?

A: A lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in
any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition
is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It behoves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
(OROLA V. RAMOS, A.C. NO. 9860, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J)

Q: What are the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interests on the part of a lawyer?
A: The tests to determine conflicting interests are:
1. Conflicting Duties: This test will examine whether the lawyer will be required to contest for that
which his duty to another client requires him to oppose.
2. Invitation of Suspicion: This test will determine if the acceptance of a new relation of the lawyer to a
new client will invite suspicion and/or actually lead to unfaithfulness or double-dealing towards
another client.
3. Use of Prior Knowledge Obtained: This test will establish if the lawyer will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his former client any knowledge acquired in the previous employment.

Q: What are the rules that govern conflict of interest cases covering former government lawyers?
A: The rules that govern conflict of interest cases covering former government lawyers are:
1. Adverse-interest conflict exists where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents
a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while
employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse”; and
2. Congruent-interest conflict is the disqualification which does not really involve a conflict at all,
because it prohibits the lawyer from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the
former government client and the new client are entirely parallel. The “congruent-interest
representation conflict,” unlike the “adverse-interest conflict,” is unique to former government
lawyers. (PCCG v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND TAN, G.R. NOS. 151809-12, APRIL 12, 2005)

Q: May a lawyer in a law firm represent a party who has a claim against an existing client?
A: A lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in
any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.
As an organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to a
corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the
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conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case,
intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in the balance
the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and confidence.
(WILFREDO ANGLO v. ATTY. JOSE MA. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J.
CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UY-VALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G.
DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR., ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA, and ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M.
PEÑ ALOSA, A.C. No. 10567, FIRST DIVISION, February 25, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)

Q: Buenavista Properties, Inc. (BPI) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with La Savoie
Development Corporation (LSDC), represented by Atty. D, for the development of a parcel of
land into a mixed-use commercial and residential subdivision and for the sale of the subdivided lots. A
disagreement ensued between the parties. This caused the filing of a case between the parties. Atty.
advised the lot buyers to pursue their claim against BPI by instituting separate actions before the
HLURB. One of the buyers he convinced were Spouses F. After the unsuccessful claim of Spouses F for
delivery for their land title, they instituted an action against LSDC. The President of LSDC was
represented by Atty. D. Is Atty. D guilty of conflict of interest?
A: Yes, Atty. D violated Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 when he represented the President of
LSDC, in a criminal case for estafa filed by Spouses Flores, while he filed a complaint for delivery of title
against BPI before the HLURB. As such, Atty. D simultaneously represented parties despite their conflicting
interests, considering that the estafa case against the President was premised on the latter's and LSDC's
alleged misrepresentation of ownership over the lots sold and LSDC's eventual failure to deliver the title.
Thus, Atty. D's simultaneous representation of two adverse parties sans their written consent after a full
disclosure of the facts violated the rules on conflict of interest.
Atty. D also violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the CPR on forum shopping when he lodged a complaint before
the HLURB praying for BPI to execute deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles over the subdivided lots,
which was the same subject matter in the preliminary mandatory injunction earlier denied by the RTC while
the main civil case was still pending.
Atty, D violated Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, since he failed to
communicate with and inform his client about the complaint against BPI before the HLURB and also
failed to file the required position paper and draft decision before the HLURB. As such, he neglected the legal
matters entrusted to him and failed to serve his client with competence and diligence, for which he must be
clearly held administratively liable. BUENAVISTA PROPERTIES, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADO B.
DELORIA, respondent. A.C. No. 12160, SECOND DIVISION, August 14, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Q. When can a lawyer be found liable for conflict of interest?

A. Pacana v. Pascual-López, A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009. A lawyer who acted as a retained counsel of a
company was disbarred for also rendering advice to the creditors of the company. The S.C. reminded lawyers to
avoid at all times any occasion where they will represent two adverse interests.
Notes on Issue of Conflict of Interest: The nature of lawyer and client relationship is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
1. A lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients.
2. A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.
3. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with
the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered
in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care and to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.

In PO1 JOSE B. CASPE v. ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA (A.C. No. 10679, March 10, 2015), Caspe alleged the
controversy started when Atty. Mejica disregarded conflict of interest rules.  Caspe said that when he filed a
complaint for attempted murder against Antonio Rodriguez, Jr., Atty. Mejica served as Caspe’s counsel.   When
Rodriguez, Jr. filed his counter-affidavit, it was Atty. Mejica who counselled and represented him. The Court
found Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and suspended him from the practice of law for two years.

3. Candid and honest advice to clients: Give a fair assessment of the case referral.
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients. (Rules 15.01-15.08)
When lawyer-client relationship commences: no formal contract is needed, it is sufficient that the advice
and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession.
Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013.S.C. said that the termination of the
attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by
the mere expiration of the professional employment. As a general rule, the ban on disclosure of client’s
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confidences is perpetual. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the CPR and
was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years
4. Compliance with laws: No one is above the Rule of Law
5. Concurrent practice of another profession: pay separate PTRs; one profession is governed by the
Professional Regulation Commission and the legal profession by the Supreme Court.
5. Dealing with Client’s monies and properties
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
profession.(Rules 16.01-16.04)
(i)Fiduciary relationship
(ii) Co-mingling of funds: A lawyer must not co-mingle his personal funds with those of his client.
(iii) Delivery of funds: A lawyer must promptly surrender to his client and/ or account for any money
received by way of a money judgment or proceeds from a transaction he handled in the course of his
engagement.
(iv) Borrowing or lending: A lawyer must refrain from borrowing money from his client.
Please note: Article 1491(5), New Civil Code which covers the prohibition against lawyers to
participate in any public or judicial auction of a property or rights where his professional
services were engaged.

