Case 1: People v.

Pangilinan | GR no: 152662 | 

June 13, 2012 | Ponente: Perez, J.

Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses

Doctrine (Simplified Take away): Institution of criminal action interrupts the period of
prescription for both in Art. 91 of RPC and all the prescriptions for special laws provided for by
Act. 3336. There is no difference with respect to interruption.

Facts: This is a BP 22 case. Ma. Theresa Pangilinan issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate
amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos
(₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant Virginia Malolos  which were dishonored upon
presentment for payment. On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed
an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Issue: WON the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.

Ruling: YES. The idea of the accused that a different treatment on prescription for special laws be
applied is lacking legal logic. There is no distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by
special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The RULE is clear: The
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court categorically states: “Institution of the criminal action shall
interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special
laws.”

In the case herein, Act. 3336 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is
the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. The law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four
(4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however,
should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

Case 2: SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, Petitioner, v. HON. HILARION LAQUI, SR. HELEN OJARIO
and SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ, Respondents. | GR no: 138596 | 

Date: October 12, 2000 | Ponente: GONZAGA-REYES, J.

Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses

Doctrine (Simplified Take away):

1. The filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits.

Conclusions: First, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
prescription ‘shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information’ without distinguishing
whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for
action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.

Facts:

         On February 2, 1994, private respondents filed a joint-complaint against petitioners

before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City alleging that petitioners circulated a
letter containing malicious imputations against them on December 21, 1993.

Information for libel was filed before the MTC of Quezon City on May 18, 1994.

On November 9, 1996, MTC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case and ordered that the
case be forwarded to the RTC which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction with the case for
further proceedings.

On November 29, 1996, the case was forwarded to the RTC.

On January 3, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
prescription of the offense of libel. On April 2, 1997 the RTC dismissed the case, but ordered to
re-file the Information with the RTC, stating that the offense had not yet prescribed.

 On April 27, 1997, the information for Libel was re-filed.
 On June 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to quash on the ground of prescription. The motion
was denied on October 3, 1997.

 Petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration was also denied on December 4, 1997.

 Petitioner appealed to the CA. On March 1, 1999, the CA upheld the contention of the trial court
that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed. On May 11, 1999, the CA also denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

 Issue:

Whether the CA erred in ruling that the crime of libel has not yet prescribed.

 Ruling:

 NO.

 Article 90, RPC. Prescription of crime.

             The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

 Article 91, RPC.  Computation of prescription of offenses. – The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall proceed to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accuse being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

Private respondents were not remiss in their right to seek grievances when they filed their
complaint before the city prosecutor 42 days (Feb. 2, 1994) after the alleged crime of libel
occurred (Dec. 21, 1993). It was the office of the city prosecutor that committed an error when it
filed the complaint with the MTC.

 The error was probably due to the confusion as to the proper venue for the crime of libel
brought about by the passage of RA 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994. Under section 2
of said RA, the jurisdiction of MTCs was expanded to include all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding 6 years. However, although libel is punishable by imprisonment
ranging from six months and one day to four years, it is not covered as RA 7691 excludes from
its coverage cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Under article 360 of the RPC,
the information for libel should be filed with the RTC. The confusion was cleared up when this
court issued Administrative Order No. 104-96 on October 21, 1996, which categorically stated
that “libel cases shall be tried with the RTCs having jurisdiction over them, to the exclusion of
MTCs.”

 Notably, the dismissal by the MTC merely took 18 days (November 9, 1996) after the issuance
of SC Admin Order on October 21, 1996.

 The mistake of the office of the city prosecutor was thus understandable. The error was
immediately rectified by the MTC upon realizing its mistake when it ruled it was the RTC which
had the proper jurisdiction over the case. The mistake should not operate to prejudice the
interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses and, more importantly, the right of the
offended party to obtain grievance.
 Thus, the CA was correct in ruling that the offense of libel charged against petitioner had not
yet prescribed. The period of prescription for the crime was interrupted when the complaint was
lodged with the Office of the city prosecutor and remained tolled pending the termination of the
case against petitioner.

