Experiencing Postsocialist Capitalism

University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy │ 2019
E
E xperiencing
Postsocialist Capitalism:
Urban Changes and Challenges in Serbia
Edited by:
Jelisaveta Petrović and Vera Backović
Experiencing Postsocialist Capitalism:
Urban Changes and Challenges in Serbia
Edited by: Jelisaveta Petrović and Vera Backović
First Edition, Belgrade 2019.
Publisher
University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy
Institute for Sociological Research
Čika Ljubina 18–20,
Belgrade 11000, Serbia
www.f.bg.ac.rs
For publisher
Prof. dr Miomir Despotović
Reviewers
Ana Birešev
Faculty of Philosophy – University of Belgrade, Serbia
Anđelina Svirčić Gotovac
Institute for Social Research in Zagreb, Croatia
Drago Kos
Faculty of Social Sciences – University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
Mina Petrović
Faculty of Philosophy – University of Belgrade, Serbia
Vuk Vuković
Faculty of Dramatic Arts – University of Montenegro, Montenegro
Proofreader
Ivan Kovanović
Pre-press
Dosije studio, Belgrade
Printing
JP Službeni glasnik, Belgrade
Print run
200 copies
ISBN
978-86-6427-136-3
This edited volume results from the project

“Challenges of New Social Integration in Serbia: Concepts and Actors” (Project No. 179035),
supported by the Serbian Ministry of Education, Scientific Research
and Technological Development.
CONTENTS
7 | List of Contributors
9 | Acknowledgements
11 | Jelisaveta Petrović and Vera Backović
Introduction
PART I: NEOLIBERALIZED SOCIO-SPATIAL

TRANSFORMATIONS
23 | Vera Backović
The Specificity of Gentrification in the Postsocialist City:
The Case of the Belgrade Waterfront Project
45 | Jorn Koelemaij and Stefan Janković
Behind the Frontline of the Belgrade Waterfront:
A Reconstruction of the Early Implementation Phase
of a Transnational Real Estate Development Project
67 | Barend Wind
Socio-Spatial Inequalities in the Housing Market:
The Outcomes of Belgrade’s Socialist and Postsocialist
Policy Regime
105 | Ivana Spasić
The Symbolic Markers of Belgrade’s Transformation:
Monuments and Fountains
127 | Ana Pajvančić – Cizelj
Struggling with the Title: A Capital of Culture
at the Superperiphery of Europe
PART II: URBAN (RE)ACTIONS: AWAKENING

OF URBAN MOVEMENTS
151 | Jelena Božilović
Right to the City: Urban Movements and Initiatives
as the Pulse of Civil Society in Serbia
6 | Experiencing Postsocialist Capitalism: Urban Changes and Challenges in Serbia
171 | Jelisaveta Petrović

The Transformative Power of Urban Movements
on the European Periphery: The Case of the Don’t Let
Belgrade D(r)own Initiative
189 | Mladen Nikolić
The Participants in the Protest Against Illegal Demolitions in
Belgrade’s Savamala Quarter
211 | Selena Lazić
The Role of the Civil Sector in the Urban Transformation
of the Savamala Neighbourhood
229 | Marina Čabrilo
Brushing over Urban Space: Between the Struggle for
the Right to the City and the Reproduction of the Neoliberal
Model through the Example of Belgrade Murals and Graffiti
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Ana Pajvančić – Cizelj – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy,

University of Novi Sad, Serbia
Barend Wind – Department of Spatial Planning and Environment, Uni-

versity of Groningen, Netherlands
Ivana Spasić – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, University

of Belgrade, Serbia
Jelena Božilović – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, Uni-

versity of Niš, Serbia
Jelisaveta Petrović – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy,

University of Belgrade, Serbia
Jorn Koelemaij – Department of Geography, Ghent University, Belgium
Marina Č abrilo – Master’s student, Department of Sociology, Faculty of

Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Mladen Nikolić – Master of Sociology, Department of Sociology, Faculty

of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Selena Lazić – PhD candidate, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Phi-

losophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Stefan Janković – Institute for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philoso-

phy, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Vera Backović – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, Univer-

sity of Belgrade, Serbia
| 9
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The idea to prepare an edited volume that deals with the socio-spatial
transformation of cities in Serbia arose from the dramatic changes to ur-
ban space caused by the Belgrade Waterfront megaproject and the bitter
reactions to it by ordinary citizens gathered around the Don’t Let Belgrade
D(r)own initiative. We were further encouraged to implement the project
by several excellent undergraduate and Master’s theses covering the topic
of Belgrade’s transformation from various angles, that were presented at
the Department of Sociology from 2016 to 2018 at thesis committees in
which we participated. The initial idea was to produce a volume of student
papers, however, due to the importance of the topic and interest expressed
by both the local academic community and the wider public in the topic
of urban change, we determined that a greater level of attention should
be devoted to this issue. Therefore, in addition to professors and associate
professors from the Department of Sociology of the Belgrade Faculty of
Philosophy, this volume has also gathered together papers by those re-
searching urban phenomena at other Serbian universities (Novi Sad and
Niš), as well as those from Belgium and the Netherlands. Though the ini-
tial focus was to be on Belgrade’s socio-spatial transformation, this was
extended to include two other major Serbian cities – Novi Sad and Niš
– which are also experiencing intensive social-spatial changes. The end
result is that this volume grew from its original, relatively modest concep-
tion, into an international publication that we believe is fitting for a topic
of such significance and with such far-reaching consequences.
Our ideas would certainly not have been met with fruition without
the institutional support of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bel-
grade and the “Challenges of New Social Integration in Serbia” project,
from which this volume was developed. Particularly indispensable were
the head of the project, Professor Mladen Lazić, and Professor Mina
Petrović, who headed the sub-project, Territorial Capital in Serbia: Struc-
tural and Action Potential of Local Development, as well as other col-
leagues who accepted the invitation to participate in authoring the study.
We owe special thanks to Professor Mina Petrović, Faculty of Phi-
losophy, University of Belgrade, who in her role as reviewer, but also as
an advisor, greatly contributed to the quality of this volume. We are also
very grateful to our other reviewers: Drago Kos, Associate Professor at the
10 | Experiencing Postsocialist Capitalism: Urban Changes and Challenges in Serbia
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana; Anđelina Svirčić Go-

tovac, Senior Research Associate, Institute for Social Research in Zagreb;
Vuk Vuković, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Dramatic Arts, University of
Montenegro; and Ana Birešev, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Philosophy,
University of Belgrade. Their suggestions were a significant contribution to
the overall quality of the papers presented in this volume. We would like
to take this opportunity to also extend our thanks to Assistant Professor
Jelena Pešić from the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, Uni-
versity of Belgrade, for her useful advice that helped us select an appropri-
ate title for the volume. Finally, we would like to thank Milena Toković, a
researcher at the Institute for Sociological Research, for her administrative
support on this project, as well as our proofreader, Ivan Kovanović, for his
dedicated contribution to the linguistic quality of the texts.
Belgrade, 29 October 2019

| 11
INTRODUCTION
Jelisaveta Petrović and Vera Backović
The aim of this volume is to explore current urban developments in

Serbia, a former Yugoslav country, three decades after socialism. At the
very outset, we should say that as editors of this volume we had a dif-
ficult time in settling on an appropriate title for the book. The dilemma
emerged from a question that burdens current scholarship on postsocial-
ist cities: thirty years after socialism does the term “postsocialist city” still
adequately describe ongoing urban processes? Indeed, for some authors “the
“post-socialist city” reflects a regrettable lack of forward-looking imagina-
tion” (Hirt et al., 2016: 5). Others stress its contested nature that is im-
posed by a developmental paradigm, as it tends to represent something
delayed, atypical, and even abnormal (Ferenčuhova & Gentile, 2017).
Therefore, the concept is often deemed inappropriate because it reinforces
the “otherness” of non-western societies (Ferenčuhova & Gentile, 2017).
The concept has also met with criticism for being obsolete, for referring
to a vanishing object, for falling into a territorial trap and for constrain-
ing political futures (Muller, 2019: 533; Humphrey, 2002; Hirt, 2013;
Ferenčuhova, 2016; Hirt et al., 2017). These drawbacks even prompted
Martin Muller to write a farewell to postsocialism (Muller, 2019).
This is, however, not the first time East European scholars thought it
was time to say goodbye to postsocialism and consign it to the dustbin of
urban studies history. Similar attempts were made at the beginning of the
21st century (Humphrey, 2002), then again when some of the postsocialist
states joined the European Union and then once more in the wake of the
twentieth anniversary of the events of 1989 (Stenning & Horschelmann,
2008: 312). Despite these claims that the time has come to replace this
obsolete concept with something fresh and theoretically and empirically
more meaningful, scholars have yet to come up with an alternative con-
cept that is broadly accepted (Hirt et al., 2017: 13)1. This is evidenced by
the myriad of conceptual alternatives to the term postsocialism proposed
1 Although there have been attempts such as – cities after transformation/transition,

cities from the Global East (Muller, 2018).
at the 8th Cities after Transition conference held in Belgrade in September

20192. While the following constructs were used as synonyms in the con-
ference papers: post-soviet, post-communist, “former socialist cities” and
“cities after socialism”, suggested alternatives spanned from territorially
marked concepts such as: “cities of Eurasia” and “middle– and south-east-
ern Europe cities”, through geopolitically referenced: “cities of the Global
East” and “semi-peripheral” cities, to labels that clearly point to the fact
that the process of transformation is over: “cities after transition”, and that
formerly socialist cities now belong to the global (neoliberal) capitalist
system: the “neoliberal postsocialist city”. Despite the conference organ-
isers’ endeavours to move beyond “postsocialism” and to integrate post-
socialist urban scholarship into global urban studies in a novel way, the
conference agenda3 shows that sessions and paper titles containing word
“postsocialism” outnumber by far the papers offering alternative concepts,
proving what had already been noted by Ferenčuhova and Gentile, that
“far from being dead, post-socialism is alive and well in current schol-
arship” (Ferenčuhova & Gentile, 2017: 5). In other words, “postsocialist”
remains the attribute that is commonly ascribed to urban developments
in this part of the world. Although we are aware of the conceptual dis-
putes, we decided to use the term postsocialism in this volume for sev-
eral reasons we deem important. Firstly, despite three decades of intensive
change, some socialist and postsocialist legacies remain present – both in
material (e.g. urban infrastructure) and ideational forms (e.g. values) –
and entangled with contemporary processes influencing socio-spatial re-
forms, shaping the actions of citizens, economic and political actors (Hirt
et al., 2017: 17). The second rationale for retaining the term lies in the
intention of this volume to contribute to existing postsocialist scholarship
with a specific focus on Serbian experiences. We believe that the choice of
an alternative label would make for conceptual confusion and even lead to
the disregarding of thirty years of postsocialist urban studies, which have
produced an extensive and rich body of theoretical and empirical knowl-
edge on urban transformation in the region (e.g. Stanilov, 2007; Sykora
& Stanilov 2014). The last reason is somewhat practical. This concept is
still useful (for lack of a better one, at least) and recognized within global
urban studies, resonating with an audience that reaches far beyond the
community of postsocialist scholars. This means that it continues to suc-
cessfully communicate how processes such as globalization, neoliberal ur-
banization and Europeanization reshape the region while acknowledging
both the socialist legacy and different postsocialist paths.
2 https://catference2019-belgrade.rs, accessed 01/11/2019.

3 https://catference2019-belgrade.rs/programme, accessed 01/11/2019.
Introduction | 13
However, although we continue to use the term “postsocialist city”, we

have decided not to look at it as a transitory, hybrid concept, something
in-between but to focus instead on the lived experience and consequences
of postsocialist capitalism that has been evolving in the region and signifi-
cantly affecting the urban condition. Many concepts are used to describe
the capitalism that exists in the region, often with negative prefixes such
as crony, crass, wild and so forth – stressing the impact of hidden struc-
tures, interest groups, informality, familial connections and corruption,
or underlining the role of the state – political capitalism, regulatory capi-
talism etc. We believe, however, mentioned “aberrations” of the western
ideal type of capitalism, are just different aspects or manifestations of a
distinct type of capitalism that has developed in the region – often called
“postsocialist capitalism” (Swine, 2011; Bandelj, 2016). As defined by Ban-
delj, postsocialist capitalism can be regarded as a moral project with three
core features: “a) lack of state autonomy due to close coupling of political
and economic roles; b) the embrace of greed and self-interest as legiti-
mate motives for action; and c) persistence and bolstering of informality
as modus operandi” (Bandelj, 2016: 90–1). Bandelj further explains that
these characteristics of postsocialist capitalism do not exist independently
of one another but reinforce each other – i.e. informality and self-serving
greed undermine state autonomy, while the politicization of the economy
is reinforced by informality (Bandelj, 2016: 102). This divergent form of
capitalism developed in former socialist countries as a result of accelerat-
ed and compounded political and economic transformation that has over-
lapped with a period of intensive neoliberal globalization. The processes
of simultaneous and rapid “privatization, deregulation, democratization,
and neoliberal globalization created a specific context for postsocialist
transformations, which presented this region with challenges unlike those
that accompanied economic and political transformations in other (semi)
peripheral states of East Asia, Latin America or China” (Bandelj, 2016:
102–3). Given the specific type of capitalism that has emerged in formerly
socialist countries, when we talk about postsocialist cities we are actually
referring to cities of postsocialist capitalism. This is where the idea for the
title of this volume came from. Although we opted to keep the term post-
socialist within the volume, in its contextual (the process of transforma-
tion is over but the relicts of (post)socialist past still have a certain impact)
rather than hybrid / transitional meaning, in the title of the book we de-
cided to introduce the concept of postsocialist capitalism to emphasize that
the urban changes and challenges in Serbia are observed and interpreted
in the wider context of this specific type of capitalism.
By taking postsocialist capitalism as the main contextual framework

of urban analysis in this volume, we do not seek to imply that all cities
that once belonged to the socialist bloc have the same characteristics, only
that they have some common features that make them distinct compared
to the cities of the West. We accept the path dependency approach and
contextual specificities that influence different outcomes of postsocialist
transformation, which stresses that cities that once belonged to the similar
regime type, today differ considerably among one another (Rogers 2010;
Brenner & Theodore, 2002). We note that postsocialist cities, despite their
many similarities and common socio-spatial patterns, do not form a ho-
mogenous group and, thus, put regional divergence in focus. Tosics (2005
cf. Hirt et al. 2017: 4) differentiates between three types of postsocialist
cities: (1) Central European and Baltic cities, which can be considered
frontrunners in the process of capitalist consolidation; (2) Former Soviet
cities, which retain a public sector with a significant role; and (3) Former
Yugoslav and other Balkan cities, located in weak states with relatively low
economic standards (the exception being Slovenian cities). By adhering to
these distinctions, we strive to outline the specific trends and contextual
aspects of urban transformation in this sub-region.
The semi-peripheral position of Western Balkan societies, characte-
rised by a weak state and civil society coupled with low economic stand-
ards, creates complex settings for urban development. This was not, how-
ever, the case in the beginning. In comparison to other postsocialist cities,
Serbian cities had the better starting position because socialist Yugoslavia
had some elements of a market economy and hence higher incomes and
higher spending. However, policies adopted since 1987 and the events that
followed – armed conflict, economic sanctions and the breakup of the
state – devastated the cities of Serbia. As noted by Mina Petrović (2005),
during this period the development of these cities was characterised by
a sluggish tempo of postsocialist transformation, a slowness to establish
public order and developmental elements similar to those in developing
countries – especially the significant presence of illegal construction and
a barter economy. As a result of this kind of development the unregulat-
ed capitalist city emerges, subsuming elements of developing world cit-
ies (Petrović, 2005: 20, Backović, 2005). At the beginning of the new mil-
lennium and after the collapse of the Milošević regime (October 2000),
the country experienced some political and economic stabilisation and a
growth of foreign investment. However, “complex legal and institutional
transformation proved exceptionally difficult as it required the dissolu-
tion of informal links between political and economic actors” (Vujović,
Petrović, 2006:177). In such circumstances, economic actors have greater
Introduction | 15
power to shape urban development, while politicians have an opportunity

to craft the institutional framework and to decide which projects will re-
ceive support but are frequently themselves in the sway of investors. Ur-
ban planning experts do not have sufficient autonomy and are trapped
between the political and economic actors. Ordinary citizens are not suf-
ficiently engaged at the creative stage of urban development and the shap-
ing of future content in their own communities, instead their activities are
restricted to organising in order to prevent the implementation of detri-
mental or damaging political decisions.
With this form of development over the past three decades in mind,
this study will focus on the current state of affairs and the challenges faced
by the cities of Serbia. More precisely, contributions in this volume deal
with challenges stemming from the socio-spatial transformation of Ser-
bian cities under the influence of intensive process of neoliberal urbanisa-
tion, as well as with the reactions of urban actors in the specific context of
postsocialist capitalism.
The Structure of the Book

The first part of the book, entitled “Neoliberalized Socio-Spatial
Transformations”, gives a fine-grained overview of the processes that
transform urban spaces in Serbia as induced by neoliberal urbanization.
These processes are manifested in various ways but mainly through in-
stances of profit gentrification, urban megaprojects, the rise of socio-spa-
tial inequalities and the commodification of urban cultural practices.
The opening chapter, “Specificity of Gentrification in the Postsocial-
ist City: The Case of the Belgrade Waterfront Project” by Vera Backović,
deals with the particular features of gentrification in Belgrade through
the show-case example of the Belgrade Waterfront (BW) megaproject.
Backović notes that manifestations of gentrification depend on the local
context – the inherited socialist socio-spatial structure, the structure of
economy, development of the post-industrial city and entrepreneurial ur-
ban politics – which is visible in the development of the BW project. This
topic is further elaborated upon in the second chapter, “Behind Belgrade
Waterfront’s Frontline: A Reconstruction of the Early Implementation
Phase of a Transnational Real Estate Development Project”, where Jorn
Koelemaij and Stefan Janković, relying on qualitative methods, analyse
the strategies and activities of the main actors involved in developing the
BW project. The authors conclude that this project is a part of a global
trend of “world city entrepreneurialism” and state-rescaling processes.
Both chapters stress the tremendous socio-spatial changes induced by ur-

ban megaprojects, an emblematic manifestation of neoliberal urbanization
(Swyngedouw et al., 2002: 548).
The next contribution, “Socio-Spatial Inequalities in the Housing
Market: The Outcomes of Belgrade’s Socialist and Postsocialist Policy
Regime” by Barend Wind, explores how the socialist legacy and the cur-
rent market context shape housing stratification in Belgrade. The author
notes that although tenure inequality is (still) not exaggerated, the hous-
ing market in Belgrade does generate inequalities in terms of housing
wealth, housing conditions and residential location that coincide with the
socio-economic status and birth cohorts (socialist/postsocialist) of house-
hold members. A comparison of housing strategies in Belgrade shows that
individuals who came of age in the postsocialist period are in a far worse
position on the housing market than the parents’ (“socialist”) generation,
thus having to rely on family help (e.g. savings, housing assets, etc.) in
order to secure housing for themselves.
The final two contributions in the first part of the book are devoted
to exploration of the cultural aspects of current urban developments in
Belgrade and Novi Sad. In the chapter, “Symbolic Markers of Belgrade’s
Transformation: Monuments and Fountains”, Ivana Spasić examines new
monuments and fountains (statues to Tsar Nicholas II Romanov and
Gavrilo Princip, as well as the fountains at Slavija Square and Topličin
venac) as spatial markers and/or manifestations of deeper political and
social processes. Spasić argues that they represent the dominant politi-
cal discourse and that their appearance and location are part of ongoing
political struggles. These new structures are intended for visitors and
for the creation of a tourist-oriented vision of Belgrade, while the local
population is neglected and even excluded. Spasić concludes that this
physical and aesthetic transformation of urban space is an example of
Belgrade’s un-modernization: post-modernization (with an overempha-
sis on tourism and consumption) and de-modernization (the legacy of
Serbian/Yugoslav modernism is being replaced with artistic forms from
earlier epochs).
In the closing chapter in this section, “Struggling with the Title: Capi-
tal of Culture at the Superperiphery of Europe”, through the case study
of Novi Sad Ana Pajvančić-Cizelj shows how postsocialist cities, which
were not among the “winners” of postsocialist transformation, have ac-
cepted the strategy of the European Capital of Culture (ECoC) title as a
tool for rebranding the city and attracting investment and tourists. The
author studies the economic and cultural consequences of assigning Novi
Sad the title of the 2021 European Capital of Culture and shows that in
Introduction | 17
the superperipheral Balkan context the ECoC project produces numer-

ous, intertwined and mutually reinforcing struggles in both the economic
(material) and cultural (discursive) spheres. In the case of Novi Sad, neo-
liberal urban strategies dictate which cultural elements will be presented
and how, what will have priority and, on the other hand, what will be sup-
pressed and hidden. The most pressing urban problems either remain the
stagnant or even become aggravated by the ECoC title, thus opening the
question whether creativity-led urban development can lead to the repro-
duction of super-peripherality.
The second part of the book, “Urban (Re)actions: Awakening of Ur-
ban Movements”, focuses on the role of various urban actors and their
confrontational strategies in the context of aggressive investor-led urbani-
zation, a captured state and a weak civil society, burdened with corrup-
tion, informality and an evident lack of protection for urban public goods.
The accent is on urban grassroots initiatives, bottom-up struggles and the
creative practices of the “losers” in neoliberal urbanism.
In the chapter, “Right to the City: Urban Movements and Initiatives
as the Pulse of Civil Society in Serbia”, Jelena Božilović provides a close-
grained overview of urban actors (movements and initiatives) primarily
located in the city of Niš but also in other Serbian cities, striving to pro-
tect public urban goods framed as the right to the city. This exploration
reveals a context characterised by the captured state, stabilitocracy, deep
systemic fractures, injustice and corruption, that result from the prolife-
ration of particularistic interests by political and economic elites, typical
of postsocialist capitalism and the urban consequences thereof. In this
landscape, urban movements represent usually isolated cases of rebellion
“from below” which, if integrated, could surpass the borders of the lo-
cal/urban setting and have a more profound societal and political impact.
Urban movements seem to be the most vigorous part of civil society in
Serbia, which is otherwise usually perceived as weak and passive.
In a case study focused on the urban initiative Don’t Let Belgrade
D(r)own, Jelisaveta Petrović (“The Transformative Power of Urban Move-
ments on the European Periphery: The Case of the Don’t Let Belgrade
D(r)own Initiative”) explores whether this urban movement can be re-
garded as the manifestation of a new phase of civil society development
in Serbia. Although urban movements are probably the most important
counterforce against the negative effects of the postsocialist model of capi-
talism in urban settings, the research findings suggest that, since the lo-
cal fundraising capacities are not sufficient to support urban movement
activities in full, these movements still depend (although not directly) on
the support of domestic and foreign donors and are thus compelled to
adhere to the logic of the NGO sector (typical of the earlier phases of civil
society development in the region). Therefore, although they are the most
progressive part of civil society, urban movements still struggle to become
independent and to earn the trust and support of ordinary citizens.
In the next chapter, “The Participants in the Protest Against Illegal
Demolitions in Belgrade’s Savamala Quarter”, Mladen Nikolić provides
a close-up snapshot of the participants of the one of the protests against
the Belgrade Waterfront megaproject, organized by the Initiative Don’t
Let Belgrade D(r)own. Research conducted in the “course of the action”,
shows that the protesters are mostly highly educated young people from
urban areas (mostly from the city centre and surrounding municipalities)
from middle-class backgrounds, who oppose decline of democratic insti-
tutions, highhanded behaviour by the authorities and corruptive practices,
formulated through the protest slogan “Whose city? Our city!”, as a part of
the struggle for the right to the city.
In her chapter, “The Role of the Civil Sector in the Urban Transfor-
mation of the Savamala Neighbourhood”, Selena Lazić explores the role
of civil society actors in the urban transformation of the Belgrade’s neigh-
bourhood Savamala. Being of interest for various players (civil society ac-
tors, foreign investors and those in power at the local and national levels),
this neighbourhood has undergone a compounded process of socio-spa-
tial transformation. In the first phase (2012–2015), the urban transforma-
tion of the area was a bottom-up, culture-driven process, led by creative
entrepreneurs, civil society organizations and art collectives (pioneer gen-
trification) who reused abandoned spaces mostly for artistic and socially
responsible projects. However, after 2015 the urban renewal of this part
of the city was at first gradually and then forcefully taken over by the Bel-
grade Waterfront (BW) project, thus becoming a show-case example of
profitable gentrification.
In the final chapter, “Brushing over Urban Space: Between the Strug-
gle for the Right to the City and the Reproduction of the Neoliberal Model
through the Example of Belgrade Murals and Graffiti”, Marina Čabrilo in-
vestigates different meanings ascribed to the practice of drawing in urban
spaces. More precisely, the author questions whether the motivation for
street art in Belgrade stems primarily from the struggle for the “right to
the city” or if it is more influenced by a neoliberal matrix of production in
urban spaces? The study shows that urban street art and graffiti practices
are influenced by both of these processes and that, in certain cases, street
artists use money earned by doing “on demand” art to sustain their volun-
tary practices framed as protection of their right to the city.
Introduction | 19
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40(2):312–335.
Swyngedouw E., Moulaert, F., Rodriguez, A. (2002) Neoliberal urbanization in
Europe: Large–scale urban development projects and the New Urban Policy,
Antipode 34(3): 542–577.
Sykora, L., Stanilov, K. (eds.) (2014) Confronting Suburbanization – Urban De-
centralization in Postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe, Chichister: Wiley
Blackwell.
Vujović, S., Petrović, M. (2006) Glavni akteri i bitne promene u postsocijalističkom
urbanom razvoju Beograda, in: S. Tomanović (ed.) Društvo u previranju, Beo-
grad: ISI FF.
PART I
NEOLIBERALIZED SOCIOSPATIAL
TRANSFORMATIONS
| 23
THE SPECIFICITY OF GENTRIFICATION

IN THE POSTSOCIALIST CITY:
THE CASE OF THE BELGRADE
WATERFRONT PROJECT4
Vera Backović
Abstract: Gentrification is a general pattern of urban core transformation with

significant variations depending on local contexts. It changes built structures
or their functions but also the categories of people for whom these structures
are intended. There are two basic approaches to the study of gentrification.
First, the production-side approach focuses on restructuring the urban econ-
omy and emerging spaces suitable for gentrification. Second, the consumption
or demand-side approach deals with the actions and choices of those who cre-
ate or use gentrified spaces. One can recognize three types of gentrification
according to the actors involved – these are: pioneer, profitable and state-led
gentrification.
The analysis of gentrification in postsocialist cities is a good occasion to explore
the impact of the local context. The key analytical question is what types of gen-
trification exist and to what extent. In general, the majority of actors on both
the production and the demand side are mostly foreigners, while the role of the
public sector is different when compared with developed (capitalist) countries.
Comparing Belgrade to other postsocialist cities one can see to what extent gen-
trification is influenced by the postindustrial economic development (advanced
services and symbolic economy), and by foreign investments, also what influence
the demand for gentrified space.
Keywords: postsocialist city, pioneer gentrification, profitable gentrification,
state-led gentrification, Belgrade
* Earlier version of this paper was published in: Backović,V. (2018) Džentrifikacija kao
socioprostorni fenomen savremenog grada, Beograd: Čigoja štampa & ISI FF.
The paper is part of the research project “Challenges of New Social Integration in
Serbia: Concepts and Actors” (No. 179035), supported by the Serbian Ministry of
Education, Scientific Research and Technological Development.
24 | Vera Backović
Introduction
Gentrification is a visible transformation of contemporary cities, but
it is manifested differently depending on the given socio-spatial context.
One could define gentrification as a process where the physical structure
of residential buildings is changed or their use is changed to residential (in
the event that the buildings previously served a different purpose), pri-
marily in the central-most locations of cities. This process is followed by
changes to the social categories of people for whom these new or refur-
bished buildings are intended. One can understand gentrification as spa-
tial reflection of key socioeconomic processes in the contemporary city
– i.e. postfordism and postmodernism – the effects of which are powerful.
There are two main approaches explaining this process. The pro-
duction-side approach deals with structural changes (restructuring of the
urban economy, circulation of capital), which creates the space and frees
up properties suitable for gentrification1. The consumption-side approach
deals with demand – the actions (choices) of actors who make or use
gentrified spaces2. As ideal types one can distinguish pioneer, profitable
and state-led gentrification/mediated gentrification. In pioneer gentrifica-
tion the actors are mainly artists, who renovate space for work and living,
thus gentrifying the neighbourhood. In the case of profitable gentrifica-
tion, investors and construction firms build residential buildings, which
are intended for representatives of the (new) middle class (service and/
or creative class). Meanwhile, state-led gentrification is initiated by na-
tional or local governments as part of entrepreneurial governing strate-
gies. State-led gentrification is one of the strategies of the entrepreneurial
city in which urban policy accepts the gentrification practices and thus
the process starts in less developed cities. In the entrepreneurial city there
is partnership between the public and private sector (firms and investors),
and in city planning the branding of space and the advertising of the city
as a commodity take on a more important role (Harvi, 2005). Therefore,
1 Smith (Smith 1979, 1987, 1996) highlighted the importance of the capital accumula-
tion process through the urban real estate market. Suburbanization and deindustri-
alization of the urban core led to a reduction in the value of land in the centre of the
city and created a gap between its potential and actual value. This rental gap is being
closed by the new logic of the housing market formed in the process of gentrification.
2 Ley (Ley, 1980, 1986, 1996) emphasized the importance of cultural values, consump-
tion practises and specific lifestyles of the new middle class or creative class/artists
(Florida, 2002, Ley, 1996). Ley pointed out that changes to the value system – such as
women’s self-realization, alternative forms of family organisation, the postponement
of marriage and parenthood – motivated people to live in the city centre thus creat-
ing demand for gentrified space (Ley, 1986, 1996).
The Specificity of Gentrification in the Postsocialist City: The Case of the BW Project | 25
gentrification unites several important dimensions of urban transforma-

tion: restructuring of the economy, new models of city administration and
city planning, along with changes in social structure that stem from eco-
nomic restructuring. Thus, the increase of service and creative classes af-
fects the diversification of social values and lifestyles which are visible in
the urban space.
In this chapter, following the geography of gentrification3 (Lees,
2000), we will show the specificities of this process in postsocialist cit-
ies4 and in Belgrade. The variations of the gentrification phenomenon fall
firmly under the influence of socio-economic conditions such as the char-
acteristics of the urban economy (industrial and postindustrial develop-
ment); the characteristics of the housing market and the role of its key ac-
tors: state/local authorities; the private sector/investors and construction
firms; creative and service fractions of the middle class. In the analysis
of gentrification, one also needs to include the established socio-spatial
structure during the socialist urban development.
The Socio-Spatial Transformation

of European Postsocialist Cities
The new use of core spaces in the cities of the most developed capi-
talist countries emerged with the closing of the rental gap that arose as
a consequence of suburbanization during the industrial phase of devel-
opment and the subsequent deindustrialization that attracted new invest-
ment and initiated gentrification of previously abandoned or derelict sites.
The question of demand is the other side of this process, i.e. are there the
actors who will realize this process on their own, or will instigate private
sector actors to become involved. Initiation of the process (pioneer gen-
trification) is connected with a diversification of lifestyles, the mobility
of the population and the availability of space (i.e. a dynamic real estate
market).
In postsocialist cities one finds possibility for the initiation of the gen-
trification process in under-urbanized central city areas inherited from the
socialist period. Urbanism and the spatial economy of socialist cities were
3 To examine gentrification in various contexts it is necessary to appreciate the socio-

economic and historical conditions which cause the modifications of the phenom-
enon. Following that analytical logic, the so-called geography of gentrification has
been constituted (Lees, 2000).
4 In this analysis, the concept of postsocialist city is used due to a significant influence of
socio-spatial structure formed during the socialism on the process of gentrification.
26 | Vera Backović
based on the redistributive power of the party elite whose primary aim was
to invest in industrial development. Thus, the socialist city was marked by
the prevalence of industry and housing over other functions, especially the
commercial. Development of the tertiary sector and infrastructure, exclud-
ing infrastructure indispensable for direct industrial development, were
not seen as productive activities (Enyedi, 1996). The social (i.e. state) own-
ership of a city’s resources and the non-market economy resulted in inef-
fective use of space and insufficient development of urban services. Thus,
under-urbanization as a key characteristic of socialist urbanization has
two aspects: quantitative – a lower degree of urbanization in comparison
to achieved industrial development; and qualitative – undeveloped infra-
structure (both communal and commercial) (Szeleny, 1996).
The socialist city created a different socio-spatial structure compared
to the capitalist city, both in the urban centre and the periphery. The pro-
cess of suburbanization did not take place in the same way as in capitalist
cities, where members of middle and higher classes moved to the suburbs,
which offered them a higher quality of life. Contrary to that, in socialism
cities were expanded by migration from rural areas5. The infrastructural
development of suburbia was on a considerably lower level in comparison
with more central locations. Thus, the periphery remained even more un-
der-urbanized (Petrović, 2009). The centre of the socialist city6 remained a
desirable place to live and its “emptying” by the higher classes did not oc-
cur. In addition, due to urban and housing policies, the neighbourhoods
of these cities were more class heterogeneous.
Socialism constrained the pluralization of lifestyles (generally through
consumption) and the spatial mobility of the population7 via established
housing policy8. The residential mobility of all social classes in capital-
ist societies is considerably greater (compared with socialist societies) and
results in the harmonization of income possibilities and housing char-
acteristics, which is connected not only to the main phases of lifecycles
(marriage, birth of children, departure of grown up children from the
household) but also to changes in career path (Petrovic, 2004: 304).
5 For example, the basic architectural-urban design of the settlement on the outskirts
of Belgrade is a mix of legal, semi-illegal and illegal family housing construction
(Vujović, 1990:114). The increase in the population of Belgrade was not accompa-
nied by an adequate development of communal and social infrastructure. On the
periphery of the city there is lack of sanitation infrastructure, inadequate public
transport connections, as well as an underdeveloped network of facilities such as kin-
dergartens, primary schools, healthcare provision, etc. (Vujović, 1990).
6 Examples include Prague, Budapest, Belgrade and Zagreb.
7 This does not refer to the rural-urban migration that was characteristic for this pe-
riod but rather to poor mobility when finding a job and solving the housing issue.
8 The principle of housing policies was to provide moderate housing to each house-
hold, thus solving their housing problem for a lifetime.
The dominance of heavy industry and the neglect of the production

of consumer goods were systemic constraints that hampered the transfor-
mation of socialist societies and cities9 well into their postindustrial phase.
During the 1990s, postsocialist countries fell under the simultaneous influ-
ence of several processes: their transformation towards a capitalist system,
which changes the entire structure of society10; their transition from indus-
trial to postindustrial economies; and complex (economic, political and cul-
tural) globalization based on technological information revolution. Thus,
the postsocialist city reflects changes towards the market-based, postin-
dustrial city on the one hand, and changes to governance from a dominant
state command model towards entrepreneurial and potentially cooperative
models of governing, on the other (Harvi, 2005). Under socialism only a
small number of actors could influence urban policy and urban develop-
ment, which primarily depended on state planning and the distribution of
funds from a central budget. The fall of socialism enabled the constitution
of other actors who became able to influence the tempo and direction of a
city’s development. Thus, urban development came to be influenced by po-
litical actors (the state and local authorities), economic actors, urban plan-
ning experts and the general population. There is also the increasing influ-
ence of external / supra-national actors such as supra-national institutions
and international companies (Tosics, 2005; Vujović, 2004). These actors
form very complex mutual relationships resulting in changeable coalitions,
which direct the priorities of city development (Stoker, 2005; Basan, 2001).
The most significant change relates to the fact that foreign capital starts to
exert a great influence on the urban economy and urban space.11
Important changes on the city level are the decrease of state control
over land and housing stock, privatization and restitution of housing/build-
ings12, and the decentralization of decision-making processes. However, the
transmission of power from state to other actors (the private sector and lo-
cal authorities) and their participation in city development, without an in-
stitutional framework to direct them, has left a lot of space for violation of
9 State/social property and planned investments did not take into account the value of
land and profit, so that socialist society produced a different city.
10 The most important changes are: in the economy – the introduction of private prop-
erty and the market and the privatization of state property; in the political system
– the introduction of political pluralism and declarative decentralization of decision-
making processes.
11 At the beginning of the process of postsocialist transformation, the property/real estate
market became the most internationalized area of the local economy (Sykora, 1993).
12 As restitution returns whole buildings to their previous owners, it contributes to the
gentrification process. In the case of privatization of apartments, the existence of sev-
eral owners or/and different statuses of ownership in the same building less stimulate
gentrification.
28 | Vera Backović
the public interest, and the domination of private interest.13 Thus, because
of the weakening of the state as a central authority and the arbitrariness of
city authorities in applying the principles of governing an urban system in
accordance with market conditions, a chaotic model of city development
has been established (Stanilov, 2007; Petrović, 2009). Equally important
are the rule of law and local autonomy in deciding on investment projects,
since local authorities should also have the ability to absorb the negative
effects of wider political changes. Privatization of the public sector is not
a sufficient reform measure in postsocialist cities, it is also necessary to
create a public sector that assumes a regulatory function and the function
of social protection (Petrović, 2009). Thus, the entrepreneurial strategies
of postsocialist cities are reduced to client-centred coordination and nego-
tiation, while the non-transparency of the political elite’s decision-making
process channels the influence of private capital through corruptive rather
than partnership strategies14 (Petrović, 2009: 65).
The aforementioned structural changes in postsocialist societies are
manifested at several levels: on the global level postsocialist cities are in-
volved in the network of European cities. Postsocialist capitals are the first
points of “entry” by foreign companies to these countries15. They evolve
as places for the relocation of leading European/global industrial, com-
mercial and service chains (Petrović, 2009: 57). The deindustrialization
of postsocialist cities is the result of collapse of industry rather than its
transformation into the service economy and industry of culture. On the
city level, how property and space are used has changed. Sykora analy-
ses changes to the use of urban space16 through the theory of rent17 and
the functional gap. The activities present in the central city zones under
socialist urban economy have quickly been replaced by more profitable
13 Local authorities remain under the strong influence of national authorities because
in many cases the national political elite is not ready to allow decentralization and
transfer management of economic resources to local governments (Petrović, 2009).
14 As Burazer political capitalism is being established, favouring economic actors close
to the political elite and from which the political elite has economic gain, it creates
monopolistic markets and blocks economic and spatial development (Trigilia accord-
ing to Petrović, 2009).
15 Capital cities of postsocialist countries occupy a semi-periphery position (Backović,
2005). There is a polarization between the capital and other urban settlements at the
state level (Musil, 1993).
16 There are several ways: 1. The use of empty and deserted buildings; 2. The replacement
of less efficient industrial or commercial activity with some more efficient activity; 3.
Converting apartments into office space; 4. Rehabilitation of old apartments into luxu-
rious ones; 5. Constructing new buildings on unused land (Sykora, 1993:290).
17 The rent gap plays an important role in the urban renewal process for it attracts a
great number of construction firms which buy real estate at low prices, invest in its
renovation and then sell it on at higher prices (Sykora, 1993; Smith, 1987).
activities, which brought about a considerable commercialisation of space

(Sykora, 1993, 1998). The growth of business and service activities de-
manded new commercial space in postsocialist cities. However, without
residential functions in revitalized and converted spaces, these adapta-
tions cannot be understood as gentrification.
In Prague’s central zone a great number of apartments were returned
to their owners18, thus stimulating investment by foreign construc-
tion firms because the new owners could not afford to pay for renova-
tion (Sykora, 2006). There are some parts of neighbourhoods in Prague
which we can speak of as gentrified.19 The realised revitalisation of hous-
ing units, which contains aspects of gentrification and commercialisation,
influenced a change in the population of the neighbourhood. Thus, the
number of inhabitants of two central Prague districts, 1 and 2 (the city’s
historical core and Vinohrady)20, decreased by almost a fifth between
1991 and 2001, which is a direct consequence of the decreasing number
and increasing size of residential buildings21, while the social status of in-
habitants has increased22 (Sykora, 2006).
In Budapest, the process of suburbanization was intensified when the
new upper middle class left the city centre, which continues to be inhab-
ited by lower status groups. In the meantime, there has been an increase
in the number of members of the new middle class whose residential pref-
erence is the city centre and an urban lifestyle. The increased number of
international investors and corporate construction firms have integrated
the city into global capitalism. It is especially significant that residents
are willing to invest in the renovation of apartments acquired during pri-
vatization. Kovacs et al. (2013) conclude that urban regeneration and im-
provements in devastated Budapest districts were realized without major
problems and obstacles, as the process was not accompanied by massive
displacement or social tensions among the population, due to the size of
the ownership sector but also due to the social responsibility of local au-
thorities23. A Western model of gentrification was realized in smaller areas
– SEM IX and Rev 8 (Kovacs et al., 2013).
18 In some central parts as much as three quarters of all buildings (Sykora, 2006).
19 The neighbourhood is inhabited by both new residents (gentrificators) and old; there
are new and old buildings, those that have been renovated and those that have not
(Sykora, 2006).
20 The main gentrified district in Prague.
21 In the process of gentrification smaller and more modest flats are often expanded or
joined together, thus becoming larger, more luxurious apartments.
22 The number of inhabitants with university degree increased especially in Prague’s dis-
tricts 1, 2 and 6 (districts with private villas, traditionally inhabited by the higher class).
23 This model could be named “localized gentrification”, due to interventions by local
authorities and the aspect of keeping the process under control by the public sector
(Kovacs et al., 2013).
30 | Vera Backović
In postsocialist cities pioneer gentrification grows at a slow pace, but