Q. Is it proper for a lawyer to ask from her client for an advance for her professional fees and thereafter
not render any kind of legal service to the client?
A. No, it is not proper for a lawyer to ask for an advance for her professional fees and thereafter, not to render
any kind of legal service to client.
Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013.S.C. found Atty. Espejo guilty of
gross misconduct for failure pay a personal loan to her client which she initially asked as an advance for her
professional fees. The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for
gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. Thus, Atty. Espejo was suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years. 
CECILIA AGNO v. ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN [558 SCRA 1, December 7, 2010] A lawyer who paid another
with a personal check from a bank account which he knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely
low regard to his commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers, thereby seriously tarnishing the
image of the profession which he should hold in high esteem.

Q. What instances would indicate violation of a lawyer’s fiduciary duty?

A. Bayonla et al v. Atty. Purita A. Reyes, A. C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011. For her failure to turn over to her
clients the just compensation in an expropriation case, S.C. disbarred the respondent lawyer.
Freeman v. Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, A. C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011. S.C. disbarred respondent-lawyer for
employing deceit to personally gain from the proceeds of the insurance claims and retirement benefits of the
deceased British spouse of the complainant.

Important matters to consider on fiduciary duty:

(1). Lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received in the course of his
engagement as counsel.
(2). Even if a lawyer has a lien for fees, he is bound to turnover any property or money received on
behalf of his client.
(3). The turnover of money or property to his client is subject to lawyer’s lien.
All costs of litigation must be borne by the client.
5. Fidelity to client’s cause

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Q. What is the nature of a lawyer-client relationship?

A. Josefina Carranzavida de Zaldívar v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013. S.C.
suspended respondent lawyer for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon
18 of the CPR. S.C. reiterated that the relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost
trust and confidence. Whether his services are paid or rendered pro bono, a lawyer’s duty of competence and
diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice,
but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings
or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the
lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.
Notes on Issue of Conflict of Interest: The nature of lawyer and client relationship is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.

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 A lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients.
A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with
the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered
in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care and to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.

(iv) Duty to apprise client: The lawyer must inform the client of the status of the case.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. (Rules 18.01-18.04)

Q. What characterizes the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence?
A. Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen, A.C. No. 5044, December 2,
2013. S.C. reiterated the need for lawyers to be ever mindful of the cause of their clients and accordingly exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He is expected to act with honesty in
all his dealings, especially with the courts. These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of
Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR. Atty. Quesada’s failure to attend the scheduled
conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care
and diligence in managing his client’s cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR. 
Stephan Brunet and Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren, A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014.
For having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR, Atty. Guaren was suspended from the practice of law for six
months. Despite acceptance of the amount of P7,000.00 for the titling of complainants’ lot, he failed to perform
his obligation and allowing 5 years to elapse without any progress on the referral. S.C. reiterated that the
practice of law is not a business and it reminded lawyers that the duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and
law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013:  The Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr.
violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he filed a criminal
case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract;
when the case was dismissed he committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance
and damages before the RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC; and he did not also apprise complainant
of the status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of
professionalism in dealing with complainant is gross and inexcusable. The legal profession dictates that it is not
a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the
protection of the client’s interest.
Carlito P. Carandang v. Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina,A. C. No. 7813, Apr. 21, 2009.In a June 3, 2013 case, S.C.
reiterated that the Attorney’s negligence to file an appellate brief and his failure to inform the client that the
case was dismissed because of his negligence is guilty of violating Canon 18. Similarly, a lawyer who falsifies the
date of receipt of the decision to make it appear that the time was filed within the prescriptive period is also
guilty of negligence and was slapped with a monetary fine.
Ermelinda Lad vda. De Dominguez, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty.
Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014.The S. C. held that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care
and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. For his failure to promptly file a pleading he
already signed on the ground that his client did not send the filing fees and 30% of his professional fees, the S.C.
was suspended for three months The Court said that this act exhibited his lack of professionalism.

To summarize:
On the Duty to Serve with Competence and Diligence
(i) Adequate protection: A lawyer must ensure the appropriate legal reliefs for his client.
(ii) Negligence: A client is bound by the negligence of his counsel.
(iii) Collaborating Counsel: With the consent of the client, a collaborating counsel may participate in
an on-going case

7. Representation with zeal within legal bounds

Q. What is the recourse of a party who has lost a case?

A. Re: Verified Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc. /Re: Resolution
dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty. Homobono Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-CA-
J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013. S.C. held administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not
25 | P a g e
substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a
duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. It found Atty. Adaza
guilty of indirect contempt for his failure to impress upon his client the features of the Philippine adversarial
system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what
his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before the courts. 
(i) Use of fair and honest means: A lawyer must only employ such legal strategy allowed by the
circumstances.
(ii) Client’s fraud: A lawyer must not condone any illegal acts of his client.
(iii) Procedure in handling the case: The lawyer’s acceptance and the limits of the engagement of his
services must be made clear at the commencement of the lawyer-client relationship.

CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

Q. When will the lawyer be held accountable for violation of the responsibility to serve his client with
zeal within the bounds of law? 
A: Dimagiba v. Montalvo, Jr. Adm. Case No. 1424, October 15, 1991. Lawyer was disbarred for stretching for
almost 49 years a case involving a probate of a will from which more than other ten criminal and civil suits were
instituted.
Ong v. Unto, Adm. Case No. 2417, February 6, 2003. S.C. suspended a lawyer for six months for using harassing
tactics to harass a party from him his client wanted to obtain child support.

CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al.,  G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2011: The case stemmed
from the execution of a final decision with the C.A. in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however, entered
into a compromise agreement with the respondents pending appeal without informing her counsel. Malvar’s
counsel filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect Attorney’s Rights.
S.C., on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients compromising their
cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing or completely setting to
naught the stipulated contingent fees. It said that even if the compensation of the attorney is dependent only
on winning the litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of the case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive
the attorney of the legitimate compensation for professional services rendered.
Atty. Sison v. Atty. Camacho: A lawyer who entered into a compromise agreement without the consent of the
client was disbarred by the Supreme Court.

Attorney’s fees: (i) Acceptance fees; (ii) Contingency fee arrangements; (iii) Attorney’s liens; (iv) Fees
and controversies with clients; (v) Concepts of attorney’s fees - (a) ordinary concept and (b)
extraordinary concept.
PNOC v. APAC MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by CESAR M. ONG, JR., G.R. No. 190957, June 5,
2013: There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees – the ordinary concept and the
extraordinary concept. In its ordinary concept, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to
a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept,
they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing
party. Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the case
within the ambit of these enumerated instances to justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be
reasonable.
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation should be recovered.
The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.
The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect

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his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected
in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
Q: What is an acceptance fee?
A: An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get
paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation (Yu vs. Bondal, 448 SCRA 273).

Q: What is a contract for contingent fees?

A: Contract for contingent fees is an agreement in writing by which the fees, usually a fixed percentage of
what may be recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend a
supposed right. Contingent fees depend upon an express contract, without which the attorney can only
recover on the basis of quantum meruit. (National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, 656
SCRA 60)

Q: What is the principle behind the application of quantum meruit to settle professional fees of lawyers?
A: The principle of quantum meruit justifies the payment of the reasonable value of the services rendered by
the lawyer and may be used to determine his compensation in the absence of a written agreement for that
purpose. (International Hotel Corporation vs. Joaquin, G.R. No. 158361, April 10, 2013). It may be authorized
in the following cases:
a. There is no express contract for attorney’s fees agreed upon between the lawyer and the client;
b. When although there is a formal contract of attorney’s fees, the stipulated fees are bound unconscionable
or unreasonable by the court;
c. When the contract for attorney’s fees is void due to purely formal matters or defects of execution;
d. When the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion;
e. When lawyer and client disregard the contract of attorney’s fees;
f. When there is a contract but no stipulation as to attorney’s fees; and
g. When the client dismissed his counsel or the latter withdrew therefrom, for valid reasons.

When a client agrees to pay an attorney under a contingency fee agreement and terminates the attorney
before occurrence of the contingency, the attorney may recover based on quantum meruit. In contrast to
withdrawal, this rule applies whether the client terminates the relationship with or without cause. However,
there are two exceptions to this rule:
1. If an attorney violates the CPR, then compensation is not available and
2. If the attorney substantially performs the duties owed to the client, then the attorney may recover the full
contingency, not just quantum meruit. The substantial performance exception only applies in the rare case
where full performance is delinquent by "minor and relatively unimportant deviations."' (Ross v. Scannell, 97
Wn.2d 598, 1982)

A contingency contract is a written contract whereby the lawyer would be paid attorney’s fees only if the suit
or litigation ends favorably to the client. Contingent fee contracts are permitted in this jurisdiction because
they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the client has
meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction
of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of litigation. (Atty. Orocio v. Angulan
et. al., G.R. No. 179892-93 January 30, 2009)

Q: What are the factors considered in the determination of professional fees?

A: Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper
amount of attorney fees, to wit:
a. The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c. The importance of the subject matter;
d. The skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f. The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
g. The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client form the service;
h. The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i. The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j. The professional standing of the lawyer.

Q: What is a contract of champerty?

A: A champertous agreement is similar to a contingent fee agreement wherein the lawyer will be paid only if
he is successful in handling the case. But what makes it champertous is the provision that the lawyer will
shoulder all expenses of litigation. That makes the lawyer a businessman who invested in the case in the hope
that he will profit from such investment. A contingent fee contract is valid, while a champertous agreement is
invalid. (The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Cadavedo v. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014)

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Q: Distinguish between champertous contract from contingent fee.
A: The distinctions between champertous contract distinguished from contingent fee are:
1. Contingent fee may be paid in cash, whereas, a champerty can be paid only in kind;
2. Counsel does not undertake to bear all the expenses of litigation, whereas in the latter, there is an
undertaking that a lawyer will conduct litigation on his own account, to pay expenses thereof and to
receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of a judgment (Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics 3rd ed., p.266).
3. Acceptance of an initial fee or during the progress of the litigation does not detract from the contingent
nature of the fees, as long as the bulk thereof is made dependent upon the successful outcome of the
action (Francisco vs. Matias, 10 SCRA 89).