Case 3: Cariño v. Castro | GR no: 176084 | 

Date: April 30,2008 | Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

Section 5, Rule 110

Doctrine (Simplified Take away):

 

Appeals; Who has the jurisdiction: In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or
in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor
General; The conformity of the Assistant City Prosecutor to a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals is insufficient as the rules and jurisprudence mandate that the same should be
filed by the Solicitor General.  
Facts:
 

Petitioner Carmencita G. Cariño files a complaint-affidavit for violation of BP Blg. 22 against

respondent Merlin de Castro before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Accordingly,
respondent was charged with five (5) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13 which was dismissed of the same court. Which the RTC upon
appeal of the petitioner for a motion of reconsideration also dismissed the same appeal for lack
of merit. Thereafter, petitioner, through counsel and with the conformity of Asst. City
Prosecutor, Sawadjaan Issan, filed a petition for review before the CA. However, in the assailed
decision, the CA dismissed the petition because it was filed only by the private prosecutor and
not by the Office of the Solicitor General as mandated by law.

Issue:
 

Whether or not the decision and resolution of the CA are not in accord with law and applicable
jurisprudence of the honorable court.

Ruling:
 
NO. The CA correctly dismissed the petition. Under Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all
criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shallbe prosecuted under the direction
and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of
offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal
circuit trial courts, and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are
brought to the CA or to this Court, it is the Sol. Gen. who must represent the People of the
Philippines not the fiscal.  In the case at bar, it was filed only by the private prosecutor and not
by the Office of the Solicitor General when the petition for review was brought before the CA.
Hence, such action not initiated by the Sol. Gen. should be summarily dismissed.
 
Additional Note:  Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code explicitly provides, viz.:
“SEC. 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall
have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.”

Case No 4: Jaca v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 166967   

January 28, 2013 | BRION, J.
RULE 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Doctrine (Simplified Take away):

Rule 110, Sec 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense is
committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

Rule 110, Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment.

Facts:

The petitioners occupied appointive positions in the different divisions of the Cebu City
government: Gaviola was the City Administrator; Cesa was the City Treasurer; Bacasmas was
the Chief Cashier of the Cash Division, which is under the Office of the City Treasurer, and Jaca
was the City Accountant. The controversy arose when there were grants of cash advances
without prior proper liquidation. A surprise audit of the cash and other accounts handled by all
accountable officers was conducted. Among these disbursing officers was Rosalina G. Badana,
who was the paymaster. While Badana reported for work in the early morning of March 5, 1998,
she immediately left upon learning of the planned surprise audit to be conducted that day; she
has not reported for work since. The audit team reported that Badana incurred a cash shortage
of P18,527,137.19. The Ombudsman charged the petitioners and Bacasmas with violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 301919 before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan found
petitioners and Bacasmas guilty as charged and held the petitioners solidarily liable to the Cebu
City government for the amount of P18,527,137.19.  
Issue:
Whether or not the the petitioners are correct in arguing that the prosecution could not have
validly alleged that the petitioners committed the offense "with deliberate intent, with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith and with gross inexcusable negligence since these several modes of
committing the crime are inconsistent with each other

Ruling:

The information is valid. Pursuant to the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, the Revised Rules of Court require, inter alia,
that the information state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, it requires that these acts
or omissions and their attendant circumstances "be stated in ordinary and concise language"
and "in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment." 

As long as the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity and reasonable
certainty that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged, then the information is
considered sufficient. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends
on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in
the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.

Admittedly, in the case at bar the prosecution could have alleged in the information the mode of
committing a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 with technical precision by using the
disjunctive term "or" instead of the conjunctive term "and." Nonetheless, in the early case of
Gallego, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court already clarified that the phrases "manifest
partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence" are merely descriptive of the
different modes by which the offense penalized in Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 may be
committed, and that the use of all these phrases in the same information does not mean that the
indictment charges three distinct offenses.

Case 6:  People of the Philippines vs PO2 Valdez

G.R. No. 175602 
Date: February 13, 2013 | Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.
Related Topic to the syllabus

Doctrine (Simplified Take away): Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which
relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Facts: The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as
charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and
ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC
on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that each of the accused pay to the heirs of each
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of suit. The two accused then
came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw
appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed
and terminated. On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2
Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of
murder, and meting on him for each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Subsequently,
Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self- explanatory letter dated March 12, 2012, where he
pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the
ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.

Issue: Whether or not the judgement by the appellate court downgrading the penalty of Edwin’s
co-accused is applicable to him.

Ruling: Yes. On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the
downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of
his convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading
of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to deny
to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering
that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault
against the victims, warranting their equal liability under the principle of conspiracy.

We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly
provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

A literal interpretation of the phrase “did not appeal,” as espoused by private respondent, will not
give justice to the purpose of the provision.

It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its
reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case
where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied
the foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-
accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.