Pixova perceives an increase of alternative use of space in Prague (Pixova,
2012). Alternative activities are related to the rise of a new middle class
(young artists, creative experts, members of sub-cultures, students, aca-
demics and activists). Pixova notes that they have the same characteristics
identified by Lay (1996): special needs and a taste for the consumption
of culture, lifestyle, and also in preferences for urban space. Some of the
members of the new middle class in Prague has become an important ac-
tor in creating new alternative trends and spatial patterns, as well as es-
tablishing new alternative spaces – art galleries and exhibition spaces have
opened in formerly industrial zones.24 This use of space can be brought in
a certain relation with the pioneer gentrification – different lifestyles and a
new aesthetic – although it is important to emphasize that these spaces do
not contain a residential function.
Also, one of the specificities of gentrification in postsocialist cities
is the non-investing into neighbourhoods of the working class already in
the middle-class neighbourhoods. One invests into neighbourhoods ac-
cording to their social rather than physical characteristics (Sykora, 2006).
Undoubtedly, gentrification will continue to expand, but if it is not about
large spatial transformations25, the inherited heterogeneity of the neigh-
bourhood will to some extent be retained.
The Presence of the Phenomenon

of Gentrification in Belgrade
The uniqueness of postsocialist transformation in Serbia has influ-
enced the socio-spatial development of Belgrade and how the process of
gentrification in it is manifested. Initially, during the period of so-called
blocked transformation (from 1989 to 2000), the process of social trans-
formation began and was intensified after political changes in 2000 (Lazić,
2005, 2011). After political stabilization the inflow of foreign investment
and the arrival of international firms began. Belgrade26 attracted the larg-
24 At the same time, several alternative grassroots community projects were also re-
alized in Prague. These centres served for socializing and non-commercial culture,
despite multiple challenges imposed by the local authorities (Pixova, 2012:102).
25 Such as the Belgrade Waterfront project.
26 The city, especially New Belgrade, attracts investors due to its location, the vicinity of
the old city centre, relatively good infrastructure, with enough free space, without un-
resolved property-legal relations. In central parts of the city one can identify an accel-
erated commercialization of space: the opening of stores of world brands, branches of
banks, restaurants and cafes in prestigious urban locations (Backović, 2010).
est number of domestic and foreign investors in Serbia. The economy

gradually began to grow and the rate of GDP growth increased (2000:
7.8%, 2001: 5.0%, 2002: 7.1%, 2003: 4.4%, 2004: 9.0%)27. The structure of
the economy gradually changed, so about 60 percent of the national prod-
uct comes from the tertiary sector. Trade and similar activities account
for about a third of total GDP and industry no longer dominates as was
the case before (SRGB, 2008: 14). GDP growth in this period is due to
the growth of economic activity in the service sector. However, the trend
of inflows of investments, economic restructuring and growth has stalled
under the influence of the global economic crisis.28 Although economic
reforms after 2000 led to certain increases in production, living standard
and poverty reduction, trends in employment decline and increase in un-
employment29, which were characteristic of the 1990s, are still visible.
As in the case of Zagreb/Croatia (Čaldarović & Šarinić, 2008; Svirčić
Gotovac, 2010), in Belgrade/Serbia institutional framework has not ad-
equately kept pace with changes on the ground and, therefore, private sec-
tor actors came to dominate the city’s urban spatial development (Vujović
& Petrović, 2006; Petovar, 2006). The interests of investors became en-
trenched as the dominant factor in urban planning, regardless to the con-
sequences for the surrounding areas regarding the quality of housing and
living conditions in the neighbourhood and in the city as a whole. The
practice came to be known as investor urbanism and denotes the adjust-
ment and subordination of the city’s space to the interests of investors,
that is, those interested in building in or reconstructing a certain urban
area (Petovar, 2006: 76).
Although the process of commercialisation of space and the con-
struction of new residential buildings is taking place, gentrification in Bel-
grade has not been explored sufficiently, with the exception of Todorić
and Ratkaj (2011) and Krstić (2015). The analysis in this paper is focused
on prerequisites for the emergence of the phenomenon that have been
identified in other, primarily postsocialist, cities. In spite of structural
27 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Republic of Serbia 1995–2017. (ESA 2010) http://
webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/PageView.aspx?pKey=61, accessed 15/12/2017.
28 In 2009, GDP receded by –3.1%; the rates were barely positive in 2010, 2011 and
2013 (0.6%, 1.4% and 2.6%, and negative growth rates were again recorded in 2012
and 2014 (-1.0% and –1.8%). In the last three years, there has been a gradual eco-
nomic recovery with positive growth rates (2017, 1,9%). GDP of the Republic of
Serbia 1995–2017. (ESA 2010) http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/PageView.
aspx?pKey=61, accessed 22/03/2018.
29 The unemployment rate in Serbia is among the highest in the region and is signifi-
cantly higher than the unemployment rate in the EU27. Only Greece (23.6%) and
Spain (19.6%) (Eurostat) had higher unemployment rates than Serbia in 2016.
32 | Vera Backović
changes, the centre of Belgrade did not cease to be the most desired living
location. During the socialist period, the city centre was a prestigious resi-
dential location30, in addition to the pre-war elite settlements of Dedinje,
Topčidersko brdo, Senjak and Kotež Neimar. These were inhabited by the
elite, the political, military and police leadership, as well as the intellectual
elite, artists and scientists (Vujović, 1990). The postsocialist transforma-
tion did not instigate changes to these developmental trends and served
merely to intensify them. The 2002 census (Appendix 1) shows that the
highest concentration of the highly educated is in communities in the city
centre.31 Data from the last census (2011) show an even higher concentra-
tion of the highly educated, especially in the municipalities of Stari grad
and Vračar, in which every second resident has a higher education or uni-
versity diploma. The data show that there was no change in the socio-spa-
tial structure, the centre of the city was and remains a desirable location.
Also, Western-style suburbanization as seen in some postsocialist cities
(Budapest), did not occur in Belgrade.
Construction of residential buildings is not concentrated in central
areas32, where the number of higher middle-class inhabitants continues
to increase. This indirectly means that members of this class choose to
move to the centre, and not necessarily to new residential buildings. This
kind of mobility cannot be considered to be gentrification. Also, if a single
residential building is built and there is no spatial transformation of the
neighbourhood this also cannot be seen as gentrification.
Analysing the demand-side (actors), we can identify that foreign
actors have not yet become a significant demand generator. This due to
low rates of foreign investment and the small number of local people em-
30 Based on the 1991 census data, it is possible to analyse the socio-spatial structure
that was established during the socialist period. The central city locations are distin-
guished by a concentration of highly educated people, especially the municipalities
of Vračar and Savski venac. Certain neighbourhoods, here designated by the name of
their community centres (mesna zajednica – MZ), exhibit an unusually high propor-
tion of those with higher education attainment: MZ Zapadni Vračar with 30.39%,
Fourth of July with 29.56%, MZ Trg Republike, 29.58% and Obilićev venac with
29.89%.
31 Vračar (MZ Cvetni trg, 37.57%), Savski venac (MZ Četvrti juli, 39.58%), Stari grad
(MZ Moša Pijade, Obilićev venac and Čukur česma with just over 35%) and Palilula
(MZ Tašmajdan, 36%) (Backović, 2010).
32 According to the data on housing construction in Belgrade, among central city mu-
nicipalities, Stari grad has the lowest rate of housing construction (1.1 in 2009), while
this parameter is much higher in Savski venac (4.8) and Vračar (8.2). New housing
production is concentrated in New Belgrade, Voždovac and Zvezdara so these mu-
nicipalities have a construction rate higher than the city average (Todorić & Ratkaj,
2011: 68).
ployed by foreign firms. In Belgrade33 only 6.1% of employees are em-

ployed by foreign companies, only one fifth of which are classified as ex-
perts (20.6%). Although the structure of economic activities indicates an
increasing share of services and a decrease in the activities of the primary
and secondary sectors, the city’s low GDP and the structure of economic
activity (Radonjić, 2012) show the underdevelopment of the post-indus-
trial economy and, therefore, the creative and service class. Consequently,
the number of potential demand creators for gentrification is rather low
compared with other postsocialist cities.
The analysis of the real estate market in Belgrade shows that, on one
hand, the high price of newly built apartments34 in better city locations
make this type of housing affordable only to members of the elites. In
mid-2000, when the political and economic situation stabilized, some in-
vestment was initiated into mid-range residential buildings in the form of
gated communities (Oasis and Panorama in Dedinje – by local investors
City Real Estate and Meridin Balkans, respectively). Subsequently, larger
residential complexes were built away from the city centre, partly funded
by foreign capital: Belville in New Belgrade (2000 units) and Oasis Golf
Course in Surčin (6000 units) (Hirt & Petrović, 2011). The realization of
such large-scale projects caused an increase in demand. The expected resi-
dents of Bellville and the Oasis Golf Course were foreigners as embassies
and banks were interested in renting housing facilities for their employ-
ees in buildings with controlled access (Hirt & Petrović, 2011). However,
the worsening economic situation then caused this demand to decline35,
33 The structure of GDP by activity in 2016 for the Belgrade region was as follows: Agri-
culture, forestry and fishing (1.8%); Mining; manufacturing industry; supply of elec-
tricity, gas and steam and water supply and waste water management (16.8%); State
administration, defence and compulsory social security; education and health and
social protection (10.8%); Professional, scientific, innovation and technical activities
and administrative and support service activities (10.1%); Financial and insurance
activities (6.3%); Construction (5.4%); Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor ve-
hicles; transport and storage and accommodation and food services (24.2%); Real es-
tate (with imputed rent) (10.1%); Information and communication (11.8%) and Art,
entertainment and recreation; other service activities; the activity of the household
as an employer and the activity of extraterritorial organizations and bodies (2.8%)
(Source: Working document Regional Gross Domestic Product, Regions and areas of
the Republic of Serbia, 2016, RZS).
34 Average selling price in euros per square metre of apartment space in new-builds:
Voždovac (1500–1700); Vračar (2300–2500); Zvezdara (1650–1850); Zemun (1200–
1400); New Belgrade (2300–2600); Palilula (1700–1900); Stari grad (3000–3300);
Čukarica (2000–2300) and Savski venac (2300–2700). Source: Colliers Overview of
the real estate market, 2011.
35 Even five years after construction was completed in Belville, not all apartments had
been sold.
34 | Vera Backović
so in the forthcoming period smaller complexes are again planned (Col-

liers data for 2013). On the other hand, the average price of housing (per
square metre) in central city locations remains rather high and thus can-
not encourage pioneer ventures of space conversions or adaptations that
would lead to the concentration of artists (i.e. pioneer gentrification).
Regarding the conditions perceived as necessary for pioneer gentri-
fication, it is important to note some additional facts. First, although the
economic position of professionals in Serbia in the period after 2000 had
improved relative to the 1990s, for most of them the increase was insuf-
ficient for housing to become a matter of choice.36 Additionally, privatiza-
tion of the housing system also did not increase housing mobility, since
the high incidence of homeownership does not contribute to frequent
change of housing (Petrović, 2004). Second, although there are some ex-
amples of urban space conversion in Belgrade (Beton Hala, KPGT, BIGZ,
KC Grad, projects in Savamala, Ciglana etc.) – with devastated (industri-
al) areas revitalised primarily to offer alternative cultural scenes or create
cultural centres – without a new residential function this does not catego-
rise them as examples of pioneer gentrification. Although these projects
certainly have influenced the creation of alternative cultural spaces and
contributed to a diversification of lifestyles and the related broadening of
how urban space is used.37
The Belgrade Waterfront Project:

An Example of Profitable Gentrification
This part of the paper will analyse the Belgrade Waterfront Project
(BWP) as an example of profitable gentrification that is radically trans-
forming the centre of the city. The BWP is located in the Savamala dis-
trict38, which is a very attractive location in the city and, therefore, vari-
36 In addition, the living standards deteriorated in 2012 compared to 2003, so the dete-
rioration of the economic position is visible for all classes in Serbia, except the high-
est (Cvejić, 2012: 149; Manić, 2013: 24). Lower middle economic position (38.4%)
dominate the categories of professional, self-employed, lower management and free-
lance professional with higher education (Manić, 2013: 23). In Belgrade, the econom-
ic position of this class is higher, 36.4% have a middle and 24.2% have higher middle
economic position, but that is also insufficient to create new residential choices (re-
garding location, type or quality of housing). The illustrated data show that there are
structural limitations for the initiation of gentrification.
37 In Western cities, the trend of “returning to the city centre” is based on alternative life-
styles, so analysis of gentrification should not ignore this very important dimension.
38 For more about the historical development of the Sava riverbank and plans for its
reconstruction see Dajč (2012) and Kadijević & Kovačević (2016).
ous ideas and plans for its renewal and revitalisation had been developed
earlier but none of them came to be realized.39 Recently, the area has also
been revitalised by an infusion of cultural content. The initiative was nei-
ther made by individuals as a result of their autonomous actions or in-
volved the adaptation of residential buildings, which are the peculiarities
of the pioneer phase of gentrification in Western cities. The revitalization
process was reduced to the opening of cultural centres, entertainment
spaces (cafes, bars, clubs) and places used by the civic sector for their ac-
tivities (in culture, education, etc.) with the support of local authorities40
and the private sector (small-scale entrepreneurs).41 The transformation
of the abandoned Nolit warehouse into the Magacin Cultural Centre42
(initiated in 2007 by the Belgrade Youth Centre, an official institution of
the city) can be taken as the beginning of this revitalisation cycle. Follow-
ing this, many other facilities were opened: The Grad European Centre for
Culture and Debate43 (2009), the multifunctional Mikser House (2012),
Nova Iskra (2012), etc. A series of activities were organized44as part of the
Urban Incubator project in Belgrade45, initiated by the Goethe Institute, as
was the Savamala Civic District.46 From 2012 to 2016 the Mikser Festival
was held in Savamala47. The opening of new facilities and the organization
of various programmes and activities drew attention to Savamala, which,
among other things, became a tourist attraction. In local and foreign me-
dia, this part of the city gradually took on a new image as a place of crea-
tivity, culture, nightlife and entertainment (see more in the chapter by Se-
lena Lazić in this volume).
39 As Savamala is located in a central location, almost all General Urban Plans (GUP
1923, GUP 1950, GUP 1972, GP 2003 (amendments 2005, 2007, 2009, 2014) and
GUP 2016) dealt with this area in detail (Cvetinović, Maričić & Bolay, 2016).
40 More about the role of local authorities, primarily the Municipality of Savski Venac,
and foreign funds in Jocić, Budović & Winkler, 2017. As the authors point out, there
was no official plan for the revitalization of Savamala, while the idea was created in
2006 (Jocić, Budović & Winkler, 2017: 129).
41 The private sector invested in activities relating to art, culture and entertainment.
42 The space is intended for exhibitions, lectures and other cultural content.
43 KC Grad was opened in an old warehouse building from 1884, representing an ex-
ample of the conversion of the industrial into cultural space, while preserving the
authenticity of the space. Workshops, conferences, concerts, exhibitions, film screen-
ings, literary evenings, etc. are held here. This project was initiated and realized
through partnership between the Municipality of Savski venac and Felix Meritis – an
independent European centre for art, culture and science (Amsterdam, Netherlands).
http://www.gradbeograd.eu/partneri.php, accessed 10/03/2018.
44 More about the Urban Incubator Project in Cvetinovic, Kucina & Bolay, 2013.
45 http://www.goethe.de/ins/cs/bel/prj/uic/sav/enindex.htm, accessed 09/03/2018.
46 More in Cvetinovic, Kucina & Bolay, 2013.
47 In 2017 the Mikser Festival returned to the grain silos of the former “Žitomlin” mill
in Lower Dorćol, the location where it originally began.
36 | Vera Backović
These processes do exhibit certain characteristics of “pioneering”

urban revitalisation, primarily due to the fact that they were not guided
by strategic plans and projects, although they were carried out with the
support of local authorities. With time, the shift from this kind of trans-
formation to profitable gentrification happened with the initiation of the
Belgrade Waterfront Project (BWP)48.
The construction of the Belgrade Waterfront complex began on 27
September 2016, with the laying of a foundation stone for a tall tower,
which is a symbol of the project and has ambitions to become a new sym-
bol of the city.49 The event was attended by the highest national and local
level representatives (the Prime Minister and the Mayor of Belgrade) and
the owner of Eagle Hills (investor). Although the city authorities were ini-
tially involved, national level politicians soon took over the realisation of
the project.
The investor’s official website50 announces the construction of more
than 6,000 luxurious apartments; 24 centres with business premises; the
new Belgrade Tower; eight hotels; a new 1.8km-long riverside promenade;
the BW Gallery, a new shopping district which is planned to become the
main destination in the region for shopping, entertainment and vacations;
the Belgrade Park and accompanying cultural and artistic centres.51
The signing of the agreement between the investor and the Serbian
state was preceded by the adjusting the institutional framework to allow
the implementation of the proposed project. The national government de-
clared BWP to be a project of national significance, which was the starting
point for changing urban planning regulations and city planning docu-
ments. From May 2014 to April 201552, urban planning regulations were
48 The BWP was presented by the investor, Eagle Hills, in January 2014. The project
relates to the right bank of the Sava River, covering an area of about 100 hectares
between Belgrade Fair and Branko’s Bridge and between the Sava River and Savska
Street. The value of this investment project is estimated at around EUR 2.8 billion for
the construction of over 1.5 million square metres of housing, business and commer-
cial space and space for cultural, artistic and sporting events: http://www.vreme.com/
cms/view.php?id=1276219, accessed 10/03/2018.
49 It was declared that the 160m tower would be named the Belgrade Tower: http://
www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/5/Економија/2051831/Постављен+камен+темеља
ц+за+”Београд+на+води”.html, accessed 10/03/2018.
50 https://www.eaglehills.com/sr/our-developments/serbia/belgrade-waterfront/master-
plan, accessed 28/04/2018.
51 It is not specified which content will be included therein.
52 The Agreement was signed on 26 April 2015 between representatives of the state,
the city and international private capital – Eagle Hills (the company’s headquar-
ters are in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates). The contract was signed by the
director of Eagle Hills, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Construc-
tion, Transportation and Infrastructure, Zorana Mihajlović, and the Director of the
BW company, Aleksandar Trifunović: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr /story/13/
changed so as to fit the investor’s proposal. In July 2014, amendments to

the Master plan of Belgrade (MPB) were proposed, stating the need to re-
view the following: the rules for the implementation of the proposed plan
(the obligation to hold a tender and seek expert opinion for individual
locations)53; permission to build high-rise buildings throughout the city;
and repurposing land in the area of the Sava Amphitheatre54, especially
the relocation of rail traffic (IDGPB2021, 2014: 2).55 By adopting amend-
ments to the MPB 2021, regulations related to protection of the panoram-
ic view of the old city were also abolished.
On 3 June 2014, the Government of the Republic of Serbia took a
decision to pass the Spatial Plan for the Special Purpose Area and Devel-
opment of Part of Belgrade Coastal Area – the Riverside Area of the River
Sava for the Project “Belgrade Waterfront”. The process that enabled the
implementation of the project was completed on 8 April 2015, when the
National Assembly passed a Lex Specialis on the BWP, known as the Law
on Determining the Public Interest and Special Expropriation Procedures
and Issuing the Building Permit for the Project “Belgrade Waterfront”.56
It is of particular note that Article 2 of this Law determines that the con-
struction of the BW business-residential complex is in the public interest.
The realisation of the BWP led to a displacement of population and
the relocation of existing content from Savamala. In April 2016, 234 fami-
lies57 were displaced, the Miksalište58 refugee centre was evicted and more
than 1,000 square metres of office space in Hercegovacka Street, Mostar-
ska Street and Braća Krsmanović Street were violently torn down. Some
clubs moved to Skadarmala.59 In May 2017 Mikser House closed its doors,
explaining that their rent had been continuously increased by the owner
of the property.60
ekonomija/1900785/potpisan-ugovor-za-beograd-na-vodi-vredan-35-milijardi-evra.
html, accessed 11/03/2018.
53 Namely, if the Government of the Republic of Serbia determines that one location is
important for the Republic of Serbia, a tender for that location tender is not obligatory.
54 The height and number of storeys defined by regulations on the height of buildings
can be increased through the creation of a Detailed Regulation Plan.
55 In September the Belgrade City Assembly adopted amendments to the MPB.
56 http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/lat/pdf/zakoni/2015/547–15%20
lat.pdf., accessed 11/03/2018.
57 https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/timotijevici-i-bez-vode-brane-svoju-kucu/, accessed
23/02/2018.
58 https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/beograd-izbeglice-miksaliste/27699370.html, ac-
cessed 23/02/2018.
59 In March 2016, some bars and clubs from Savamala “Kenozoik”, the former “Peron”
and “Dvorištance” continue to work in the area of the former brewery.
60 http://house.mikser.rs/dovidenja-savamala/, accessed 22/02/2018.
38 | Vera Backović
Once it had been made public, the proposed plan for the BWP was
sharply criticised by industry professionals and Belgrade residents. The
Initial Board for Architecture and Urban Planning of the Department
of Visual Arts and Music of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
(SANU) submitted remarks to the Republic Agency for Spatial Planning61
(October 2014). The Academy of Architecture of Serbia62 (AAS) adopted
a Declaration on BWP63 (March 2015) and a debate was held on the topic:
Under the Surface of the BWP (October 2014). The negative consequences
of the project and criticism of various aspects of the project are related to:
changing the institutional framework, socio-economic and architectural-
urban impact and infrastructural problems.
From a legal standpoint, the Lex Specialis adopted is considered harm-
ful, unconstitutional and contrary to the fundamental principles of Inter-
national law. The BWP lacks sufficient facilities for public use, although it
is claimed that its construction is in the public interest. In fact, the plan
contains primarily commercial content, intended for sale.64
The in their adopted declaration the AAS pointed to violation and
alteration of urban plans and call for the immediate suspension of the pro-
ject. The MPB was amended under pressure from the executive branches
of the national and Belgrade governments. A clause stipulating that the
central part of the Sava Amphitheatre be reserved predominantly for
structures with a public function with a limited number of storeys was
removed. Riverside areas are not protected as a common good.65 In the
remarks made by the SANU, it is alleged that cooperation with domestic
experts is lacking and that the institutions are reduced to the role of the
executors – to create conditions that will suit the investor’s plans.
Critics also highlighted the fact that the project’s implementation will
jeopardize the symbolic image of the city, with significant consequences
for the infrastructure of that area and its surroundings. The ASS Declara-
tion criticizes the idea of creating a new image of Belgrade by building
the Belgrade Tower. It asks who ordered and profiled this new identity.
In addition, the style and quality of architecture proposed by the project
61 Remarks and suggestions on the Draft of the Special Purpose Area Spatial Plan for
Regulation of the Coastal part of the City of Belgrade – riverside area of the river
Sava for the project “Belgrade Waterfront” (Remarks and Suggestions).
62 An independent professional-artistic association of distinguished creators in the field
of architecture, urbanism, history and architecture theory.
63 http://aas.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Declaration-AAS-o-Beograd-na-vo-
di-05.-mart-2015.pdf, accessed 09/01/2018.
64 http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/pravo_danas/advokati_projekat_quotbeograd_
na_vodiquot_neustavan_.1118.html?news_id=299519, accessed 10/01/2018.
is commonplace elsewhere in the world, and offers no unique or local

identity.66 The comments of the SANU also paid attention to the issue of
identity by pointing that the planned buildings are in conflict with the ba-
sic topographic and morphological characteristics of the area, since they
completely block most of the vistas of the city and almost all the promi-
nent places that make up the historical identity of Belgrade. The proposed
height of the new tower is also considerably above the angle of Terazije,
Slavija, the Boulevard of King Aleksandar and Vračar plateau. Thus, visu-
ally Belgrade will be completely cut off from its waterfront and turned
into a hinterland behind gigantic structures.67
As the centre of the city already struggles with infrastructural prob-
lems, especially traffic problems, the question is how existing capacity will
endure the additional pressure. The BWP is projected to accommodate
14,000 residents and over 12,000 employees.68
The price of housing in the BWP has also come under criticism. The
lowest price announced per square metre is 2,500 euros, while the price of
the cheapest apartment is 156,000 euros.69 The announced prices indicate
that the housing space will undoubtedly be available only to members of
the elite and foreigners. In the remarks of the SANU, it is pointed out that
it is not clear how the number of housing units was calculated, nor for
whom this category of apartments is intended (in other words, what is the
benefit for the city or the Republic of Serbia?).70
In addition, it is alleged that existing small– and medium-sized shops
will be compromised by the construction of a large mall. There is also a
remark that the complex does not contain enough green spaces or squares.
The BWP does not pay enough attention to public spaces, parks and other
green areas, which are extremely important contents and purposes.71
In addition to the opinions of experts, ordinary people have also ex-
pressed criticism and dissatisfaction with the proposed project. In particu-
lar, the initiative Ne davimo Beograd (Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own)72 has
67 The highest structures in Belgrade on the waterfront will reach an altitude of 175m
above sea level (75 + 100) while the Terazije plateau is at 117m, Slavija at 119m, and
Crveni krst is at 157m. Remarks and Suggestions, p. 16.
68 Remarks and Suggestions, pp. 8–9.
69 https://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2016&mm=09&dd=21&nav_
id=1179096, accessed 09/01/2018.
70 Remarks and Suggestions, p. 13.
71 Remarks and Suggestions, p. 14.
72 This Initiative was created by a civil society organization called the Ministry of Spa-
tial Planning, which has since 2011 dealt with the urban transformation of Belgrade
and other cities in Serbia and advocates responsible use of public property: https://
issuu.com/ministarstvoprostora/docs, accessed 12/02/2018.
40 | Vera Backović
followed the whole process of the BWP.73 The greatest public reaction was
caused by the events in Savamala on the night between 24 and 25 April
2016, when a group of masked people used earthmoving machinery to tear
down buildings at the location of planned construction for the BWP. This
violent demolition of buildings in Hercegovačka street became a critical is-
sue that spurred people to become more involved in the protests. According
to various estimates the number of people taking part in the protests during
the summer of 2016 was between 5,000 and 25,000 (see more in the chap-
ters by Jelisaveta Petrović and Mladen Nikolić in this volume).
The implementation of the BWP shows the dominance of investor ur-
banism in Belgrade. In this case, criticism came from the expert commu-
nity and civil initiatives. The inability to influence its implementation to
some extent shows how other actors, beyond the political and economic
spheres, have become irrelevant in directing the development of the city.
Conclusion
Some rare cases of pioneering gentrification are evident in postso-
cialist cities, however, in most cases it is profitable gentrification – where
housing facilities are intended for members of the service class, primarily
foreigners and the employees of foreign companies.74 Thus, another pe-
culiarity of gentrification is that foreign companies are present as inves-
tors, while foreigners are also the end users of residential space. Profitable
gentrification is directly related to the development of the service econ-
omy and in postsocialist cities it is primarily dependent on the presence
of foreign capital. The main actors are investors and entrepreneurs who
build facilities for the middle classes (Prague, Budapest, Tallinn) or the
economic and political elite (Zagreb75, Belgrade).
73 The Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own initiative has highlighted non-transparency of de-
cision-making. The first activity they organized was participation in a session of the
City Assembly, where a public debate was held on the construction of the Belgrade
Waterfront project. Subsequently, they protested when the Agreement was signed on
26 April 2015: http: //www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php? Yyyy = 2015 & mm = 04 &
dd = 26 & nav_id = 985118, accessed 12/02/2018.
74 In Hungary (Kovacs, Wiessner & Zischner, 2013) this has changed since the coun-
try joined the European Union. Unrestricted rights of foreigners to own property
increased investment in the housing fund at central locations in Budapest because
foreigners and highly-paid local professionals employed by international companies
wanted to live near the workplace.
75 In the case of Croatia (Svirčić Gotovac, 2010), the middle class was replaced by the
elite, who are the only ones able to afford apartments with a very high price per
square metre (i.e. 7,000 up to 10,000 euros).
The BWP (commercial and residential luxury space) is an example of

profitable gentrification whose implementation significantly transforms a
central core of Belgrade. The constructed facilities are intended for mem-
bers of the elite and for foreign citizens, in accordance with findings in
other postsocialist cities. This foreign investment has undoubtedly been
supported by national and local authorities. The implementation of this
project shows that the involvement of foreign investors is too great and
that the actions of the public sector are emblematic of the dominance of
state level central power, non-transparent decision-making, disregard for
expert opinion and the exclusion of the civil sector.
Appendix 1
Table 1 Increase of spatial concentration of highly educated

residents in central Belgrade municipalities76
Municipality / Year 1991 2002 2001

City of Belgrade 11.7% 13.7% 27.8%
New Belgrade 17.7% 20.9% 40.6%
Savski venac 23.6% 27.5% 46.6%
Stari grad 23.8% 29.6% 50.2%
Vračar 27.6% 31.9% 52.3%
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| 45
BEHIND THE FRONTLINE OF THE

BELGRADE WATERFRONT:
A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE
OF A TRANSNATIONAL REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Jorn Koelemaij and Stefan Janković
Abstract: In 2012, plans were announced to develop a large-scale mixed-use wa-

terfront project along the Sava River in central Belgrade. Within 30 years, the
80-hectare site is projected to contain the region’s largest shopping mall, alongside
thousands of square metres of luxury apartments and high-end offices. Promises
of a 3.5 billion euro investment from the United Arab Emirates associated with
this real estate development project quickly led to polemical interactions and ten-
sions between the plan’s supporters and critics. Based on a variety of qualitative
methods, including in-depth interviews conducted in Belgrade, Dubai and Abu
Dhabi, we will outline the strategies and actions that key actors and stakeholders
undertook, particularly during the project’s early implementation phase in 2015
and 2016. We will illustrate how these interactions and tensions between and
among the actors took place on and across different scales. Prior to empirical in-
vestigation of confrontational actor-relations, the paper will concisely discuss how
Belgrade Waterfront fits into a wider global trend of “world city entrepreneurial-
ism” and associated state rescaling processes. On that basis, the paper will then
focus on how this transnational real estate development project, despite claims
that it will increase competitiveness and employment, came to be perceived as a
potential threat by its opponents (who assume that it will trigger uneven develop-
ment and functions as a catalyst for authoritarianism). This brings us to the fo-
cal point of the contesting voices and actions arrayed against this project, which
revolves primarily around claims that the “public” are being excluded during its
implementation.
Keywords: Belgrade Waterfront, world-city entrepreneurialism, real estate de-
velopment, power relations
Introduction
“Eagle Hills develops flagship city destinations
that invigorate aspiring nations, [h]elping countries raise
their global profiles to new heights”
(Eagle Hills, 2014)
“Belgrade Waterfront takes urban renewal
to new heights – a smart city for a future that
combines commerce, culture and community”
(Eagle Hills, 2014).
The above quotes are just two examples of the many catchy procla-
mations with which readers were confronted in the original official bro-
chure of the “modern centre of excellence”, presented to the public shortly
after the project was announced. Belgrade Waterfront (BW) is a transna-
tional real estate development project in Serbia’s capital that is currently
being realized on a mostly derelict, yet centrally located site along the
river Sava, to the rear of the city’s 19th century central railway station.
Within 30 years, the site, covering almost 80 hectares, is intended to con-
tain a 200-metre-tall tower, a large shopping mall and mixed-use spaces
for working, living and leisure. The project, which has taken shape as a
joint venture between a United Arab Emirates (UAE) based investor and
the Republic of Serbia, has caused significant controversy and brought
rise to struggles between different socio-cultural actors representing a va-
riety of scalar positions and hierarchies. The overblown ambitions and
promises that accompanied promotional activities during the project’s
early implementation phase attracted the attention not only of potentially
interested investors and buyers, as was intended, but also that of a variety
of (local and international) journalists and academics, who more often
than not placed particular emphasis on the concerns of critical voices op-
posed to the project.
Indeed, the case of Belgrade Waterfront offers a unique opportunity
for scholarly reflection from multiple interesting analytical angles. Re-
searchers have thus far focused on four areas: the role and strategies of
actively resisting social movements (e.g. Matković & Ivković, 2018); the
public interest and participation or the lack thereof (Lalović et al., 2015);
changing institutional frameworks (Zeković, Maričić & Vujošević, 2016)
and the active, top-down role of (those acting on behalf of) the state
(Grubbauer & Čamprag, 2019; Koelemaij, 2018); and finally the displace-
ment of informal settlements (Stanković, 2016). Our goal in this paper is
to integrate those insights, and to reconstruct the early days of Belgrade
Waterfront by adopting an agency-focused, relational analytical approach.
Behind the Frontline of the Belgrade Waterfront | 47
The main intention is to reflect upon existing power relations behind

the project while assessing to what extent it is possible to speak of “sca-
lar hierarchies” in this particular context. Additionally, we will evaluate
strategies adopted by the project’s main stakeholders and the underly-
ing rationales they serve. In order to do so, we have conducted in-depth
interviews with numerous stakeholders who were closely involved with
the project, either directly or indirectly. Our respondents can be identi-
fied both as supporters, who personally or professionally approve of the
project, and as opponents, who disapprove of the project for a variety of
reasons and from a variety of backgrounds. Additionally, city and nation-
al-level policy documents relating to the project or to spatial planning in
general were extensively analysed.
Due to on-going changes to the project’s design and legal status, as
well as the constantly shifting frontline between opposing and support-
ing actors, this chapter is confined to the project’s early implementa-
tion phase: from the summer of 2014 to the summer of 2016. Taking an
agency-focused approach as essential to obtaining insights into the social,
economic and political dimensions behind global urban policy-making,
we set forth from three main research questions. In short, we aim to ex-
ploratively reveal which actors act on behalf of which structures and insti-
tutions, to observe how they act and to understand why they act the way
they do. This approach allows us to engage with on-going debates in the
academic literature that question the notion of state rescaling as it pertains
to world city-entrepreneurial projects (e.g. Golubchikov, 2010), as well as
with the generally accepted logic behind speculative urbanism in so-called
frontier capital markets.
Prior to presenting the Belgrade Waterfront project in more detail,
Section 1 will briefly discuss how the term “world city entrepreneurial-
ism” has been understood thus far. Subsequently, in Section 2, we ex-
plain and justify the methodology employed. Section 3 discusses the
main events relating to the launch of Belgrade Waterfront and the reac-
tions and tensions the announcement triggered, as well as identifying the
key actors and groups who have raised their voices against the project.
Similarly, Section 4 reveals how actors on the other side of the frontline
have defended and justified the project. In Section 5 we analytically dis-
cuss the power relations between these different actors, which attitudes
and interactions accompany their positions and how this relates to the
scales on and across which they operate. In the concluding section, we
argue that the main incentives for all of the involved stakeholders are,
to a greater or lesser extent, to gain symbolic capital from the Belgrade
Waterfront project.
1. World City Entrepreneurialism

and its Speculative Urban Practices
When David Harvey (1989) wrote his seminal paper on urban entre-
preneurialism, he first and foremost expressed concerns on how the in-
creasing focus on inter-urban competition not only led to changing trends
in urban governance and policy but also that this new fashion had mac-
roeconomic consequences. Public-private partnerships facilitating specu-
lative urban development projects became a widespread phenomenon in
North American cities from the early 1980s onwards. Harvey noted that
this new type of boosterism implied that local governments often took
on the financial risks, while the private sector took the benefits. In what
proved to be prescient, Harvey (1989, p. 10) further noted that one of the
features of urban entrepreneurialism would be that “it may even force re-
petitive and serial reproduction of certain patterns of development (such
as the serial reproduction of ‘world trade centres’ or of new cultural and
entertainment centres, of waterfront development, of post-modern shop-
ping malls, and the like)”.
In the three decades that have passed since, numerous studies have
shown that urban entrepreneurialism is not only a US phenomenon.
Moreover, inter-urban competition has been upscaled and, since the be-
ginning of the new century, it appears to have become fashionable for
many urban policymakers across the globe to try to put their city “on the
map” through city marketing campaigns and flagship architecture, in or-
der to improve the city’s so-called global status. While it started out as a
critical academic concept (Sassen, 1991, see also Van Meeteren, Derudder
& Bassens, 2016), the global city has in recent years increasingly become
an aspirational category, due to the growing influence of transnational
consultancy firms in global policy-making, as is frequently highlighted
in the burgeoning policy mobilities literature (e.g. Prince, 2012). Accord-
ing to Leon (2017), who describes this trend as “municipal mercantilism”,
such interventions require an active state (contrary to neoliberal assump-
tions) and they reinforce class relations.
Although similar observations about the active role of the state in ur-
ban entrepreneurial projects are now being more widely recognized, the
key question remains precisely which state actors are to be most involved.
Framed differently: “which actors act on behalf of the state?”. It seems that
in most cases, urban entrepreneurial projects in “emerging” or “develop-
ing” economies, particularly larger scale projects, still rely on the close in-
volvement of central, national-level governments (Golubchikov, 2010). It
is they who often initiate and facilitate boosterist policies with the aim of
eventually asserting the political elite’s power position. Policies and pro-
jects such as these often have a very speculative and experimental char-
acter, meaning that the financial outcomes are uncertain, thus involving
high-risks where public money is involved (Goldman, 2011; Goodfellow,
2017; Lauermann, 2018). This is a phenomenon that has thus far mainly
been witnessed in the Global South, namely the Middle East (Acuto, 2010;
Wippel et al., 2014), Asia (Ong, 2011; Olds & Yeung, 2004) and Africa
(Watson, 2013). When a world city entrepreneurial project is also being
facilitated by foreign capital, such as in the case of Belgrade Waterfront,
an interesting additional layer is added in terms of governance dynamics.
What makes such cases particularly interesting is that while both the pro-
viding foreign or “global” investor and the receiving “domestic” govern-
ment share some similar goals, their respective incentives and rationales
for becoming involved in these kinds of projects can simultaneously differ.
2. Doing Global Urban Research Relationally:

A Matter of Methods
In the same year that Harvey published his urban entrepreneurialism
paper, Manuel Castells (1989) came up with his concept of the (global)
“space of flows”, arguing that spaces and cities are continuously being pro-
duced by what (transnationally) flows through them. This epistemological
shift implies an almost unequivocal compliance with the coexistence of
multiple spatial arrangements (Löw, 2016; Low, 2017; Janković, 2015) –
inter alia, subtracting the assumed fixity of spatial affairs. It has addition-
ally inspired many urban studies scholars who have since applied those
conceptual thoughts in a variety of ontological ways, ranging from the
more structural (e.g. Taylor & Derudder, 2015) to post-structural and as-
semblage approaches (e.g. Jacobs, 2012; Allen, 2016; Amin & Thrift, 2017)
and everything in between (e.g. McCann & Ward, 2010). With the inten-
tion of comprehending the global networks and negotiations that underlie
Belgrade Waterfront, and thus of focusing on the geographies of govern-
ance behind the project, our approach endeavours to combine a political
economic narrative with insights derived from some useful elements of
topological and assemblage analyses. In line with Büdenbender and Gol-
ubchikov (2017, p. 81), our “take on assemblages is more tactical than on-
tological” and is thus located somewhere in between the sharp divides, as
it acknowledges the existence of structured realities whilst concurrently
seeking to trace how they are composed. While allowing us to find out
how state authority is being socially constructed through the role of dif-
ferent actors and materialities (see Allen & Cochrane, 2010; Sassen, 2008),
this approach enables us also to assess how different scales are socially
constructed through relationalities (Massey, 2005). The major advan-
tage of this approach is that it makes possible to discern the mechanisms
through which world city entrepreneurialism operates, while also taking
into account the various and often-conflicting tonalities that actors dis-
play in relation to this project.
Thus, rather than force our observations into neat and harmonious
patterns, we intended to extract as much as possible from the recent res-
toration of processual thinking (e.g. Abbott, 2016) and “agency-driven”
methodological prescriptions. If the maxim proposed by Desmond (2014,
p. 565), “processes live in relations”, is truly adopted it then appears nec-
essary to reject the view of (collective) actors as “culturally bounded”, al-
lowing them instead to create boundaries through conflict permeated by
a distinct moral grammar and interpretative strategies. Such methodologi-
cal approaches make it possible to retrieve the enduring pursuit of power,
recognition and resources that exists within urban affairs and particularly
in defining “public space” (Vigneswaran, Iveson & Low, 2017). Still, the
focus set on the field where these relations enmesh, seeks to go beyond
merely registering relevant actors and aims to discern the very rationale
of action or involvement. As Hoyler and Harrison (2018) state in their
concluding remarks in the recent edited volume, Doing Global Urban
Research, a trend towards agency-focused research has indeed helped in
sharpening analytical lenses. Namely, they argue that having asked and an-
swered the “who-questions”, “questions that begin with ‘what’ and ‘where’
will help you define the scale and scope of their agentic role in the global
urban; those starting with ‘how’ will allow you to uncover the strategies
and mechanisms that enable the actor(s) to fulfil this role; and ‘why’ ques-
tions will help to unpack their motivations and interests” (p. 227).
To unravel exactly these research questions regarding the Belgrade
Waterfront project, we have made use of a variety of qualitative research
methods and conducted fieldwork research at different locations. Between
August 2015 and August 2016, we conducted 14 in-depth interviews with
a total of 21 stakeholders in Belgrade, including politicians, consultants,
civil servants, journalists, academics, activists and businessmen. In the se-
lection procedure we aimed to find a balance regarding their pro or con-
tra attitudes to the project. In every interview we asked the respondent
to not only reflect upon their own involvement regarding the Belgrade
Waterfront project but also to share their knowledge with us on what they
thought about the power relations and motivations behind certain actions.
In this way we were able to familiarize ourselves with whatever took place
“behind the frontline” of the project but it also allowed us to better under-
stand why it is that the different opposing groups make use of different
strategic discourses. The insights that we derived from this collected ma-
terial was supplemented by thorough analysis of several policy documents
(mainly issued by the Republic of Serbia and the City of Belgrade), as well
as advertising brochures issued by the Belgrade Waterfront Company. Ad-
ditionally, during the spring of 2018, 13 interviews were conducted with
real estate development experts in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, London and Am-
sterdam. Some of these provided us with important insights into how
UAE-based developers generally perceive transnational real estate devel-
opment activities.
In the remainder of this paper, we will gradually construct our con-
cluding arguments according to the “show, don’t tell-principle”. A relative-
ly large number of quotes will be shared, not only to make the text more
vibrant but even more so to illustrate the actor-perspective in practice as
accurately and as authentically as possible.
3. A New Skyline for Belgrade:

The Main Criticisms
The introduction to this chapter reveals some of the main character-
istics of Belgrade Waterfront or at least how it was presented during its
first announcements in 2013 and 2014. According to Radosavljević (2008),
the Amphitheatre site, on which Belgrade Waterfront is being constructed,
has for quite some time been regarded as a site that could potentially yield
political and societal support for ruling political elites. Over the past cen-
tury, there had been several plans and proposals to develop this centrally
located site but they remained unimplemented for various reasons. This
situation changed from the moment that Aleksandar Vučić rose to power,
from his becoming deputy prime minister in 2012, prime minister in 2014
and eventually president of the Republic of Serbia in 2017. During earlier
electoral campaigns, he assured voters that he had found a foreign investor
that was willing to help the country to finally develop the mainly unused
site along the Sava River, and thus to contribute to the city’s “global profile”.
During 2014, large billboards and advertising exhibition spaces show-
ing a model of BW emerged throughout Belgrade’s city centre, attracting a
lot of attention, from journalists, architects, activists and academics, both
domestic and international. Another factor that contributed to the profile
of the project was, as has already been mentioned, the striking amount
of foreign direct investment (purportedly €3.5 billion) that was quickly
emphasised by those directly involved. Moreover, Vučić himself, the prime

minister at that time, and Siniša Mali, then mayor of Belgrade and a mem-
ber of the same political party as Vučić, often acted as a spokespersons
and ambassadors for the project. From the investor’s side, the well-known
real estate developer, Mohammed Alabbar, who has been the chairman
of Dubai-based developer Emaar Properties for over a decade, presented
himself as the man behind the project. It is known that Alabbar has close
ties to Dubai’s long-time ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Mak-
toum, while also being a member of the Dubai Executive Council, a posi-
tion that gives him a voice in the country’s economic, geo-economic and
political strategies – something we will return to at the end of this chapter.
As has already been indicated, initial reactions to the presentation of
the BW model were generally fairly sceptical and critical. Accusations of
perceived corruption and naivety behind the project went hand in hand
with those stressing a mismatch between such an “elite-serving” project
and the apparent lack of demand for it. The actual motivations behind the
project remained largely opaque. The extent to which BW would serve the
“public interest” thus quickly became a central issue. While urban theory
has consistently emphasised the politics of dissent (e.g. Smith, 2005), it
has hardly been “engaging directly with the ongoing discord that is a char-
acteristic of many urban political contexts” (Phelps & Valler, 2018: 83).
Generally speaking, the project was opposed from its earliest moments
predominantly by urban civil society groups such as activists, profession-
als (journalists, architects and urban planners with links to NGOs), aca-
demics and opposition politicians. A shared social commonality among
these actors is either their privileged academic careers or the rich profes-
sional experience they were able to garner in fields such as architecture,
planning or journalism. This common ground helped shape the bulk of
the criticism levelled at the project itself. We identified six main points
that nearly all of the “opposing stakeholders” advanced during our field-
work. These were: 1) the top-down way in which the project had been
imposed upon them; 2) the illogical design and “inverted” implementa-
tion of the project; 3) the project’s elite-serving and supposedly “exclusive”
elements; 4) the neglect of existing planning laws and regulations; 5) the
lack of transparency regarding planning details and the amount of public
money that was involved; and 6) allegations regarding personal enrich-
ment, money laundering and/or corruption.
The fact that the ruling political elites in Serbia and Belgrade “in-
stantly” came up with an investor and almost immediately presented a
model frustrated many of the aforementioned groups. Two representatives
of the activist initiative Ne da(vi)mo Beograd (which means We Won’t Let
Belgrade D(r)own in English) with whom we spoke indicated that they

found it worrisome that there had not been any international competition
for the design of the project, as required by Serbian law. As an opposition
politician from the City Assembly stressed:
“It is not possible that the mayor, or anybody, decides alone. This is
what Tito did and Hitler and Stalin and Mao Zedong, but [this can]
not [happen] today. There is an obligation to conduct an international
competition, [to look] for architectural solutions” (Opposition politi-
cian, City Assembly).
While a public hearing was organised in 2014, during which citizens
were invited to come up with alternative ideas or solutions, several of our
respondents were convinced that all alternative proposals had been ignored:
“Nobody asks the municipality anything... Only if we have, when they
change some urban plans, all Serbian citizens can give their suggestions;
municipalities can also give their suggestions but, you know, nobody
takes them into consideration” (Municipal Architect, Savski venac).
The top-down implementation of the project was reaffirmed by em-

ployees of the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade, who admitted that
their role in it was fairly limited:
“It was on the state level. It was on the top level. It was on the level of
the prime minister, I think, so it was something that had been decided
before our [Master] plan.” (Civil Servant, Urban Planning Institute).
Furthermore, it was not surprising that immediate and uncompro-
mising criticism of the project’s Master Plan came mainly from members
of the Serbian Academy of Architecture. Apart from disapproval based on
personal taste, they mainly disregarded the design as being “childish” and
“empty”, while they highlighted the lack of integration into the city’s wider
urban fabric – such as, for instance, in terms of issues relating to mobility.
All in all, it seemed to them as though the plan had been simply copy-
pasted from previous developments in the UAE, although the people from
the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade denied this. As one of our re-
spondents, an emeritus professor who also held positions in public spatial
planning agencies, put it:
“Of course, what we saw was really funny. No studies [had been done].
No feasibility studies, no calculations. Nothing. It is just for small chil-
dren, you know. [They] prepared some nice pictures and put two sen-
tences under each picture, and that was all. The city, the state, they have
[communicated] nothing about controlling financial, economic or eco-
logical implications or whatever” (Urban Planning Consultant).
In line with that, many opponents of the project expressed concerns

that BW failed to follow normal planning procedures:
“[...] usually, like in any state in the world I think, the first steps are to
make a plan, to discuss it with stakeholders, to adopt the plan, to make
it official, then to make a project, then to get construction permits and
then to do marketing, yeah? But here, everything was mixed. First there
was the model, then the project, then the plan” (Municipal Urban Plan-
ner and Consultant).
While these criticisms almost unanimously tackled the developers’
lack of professional competence and deviation from standard procedure,
they also displayed a renewed commitment to shaping public spaces and
the possibilities thereof (Vigneswaran, Iveson & Low, 2017). The third
main point of criticism was mainly ideological and referred to the exclu-
sionary nature of building an elite-serving waterfront project which com-
prises only luxury apartments, retail and office space. Many respondents
ridiculed the conspicuous lack of feasibility studies and, more importantly,
expressed serious doubts – based on the rather limited size of the Serbian
real estate market – about whether there would be sufficient interest in
the large quantity of residential and office space proposed. Despite all the
rhetoric on increasing competitiveness and employment, opponents have
seen it as a potential threat, assuming that the project will trigger une-
ven development and act as a catalyst for authoritarianism. These worries
were mainly expressed by activists with links to Ne da(vi)mo Beograd.
Although the BW site had indeed been derelict for decades, a number of
abodes remained, the inhabitants of which had to be relocated when the
site was cleared in preparation for construction. Although government
representatives argued that these domiciles were “illegal anyway” and
that they had been generous in offering compensation to the inhabitants
so they could relocate, many of our respondents had their doubts about
whether the relocations were socially just:
“Everything there was... not state-owned, it was publically owned... It
was a system in former Yugoslavia, so you were a shareholder in your
company and then the company would give you an apartment. And
they got a promise and they got the apartment in the beginning of the
1990s, but then the civil war happened and everything, households,
went to the private sector and stuff like that” (Activist 1).
“...But they were not illegal, that’s important. They just needed to trans-
form from that form of ownership to the new one. So, they had the
right to live there, given to them by the railway company. So yes, they
are not the owners of this place but they are not illegal. They live there”
(Activist 2).
In addition to this, all of the opposing groups stated that the implied
price of housing in BW would result in a sharp mismatch with the average
income in Belgrade and would thus be unaffordable for the vast majority
of people:
“We have so much office space here in Belgrade that is actually empty.
And you cannot rent it or sell it or... So, who is going to come to rent
an office here? Or to buy an office, or to buy an apartment? Who? The
salary here in Belgrade is around 450 euros per month. In [the rest of]
Serbia it is 350. It’s... impossible to imagine...” (Urban Planning Con-
sultant).
Apart from the supposed lack of demand for so much high-end resi-
dential and office space, several respondents indicated that they were afraid
the project would become too much akin to a gated community, lacking
public space and essentially rendering the Sava riverbanks private space.
Probably the fiercest point of criticism related to the alleged illegality of
the proposed plans and the fact that new laws were introduced in order to
meet the developers’ needs. In 2015, the Serbian government declared the
project to be of “national importance”, which justified pursuing a so-called
Lex Specialis (Službeni glasnik RS, 7/15) – i.e. a special law that would ap-
ply only to BW and which overrules existing laws regarding planning per-
mission, while simultaneously serving as a permit allowing construction
to begin. As a result of the Lex Specialis, all limitations on the permissible
height of buildings or the required ratio of buildings with “public func-
tions” were stripped away. The ease with which existing laws were being
bypassed led to indignant reactions amongst the project’s opponents:
“[It started already with the] railway station, [which] is officially cul-
tural heritage. It was built in 1884. The facade is protected. So, it’s im-
possible to put anything on that facade because it’s protected. But they
built an enormous, gigantic commercial billboard [in front of it]. So, I,
as a member of the assembly, I asked: ‘how is it possible?’ Where are the
inspectors? Where are the police?”
“Eagle Hills is a private, commercial company. So, you know, they just
ignore the law. The city ignores the rules of the city. Any other private
company would have had big problems to find advertising space. You
know it’s [usually] very expensive, it’s very difficult to find a place, and
they [just came and] have this... So, there is no law in this country, it’s
the Wild West...” (Opposition politician, City Assembly).
Both activists and architects emphasised that they were not necessar-
ily against foreign investment – stating that there is a conspicuous con-
trast between an investor who manages to comply with local laws and one
that just benefits from close ties with local political elites. The initial lack
of clarity and transparency regarding the amount of public money that

was involved in the project was repeatedly highlighted as a major concern.
This contributed significantly to rumours that BW was either a big confi-
dence trick that naïve politicians were unaware of, or that it was a mecha-
nism through which they could eventually enrich themselves:
“All investments are welcome, we don’t have enough investors here, of
course we need international investors, they’re welcome.... But we can-
not be a part of contemporary Europe if we do not respect the rule of
law” (Municipal Urban Planner).
“There is no development without investment, so let’s be clear about
that... But you have to make it transparent, you have to have a system
that defends your rights, the rights of the citizens. And that’s what never
happens here. I mean, you have the system of laws and you have the
investor and then you change the laws, you’re not defending the interest
of the people who vote for you” (Activist 2).
“They are going to have a contract, which is still secret, we don’t know
anything about the contract. So, I suppose that Belgrade has the obliga-
tion to prepare the site, for such large costs, and we are not going to be
able to fulfil that and they’re going to sue us, to get some extra money.
And to share that with the government, and that’s the idea.” (Municipal
Urbanist).
4. Mutual mystifications?
A contract was indeed signed in April 2015 by the Serbian Minister
of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure, Zorana Mihajlović, and the
Chair of the Managing Board of Eagle Hills, Mohamed Alabbar, who
simultaneously represented Belgrade Waterfront Capital Investment
LLC (the “Strategic Partner”), Al Maabar International Investment LLC
(the “Guarantor”), and the Belgrade Waterfront Company (a re-branded
name for what used to be the local subsidiary of Eagle Hills). This con-
tract was, seemingly as a result of increased public pressure, made pub-
licly available a few months later (Joint Venture Agreement – Belgrade
Waterfront Project, 2015). It mainly contains information about how the
newly established “public-private”1 Belgrade Waterfront Company is or-
ganised. While the legal and operational details of this contract are more
extensively discussed by Grubbauer & Čamprag (2019) and Koelemaij
(2018) respectively, the most important thing to note here is that the
project does not contain even close to €3.5 billion of direct investment
1 Although, the usage of the notion “public-private” is somewhat tricky here as it was
admitted to be mainly a government-to-government agreement, see also Section 5.
and that it will be developed in multiple phases, whereby the Republic of

Serbia is responsible for preparation of all basic utility infrastructure and
services, while the “Strategic Partner” is responsible for development of
the project in co-operation with a select number of partner companies.
An example of the latter is the US-based “global architectural company”
RTKL, which was repeatedly mentioned as responsible for designing
BW’s “master plan”.
When we discussed increasing concerns regarding the project’s lack
of transparency with two managers at Eagle Hills (later the Belgrade Wa-
terfront Company), both of Serbian origin and with degrees in interna-
tional business and finance from US universities, their reaction was two-
fold. Firstly, placing at the forefront the logic of markets as an impersonal
force regulating their work (West, 2017), they asserted that many details
were deliberately kept secret precisely because they had to adapt rapidly
to “a fast-changing market”. Secondly, they admitted that it may as well
be better for public opinion concerning the project if they revealed more
details about their plans. This eventually happened to an extent when the
contract was later made public. They did, however, also acknowledge that
most of the main decisions came from the Eagle Hills head office in Abu
Dhabi and that thus they did not always have that much impact on the
way the project was being implemented – although they did emphasise
continuous interaction with Abu Dhabi. This was also carefully admitted
by the Belgrade Mayor’s Chief of Staff, who simultaneously holds a posi-
tion on the Supervisory Board of the Belgrade Waterfront Company (even
though it is a “project at the state level”) and who explains that “only me
and Siniša Mali were there from the beginning and are therefore 100 per-
cent acquainted with the project”:
“We are not dealing with that (advertising campaign), it’s an investor-
story you know... they provide the finance and they’re taking care of
the project, because that’s something that they do the best, you know.
We cannot do that... But it’s... Now, you have (the situation) that the
government is defending the project more than the investor itself, you
know...” (Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff).
While he did acknowledge that this limited decision-making power
was sometimes a bit frustrating, he also accepted and justified these un-
even power relations by stating:
“That is investor-urbanism... ...In this kind of world, you have multi-
national companies, big companies that have businesses all over the
world. They already have that knowledge, you know, they have that
know-how” (Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff).
As a counter-accusation to the allegation that Serbian government in-

stitutions were too secretive about the project, it was rather contradictori-
ly, repeatedly stated that critics of the project continually and deliberately
“mystified” things:
“...it’s again, that mystification, you know. It [would be a] problem for
[every] single investor in the world, to invest only in equity. Now [we
have] one [that] is investing in equity in that amount...[Normally] when
you have a real estate project, you will go into classic project financing,
you are going to the banks, and tell them ‘ok, this is what I have’. But
for political reasons, and we know how people are going to [perceive
that as if] ‘we were selling our land for not even a dime’, but we are not
selling, we are leasing it, but when we show that to them they go like ‘ok
but that’s the same’. It’s not the same! Then of course, when you build
real estate, you will offer apartments for pre-sale, [...] it’s normal, you
know, it’s business, it’s everyday business things, you know... But people
don’t know that, they will always mystify something” (Mayor’s Office
Chief of Staff).
The aforementioned Eagle Hills representatives also argued that their
biggest challenge was to “create a belief amongst the people”, since accord-
ing to them, “there was a lack of knowledge in Serbia about how present-
day business is conducted.” According to them, people still relied too
much on the state to look after them, and they should accept that “changes
in the law are necessary for the international property market” and that
“nations should be competitive with their tax and visa-regimes.” In order
to create some trust and constancy regarding the project, Eagle Hills de-
cided to open a publicly accessible exhibition space as an advertisement
for the project, right next to the future construction site. For this purpose,
they renovated a dilapidated building, making it possible for supporters of
the project to claim that “in a few years time, this whole part of Belgrade
will look as beautiful as this”. They also launched an immense advertising
campaign as a “legitimizing” strategy that imbues the public with what
one researcher recently termed “affective promise” (Dekeyser, 2018). Fur-
thermore, the civil servants, politicians and private actors who defended
the project all emphasized that Alabbar and his other company “Emaar
Properties” had a very reliable reputation across the globe:
“Look at what happened in 2007, when we had the global financial cri-
sis. Many investors worldwide pulled back their investments, but Emaar
did not, they kept their promises” (Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff).
Another common message amongst the executives of the project was
that they continuously downplayed its size or significance, emphasizing
that the project was in fact “nothing special”. Neither within the context of
Belgrade, since “the development of Novi Beograd was a lot bigger” (Acting
Director, Belgrade Land Development Public Agency), nor internationally:
“Because Emaar, the company that is managed by Mr. Alabbar, in 2000-
and... I think that was 14... they had 52 projects all around the world... A
new one being launched every week. In one year, 60+ billion of invest-
ments for just that team. So, it’s not that we [in Belgrade] are something
special, something that they are not used to do... So, it is not something
that was happening because, you know, someone was whispering in the
sheikh’s ear or something... No, these guys are developing mainly in Af-
rica, and I think also in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and so on. So those are
their main projects, and we are just one of them, so...” (Mayor’s Office
Chief of Staff).
In the next section, we will take a closer look at the power relations
behind the early implementation process of BW, supplemented by insights
that were acquired through interviews with real estate development ex-
perts in the UAE. These subsequently also allow us to reflect on the why
questions, or the incentives that lie behind the project and have caused so
much controversy.
5. Rationales and Relationalities

If BW can indeed be categorised as “unexceptional” in any way what-
soever, this can only be because other transnational real estate develop-
ment projects operated by UAE-based companies are equally lacking in
transparency. Based on online research and interviews conducted with
real estate development experts, we have found that many of those trans-
national schemes are actually not as “big” or as “successful” as the Mayor’s
Office Chief of Staff assured us. Although multiple respondents in Abu
Dhabi and Dubai did acknowledge Alabbar’s “cleverness” in many ways,
they also assured us that his transnational activities were in fact rather
experimental:
“What they did is that they formed a new company called Eagle Hills.
So, Eagle Hills is a master developer, based out of Abu Dhabi, it’s effec-
tively [the] Abu Dhabi Government, “royal family money”... It’s run by
Alabbar and he’s doing exactly the same as he did with Emaar Interna-
tional... He’s doing huge schemes, all over the world and, so far, he’s been
making a complete mess of it” (Real Estate Development Consultant).
Later in the same interview, the respondent further explained why
he thought many transnational real estate development projects by UAE-
based companies were failing:
“Alabbar tries to apply Dubai principles to his projects. And those pro-
jects do not work the way that Dubai works. You know, in Dubai or
Abu Dhabi, if he wants to get consent, he will just go ahead, and Emaar
will go ahead, and they will go and start building, even though they
haven’t got a building permit” (Real Estate Development Consultant).
Additionally, several UAE-based real estate development consult-
ants who we interviewed also highlighted the fact that feasibility studies,
which should always be the starting point of a development project, were
frequently not taken too seriously when it came to transnational activi-
ties. According to the experts, another reason why many of them have
not been very successful in the past – apart from unexpected political re-
gime changes or the global financial crisis – is that it is extremely difficult
to successfully develop a project while retaining the main command and
control function at a headquarters in Abu Dhabi and without having a
solid team on location.
As we have already shown, this corresponds to statements by local
representatives of Eagle Hills (the BW Company) who we interviewed. Al-
though they were of course involved in the project’s implementation, the
main decisions continued to come “from above” – i.e. from Abu Dhabi.
Whilst the local representatives firmly and repeatedly stressed that the
primary motives behind the project were economic, explaining that it
“would attract the wealthy Serbian diaspora”, and that the “psychology of
people is similar everywhere, so we will build it and they will come”, our
respondents from the UAE almost unanimously argued that transnational
projects were instead mainly driven by political motives. During the early
implementation phase of BW, some journalists revealed that the project
is not self-contained and that it is part of a wider bilateral agreement that
also includes deals in other sectors (e.g. Wright, 2015). This was also, al-
beit a little hesitantly, alluded to by the Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff:
“Just so you understand, it was G to G business... Government to gov-
ernment. We have those... bilateral agreements, signed with them”
(Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff).
These findings tell us a lot about the actual motives behind the pro-
ject. Despite on-going rhetoric on economic incentives, such as “providing
jobs”, “attracting creative businesses” and “increase Belgrade’s internation-
al competitiveness”, the motives do indeed seem to have been mainly po-
litical and geopolitical (see also Barthel & Vignal, 2014 and Büdenbender
& Golubchikov, 2017 respectively). The developer, being ostensibly private
while possessing close social and financial ties with the government in
Abu Dhabi, operates across scales, selectively co-operating with a growth
coalition including international consultancy firms as well as local and na-

tional-level politicians, civil servants and companies in Serbia. Although
the investors do of course hope to realise some return on their investment
into BW, it is clear that other bilateral agreements are a more attractive
part of the portfolio. Furthermore, UAE elites aim to expand geographi-
cally to gain and maintain legitimacy and visibility or, in other words, to
increase their “symbolic capital” in order to “stay on the map” (see also:
Wippel et al., 2014).
For Serbian political elites, the project also clearly serves to assert
their power position. Despite all the controversies and resistance regard-
ing the project, Vučić was re-elected in 2017, indicating that a large pro-
portion of the electorate continues to have faith in him. In a way, BW can
be regarded as a scale-making project for the Vučić administration. Since
his party, SNS2, currently holds a majority position in both the national
and the city assemblies, they are able to “move” actors from one level to
another with relative ease. This is for instance illustrated by the Mayor’s
Office’s Chief of Staff ’s simultaneous role of being on the Belgrade Wa-
terfront Company’s Supervisory board or the former Mayor of Belgrade,
Siniša Mali, who recently became the Minister of Finance. Furthermore,
the fact that Mali has travelled across the globe to promote the BW model
and advertise the pre-sale of BW apartments also implies that the project
enables “them” to build on their symbolic capital in the arena of the global
wealth elite.
At the same time, however, the international attention the project
has attracted has also inflicted some harm to their image. Due to the fact
that some of the members of the Ne da(vi)mo Beograd activist initiative
are also involved in global activist networks, such as INURA or DiEM25,
the top-down and rather authoritarian way in which BW is being imple-
mented has been condemned by members of the European Parliament.
Particularly in April 2016, when several buildings on Hercegovačka street
(part of the future construction site) were demolished overnight by a
group of unknown, masked men (Zaštitnik građana, 2016). Unsurprising-
ly, these events further galvanised resistance against the project, resulting
in increasing numbers of people attending Ne Da(vi)mo Beograd’s dem-
onstrations in the following weeks (see more in the chapters by Jelisaveta
Petrović and Mladen Nikolić in this volume). Conversely, BW has also ap-
peared to be a scale-making project through which Ne da(vi)mo Beograd
has been able to gain symbolic and political capital. Their movement has
since grown into a political party that participated in the municipal elec-
tions in early 2018. Clearly this story does not end there.
2 Srpska napredna stranka [Serbian Progressive Party]
Conclusion
At the time of writing, the first two residential towers (the BW Resi-
dences complex) have just been completed, two more towers (the BW Vis-
ta complex) and the shopping mall (BW Gallery) are under construction,
while sites for several further buildings are being prepared. This chapter
has focused on a variety of events that occurred during two years of the
early implementation phase of this large-scale real estate development
project – a project that has attracted widespread attention and which con-
tinues to cause a great deal of controversy. We have adopted an approach
that has allowed us to focus on the role of agency, as well as the mutual
relationalities between the most prominent actors on and behind the pro-
ject’s “frontline”. This methodological strategy enables us to critically en-
gage with contemporary debates regarding state rescaling and world city
entrepreneurialism, as well as discussing the stated rationales and moti-
vations behind similar controversial, speculative real estate development
projects. For that reason, we would like to encourage others to persist in
conducting follow-up research that could further elaborate on our insights
and analyses. We continue to hope that the “mist” still currently obscuring
Belgrade Waterfront and its “frontline” will eventually lift.
First, we can conclude that world city entrepreneurial practices, par-
ticularly those falling outside the so-called Euro-American context, are of-
ten initiated and facilitated by central governments rather than local ones.
While the political elites backing such projects try to justify them mainly
by relying on economic advertising jargon that relates to “boosting” the
future urban economy, they are actually boosting and asserting their own
symbolic power position through experimental development schemes that
are primarily “meant to impress”. Adding the layer of transnationalism to
this theoretical concept opens up another dimension regarding the politi-
cal and geopolitical incentives behind the scenes. On the basis of our re-
search, we state that transnational real estate developments are often gov-
ernment to government agreements and that they cannot be understood
as stand-alone projects. In other words, they seem to be a part of wider
bilateral agreements or strategic political decisions. While geo-economics
and geo-politics frequently co-exist, the latter appears to dominate.
A second conclusion that we want to emphasise is that a project like
BW can serve elites by being a scale-making project, in that it allows the
main actors to operate across and “jump between” different scales in or-
der to extend their coalitions and thus their actual power. Although the
decision-making processes behind BW appears, at first sight, to indicate
scalar hierarchies where a “global” investor makes the decisions that are
then executed by national-level politicians and civil servants at the ex-

pense of the existing plans and ideas of local-level policy-makers and civic
society groups, our analysis illustrates that this is not the whole story. It
has proved to be the case that those actors who are able to “jump scales”,
including the opponents of the plan, are in fact the ones who possess the
most political and strategic capital. Along with Leon (2017) and other
critical scholars who have discussed urban entrepreneurialism in the spirit
of David Harvey, we can therefore also confirm the statement that world
city entrepreneurial projects significantly reinforce class relations.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Mila Madžarević for her great help and as-
sistance during our fieldwork, as well as all of our respondents and the
people who pointed us in the right direction throughout our fieldwork.
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| 67
SOCIOSPATIAL INEQUALITIES
IN THE HOUSING MARKET:
THE OUTCOMES OF
BELGRADE’S SOCIALIST AND
POSTSOCIALIST POLICY REGIME
Barend Wind
Abstract: The housing market in Belgrade is characterized by a structural dis-

equilibrium: the median income is far too low to enable most people to af-
ford the average sales price for a small family apartment. This chapter tries to
build an understanding of this situation by positioning housing in the political
economy of Serbia’s rudimentary welfare state. Serbian cities have nearly uni-
versal homeownership (up to 90% of the population resides in owner-occupan-
cy). Tenure inequality might be limited, but it would be delusive to conclude
that the housing market in Belgrade does not generate other inequalities. In
this chapter, we distinguish between inequality regarding: 1) housing wealth,
2) housing conditions, and 3) residential location. We describe how these three
forms of inequality coincide with socio-economic status and birth cohorts. The
combination of housing privatization during the transition from a socialist to
a market economy is followed by an incomplete marketization of the underly-
ing assets, which has slowly reshuffled households across urban space. In this
chapter, we reflect on the outcomes of this process by showing which neigh-
bourhoods, socio-economic groups and birth cohorts can be considered win-
ners and losers in terms of wealth, housing conditions and residential location.
The empirical results are based on the ISR (Institute for Sociological Research)
survey, conducted in 2012. The analyses show that privatized housing assets
function as welfare arrangements (by providing income in in-kind benefits) for
many, but that the marketization of housing increases the economic vulnerabil-
ity of younger households with limited resources.
Keywords: housing wealth, asset-based welfare, homeownership, spatial justice
68 | Barend Wind
Introduction
Socio-economic inequality and socio-spatial segregation have in-
creased since the fall of communist regimes in nearly all Central and East-
ern European countries (Brade et al., 2009; Marcińczak et al., 2015). These
findings cannot be translated one-to-one to Belgrade (Serbia), due to the
heritage of Yugoslavia’s distinct (quasi-market) socialist model and Serbia’s
distinct (slow and messy) path towards a market economy. However, as in
other postsocialist countries, Serbia has privatized public rental housing,
deregulated spatial planning and liberalized the housing market. In terms
of housing costs, housing wealth, housing quality and spatial quality, these
measures have generated winners and losers who are distributed unevenly
across age cohorts and socio-economic groups. Unfortunately, detailed ac-
counts of the socio-spatial patterns that have emerged in Belgrade during
the transition period are lacking.
After the collapse of the Serbian League of Communists in 1990, hous-
ing allocation mechanisms that formerly suppressed class-based segrega-
tion were dismantled and the economy liberalized. The state monopoly
over spatial planning and development ceased to exist and publicly-owned
companies that distributed housing among their workers were privatized
or dissolved. Therefore, academic commentators from the 1990s argued
that the urban structure of the socialist city (often characterized by spatial
inequality on the basis of regime-loyalty) would soon become more simi-
lar to other European (particularly Western European) cities in which the
market has already been the dominant allocator of housing for decades
and which are often characterized by more pronounced income-based
forms of urban inequality (Sailer-Fliege, 1999). Whereas institutions may
have changed overnight, spatial patterns do not change at a similar pace as
they require residential mobility as well as construction of new and demo-
lition of old housing. During the 1990s, residential mobility was limited,
as the give-away privatization of publicly-owned housing allowed work-
ing class households to purchase apartments they could have never have
afforded in a “free” housing market (Yemtsov, 2007). Hence, the socialist
distribution of households across the urban space could persist during the
first phase of the transition to a capitalist economy. According to Struyk
(1996), housing played a role as a “shock absorber”.
At present two generations have navigated through a postsocialist
housing market to find their first home. All those who were too young to
buy their home as part of a privatization scheme are confronted with this
new reality. The introduction of a market for land and housing has driven
up land and house values at central locations, leaving young households
Socio-Spatial Inequalities in the Housing Market | 69
with low incomes no other choice than to suburbanize or to rely on fam-

ily assistance to find affordable housing in a more central neighbourhood.
Evidence from across postsocialist Europe shows a gradual displacement
of former blue-collar workers by highly-educated youngsters in central
districts of popular cities (e.g. Prague and Budapest), indicating gentri-
fication (Ouředníček et al., 2015; Kovacs, and Szabó, 2015) (see more in
the chapter by Vera Backović in this volume). On the other hand, evidence
also shows that the socialist stratification of housing is tenacious, as fami-
lies hold on to their socialist-era housing assets and use them as a source
of family-help (Druta & Ronald, 2018). In an analysis of postsocialist Bel-
grade, Kušić and Blagojević (2013) poetically argue that “post-socialist
cities are the result of ‘multiple transformations’. Their ‘morphology, land
use and social segregation’ are similar to ‘typically capitalist cit[ies]’, but
in part they still ‘resemble frozen mirrors of socialism’. In Belgrade, also,
the urban landscape is torn between the heritage of the socialist era and
dynamic post-socialist processes” (p. 283).
This chapter attempts to understand the effect of the socialist and
postsocialist stratification of housing on the socio-spatial structure of Bel-
grade, the capital of Serbia (1.6 million inhabitants). The stratification of
housing entails the distribution of housing tenure (homeownership versus
rental housing), housing wealth, housing affordability and overcrowding
across socio-economic groups. The chapter compares the stratification
of housing for three groups with different housing careers. These three
groups are based on the birth cohort of all household members due to
the fact that the period in which various household members entered the
housing market impacts upon their current housing situation. The first
group consists of households in which the head of the household is born
before 1965 and there are no adult children (older than 25) living in the
home. Although all cohort demarcations are inherently questionable,
those households are likely to have fulfilled their housing needs under
socialism, as the head of the household was over 25 (the average mari-
tal age) by 1990. The second group consists of households in which the
head of the household was born after 1965 and there are no members of
their parents’ generation living in the household. These households have
most certainly entered the housing market during the postsocialist period.
The third group consists of households with adult members born before
and after 1965, belonging to different generations. Their housing choices
might be influenced by both the socialist and the postsocialist policy re-
gimes. Comparison of the three groups with their different housing ca-
reers is based on the assumption that their housing patterns are the result
of a differential exposure to the two policy regimes, whilst also remarking
70 | Barend Wind
that the results might be less pronounced than expected as many young
households use parental resources accumulated under socialism to enter
the housing market.
The empirical work was carried out on the basis of the ISR Survey, a
nation-wide survey of household consumption, income, and wealth. The
survey was carried out in 2012 by the Institute for Sociological Research
in Belgrade and contains more than 2,200 households in Serbia (653 in
Belgrade). This allows for descriptive analyses on the sub-city level and for
multivariate analyses of housing patterns in the Belgrade urban region on
the individual level.
The empirical analyses contribute to at least three debates. First, they
contribute to the literature on the role of (historic) institutions in pro-
ducing (present-day) social and spatial inequalities. The concept of in-
stitutional sedimentation is mentioned in the context of spatial planning
(Willems, 2018) but has never been used as an analytical tool in hous-
ing studies. Second, this chapter shows the role of housing assets in the
provisioning of welfare. Whereas the role of asset-based welfare is widely
discussed in the Western European context, evidence on the postsocial-
ist context is scarce (for a notable exception see Druta & Ronald, 2018).
Third, this chapter enriches studies of postsocialist housing by focusing
on a context with a different starting point (the more liberal form of so-
cialism in Yugoslavia – see Estrin, 1991) and transition to a market econ-
omy (characterized by a devastating inter-ethnic war during the 1990s).
This chapter continues with an overview of the literature on housing
and welfare, in general terms, and in postsocialist countries in particular.
Subsequently, this chapter discusses Serbia’s socialist-era policy frame-
work and Serbia’s postsocialist-era policy framework on housing. After a
description of the data and methods used, the main findings are discussed
and positioned in the international literature.
Welfare, Housing and Segregation

The stratification of housing can only be understood as a part of wider
social stratification. The welfare regime determines the level of income in-
equality and impacts indirectly – through the purchasing power it provides
– on the stratification of housing. Spatial planning and housing policies
directly impact upon the stratification of housing by altering what kind of
housing individuals with different levels of purchasing power can afford.
Esping-Andersen (1990) defines three ideal-typical welfare regimes,
based on the degree of decommodification (protection against market
risks) and the nature of stratification. First, in the liberal welfare regime
(e.g. the US), the market is the main distributional mechanism. The state
provides a minimum level of means-tested social assistance, whereas so-
cial insurance to bolster incomes in times of need is provided by mar-
ket actors. This results in high levels of income inequality. Second, in the
conservative welfare state regime (e.g. Germany) the non-profit sector is
the main distributional actor. The state provides a moderate level of social
assistance, whereas state-mandated and occupationally fragmented non-
profit organizations provide social insurance maintain the recipient’s so-
cial status even in times of unemployment. Finally, in the social democrat-
ic regime (e.g. Sweden), the state is the main distributional mechanism.
The state manages generous and universal social assistance and social in-
surance schemes and generally levies progressive taxes, resulting in a more
equal distribution of incomes.
Housing can be considered the “wobbly pillar” of the welfare state
(Torgersen, 1987), as it fulfils a social need but is mainly allocated through
the market – unlike the other welfare domains such as healthcare, edu-
cation and social security. Homeownership and welfare are, however, in-
trinsically connected. Given that most welfare arrangements are forms of
horizontal redistribution (within an individual, across the course of their
life) rather than vertical redistribution (from higher income groups to
lower income groups), homeownership competes with the opportunity to
contribute and the necessity to use collective welfare arrangements (Ke-
meny, 1981; Castles, 1998). First, paying welfare contributions crowds out
mortgage payments or savings for building materials. Second, homeown-
ers need a lower pension after retirement due to the low costs associat-
ed with outright ownership of their home. Homeownership as (partial)
replacement of second-tier pension schemes is the core characteristic of
passive asset-based welfare (Ronald & Kadi, 2017). Passive asset-based
welfare is an essential element of Mediterranean countries with a familial
and multi-generational tradition of homeownership (Allen et al., 2008).
Active asset-based welfare occurs especially in liberal welfare states, as it
allows homeowners to use their housing wealth as an addition to second-
tier pensions by selling their home, or by using reverse mortgages. Pro-
active asset-based welfare is based on the rental income from secondary
property ownership, especially common in conservative welfare states
with fragmented coverage.
Socio-economic and housing inequalities do not automatically trans-
late into segregation, but segregation does seem to exacerbate these same
inequalities. Whereas the egalitarian Nordic countries are characterized
by considerable levels of ethnic segregation, the more unequal Mediter-
72 | Barend Wind
ranean countries are characterized by the lowest levels of segregation on

the continent (Arbaci, 2007). The explanation can be found in differences
in spatial planning doctrines but also in the role of the market in the al-
location of housing. In countries where the family plays a large role in the
allocation of housing due to self-construction and inheritance, the link
between income stemming from the labour market and the housing mar-
ket is weaker, resulting in less segregation (Allen et al., 2008). In near-
ly all European capital cities, socio-economic segregation has increased
(Marcińczak et al., 2015). First, this is the result of welfare state restruc-
turing in a neoliberal and productivist direction, generating more uneven
income distributions. Second, this is the result of the uneven absorption
of capital by the built environment, making way for lucrative redevelop-
ment projects that gradually displace low income residents. The overall
upswing of socio-economic segregation results in a concentration of hous-
ing wealth (Wind & Hedman, 2018). New housing market cleavages could
increasingly become cleavages of welfare as well.
Serbia’s Socialist Policy Regime