Q: Cite the rules governing charging lien.

A: The rules which govern charging lien are:
1. A lawyer shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien
to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court (Rule 16, Code of Professional Responsibility).
2. A charging or special lien is an attorney’s specific lien for compensation on the fund or judgment which
he has recovered by means of his professional services for his client in a particular case. The lien shall
attach to the proceeds of the judgment and the client who receives the same, without paying his attorney
who was responsible for its recovery, shall hold said proceeds in trust for his lawyer to the extent of the
value of the lawyer’s recorded lien (National Power Corporation Drivers and Mechanics Association vs.
National Power Corporation, 565 SCRA 417).
3. A charging lien, to be valid as security for payment of attorney's fees and lawful disbursements, requires
that the following requisites concur:
a. There must be an attorney-client relationship;
b. The attorney has rendered services;
c. A money-judgment favorable to the client has been secured in the action;
d. The attorney has a claim for attorney's fees or advances; and
e. A statement of his claim has been duly recorded in the case with notice thereof served upon the client
and the adverse party (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 367).
4. The attorney's charging lien takes affect from and after the time the attorney has cause a notice of his lien
to be duly entered in the record of the case (Macondray and Co. vs. Jose, 60 Phil 590). The record, to be
valid, should be effected while the court has jurisdiction over the case and before full satisfaction of the
judgment (G.A. Machineries, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 79 SCRA 291).

Q: What is a retaining lien?

A: An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1) lawyer-
client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied
claim for attorney’s fees. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain
their client’s funds or properties. Furthermore, assuming that Atty. Mendoza had proven all the requisites for
a valid retaining lien, he cannot appropriate for himself his client’s funds without the proper accounting and
notice to the client. (Spouses Nicasio v. Atty. Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440, November 26, 2014)

A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers
and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of
the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter (Rule 22.02, Code of
Professional Responsibility).
Illustrative Cases:
1. A right merely to retain the funds, documents and papers as against the client until the attorney is fully paid
his fees. It should be underscored that the retaining lien of an attorney is only a passive right and cannot be
actively enforced. It amounts to a mere right to retain the documents and papers as against the client, until
the attorney is fully paid, the exception being that funds of the client in the attorney's possession may be
applied to the satisfaction of his fees (Ampil v. Juliano-Agrava 34 SCRA 370).
2. The retaining lien attaches from the moment the attorney lawfully obtains and retains possession of the
funds, documents and papers of the client. The lawyer's position is similar to that of a creditor, who holds an
attachment lien over the property, and the client-debtor must discharge the lien over the property, and the
client-debtor must discharge the lien before he can dispose of the property to third persons (Rustia vs. Abeto,
72 Phil. 133).
3. The lawyer need not file an action in court to enforce his retaining lien and recover his fees and
disbursements if what he retains in the exercise of his lien refers to funds or money of the client that lawfully
comes into his possession and the client does not dispute his claim for attorney's fees and amount thereof. In
such case, the lawyer may lawfully apply the client's funds in satisfaction of his claim for attorney's fees and
disbursements (De Jesus-Alano v. Tan, 106 Phil. 445).

Q: Under what circumstances may a lawyer share his professional fees?

A: The general rule is that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law, except:
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1. Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's death, money
shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or
2. Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
3. Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even if the plan is based in
whole or in part, on a profit-sharing agreement. (Rule 9.02, CPR)

Read Rule 138, Section 24, Rules of Court on Compensation of Attorneys

Rule 138, Section 12, Rules of Court on Compensation for Attorneys de officio
Rule 138, Section 37, Rules of Court on Charging Lien

Q. May a lawyer have a lien on a judgment to protect his professional fees?

A. Yes, a lawyer may take steps to protect the non- payment of his professional fees.
Conchita Baltazar, et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Bañez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013. Section 26, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of
his compensation. The court may, at its discretion, allow the lawyer to have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by the client. In this case,
however, the contract for legal services is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement whereby an
attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for some
bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are prohibited under Canon 16.04 of the CPR,
which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client.

Q. What is the nature of a champertous contract?

A. A champertous contract is one where a lawyer finances a litigation case and his professional fees are
assured immaterial of the outcome of the case. The contract does not provide for reimbursement of the costs
of litigation.
In Re: The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (both
deceased), substituted by their Heirs, namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa, Heirs of Raquel,
Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo,  G.R. No. 173188. January 15, 2014: The
Court held that the contingent fee of P2000.00 should control the agreement of counsel and his clients
although the same was contingent upon winning the case. The Court said that granting arguendo that the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the
latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is void. The agreement is champertous and is contrary to
public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to “conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses
thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is
obnoxious to the law.”