 
 Case 7: Frias v. People of the Philippines | GR No. 171437 | 
Date: October 4, 2007 | Ponente: Corona, J.
Sections 6 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
 
 
Doctrine (Simplified Take away): The right to object the sufficiency of the information
should be exercised upon arraignment and during trial. Failure to do so would result in a
waiver. Moreover, the sufficient is deemed sufficient if it identifies the elements that
constitute the crime charged. 

FACTS: The petitioner herein was charged with the violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal
Code, and the following information provides, among other things, that the petitioner was the
Mayor of Capas, Tarlac, and that he unlawfully and feloniously failed to render accounts for a
period of two months after the said accounts should have been rendered. The Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan found the petitioner guilty as charged. Then, the latter moved for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present petition wherein the petitioner contended
that he was deprived of due process because the information against him failed to identify his
violation.  

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was deprived of due process because of the
insufficiency of the Information. 

RULING:  No. The accused was not deprived of due process.

It is to be noted that the right to question the sufficiency of information is not absolute. The
objection should have been done upon the accused’s arraignment or during his trial. Failure to
do so would result in the waiver of the right to question the sufficiency of the information. In the
case at hand, the petitioner was deemed to have waived this right when he entered into a plea
upon his arraignment and participated in the trial. Moreover, the information provided in the
case herein clearly stated the elements constituted the violation of Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, it means that the information sufficiently informed the petitioner of the
charges made against him. 
 Case 9: People v. Cristobal | GR no: 159411 | 

March 30, 2011 | Ponente: Bersamin, J.

Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses

Doctrine (Simplified Take away):  The Supreme Court on multiple occasions had ruled that the
information may state the APPROXIMATE date of the crime’s commission through the words
“on or about”.

Facts: Central to this case is the accused challenge re the time and date of the the information
charging him with qualified theft, viz:

That on or about the 2nd of January, 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, OLIVIA
ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL, being then the teller of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main
Branch, Sto. Rosario Street, Angeles City, and as such is entrusted with cash and other
accountabilities, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away cash money amounting to $10,000.00, belonging to the Prudential Bank, Angeles
Main Branch, represented by its Branch Manager, EDGARDO PANLILIO, to the
damage and prejudice of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, in the aforementioned
amount of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) or its equivalent of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱260,000.00), Philippine Currency and parity
rate.

The petitioner submits that the information charged her with qualified theft that allegedly
transpired on December 29, 1995, but the evidence at trial could not be the basis of her
conviction because it actually proved that the taking had transpired on January 2, 1996; and that
the discrepancy would unduly prejudice her rights as an accused to be informed of the charges as
to enable her to prepare for her defense.

Issue: Whether or not “on or about” is insufficient to allege the time and date of the commission
of the offence amounting to failure of the prosecution to inform him of the charges. 

Ruling: It is sufficient. Conformably with Section 6 and 11 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the information was sufficient because it stated the approximate time of the commission
of the offense through the words "on or about the 2nd of January, 1996," and the accused could
reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she was charged from a reading of
its contents as well as gather by such reading whatever she needed to know about the charge to
enable her to prepare her defense.
The information herein did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed,
considering that the date was not a material ingredient of the offense. As such, the offense of
qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of
its commission. Verily, December 29, 1995 and January 2, 1996 were dates only four days apart.

For your perusal, here are the rules:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the
offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information.
Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as
the information or complaint will permit. (10)

 
Case 8: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOEL "ANJOY" BUCA,
Accused-Appellant | GR no: 209587| 
Date: September 23, 2015| Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
 
Doctrine (Simplified Take away):

1.       Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters - not to the central fact
of the crime - do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses'
declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. For a
discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it
must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged.
2.   Date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the crime and need
not be stated with absolute accuracy. What is material is that the occurrence of rape is
established.

Facts:

On December 24, 2002, AAA, a seven (7) year old girl, together with her younger siblings CCC,
DDD and EEE were in their house. Accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy" Buca,  a neighbor of their
family, entered the house and ordered AAA's siblings to go to another room to sleep. When
Anjoy and AAA were all alone, Anjoy placed AAA on his lap, pulled down her panties and
forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. He began to have sex with AAA. CCC, the younger
brother, who was at that time hiding below a bench, saw what was happening. CCC came out
and pulled AAA away from Anjoy. Then, Anjoy warned AAA not to tell anyone of what he did or
else he will kill her parents.