Serbia’s socialist welfare model cannot be understood on the basis of
Esping-Andersen’s theory that takes the “democratic class struggle” as its
starting point. Although Yugoslavia’s socialist model was characterized by
more freedom and market influence than Soviet communism, the internal
dynamic of its political decision-making was not guided by democratic
competition for the working– or middle-class vote (Dyker, 2013). Oren-
stein (2008) points at four distinctive characteristics of the communist
welfare model that also fit the Yugoslav case. First, the model is character-
ized by full employment for both genders. This was achieved mainly by al-
locating labour through state-owned companies. Second, the communist
welfare model is not characterized by financial transfers to low-income
households, but by subsidies for life necessities, such as food, housing,
holidays and culture. Third, it is state-owned companies, rather than the
state itself, that take care of the welfare needs of their workers. As a re-
sult, the communist welfare model is fragmented along the lines of occu-
pational status – just like conservative-corporatist welfare states. Fourth,
welfare strategies are used to create loyalty towards the state, rather than
protecting workers against market risks.
The Yugoslav welfare model differs from the models in states domi-
nated by the Soviet Union. First, decision-making was more decentralized
due to the federal nature of the state and the belief that local decision-
making was better able to satisfy local needs. Second, the influence of
workers on social and economic processes was greater. After the incor-
poration of self-management in the constitution of 1974, the influence
of workers’ councils in state-owned companies was increased and work-
ers were allowed to become shareholders in socially-owned enterprises.
Third, the Yugoslav model can be considered to be a form of market so-
cialism in which competition was encouraged, resulting in higher qual-
ity products and more exports (Estrin, 1991; Thomas, 1999). The socially
and publicly (state and municipality) owned companies functioned as the
main providers of life-long social security. As a consequence, those em-
ployed in other sectors, faced lower living standards due to a lack of social
protection (FES, 2011).
Yugoslavia’s socialist housing system has shifted from a state-led mod-
el right after World War II, to a social-market model before the dissolu-
tion of the socialist state in 1990 (Le Normand, 2014). The rapid industri-
alization of Serbia after WWII triggered a wave of rural-urban migration
that needed to be accommodated in the larger cities. A state monopoly of
land supply for new housing construction, based on the collectivization of
buildable land, gave local authorities the opportunity to remove the cost
of land from the cost of new housing (Waley, 2011). Based on the ideol-
ogy that housing is a primary social good (Ristić-Trajković et al., 2014),
the production costs of housing led the new developments, largely discon-
necting disposable income from housing consumption. In this period, the
municipality and publicly-owned companies took the lead in construct-
ing housing, distributing it among their employees via use-rights. This
allowed blue-collar workers, seen as the ideological and political bearers
of the state, to obtain affordable housing in modern, small-scale housing
estates, alongside white-collar civil servants. However, the distribution
of socially-owned housing also generated considerable inequalities, as it
prioritized the needs of those loyal to the state – mostly those well-posi-
tioned in state-owned and socially-owned companies (Petrović, 2001). In
Belgrade, first-generation socialist housing can be considered a form of
post-war reconstruction, filling the empty spaces in the urban fabric. In
later stages, large-scale housing projects, envisioned as neighbourhoods
with their own cultural and community centres and commercial facilities,
were based on public land ownership, construction subsidies and strict
planning regulations. The prime example of such development is Novi
Beograd (New Belgrade), envisioned as a socialist model city, with mod-
ernist residential blocks in a garden-like environment – see, for example,
neighbourhoods such as Pionir and Fontana (Waley, 2011). Whereas ini-
tially most housing blocks were developed by the municipality, the army
and several large state-owned enterprises, during the 1960s and 1970s
74 | Barend Wind
housing cooperatives took on a larger role in developing housing for their

members. After the economic reforms of the 1980s, construction firms
evolved into competing real-estate developers, using bank credit and com-
pany profits to develop housing estates with a more playful design – for
example, the Cerak vinogradi neighbourhood (Kušić & Blagojević, 2013).
A considerable share of the population remained outside the focus
of “mainstream housing policy”, especially the party nomenklatura and
those who could not obtain housing through the official housing dis-
tribution system turned towards self-construction. By the 1960s it had
already became clear that the government did not have the means to in-
vest in housing for those not employed in publicly and socially-owned
enterprises (Kos, 1994). In line with other Southeast European coun-
tries such as Bulgaria and Hungary, Yugoslavia began to permit informal
forms of self-construction (Tsenkova, 2011). The urban fringe became
a place for all those who could not obtain housing through the official
housing distribution system: such as employees of publicly or socially-
owned companies stuck on waiting lists or low-income rural-urban mi-
grants employed by private small or medium-sized companies located in
the city. Le Normand (2014) shows that this strategy is reinforced in the
1970s and 1980s by allocating increasing amounts of land to the devel-
opment of single-family housing (for example, the settlements of Block
49 or Block 60 in New Belgrade), which were in higher demand than
the ideologically-preferable apartments blocks (see Ristić-Trajković et al.,
2014 for an overview of socialist ideology and housing forms). Mean-
while, financial incentives were introduced to enable households, rather
than the state or employers, to bear the cost of construction: “in line with
economic reforms at the federal level aimed at increasing competition,
banks would be given a role in financing housing, through what was es-
sentially a mortgage system. Persons who did not obtain a housing unit
from their employer could apply for a loan, based on their ability to pro-
vide 50 percent of the cost” (Le Normand, 2014:167). The party nomen-
klatura, who were prioritized through the official housing distribution
system, also granted itself the freedom to construct villas (sometimes as
second homes) outside of this system, mostly at attractive locations in the
leafy neighbourhoods around the city centre. A practice that intensified
in the 1990s. As Hirt (2009) argues, “[i]n Belgrade, however, building il-
legal homes also became a strategy of the upper classes, including elites
in the Milošević regime, who did so to prey on public space and infra-
structure. The city’s most desirable areas, Dedinje and Senjak, became
ridden with such illegal villas; in fact, entire new neighborhoods, like Pa-
dina, were created in this fashion” (p. 298).
Altogether, at the end of the socialist period, Belgrade was a moder-

ately mixed city: the pre-war city remained socially mixed due to a high
degree of private ownership combined with familialist housing practices
(Tsenkova, 2011), whereas the new modernist model neighbourhoods
were mixed due to the allocation of use-rights of housing on the basis
of one’s employer rather than one’s income. Low-income households con-
centrated in self-built housing in the urban periphery, whereas the elite
concentrated in separate villa estates in Dedinje and certain parts of New
Belgrade. Passive asset-based welfare was a cornerstone of the Yugoslav
welfare regime. The provision of use-rights for housing (rather than prop-
erty rights) through a wide variety of strategies (from self-construction
to building publicly or socially-owned apartment blocks), resulted in low
housing costs throughout the life course, allowed the state to keep welfare
expenditures low.
Serbia’s Postsocialist Policy Regime

The dissolution of the Serbian League of Communists in 1990
marked the beginning of a wave of economic liberalization, whilst also
ushering in authoritarian rule under subsequent Milošević governments.
This combination resulted in practices of crony capitalism, which had ma-
jor consequences for the provisioning of welfare. State-owned companies,
previously the main supplier of welfare, were privatized or became bank-
rupt. Subsidies for life necessities were also rapidly abolished (Upchurch
& Marinković, 2011; Mikuš, 2016). As in other communist Central, East
and Southeast European countries, international organizations such as the
World Bank and IMF propagated private ownership, economic liberali-
zation and free trade (Stenning et al., 2011). Although these reforms al-
ready rendered the communist welfare state obsolete by the early 1990s,
a thriving market economy based on (international) trade did not emerge
due to the Yugoslav wars (Orlović, 2011). Instead, a new business elite
emerged that made a fortune from the privatization of state-owned as-
sets and the import of goods during the war. On the other hand, a large
group of workers in publicly and socially-owned enterprises became re-
dundant (FES, 2011). Across the board, living standards fell sharply dur-
ing the 1990s and socio-economic inequality increased. In real terms,
Serbia’s GDP reached 72 percent of its 1989 level only in 2008 (Uvalić,
2011). During the transition period, the government’s response was lim-
ited, inadequate and fragmented, just as in most other post-communist
countries. As Orenstein (2008) puts it: “While communist economies had
not performed particularly well, they did ensure a basic standard of living
76 | Barend Wind
for all. As this guarantee began to unravel, governments sought to address

the growing social crisis with a set of emergency responses that shaped
welfare-state policy through the mid-1990s” (p.83). Serbia did not develop
a comprehensive welfare model: some groups were moderately covered by
privatized pensions but the overall level of welfare arrangements (unem-
ployment, sickness and pension schemes) remained insufficient to finance
basic needs such as food, energy and housing (FES, 2011). As a result, the
role of the (extended) family in providing social security through resource
pooling increased. All across (South-) Eastern Europe, post-communist
states developed rudimentary welfare states supplemented by family-help,
whereas the Northern European postsocialist countries developed classic
liberal welfare models with small and means-tested benefits (Fenger, 2007).
As housing played a pivotal role in Yugoslavia’s socialist welfare state,
the collapse of communism impacted the construction and allocation of
housing. With the dismantling of those publicly and socially-owned enter-
prises that owned a large share of the post-war housing stock, the state was
confronted with the question of whether to turn these housing units into
(1) social/private rental housing, or (2) into owner-occupancy. As the first
option was costly due to high maintenance costs and the second option
highly propagated by international institutions such as the World Bank
and the IMF, most states opted for the latter (Pichler-Milanovich, 2001).
In Serbia, more than 95 percent of all publicly-owned housing was privat-
ized for give-away prices during the economic and ethnic turmoil of 1990s
(Hirt, 2009). De facto, not much changed. The use-rights of housing that
formed the basis of the Yugoslav passive asset-based welfare model were
transformed into property rights that form the basis of the current Serbian
system of passive asset-based welfare. However, responsibilities for main-
tenance shifted to the new owners, resulting in poor housing conditions
(Mandić, 2010). As the newly acquired housing assets could be traded on
the market rather than exchanged within family circles, the accumulation
of housing wealth gave rise to the opportunity for active asset-based wel-
fare by liquidating assets and moving down the housing ladder.
The privatization of publicly and socially-owned housing has per-
petuated the socialist distribution of households across urban space. The
alternative, transforming them into private rental housing would undeni-
ably have resulted in an increase of rental costs at popular locations, even-
tually reshuffling households towards a market-based spatial order with a
higher degree of segregation. Struyk (1996) argues that the privatization of
housing should be seen as the shock absorber during the transition phase,
as outright homeownership allows households to sustain their livelihood
with very limited social benefits.
During the first transition period, the construction of informal settle-

ments spiked due to falling levels of legal housing production and loosely
enforced planning regulations. With the fall of socialism, belief in plan-
ning also collapsed. On the one hand, this could be due to ideological
reasons, on the other, planning was perceived as an obstacle for the new
ruling class of entrepreneurs (Vujošević & Nedović-Budić, 2006). In the
1990s, the lack of consistent and comprehensive urban planning and the
absence of publicly and socially-owned companies, which had previously
carried out most of the housing construction program, resulted in a de-
cline of housing construction from 10,000 units per year in the 1980s to
close to zero by the early 1990s (Kovachev et al., 2017). At the same time,
construction of informally-built family homes on the urban fringe – a
practice that gained ground during the socialist era – skyrocketed (Tsen-
kova, 2011). In Belgrade, Kaluđerica, an informal settlement on the urban
fringe, grew to 60,000 inhabitants in just a few years. This was particu-
larly the result of an influx of rural households, internally displaced per-
sons and returning guest workers, all searching for economic opportuni-
ties in the city. While building standards and spatial quality may be low,
these settlements are by no means home only to the urban poor who are,
nonetheless, overrepresented in these neighbourhoods (Bajić et al., 2016).
Whereas construction on vacant land or additions to existing buildings
resulted in the densification of existing neighbourhoods (Žegarac, 1999),
uncontrolled urban sprawl has reduced the overall density of the urban
area (Zeković et al., 2015). According to Bertaud (2012), Belgrade is Eu-
rope’s least efficient capital city, as urban land use consumption is 670m2
per inhabitant.
The only legal spatial developments in the early transition period are
new business and leisure facilities, built to take advantage of the tertiari-
zation of the economy (Aranđelović et al., 2017). In Belgrade, across the
city, new shopping malls appeared, and in New Belgrade – once the ad-
ministrative core of socialist Yugoslavia – a new business district emerged
(Jovanović & Ratkaj, 2014). Evidence from other former Yugoslav cities
shows that changing land-use patterns function as a catalyst for the pop-
ularity of centrally located neighbourhoods, which have become attrac-
tive residential and leisure areas (Spevec & Bogadi, 2009). In Belgrade,
the redevelopment of industrial sites, often “located in the most attractive
central parts of the city (e.g., in Novi Beograd) as a result of the com-
munist policy of prioritizing industry over other land uses [...] presents
a substantial planning challenge, as all recent planning documents indi-
cate” (Hirt, 2009:300). After the year 2010, many of them are transformed
into creative hotspots. In Zagreb, it is argued that these processes have
78 | Barend Wind
driven up property values. However, the inertia of the socialist housing

stratification has preserved a social mix: “a part of the housing stock in the
historical centres of Croatian cities has been renovated, but due to a high
share of low-income elderly, a large part is still in worn-out condition and
reconstruction is limited” (Spevec & Bogadi, 2009:464). In Belgrade, parts
of the old town have lost some of their population as “residents began sell-
ing their properties to commercial bidders (e.g., the district of Stari Grad
or Old Town, for example, lost 18% of its residents in about 10 years)”
(Hirt, 2009:300). This process is reflected in the geographical distribution
of house values, ranging from 700 EUR/m2 at peripheral locations to 4,500
EUR/m2 at central locations in 2010 (Bajat et al., 2018). The renovation of
old factories and warehouses in Stari grad, Vračar and Savski venac signals
gentrification (of facilities), and is translated in relatively high property
prices for those who move in as new residents. However, a substantive
share of the housing stock has not changed hands since 1990, which limits
residential gentrification.
Having been absent for nearly two decades, spatial development re-
turned to the political agenda during the second decade of the 21st cen-
tury. Across postsocialist countries, governments started to once again
actively intervene in the built environment, often in collaboration with
commercial partners. The social objectives are subjugated to economic
ones, based on a narrowly understood form of there-is-no-alternative pol-
itics (Lalović et al., 2015). The development of the waterfront project in
Belgrade is an emblematic case of this new approach to spatial planning.
Koelemaij (2017) describes the waterfront project, carried out as a joint
venture between an Abu-Dhabi-based investor and the Serbian govern-
ment, as a prime example of risk-taking entrepreneurial behaviour by the
local and national government. Increasing property values in the city are
presented as an investment in the common good, even though the aver-
age Belgrader (with a median monthly income of around 600 euros) can-
not afford the new developments (apartments are currently selling at over
300,000 euros). As land privatization and restitution in Serbia has been
less pronounced than in other postsocialist countries, resulting in 84 per-
cent of the land within the boundaries of Belgrade’s master plan being
owned by the state (Nedović-Budić et al., 2012) and hence enabling the
state to guide spatial development through intransparent individual ar-
rangements. Through changes in the institutional framework, the Serbian
government triggers demolition-reconstruction practices in the existing
urban fabric in order to improve the investment opportunities and po-
tential returns of private parties but without taking into account displace-
ment of former residents (Cvetinović et al., 2017).
When compared with previous generations, the generations that came

of age during the transition find themselves in a more difficult position in
terms of securing adequate housing: unemployment rose sharply and (of-
ficial) housing supply plummeted. Empirical research shows that a combi-
nation of both factors caused a postponement of critical life course events,
such as establishing independent households, marriage and childbirth.
Tomanović (2012) points out that in 2011, 57 percent of individuals in the
18–35 age group were still part of their parents’ household. Marriage (oc-
curring in Serbia on average around the age of 25, see UNECE, 2018) trig-
gers the establishment of an independent household for some but triggers
forms of more intense multi-generational living for others. Although the
financial situation for the younger age group has improved considerably
between 2003 and 2011, the housing situation has not improved. Simi-
lar findings are apparent throughout former Yugoslavia due to econom-
ic, housing and cultural factors (Tomanović, 2012). The same could be
said, to a lesser extent, of Mediterranean countries such as Italy (Mulder
& Billari, 2010). Tomanović (2008) argues that the role of the family in
the provision of housing and welfare “recognized by socialist system poli-
cies, which oriented most rights and privileges towards the family (e.g.
housing policy) rather than towards individuals. In the postsocialist pe-
riod, the security basis provided by the socialist system was ruined, and
families became even more important as providers of resources (material
and non-material)” (Tomanović, 2008:6). For young people, co-residence
with parents seems to be the main way to solve the housing crisis. If cou-
ples eventually establish their own household, other forms of family help
might play a role. Although these practices are less well documented in
Serbia, evidence from other Southeast European postsocialist countries
(e.g. Romania) shows that such strategies might entail the use of family
savings, the sale of the parental home in order to finance the purchase
or construction of housing on less valuable land, or exchanging housing
within the family (Druta & Ronald, 2018).
Since the beginning of the transition period, the pattern of land-
use has changed considerably. Belgrade’s city centre and a part of New
Belgrade have seen an increase of commercial and leisure functions that
have been accompanied by rising house values in these areas. The initial
phase of the transition towards a market economy is, however, character-
ized by two features that have barely affected the socialist-era stratification
of housing: 1) the sale of publicly and socially-owned housing to existing
tenants, and 2) the increased intensity of informal construction, particu-
larly by rural-urban migrants and internally displaced persons from the
Yugoslav wars. In later phases of the transition, regulatory changes and
80 | Barend Wind
entrepreneurial urban planning practices have actively undone the social-

ist stratification by 1) driving up house prices, which impacts the housing
market opportunities of young households, and 2) the displacement of in-
habitants from areas selected for redevelopment. In conclusion, a major-
ity of those who entered the housing market under socialism are shielded
from the consequences of the partial marketization of urban space by out-
right homeownership. The generation that came of age during the transi-
tion period needed to navigate through the marketized urban context, in
some cases using their parent’s homeownership and housing wealth as a
buffer against the unavailability and unaffordability of suitable housing.
However, the geographical patterns of their housing decisions remain un-
known.
Data and Methods

The description of changing housing patterns in Belgrade is based on
the ISR Survey, carried out in 2012. This is a nation-wide survey, com-
missioned by the Institute for Sociological Research of Belgrade Univer-
sity, comprising more than 2,500 respondents. The ISR Survey consists
of questions about income, wealth, consumption and various background
characteristics of the household. The analyses focus on a subsample living
in Belgrade (653 respondents). Although sample weights are constructed
on the national level, they are used to improve the reliability of the analy-
ses compared to non-usage of weights.
A classification of neighbourhood (types) is the starting point for a
description of the spatial side of the stratification of housing in Belgrade.
The Belgrade Metropolitan area is comprised of 17 administrative areas
(municipalities). Ten municipalities are predominantly urban (Čukarica,
Novi Beograd, Stari grad, Palilula, Rakovica, Savski venac, Voždovac,
Vračar, Zemun and Zvezdara). They comprise the old town and sur-
rounding old villages that have, in the course of time, turned into urban
neighbourhoods when they became encapsulated by the city. Seven mu-
nicipalities are predominantly suburban (Barajevo, Grocka, Lazarevac,
Obrenovac, Surčin, Mladenovac and Sopot). Some of them are centred
around a core village, but all are part of the housing market of the Bel-
grade Metropolitan region. For this study, a more detailed classification
is used, which cuts through municipal boundaries. The ISR Survey pro-
vides a classification of residents in 1) the city centre, 2) urban neigh-
bourhoods, 3) urbanized suburban areas, and 4) rural suburban areas, re-
sulting in concentric rings around the old town. This classification better
fits the housing market dynamic in the Belgrade Metropolitan Region,

as in each of these “rings” different forms of housing construction and
allocation have been dominant. Whereas the city centre is historically
dominated by private homeownership, the situation in the urban neigh-
bourhoods is more mixed due to a higher level of building activity dur-
ing the socialist era (Tsenkova, 2011). Informal construction, such as in
Kaluđerica, is most pronounced in the urban fringe (the urbanized and
rural suburbs). In contrast to the setup of the ISR Survey, all respondents
living in the municipality of New Belgrade, are classified in a fifth cat-
egory. New Belgrade is considered a separate category as it has a distinct
past and social status compared to other municipalities in the concentric
ring in which it is otherwise located. As it was built as the representative
capital of Yugoslavia, nearly all housing units were publicly or socially-
owned during socialism. Furthermore, the social status of New Belgrade
has remained relatively high throughout history.
Table 1 Distribution of cases across Belgrade’s neighbourhood typology,

supplemented by the share of apartments in the housing stock
Number of Percentage of Percentage

observations observations apartments
City centre 81 12.4% 94.7%
Urban neighbourhoods 203 31.1% 93.6%
New Belgrade 93 14.2% 79.9%
Urban suburban 176 27.0% 83.5%
Rural suburb 100 15.3% 27.7%
Total 653 100.0% 75.0%
The socio-economic status of the household is assessed on the ba-

sis of 1) income and 2) the educational achievements of the head of the
household. A combination of occupational status and income is regularly
used to operationalize the socio-economic status. However, the specifici-
ties of Serbia’s transition towards a market economy legitimize the use of
both income and educational status as proxies for socio-economic status.
Whereas income captures the socio-economic status of the working popu-
lation relatively well, the educational level is more telling for income-poor
and asset-rich pensioners. Both indicators are used simultaneously to lo-
cate housing disparities. The first indicator, the educational level of the
head of the household, is simplified into three categories: low, middle and
82 | Barend Wind
high. Those who did not attend school, did not finish primary school, only
attended primary school, did not finish high school or attended a high
school for practical education are classified as having a low educational
status. Those who attended a technical high school, a grammar school or
attended less than two years of academic education, are classified as hav-
ing a middle educational status. Those who finished an academic degree
or post-graduate education are classified as having a high educational sta-
tus. The second indicator, is simplified into three categories as well: low,
middle and high. These three groups are derived from a procedure that
creates three equally-sized groups based on their income level.
Four variables are taken as indicators of the housing situation: hous-
ing tenure, housing affordability, housing wealth, and overcrowding.
Housing tenure has three categories. Outright and mortgaged homeown-
ers are treated as “homeowners”, due to the small share of mortgaged
homeowners in the sample (3.5%). Family rental (5% of the sample) and
public or company rental housing (1.5%) is treated as “rent-free”. Private
rental housing (8% of the sample, N=51) is considered as a separate cat-
egory. The affordability of housing is operationalized as the percentage of
the household income spent on rent. This variable is available for tenants
only, as others do not pay rent (and information about mortgage amorti-
zation of maintenance costs are not available). Housing wealth is meas-
ured as the self-assessed value of the home. Whereas other studies treat
housing wealth as the house value minus residential debts, in this chapter
housing wealth is considered as the market value of the home only due to
a lack of information on mortgage debt in the ISR Survey (and the limited
use of residential mortgage debt in Serbia). All values are cross-validated
by the interviewer on the basis of sales prices in the vicinity. Overcrowd-
ing is measured by the ratio between the number of household members
and the size of the home. The housing situation is overcrowded if fewer
than15 square metres are available per person.
Separate analyses are carried out for three groups of households that
can be expected to have followed different housing careers. This classi-
fication is based on a distinction in two birth cohorts, while taking into
account the household structure. First, for all singles, couples without
children and couples with children younger than 25 years old, a differen-
tiation is made between those who are likely to have entered the housing
market during socialism (hereafter: a socialist housing career), and those
who most certainly have entered the housing market in the postsocial-
ist period (hereafter a postsocialist housing career). We use the assump-
tion that the beginning of the independent housing career usually starts
around the age of marriage (25 years old in Serbia at the beginning of
the 1990’s [UNECE, 2018]). Therefore, we are able to distinguish between
an older birth cohort (head of the household born before 1965) that was
older than 25 in 1990, and the younger birth cohort (head of the house-
hold born after 1965) that was younger than 25 in 1990. Multigenerational
and complex living arrangements (ranging from parents or grandparents
living with adult children to co-residence with other family members)
are common in Serbia. Multigenerational households in which all adult
household members are born before 1965 are classified as having a social-
ist housing career. Multigenerational households in which all household
members are born after 1965 are classified as having a postsocialist hous-
ing career. Households in which the head of the household (born before
1965) co-resides with an adult member of a younger generation (children
or grandchildren born after 1965), are classified as having a mixed hous-
ing career. In these cases, both the socialist and the postsocialist housing
regime might have impacted upon the housing decisions of the house-
hold members. In a similar fashion, households in which the head of the
household (born after 1965) co-resides with an adult member of an older
generation (parents or grandparents born before 1965), are classified as
having a mixed housing career. Finally, those with missing information on
the relationship between the household members, are classified on the ba-
sis of the birth cohort of the head of the household. The table below sum-
marizes the size of all three housing career groups.
Table 2 Distribution of cases across the three housing career groups
Housing career group N Percentage

Socialist 275 42.11%
Postsocialist 82 12.56%
Mixed 296 45.33%
Total 653 100%
The following chapter presents a mix of descriptive and multivariate

statistical analyses. First, descriptive information about housing tenure,
housing wealth and overcrowding is presented for different neighbour-
hoods, and households with a different educational status. Results are dif-
ferentiated for those with a socialist, postsocialist or mixed housing career.
Subsequently, multivariate OLS regression analyses test the significance of
these patterns.
84 | Barend Wind
Results
The Urban Structure
Serbia is recognized as a familialistic homeownership society, char-
acterized by nearly universal homeownership and a large role played by
the family in the allocation of housing. When five neighbourhood com-
binations in Belgrade are compared, owner-occupancy is the dominant
housing tenure in all of them. Homeownership rates are somewhat high-
er in the urban and rural suburbs of Belgrade (around or just below 90
percent) than in the city centre or other urban districts (where they are
around or just above 80 percent). However, the historic causes of these
high homeownership rates differ. Whereas private ownership in the pre-
socialist housing stock of the city centre and the urban neighbourhoods
remained the dominant tenure during socialism, privatization of publicly
and socially owned housing is the main engine of high homeownership
rates in the post-war stock of urban neighbourhoods and in New Bel-
grade. In the rural and urban suburbs, self-construction during and after
socialism resulted in high homeownership rates. Although not all differ-
ences are significant on the p<0.005 level, Figure 1 indicates that there is
a clear tenure gradient from central to more peripheral locations. Rental
housing is much more common in the city centre and urban neighbour-
hoods (respectively 15% and 11%) than in the urban and rural suburbs
(respectively 7% and 1%). On the one hand, this is the result of a higher
demand for (short-term) rental housing at centrally located areas, while
on the other, the greater flexibility of the older private housing stock for
sub-letting fuels this process. The larger private rental sectors in the cen-
tral parts of Belgrade might be both the outcome of gentrification and the
driving force behind this process.
Whereas tenure inequality between neighbourhood combinations is
limited, housing wealth inequality might be more pronounced. After all,
local house price dynamics determine the financial meaning of owning
one’s home. Figure 2 clearly confirms the pattern sketched out by Bajat et
al. (2018), showing a gradient from high levels of housing wealth in the
city centre to low levels of housing wealth in the rural suburbs. The city
centre (Stari grad, Vračar) has the highest levels of housing wealth (the
median being slightly above 100,000 euros). Households living in the
urban districts surrounding the city centre (the urban parts of Čukarica,
Palilula, Rakovica, Voždovac, Zemun and Zvezdara) have somewhat
lower levels of housing wealth (the median being around 80,000 euros).
Similar levels of housing wealth can be found in New Belgrade. This
might be surprising in comparison with Western European cities, where
modernist high-rise estates have fallen out of grace but the relatively
high quality of building stock and the high level of accessibility boost
house prices in the former socialist utopias. The urban suburbs are char-
acterized by lower house prices due more remote locations, poorer ac-
cess to facilities and the complex legal status of informally-built housing
stock. Households living in these socialist and postsocialist (informally
built) family homes, accumulate less housing wealth than their counter-
parts in New Belgrade (the median being 60,000 euros), but reside in
much larger houses (on average larger than 100m2). The median hous-
ing wealth level in the rural suburbs amounts to only one third of that in
the city centre: 40,000 euros.
Housing tenure across neighborhood combinations in

Belgrade
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
City Center Urban Districts New Belgrade Urban Suburbs Rural Suburbs
Homeownership Private Rental Rent-Free
Figure 1 Housing tenure across neighbourhood combinations in Belgrade.

Source: ISR Survey (2012).
86 | Barend Wind
Housing wealth and housing size in neighborhood

combinations in Belgrade
110000 120
100000 110
90000 100
80000
90
70000
80
60000
70
50000
40000 60
30000 50
20000 40
Housing wealth (EUR) Size (M2)
Figure 2 Median income and housing wealth across neighbourhood

combinations in Belgrade.
Belgrade is characterized by a lower level of socio-economic segre-

gation than could be expected on the high location gradient of house
values. Instead, all neighbourhood combinations have a relatively mixed
population in terms of socio-economic background. Figure 3 shows the
socio-economic composition of different neighbourhood combinations,
based on the educational status and income of the head of the house-
hold. It is remarkable that households with a medium educational status
are well-represented (30–60% of the total population) in all neighbour-
hood combinations, from the city centre to the rural suburbs. However,
households with a high educational status are far more likely to live in
the city centre (57%) or New Belgrade (55%) than in the urban suburbs
(17%) or the rural suburbs (8%). Households with a low educational sta-
tus show a reversed pattern. They constitute a large part of the popula-
tion in the rural suburbs (59%) and the urban suburbs (27%) and a very
small part of the population in New Belgrade (8%) or the city centre
(1%). The distribution of income groups across neighbourhood combi-
nations is more equal due to the low pension incomes of retired people.
As a result, a relatively large share of the inhabitants of the city centre
(22%) and the urban districts (43%) has a low income. Whereas some
of these might be working poor, a majority is likely to be retired em-
ployees of publicly and socially-owned enterprises who enjoyed a high
social status under socialism. The rural suburbs show a reversed pat-
tern: the share of low-educated inhabitants is much larger than the share
of low-income persons, indicating an overrepresentation of “self-made
entrepreneurs”. There are two main reasons why all neighbourhood
combinations are relatively mixed. First, it is the outcome of widespread
ownership of housing that has been occupied by the household since
the socialist period. The allocation of – later privatized – rental hous-
ing was not primarily based on one’s purchasing power but loyalty to-
wards one’s employer. The construction of these complexes throughout
the city has contributed to neighbourhood mixing. The privatization of
these units has prevented displacement of poorer residents, as outright
ownership functions as a hedge against house price inflation. As a result,
well-educated retired people with limited incomes are able to remain in
the urban districts. Self-construction, concentrated in the suburban ar-
eas, has been an attractive strategy for higher middle-class households
to escape the city and for poor rural-urban migrants to get access to the
city’s economic opportunities. The distance between both developments
is small, resulting in relatively mixed communities. Due to the mixed
nature of most neighbourhoods, phenomena such as overcrowding (in
Western Europe associated with neighbourhoods of concentrated disad-
vantage), are widespread throughout the city. The results show that 30
to 35 percent of all homes in the urban districts, New Belgrade, urban
suburbs and rural suburbs can be considered overcrowded.
The over-representation of lower socio-economic groups in the sub-
urban areas, and the overrepresentation of higher socio-economic groups
in the city centre and New Belgrade might be the result of 1) inequalities
that emerged during the socialist period, and 2) processes of gentrifica-
tion and the suburbanization of poverty during the postsocialist period.
However, the current cross-sectional reading of the data does not make
it possible to distinguish between the two. Most likely, both factors play
a role. Historic overviews of Belgrade’s urban development highlight the
concentration of lower-educated and poorer households at the city’s edges,
mainly in informal settlements. The socio-economic profile has likely de-
creased during the 1990s due to the influx of internally displaced persons
resulting from the Yugoslav wars. The results show an overrepresentation
of ethnic minorities such as Roma, Bosniaks and Macedonians in the ur-
ban suburbs (19% of the total population, compared to 12% in the city
centre) and the urban districts. The larger share of private rental housing
in the city centre and the urban districts indicates an increase of the so-
cio-economic status of these areas, as house price increases have rendered
these units unaffordable to tenants with low socio-economic status.
88 | Barend Wind
Socio-economic status of neighborhood combinations in

Belgrade
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Low Medium High
Figure 3. The socio-economic status of neighbourhood combinations in Belgrade.

Social Structure
A comparison of three socio-economic groups shows to what extent
social inequalities translate into housing-related inequalities. Whereas the
tenure distribution only varies to a limited extent between neighbourhood
combinations, tenure inequality between socio-economic groups is more
pronounced. Figure 4 shows that 89 percent of all households with a highly
educated head, are homeowners. Homeownership is even more widespread
among high-income households (93%), indicating that the profitability of
one’s labour market career is more important than high initial credentials
(although both are strongly correlated). Around 84 percent of all low-ed-
ucated households own their home. This figure is even lower if income is
taken as indicator for socio-economic status: 81 percent of all low-income
households own their home. The results indicate that higher educated
households with low labour market earnings more often turn towards hous-
ing alternatives beyond homeownership. Interestingly, the results show that
private rental housing is more common among medium-educated house-
holds (10%) and middle-income households (12%) than among low-educat-
ed households (5%) and low-income households (8%). Whereas households
with a medium socio-economic status can afford private rental housing
(where rents comprise between 30% and 50% of their income), households
with a low socio-economic status turn towards rent-free housing solutions

within the family (as less than 1.5% of the housing stock comprises social
housing). Furthermore, lower and higher educated individuals might have
different forms of social capital deployed to acquire affordable housing,
translating the social stratification into a stratification of housing.
It is deceptive to conclude that housing-related inequalities are limited
because more than three quarters of all socio-economic groups reside in
homeownership. Figure 5 indicates that housing wealth inequality between
different socio-economic groups is considerable. Housing wealth inequality
is more pronounced when educational groups are taken into account, com-
pared to income groups. Education is more suitable as a long-term proxy to
capture the socio-economic status of retired households. Whereas the me-
dian housing wealth of low-educated households is 40,000 euros, it is 60,000
for low-income households, due to an overrepresentation of income-poor
and asset-rich retired households. The median housing wealth of highly
educated households and high-income households is much higher (100,000
euros). The higher average levels of housing wealth among highly educated
households (129,000) compared to high-income households (143,000), in-
dicates that those owning the most expensive housing units are more often
highly educated than high-income earners. It is remarkable that housing
wealth inequality between socio-economic groups is considerable but also
that these groups are not spatially concentrated. This means that the frag-
mentation of housing stock within neighbourhoods causes the inequality
between socio-economic groups in terms of housing wealth.
Housing tenure of households with a different socio-

economic status
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Low Low Medium Middle High High
education income education income education income
Homeownership Private rental Rent-free
Figure 4 The tenure balance for three socio-economic groups in Belgrade.

Source: ISR Survey (2012)
90 | Barend Wind
Median and average housing wealth for different socio-

economic groups
160000 160000
140000 140000
120000 120000
100000 100000
80000 80000
60000 60000
40000 40000
20000 20000
0 0
Low Low Medium Middle High High
education income education income education income
Median value Average value
Figure 5 Median income and housing value for three socio-economic groups in
Belgrade.
A Tale of Two Generations

In the next figures, the stratification of housing is compared across
three distinct housing career groups: households that are likely to have
started their housing career before the collapse of the socialist system in
1990 (head of household born before 1965), households that have started
their housing career during the postsocialist period (head of household
born after 1965 and living independently), and households with a mixed
housing career (household members from different generations born be-
fore and after 1965), impacted by both policy regimes.
A minority (39%) of the individuals that came of age after the fall of
socialism and were 25 years or older in 2012 (the average marriage age),
has established an independent household. The rest (61%), reside in mul-
tigenerational households. Multigenerational living is deeply engrained in
the culture of the former Yugoslav countries and allows for familialistic
forms of welfare and domestic care. However, other sources point out that
the large share of multigenerational households is not primarily the result
of personal preference but merely the outcome of a shortage of affordable
housing (Tomanović, 2012). Our results provide partial evidence for this
claim, as the profile of the independent households with a postsocialist
housing career is socially selective. Whereas only 20 percent of the low-
educated individuals (born between 1965 and 1987) have established their
own household, slightly less than half of the highly-educated have estab-
lished their own household. This might be due to different cultural prefer-
ences but also due to housing market constraints. The results indicate that
those with a postsocialist housing career (born after 1965 who established
their own household) face a different housing market context. Figure 6
shows the tenure balance within the three housing career groups. Whereas
only a few percent of households with a socialist or mixed housing career
reside in private rental housing (4% and 3% respectively), almost a quarter
of the households with a postsocialist housing career rent their homes. One
explanation for the large share of private rental housing is the unafford-
ability of homeownership. With a median labour market income of 6,500
euros per year is it difficult to afford to purchase a home in the urban parts
Belgrade, where the median house value is close to 100,000 euros.
Housing tenure for households with a different housing

housing career
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Socialist Cross-generational Postsocialist
Homeownership Private rental Rent-free
Figure 6 Housing tenure of households with a different housing career.

Households that have followed a different housing career are char-

acterized by different housing market outcomes in terms of housing con-
ditions and housing wealth. Figure 7 shows that, comparing households
with a socialist and a postsocialist housing career, the latter group faces
much higher levels of overcrowding (36% live in overcrowded condi-
tions compared to 20% of those with a socialist housing career). Housing
conditions for multigenerational households are worse still. Even though
members of this group generally live in larger homes, 45 percent live in
overcrowded conditions. On average, these households have less than one
room per person (including the living room), indicating high levels of
room sharing among siblings.
92 | Barend Wind
Interestingly, median levels of housing wealth do not differ much be-

tween those who followed a socialist, postsocialist or mixed housing ca-
reer. A big difference is the price that different households have paid to
accumulate their housing wealth. The households that entered the hous-
ing market under socialism (those who follow a socialist or mixed hous-
ing career) have not paid for their home individually (although they did
collectively) as a consequence of give-away privatizations and self-con-
struction. The independent households born after 1965 (following a post-
socialist housing career), paid the market price to attain homeownership
if they did not use family help, as is common. This outcome contributes
to housing wealth inequalities between socio-economic groups, as estab-
lishing an independent household at a relatively young age becomes the
domain of individuals with a high socio-economic status. The concentra-
tion of individuals with a low socio-economic status in multigenerational
households (indicated by their mixed housing career) means they need
to share the same amount of housing wealth with more family members.
Both trends reinforce societal disparities.
Housing conditions of households with a different

housing career
50 2.00
40
1.50
30
1.00
20
0.50
10
0 0.00
Overcrowding (%) Rooms per person
Figure 7 Overcrowding and the number of rooms per person among households
with a different housing career.
Median housing wealth

100000
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
Figure 8 Median housing wealth of households with a different housing career.

During the transition from a socialist to a market economy, the al-

location of housing has shifted towards the family and the market. As a
result, the distribution of households across urban space has changed.
The households that entered the housing market under socialism and
those with a mixed housing career (in which the older members entered
the housing market under socialism), are barely influenced by the shift-
ing housing regime. Figure 8 shows that the main difference between
households that followed a socialist and a mixed housing career, is an
underrepresentation of the latter group in the city centre and New Bel-
grade, and an overrepresentation in the urban suburbs. This outcome is
associated with the family size of multigenerational households with a
mixed housing career, as housing units in the central areas are smaller
than on the periphery. A comparison between households with a social-
ist and postsocialist housing career shows that independent households
headed by an individual born after 1965 (those with a postsocialist hous-
ing career) are more likely to live in the city centre (Stari grad, Vračar)
and less likely to live in the rural suburbs (e.g. Kaluđerica, Čukarica and
Grocka). The differences are more pronounced when comparing the resi-
dential location of two groups of individuals who came of age during the
postsocialist period, those living independently (postsocialist housing ca-
reer) and those living in a multigenerational household (mixed housing
career). Whereas only 8 percent of the households with a mixed housing
94 | Barend Wind
career live in the city centre, this figure is 15 percent for households with
a postsocialist housing career. Nearly 20 percent of the households with
a mixed housing career live in the rural suburbs, compared to 12 percent
of the households with a postsocialist housing career. On the basis of the
cross-sectional data used, it is impossible to determine whether the dif-
ferent spatial patterns between groups with a different housing career are
the result of 1) the social selectivity of independent living, or 2) increas-
ing socio-economic segregation. However, it is plausible that the social
selectivity of independent living plays an important role as households
with a high socio-economic status are overrepresented among house-
holds with a postsocialist housing career. They have a higher likelihood
of living in the city centre, as they have the familial resources to buy or
inherit a home in an area with higher house prices. However, living inde-
pendently comes at a high cost for 20 percent of households: those who
rent generally spend between 30 and 50 percent of their income on rent.
Those with a low socio-economic status have a lower likelihood of liv-
ing independently and a lower likelihood of living in an urban area (the
city centre, urban neighbourhoods and New Belgrade). Living in mul-
tigenerational housing for many comes at the expense of overcrowding
(45% of households with a mixed housing career live in overcrowded
conditions). The different residential patterns of postsocialist households
might suggest gentle forms of gentrification in the city centre, but the
overall picture (see Figure 3) is one of neighbourhood mixing rather than
segregation.
Although they might be neighbours, the housing conditions of dif-
ferent socio-economic groups do vary. The socialist households (often
having a relatively high socio-economic status) predominantly reside in
homeownership with low monthly costs. A large share of the postsocial-
ist single-generational households (often also of relatively high socio-eco-
nomic status) are frequently overburdened by high levels of rent. House-
holds that followed a mixed housing career (these multigenerational
households often have a lower socio-economic status) are predominantly
homeowners but face overcrowding due to small floor space relative to the
number of household members.
Residential location of households with a different housing career

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Figure 9 Residential location of households with a different housing career.