8. Preservation of client’s confidences: (i) Prohibited disclosures and use; (ii) Disclosures, when
allowed: The disclosures made a client to a lawyer are covered by the privileged communications rule.
The lawyer may, however, disclose information relayed to him by a client when the latter is about to
commit a crime or when there is a dispute between the lawyer and his client and the information is vital
in the defense of the lawyer.

Q. When is lawyer released from his non-disclosure duty?

A. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009: Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
“Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and a secret of his client even after the
attorney-client relationship is terminated.”
The S.C. held that a lawyer is released from his non-disclosure duty when he files with a government agency a
pleading or any document on behalf of his client. The Court said that the right to information is protected
under the Bill of Rights.

CANON 22 – A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 provides:
“A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he
is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursues conduct violative of these canons and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g) Other similar cases.”

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9. Withdrawal of Services: valid, justifiable reasons for withdrawal

PART TWO - JUDICIAL ETHICS

I. Sources of Judicial Ethics: 1. The Constitution; 2. The Rules of Court; 3. Statues creating courts; 4.
The New Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (took effect on June 1, 2004 per A.M.
03-05-01-SC) which was patterned after the Bangalore Draft of Code of Judicial Conduct; and .5. Code
of Judicial Conduct
II. Membership in the Judiciary
Qualifying to the Bench
1. Members of the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts: Section 7(1), Article VIII, 1987
Constitution mandates that a Justice of the Supreme Court and all collegiate appellate courts must be
a natural born Filipino.
Qualifications of SC Justice: natural born Filipino, at least be 40 years old, must have been for 15 years or
more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
2. Members of the lower courts (regional trial courts and first level courts): Section 7(2), article VIII,
1987 Constitution provides that Congress shall provide for qualifications but one must be citizen of the
Philippines and member of the Philippine Bar.
3. Common qualification for all members of the judiciary, Section 7(3), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution
provides: “A member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.”
4. Term of Office: Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides that members of the judiciary “shall
hold office during good behavior until they reach 70 years old or they become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office.”
5. Manner of Selection and Appointment (Read Section 8, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution for the
composition, powers and term of office of members of the Judicial and Bar Council)
Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012: Congress is entitled only to one seat in the JBC and not
one for each house.
Recent rulings related to the JBC:

Villanueva v. JBC (2015): A first level trial court must await a 5-year period before he can be promoted as
RTC judge. The Court sustained the power of the JBC to prescribe rules in the screening of qualified
candidates to the judiciary to ensure that only men of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence will be appointed to the bench.
Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno and JBC (2015): Having been denied due process, Jardeleza should be
included in the list of nominees to be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court. An issue about his integrity
was raised in the selection process but Jardeleza was never given the opportunity to be heard to overturn the
allegation against him.
Law
Appointments made by the President in the judiciary do not need any confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. (Section 9. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Judge Philip Aguinaldo et al. v. President Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017: The declaration of
the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the
creation of six new positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental
to its ruling that President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his appointments to the vacant
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts.
The Court pointed out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the
Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed
members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers.
By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or
order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their appointment by the
President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.

Please note that:

Any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. (Section
4(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010: The appointment of a member of the Supreme Court is not
covered by the midnight appointment ban. the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: “Had the
framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.”

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For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the submission of
the list. (Section 9, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Requirements in the discharge of responsibilities of members of the judiciary:
1. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly,
the facts and law on which it is based. (Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
2. Dedicated service to the judiciary
3. Members of the judiciary shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions. (Section12, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
4. SALN Requirement
Members of the Supreme Court shall not only report all their assets, liabilities, and net worth
upon assumption to duty but they must disclose such to the PUBLIC in the manner provided
by law. (Section 17, Article XI, 1987 Constitution)
5. Allegiance to the Philippine Government. Any public officer owes allegiance to the Philippine
government and its Constitution and a public officer who seeks to change citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law.(Section 18, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Republic v. Sereno: C.J. Sereno was removed through quo warranto proceedings for not filing her
SALN for eight years while she was employed at the U.P. College of Law.

III. Qualities (I.I.I. PECD): Independence, Integrity, Impartiality, Propriety, Equality and Competence
and diligence

A. Uphold the Dignity and Independence of the Court

CANON 1 – Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair
trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and
institutional aspects. (Sections 1-7)
Two aspects of independence: institutional independence and personal independence: What is expected of
judges: to discharge their functions based solely on a fair assessment of the facts and invoking the
appropriate provision of law in resolving issues presented before the court; and shield themselves from any
kind of influence from any party involved in the case.

In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, 664 SCRA 465 (2012): A complaint against justices of
the Court of Appeals must be dismissed if the same is baseless and the recourse of the party is to seek judicial
relief from an adverse decision.

In Re: S.C. Resolution dated 28April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 146817 and 145822, (Atty. Pena) 669 SCRA 530
(2012): A motion to inhibit the ponente in a pending case before the S.C. based on suspicion of bribery in the
form of a brand new Mercedes Benz and collusion with another senior associate justice of S.C. cannot be given
due course. Counsel must show proof that a connection and direct correlation exists between his failure to
receive a copy of its Motion for Clarification of the other party. He alleged that the incident did not allow him
to refute the allegations therein. The Court said that such imputation is “completely untenable and
irresponsible.”

Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, A.M. 1. No. RTJ-96-1336, July 25, 1996: A judge was dismissed from service for gross
misconduct for sexually harassing his Clerk of Court.

Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 165: The Court held that the
complainant was not deprived of due process when the charge against him was upgraded from grave serious
injuries to homicide. It said that when the death occurred after the filing of the first information the same can
be amended as a matter of course.

B. Uphold the Integrity of the Institution: CANON 2 – Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge
of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges. (Sections 1-3)
Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014: The Court held
Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Circular No. 1–90, and of gross ignorance
of the law. He was suspended for six months for having notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were
documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also
notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his
court’s territorial jurisdiction. As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of
cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal
impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of
cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’
requirements for marriage. Circular No. 1–90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1–90 allows
municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if
connected with their official functions and duties.
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Samson v. Judge Caballero, A. M. No. RT J-08- 213, 595 SCRA 423. The newly appointed judge was not
allowed to assume his post as RTC judge of Cabanatuan City for his material misrepresentation in his
application form. Caballero did not disclose that a graft and corruption charge was filed against him before
the Office of the Ombudsman when he served as a prosecutor.

Suarez v. Judge Dilag, A. M. No. RT J-06-2014, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 491: A judge was dismissed from
service due to gross misconduct. The judge was found to have officiated several marriage rites in a short span
of time without having resolved the numerous cases pending before his court.

Santos v. Judge Arcaya- Chua, A. M. No. MT J-07-20093, February 17, 2009: A judge was suspended by the
Court for having accepted money to intercede on behalf of her husband’s relative in a pending case before the
Supreme Court where she was previously employed.

Inonog v. Judge Ibay, A. M. No. RT J-09-2175, July 28, 2009, 594 SCRA 168. A judge was fined by the Court
for “oppressive” conduct for citing a driver in contempt of court for having parked the car of his employer in
the parking slot assigned to the judge. The judge imposed upon the driver a monetary fine.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014: The Court held that Judge Larida, Jr. committed several lapses, specifically the
non-submission to the Court of the required inventory of locally-funded employees, and his allowing Marticio
to draft court orders. Such lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and regulations
issued for the governance and administration of the lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them, as well
as a laxity in the control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The omission to submit
the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of Court. Although it was very likely
that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma to do and submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr. as
the Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer directly burdened with the responsibility for doing so.
Further, for knowingly allowing detailed employees to solicit commissions from bonding companies, Judge
Larida, Jr. contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to take or initiate
appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which he would
have become aware. 

Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200,
April 2, 2014: The Court held the conduct of Judge Austria of posting a picture with indecent attire for the
public’s consumption in her Frendster account is inappropriate.. The Court held that she was guilty of
impropriety. While judges are not prohibited from becoming  members  of  and  from  taking  part  in  social 
networking activities, they do not shed off their status as  judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the
same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. 
Judge Austria was guilty of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court said Judge Austria
disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of
herself wearing an “off-shouldered” suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing. .

C. Maintain Impartiality
CANON 3 – Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.  It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.(Sections 1-6)

Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Judge Vilalon-Pornillos, 592 SCRA 36: A judge was dismissed from
service for gross misconduct. Evidence was presented to establish the propensity to exact money from
litigants and lawyers. She also exhibited manifest bias in her demeanor in court.

Paco v. Quilala, et. Al., A. M. No. RT J-02-1699, 413 SCRA 364: A judge together with the Clerk of Court and
the court stenographer assigned to his court were also sanctioned by the S.C. The Court said that except for
clarificatory questions, the judge may not be allowed to ask questions that would elicit answers to favor one
of the parties to the case. It is not also proper for the judge to allow the Clerk of Court to conduct any
proceeding in the absence of the judge and for the stenographer to transcribe such proceedings.

Complaint against Chief Justice Corona dated September 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal Recreational
Corp., A.M. No. 12-6-10 SC, June 13, 2012: The complaint raised the issue on the capacity of then Chief
Justice to decide on a pending case without any bias. The S.C. dismissed the complaint because the same has
become moot and academic with the impeachment and eventual removal of Chief Justice Corona from office.

Villaluz v. Mijares, A. M. No. RT J-98-1402, April 3, 1998, 288 SCRA 594: This case was filed by Justice
Villaluz, the former spouse of Pasay City RTC Judge Mijares, against her. The S.C. called the attention of
Mijares that the Rules of Court prohibit judges from hearing cases involving relatives up to the sixth civil

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degree of consanguinity or affinity. In the same fashion a member of the bench may not hear cases where a
counsel is a relative up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

D. Conduct oneself in an Appropriate Manner

CANON 4: Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge. (Sections 1-15)

Albos v. Alaba, A.M. No. MTJ-91517, March 11, 1994: A judge who failed to sign the order granting bail to the
accused and who left for an out of town was found to have been remised of his responsibility as a judge.

Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal , A.M.
RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013:  The S.C. held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge
should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within
the period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a written request for the extension
of her time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be implemented
with an awareness of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances
specific to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard Judge Lazaro’s
limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket
and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for her to apply for
the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. 

Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial
Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol,  A. M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.For his failure to sufficiently
explain why he failed to act on the twenty-three (23) cases submitted for decision/resolution, the S.C.
imposed upon him administrative sanctions. The Court held that it has consistently impressed upon judges
the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is
justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant
in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11,
2013.The S.C. held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties for his failure
to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at the
time he compulsorily retired. Such unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions,
and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency.
The Court that this warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. Judge
Soriano’s inefficiency in managing his caseload was compounded by gross negligence as evinced by the loss of
the records of at least four (4) cases which could no longer be located or reconstituted despite diligent efforts
by his successor. Judge Soriano was responsible for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt
delivery of court services, especially the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, Judge Soriano was found guilty of
gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, and fined P40,000 to be taken from the amount withheld
from his retirement benefits. 

Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for Decision and Resolve
Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013: The
S. C. said that Carbonell’s failure to decide cases within the reglamentary 90-day period without any
justifiable and credible reasons constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court reiterated that as a frontline official
of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be
faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be
his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the
public have reposed in him and the institution he represents. The Court reduced the recommended penalty of
fine from P50,000.00 to P20,000.00 considering that Judge Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor
health condition may have greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge.

E. Observe Fairness to all Parties

CANON 5: Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the
judicial office. (Sections 1 - 5)
Re. Conviction of Judge Angeles, A. M. No. RT J-06-9-5215, 543 SCRA: The Court held that a judge cannot be
suspended in the discharge of her responsibilities until after conviction of a criminal offense she allegedly
committed has become final and executory.

Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, 537 SCRA 38: The Court reminded the family court judge to avoid using vulgar
language in the course of the trial. Use of vulgar language insults a witness and may also diminish the respect
of the litigants towards the court because court proceedings are held in public.

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Sy v. Judge Fineza, A.M. RT J-03-1808, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 374: The Court will not condone the acts
of judges of accepting money from a litigant with a pending case before his court nor should a judge be seen
dining with a litigant facing a criminal case before his court.

F. Duty to Exhibit Competence and Diligence

CANON 6: Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. (Sections 1-7)
Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ,
December 4, 2013: S.C. said that as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any
of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The Court reminded parties that resort to judicial
remedies must be exercised to question the decision of the trial judge. Bad faith on the part of the trial judge
should never be imputed unless the same can be supported by evidence.

Biggel v. Judge Pamintuan, A. M. No. RT J- 08-2101, 559 SCRA 344: The apparent bias exhibited by the judge
shown in the delay in the legal procedure cannot be condoned. S.C. held reminded judges of their pivotal role
in the administration of justice.

Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, A. M. No. MT J-07-1676, 577 SCRA 93: S.C. held that gross misconduct and serious
lapses in the conduct of the affairs of the court merit dismissal from the judiciary except for reasons of
compassion, the Court awarded the retirement benefits of the judge who died during the pendency of this
administrative case.

Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutor’s Office, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7,
Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City ,A.M. No.
RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377, March 5, 2014: The Court held Judge Bitas judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law when he deviated from the requirement of a hearing where there is an application for
bail and aggravated his offense when he also granted bail to Miralles without neither conducting a hearing
nor a motion for application for bail. Judge Bitas’ acts are not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and
judgment on his part, but a patent disregard of well-known rules.  When an error is so gross and patent, such
error produces an inference of bad faith. Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section
10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2,000,000 but not more
than P5,000,000.  Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion
which can be exercised only by Judge Bitas after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the
application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine
whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong.

Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200,
April 2, 2014: The Court reiterated the rule that in administrative cases and disbarment proceedings, the
complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. In this case,
the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality,
and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish Judge Austria’s bad
faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and
suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. Even granting that
the judge erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary
action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. An administrative complaint is
not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a
judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.

Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocelyn G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-
1841, June 2, 2014: The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges.  In this case, the civil case was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is
governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of
the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. In violation of this rule, Judge
Regencia rendered judgment only more than two years later the judge failed to proffer any acceptable reason
in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision. .

IV. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)

Prohibition on practice of profession: No member of the judiciary may practice their profession
during their incumbency.

A. Prescriptive Duty to resolve pending matters

All matters pending with the Supreme Court must be resolved with 24 months;
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 Twelve (12) months for all collegiate appellate courts; and
Three (3) months for all other lower courts. (Section 15(1), 1987 Constitution)

B. Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges: may be voluntary or involuntary: There are two rules
governing the qualification and voluntary inhibition of judges: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court; and
Rule 3. 12 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:
“ Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise , or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.” (ex. If judge served as wedding sponsor to one of
the litigants or litigant is his “kasambahay.”)

Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states:
“Rule 3.12. – A Judge should take no part in proceeding where the judge’s impartially might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustees or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to co-
counsel within the fourth degree;
The judge knows that his spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary,
or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”

1. Voluntary Inhibition: When voluntary inhibition be done: A judge is allowed under the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, supra, to voluntary inhibit from a case for just or
valid reasons other than those grounds of disqualification.

Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and
Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013. Complainant charged
Justice Hernando with manifest bias because he voluntarily inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676
only after the promulgation of the March 28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions. Complainant alleged that
she should have been informed of the voluntary inhibition. The Court, however, said that under the internal
rules of the C.A., the same was not necessary. In the spirit of transparency, the Court held that henceforth all
the parties in any action or proceedings should be immediately notified of any mandatory disqualification or
voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has participated in any action of the court, stating the reason for the
mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that the
disqualification or inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause injustice to or to prejudice any party
or cause.