BBB, the mother of AAA came home after buying food. CCC met her at the door and told her,
"Mie, Mie, si Ate (referring to AAA) gani no ky gibastos ni Anjoy". BBB pretended to ignore the
information relayed by CCC as Anjoy was still inside their house. BBB was scared that Anjoy
might notice her reaction. About ten minutes after, Anjoy left their house. AAA then disclosed
that Anjoy did the same thing to her many times already.
On the same day, AAA and her mother BBB reported the incident to the police. They also went
to a physician to have her examined. The medical examination concluded that genital findings
are suspicious for sexual abuse.
BBB filed 3 Informations against accused-appellant Anjoy.

Issues:

1.   Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of rape.

2.   Whether accused-appellant may be convicted of rape despite the failure to allege the
exact date of the commission of the crime in the Information.

Ruling:

1. Yes.
The elements of rape were duly established. The testimony of AAA was found to be sufficient to
establish the element of carnal knowledge. Testimonies of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter
pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to
obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.
As to the element that the victim is under 12 years of age, the presentation of her birth
certificate confirming that she was indeed seven years old at the time the crime was committed
on December 24, 2002 sufficiently established the second element of rape in this case.

2. Yes.
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, states that it is
not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. Such requirement is not
applicable to the crime of rape where the date of the commission of the offense is not an
essential element. Also, said Section 11 expressly permits that a crime may be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
The information charging accused-appellant of rape sometime before December 24, 2002 when
the crime was committed exactly on December 24, 2002 is sufficiently compliant with said
Section 11.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an information is
deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
 Case 9: People v. Delfin | GR no: 201572 | 

Date: July 9, 2014 | Ponente: Perez, J.

Section 6 and 11, Rule 110

 
 
Doctrine (Simplified Take away):
 
Date of Commission of the Offense: In crimes where the date of commission is not a material
element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the
information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the
date of commission be approximated. In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just
deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal
amendment of the information.

Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as
established in evidence: Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the
information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it
induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same
offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by the
evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right of the accused
to be informed of the specific charge against him.

Facts:
 

On the night of 27 September 2000, Emilio Enriquez was killed after being gunned down at a
store just across his home. Suspected of killing was the appellant Rael Delfin and was
subsequently charged with the crime of Murder. Appellant offered the alibi that he was fishing
on the seas of Bataan on the date and time of the supposed shooting. According to the appellant,
he left for the seas at about 3:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000 and only returned at around 4:00
a.m. of the next day. The RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of murder under Article 248(1) of the RPC.
In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the information under which he was tried and
convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy between the date of the commission
of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., “on or about the 27th day of November 2000”
and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000. Appellant protests that
the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder
violated his right to be properly informed of the charge against him and consequently impaired
his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.

Issue:
 

Whether or not the discrepancy in the information of the date established during the trial
invalidates the information.
Ruling:
 
NO. Variance in the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in the information and  as
established during the trial does not invalidate the information in crimes where the date of
commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with
absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the
sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated.

The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of commission
of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when
such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence
are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In this case, however, we find applicable,
not the exception, but the general rule. We find implausible the likelihood that the accused may
have been caught off-guard or surprised by the introduction of evidence pointing to commission
of the murder on 27 September 2000, considering that all documentary attachments to the
information all referred to the murder as having been committed on that date. Indeed, appellant
never objected to such evidence during the trial and was even able to concoct an intelligent alibi
in direct refutation thereof.

What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate allegation in
the information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is obvious from the fact
that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder as having been committed on the 27th
of September 2000, the information’s mistake is limited only to the month when the crime was
committed. Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence
presented by the prosecution.
 ( Sorry for the long ruling hihi. I just think that everything is connected with one another for
better understanding.) 
 
 

Case No 10: People of the Philippines vs. Nocum | G.R. No. 179041
April 1, 2013 | DEL CASTILLO, J.
RULE 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Doctrine (Simplified Take away):

Rule 110, Sec 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

FACTS:

On May 25, 2000, an Information was filed charging Mallari and co-accused Arne! Nocum
(Nocum ), Rey Johnny Ramos (Ramos), Carlos Jun Posadas (Posadas) and Pandao Poling
Pangandag alias Rex Pangandag (Pangandag) with violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6539,
otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659. The
prosecution’s lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self-confessed member of "FX gang.
Nocum led the syndicate’s criminal activities in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who was the
head of the Land Transportation Office in Lanao Del Norte, led the Mindanao operations. RTC
rendered its Decision finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with
homicide. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the ruling of the trial court but modified the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 934650 which prohibited the imposition
of the death penalty.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the the aggravating circumstance of a commission of the offense by a member
of an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 of the RPC as amended by RA
765968 should be considered and thus, imposed upon Mallari the death penalty

RULING:

NO. Under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended by
Section 20 of RA 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the
owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof. In this case, the trial court considered as aggravating circumstance the
commission of the offense by a member of an organized or syndicated crime group under
Article 62 of the RPC as amended by RA 765968 and, hence, imposed upon Mallari the death
penalty.

However, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying
circumstances must be alleged in the Information. This new rule took effect on December 1,
2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases since it is favorable to the appellant. Here,
there is no allegation in the Information that Mallari was a member of a syndicate or that he and
his companions "had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of committing
crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group." Hence, the
same cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against Mallari. Thus, in
consonance with Article 63(2) of the RPC, which provides that in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Mallari must, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.  Mallari is also not
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 372 of RA 9346.
 Case 13: People v. Chingh | GR no: 178323 | 

March 16, 2011 | Ponente: Peralta, J.

Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses

Doctrine (Simplified Take away): Waiver of Duplicity of the Offense (Riano said this came out
during the 2011 Bar) – Should the information be defective because of duplicity (also called
‘multifariousness’), an objection must be timely interposed BEFORE TRIAL; otherwise, he is
deemed to have waived said defect.

Facts: On March 11, 2004 in the City of Manila, Philippines committed sexual abuse and
lascivious conduct upon a ten (10) year old minor child, VVV, by then and there pulling her in a
dark place then mashing her breast and inserting his fingers in her vagina and afterwards his
penis, against her will and consent, thereby causing serious danger to the normal growth and
development of the child.  

From the Information, it is clear that Armando was being charged with two offenses:

(1) Rape under paragraph 1 for having carnal knowledge of VVV, who was under twelve years
of age at the time (d), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, and

(2) Rape as an act of sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A for committing an act of
sexual assault by inserting his finger into the genital of VVV under the second paragraph of
Article 266-A.

Indeed, two instances of rape were proven at the trial. First, it was established that Armando
inserted his penis into the private part of his victim, VVV. Second, through the testimony of
VVV, it was proven that Armando also inserted his finger in VVV’s private part.

Issue: WON the information is defective for duplicity

I qualify. The Information has sufficiently informed accused-appellant that he is being charged
with two counts of rape. Although two offenses were charged, which is a violation of Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that "[a] complaint or
information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment
for various offenses." Nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of
as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out
separately the findings of fact and law in each offense." Consequently, since Armando failed to
file a motion to quash the Information, he can be convicted with two counts of rape.
Issue: What are the proper penalties for both offenses?

(1)   Reclusion Perpetua for rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A.
(2)   For Rape Through Sexual Assault under Article 266-A paragraph 2 modified: In this case, the
offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Armando was aptly
prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed
therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and
considering further that Armando’s act of inserting his finger in VVV’s private part undeniably
amounted to lascivious conduct the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under
Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits Rape Through
Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the
child victim. 

Case 13: People of the Philippines v. Ubiña | GR No. 176349 | 

Date: July 10, 2007 | Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J..
Sections 6 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
 
 
Doctrine (Simplified Take away): Qualifying circumstances must be specifically pleaded
or alleged with certainty in the information.

FACTS: The appellant herein was charged with rape, and under the information, it has been
given that “on or about October 16, 2000, in the Municipality of Sto. Nino, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, [Or]Lando A. Ubiña, uncle
of the offended party AAA, thus, have moral ascendancy over the aforesaid complainant, with
lewd design and by the use of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party, AAA, a minor 15 years of age
against her will.” After the trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment finding the
appellant guilty of the crime of rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal,
the appellate court disregarded the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship. 

ISSUE: Was the appellate Court correct in disregarding the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship?

RULING: Qualify. The Court was correct to disregard the special qualifying
circumstances of relationship but erred in disregarding minority.
In People v. Esperanza, the court provided that qualifying circumstances alter the nature of the
crime of rape and increase the penalty. Thus, they must be specifically pleaded or alleged with
certainty in the information. In the case at hand, the information merely mentioned the appellant
as the victim’s uncle, without specifying that he is a relative within the third civil degree either by
affinity or consanguinity. If the qualifying circumstances be applied based on the information, it
would in effect deny the appellant of his right to be informed of the nature of the crime. He
cannot be charged with rape and be tried and convicted of rape in its qualified form. However,
the minority of the victim was properly alleged in the information and was proven during the trial
by the presentation of the victim’s birth certificate. Hence, it may be properly considered as an
aggravating circumstance.  

Case 14: Bonifacio vs RTC Makati| GR no: 184800| 

Date: May 5, 2010| Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.

Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Doctrine (Simplified Take away):

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.
This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended,
specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of
such cases.

Facts:

Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private respondent
Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal complaint
before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code .

The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does, publicly and maliciously
with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of
Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to public hatred and
contempt, and published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com a defamatory article
persuading the public to remove their investments and policies from the said company. This is
after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary loss under the policies they
obtained from the company. Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable cause to indict the
petitioners, filed separate information against them .

Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the grounds that it
failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not
punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC. 

Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial
courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended
parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first
published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the
offended party accessed the internet-published article.
Issue:

Whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light
of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363.

Ruling:

No.

The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of
two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. 

The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second.
Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the
requisite allegation of printing and first publication.

Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in
any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it
was written or printed. Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has
a choice of venue.

Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a
libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.

To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as
to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation
cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning
complaints filed in remote municipal courts 

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the
offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order
to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its
printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would
spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and
prevent.

 
 Case 15: Union Bank of the Philippines v. PP | GR No:192565 | 

Date: February 28, 2012 | Ponente: Brion, J.

Sec.10 and Sec. 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 RoC

 
Doctrine (Simplified Take away):
 

Criminal Jurisdiction; Venue: Section 10 and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the
offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.

Section 10. Place of commission of the offense. — The complaint or information is sufficient
if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of the
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is
necessary for its identification.
Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) Subject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction: Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal
case on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined
together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Facts:
 

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation stemmed from
petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed
as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998.
The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and
raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the
Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not
the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has
jurisdiction over the perjury case. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not it is the Pasay City court and not the MeTC-Makati City acquires jurisdiction
over the case of perjury in the case at bar.

Ruling:

MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the
perjury case against the petitioners. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction
of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try
cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in
the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the
municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available. 
In the case at bar, The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in
Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City. We also find that the third element of willful and
deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not
Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information.
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the
false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati
City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not
true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the
perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

Note: NOT RELATED TO THE TOPIC. FOR SUBSTANTIAL BASIS TO SUPPORT

THE RULING ONLY.

Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of
perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive
and administer the oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.
 Case 19: Mendez v. People| GR no: 179962 | 
Date: June 11, 2014 | Ponente: Brion, J. 
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Doctrine (Simplified Take away): 

Amendments that do not charge another offense different than the one charged in the
original information or do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case that would cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of his defense are considered merely as
formal amendments.

Facts: The petitioner herein was charged with the violation of the National Internal Revenue
Code for his failure to file income tax returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and for failure to
supply correct and accurate information as to his true income for taxable year 2003. An
information was filed, and it reads: “That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon
City, and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the above named accused, a duly registered
taxpayer, and sole proprietor of "Weigh Less Center" with principal office at No. 31
Roces Avenue, Quezon City, and with several branches in Quezon City, Makati, San
Fernando and Dagupan City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail
to file his Income Tax Return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the taxable
year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the estimated amount of
₱1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest.”  On May 4, 2007, just a day
before the accused was arraigned, the prosecution fled a Motion to Amend with Leave of Court,
and the information reads: “That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City,
and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the above named accused, doing business under
the name and style of "Weigh Less Center"/Mendez Medical Group", with several
branches in Quezon City, Muntinlupa City, Mandaluyong City and Makati City, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his income tax return (ITR) with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue for income earned for the taxable year 2001, to the
damage and prejudice of the Government in the estimated amount of ₱1,089,439.08,
exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest (underscoring and boldfacing in the
original).” The petitioner claims that the prosecution’s amendment is substantial and is
prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Criminal Procedure. He furthered that the
amendments alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise and affect the
form of his defense. As a result, he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation made against him.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment was substantial in nature?

Ruling: No. They were mere formal amendments.

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, the Court ruled that amendments that do not charge another
offense different than the one charged in the original information or do not alter the
prosecution’s theory of the case that would cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
his defense are considered merely as formal amendments. In the case at hand, the Court does
not see how the prosecution’s amendments would adversely affect any substantial rights of the
petitioner. The court furthered that the change in the date from 2001 to 2002 is only consistent
with the allegation in the information on the taxable years it covers, that is, for the taxable year
2001. As for the addition of the phrase “doing business under the name and style of Mendez
Medical Group…,” the Court explained that as a sole proprietor, the petitioner should have filed
a consolidated return in his principal place of business, regardless of the number and location of
his branches. Moreover, such an addition is merely descriptive of the nature of the business
organization established by the petitioner, and it does not change the prosecution’s theory that
the petitioner failed to file his income tax return.