A Comprehensive Picture
Three characteristics of the housing situation impact upon a house-
hold’s position in social stratification: housing tenure (homeowners have
lower housing costs), housing wealth (the home is generally a household’s
most valuable asset) and housing situation (overcrowding). The descrip-
tive analyses show that these three housing outcomes are distributed un-
evenly across households with different housing careers, socio-economic
positions and residential location – however, these factors are related. The
OLS regression models in Table 3 test the impact of each of these factors
– controlling for variables operationalizing the other two – on homeown-
ership, overcrowding and housing wealth. Models 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 include
housing career, income and educational status. Models 1.2, 2.2. and 3.2
estimate the impact of family composition (housing size, children, eth-
nic status), housing characteristics (housing type, housing size, number
of rooms), and the residential location (city centre, urban districts, New
Belgrade, urban suburbs, rural suburbs), controlling for the characteristics
included in model 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1.
Model 1.1 confirms that homeownership is less common among
households following a postsocialist housing career (single-generational
households headed by an individual born after 1965), controlling for in-
come and education. Furthermore, it shows that households with a higher
96 | Barend Wind
income are more likely to be homeowners. These effects remain signifi-

cant when variables describing family composition, housing characteris-
tics and residential location are added in Model 1.2. Of all variables added
in Model 1.2, only the residential location shows significant results. Cet-
eris paribus, those living in urban or rural suburban neighbourhoods are
more likely to own their home than those living in the urban part of the
Belgrade metropolitan region.
Overcrowding is more common among households following a post-
socialist or mixed housing career than among households that followed a
socialist housing career, even after controlling for income and education
(Model 2.1). Households with a postsocialist housing career have bought
on average smaller apartments than those who followed a socialist housing
career, but inhabit them with a comparable number of household mem-
bers. Multigenerational households (those with a mixed housing career)
share a larger home with an even larger number of household members.
Controlling for the housing career, no significant results are found for in-
come and education, indicating that overcrowding is common not only
among households with a low socio-economic status but other households
as well. It is remarkable that none of the neighbourhood variables is sig-
nificant, meaning that overcrowding happens throughout the city, from
self-constructed family homes in the suburbs, to privatized apartments in
the urban areas of the metropolitan region.
The distribution of housing wealth reinforces tenure inequalities.
Model 3.1 shows that the households that followed a socialist, postsocial-
ist or mixed housing career do not differ significantly in terms of hous-
ing wealth. As multigenerational households that followed a mixed hous-
ing career need to share their housing wealth with a considerably larger
amount of household members, their position in socio-economic stratifi-
cation is lower. This has implications for the welfare function of the home.
Multigenerational living is a strategy to allow more family members to
profit from passive asset-based welfare, without allowing them to engage
in active asset-based welfare. Housing wealth is, however, strongly associ-
ated with both the educational level and income of the head of the house-
hold. During socialism, highly educated individuals could obtain better
housing at more attractive locations, turning it into valuable assets that
they could cling onto after their income drops upon retirement. In the
transition period, high-income households (mostly, but not always, higher
educated) could buy better housing at more attractive locations. Control-
ling for the above-mentioned indicators, housing wealth is positively as-
sociated with more centrally located neighbourhoods. Interestingly, house
values in New Belgrade are higher than in other neighbourhoods at a sim-
ilar distance from the city centre.
Table 3 Results of OLS regression analyses with homeownership,

house value and overcrowding as dependent variables.
Homeownership Overcrowding Housing wealth
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 3.1 Model 3.2
Housing career
Socialist – – – – – –
Postsocialist -0.22*** -0.22*** 0.13** 0.12** -6515 7290
Mixed 0.02 0.00 0.26*** 0.25*** -855 14842
Income
Low (ref.) – – – – – –
Middle 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 766 3893
High 0.10** 0.08* 0.02 0.03 46375*** 26709*
Education
Low (ref.) – – – – – –
Middle 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.02 19011 13825
High 0.02 0.09+ -0.09+ -0.11+ 69758*** 33252*
Children
No – – –
Yes 0.01 0.00 -8591
Household size 0.00 Omitted -11433**
Ethnic minority
No (ref.) – – –
Yes -0.04 -0.03 -5450
Housing type
House – – –
Apartment -0.02 0.00 -27942*
House size (M2) 0.00 Omitted 1009***
Number of rooms 0.03* Omitted -2443
Neighbourhood combination
City Centre – – –
Urban Districts 0.04 0.10+ -57478***
New Belgrade 0.09+ 0.13+ -35288*
Suburban 0.12* 0.09 -83723***
Rural 0.12* 0.07 -122552***
Constant 0.84*** 0.68*** 0.19*** 0.08 48900*** 99418***
R-squared 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.35
N 653.00 647.00 653.00 653.00 589.00 583.00
98 | Barend Wind
Conclusion
In the years that followed the overthrow of socialist governments
in the former Soviet Bloc and in Yugoslavia, housing scholars expected
that the stratification of housing would change dramatically during the
transition towards a market economy. The role of the state in the provi-
sion and allocation of housing would be taken over by 1) the family, or
2) the market, resulting in a familialistic or liberal stratification of hous-
ing (Struyk, 1993; Druta & Ronald, 2018). Whereas the political system
and economic model has changed rapidly, the stratification of housing
remains “sticky” as residential mobility is the only driver for change.
The policy recipe followed by nearly all postsocialist governments dur-
ing the transition period, consisting of a mass-privatization of publicly or
socially-owned housing units to their residents, has decreased residential
mobility (Pichler-Milanovich, 2001; Tsenkova, 2008). This has partly pre-
served the socialist stratification of housing. The privatization of hous-
ing protected households for the economic turmoil that accompanied the
transition towards a market economy, by providing them with passive as-
set-based welfare (Stryck, 1993; Mandic, 2008). Outright homeownership
allows households to sustain their livelihood even in times of instable and
reduced labour market incomes (Ronald et al., 2018). Nevertheless, since
the fall of socialism, socio-economic segregation has increased in most
larger cities in Central and Eastern Europe (Marcińczak et al., 2015). This
indicates that part of the housing stock has been traded on the market,
where the income level is the main determinant of housing consumption.
Twenty-five years after the beginning of the transition period, households
are faced with the remains of the socialist system and the new market con-
text. On the one hand, housing assets acquired (by family members) un-
der socialism, impact housing market opportunities. On the other hand,
the market determines house prices, shaping the conditions under which
new households enter the housing market. This chapter attempts to un-
derstand how the former socialist context and the current market context
shape the stratification of housing in Belgrade, by providing a spatial, so-
cio-economic, and generational account of inequalities in terms of tenure,
housing quality and housing wealth.
Looked at from a spatial perspective, tenure inequality is limited.
Homeownership is the dominant tenure in all neighbourhoods of Bel-
grade, both for central apartments and for suburban detached housing.
Whereas homeownership was already dominant in the suburbs during so-
cialism due to informal self-construction, it became the dominant tenure
in urban areas due to the mass privatization of housing in the 1990s. The
introduction of a market for housing has given a different financial mean-
ing to homeownership in different neighbourhoods. As a result, the medi-

an housing wealth in the city centre (Stari grad, Vračar) is twice that in the
rural suburbs (Kaluđerica, Čukarica and Grocka). However, most neigh-
bourhoods in Belgrade are relatively mixed in terms of socio-economic
status. First, this is the outcome of the privatization of housing, allowing
blue collar workers to obtain homes at locations that would be unafforda-
ble for them under current market conditions. Second, this is the result of
the large role of the family in the provision of housing. Households rather
pool resources within the family than obtain a mortgage to buy a home,
breaking the direct link between income and housing consumption.
Looked at from a socio-economic perspective, households with a low-
er socio-economic status have a lower likelihood of being homeowners,
accumulate less housing wealth and more frequently live in overcrowded
conditions. Interestingly, rent-free housing, provided by the family, is the
most common housing solution for low-income households, whereas pri-
vate rental housing is more common among middle-income households
(mainly due to relatively high rental costs). Although a large majority of
all households own their home, households with low socio-economic sta-
tus accumulate only half the housing wealth of their counterparts with
a high socio-economic status. This is the result of an overrepresentation
of the former in suburban areas and the lower housing conditions of this
group in the more mixed urban areas.
A comparison of households that started their housing career under
socialism, households that started their housing career during postsocial-
ism and those with a mixed housing career (multigenerational house-
holds that are impacted by both policy regimes), shows that individuals
who came of age during the transition period have fared worse than their
parents’ generation on the housing market. A majority (60%) has not es-
tablished their own household, but co-resides with family members. Al-
though this is historically a common housing strategy in Yugoslavia, the
results suggest that this practice has become more wide-spread during the
transition period. It impacts upon the stratification of housing as multi-
generational households are prone to overcrowding (45%), and accumu-
late smaller levels of housing wealth. The minority that has established an
independent household often lives in private rental housing (30%) and are
overburdened with high housing costs (often 40–50% of the income).
The stratification of housing in Belgrade is the outcome of “institu-
tional sedimentation”. The current distribution of 1) households across ur-
ban space and 2) housing tenures, housing wealth and housing conditions
across socio-economic groups, is as much a result of the socialist housing
regime as it is the postsocialist housing regime. The high level of outright
100 | Barend Wind
homeownership at the beginning of the transition period has consolidated

the socialist stratification of housing. It is the result of the privatization of
rental housing and wide-spread forms of ownership during socialism (self-
construction, socialist owner-occupation). Outright homeownership al-
lows the use of housing as a form of passive asset-based welfare. The trans-
formation of decommodified socialist-era use and ownership rights into
market assets has triggered the uneven development of house prices. This
transformation determines the financial value of housing allocated during
socialism, setting the limits for future residential mobility and active asset-
based welfare. Only a small group of households that has either very high
incomes or no family resources is solely affected by the postsocialist hous-
ing regime. Therefore, private rental housing is much more wide-spread
among those who entered the housing market during the transition period.
Most households that came of age during the postsocialist period use fam-
ily help (savings, housing assets, etc.) to get a head start on the housing
market. Together, these processes put a brake on a sorting of households
on the basis of their incomes, along the lines of house price inequality.
Whereas households with a low socio-economic status concentrate in the
suburbs, most of Belgrade’s neighbourhoods are relatively mixed. However,
the same strategies that produce these mixed outcomes, generate inequali-
ties within Belgrade’s neighbourhoods in terms of housing quality and
housing costs. In the event that housing comes to be seen as a financial
asset in the future, triggering residential mobility, housing wealth inequali-
ties between socio-economic groups could also result in spatial disparities.
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| 105
THE SYMBOLIC MARKERS

OF BELGRADE’S TRANSFORMATION:
MONUMENTS AND FOUNTAINS
Ivana Spasić
Abstract: The aim of this chapter is to examine a number of Belgrade’s freshly

constructed monuments as symbolic markers of the transformation the city has
recently been undergoing. The selection includes statues to Tsar Nicholas II Ro-
manov and Gavrilo Princip, as well as the fountains at Slavija Square and Topličin
venac. It is argued that by their physical and aesthetic properties, as well as in
how the process of their construction unfolded, these structures embody in a nut-
shell the crucial features of the overall urban change in Belgrade lately. These
features may best be described as twin developments of postmodernization and
demodernization. The first refers to an overemphasis on tourism, consumption,
entertainment and “pleasure”, foregrounding visuality and surfaces; as well as to
disposing of previous practices of rational, strategically guided urban develop-
ment based on expert opinion and relatively transparent lines of administrative
decision-making. The latter concerns the aesthetic aspect where the legacy of
Serbian/Yugoslav modernism is being discarded and increasingly replaced with
older, more monumental and “literalist” artistic forms of earlier epochs.
Keywords: Belgrade, urban change, monuments, fountains, postmodernization,
demodernization
Introduction
Belgrade’s urban landscape displays an astounding diversity of shapes,
sizes, styles, and eras – “excessive stylistic variegation”, in the words of
architectural historian Aleksandar Kadijević (2017: 13).1 Whether this
1 “The cultural identity of Serbia’s capital has over the past two centuries often changed,
in parallel with its spatial expansion, dense buildup, and demographic growth,” writes
Kadijević, and the medley results from “war destructions, developmental disconti-
nuities, changes in political regimes, as well as in dominant political and architectural
ideologies” (2017: 13). See also Vujović (2014) and Ristović (2018).
106 | Ivana Spasić
is taken as a virtue or a failing, it constitutes the inevitable backdrop to

any examination of urban change in Belgrade. Lately, we have witnessed a
wave of transformative moves, threatening – or promising – to change the
city in a more fundamental sense. Applying the useful typology of urban
interventions proposed by Kadijević,2 these changes can be characterized
as: unnecessary, hasty, poorly elaborated, lacking the support of experts or
justification through democratic public dialogue, and following the strate-
gies of crass capitalism and “investor-led” urban planning.
While this is the general subject matter of the entire present volume,
this particular chapter3 discusses a number of recently erected structures
which, as will be argued, conveniently condense the main trends in the
city’s current urban transformation, as tokens of an advertised “new” face
of Belgrade. Over the past couple of years, a number of statues and public
fountains have been built,4 purporting to turn Belgrade, “finally”, into the
bustling, shiny metropolis it “deserves to be”. As such, they may be sub-
sumed under what Radović (2014: 140) has called the “targeted symbolic
marking of the city center”. In contrast with “spatial cleansing” identified
by Herzfeld (2002) as expression of the political in physical space, we may
call this “spatial cluttering”, with the same function.
It has long been recognized that material objects and their distribu-
tion in space provide underpinnings to a shared, commonsensical reality
of everyday life. “By their physical presence in the world, and in specific
times and places, things sustain identity by constituting part of a matrix
of relational cultural elements including practices, representations, and
spaces which gather around objects” (Edensor, 2002: 103). Public statues
and fountains are recognizable landmarks in the urban landscape and
are often taken up in urban studies for an insight into deeper political
and social processes. Public fountains, thanks to the presence of water, a
vital natural resource but regularly shrouded in strong cultural significa-
2 Differentiating by: 1) scale: expansive (encompassing) vs. smaller (less conspicuous)
transformations; 2) degree of implementation: complete vs. less fully implemented; 3)
civilizational character: necessary, inevitable, purposeful, supported by consensus of
expert opinion vs. abrupt, ill-devised and under-elaborated, aggressive, environmen-
tally destructive; 4) discursive viability: publicly justified with clear and reasonable
arguments, or not, 5) methodology, 6) ideological and economic strategy (Kadijević,
2017: 14–19).
3 The paper is part of the research project Challenges of New Social Integration in Ser-
bia: Concepts and Actors (No. 179035), supported by the Serbian Ministry of Edu-
cation, Scientific Research and Technological Development. I wish to thank Milan
Popadić for useful comments on a draft version of the paper.
4 And as many as 54 more fountains were promised by the Serbian president and rul-
ing party leader, Aleksandar Vučić, in April 2018 https://www.danas.rs/beograd/
vesic-na-inicijativu-vucica-beograd-ce-dobiti-54-fontane/, accessed 24/08/2018.
The Symbolic Markers of Belgrade’s Transformation: Monuments and Fountains | 107
tion, bring together visuality and utilitarianism, symbolic and pragmatic

functions: they quench the thirst of passers-by, represent focal points for
sociality, while often also possessing a memorial and symbolic character
(Popadić, 2012: 144–160).
Public monuments in turn are prime vehicles for materializing urban
memory. As “memory objectified” (Popadić, 2015: 66), they are indispen-
sable instruments in the “symbolic coding of public spaces” (Potkonjak &
Pletenac, 2007) and crucial elements in the “canonical system of symbols”
– a system of signs that defines the text of a collective identity, determined
in accordance with official ideology by those holding power (Azaryahu,
1999). Verschaffel (1999: 333) defines the “monumental”, as form and idea,
as “the visualisation of a relation between time and stone”, with two main
functions: to commemorate, and to represent power. This is accomplished
by a specific materiality both woven into and defying everyday routines:
“Monuments stand out, by their central and eye-catching position, by their
size, which is somewhat larger than the habitual size of the quotidian, by
their being placed on a pedestal, or by their massive and solid appearance.
They thus function as landmarks and at the same time as obstacles one
stumbles on as one goes about one’s daily business” (1999: 333).
Especially as, according to Johnson (1995:52), “an examination of
public statuary ... highlights some of the ways in which the material bases
for nationalist imaginings emerge and are structured symbolically”. Mon-
uments are useful as a heuristic source for understanding the emergence
and articulation of dominant discourses, and their locations “serve as the
focal point for the expression of social action and a collectivist politics”
(Johnson, 1995: 62). Even though they generally express dominant ideolo-
gies of states and rulers, monuments can also be used to challenge these,
so battles over their placement or displacement occur regularly as part
of political struggles (Crinson, 2005: xvi-xviii). After historical ruptures,
the choices political actors make about which existing memorials to re-
tain and incorporate into the new political idiom, and which to eliminate,
tell us a great deal about changing official conceptions of national identity
and the nation-building process (Forest and Johnson, 2002: 525)
The Markers
In spite of their obvious differences, the structures discussed in this
chapter, together with a few antecedents, share a number of common fea-
tures. To begin with, they have stirred controversy and divided the public
opinion: people either like or utterly dislike them, few are left indifferent.
108 | Ivana Spasić
Secondly, in their coming into being, the institutional procedures

of decision-making as defined by existing regulations have not been fol-
lowed, or not fully. This also means that expert opinion (town planners,
architects, landscape architects, designers, artists, art critics, and conser-
vationists) has largely been sidestepped. The relevant professionals were
generally not consulted, or the consultation was feigned; when they op-
posed the projects, their objections went ignored. Many of the structures
were designed abroad rather than by Serbian artists. In sum, existing local
knowledge was not tapped but instead, the whole “package” was simply
imported. Finally, the form, design and location of the structures are in
many cases marked by amateurism and incompetence.
Thirdly, decisions on which structures to build and where to place
them have shown little or no concern for the needs of people actually liv-
ing in Belgrade. Rather than amenities for residents, sorely missing in so
many areas, these are devices to prop up a tourist and image-oriented vi-
sion of Belgrade, aimed at its visitors. A more general, and more upsetting
feature, let us call it symbolic abdication, refers to the community’s abroga-
tion of its own power to aesthetically regulate itself. In other words, the
city gives up its sovereign right to determine its own visual landscape and
the meanings the latter exudes. In the selected examples, this is expressed
as surrendering to the pressures of money (“investors”), foreign political
powers, or both.
It will be contended that the underlying process these examples point
to can be described as un-modernization: a simultaneous post-moderniza-
tion and de-modernization of Belgrade. The former refers to two kinds of
change: in the fundamental concept of the city (overemphasis on tourism,
entertainment, “pleasure”, and visuality), and in the practices of urban
planning (where rational, strategically guided urban development is re-
placed by haphazard individual projects directed by erratic money flows).
The latter process, de-modernization, takes place in the aesthetic realm:
the legacy of Serbian/Yugoslav modernism is being discarded in favour of
traditional art forms revived from earlier epochs.
The analysis focuses mainly on a selection of four representative
structures: two fountains, at Slavija and in Cara Lazara Street; and two
statues, for Emperor Nicholas II of Russia and Gavrilo Princip. All of these
landmarks have been erected in the past six years, that is, since the abrupt
political changeover of 2012 that brought the newly dominant Serbian
Progressive Party (SNS) to power in the city of Belgrade. These structures,
while not unprecedented in their formal-visual and institutional features,
do illustrate a significant acceleration of trends initiated previously. They
might even turn out to be the beginning of the new mainstream in the
capital’s town planning: What perhaps was a series of disconnected, loose-

ly planned one-shot actions may be crystallizing into a more consistent
new “logic” of urban policy in Belgrade.
The Red Rooster Fountain

The first marker to be discussed is the fountain constructed in 2016
at the quaint triangular intersection of Cara Lazara, Vuka Karadžića and
Gračanička streets, in the very heart of Belgrade. The name comes from
the granite sculpture of a rooster that sits atop the fountain, referencing a
famous eponymous cafe nearby. The rest of the fountain is made of (very)
white marble. Its author is the respected architect Branislav Jovin. Two
identical exemplars (minus the rooster) already exist, previously designed
by Jovin for towns beyond the borders of Serbia, but within what are
sometimes called the “Serbian lands”: one is in Herceg Novi (Montenegro)
and the other in Trebinje (Republika Srpska, BiH).
The fountain came as part of a reconstruction of the square, under-
taken in 2015–2016. The renewal also involved the removal of a number
of large mature trees, which used to make the square uniquely pleasant on
hot summer days. The cafe changed too.5 In such a setting, the fountain
looks odd and superfluous. Visually, it cannot be appreciated from any
angle, since the square is too narrow. The spot where it stands seems as
though it was chosen at random. The marble sticks out in the environ-
ment, leading one commentator to liken it to plastic. The fountain’s de-
sign is highly conservative and vaguely replicates the style of traditional
Mediterranean architecture, which might be an excellent fit for Trebinje
or Herceg Novi, but is absent from Belgrade’s visual landscape (at any rate,
a Mediterranean fountain would definitely not have a red rooster on it).
The fact that this is practically a copy of fountains already constructed in
smaller towns reinforces a sense of inauthenticity and secondhandedness.
The idea for the site, including the fountain itself, was originally con-
ceived as part of a comprehensive plan for the pedestrian zone in cen-
tral Belgrade whose implementation began in the mid-1980s. The whole
project was premised on the anticipated construction of a subway system,
which would allow for the heart of Belgrade to rid itself of car traffic, but
which never materialized. The project was partly realized, most visibly in
Knez Mihailova street, but then discontinued for lack of money. It was
relaunched in the 2010s, despite changed circumstances and new aesthetic
5 After several rounds of changes in ownership, design, atmosphere and clientele, the
current Red Rooster Cafe is a far cry from the old venue embedded in Belgrade ur-
ban mythology.
110 | Ivana Spasić
exigencies, by simply taking old sketches up from the shelf. As a critic

writes, to revive a project that may have been good in its time but is now
thirty years old, without any reassessment or adjustment to the new situa-
tion, is bound to cause problems.6
The Slavija Fountain

The other, much more massive and central fountain is the one at
Slavija interchange. It was opened in June 2017, then closed again from
August to November, for a large-scale reconstruction of the interchange.
In the process, the statue and the grave of the early 20th century social-
ist politician and writer, Dimitrije Tucović, were removed (without his
family’s approval). This monument was the longtime visual and symbolic
marker of the place, officially called Dimitrije Tucović Square for decades.
Tucović’s earthly remains were reburied at a cemetery, and the monument
was moved to a much less prominent location at the edge of the square.
This replacement of a leftist political leader, labor organizer and critic of
Serbian nationalism, with a brightly-colored singing fountain, constitutes
a near-perfect example of “re-writing the past into urban tissue” (Radović,
2013). In this unequal battle between socialist and capitalist imaginings of
the Serbian past, it was not hard to guess which side would win.
The fountain is quite large, encompassing 800 square meters of water
surface, with 350 nozzles that spray water 16 meters upwards, and 400
differently coloured spotlights. At certain hours during the day the foun-
tain also plays music. It was enthusiastically promoted by the Belgrade
authorities as something spectacular, fantastic, world-class, never before
seen in Belgrade, “the only such fountain in this part of the world”, “one of
the largest European fountains”, a symbol of Belgrade and a tourist attrac-
tion. In sum, “one of those things that make the difference between big
and small cities”, to quote city manager, Goran Vesić.7
Yet it was from the very beginning mired in controversies. The gen-
eral public received it with both jubilation and the sharpest criticism. The
broad framework for the debate concerns the entire reconstruction of
Slavija, an important traffic node for Belgrade with a sad history of bad
6 Marko Stojanović, Očerupani pevac: Kako je jedna česma podelila struku i javnost,
https://www.gradnja.rs/ocerupani-pevac-kako-je-jedna-cesma-podelila-struku-i-
javnost/, 2016, accessed 12/07/2018.
7 Quoted in Nedeljnik, http://www.nedeljnik.rs/nedeljnik/portalnews/glasajte-u-an-
keti-da-li-vam-se-vise-svida-slavija-65-ili-slavija-2017-godine, accessed 3 Sep 2018.
Interestingly, in the online poll the weekly organized, attaching two photos of the
square 50 years apart, and asking the readers “Which version of Slavija do you prefer,
1965 or 2017?”, 70% of respondents chose the old one.
reorganizations and botched attempts at improvement. This time, there

was a comprehensive plan, which might have solved at least the most ur-
gent circulation problems (especially the intersecting pedestrian and mo-
tor vehicle traffic), but then the local government changed and the project
was changed accordingly.
That a fountain, of all things, was placed in the middle of a rounda-
bout, with no access by pedestrians, caused considerable bafflement. By
its sheer size, even without the multicolored lighting at night, it distracts
drivers. Then, there are safety concerns: spraying water is not a desirable
companion to speeding cars, especially in winter. As for its appearance,
the designer and producer remain unknown. We may surmise that it is
simply an item from the mass-manufactured, anonymous urban embel-
lishment assortment purchased from a contractor.
The music is a problem in its own right. No one can sit down and
listen to it, since there is no place to sit. Many have also complained about
the poor selection of musical numbers (citing “bad taste,” and “lost oppor-
tunity to influence the nation’s cultural level”). A small number of songs
are replayed over and over again for hours, which annoys the few who
can – indeed, must – hear the fountain’s music, that is, the residents of
the nearby apartment buildings and workers in offices overlooking Slavija.
Again, the disregard for the interests of citizens is striking.
Investigative journalists discovered a host of unpleasant facts about
the fountain. For instance, that it still lacked a use permit when it was
opened; that the opinions of experts from the Faculty of Traffic Engineer-
ing were ignored; that safety warnings were not heeded and the requi-
site tests never conducted, and so forth.8 Within just weeks of opening,
the fountain became the center of a series of smaller and larger scandals.
Politically the most consequential of these, let us call it the “AliBaba con-
troversy”, concerned the price of the fountain. A nearly identical foun-
tain was promptly discovered on the Chinese online trading site AliBaba.
com, offered for EUR 200,000 instead of the 1.8 million that were actually
paid.9 This caused a debate that still continues and centers on allegations
of corruption. The price difference remains unexplained, just like, after
all, the whole business of procuring the fountain.
In the “foam scandal” in March 2018, unknown perpetrators poured
detergent into the water at night. No group came forward to claim respon-
sibility for this action but the city authorities immediately accused, with-
8 https://www.istinomer.rs/clanak/2066/Kosava-ili-institucije-ko-je-zaduzen-za-bez-
bednost-fontane, accessed 15/07/ 2018.
9 See e.g. https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/beograd/2862307/pronadjena-potpuno-ista-fon-
tana-na-alibabi-kosta-200–000-dolara-u-beogradu-18-miliona, accessed 15/09/2018.
112 | Ivana Spasić
out reservation, their political opponents, who at the time were protesting
the results of an election won by the ruling party.10
The “leaking scandal” occurred just three days after the fountain’s
opening, when it began to leak on one side, flooding parts of the road-
way and interfering with traffic. In the public altercation that ensued, it
turned out that the project had to be modified during construction when
it was realized that the originally planned pumps would push water over
the brim and onto the street. Funnily, this simple fact was not discovered
until four long months into the actual works.11
Finally, the “crumbling scandal” involved the paved area across the
fountain, on the square’s outer perimeter, rebuilt as part of the recon-
struction project. Composed of terraced concrete defying the terrain and
meaningless metal poles, with an overall design whose rationale remains
obscure, the plateau began to fall apart almost immediately. After provok-
ing a minor public outcry online, it was closed in March 2018 and stood
abandoned for many months, to be provisionally re-opened towards the
end of the year – though still deprived of any identifiable aesthetic or
practical function.
To conclude, the Slavija fountain merely “looks” (and, alas, “sounds”),
but, physically isolated and inaccessible as it is, it does not serve any
practical purpose, be it rest, quenching thirst, or socializing. It cannot
become part of everyday life since people cannot walk around, sit on its
steps, enjoy the coolness of the water, or relax while listening to the mu-
sic. In short, it cannot be directly utilized at all. It can only be admired
from a distance.12 In this sense, it is a remarkable illustration of postmod-
ern “empty” visuality, a spectacular appearance in place of a real solution
to real urban problems, with the residents’ voices unheard. As will be
discussed in the concluding section: a skewing of the public agenda, if
ever there was one.
10 “City manager Goran Vesić [...] blamed explicitly the activists of the Don’t Let Bel-
grade D(r)own initiative. The movement denied the accusations, claiming their ac-
tivists took no part in damaging the fountain and stressing that they always take re-
sponsibility for what they do, hence all their actions are public and announced in
advance.” https://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/iskljucena-fontana-na-slaviji-vodovod-
zbog-sipanja-deterdzenta-podnosi-krivicne/2qezm8n, accessed 08/07/2018
11 https://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/menjali-projekat-fontane-na-slaviji-u-toku-rado-
va-ustanovljeno-da-ima-jednu-ozbiljnu/fgxytbk, accessed 08/07/2018.
12 Architect and blogger Marko Stojanović has an interesting answer to the question
of why a fountain was built on the square in spite of all the obvious reasons to the
contrary: because it harks back to the (imaginary) past of a bourgeois Belgrade from
the 1930s, which is currently the favored historical period in the popular imagina-
tion (Stojanović, Muzička fontana na Slaviji koju niko ne čuje, https://www.gradnja.
rs/muzicka-fontana-na-slaviji-koju-niko-ne-cuje/, accessed 09/07/2018).
The Gavrilo Princip Monument

Turning now to the recently erected statues, the first of these is dedi-
cated to Gavrilo Princip, the patriot-revolutionary from Bosnia who as-
sassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand von Habsburg in Sarajevo in 1914.
In Serbia, Princip is generally considered a hero and freedom fighter,
though no monuments have been dedicated to him thus far. The statue is
located in a park, at the corner of Nemanjina and Sarajevska streets, close
to the buildings of the Government of Serbia and the Ministry of Finance.
This is the oldest public park in Belgrade (it originates from the mid-19th
century), long called the Financial Park but in 2017 renamed after Gavrilo
Princip.
The monument was unveiled in the presence of the presidents of Ser-
bia and Republika Srpska (the Serb entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina),
Tomislav Nikolić and Milorad Dodik, government ministers, officiating
priests,13 and an audience of about one thousand onlookers, on 28 June
2015. This day, called Vidovdan, is probably the most heavily symbolic
date in Serbian historical consciousness, on which many decisive events
have taken place, starting with the 1389 Battle of Kosovo and including
the 1914 Sarajevo assassination. According to press releases, the site was
chosen because the members of Mlada Bosna used to gather in this neigh-
borhood and it is from here they are said to have left for Sarajevo in 1914
(the railway station was nearby).14 However, the entire project appears to
have been quite confused, and the eventual site was selected at the very
last moment, through a decision-making process lacking any transpar-
ency. The initiative for the monument officially came from the national
government and rather curiously, the Ministry of Labor, whose minister
Aleksandar Vulin15 chaired the committee entrusted with organizing the
monument’s construction. The initiative was subsequently accepted by the
13 The decision to consecrate the monument with an Orthodox religious rite singularly
falsified the original political convictions and goals of Princip himself and the or-
ganization he belonged to, Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), whose patriotism was em-
phatically secular, modernist and proto-Yugoslav rather than religious, conservative
and ethnically exclusive.
14 That Belgrade’s main railway station is no longer where it stood for more than a cen-
tury, since it was closed in 2018 to make room for the Belgrade Waterfront renewal
project and hastily moved into the unfinished, poorly equipped and nearly unreach-
able facility far from the city center, is another important feature of the “new face of
Belgrade”, but one that remains beyond the scope of this paper.
15 If one is tempted to ask what on earth does a labor ministry have to do with erecting
monuments to controversial national heroes of the past, the answer should prob-
ably be sought in person of Vulin himself. This most colorful member of Aleksandar
Vučić’s entourage has for years been assigned the role of provocateur, giving the most
114 | Ivana Spasić
city administration’s Committee for Monuments and Street Names. De-

scribed as a “joint project of the governments of Serbia and Republika
Srpska, and the city of Belgrade”, it is actually a donation from Srpska.16
An identical statue has been standing in a park in East Sarajevo, the en-
tity’s second political center, since 2014.
Lest the national-political implications of this monument, and the
whole endeavor which brought it into existence, be lost on the public,
President Nikolić in his speech linked the resistance to memorializing
Princip with the prosecution of Serbian war crimes from the 1990s, and
conversely, the celebration of Princip with the values of freedom and inde-
pendence, and said that the monument was delayed by a century because
Serbia had been ruled by the wrong kind of people.17 In this way he made
quite an explicit connection between the monument he was unveiling and
the most brazenly nationalist, self-complacent and denialist strand in Ser-
bian politics.
The bronze statue is two meters tall and weighs 350 kilograms, a
rather humane scale. Its author is Zoran Kuzmanović, a relatively well-
known Serbian sculptor and expert in bronze. This statue’s main draw-
back is its location and lack of harmony with its surroundings. It sits
awkwardly at the lowermost corner of a descending park, facing the
fence and with the park’s grassy, rugged slope as an unseemly back-
ground. It has the air of a bad photomontage. Its position in the far cor-
ner of the park gives off a sense of marginality and negligence. But per-
haps that was precisely one more political message – this time implicit,
and reflecting the schizophrenia of contradictory political orientations
generally characteristic of the SNS (“Yes, we celebrate Princip, but listen,
let’s not overdo it...”).
aggressive, outrageous, unfounded and unreasonable public performances aimed

against Serbia’s neighbors and/or the domestic opposition.
16 See e.g. http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/330061/Spomenik-Gavrilu-Principu-u-Fi-
nansijskom-parku, https://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/pogledajte-postavljanje-spomeni-
ka-gavrilu-principu-u-beogradu/ywpe329, accessed 24/06/2018.
17 “If Winston Churchill ... wrote that Princip died in prison, and that the monument
erected by his compatriots celebrated his and theirs crime and genocide, then the
proposed resolution on Srebrenica comes as no surprise ... Gavrilo Princip did not
have a monument in Serbia, and nothing is by accident. We had to wait for such
people to decide on it who live by his principles of freedom, independence, unity;
we had to wait for such people to decide on Princip who wouldn’t have pulled Prin-
cip’s memorial down, had there been enough courage to create it before.” Quoted
from:/http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/beograd/1634063-gavrilo-princip-je-konacno-u-
srbiji-na-vidovdan-otkriven-spomenik-na-koji-se-cekalo-vise-od-jednog-veka-foto,
accessed 24/06/2018.
The Tsar Nicholas II Monument

The other monument in our sample is, on the contrary, impossible to
miss. It is the huge statue of Nicholas II, the last emperor of Russia, slain in
1918 by the October revolutionaries. It is placed in a – or better, the – cen-
tral street of Belgrade (Kralja Milana), which connects two major squares
(Terazije and Slavija), next to a whole series of important seats of political
power: the Presidency, City Hall, and the former building of the National
Assembly. The embassy of imperial Russia used to stand at this site in the
19th century and the present-day Russian Cultural Center is nearby.
The statue is a gift from the Russian Military Historical Society and
the Russian Federation. The 50 tonnes, 7.5m monument was designed by
Russian artists, Andrei Kovalchuk and Gennady Pravotvorov. The monu-
ment consists of a 3.5m full-figure statue of the stern-looking Tsar, clad in
a military uniform, resting his hand on a column wrapped in symbols of
imperial power and Orthodox Christianity, all portrayed in minute realistic
detail and standing atop a granite pedestal, with a historical quote engraved
on the sides.18 Having arrived from Russia, it was unveiled in November
2014, within the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of World War I.
The erection of the statue was accompanied by a reconstruction of the sur-
rounding park, also in cooperation with Russian experts. The park, once
Devojački Park, was renamed Aleksandrov Park in 2017, to honor the Red
Army Choir members killed in a 2016 plane crash over the Black Sea.
The monument was consecrated by the patriarchs of the Serbian and
Russian Orthodox churches, and the ceremony was attended by a long line
of dignitaries from both sides, including the Serbian president, Tomislav
Nikolić, ministers, emissaries of the two governments, high priests, the
mayor of Belgrade and his aides, and the Russian ambassador to Ser-
bia.19 President Nikolić extolled the virtues of the Emperor and declared
the eternal unity of the Serbian and Russian national destinies,20 while
18 The quotes, in Russian and in Serbian, are taken from Nicholas’ July 1914 letter to
the Serbian Crown Prince, Aleksandar Karađorđević: “All my efforts will be turned
toward protecting the dignity of Serbia... In no case will Russia be indifferent to the
fate of Serbia.”
19 The Serbian Wikipedia entry on the monument offers details. See https://sr.wikipedia.
org/, accessed 19/06/ 2018.
20 “This monument at the heart of Belgrade shines to celebrate the memory of the mar-
tyred Emperor Nicholas, as a sign of the eternal victory of goodness and justice ... The
pages of Serbian and Russian history are as if written by the same hand. Regardless of
time and place, regardless of the social system in power ... the struggle for freedom,
often for life itself, and Biblical martyrdom are common links in the sacred chain of
endurance of the Serbian and Russian peoples.” Source same as preceding footnote.
116 | Ivana Spasić
Russia’s Patriarch Kiril called the event historical and pointed out that this
is the first monument to Nicholas in Europe but outside Russia. Serbia’s
Patriarch Irinej, elaborating on the emperor’s saintly character, stressed
that now we are “reminded of what the Tsar did for his Orthodox, Serbian
people” (emphasis added). Andrei Kovalchuk, also present for the occa-
sion, assured that he and his coauthor did their best to harmonize the
monument with the setting, adding that it was made “following the classi-
cal tradition, which is these days rather rare in Europe”.21
Kovalchuk is a prominent Soviet and Russian sculptor, an artist in ob-
vious political favor.22 He has won numerous state awards for his memo-
rials to people and events from Russian national history (rulers, priests,
poets, artists, warriors, workers, chiefs of security, and victims of disasters
alike), scattered throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics, in-
cluding a 2017 statue of Emperor Alexander III in Crimea. His aesthetics
are unapologetically realistic, monumental, explicit, and celebratory, be-
reft of any trace of irony, doubt, ambivalence, or social critique.
So is Nicholas. In its physical proportions, the statue seems to con-
form to the “politics of scale” (Sidorov, 2000) from back home.23 Awe-
inspiring, almost intimidating by its size and posture, and in conjunction
with the location, it clearly conveys the (geo)political message of intended
Russian dominance. Given that it was erected voluntarily, there is more
than a hint of embarrassing colonial obedience for the receiving side. Aes-
thetically, it is disheartening for its humorless literality. It emanates a dis-
tant, authoritarian power, aloof from everyday life and ordinary people.
With the placement of the statue at such a highly charged site, an instance
of “symbolically dense landscape” (Forest & Johnson, 2002: 529), the en-
tire setting has been changed profoundly. Such as it is, the monument
clearly embodies the “symbolic abdication” mentioned in the introductory
sections: everything in this undertaking, from the general idea to the last
21 Quoted from: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/beograd.74.html:514543-Postavljen-
spomenik-ruskom-caru-Nikolaju, accessed 19/06/2018.
22 In addition to creating state-building monuments that promote the official ideology,
Kovalchuk often poses for photos with Putin and plays prominent roles in Russian
cultural institutions, including chairmanship of the Artists’ Union.
23 Following the example of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow (1997),
Sidorov writes that the new, reconstructed temple, in spite of the contrary opinion
which was widespread but not attended to since there was no public debate – sound
familiar? – followed the desires of the government to tread in the steps of an earlier
architectural tradition: “The state-led restoration was to continue the tsarist and So-
viet tastes for grandiose structures”, a “past monumentalism” that “prioritize[d] size
over symbolic significance” (Sidorov, 2000: 563). That in present-day Russia “the
style and design of official monuments reflect[ed] much continuity between Russia
and the USSR”, and that “authoritarian and imperial representations of the Russian
nation” persist today is also noted by Forest and Johnson (2002: 525).
detail of the finished work, was “donated”, that is, imported/imposed from
the outside, with Belgrade acquiescing obligingly.
The monument did not go totally unchallenged however. In June
2017, it was sprayed with graffiti by an activist group, apparently (accord-
ing to their Facebook post) in protest against nationalist and conservative
cultural policies of the Serbian government. In news reports this was de-
scribed as a “destruction” or “ruining” of the monument. Municipal of-
ficials, headed by the ubiquitous Vesić, said they were “appalled” by the
fact that “vandals” damaged this “cultural-historical monument” (barely
two years old at the time), “one of Belgrade’s most important ones”, and
promised to punish the offenders.24
Predecessors and Successors