How voluntary inhibition is effected: A judge may motu propio or on motion of a party voluntarily recluse
from a case if he has good or valid reasons which render him incapable of acting objectively on the case.

When a judge should not inhibit himself: Absent any ground for disqualification, a judge should not inhibit
and if a motion to that effect is filed, he should deny it if, despite the circumstances cited by the movant, he
honestly believes that he can act on the case objectively.
2. Remittal of Disqualification: Nature of remittal: Remittal of disqualification is the process by which a
judge who is disqualified to sit on a case on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 5, Canon 3, may purge
himself of such a disqualification so that he may act upon the case.
How remittal is effected: This process is allowed under Section 6 of the same Canon which provides:
“A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record
the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge’s
participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial; the judge may
then participate in the proceeding. The Agreement, signed by all the parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceedings.”

V. Discipline of Members of the Judiciary

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A. Members of the Supreme Court: Impeachment. (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution); Grounds;
and Proceedings
In re: Undated letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, A.M. No. 09-2-19- SC: The Court fined a retired justice of the
Supreme Court with P500, 000.00 and indefinite suspension for premature release of a decision involving the
citizenship requirement of a member of the House of Representatives.
In Re: Letter Complaint of Atty. Pena against Justices Carpio and Sereno, A.M. No. 12-6-11- SC: The Court
dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Pena to substantiate his allegations and that the same are purely
conjectures which cannot be a subject of judicial review.

B. Discipline of Appellate Justices and Lower Court Judges: Read Section 11, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution
1. Jurisdiction over disciplinary cases: The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
appellate justices and lower court judges.
2. Vote required dismissing a member of the judiciary: A majority vote of all justices who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
3. Grounds for disciplinary action over appellate and trial judges
An appellate justice and a trail judge may subject of disciplinary action for violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
4. Sanctions: fines, suspension, dismissal from office, forfeiture of benefits and disbarment
Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Daniel R. Liangco, A.C. No.5355, December 11, 2011: A trial court
judge was dismissed from service for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. He allowed a local
government unit to take possession and awarded ownership of a private property without any expropriation
proceedings having been filed by the government. As a defense, the judge said that what he rendered was not
a decision but only an opinion. After his dismissal, the Court initiated disbarment proceedings against him
before the IBP. The IBP recommended his disbarment which the Court affirmed.

Q: Several complaints were lodged against Executive Judge A included administrative cases filed by his
fellow judges which included among others, his berating court security guards in public, maligning a
fellow judge, intervening on behalf of a litigant before another court and asking for “grease” money
through his Clerk of Court. The Office of the Court Administrator (“OCA”) initiated investigation against
Executive Judge A and concluded that he was guilty of Gross Misconduct and Insubordination for
refusing to comply with the numerous directives of the Court to file a comment on the administrative
complaint against him. During the pendency of the investigation, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
the 2002 Barangay elections.
What is the effect of the filing of his COC?
A: When respondent filed his COC, he is automatically resigned from the judiciary.

Q: Did the judge’s resignation enjoin the Court from continuing with his investigation?
A: The resignation of Executive Judge A did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction in determining his
administrative liability. It is well-settled that resignation should not be used either as an escape or
an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or administrative sanction. Verily, a judge who
deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of the Court is guilty of the
same. It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s
confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will
never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and
diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.
Verily, a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of the Court
is guilty of the same. In this case, it is noteworthy that respondent was afforded several
opportunities, not to mention a generous amount of time to comply with the Court’s lawful orders, but he has
failed and continuously refused to heed the same. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. EXECUTIVE
JUDGE OWEN AMOR, RTC DAET, CAMARINES NORTE, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2140, EN BANC, October 7, 2014,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)

Q: O filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a letter, alleging that it was
“intimated to her” that Atty. C, whom she met only once, was in cahoots with Justice L
in engaging in the shameful business of “selling” decisions involving cases from the CA-CDO to the
highest bidder. Subsequently, O filed before the same agency a letter, requesting the latter
to investigate and stop the purported partnership of Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion from the
business of selling decisions in exchange for money. Does the Office of the Ombudman have jurisdiction
over the case?
A: The Office of the Ombudman does not have jurisdiction over the case. Under the Constitution, the discipline
of the members of the judiciary and its employees is vested solely in the Supreme Court.
(RE: LETTER OF LUCENA OFENDOREYES Alleging Illicit Activities of a Certain Atty. Cajayon involving cases in
the Court of Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City, A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA, EN BANC, June 6, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE,
J.)

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Q: Who has the burden of proof in administrative proceedings?
A: Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving the
allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts
upon which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or defense. (RE:
LETTER OF LUCENA OFENDOREYES Alleging Illicit Activities of a Certain Atty. Cajayon involving cases in the
Court of Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City, A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA, EN BANC, June 6, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)

Part III: Practical Exercises

Review how to prepare the following documents:

1. Letter of Demand

2. Contract of Sale with Acknowledgment

3. Affidavit with Jurat

4. Court Pleading: Motion for Extension of File a Pleading

Motion to Declare a Party in Default

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