The trends the examined structures represent so well, however, did
not start in 2012. They can be traced at least a decade into the past, to a
time when Belgrade was run not by the SNS but by their political oppo-
nents, a coalition around the Democratic Party (DS).25
Some commentators see the monument to the turn-of-20th-century
populist politician, Nikola Pašić, erected in 1998 at the freshly renamed
eponymous square,26 as the point of departure. Against the backdrop of
increasingly strong appeals to “decommemorate” Yugoslavia and socialism
in Belgrade’s public spaces, and “commemorate” a different, ethnonational
and anti-communist past, the emergence of this statue “sent a clear mes-
sage about both the new dominant political symbolism and new trends in
urban public sculpture” (Radović, 2014: 131).
The second half of the 2000s abounded in realist figural memorials.
At Belgrade International Airport, a controversial statue of Nikola Tesla
was erected in June 2006 on the 150th anniversary of the inventor’s birth.
Made of bronze, 3.5m tall and weighing one tonne, it portrays a stand-
ing Tesla, looking rather clumsy and confused. Of all the memorials dis-
cussed here, this one provoked the most resistance. It was denounced al-
most unanimously as dilettante and kitsch by experts,27 the two relevant
24 http://www.novosti.rs/%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8/%D0%B1%D0
%B5%D0%BE%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4.491.html:672489-Vesic-Unista-
vanje-spomenika-caru-Nikolaju-vandalizam, accessed 16/09/2018.
25 Yet significant continuity is established through the powerful figure of Goran Vesić,
who has succeeded in holding onto key positions in the city government for years
and irrespective of changes in political leadership.
26 Marx and Engels Square until 1997.
27 More than one open letter protested the monument. Twenty-five Serbian members
of the International Association of Art Critics demanded the statue to be removed:
118 | Ivana Spasić
committees of the city administration, and the public at large. The incom-
petence of its author, Drinka Radovanović, was pointed out, along with
her evident political backing,28as was the bypassing of the required public
competition and evaluation by expert committees. Still, the project was
approved by the national-level Committee for Tesla’s 150th Anniversary,
headed by the then prime minister, Vojislav Koštunica, and the Belgrade
City Assembly assented. The memorial was commissioned by EPS, the na-
tional electric utility, and hence also belongs to the category of “gifts”. This
becomes particularly problematic at the symbolically crucial location of
the international airport, the “door to a country”, as a critically-minded
young sculptor put in his comment,29 where foreign visitors arrive and
first see Belgrade and Serbia.30
Another addition to the “gifts” series appeared in 2009, when a statue
of the Russian poet, Alexander Pushkin, was erected in the (again, freshly
renamed) Cyril and Methodius Park. A donation from the Association
of Russian Writers and the Russian Federation, the statue was created by
Russian sculptor, Nikolai Kuznetsov-Muromsky, and unveiled on Push-
kin’s birthday by the Russian Ambassador.31
The point at which aesthetic anti-modernism was conjoined with
symbolic abdication in its crudest form – before the Tsar Nicholas statue
plunged standards to new lows – was the reconstruction of Tašmajdan Park
in 2011. The works were financed entirely by the government of Azerbai-
“The chance for Serbia to place at this key node of communication with the world ...
a convincing, adequate memorial, worthy of Tesla’s name and legacy, has been wasted
mindlessly. Instead, what was put on the pedestal was a monumentalization of il-
literacy, ignorance and primitivism of a community unable to tell art from non-art”
(http://mondo.rs/a30254/Zabava/Kultura/AICA-trazi-uklanjanje-spomenika-Tesli.
html, accessed 12/07/2018.). Another, very similar statement came from a dozen
prominent visual artists and art professors, published in Politika on 20 Jul 2006.
28 Radovanović, although a self-taught sculptor without academic credentials, has
been entrusted since the late 1980s with creating a large number of memori-
als to Serbian historical personalities. See e.g. https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.
php?id=508261&print=yes, Vreme, 9 Aug 2007, accessed 12/07/2018). For a more
elaborate analysis see Milenković (2009).
29 Quoted in Novosti, http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/kultura.71.html:186107-Umetnicko-
gusarenje, accessed 12/07/2018.
30 In spite of all the criticism, the statue not only remained in place but its maligned au-
thor was warmly welcomed ten years later by the Airport Authority, as special guest
at the celebration of Tesla’s 160th anniversary (http://www.beg.aero/lat/vest/13011/
aerodrom-nikola-tesla-obelezio-160-godina-od-rodenja-naucnika-cije-ime-nosi, ac-
cessed 05/09/2018). Passions apparently fade rather quickly.
31 The official press release explained that Pushkin, together with the existing mon-
uments to Saints Cyril and Methodius and the Serbian language reformer Vuk
Karadžić, completed a monumental personification of Slavic culture (http://www.
seecult.org/vest/spomenik-puskinu-kod-vuka, accessed 24/08/2018).
jan, under the condition that a statue to Heydar Aliyev, the country’s first
president, be placed in the park. The city authorities agreed, adding the
statue of the Serbian writer, Milorad Pavić32, as a sort of fig leaf intended
to ease the humiliating asymmetry of the deal. The park was opened with
much pomp by the presidents of the two countries (Boris Tadić and Ilham
Aliyev, the son of Heydar), and hailed as a “symbol of permanent friend-
ship of the two peoples” (which incidentally lack any direct historical, cul-
tural, personal, or any other kind of connection). It was probably the most
expensive, and the most un-democratic, “donated” intervention into the
city’s tissue ever enacted in Belgrade.33
The line of anti-modernist public statuary with dubious institution-
al backgrounds seems to be continuing. In late 2016 a monument to the
American pop-art icon Andy Warhol was announced, its design totally
at odds with the artistic credo of Warhol himself (Stojanović, 2016). Al-
though nothing has been heard of it since the announcement. In spring
2018, a much-ridiculed Yuri Gagarin memorial, another gift of shady
provenance that includes Russia and a domestic tycoon dynasty, was put
up and quickly taken down, amidst public uproar over its caricatural ap-
pearance. In the same year, the project for a (very monumental) memorial
to Stefan Nemanja, the medieval founder of the Serbian state, designed
again by Russian authors won the first prize in a competition for the re-
construction of the square in front of the former railway station.34 We
cannot but wait and see what the future will bring.
Urban Transformation as Post– and

De-Modernization
The structures discussed conform in many respects to Belgrade mov-
ing in the direction of what is usually labeled the “postmodern city”. This
concept emphasizes “the significance of culture ... and consumption for
(economically) promoting the city, as well as the role of urban consump-
32 Pavić’s most famous novel, The Khazar Dictionary, is ostensibly about the ancient
Khazar people, believed to be the forefathers of today’s Azeris. However, the connec-
tion, made out of desperation by the cash-strapped, hypocritical city authorities, would
likely have been dismissed by Pavić himself, had he lived to see it: his sophisticated
literary postmodernism hardly squares with such simplistic political assimilations.
33 The reconstruction cost EUR 2 million. Both statues, made of bronze and about 3m
tall, authored by the Azerbaijani sculptor Natig Aliyev, were completely produced in
Azerbaijan. No one from Belgrade had any influence on their design or execution.
34 The jury’s president was Nikola Selaković, the Serbian president’s chief of staff and
a lawyer by training. http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/389683/Beograd/Spomenik-
Stefanu-Nemanji-2019, accessed 20/09/2018.
120 | Ivana Spasić
tion spaces and urban lifestyles as major aspects of social integration ac-
complished through consumerism” (Petrović, 2009: 44). Statues and foun-
tains, especially if they lack a strong use value and are not grounded in
citizen demand, are superficial adornments that serve other purposes than
satisfying the needs of residents, solving urban problems, or enhancing
the quality of life in the city. They are rather moves in the game of the
symbolic economy – “the production of a dominant city image” – which
in postmodern urban policy takes over from political economy (Petrović,
2009: 91).
The construction of these structures, like just about anything else
that the Belgrade municipal authorities have been doing since 2012, is be-
ing justified in terms of “attracting more tourists”, “polishing our city and
making it more beautiful”, or “making our city enjoyable to our guests”.
We already know of “city as advertising space” (Batarilo, 2015), but more
is suggested here: as if the entire city ought to become a huge ad for its
own self.35
These arguments are reminiscent of what Eisinger (2000) has called
“building the city for the visitor class” which is based on the “politics of
bread and circuses” (although, admittedly, “bread” is increasingly being
dropped from the equation). Turning a city into an entertainment ven-
ue, Eisinger warns, “is a very different undertaking than building a city
to accommodate residential interests”, and the two are not easily recon-
ciled (2000: 317). This orientation towards outsider needs, whereby “local
elites create a hierarchy of interests in which the concerns of visitors ...
take precedence over those of the people who reside in the city,” skews the
civic agenda to the detriment of fundamental municipal services. Huge re-
sources are invested in urban face-lifting and entertainment, while “more
mundane urban problems and needs must be subordinated or ignored”
(2000: 322). Similarly, Harvey speaks of a transition “from managerialism
to entrepreneurialism”, in which “urban governance has become increas-
ingly preoccupied with the exploration of new ways in which to foster
and encourage local development and employment growth”, even though
“such an entrepreneurial stance contrasts with the managerial practices of
earlier decades which primarily focused on the local provision of services,
facilities and benefits to urban populations” (Harvey, 1989: 3).
In Belgrade, all questions asked by the public as to the justifiability
and viability of new urban projects receive one and the same answer: they
35 The curious practice of keeping Christmas lights on in the city streets from mid-
September until late March, with the costs rising 150-fold between 2014 and 2018,
is arguably the most outrageous example of this attitude. https://www.danas.rs/beo-
grad/vesic-da-dokaze-kako-je-grad-zaradio-od-rasvete/, accessed 25/09/2018.
will boost profit from visitors. In this, again, Belgrade behaves in a “post-
modern” way. As Srećko Horvat (2007: 12) writes, in postmodern cities any
protests against new buildings are quickly quelled by the argument of “mil-
lions of visitors”, that is, profit. All this is manifested even more brutally in
a postsocialist context, where “local authorities ... comply with the strategy
of promoting urban consumption spaces ... which, due to inherited under-
urbanization, is presented uncritically as a form of progress. In this way
capitalism is sub-consciously legitimized, although the city of consumption
creates more divisions than it provides services” (Petrović, 2009: 68).
The other aspect of postmodernization, identified in the introductory
section, is a transformation of planning practices. The discussed symbolic
markers of Belgrade have resulted from processes that do not show any
overall plan and in which the purposeful and consistent agency of state
institutions is not prominent. In other words, earlier practices of ration-
al, strategically guided urban development, based on expert opinion and
relatively transparent lines of administrative decision-making, are being
disposed of.
The modern city was characterized by plans and programs developed
on the basis of information. “Survey before plan”, the touchstone of such
rational comprehensive urban planning, assumed accumulation of knowl-
edge on how the urban system operates before interventions are devised by
planners to improve the urban environment. Moreover, “modernist plan-
ning was committed to an idea of social progress, via social engineering
and the intervention by planners to achieve specified ends. Usually such
plans involved ideas of social balance, greater social equity and increased
access to resources and facilities” (Thorns, 2002: 77). This “authoritative
planning”, based on strict projects and universal schemes (Petrović, 2009:
54), sought legitimation through technical and scientific expertise: “It was
based around the idea that it was possible to produce logical, coherent and
systematic arrangements for urban development” (Thorns, 2002: 182).
While in the Fordist/modern city local government aims at develop-
ing and maintaining collective consumption, in the postmodern/post-
Fordist city it focuses on utilizing urban resources in order to attract mo-
bile international capital. In the former, space is shaped in accordance with
collective goals set on the basis of utopian visions grounded in solidarity;
in the latter, space is independent and autonomous, and local specificity is
defined in the service of economic growth and competitiveness (Petrović,
2009: 54). Investor-led town planning takes over, which is the “adaptation
and subordination of urban space to the interests of those who intend to
undertake (re)construction”, when the interests of the investor are taken
as absolute, regardless of the consequences for the environment, quality of
housing and living, or the city as a whole (Petovar, 2006).
122 | Ivana Spasić
These two sides of the process of postmodernization – culturaliza-

tion and spectacularization, fueled by entrepreneurialism, on one hand,
and the abandonment of planning, on the other – are not unrelated. Har-
vey (1989: 12) identifies a “subterranean but nonetheless vital connec-
tion between the rise of urban entrepreneurialism and the post-modern
penchant for design of urban fragments rather than comprehensive ur-
ban planning, for ephemerality and eclecticism of fashion and style rather
than the search for enduring values, for quotation and fiction rather than
invention and function, and, finally, for medium over message and image
over substance”. Cynics will say that we should, after all, rejoice that Bel-
grade has finally joined the trends Harvey diagnosed three decades ago.
There is an important sense, though, in which the way Belgrade is
transforming is not postmodern, at least not in the customary under-
standing of the term. Urban theory holds that not only does the focus in
urban policy move from the political-economic to the cultural-aesthetic
dimension, but “urban political debate tends to shift from questions about
how to redesign the city to increase equality and social justice ... to ones
more focused around the politics of identity” (Thorns 2002: 80), or more
precisely, “towards the expression of diverse identities” (Petrović, 2009: 52,
emphasis added). What is alluded to here, of course, is a plethora of iden-
tities other than and thriving within the single, national identity: gender,
ethnicity, age, race, sexuality, cultural background, lifestyle, value choic-
es and commitments etc. In Belgrade on the contrary, what is promoted
by the current selection and design of symbolic markers is precisely the
good old nation. The analyzed monuments unify and uniformize collec-
tive identity: a “(re)invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983)
clearly gives precedence to the national over other types of membership.
What is more, this one identity is given a single prescribed shape, man-
dated from above, that rules out critical reflection. In other words, instead
of postmodern diversity, it is sameness that is celebrated. One is tempted
to conclude that here we have a two-pronged, seemingly contradictory
development: culturally modernist objectives – homogenization and cen-
tralization – are pursued by postmodern means, in terms of the technol-
ogy of governance. Another possible interpretation would be to see what
has been going on in Belgrade simply as an instance of a “reactionary”
response to the crisis in urban planning that shook off its old habits and
certainties from the early 1990s onwards (Thorns, 2002: 192).36
36 Thorns explains: the outcome of the crisis “has been either reactionary, with an af-
firmation of the status quo and tradition leading to what has been termed neo-tradi-
tionalism which tends to be expressed through the revival of community ideologies
as part of a new set of moral rhetoric about social inclusion, or resistance which, in
contrast to the first, looks for a program of political change which addresses issues
The second process, de-modernization, concerns the formal artistic

properties of the markers. Here, a traditional realism, which the top ech-
elons of Serbian art effectively renounced decades ago, is resuscitated. The
discussed statues are all figural (i.e. they materially “represent” the personal-
ities they are dedicated to) and realistic in terms of style. They date from the
beginning of the 21st century, while a history of public monuments (Michal-
ski, 1998: 7) argues that as far back as 1914, the epoch of stately marble
statues of great individuals had already past. In the period that followed,
abstraction was gradually gaining ground and the “demise of the public
figural monument” became definitive in the second half of the 20th century.
Moreover, a new type of monument emerged in the 1960s: the inconspicu-
ous one. “In the mid-1960s, the widespread feeling that the status of the po-
litical public monument had been rendered meaningless resulted in a new
art form: monuments which tried to attain invisibility as a way of engender-
ing reflection on the limitations of monumental imagery” (Michalski, 1998:
172). In Serbia, having participated in global art trends for a couple of dec-
ades, we are now evidently moving in the opposite direction.
Being an integral part of international artistic developments coincid-
ed, paradoxically, with the period of communist single-party rule. In Yu-
goslavia, this rule was specific in many respects, including the arts. Social-
ist realism, originally the official style of the communist regime, uncritical
towards and celebrating the dominant ideology – a “kind of antimodern-
ism” (Šuvaković, 2008), was abandoned in SFRY as early as 1952, after the
1948 break with Stalin’s USSR. It was superseded by socialist modernism,
which developed thanks to increasing communication with Western high
modernism and the avantgarde (Denegri, 2003). Socialist modernism, the
dominant artistic orientation in Yugoslavia for more than thirty years, was
considered an expression of the country’s progress and independence, yet
with an explicit awareness of belonging to the international artistic world.
And not only that: due to the country’s position between the two Cold War
blocs, it “emerged as such only in Yugoslavia, thus constituting a unique
formation resulting from the cross-breeding of the properties of the East-
ern and Western art model”, although the Western model prevailed over
time (Denegri, 2003: 173). Importantly, modernist art understood itself
as ideologically neutral and autonomous from political power, guided ex-
clusively by aesthetic concerns. It is ironic that under a repressive regime
art enjoyed more autonomy than in the context of political pluralism and
apparent democracy, when it is again called upon to perform political and
ideological services.
of power” (2002: 192). In Belgrade, the former evidently dominates, while the latter
is present marginally and sporadically, e.g. in the form of urban civic initiatives like
Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own.
124 | Ivana Spasić
After the abstractionist recess, we have reverted to the most classic

figural realism of 19th century. Also, sharing in trends characteristic of
Western art seems no longer to be taken for granted. Belgrade is obvi-
ously happy to have, on its central street, a monumental statue whose style
is, in the words of its own author, “rarely found in Europe these days”.
The prominent art historian and critic, Irina Subotić, notes the strangely
regressive form of recent monuments. These “utterly conservative, mean-
ingless and artistically worthless memorials,” she argues, are radically
changing the spirit of Serbian cities. An “urbicide by monuments” is tak-
ing place in which Belgrade is being killed by “a collision of provincial
traditionalism with neoliberal economy”.37 Though not as extensive and
ambitious as the thorough “rebranding through architecture and monu-
ments” in Skopje (Cvitković & Kline, 2017), the revamping of Belgrade
shares some of the latter’s features.
While monuments are generally put up to embody “sacred” or “icon-
ic” (Alexander, 2010) societal values, recent monuments in Belgrade and
Serbia engender social conflict and division because they do not stem
from a consensus reached through open, democratic debate. Instead, as
art critic Nebojša Milenković (2009) writes, they come as results of po-
litical brokerage: “A politician in power, disregarding the requisite proce-
dures, or barely, chooses an artist on his or her own whim ... transfers the
money from the public funds, and voilà!” In this way, Milenković argues,
rather than being “symbolic sites that reflect those (central) values that in
a given society are exemplary and thereby incontestable – the monuments
become points of endless conflicts, divisions and the basest politicking”.
Conclusion
The symbolic link that mediates the triadic relationship between the
visual form, the city, and the political, is undergoing transformation in
contemporary societies. Yet the direction of this transformation is ap-
parently not the same in all contexts. Overall, the movement has been
described as one of informalization and wilful unpretentiousness, so to
speak. “The monumental is out of fashion in modern societies. Although
on some occasions power still relies upon monumentality and the distance
it creates, it now prefers to look more ‘informal’ and warmer”, while the
significance of monuments in public space “seems to lie primarily in their
suitability to be transformed into an icon” (Verschaffel, 1999: 335).
In Serbia, however, a different path has been taken. Power still likes
to be expressed in the old-fashioned, grand forms, and the iconicity of
37 Interview published in Vreme 1425–1426, 26/04/2018, https://www.vreme.com/cms/
view.php?id=1594251, accessed 12/07/ 2018.
Belgrade itself seems to no longer be a priority. The statue of a foreign

emperor at a key spot in the city center, an assembly-line fountain, an-
other fountain with two older twins in small towns – these are all clearly
not intended to become symbolic markers of Belgrade as a unique, in-
imitable place. At the same time, older Belgrade icons, that is, structures
that can be found only here, distinctive in their form and meaning, which
have served as symbols of the city for a long time – such as the statue of
the Victor at Kalemegdan, the Monument to the Unknown Hero at Avala,
the Museum of Modern Art, or the city skyline at the confluence of the
Sava and the Danube, which is currently being permanently disfigured by
the high rises of the Belgrade Waterfront project – are almost forgotten.
They are falling into disrepair, as well as being symbolically dissolved in
the new jumble of proliferating signs.
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| 127
STRUGGLING WITH THE TITLE:

A CAPITAL OF CULTURE AT THE
SUPERPERIPHERY OF EUROPE*
Ana Pajvančić – Cizelj
Abstract: Numerous criticisms of the “creative city” concept have pointed to its
loose argumentation and the social consequences of its practical implementation.
In this paper we start by briefly presenting these criticisms before turning to the
specific ways in which the creative city has been manifested in Central and East-
ern Europe. We turn finally to situating the topic in the Western Balkans – i.e. the
superperipheral context – and engaging in analysis of Novi Sad, which has been
selected as a European Capital of Culture (ECoC) for 2021. Following the ideas
of Harvey (2001), Peck (2005) and Todorova (2006) our starting hypothesis was
that in the superperipheral and postsocialist context of the Balkans the ECoC
project produces struggles in the economic and cultural (discursive and material)
domains which are both intertwined and mutually reinforcing. We conclude that,
in this case, the struggle is revealing due to the highly selective process in which
some “exotic” and “appropriate” parts of the local/national culture are used as
“decoration’ for the introduction of homogenized neoliberal urban models, while
other “unwanted” local socio-cultural elements are “cut off ” and suppressed. The
ECoC title has also, however, brought a new urban dynamic into the city, within
which we can hope to also see the articulation of different visions that could ad-
dress structural and long neglected urban problems alongside the creative city for
all.
Keywords: European Capital of Culture, creative city, neoliberalism, superper-
iphery, Novi Sad
* The first version of this paper was presented at the 10th midterm Conference of the
European Sociological Association Research Networks Sociology of the Arts & Soci-
ology of Culture. Creative locations: Arts, Culture and the City, 4–7 September 2018,
Valletta, Malta. The production of this paper was supported by the Ministry of Edu-
cation, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia (Project
No. 179053).
Introduction
Strategies embedded in discourses of culture/creativity are attracting
considerable interest among urban researchers and practitioners in cities all
around the world. Although the relationship between culture and urban de-
velopment is certainly not a new discovery (see Mamford, 2010; Hall, 2001),
there is an obvious shift in the way this relationship is interpreted and acted
upon. This shift was introduced in Richard Florida’s 2002 book The Rise of
the Creative Class1. Despite its “conceptual and methodological weaknesses”
(Krätke, 2012) and later revisions, Florida’s ideas still drive urban develop-
ers from San Francisco to Cairo and Singapore. His main thesis was simple
(banal even, as noted by Schmid, 2012) and catchy: creativity has become the
primary driver of economic growth in the most recent phase of capitalist de-
velopment. Cities should, Florida goes on to explain, invest in trendy, excit-
ing, authentic, attractive and vibrant places in order to attract the new crea-
tive class with its specific lifestyle demands and spending habits. This class
will then, as the story goes, somehow generate economic growth through
new jobs in the creative sector, new markets and an influx of tourism.
Despite the increasing popularity of this thesis, concerns have
emerged that question the validity of its basic assumption about culture/
creativity as a propellant for urban economic growth. Needless to say, the
whole discourse where culture is treated as a “commodity as any other”
is highly questionable on many grounds. Numerous critical reviews have
emerged, citing mostly Western, American and Western European cases
(Peck, 2006; Malanga, 2004; Krätke; 2010; 2012; 2012a; Scott, 2006; Stor-
per & Scott, 2009; Marcuse, 2011).
These critical evaluations have pointed to the loose arguments of the
creative city thesis and the social consequences of its practical implemen-
tation (namely social exclusion, elevation or reproduction of social ine-
qualities, gentrification, commodification of culture and the normaliza-
tion of the neoliberal environment).
Until recently, very little was known about the specific manifestations
of creative city strategies outside the West. Thus, the role of local contex-
tual factors, the position of the city in global and regional urban hierar-
chies and the mediation of these processes, remains unclear. This poses
an important question on how the dependent, peripheral position of cit-
ies influences different manifestations and impacts of homogenized and
“manualized” cultural and creative initiatives.
1 Florida’s idea is not the only one that refers to the role of culture and creativity in ur-
ban development. Similar ideas were previously developed by Charles Landry (2008)
and later emerged as responses to Florida (Scott, 2014; Marcuse, 2011). In this paper
we mostly refer to Florida’s concept as it seems to have been the more influential in
the terms of practical implementation.
Struggling with the Title: A Capital of Culture at the Superperiphery of Europe | 129
In this paper we use several theoretical starting points in order to

examine the impact of urban policy led by concepts of culture/creativity
in the superperipheral context. To achieve this, we have selected as our
case study the European Capital of Culture (ECoC) project in Novi Sad,
Serbia. The concept of “superperiphery” (Bartlett, 2009)2 is used to de-
note circumstances within which a city is vulnerable to the problems pro-
duced by globalization but lacks the internal regulatory capacity – as well
as external support from supranational institutions and regulations – to
resolve them. While we certainly acknowledge the importance of political
economy perspectives to understanding cultural manifestations in cities,
we also intend to capture the role of deeper cultural layers embedded in
their specific historical development. We find the ideas of Maria Todorova
(2006), who traces discursive constructions of “the Balkans”, especially rel-
evant for this kind of analysis. By relying on this kind of perspective, the
position of a superperipheral city can be observed not only in the material
or economic but also in cultural, discursive terms.
The ECoC event is seen as an opportunity to observe the interplay of
the cultural (discursive) and economic (material) dimensions of the globali-
zation and also as the main platform that introduces and advocates the crea-
tive city discourse in the city of Novi Sad. Thus, in this paper, we are not
focusing on the ECoC project as such, rather we use it as a lens through
which we can observe this specific form of globalization. We start by briefly
presenting some of the main criticisms of the creative city concept, then
turn to its specific manifestations in the CEE and Western Balkans and fi-
nally engage in analysis of the first activities surrounding the ECoC project
in Novi Sad. As the title of ECoC was awarded only recently, the paper is or-
ganized as a preliminary report relying on the available official documents
provided by the Novi Sad 2021 Foundation (Application (Bid) book, official
web pages and newspaper articles) as the main empirical evidence.
The Creative City and Neoliberal Governance:

Roots and Consequences
Jamie Peck (2005)3 developed one of the first systematic critiques
of the kind of urban development that is led by culture and creativity, as
rooted in the Florida’s thesis. According to Peck (2005: 763) “rather than
civilizing urban economic development by “bringing culture in”, creativity
strategies do the opposite: they commodify the arts and cultural resources,
2 William Bartlett (2009) uses the concept developed by Sokol (2001) to argue that the
conflicts in the 1990s pushed the Balkans countries into the European superperiphery.
3 The title of his paper is used as an inspiration for the title of this paper.
even social tolerance itself, suturing them as putative economic assets to

evolving regimes of urban competition”. Consequently, creativity plans
“do not disrupt established approaches to urban entrepreneurialism and
consumption-oriented place promotion, they extend them” (ibid: 761). He
correctly noted that Florida’s ideas can serve to legitimize and normalize
the neoliberal environment as the “natural habitat” of the creative class.
This vision is, according to Peck, “manualized” in the rapidly-growing lit-
erature as a set of techniques, “habits of the mind” and “hypsterization
strategies” that explain “how to” transform places to attract the creative
class. This “creative awakening” is manifested through the “recycling [of]
the rather narrow repertoire of newly legitimized regeneration strategies”
(ibid: 752). For example, the conversion of postindustrial spaces into art
centres. Peck argues this idea has been taken for granted in the form of the
“creative cities script”, which determines “favoured strategies and privi-
leged actors, determining what must be done, with whom, how and where”
(ibid: 742). Often, this implies the process “by which selected segments of
erstwhile oppositional milieus are integrated and co-opted into the new
metropolitan mainstream” (Schmid, 2012: 55). According to Peck, cities
have willingly entrained themselves to Florida’s creative vision because of
the claim that practically any city can achieve the economic regeneration
by applying the creative city script. Thus, even in the face of budget crises,
additional funding is raised for creativity strategies.
However, “whether or not this will stimulate creative economic
growth, is quite another matter” (ibid: 749). Peck quotes Malanga (Ma-
langa, 2004:45 in Peck, 2005) who reasonably asks whether the marginal
cultural attractions can indeed stimulate economic growth and, even more
importantly, is it possible to build such “creative places” artificially? In-
deed, the most creative cultural places around the world are the result of
spontaneous processes. But even if it does create economic growth, how
would the “creative trickle-down” take place?
Stefen Krätke further develops Peck’s critique and claims that “only a
limited number of specific cities and metropoles can make use of the cul-
tural economy sector as a relevant focus for their development strategy”
(Krätke, 2012: 143). And even in those places, in the shadows of those
apparently successful creative islands, lay a number of social problems:
marginal groups, elderly, social welfare recipients who do not fit in this
new cultural urban vision (ibid). In addition, the original creative scene,
the pioneers who worked to upgrade a given inner-urban area, are often
pushed to relocate to other, lower-value locations (Krätke, 2010).
Scott (2006) has shown that the main logic behind the creative city
concept – that jobs follow people – is flawed. Actually, it is the other way
around – the system of production generates jobs and influences regional

economic competitiveness.
Florida fails to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions un-
der which skilled, qualified, and creative individuals will actually congre-
gate together in particular places and remain there over any reasonably
long-run period of time. The key to this conundrum lies in the produc-
tion system. Any city that lacks a system of employment able to provide
these individuals with appropriate and durable means of earning a living
is scarcely in a position to induce significant numbers of them to take up
permanent residence there, no matter what other encouragements policy
makers may offer. A few fortunate centres perhaps may achieve something
that approaches a creative, high-quality environment across the board,
but in most metropolitan areas, developments of this type will most likely
continue to exist only as enclaves in an urban landscape where poverty
and social deprivation still widely prevail (Scott, 2006:12).
But how can we explain the popularity of the creative city concept
and the support that local and national governments generously provide
for such initiatives, despite budget constrains? All the mentioned critical
reviews clearly point to the social consequences but not the roots and caus-
es of creativity-led urban development. In the next paragraph, we briefly
present what might be the main driver, or socio-economic cause behind
this model of development, by relying on the arguments offered by David
Harvey.
In Spaces of Capital (2001: 394–411) Harvey examined the relation-
ship between culture and capital through the concept of monopoly rent
(higher rent for owners, based on the holding of a monopoly over a spe-
cific place) and showed how local cultural developments can be under-
stood in relation to the (global) political economy. The culture and crea-
tivity strategies and their emphasis on producing unique places are here
seen as attempts to garner monopoly rents in the latest phase of capitalist
development, where natural monopolies based on space and proximity
fade away. “What is at stake here is the power of collective symbolic capi-
tal, of special marks of distinction that attach to some place, which have a
significant drawing power upon the flows of capital more generally” (ibid:
405). The scarcity of place can be created by withholding land or resourc-
es from current uses and speculating on future values. According to Har-
vey, claims to uniqueness and authenticity, embedded in the historically
constituted cultural artefacts and practices are the main basis for specu-
lation on future value of place. They are as much an outcome of discur-
sive constructions (historical narratives, interpretations and meanings of
collective memories) and social struggles as they are grounded in material

fact. “Once established, however, such claims can be pressed home hard in
the cause of extracting monopoly rents” (ibid: 405). This discursive pro-
cess of selecting appropriate cultural narratives that will later serve as the
base for monopoly rents is highly selective and the “guardians of collective
symbolic and cultural capital (the museums, the universities, the class of
benefactors, and the state apparatus) typically close their doors and insist
upon keeping the riff-raff out” (ibid: 406). Thus, the discursive creation
of the new cultural profile of cities, aligned with the logic of capital, is ex-
clusive and makes a distinction, breach or conflict between privileged and
marginalized actors in cities. The material benefits of this development
are unevenly distributed, causing a rift between the high valued “new ur-
ban culture” and suppressed and devaluated everyday urban culture of the
local population. By analysing Liverpool’s hosting of the European Capital
of Culture in 2008, Eliot Trotter (2009:113) expands on Harvey’s insights,
and suggests that a pre-condition for exploiting the cultural infrastructure
of a city is the transformation of elements of cultural distinctiveness –or,
more generally, “the commons” – into fixed capital, which in many cases
involves outright or de facto forms of privatization.
But, “why let the monopoly rent attached to that symbolic capital be
captured only by the multinationals or by a small powerful segment of
the local bourgeoisie?”, asks Harvey (2001: 407). Who has the right to the
creative city? Peter Marcuse (2011) makes a contrast between the creative
city and the right to the city concept, arguing that the Florida’s concept is
exactly what we need to overcome in order to have a truly creative city for
all. According to Marcuse, that kind of creative city:
“[...]will not be the city that, on the one hand, leaves a large portion of
its residents with less than the basic material needs for a decent and
healthy life: leaves many homeless, undernourished, in bad health and
with inadequate care, in polluted environments, congested cities, in-
secure neighborhoods, subject to the domination and exploitation of
their labor power and the restriction of their freedoms to speak, to act,
to assemble, to develop – residents deprived of even the rudiments of a
decent life” (ibid: 1).
Democracy, recognition, representation and redistribution are, in
other words, the necessary elements of the true creative city.
Harvey (2001) sees this possibility within the contradictions of the
cultural logic of capital itself. Namely, its tendency to value uniqueness,
authenticity, particularity and originality is inconsistent with the homoge-
neity presupposed by commodity production.
“And if capital is not to totally destroy the uniqueness that is the basis
for the appropriation of monopoly rents (and there are many circum-
stances where it has done just that and been roundly condemned for
so doing) then it must support a form of differentiation and allow of
divergent and to some degree uncontrollable local cultural develop-
ments that can be antagonistic to its own smooth functioning” (Har-
vey, 2001: 409).
Drawing on these insights, it can be concluded that culture/creativi-
ty-led urban policies go hand in hand with neoliberal urban governance
and result in the concentration of wealth and power, dispossession, gen-
trification and displacement (Harvey, 2012; Brenner and Theodore, 2002).
On the other hand, these developments seem to open up “spaces of hope”
(Harvey, 2001) and stimulate new alliances as the basis for new conten-
tious (cultural) policy in the city.
The high hopes raised by Florida’s recipe turned out to be unjustified
– not only because of their social consequences, but also because these
strategies are highly contextual and depend on the system of production
that underlie the city/region. Despite the unifying tendencies of globaliza-
tion, it is obvious that neoliberal urban policies do not manifest in the
same way in all places. Brenner and Theodore (2002: 349) introduced the
concept of “actually existing neoliberalism” and argued that “an adequate
understanding of actually existing neoliberalism must explore the path-
dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited regulatory
landscapes and emergent neoliberal, market-oriented restructuring pro-
jects at a broad range of geographical scales”. Following this conceptual
framework, we now turn to the specific manifestations of urban strategies
led by culture/creativity in the postsocialist cities of CEE.
The Creative City in the Postsocialist,

Neoliberal and Peripheral CEE
The global city discourse is marked by western-centrism, economism
and presentism, resulting in attention being focused mainly on the prima-
ry economic centres in the West, while the peripheral cities, the cultural/
political dimension of globalization, as well as the role of path depend-
encies in the globalization of the cities, are neglected (Pajvančić – Cizelj,
2017). However, peripheral urban centres that do engage with cultural/
creative urban development are difficult to examine due to the underde-
velopment of theories relevant to local contexts and a general lack of rel-
evant empirical data.
The recent work of Czirfuzs (2018) about the role of creativity and cul-
ture in reproducing uneven development across Central and Eastern Europe,
gives an excellent overview of urban development led by creativity and cul-
ture in CEE. According to him, critiques of culture/creativity driven urban
development, described previously in this paper, are largely valid in CEE and
even exacerbated by the lack of capital. In addition, culture/creativity dis-
courses in CEE can be seen as powerful signifiers that the region has left
behind its old industry-based development and embraced the western way of
creative economy. Drawing from the results of different studies conducted in
the region, Czirfuzs (2018) concludes that behind these powerful discours-
es, the old path dependencies and structural centre/periphery relationships
seem to endure. Within the new mode of development, CEE cities are often
(if not always), stuck in the lower-ends of the knowledge economy or less
knowledge-intensive parts of global production networks (Blažek & Csank,
2015, in Czirfuzs, 2018: 107). Besides, the concentration of those services in
the main CEE cities further exacerbates problems of urban-rural divides and
uneven regional development across CEE, or as stated by Czirfuzs (2018:
107), “simply reproduces former unevenness in the manufacturing sector”.
Drawing from numerous empirical case studies, Czirfuzs (2018: 110) states
that this kind of urban development “increases gentrification and displace-
ment, raises socio-spatial inequalities and starts new rounds of capital ac-
cumulation in cities”. However, he also notes how new social movements
against creativity-led urban development are on the rise.
The ECoC: Rebranding Peripheries

A recent phase of the European Capital of Culture programme can be
used as an illustrative example of cultural-led urban development through
“mega events” in the European periphery. The ECoC programme itself
was launched by the European Commission in 1985 with the aim of estab-
lishing greater cultural cohesion between the member states. In the first
years, ECoC titles were awarded to traditional cultural centres like Ath-
ens (1985), Florence (1986), Amsterdam (1987), Berlin (1988) and Paris
(1989). This practice changed in 1990 when Glasgow, until then known
as a small, “dirty industrial city” with huge economic and social problems,
was awarded the title of ECoC (Griffiths, 2008)4. The case of Glasgow5
4 Corina Turşie (2015) identified two phases of the ECoC program, marked by two
different strategies used by host cities. The first was inspired by a top-down entre-
preneurial vision, city competitiveness, internationalization and “high” culture, and
second, progressive or capability strategy focused on the distribution of benefits to
the citizens, reducing socio-economic disparities and raising overall standards of liv-
ing, reflecting the broader trends in cultural policy.
5 For critical reflections about the Glasgow case see Mooney, 2007.
set a precedent because the award was motivated globally (not locally)
and its primary goal was economic. The experience of Glasgow, seen as a
worldwide success, has prompted other de-industrialized cities to test this
“prescription” for securing a safer, post-industrial future (Griffiths, 2008).
This idea quickly found its way to postsocialist cities, especially small-
er cities that have been left out of global integration in the initial phase of
their transition. Deindustrialization, dismantling of regulatory institutions
and aggressive (often corrupt) privatization in those cities created struc-
tural problems such as unemployment, growing inequalities, commercial
overbuilding, the usurpation of public spaces and the reduction of public
services. This scenario, correctly noted by Trócsányi (2011:266) as “recall-
ing the world of free competition capitalism of the 19th century in many
respects”, did not favour the spread of cultural urban rehabilitation. Nev-
ertheless, throughout CEE “culture appears to offer a relatively cheap and
quick way to “do the trick” and represent the region as equivalent to other
developed democratic countries” (Czirfuzs, 2018:111). The ECoC is seen
here as a tool for rebranding the city, repositioning it in the European ur-
ban hierarchy, and attracting investment and tourism.
Márta Bakucz (2012) analysed the Hungarian city of Pécs from the
perspective of a peripheral ECOC title-holder for 2010 and stressed the
importance of simultaneous development of culture and other industries.
Corina Turşie (2015) posed the question how formerly communist, pe-
ripheral cities deal with their past while re-inventing their identities and
re-narrating their history in a European context6, in order to fit in the
European dimension of the ECoC programme? By examining two former
ECoCs, she observed how the unwanted heritage of the cities’ past, soon
became exploited and re-invented to fit the general ECoC aim of promot-
ing diversity and the richness of European culture.
This process of re-invention of culture in the postsocialist/peripheral
context is, however, complex and contentious as it is situated in the broad-
er urban dynamic and its actors. Ooi, Håkanson and LaCava (2014: 421)
make a useful distinction between the politics of the ECoC – the “grubby
business of seeking legitimacy, mobilizing community support and man-
aging local dissatisfaction” and the poetics of the ECoC – the “presentation
of ECoC in an attractive manner to win local support and attract out-
side attention”. Accordingly, analysis of every specific ECoC case needs
to address the process of negotiation within conflicting urban realities as
well as the arguments, means and rhetorical devices used to justify and
legitimize new cultural activities. From the sociological point of view, it is
6 Persistent orientation towards Europe (“Europeanization”) in CEE seems to distin-
guish this region from other postsocialist places.
important to observe who gets to speak and be heard, how the conflicting
meanings of culture are managed and finally, whose definition of culture
is accepted.
It appears that most peripheral cities that were awarded the ECoC
title used their peripherality as an advantage. Following Harvey’s line of
argument, it might be claimed that peripherality itself is used to denote
distinction and uniqueness, to add extra value to the space. The question
of peripherality becomes even more interesting when it is applied to the
Balkans. From the perspective of political economy, Balkan cities could be
seen as the superperiphery of Europe. Many countries, according to Bar-
tlett (2009), became labour-export economies, with significant outflows
of skilled labour and follow a path of low-skill growth. They have been
left out of the most beneficial elements of the globalization process, while
simultaneously suffering from its main defects. “Furthermore, as transi-
tion has proceeded, disparities between capital cities and rural areas have
increased, while weak administrative capacities have hindered the imple-
mentation of effective local development policies to counteract these ef-
fects” (Bartlett, 2009: 21–22).
From the cultural/discursive perspective, the Balkans can be defined
through their Ottoman and socialist heritage and seen as the “other”
within Europe while Balkanism refers to specific discourses that deter-
mine attitudes and actions toward the Balkans (Todorova, 2006). Within
this discourse “Balkan” is the symbol for something “aggressive, intoler-
ant, barbaric, semi-developed, semi-civilized, semi-oriental” (Todorova,
2006:11). These notions have, according to Todorova, often served as a
repository of negative characteristics upon which a positive and self-
congratulatory image of the “European” has been built. Taking this as a
starting point, we can approach the subject of this paper from a different
perspective and pose the following question: How does the presence of
European authority affect local processes of reinventing peripheral, post-
socialist and Balkan urban culture?
Our starting hypothesis is that, for several reasons, the ECoC project
produces struggle. The first of these reasons arises from tension between
the homogenized European dimension and heterogeneous local specifici-
ties, in this case deeply embedded in the Balkan discourse. It is difficult to
reconcile “Balkan” and “European” because, as shown by Todorova7, they
function as oppositions to one another. Thus, what is the accepted “dose”
7 This is, according to Todorova (2006), one of the key differences between the no-
tions of the Balkans and Orient. In the eyes of the European, the Orient is a source of
mystery, the unknown, the exiting other to be conquered. The Balkans is on the other
hand a mirror image for Europe, a despised part of the self to be rejected.
of the Balkan that makes it interesting but not imposing and threatening?
The second reason for the struggle with the ECoC title arises from the ma-
terial, superperipheral position of the city. The poor social and communal
infrastructure of the city and the ongoing socio-economic crisis, make it
hard to advocate and allocate funds for cultural regeneration. The second
proposition that will guide our analysis is that cultural and economic (dis-
cursive and material) dimensions of the struggle are intertwined.
The ECoC in Novi Sad: Empirical Analysis

Serbia and Novi Sad – A General Overview
The following table (Table 1) presents some basic data about Serbia,
comparing it to one “core” Central European and one semi-peripheral,
neighbouring Eastern European country (Austria and Hungary, respec-
tively).
Table 1 Country profiles – Serbia/Austria/Hungary
Serbia Hungary Austria

Total population (in thousands) 8,820 9,753 8,712
Annual population growth (%) -0.5 -0.3 1.3
Rural population (% of total population) 44 28 34
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live 5 4 3
births)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 75 76 82
Poverty headcount ratio at 3.10 PPP$ a 1.3 0.5 ..
day (% of population)
GDP per capita – PPP$ 13,482 25,582 47,824
Annual GDP growth (%) 2.8 2.2 1.5
GDP in billions – PPP$ 104 265 443
Source: UNESCO Country profiles
When it comes to the knowledge economy and its indicators, in 2016

Serbia had around 2,300 researchers per million inhabitants, Hungary
had 4,000 and Austria had 7,000. In the same year, Serbia’s gross domes-
tic expenditure on R&D was 0.9 percent of GDP, in Hungary around 1.5
and in Austria around 2.7 percent (Source: UNESCO). Although at the
beginning of the decade the country was relatively well integrated into
the world economy and had a higher standard of living than many other
transition countries, the Serbian economy was devastated as a result of
armed conflicts, international sanctions and trade shocks stemming from
the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) during
the 1990s (Country Report, Serbia, European Commission, 2006). Given
these broad indicators we can situate Serbia in Bartlett’s (2009) conception
and define it as part of the European superperiphery.
Despite the lack of disaggregated data, especially on the local level, it
is obvious that Serbia’s development is highly territorially uneven.8 Novi
Sad is one of the few “growth poles” in the country. Compared with other
Serbian cities it is: a) one of the very few places experiencing a slight de-
mographic growth; b) multi-ethnic; c) developed above the national av-
erage (National Agency for Regional Development); and, d) one of the
Serbian cities with the highest index of social development (Social Inclu-
sion and Poverty Reduction Unit, 2015)9. Novi Sad is the administrative
centre of the Province of Vojvodina, Serbia’s most important agricultural
region, inhabited by many minorities. With around 250,000 inhabitants,
Novi Sad is second only to the country’s capital in terms of population. As
is the case with many other cities in Serbia, Novi Sad has suffered from a
breakdown of industry during the last decade of the 20th century and has
managed to restore some of its previous economic functions only during
the 2000s.
The socio-spatial structure of Novi Sad reflects the territorial une-
venness seen on the national level. One of the striking examples is water
and sanitation – most smaller settlements located in the wider Novi Sad
municipality lack access to sanitation (or have only gained access very
recently)10. In addition, there is a lasting, neglected problem of the sub-
standard settlements in the city11, as well as a high number of illegally
8 Overall income inequality, measured by Gini coefficient, is significantly higher in
Serbia when compared with EU states – 38.6 in 2015 compared to the EU– 28 aver-
age of 31.0 (Arandarenko, Krstić & Žarković Rakić, 2017). Recent research points to
the fact that Serbia is “economically, socially and demographically polarized space”
with “deepening differences between regional centres and the rural hinterland”
(Joksimović & Golić, 2017:246).
9 Detailed data about the economic profile of the city is available here: http://www.nov-
isad.rs/sites/default/files/attachment/profil_2011_eng_web.pdf, accessed 01/06/2018.
10 In addition, Novi Sad, as well as Belgrade, still pours sewage into the Danube, as both
cities still lack central sewage treatment facilities.
11 The city of Novi Sad is surrounded by several substandard settlements (Veliki Rit,
Bangladeš, Šangaj and part of the Adice) inhabited by more than 500, mostly Roma,
constructed buildings. A development strat-

egy driven by short-term economic thinking
resulted in overbuilding, reductions of public
and green spaces, neglect of environmental is-
sues and the deterioration of living conditions
in the city (see Pušić, 2009). This is coupled
with the construction of luxury housing com-
plexes, further increasing socio-spatial in-
equalities and mimicking the neoliberal devel-
opmental path of the capital. In contrast with
prevailing assumptions about entrepreneurial
cities – and as a result of high centralization
and concentration of power within the ruling
party – the national government plays the pri-
mary role in (neoliberal) urban development
in Serbia (Grubbauer & Čamprag, 2019).
Historically and culturally, the city of
Novi Sad is located at the crossroads of civi-
lizations, which can be illustrated by the fact
that the line Huntington (1996) drew through
the Europe in order to divide the Orthodox
and Catholic parts of the continent, goes di-
rectly through the city (Image 1)
Behind stereotypical portrayals of the city
– such as the “Serbian Athens”, with its peace-
ful, tolerant and multicultural profile – lie eth-
nic tensions and nationalist exclusion. While
the city was developing (in fact growing) ac-
cording to the neoliberal recipe, the Cultural
Centre of Novi Sad, was heavily criticized Image 1 S. Huntington di-
for favouring nationalist cultural content, as vide of Orthodox and Catho-
stated during a protest organized by the Youth lic civilization in Europe12
Initiative for Human Rights13. The same in-
stitution censored an art exhibition because it
“offended Christianity”, which resulted in the group of artists pulling their
families living in critically disadvantaged conditions. They lack basic urban infra-
structure and some of them are situated directly next to landfill sites (Jovanović &
Bu, 2014).
12 Source: Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22.
doi:10.2307/20045621, accessed 05/06/2018.
13 http://www.autonomija.info/antifasisticka-dekontaminacija-kulturnog-centra-no-
vog-sada.html, accessed 01/06/2017.
work from the Centre and boycotting it for suppressing artistic freedom14.
Moreover, the officials of the City of Novi Sad ecstatically announced
huge investment in the construction of a museum devoted to the events of
1918 when Vojvodina proclaimed its secession from the Austro-Hungar-
ian Empire to unite with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In
the meantime, the same local government allowed a private investor to de-
molish a protected historical building in the city centre, which contained
some important elements of Armenian heritage that is now almost com-
pletely wiped out from the city. This kind of urban policy is simultaneous-
ly embedded in anti-modern (nationalist, traditionalist) and postmodern
(neoliberal) values, that go “hand in hand”. Mišović (2017) correctly noted
how the “postmodern Triumph created the conditions for revisionism at
the periphery of the world capitalist system, as the basis on which a glo-
balized neo-liberal society is being built, and which, for its new symbolic
markers, takes the philosophy of ethno-exoticism as one, essentially, anti-
modern policy of servitude and auto-colonialism”.
Novi Sad – ECoC 2021

In order to map and interpret two presumed dimensions of struggle
with the title of ECoC (economic and cultural), in the following chapter
we analyse several illustrative elements of the ECoC project in Novi Sad.
The evidence is gathered from the official web page of the Novi Sad 2021
Foundation and from local newspapers.
The ECoC programme in Novi Sad is deeply rooted in the creative
city script, as described above, and functions as the main platform that
introduces and advocates the creative city discourse in Novi Sad. The
struggle with the title was obvious from the very beginning – the initial
candidacy did not impress the panel, who stated that there is a “consid-
erably underdeveloped European dimension” and that the bid lacks “an
innovative approach” (European Capital of Culture, 2016). The Report
from the First Monitoring Meeting by the panel of independent experts
in 201715 repeated that the European dimension is undeveloped and also
criticized the “lack of clear artistic vision” and “event-oriented approach”.
This points to struggles with the reinvention of an urban culture within the
creative city discourse in a peripheral context but also to European author-
ity over the project and the servility of the local developers. The tension
14 https://www.blic.rs/kultura/vesti/otvorena-izlozba-umetnika-koji-bojkotuju-kultur-
ni-centar-novi-sad/zhpy9wc, accessed 01/06/2017.
15 Available at: http://novisad2021.rs/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Ocena-panela-eng..
pdf?jez=lat, accessed 15/06/2018.
between what are perceived as Euro-

pean values and Balkan culture can
be illustrated by the main logo of
the project, which consist of words
written with a combination of Cyril-
lic and Latin letters (Image 2) and
also the biggest event organized by
the Foundation so far – celebration
Image 2 Novi Sad 2021 Logo
of the Orthodox New Year.
The total budget for the (four-year) project is around 30 million eu-
ros, with an additional 34 million planed for infrastructural investment16.
Compared to some other ECoCs, this might look like a relatively small
budget (see, for example, Mons17). Actually, it is a large figure when we
take into account that the city’s total 2018 annual budget was around 200
million euros (with the budget for culture in 2016 being around 8 million)
and the total budget of the Province of Vojvodina for 2018 was around
550 million euros18. Similar to other, past ECoCs, the majority of funding
comes from the domestic public sector (around 85% for operating costs and
around 60% for capital investments). The infrastructural costs are mostly
planned to be provided by the Province of Vojvodina (51%) with little
funding from the local (5%) and national government (5%)19. This might
indicate that the already high level of centralization, uneven development
and urban-rural divide in the Province (also called “Novosadization”)
might become even larger in the coming years. The costs of the Project
(especially it biggest infrastructural investment, located in Novi Sad) are
borne by the whole Province, while the benefits (if any) will be enjoyed by
a narrow segment of Novi Sad’s population.
A brief analysis of the table showing the main potentials and risks of
the project in the Bid Book shows how the actual social context is ignored
and distorted: the reality marked by inequalities, poverty, environmental
problems and partocracy is erased and the “blame” for the supposedly in-
adequate (cultural) profile of the city is, in a neoliberal manner, trans-
ferred to its citizens. For example, the citizens of Novi Sad are seen as a
potential obstacle and described as “apathetic and uninterested in culture
due to exposure to reality [TV] programs”, which will be solved by a mod-
16 Source: Bid Book

17 Source: European Commision (2016) Ex-post Evaluation of the 2015 European Capi-
tals of Culture, accessed 01/10/2018.
18 http://www.budzet.vojvodina.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GRADJANSKI-
BUDZET_2018.pdf, accessed 15/06/2018.
19 Source: Bid Book
ern, participatory approach to culture. In fact, the citizens, especially the

marginal social groups, often do not have the financial means or objective
opportunities to participate in the cultural life of the city in any way other
than they do now. Other obstacles that were identified are the perceived
“low capacities” and old-fashioned style adopted by cultural workers,
which are to be overcome through capacity-building and education. In re-
ality, a number of cultural workers actually have high professional capaci-
ties and the real problems lie in the low salaries and political, rather than
the professional, management of their institutions. In addition, an alleged
lack of communication between members of different ethnic communities
is posed as an obstacle, as if it were a matter of personal animosity and
not the systematic marginalization of minorities, especially in area of cul-
ture. Finally, local artists are also seen as an obstacle because they are “not
interested in cultural industries and are engaged in art for art[‘s sake]”, a
fact that is intended to be changed by raising their entrepreneurial capaci-
ties. Again, the structural problems of insufficient support for the arts and
continued politicization remain intact.
In a way, the Bid Book ignores structural social problems and shifts
responsibility to the individual and local level. Such a distorted image of
reality will probably produce even more struggles against the realization of
proposed activities because some of these continue to be uninformed and
mistargeted. The European intervention is here seen as an opportunity to
“save” the culturally unaware, old-fashioned local community. This dis-
cursively enhances the material and superperipheral position of the city,
making it look weak, subordinate and dependent on foreign knowledge
and expertise. This then clears the ground for practical transformation of
the urban space under the ECoC, inspired by neoliberal practices.
We now turn to the one of the biggest infrastructural projects within
the ECoC project in Novi Sad, the transformation of the former industrial
site known as the Chinese Quarter into “Youth creative polis”, costing 16
million euros. The main idea is “to revitalize [the] so-called Chinese quar-
ter” as an “abandoned and deteriorated factory site” and transform it into
a “new creative district for youth activism” through “complete reconstruc-
tion of the infrastructure, revitalization of the existing objects and build-
ing new objects for tourism, arts, ICT, and creative industries, through
public-private partnerships”20. Public funds are planned mostly for the
reconstruction of infrastructure and private funds (around 9 million)21
for the new buildings, which raises serious concerns about whose inter-
est are going to come first. Although promoted as something innovative,
20 Source: Bid Book.
21 Source: Bid Book.
it is obvious that this project was inspired by dozens of similar initiatives,

through the recycling a narrow repertoire of routinized strategies, as de-
scribed by Peck (2005). The economic potentials, although highly ques-
tionable, are frequently repeated (“for every euro invested in culture, we
can expect eight times as much in return”22) and expected mostly from
the very broadly defined “creative class” (in this case, the ICT sector). Al-
though in bad physical shape, the Chinese Quarter was a socially rich,
lively, artistic and alternative space, used as an urban “common”. This
unique, spontaneously developed feature was obviously the main motive
for picking this particular space for revitalization under the EcoC and
used to attract private investors (there are a number of both psychically
and socially abandoned industrial sites in the city that could have been
selected instead). In order to do so, the space needed to be “sterilized” by
pushing out some unwanted elements (“riff-raff ” in Harvey’s terms). In
this case, the “riff-raff ” was composed of artists, social activists, manual
labourers and a few homeless people who used the place as a shelter. Their
contribution to the “social life” of this place was dismissed and one part of
the original creative scene was pushed out to other, lower-value locations,
as was similarly noted by Krätke (2010).
This “sterilization” was not merely material, it was also discursive. In
order to obtain legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the quarter needed to
be reimagined and shown as an underused place without an identity23.
This was achieved by a survey conducted by a private media agency24, a
series of informal public talks organized by the Foundation and through
the one official and obligatory mechanism for public participation in ur-
ban planning. Public discussions organized by the Foundation were pre-
sented as an innovative participation mechanism, while in fact their loose
structure and undefined procedures could legitimize almost any decision
(by selecting appropriate participants, by subjective interpretations of the
course of events during the discussions and so forth). Employment of the
obligatory, official and legally grounded mechanism of participation in
Local Parliament was followed by the large number of objections to the
new plan by the citizens and experts but all of them were simply dismissed
and rejected by the city officials25. The public quickly recognized the po-
22 http://rs.n1info.com/a201173/Vesti/Kultura/Novi-Sad-proglasen-za-Evropsku-pre-
stonicu-kulture-za-2021.html, accessed 15/05/2018.
23 In fact, very few places in Novi Sad have a clear identity function, especially for those
people who do not live close by.
24 http://www.mojnovisad.com/vesti/istrazivanje-novosadjani-znaju-gde-je-ali-ne-zna-
ju-sta-je-kineska-cetvrt-id17547.html, accessed 01/06/2018.
25 http://www.021.rs/story/Novi-Sad/Vesti/155659/Burna-rasprava-i-masovan-odziv-
Novosadjana-zbog-rusenja-Kineske-cetvrti.html, accessed 01/06/2018.
tential risks and questioned: a) the potential gentrification and displace-

ment26; b) privatization and commodification27; c) irrational and unjusti-
fied public expenditure28; and, d) potential corruption29.
One segment of these erstwhile oppositional milieus (cultural work-
ers, experts and grassroots movements) could be easily neutralized, inte-
grated and co-opted into the new mainstream, as also noted by Schmid
(2012), because the Foundation is allocating a significant amount of fund-
ing for cultural projects in the city.
Concerns that have been raised over these issues were initiated by
plans for the reorganization of the Chinese Quarter, which involved the
relocation of users and an influx of new private actors. All these fears and
criticisms are still not fully articulated or expressed because the project
has not yet been realized and its full plan has not been presented to the
public. While the new physical appearance of the quarter has been widely
publicised, it is still unknown what the reconstruction will mean in terms
of the area’s social content (new functions and actors are just broadly and
not explicitly defined). This situation can be described as a non-transpar-
ent process of speculation over the future value of this part of the city.
Conclusion
The challenge of this paper was to describe the situation without suf-
ficient data about the real impact of the project on the built environment
and social life of the city. Most of the planned interventions into built envi-
ronment (such as the transformation of the Chinese Quarter – as covered
here – as well new building for the Music School, new cultural centres and
revitalized public spaces, that were not covered by this analysis) have yet to
be completed and it is not possible to fully judge their impact at least until
the first evaluations are publicly available. That is why we conceived of this
paper as a preliminary analysis aiming at capturing and explaining the ini-
tial social tensions – struggles – that this project has brought to the city.
In this paper we presented some of the main criticisms of creative/
cultural-led urban development: on one hand, they are based on the loose
assumption that economic development can be boosted anywhere, solely
by applying the “creative city” script, and on the other, they often result in
social exclusion, gentrification and the commodification of culture. The
26 http://detelinara.org/petar-drapsin-kineska-cetvrt-i-youth-creative-polis-tekst-slo-
bodana-jovica-u-novom-5-broju-biltena-stanar/, accessed 01/06/2018.
27 http://www.masina.rs/?p=500, accessed 01/06/2018.
28 http://dostajebilo.rs/blog/2018/06/22/izvestaj-o-radu-evropske-prestonice-kulture-
2021-slobodnim-stilom/?lang=lat, accessed 01/06/2018.
29 http://javno.rs/analiza/novi-sad-2021-privatna-prestonica-kulture, accessed 01/06/2018.
rising popularity of these strategies can be explained via Harvey’s notion

(2001) that they serve as a means for extracting monopoly rent in a new
round of the capital accumulation, based simply on of the cultural distinc-
tiveness of a place. Thus, cultural/creative-led urban strategies, at least in
their present form, can be regarded as the companions of an overall pat-
tern of neoliberal urban development.
In the European context, these strategies are often implemented un-
der the umbrella of the European Capital of Culture, especially after its
shift towards smaller, peripheral and formerly industrial cities. Taking the
Novi Sad ECoC 2021 project as a case study, our starting hypothesis was
that, in the superperipheral, postsocialist, Balkan context, the ECoC pro-
ject produces struggles in the economic and cultural domains. Those two
sources of struggle against the ECoC title – cultural and economic (dis-
cursive and material) – are seen as intertwined and mutually reinforcing.
Although the material conditions play a minor role in the public promo-
tion of the ECoC project in Novi Sad, they are crucial for understanding
the discursive efforts to change the cultural profile of the city. In the case
of the Chinese Quarter in Novi Sad, a new, neoliberal, economic model of
urban development, as a companion of the creative city concept, is legiti-
mized and justified both by imposing and promoting new cultural values
and discourses and their actors, and also by suppressing those who do not
fit the new urban vision.
The analysis has confirmed previous findings (Czirfuzs, 2018) that
critiques of urban development driven by culture/creativity produced in
the West are largely valid and even exacerbated in the CEE context, due to
lacking resources, aggressive neoliberalism, underdeveloped local regula-
tory mechanisms, marginalized social agenda and endangered urban com-
mons. Elevation of specific socio-spatial problems observed elsewhere in
CEE, namely the regional inequalities and urban-rural divide, were also
noticed in the case of Novi Sad. However, our case departs from the CEE
because the Balkan region lacks systematic outside support for territorial
cohesion and regional development. The superperipheral position makes
the region highly vulnerable to the risks deriving from global integration,
with a low local capacity and supranational support to overcome them.
The most pressing, structural urban problems of the peripheries will most
likely remain intact or even become exacerbated within the ECoC title
while the public budget and attention will be redirected to controversial
cultural mega-projects.
In this paper, however, in the absence of sufficient “hard” empirical
evidence (e.g. about the concentration of lower segments of the knowl-
edge economy in superperipheral cities), the question of whether cultural/
creativity-led urban development leads to the reproduction of superper-
ipheriality remains open. The peripheral or superperipheral position of
a city is not just economically defined, however, it is also embedded in

cultural and discursive marginalization. In a way, peripheriality is not
defined from within but clearly defined (stigmatized) from the outside.
This stigmatization is, in our case, based on the discourse Todorova called
Balkanism. Brief discursive analysis conducted in this chapter, pointed to
the dependent, servile position of local actors before European authority/
knowledge regarding the ECoC title, which in a way reflects or even en-
hances the dependent material position of the city. Local actors are obvi-
ously struggling to find the appropriate European “look” and with satisfy-
ing their European audience. In the initial phase of the ECoC project in
Novi Sad, this struggle is revealed as the highly selective process in which
some “exotic” and appropriate parts of the local/national culture (Ortho-
dox religion, Balkan motifs) are used as “decoration” for the introduction
of homogenized neoliberal urban models, while other “unwanted’ local
elements are “cut off ’ and suppressed.
This illustrates how a global neoliberal system interacts with a local
culture and national state, but also points to the struggles and resistance
of local actors facing the need to reconcile local heterogeneity with global
unification. Although often seen as opposing forces (internationalization
vs. national isolation) neoliberalism and nationalism can indeed go hand
in hand. In this case, it is difficult to identify whether nationalistic dis-
course serves to support neoliberal intervention or if it is rather the other
way around. In any case, they are obviously complementing or even rein-
forcing one another.
The case of Novi Sad differs from the Western cases, where short-
term creativity projects disrupt comprehensive planning in favour of selec-
tive development of “urban fragments’ with market potential (Peck, 2005).
Here, the long-term planning was disrupted in the 1990s, during the war,
transition and institutional breakdown. This state of affairs changed only
slightly during the 2000s when Novi Sad continued to grow almost spon-
taneously, driven by short-term economic goals when “anyone who had
even a small amount of money, could build anywhere whatever he want-
ed”, as noted by Pušić (2009). Given that, the ECoC title can also be seen
as a chance to develop long-term, integrated and strategic planning in the
city. For example, the strategy for the development culture in the city of
Novi Sad was developed as part of the preparation for the ECoC bid. In
addition, the title brought new roles for urban actors, initiated public de-
bate about the goals of urban development and triggered new alliances as
well as the new conflicts. Within this new urban dynamic, we could hope
to also see an articulation of different visions, which address structural
and long neglected urban problems and advocate for poverty alleviation,
social welfare concerns, environmental sustainability and socio-spatial re-
distribution, alongside the creative city for all.
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PART II
URBAN REACTIONS:
AWAKENING OF URBAN
MOVEMENTS
| 151
RIGHT TO THE CITY: URBAN

MOVEMENTS AND INITIATIVES AS THE
PULSE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SERBIA*
Jelena Božilović
Abstract: The chapter deals with the phenomenon of urban movements and ini-
tiatives in Serbia in recent years. The topics focused on by the chosen social and
urban actors are varied and depend on the local context and actual problems
encountered by dissatisfied citizens. What is common to all of them, however, is
that by demanding their right to the city they point to deeper systemic and in-
stitutional fractures, injustices and the narrow interests of power-wielding elite,
which come to life in interactions between the local and state authorities. This
chapter discusses these urban movements and initiatives within the political-
party milieu of contemporary Serbia, as without this context the phenomenon
could not be fully explained. Furthermore, the chapter emphasizes that the ac-
tors studied here are not merely dissatisfied with the actions and decisions of
the political parties currently in office but are also critical of opposition parties.
These are seen as having failed to live up to the trust placed in them in the past
(i.e. when they were in power) and are now seen as disorganized, disunited and
weak in responding to the needs of dissatisfied and apathetic citizens. Urban
movements and local initiatives represent, therefore, a social and political rebel-
lion from below that, even though it begins as the right to the city, possesses a
wider social significance. The chapter provides particular insight into the city of
Niš and the specific initiatives that, acting against the state and local party elite,
defend the interests of ordinary people by performing actions directed towards
the right to the city.
Keywords: city, right to the city, urban movements, civil society, civic activism
* The paper is part of research conducted within the Tradition, Modernization and Na-
tional Identity in Serbia and the Balkans in the European Integration Process (179074)
project, financed by the Ministry of Science and Technological Development of the
Republic of Serbia and implemented by the Centre for Sociological Research at the
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš.
Introduction
Since urban movements and protests fall within the scope of civil so-
ciety, the introductory part of this chapter will discuss the meaning of the
term civil society, followed by a brief review of the development and char-
acteristics of civil society in Serbia.
As an autonomous sphere of activity, civil society has its roots in the
period of great revolutions, when the bourgeois class struggled and won
the autonomy of the economic sphere (market principles and self-regula-
tion) of society from the state. After the establishment of the capitalist sys-
tem, the strengthening of the capitalist class and the wars in the first half
of the 20th century, civil society has been revived but this time with new
demands. These are no longer concerned with economic freedom but, on
the contrary, with the limitation thereof as, together with the state appara-
tus, it is believed to suppress the “life-world”. It is therefore the autonomy
of society that is now being demanded, both from government and from
the private interests of the most economically powerful class. It was in
the second half of the 20th century that social movements in the West ex-
panded and advocated for the common interests they deemed to be under
threat. The values promoted are peace, ecological balance, emancipation
of women and gender equality, sexual freedom and solidarity.
Civil society can be defined based on its genesis through three crucial
characteristics: it is a type of social action; it has a relationship with the
economy and the state, yet is autonomous; and it is a project that contains
utopian dimensions (Lazić, 2005: 100). Civil society is permeated by com-
munication and its main actors are citizens, social movements and dif-
ferent civil organizations and associations that draw attention to certain
issues and problems and defend certain values that are, for them, impera-
tive. Its main components are therefore civil initiatives, advocating for the
common good, as well as the supplementation and control of the political
system of representative democracy.1 Vukašin Pavlović believes that social
movements are the most important link in the chain of various collective
actors in civil society, considering them doubly critically oriented: towards
the state, institutions and political community, on the one hand, and to-
wards the society as a whole, on the other (Pavlović, 2006: 38).
When it comes to Serbia, one can speak of the emergence and ex-
istence of civil society only after the collapse of Yugoslav socialism and
the introduction of a multi-party system in the 1990s. Prior to this, dur-
ing decades under a one-party system, civil engagement was sporadic and
1 More on the history and the meaning of the term “civil society” in Molnar, 2003.
Right to the City: Urban Movements and Initiatives as the Pulse of Civil Society... | 153
occurred usually in the sphere of culture, which was relatively open to

Western influence. The only relevant political actor in Yugoslavia was the
political elite, while the civic activism of groups and masses was tempo-
rary and kept in check by the authorities and police. Furthermore, the
command and plan model of state development spread into all aspects of
the society, thus making it impossible to talk about a developed pluralism,
which is immanent in democratic societies. This was a case of the totaliza-
tion of all social subsystems and ideological monopoly (Lazić, 2005: 67),
where if certain initiatives appeared as the voice of the people, they often
did not even constitute opposition to the fundamental assumptions of the
system (the party, the leader and the values of socialism).
It would be incorrect to think, however, that the Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was governed by totalitarian consensus. In
contrast to other socialist countries, Yugoslavia was more liberal and not
all opposing opinions were censored or suppressed. Proof that there existed
an alternative way of thinking and acting within the system lies in the sci-
entific, philosophical, artistic and other cultural endeavours whose prac-
tices showed that a civil-critical relationship towards the authorities and
dominant values was possible. The openness of Yugoslavia towards West-
ern culture can most easily be traced through popular culture and especial-
ly film. Foreign films from various countries were shown throughout SFR
Yugoslavia, the majority of which were American (thanks to the US being
the largest producer). Large numbers of Italian, French and British films
were also shown – meaning imports were dominated by western cinema-
tography. Soviet films also featured but their number was reduced after the
de-Stalinization of the country. All of this took place during a time when
the Yugoslav authorities began to question Soviet models of governance,
including in the cultural sphere (Vučetić, 2012; Janjetović, 2011).2
2 In Serbia the Black Wave movement represented an interesting alternative phenom-
enon in film. It emerged during a period of development for Serbian independent
film, somewhat inspired by the French New Wave, yet with contextual, social specifi-
cities (socialist society) and original aesthetic approaches (directing, acting, camera
movement, cuts, etc.). In contrast to films about the Yugoslav Partisans, which were
ideologically acceptable in the sense that they defended socialist ideas through the
medium of motion pictures (Zvijer, 2011), Black Wave directors focused their stories
on the common man and everyday life in the suburbs, filled with misery and with
existential and psychological difficulties – subjects very far removed from the pro-
claimed state of socialist wellbeing. Precisely due to its critical examination of social-
ist reality, realism and naturalism, certain Black Wave films were banned, however,
the majority still played in cinemas or at film festivals, such as those in Pula or Niš.
It is also interesting to note that the best Black Wave films (even though disliked by
the Yugoslav authorities) were sent to the most prestigious international festivals (for
example, Želimir Žilnik’s Early Works won a Golden Bear at the Berlinale).
As Yugoslav intellectual projects, the Praxis journal and the Korčula

Summer School were based on the Marxist paradigm of the critiquing of
everything, which implied a critical evaluation of the capitalist world but
also of Yugoslav socialism and the governing party. Praxis was founded
by philosophers and sociologists from various Yugoslav university centers
but its editorial board also included the leading global intellectuals of the
time. The journal was published for ten years, after which its publication
was precluded through pressure and attacks in the media. Regardless of
the fact that it ceased to exist, its ten years of publication speaks volumes
of the possibilities for opposition, civil and intellectual activity, while some
even claim that it represented, for Yugoslavia, a period of democratization
of sorts (Eterović, 2007). Politically, one of the most intriguing years was
certainly 1968, known throughout the world as a year of student move-
ments and demonstrations, which also spilled over onto Yugoslav soil. In
the SFRY this movement began as the expression of the tendency to de-
mocratize society, strengthen self-government, but also against elitization,
authoritarianism and the growing bureaucratization of society. Similar to
the intellectual circle gathered around Praxis, the student demands were
also made with the aim of encouraging leftist ideas. The authorities and
the party were challenged, but not the socialist ideology itself. On the con-
trary, it was a deficit of socialism evident in the regime that initiated the
activism in the first place.
At the time, other organizations and movements also stood as expres-
sions of certain sections of society. Namely, a new feminist movement
emerged in Yugoslavia in the 1970s, precisely in the aforementioned at-
mosphere of re-examination and critique of the state and the scope of so-
cialism. Thus, feminism in Yugoslavia should not be interpreted outside
of the context of Praxis, the Korčula Summer School and the 1968 stu-
dent protests. In a series of conferences held in cities around the SFRY, the
“female question” was posed publicly, enabling the second wave of femi-
nism to reach the Yugoslav socialist society (Stojčić, 2009: 113). It is also
worth mentioning the environmental movement in the SFRY, which has
its roots in the 1970s, only to develop into a social movement a decade
later through a number of spontaneous “bottom-up” civil actions and pro-
tests in various urban centers. Parallel to the environmental movement,
an anti-nuclear movement emerged in the middle of the 1980s, within
which renowned scientists expressed their stern concerns regarding the
construction of nuclear power plants. They were mostly physicists but the
movement also included political scientists and sociologists (more on this
in Oštrić, 1992).
The 1980s were, however, the decade in which the SFRY began to
decline and nationalist discourses started to slowly but surely dominate
the public sphere. The intelligentsia became the forbearer of national-
ist tendencies, removing class identity into the background and forming
a milieu in which Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milošević could
thrive. Despite the strengthening of nationalist movements and options,
the resistance, primarily intellectual, was also present and able to point to
the dangers of increasing nationalist narratives and the importance of a
democratic transformation for Yugoslavia. One such civil-intellectual cir-
cle was the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (Udruženje za
jugoslovensku/jugoslavensku demokratsku inicijativu, UJDI), formed in Za-
greb in 1989. As the coming years would come to show, their appeals, as
well as those of other anti-war civil movements, remained marginalized.
The 1990s, marked by Yugoslavia’s blocked transformation,3 were the
decade when political and party pluralism were created in Serbia. It was
also a time when different shoots of civil society began to appear, such as
the social movements and non-governmental organizations that, through
almost continuous activity, worked to bring down the newly-formed re-
gime as it was based on the tenets of nationalistic authoritarianism (see
Gordi, 2001). A significant increase in the number of non-governmental
organizations was recorded especially after the opposition bloc won the
1997 local elections. NGOs continued to multiply and strengthen after the
year 2000, while the civil society in the nineties pulsated primarily due to
the activities of opposition parties and social movements, as well as pro-
tests that they organized in major cities across Serbia. The emergent civil
society described here played a key role in overthrowing the regime of
Slobodan Milošević and one of the most important movements within it
was the student movement Otpor (Resistance – more on this in Božilović,
2011). Apart from Otpor, other social movements that had previously
formed in the SFRY, directed their activism during the 1990s towards an-
ti-nationalist activities, such as feminism. The anti-war movement is also
of particular interest, since it brought together several initiatives, among
which were Žene u crnom (Women in Black). The anti-war civil protests
that took place in the streets of Serbian cities in 1991 and 1992 were well-
attended and one of the more famous pacifist initiatives was Rimtutituki,
a supergroup comprising famous Serbian rock and roll musicians, who
called for the cessation of hostilities and the breakup of the country in
their own specific, creative way.
After the political changes in 2000, when society in Serbia started to
build democratic institutions and a democratic political culture, non-gov-
3 See Lazić, 2005:122.
ernmental organizations appeared as a significant factor in civil society and

their number was growing. On the other hand, civil activity through social
movements declined. It did not, however, disappear entirely and remained
present in, among other things, the actions of right-wing movements that
emerged in reaction to the movements and civil initiatives that defended
the right to freedom (primarily the freedom of life choices, freedom of
speech, right to space, etc.), such as LGBT movements. Despite the signifi-
cant increase and spread of the NGO sector, along with many other ideo-
logically diverse civil associations, civil society in Serbia remained fragile.
Even though it can generally be said that the period after the 5th of
October changes was a time when the conditions for the development of
civil society under the democratic principles being established were fi-
nally met, this development was itself far from simple. It was somewhat
expected from the example of other former socialist countries, which had
begun the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society before
Serbia, that the development of civility and civil political culture would
be difficult. Pavlović states that postsocialist societies can be described as
societies of poor political culture with insufficiently developed civil expe-
rience – a fertile ground for easy deterioration into authoritarianism and
the exclusion of society from the social and political balance for which
democracy strives (Pavlović, 2006: 171). Examining the difficulties of
the democratic transformation of postsocialist societies, Piotr Sztompka
analyses them from the perspective of culture, where apart from the un-
derdeveloped entrepreneurial, discursive and everyday culture, the unde-
veloped civil culture also represents an obstacle on the way towards de-
mocratization. Citizens are not politically active and ready to participate,
no one cares about public goods, opponents do not respect each other and
the rule of law is fragile (Sztompka as given in Pavlović, 2006: 172).
Of importance here are research results that can be used to trace the
path of civic activism in Serbia from the 1990s to the present, which serve
to corroborate the stated observations. It is shown, namely, that the par-
ticipation of citizens in protests and their involvement in political and
social organizations was much higher in the nineties has been decreas-
ing since. There exist different interpretations of the reasons behind this
phenomenon but it can be generally concluded that the reforms of the
5th of October were questionable and painstaking and the transformation
was inefficient and inconsistent, which caused disappointment, passivity
and mistrust in social institutions (Petrović, 2016: 381). A 2012 study of
civic engagement indicates that the reliance on one’s own abilities, as well
as one’s own family, is seen by most citizens as the best way to realize
the common interests of citizens (see Petrović, 2016). Similar attitudes are
also observed in the citizens of other postsocialist countries (Jacobsson,
2015: 15). The state, including the political parties, retains very low lev-
els of trust.4 In favour of this disappointment and maintaining one’s dis-
tance from politics, 2017 findings also indicate a very low level of politi-
cal activism (engaged in by only four percent of citizens) and a very high
percentage of apoliticism (37%). Also, a very high percentage of those
respondents who deem themselves to be well-informed are not active in
the political sphere (34%)5. It is also interesting to note that citizens do
not perceive non-governmental organizations as organizations of trust but
rather as actors oriented towards profit. Besides, NGOs are seen as dealing
with public policies rather than with politics, their results are temporary,
they have insufficient power to challenge the power of the state and their
power to mobilize is weak (Vuković, 2015).
Apart from great apathy and apoliticism, the Serbian civil society to-
day still pulsates mainly thanks to the growing urban movements and lo-
cal initiatives that have become one of the major sources of resistance to-
wards the current government through the right to the city. Consequently,
some authors interpret the growth of urban movements as a new devel-
opmental phase of civil society in postsocialist countries that challenges
the dominant and leading role of non-governmental organizations (Jacob-
sson, 2015: 5). Before we take a look at some of these movements, we need
to explain the political context within which we observe them.
The Socio-Political Context

and the Awakening of Cities
It has already been mentioned that after the 5th of October chang-
es the unfulfilled expectations citizens led to civic apathy and a certain
loss of hope. This disappointment manifested itself in, among other
things, the electoral will of voters, when the coalition gathered around
4 The described characteristics of Serbia’s political culture can be related to amoral
familism, which Benfild wrote about in a study on the characteristics of the citi-
zens of southern Italy or the incivism (srp. necivizam) that was studied by Willy in
France (Podunavac, 1982; Stevanović, 2008). It is a social phenomenon characterized
by high distrust of citizens in all social structures that stand outside the family and
close circles. Not only is there a cynicism towards the bearers of political power, but
citizens have no confidence in one another, which prevents civic cooperation and
engagement for the promotion of general interests: “Only the holders of public func-
tions are in contact with the public sphere and they are paid for that. For ordinary
citizens there is no serious interest in politics, even the manifestation of this interest
is qualified as immoral and indecent” (Benfild according to Podunavac, 1982: 159).
5 https://demostat.rs/sr/vesti/istrazivanja/politicki-aktivizam-u-srbiji/131, accessed
19/08/2018.
the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka – DS) lost the 2012 election
and the majority opted for the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna
stranka – SNS) – which had formed as an offshoot of the nationalistically
oriented Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka – SRS). Since
then, a specific political climate has been formed in Serbia, in which the
government is overwhelmingly centred on the person and the authority
of the leader, while partially established democratic institutions are sup-
pressed as are the media, which would previously allow the circulation
of different discourses and would thus strengthen the democratic public.
This style of government is based on a combination of autocracy and un-
consolidated democracy and the result of this combination is a hybrid re-
gime, frequently called a stabilitocracy in social and political studies6 (Pri-
matarova & Deimel, 2012: 5). It is a powerful type of regime that currently
characterizes almost all of the countries in the Balkans. Although it could
be expected that the democratic institutions of Balkan countries would
gradually become stronger during the long process of integrating with the
EU, it has actually been shown that democratization and EU integration
are not parallel processes (BiEPAG, 2017).
As well as suppressing democratic procedures, political pluralism and
an open media environment, stabilitocracies are also strengthened by cri-
ses that are produced by the governments themselves to create fear and
thus generate their own legitimacy. At the international level, this kind of
government is supported by Western countries, whose leaders see them
as a factor of sustaining peace and stability, regardless of their evidently
autocratic character, which results in significant erosion of the democratic
political culture7.
By operating in this manner, stabilitocratic regimes, including the re-
gime in Serbia, obtain high percentages of votes in elections.8 On the
other hand, there is much abstention among citizens, who do not support
the government but do not seek solutions to the problem by turning to
opposition political parties. Citizens are fed up with political figures that
have been present in the political scene since the nineties and there ap-
pears to be a prevailing attitude that all politicians are the same, hence
6 https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-
fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies, accessed 20/08/2018.
7 https://florianbieber.org/tag/stabilitocracy/, accessed 20/08/2019.
8 In the 2017 elections the governing party won 55.08 percent of the vote. These results
are compatible with the authoritarian leanings of the citizenry, which are illustrated
by a 2016 study. According to the findings, a high percentage of respondents de-
clared that they support a strong leader (in Serbian “a strong hand”) and they value
obedience as a personality trait (https://demostat.rs/sr/vesti/istrazivanja/istrazivanje-
javnog-mnenja-srbije-oktobar-2016/7, accessed 19/08/2018.)
it does not matter who is in power. Furthermore, the opposition parties

are ideologically heterogeneous, which makes it more difficult for them
to unite and organize around clear political goals and a common vision
of the future. Moreover, they do not have sufficient media coverage that
would allow them to address the citizens and criticize the government and
the condition of society. Hence, it can be concluded that the opposition is
significantly weakened.
Part of the Serbian population has lost trust not only in domestic po-
litical actors (the governing and opposition parties) but also in the Eu-
ropean Union, which supports the government. Although the results of
opinion surveys, which have now been gathered for years, show that sup-
port for the integration of Serbia into the EU has never fallen below 40
percent, it is noticeable that this percentage has decreased during the last
nine years and, in 2016, a quarter of respondents did not find anything
positive in Serbia’s membership of the EU.9
Regardless of the prevailing distance from the political sphere, how-
ever, civil society in Serbia has not died out – it lives on thanks to mostly
urban movements and initiatives. Namely, over the past few years, some
people have begun to organize spontaneously and gather around specific,
local issues. In contrast to grand political issues (such as EU integration
and Kosovo), the course of which ordinary people feel they cannot influ-
ence, issues faced by local communities have to some extent succeeded
in mobilising apathetic citizens because they are concerned with a direct
context that is much closer to their daily lives.10 Turning to municipal is-
sues and problems has grown into a struggle for the right to the city. Thus,
cities have become bases of civic democratic practices that highlight the
neglect of the common good and tendencies to make decisions in the cen-
tre or “from above” without consulting the public and sometimes even by
bypassing the legal and institutional framework. These urban movements
stand against the “strong hand” and the suppression of freedom as well
as the neoliberal policies connected with this government. These actors,
through organized actions and protests for the right to the city, demand
more democracy and seek the right of citizens to participate in the process
of running the city – which Castells holds as one of the most important
determinants of an urban movement.11
9 Unlike today, in the 1990s, the countries of the West clearly supported the opposi-
tion in Serbia, and then the citizens were more attached to the democratic values
these countries symbolized. (https://demostat.rs/sr/vesti/istrazivanja/entuzijazam-za-
pristupanje-eu-se-smanjuje/317, accessed 19/08/2019.
10 A survey by Cesid shows that 52% of citizens believe that they cannot change any-
thing in the politics (Cesid, 2017). (www.cesid.rs, accessed 20/08/2018.)
11 Urban movements can be defined as social movements which “are generated by the
mobilization of citizens in order to highlight certain requirements regarding acces-
Civil Society in the City of Niš:

Movements and Protests
One of the first urban revolts that became a movement is related to the
formation of the Association of Free Tenants (Udruženi pokret slobodnih
stanara – UPSS) from Niš. It is a movement that originated in 2015 as a
spontaneous gathering of citizens on the initiative of tenants (residents) of
an apartment building in Niš because in response to the almost doubling of
the cost of district heating by the public utility company, Toplana (District
Heating Plant). News of the meeting of these residents spread quickly and
gathered a large number of tenant assembly presidents interested in some
form of cooperation to solve local problems. After a few meetings, they
came to the idea to organise an association that will monitor the work of
Toplana but also the work of other city agencies, which the activists be-
lieved operated more to the detriment than the benefit of citizens.
The authorities did not approve of this kind of civic action and the
movement had trouble finding premises in which they could hold meetings
and discussion. Although local community centres should serve such a pur-
pose, the head organizers were initially told that local community centres
could only be used for political gatherings. They were also denied the use of
the city hall without any clear explanation12. After the activists had appeared
in the media, a local community centre opened its doors to them.
Civic protests, as well as meetings and discussions with guests of
the UPSS, have been held regularly and it can therefore be said that this
movement has been continuously active. Communication with the pub-
lic is mostly conducted via social networks but this year they also started
publishing a bulletin, Glas stanara (Voice of the Tenants), which is distrib-
uted to citizens free of charge in order to inform them about local issues,
indicating broader cracks in the system. The topics that are discussed are
highly important, especially because they are concerned with the position
of underprivileged and marginalized citizens, who are frequently on the
very edge of destitution. The institutions of the City of Niš seldom react
to or solve the problems faced by ordinary people so the movement con-
tributes to a wider public becoming informed about everyday difficulties
encountered by certain citizens. Although the activities of the movement
are mostly of a local character and, as such, are focused on the promotion
sibility and quality of urban resources. Unlike interest groups that put pressure on
politics through routinized approaches to political authority, urban movements are
situational and challenging, as their demands usually call into question the current
practice of urban politics” (Petrović, 2009: 199).
12 http://www.upss-nis.org/o-nama/, accessed 25/08/2018.
of the common good of the citizens of Niš, the activists have displayed
solidarity with other movements and participate in the activities of organ-
izations across the country that share the same values. The movement has,
for instance, lent its support to strikes by the workers of those factories
that have been affected by bad privatization. In addition to labour rights,
their activity is also directed towards raising the awareness of freedom of
the press, which is currently under threat, since they believe it to be one of
the crucial problems of contemporary Serbia. One of the pivotal points of
the movement is a struggle against the domination of partocracy, i.e. the
employment of incompetent individuals based on their membership of a
political party. They also promote values based on local autonomy and
decentralization as the most effective way to react to the everyday prob-
lems of a city’s inhabitants. In a broader sense, the movement promotes
antifascist values and ideologically and is left-oriented. Furthermore, the
political activities of the movement are conducted in cooperation with
other movements and organizations in the city and the country but are
independent of political parties.
One of the achievements of the UPSS was a successful lawsuit against
Toplana. This “win” points to the wider significance of the movement.
More precisely, it has shown that even in a civil society permeated by pas-
sivity, a citizen as a political subject, aligned with others and by means of
perseverance and good organization, can demonstrate that the system is
not omnipotent, which inspires the continuation of joint action.
The emergence of the UPSS has influenced civil society to wake up
through a call for the right to the city. The large-scale protests as a sort of
fight for the right to the city triggered, however, another event. In March
2018, a wave of civic protests began in Niš, instigated by the spontaneous
revolt of citizens due to the announcement by the Government of the Re-
public of Serbia that Niš’s Constantine the Great Airport – which is owned
by the city – could be handed over to the state. State officials and local
leaders claimed in unison that the city of Niš does not have enough finan-
cial resources to invest in the development of this institution and that the
state should, therefore, “help” with airport maintenance. Since the citizens
of Niš know that the airport has been operating successfully over the past
few years and that there is no economic justification for a change of own-
ership nor a change of business model, the public suspected that the hid-
den interests of the authorities lay behind the change of ownership. Dis-
satisfied citizens managed to mobilize quickly and gather around the civic
initiative, We Won’t Give Up Niš Airport (Ne damo niški aerodrom)13, to
13 The initiative comprises former municipal councilor Miloš Bošković, the United
Movement of Free Residents, the National Coalition for Decentralization, the Media
and Reform Centre and Proaktiv.
ask why a successful model of ownership – which has led to the business
expanding and the number of passengers increasing – should be changed
to a centralist model.14
Not long before the announcement of the change of ownership of the
airport in Niš, a concession agreement was signed with a French company
for Nikola Tesla Airport in Belgrade. It was not difficult to connect these
two events and see that the development and successful operation of Niš
Airport could impact the success of the country’s main airport. Repre-
sentatives of the civic initiative believe that behind the idea of a change
of ownership was the state’s intent to establish control over Niš Airport
in order to limit the number of flights and passengers (so that it does not
exceed a million passengers per year) and hence enabling Belgrade airport
and its concessionaire to achieve better results. The contract concluded
between the state with the concessionaire has not been made public –
which violates basic democratic and civil principles – and the very act of
establishing control over Niš airport consequently implies the sabotage of
the economic development of the largest city in southern Serbia.
Over the following months, a wave of dissatisfaction broke into civ-
il protests for the right to the city, which took place in the city’s central
square and in front of the City Assembly of Niš, where the vote on hand-
ing over the airport to the state was supposed to take place. Due to the
civil revolt, the City Assembly session was postponed and, during that
time, the citizens symbolically held a public vote in front of the Assembly
building and said no to the handover of Niš Airport, making it clear to the
authorities that the airport belongs exclusively to the citizens of Niš.
The protests were held
periodically and each protest
was followed by rock music,
continuing the tradition of
civil protests in Serbia from
the 1990s. Also, songs by local
groups and songwriters were
chosen in order to emphasize
the local character of the civic
Image 1 Protests in Niš, June 2018. struggle and enhance the lo-
Source: www.jugpress.com, 25/08/2019 cal identity of the protest. As
14 It has been established that the successful operation of Niš Airport has positively af-
fected the city’s economy and the airport’s cultural significance is also a worthy point
for discussion. Due to the lowered cost of European flights, the mobility of young
people has increased, as has the number of domestic and foreign tourists in the city –
all of which has contributed to something of a revival for the city of Niš.
a follow-up event, a full-length musical concert in the form of a protest

party was held on the banks of the Nišava. As is usually the case, civic
protests involve a kind of carnivalization of space and carry with them a
certain ludic character. Local spirit and humour came to the fore through
numerous humorous banners directed against key political figures. One
of the more prominent symbols of the initiative, found on various protest
paraphernalia, is a raised fist.15
As already mentioned, the citizens of Serbia are disappointed with all
political parties, so civic protests in the country take place largely with-
out cooperation with opposition parties. The We Won’t Give Up Niš Air-
port initiative also distanced itself from opposition parties when they an-
nounced that they would also organise a protest against handover of the
airport. The initiative’s representatives came out with the view that, while
they respect the right of opposition parties to publicly express their dis-
satisfaction, they do not want the Niš Airport “story” to be misused for
political point-scoring. The organizers did not want to disrupt the unity
of the citizens of Niš who, despite different political affiliations, managed
to agree on this important issue concerning the city. As they claimed, this
topic was bigger than the authorities but also bigger than the opposition.
Despite the citizens’ resistance, the vote at the Assembly of the City of
Niš was held in June 2018, and it was decided that the city would transfer
ownership of the airport to the state. Citizens gathered in front of the as-
sembly were not allowed to attend the vote. The transfer agreement was
signed sometime later in Belgrade, in order to avoid further and larger
protests by the dissatisfied citizens of Niš. In spite of the fact that the pri-
mary goal of the initiative was not achieved, it has not been disbanded
and continues to seek access to information about the development and
investment plan promised by the state when it argued for the change of
ownership.
The requisition of Niš Airport should be observed by taking into
account the context of the issue of decentralization. Serbia is one of the
most centralized countries in Europe, both in the concentration of author-
ity at the state level and in terms of demographic indicators that speak
of a constant increase in the population of the capital and the disappear-
ance of smaller communities. This process is sometimes known in pub-
lic discourse as “Belgradization”. The economic aspect of this process of
centralization is also significant. While almost half of the total budget of
some EU countries is passed along to local communities, in Serbia only
11 percent of funds are allocated for local government needs (Miladinović
15 Three fists are part of the memorial of the Bubanj Park in Niš. It is a monument dedi-
cated to the victims of Fascism and embedded in the identity of the city.
& Strahinić, 2016). The rationale for this centralized fiscal policy is often
found in the allegedly irresponsible disposal of funds by the local gov-
ernments, which are not sufficiently competent to rationally spend the
money that they get. The problem of the centralization of the country is,
however, also a political issue that undermines democracy, above all at the
local level. Instead of the residents of cities electing their own representa-
tives, these are appointed by the leadership of the party. This results in an
all-encompassing situation in which the people who govern cities do not
express their primary loyalty to the cities themselves and their citizens but
to the party and its leadership. Thus, the political culture ceases to be civic
and democratic and local governments and citizens suffer due to a politi-
cal body that strives to comply with the central authorities while retaining
its privileged position. The requisition of the airport from the city is one
of the examples that corroborates the described political interest pattern.
In any case, the We Won’t Give Up Niš Airport citizens’ initiative did
not operate in isolation but was always actively supported by members of
civil movements from other Serbian cities. Solidarity with the protesters
was not merely declarative in terms of support through social networks
and activists from other cities participated in the rallies and street protests
organized by the initiative.16 The Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own initiative was
one of the first movements to support the activism of the Niš initiative,
since it also emerged as the result of a citizens’ revolt against the city gov-
ernment, i.e. against the decision to build the Belgrade Waterfront complex.
Here, the right to the city was also the backbone of the struggle. Above all,
the citizens objected to the simple decision on the use of public space but
particular outrage was caused by a violation of the law in the demolition of
buildings in the Savamala district. This event has ultimately developed into
a long-standing affair.17 The Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own initiative took a
political step further in its independent participation in the 2018 Belgrade
elections. Having won just over three percent of the vote, they did not cross
the threshold and gain seats in the city parliament (see more in the chapter
16 Digital communication and the spread of information through social networks are
all the more important for contemporary social movements and civil protests as they
allow rapid distribution of news, fast mobilization of citizens and the networking of
movements gathered around the same goal. In addition, this type of civic engage-
ment in virtual space, unlike in real life, has continuity (More on Petrović & Petrović,
2017). This, however, does not in any way reduce the importance of real space for
any form of civic-political engagement, which Castells confirms when he discusses
revolutionary tourism (See Božilović, 2017: 118).
17 In addition to citizens’ criticism, numerous professional critics arose, from architec-
tural and infrastructural ones, through legal, sociological, financial, and, finally, those
symbolic-aesthetic, who pointed to the violation of the identity of the city (More in
Backović, 2018: 157–160).
by Jelisaveta Petrović in this volume). On the other hand, the ruling party
won almost 45 percent of the vote so the entire struggle over calling for the
right to the city, democracy and respect for the law might seem to be in
vain. However, the activists do not consider this result to be a failure, since
they are a new actor on the scene and, moreover, did not have enough me-
dia coverage to present their values and ideas. Through its activism, the in-
itiative continues to point to urban injustices, carry out actions to support
citizens who want to be consulted about topics relating to their neighbour-
hood and rights to the area. The basic idea that permeates this and other
movements is that the field of politics is where life takes place and that
cities and neighbourhoods are spaces that must be shaped according to the
needs and interests of citizens, not authorities, parties or private companies
that are in cahoots with the authorities. Their struggle for the right to the
city is, in this respect, both anti-autocratic and anti-party as well as being
opposed to neoliberalism.
Other cities have also started their local stories by establishing new
or activating existing movements and associations. Among the more ac-
tive groups of citizens that also assume neighbourhood policy is the most
needed by citizens and at the same time neglected by political parties, is
the Local Front from Kraljevo. In the 2016 elections, their representatives
won seats in the local parliament, winning a higher percentage of the
vote than some of the more established political parties. The Roof Over
Your Head Joint Action is also a very active association that operates more
through deeds than through words and is formed by bringing together
several local associations that share the same goals, such as strengthen-
ing local democracy and defending the right to the city. Starting from the
imperative that every person deserves and should have somewhere to live,
this association largely focuses on providing support to citizens who are
(for various reasons) subject to forced eviction by the state. The right to
housing is a basic human right and, according to these activists, the exist-
ence of the institution of private bailiffs violates human dignity and con-
tributes to increasing poverty and homelessness, while the state fails to
offer adequate solutions. It is noteworthy that opposition politicians are
rarely seen at the protests of this organization, which gives the impres-
sion that they are more inclined towards armchair policy-making. The
very emergence of many urban movements and organizations in Serbia
can be explained somewhat by disappointment in this style of politics and
a tendency to break down the current alienation and distance of politi-
cians from citizens. That is why what is promoted by urban movements
and initiatives can also be called an antipolitics, as the kind of association
and action that understands civil society and civic action more through a
prism of ethics rather than politics (Jacobsson, 2015: 14).
The UPSS, Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own initiative and Local Front
have formed a left-oriented political bloc under the name, Civic Front,
with the aim of motivating citizens to get involved in public life. In spite of
the fact that each of these movements deals primarily with topics of local
significance, their cooperation indicates that they share wider common
values they feel are under threat society as a whole. Partocracy, corrup-
tion, the lack of freedom of the press, inefficient public city enterprises,
arbitrary use of space and other topics that the movements raise in public
reveal that the problems faced by citizens at the local level are in fact uni-
versal problems of Serbian society and that they are systemic in nature.
The struggle for the right to the city is a way to channel dissatisfaction.
Such hypotheses have previously been presented by well-known urban
theorists, arguing that urban social movements are movements of broad
masses and larger social tendencies that are localized in a certain territory
(See Čaldarović, 1985: 161; Jacobsson, 2015: 1). Since they strive for alter-
native social relations – an alternative city – and since they do not have
one but a multitude of social issues that drive them into action and, there-
fore, are multidimensional, they can be considered urban movements in
the true sense.18 They are organized as movements, not parties, precisely
because they want to manifest their revolt against the idolatry of political
leaders and to break down the strict hierarchical division into leaders and
obedient followers that characterizes political parties.
An interesting feature of the urban movements presented here is that
they are not monolithic when it comes to social class – something that
is often, though not always, a feature of urban movements.19 Being ex-
posed to the same problems in the local community and neighbourhood
(communal problems, corruption in local public enterprises, the use of
land by the city authorities without the participation of citizens in deci-
sion-making, etc.), they overcome class and other collective differences or
identities and it is often impossible to classify them using a single social
category.20 Čaldarović argues that the social composition of urban move-
ments is sparse precisely because they are urban, that is they are mobi-
18 Castells defines urban social movements as more complex creations with an alterna-
tive vision of the city and society, in contrast with urban protests that represent urban
rebellions of a one-dimensional character (according to Čaldarović, 1985: 163).
19 It is certainly important to emphasize that there are numerous obstacles that make
the organized activities of members of different classes and status difficult or impos-
sible and that class unity should not be taken as an unquestionable feature of urban
movements. Some of these obstacles are pointed out by Mayer (Mejer, 2005: 291;
Mayer, 2014).
20 Some studies show that creating an alliance between citizens of different classes, as
well as linking other heterogeneous collectives into an alliance, is a growing tendency
among movements in Central and South-Eastern Europe (Jacobsson, 2015: 9).
lized and formed because of common problems and issues that are ter-
ritorially defined, so that it is the sharing of common space and territory
that unites them (Čaldarović, 1985: 159). For example, the UPSS’s forums
bring together citizens who are university professors with citizens of lower
educational attainment and lower incomes – what unites them is a com-
mon ethical framework that does not allow them to remain indifferent to
situations that they believe show the system working to the detriment of
citizens.21
Concluding Remarks
The research we relied on unquestionably shows that the citizens of
Serbia are disappointed with the sphere of politics, political parties (as one
of the key actors in politics), that they do not have confidence in the insti-
tutions of the country and that their trust in the EU has been weakened.
Some citizens channel their dissatisfaction through apolitism and passiv-
ity, so it is noteworthy that civic activism has been decreasing since the
2000s. Nevertheless, others express their dissatisfaction with the socio-po-
litical situation by offering resistance from the bottom up. They organize
themselves around the subject of their local community and defend its
resources.
Over the past several years, in many cities, spontaneous gatherings
have transformed into civil movements that have an alternative vision
of the city and the political system, striving for the revival of democratic
practices that would have a stronger foothold at the local level. The effec-
tiveness of their operation varies and some of them have, as stated above,
won seats in local parliaments, while others have failed to do so. Despite
its persistent efforts, the We Won’t Give Up Niš Airport initiative, which
was discussed here in most detail, has not achieved its primary objective:
the “defence” of Niš airport. In spite its unachieved goal, the initiative con-
tinues with targeted activities seeking to prove that the government’s in-
tention is not the development but the sabotage of this important resource
for the city.22 The UPSS has won a court case against the city-owned To-
plana but this movement has not stopped here, it continues with its civic
action by opening up various topics on the conflict between the system
and the citizens.
21 Other civic activism research conducted in Serbia after 2000 points to its class het-
erogeneity, that is, that the civic activism cannot be tied exclusively to members of
the middle class (see Petrović, 2016: 388).
22 Representatives of the We Won’t Give Up Niš Airport initiative have even launched a
procedure before the European Union authorities for the protection of competition.
It is questionable, however, how many local initiatives and urban

movements can cause major socio-political change. Despite pressures, the
authorities have so far exercised their will and decisions and the account-
ability of important local functionaries has almost always been absent. On
the contrary, some of them have even been promoted to higher positions
in the state apparatus.
On the one hand, the distance that the movements maintain from
opposition parties wins them the trust of the broader public. On the other
hand, however, it gives rise to the question of whether the significant po-
litical goals of these movements can be achieved without the resources of
political parties (infrastructure, organization and mobilization of human
resources, finance, etc.). Some theoreticians believe that urban movements
can maximize their potential to achieve social transformation by entering
into wider social alliances, which involves linking with political parties
while retaining their autonomy (See Pruijt, 2007: 5117). Serbia’s political
past shows that, through associations of civic organizations and political
parties and unification around basic values and common enemies, even
the most oppressive regime can collapse. Civic protests are the lifeblood
of a civil society that is opposed to the state, however, a major change
in the socio-political system cannot be achieved merely through protest.
The past performance of these movements shows that the achieved results
are not great and that if their activities continue to be based on sporadic
protests, they can only remain critics or a corrective agent acting on the
authorities but not a political force that would bring about significant so-
cio-political change.
Participation in local elections is therefore a significant step forward.
Examples from other European cities show that some municipalist move-
ments, which have also fought against ineffective party politics and strug-
gled for the right to the city, favoured the local community as the real
home of politics, achieved success and won power at the local level. How-
ever, if the goal of activism is to change the system and win state power,
it is without doubt that urban movements will have to unite into stronger
and wider civil unions. Since they are based on similar values, the associa-
tion of the movements and the creation of a larger civil bloc can contrib-
ute to their strength in numbers – currently lacking in individual move-
ments – and this is necessary for them to grow into a significant political
force that would attract apathetic citizens. In addition, this would also in-
clude expressing a clear stance and presenting policies concerning major
political and national issues, which are currently being avoided by these
movements.
Therefore, even though urban social movements in themselves do not

aim at developing into parties, nor coming into power, achieving a spe-
cific social change by exerting pressure on the authorities, that does not
mean that this kind of transformation would not be welcome in certain
circumstances. This becomes particularly important if one bears in mind
that almost every urban movement in Serbia points to wider cracks in the
system. Otpor is an example of a movement that transformed into a po-
litical party and vanished, yet that does not mean that such a transforma-
tion – i.e. a tendency towards political power – represents an end to every
social and urban movement. On the contrary, it appears that it might now
stand for a new beginning.
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| 171
THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF

URBAN MOVEMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN
PERIPHERY: THE CASE OF THE DON’T LET
BELGRADE DROWN INITIATIVE*
Jelisaveta Petrović
Abstract: In this paper, we focus on the case of the urban movement, Don’t Let
Belgrade D(r)own, and explore its development, organizational structure and im-
pact. The main question we aim to address is whether the Don’t Let Belgrade
D(r)own initiative can be regarded as a herald of a new, “participatory” phase of
civil society development in Serbia.
The analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with the leaders and activists
of the Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own. The research findings suggest that, although
the emergence of grassroots activism in the larger Central and Eastern Europe
cities indicates the beginning of a new phase of civil society development in the
region (Jacobsson, 2015), urban movements in Serbia struggle with some addi-
tional difficulties. Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own at least partly depends on the sup-
port of institutional donors since local fundraising capacities are not sufficient to
fully cover the costs of its activities. Furthermore, local political culture appears
to be incompatible with the development of progressive social movements.
Keywords: urban movements, civil society, European periphery, Serbia
Introduction
Until recently, scholarship on civil society development in postso-
cialist countries has largely neglected urban activism. One of the reasons
for this blind spot in the literature on urban movements in the region is
the development of the two separate streams of research – one focusing
on changes to the urban environment and the other exploring civil so-
* The paper is part of the research project “Challenges of New Social Integration in
Serbia: Concepts and Actors” (No. 179035), supported by the Serbian Ministry of
Education, Scientific Research and Technological Development.
ciety development trends in the process of postsocialist transformation.

As noted by Kerstin Jacobsson and the other contributors to the edited
volume on urban grassroots movements in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) (Jacobsson, 2015), this gap in the research literature and the lack of
an intersectional approach has led to the oversight of a new phase of civil
society development that is taking momentum in the region, with urban
movements as leaders in the process.
The new wave of protests that broke out all around the region in the
second decade of the 21st century is interpreted in the literature as the
result of one or several intertwining factors: the economic crisis coupled
with austerity regimes in the context of European (semi-)periphery, a cri-
sis of representative democracy, democratic inadequacies, weak rule of
law, as well as the development of a new type of activist citizenship in the
region (Della Porta, 2015; Brentin & Bieber, 2019:2; Matković & Ivković,
2018; Fagan & Sircar, 2017; Dolenec et al., 2017). This new phase is char-
acterized by the development of a participatory, grassroots type of civil so-
ciety which differs from the professionalized version typical for the early
days of the postsocialist transformation (Jacobsson, 2015; Fagan & Sircar,
2017; Dolenec et al., 2017). Following the insights made by Jacobsson and
her colleagues, and on the basis of a number of case studies on urban
movements in CEE, in this paper we develop a fine-grained analysis of the
Serbian urban movement, Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own, which emerged
as a grassroots reaction to the Belgrade Waterfront megaproject (BWP).
Our analysis focuses on the question whether Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own
(hereafter: the Initiative) could be regarded as the manifestation of a new
“participatory” phase of civil society development in Serbia, as might be
expected on the basis of recent research on urban movements in Central
and Eastern Europe.
The “Weak Civil Society” Thesis and Urban Grassroots

Movements in Central and Eastern Europe
Following the collapse of socialism, societies in Central and Eastern
Europe have undergone a process of intensive change. While civil society
controlled and suppressed by the state was a characteristic of the socialist
period, “transactional”1, westernized, “liberal” civil society led by donor-
1 Petrova and Tarrow (2007) differentiate between two types of civic activism: trans-
actional and participatory. By participatory activism they assume “the potential and
actual magnitude of individual and group participation in civic life, interest group
activities, voting, and elections.” On the other hand, by transactional activism they
mean “the ties – enduring and temporary – among organized nonstate actors and
The Transformative Power of Urban Movements on the European Periphery | 173
driven non-governmental organizations was a hallmark of the early days of

postsocialism (Mandel, 2002; Howard, 2003; Andreeva et al., 2005; Fagan,
2010; Petrova & Tarrow, 2007). Research conducted in Serbia revealed
more or less the same general pattern of civil society development, with
some distinctive features stemming from a prolonged process of postso-
cialist transformation that was slowed down and aggravated in Serbia by
the civil war, international sanctions and economic collapse (Lazić 2005,
Milivojević, 2006; Fagan, 2010; Vukelić 2012, 2015; Danković & Pickering,
2017; Mikuš, 2015; Vuković, 2016). While the civil society organizations
(CSOs) in Serbia that were critical of the regime of Slobodan Milošević
frequently encountered various forms of suppression by the state in the
1990s (Paunović, 2006), during the 2000s CSOs, now acting as partners
in the processes of Europeanization and democratization, experienced
relative levels of acceptance by the state authorities. Most of these organi-
zations, however, were professional think-tanks not interested in mobi-
lising or representing ordinary people. Therefore, citizens are in general
not familiar with the work of CSOs and rarely participate in the activities
they initiate. In this respect, Serbian civil society organizations cannot rely
upon financial support from ordinary citizens as a source of financing and
long-term sustainability. On the other hand, though politically active dur-
ing the 1990s, in the 2000s CSOs became primarily orientated towards
supporting the capacity building of the state and thus significantly less
involved in contentious politics (Vukelić, 2012, 2015; Danković & Picker-
ing, 2017; Vuković, 2016).
Based on a number of research studies conducted in different parts
of the region (Jacobsson, 2015; Foa & Ekiert, 2017; Fagan & Sircar, 2017;
Dolenec et al., 2017, Bieber & Brentin 2018; Delibašić et al., 2019), in the
second decade of the 21st century one of the most notable developments is
the flourishing of a more diverse and vibrant civic life. This is manifested
through the emergence of urban “right to the city” movements, leftist/
progressive movements, new forms of protest (via new digital technolo-
gies) and various forms of activist citizenship and micropolitics (ethical/
political consumption etc.). Across the region, urban movements have
been developing in response to local problems and needs, often inspired
by the aesthetics and repertoire of action of social movements from the
West – e.g. the Occupy initiatives, anti-gentrification, “right to the city”
movements, etc. (Jacobsson, 2015:3–5). Urban activism in the region is
characterised by small or medium scale activities focused on various as-
pects (cultural, economic, environmental, communal) of everyday urban
between them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions” (Petrova &
Tarrow, 2007:79).
living. The repertoire of action of these initiatives tends to be peaceful and

organized in a carnival and do-it-yourself fashion (Jacobsson, 2015:14).
Urban activism in CEE is grassroots in its nature: it is characterised by
a lack of professionalism among the activist groups and by predomi-
nantly domestic sources of funding (Jacobsson, 2015:275–6). The ability
to connect individual citizens’ concerns with the macro-level processes
of neoliberal restructuring is perceived as a strength of these movements
(Matković & Ivković, 2018:5). Urban movements in CEE are vigorous and
challenge the image of a passive and weak civil society that still dominates
the literature on civil society in the region. It could be argued that if the
professionalized NGOs were symbolic of the early stages of postsocialist
development in CEE, urban grassroots movements are the symbol of the
new phase. These new developments demand an update in how civil soci-
ety in the region is viewed and a reassessment of the “weak civil society”
thesis (Jacobsson, 2015:6).
Based on the case of Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own, we aim to explore
in greater detail the “civil society empowerment / emancipation” thesis
that acknowledges a new phase in civil society development in CEE, led
by urban grassroots movements. Considering the slower pace of civil so-
ciety development in Serbia, characterised by donor-dependency, a lack
of citizen support coupled with unfavourable economic conditions and
a nonparticipative political culture, we assume that the development of
grassroots urban movements in Serbia will have a slightly different pace
in comparison to some other parts of the region, especially countries that
already have become EU member states.
The Belgrade Waterfront Megaproject

and its Opponents
Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own emerged as a grassroots reaction to the
Belgrade Waterfront project, portrayed by activists as a flagrant example
of “predatory” neoliberal urbanization that severely threatens the public
interest.
The “Belgrade on the Water” (as BWP is popularly known) gentri-
fication megaproject commenced in 2015, with a construction company
from Abu Dhabi, Eagle Hills, as the main investor. Once completed, this
$3 billion2 development will encompass a large portion of land close to
2 https://www.eaglehills.com/sr/our-developments/serbia/belgrade-waterfront/master-
plan (accessed 27/03/2018).
the city centre, along on the right bank of the Sava river between Branko’s
Bridge and the Belgrade Fair (Sajam). According to the project’s plans,
this new city centre will comprise luxury apartments, hypermodern of-
fice buildings, shopping malls, stylish hotels, cultural centres and the Bel-
grade Tower – the tallest building in Serbia. It has been promoted as an
intervention that will significantly improve the cityscape, attract tourists
from all over the globe and create 12,000 new jobs. From the very begin-
ning, this project has been strongly supported by the Serbian government.
High-ranking government officials proclaimed this urban revitalization to
be of national interest and that the project is expected to boost both the
local and national economy (see more in the chapters by Vera Backović
and Jorn Koelemaij and Stefan Janković in this volume).
Despite the high expectations created by government officials and the
investor, this venture has been heavily criticized by civil society organi-
zations, architects, urban planners, economists and the political parties
of the opposition. While architects and urban planners have argued that
the project is not compatible with the existing cityscape, economists have
stressed that its financial impact is not assured and that the risk of over-
reliance on public funds is high. Civil society leaders, lawyers and opposi-
tion politicians focused on the ad hoc amendment of national legislation
and adjustments to urban planning made in order to serve the needs of
the project while neglecting the public interest, as well as the decision-
making process, which they considered to be exclusionary. Social experts
have stressed the increase in social inequalities and marginalization, while
environmentalists have called into question the project’s environmental
impact (Zekovic et al., 2016; Lalovic et al., 2015:35; Maruna, 2015).
The Belgrade Waterfront megaproject can be understood as part of
a wider process of the neoliberal urbanization/investor-led urbanism that
has become a major force in postsocialist cities. Apart from some char-
acteristics this process has in common with those in other postsocialist
countries – such as the radical privatization and commercialisation of
housing, services, transportation and public space; the liberalisation of ur-
ban policies; the rising cost of communal services; the emergence of gated
communities and the rapid development of gentrification projects, etc.
(Stanilov, 2007) – the situation is even more complicated in Serbia. The
reasons for this additional complexity can be found in the country’s slow
and difficult postsocialist transformation, coupled with difficult economic
conditions, its (semi-)peripheral position, corruption, informal and illegal
construction, inadequate urban planning, policies often developed to suit
private interests and so forth (Petrović, 2005; Backović, 2005; Vujović &
Petrović, 2007; Hirt & Petrović, 2011).
Research Findings
In this paper we apply the revelatory case approach (Yin, 2014: 52)
to explore the assumption of a gradual transformation from professional
(“NGO-type”) civil society in Serbia, emblematic of the early stages of
postsocialist transformation/Europeanization (Lazić, 2005; Fagan, 2010;
Petrova & Tarrow, 2007; Vukelić, 2015), towards a participatory version of
civil society, led by urban grassroots movements (Jacobsson, 2015). The
case of the Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own initiative was selected because,
according to current information, it is an exception to the NGO-type of
civic activism that has been a major characteristic of civil society in Serbia
(Morača, 2016). The research centred on semi-structured interviews with
the collocutors (N=7): leaders (core members) and newer (rank and file)
members of the Initiative.
It should be noted that the timeframe of the study was relatively long
– spanning from July 2017 to March 2018. The reason for the choice of a
long timeframe lies in the fact that the Initiative was, at that time, in the
process of transition from a flat and loose network to a more firmly or-
ganized association of citizens participating in elections for the Belgrade
Assembly.
Analysis of the findings is based on the conceptual difference between
the two types of civic organizations/movements: participatory (grassroots)
and professional (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).
1. Participatory grassroots initiatives usually develop as a reaction to
the problems faced by local communities, such as pollution, lack of nec-
essary public infrastructure, destruction of green spaces, etc. This kind
of organization has an informal, horizontal structure and is organised
around participatory decision-making procedures. They rely upon the
strategies of mass mobilization – that is, on people, their spare time and
volunteer engagement (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 140). In general, or-
ganisations that belong to this type lack resources, have trouble sustaining
their activities and making significant social impact. Usually they last un-
til the problem is resolved or while participant enthusiasm persists (Della
Porta & Diani, 2006). Members of these groups usually belong to disad-
vantaged and vulnerable groups, but this is changing as members of the
middle classes (also affected by neoliberal urbanism) take part in these
kinds of local initiatives (Mayer, 2012).
Literature on social movements envisages two factors potentially
threatening the development of grassroots social movement organiza-
tions: “bureaucratization”, routinization and loss of a critical stance (due to
Michels’ (1962) “iron law of oligarchy”), on the one hand, and the peril of
dissolution/disappearance as a consequence of activist “burnout”, on the

other (Tarrow, 2011).
2. Professional organizations develop as a result of the work of profes-
sionals (domain experts and professional activists) on the resolution of
social problems. This type of organization is focused on mobilizing finan-
cial resources from various sources (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 140). Al-
though they are capable of being critical of official policies, they mainly
try to establish cooperative relationships with government officials and to
achieve their goals by means of advocacy and lobbying. These organiza-
tions usually have strict membership procedures, written rules and stat-
utes, as well as a formalized, nonparticipative management structure in
which leaders make the most important decisions. They are distinguished
by the engagement of paid staff who develop their professional careers
within the organization. The membership base is usually thin and formal
or non-existent. The advantage of such organizations is that they have the
capacity to deal with specific issues on a continuous and professional ba-
sis. The negative aspects of this type of organisation are weak connections
with the citizens and with those groups whose interests they are supposed
to represent, then bureaucratization, the lack of critical attitudes towards
certain social issues, as well as dependence on institutional sponsors (Del-
la Porta & Diani, 2006).
The Development Stages of Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own

The Initiative started modestly in 2014 as a result of the engagement
of a small group of friends and colleagues who were interested in urban
and cultural politics, urban sustainable development and protection of the
common good. These people had been active in various civic associations,
CSOs and collectives (in some cases, for over a decade) before joining the
Initiative. Over the years, their work in the civic sector expanded from
project management to different forms of activist engagement in urban
grassroots initiatives.
“We had all been working on various types of projects, thematically
connected with what the Initiative is dealing with today. So, it was a
natural course of events for me: I thought that, in addition to project
management, [...] it was time for me, for us, our generation, to step out
on the streets and show our dissatisfaction.” (Interview 2, core member,
June 2017)
One of the leaders of the Initiative described his path from an NGO
employee to a civic activist:
“While working for the Civic Initiatives back in 2006, I started on my

own project called ‘Openly on Public Spaces’. I was personally interest-
ed in this topic.... I started this project with the intention of exploring
power relations in the city. In the organization, nobody objected nor
helped this project (...) In 2010, I engaged in several urban initiatives
like the Inex Film, squatting in the abandoned factory in Karaburma,
the Street Gallery project, etc. (...) and this interest has spread into di-
verse directions but all related to urban settings (...) So, my concern
and engagement around the Belgrade Waterfront project is, I would say,
a normal course of events” (Interview 1, core member, October 2017)
The Initiative did develop from the NGO sector, however, its de-
velopment was “organic” in the sense that it was not directed by project
timeframes, budgets or action plans typical for NGO work. The activists
recognize that although genuine and sincere, organic development can
sometimes be disadvantageous since, “there are always a lot of unattended
issues, which you don’t know how to resolve, there are challenges you have
to face on a daily basis.” (Interview 2, core member, June 2017). Thus, as
time passed and they became more experienced in running this type of
organization, they set up certain organizational procedures and channels
of communication and decision-making.
Over a period of four years, in search of the most effective model of
organization, the Initiative has undergone several stages of development.
At certain points, these phases were intertwined: “in-office” activism,
street protest, direct local action and formal political engagement. From
2014 to 2016, the Initiative was mostly engaged in tracking the BWP’s
misdeeds in a procedural manner, analysing official documents and writ-
ing critical overviews and complaints (for more detail see Morača, 2016).
They supported some local initiatives – such as a protest by residents of
the Stepa Stepanović neighbourhood and a protest by pensioners – and
also began to network with similar local initiatives from Niš and Kraljevo.
In April 2016, after illegal demolition of houses and sheds in
Hercegovačka Street3 was carried out for the purposes of clearing ter-
rain for the BWP, the Initiative changed its repertoire of action towards a
more direct confrontation. A series of mass protests followed this event.
Between May and July 2016, Belgrade citizens, at times numbering tens of
thousands, marched in the streets with banners and slogans such as: “The
masks are off!”, “Whose city? Our city!” and “This will not pass!” (Bro-
chure, pp. 16) (see more in the chapter by Mladen Nikolić in this volume).
The protests were peaceful, playful and organized with limited resources
3 Despite the fact that a group of masked people started the demolition in the middle
of the night, the police did not respond to the calls of concerned residents.
in a do-it-yourself manner. On the first anniversary of the demolition

in Hercegovačka Street, the last large-scale protest was organized, after
which the organizers decided that it is time, once again, to change their
repertoire of action.
After the “protest” phase, the next stage of development took the
form of local activism and a focus extending beyond the BWP to other
problems of urban living, such as the consequences of (controversial) pri-
vatization, (illegal) evictions, environmental problems in different parts
of Belgrade, etc. They started a “battle” for public space at the micro level
by helping and encouraging citizens to speak up and fight for themselves.
In the second half of 2017, a transition towards a more formal po-
litical movement/party-type organization commenced. When the City of
Belgrade elections were announced in 2017, the leaders of the Initiative
decided to engage in the arena of conventional party politics. Following
these political ambitions, they decided to make significant changes to
their organizational structure.
Transformation of the Organizational Structure

Up until late 2017 and early 2018, the Initiative was a flat and loose
network of individuals4, some of them belonging to other civil society or-
ganizations. Horizontality, as one of the core values of the Initiative, made
the decentralized, loose, non-hierarchical structure the preferred organi-
zational form. The dominance of the narrative of horizontalism (informal
leaders are often called “the core”, hierarchies and leadership are negative-
ly evaluated) is also apparent in most of the progressive social movements
in Serbia (Delibašić et al., 2019: 68–9).
However, despite the narrative of horizontality maintained by the
leaders of the Initiative, newer (“ordinary”) members noticed a difference
between them and the older (core) members. In an interview conducted
before the organisational change, one of the respondents – a newer mem-
ber of the Initiative – described the internal mechanism for the distribu-
tion of roles and tasks in the following manner:
“There are several circles of people and they function according to the
principle ‘from each according to their ability’ ... They sometimes invite
us to participate, and if I decide to join, they tell me what the plan is
... if you want to do something else, you’re free to do that ... It is a flex-
ible and cool way of organizing. However, I expected it to be a bit more
4 Members of the Initiative are young, educated people aged between 25–40, typically
belonging to the so-called creative classes: journalists, architects, social scientists, art-
ists, designers, etc.
integrated and with a bit more continuity of action, but it is still really
cool because I can combine it with all my other stuff ” (Interview 3,
newer member, June 2017)
The decision-making process within the organization was described
as participatory, although apparently core members had more influence
on final decisions.
“It’s not structured, but you know who has the last word – those people
who have been here for a long time [...]” (Interview 3, new member,
June 2017)
In the autumn of 2017, the Initiative commenced a process of trans-
formation, partly due to preparations for the 2018 Belgrade elections. As
explained by one of the core members:
“At one point we asked ourselves: How far can we get with this type of
action [local, civic]?[...]This prompted us to think about transition...We
had plenty of this local work ... You do something, change some things,
but it all actually remains at the level of the exception that confirms the
rule, the wider effects are still missing. And if multiplied, it would be
awesome... And then we wondered what if we tried from the inside, not
in terms of taking power, but to see how it works, to learn something,
and in the end, why should we shun away from politics, anyway?!” (In-
terview 1, core member, October 2017)
Alongside the need to scale up the effects of their actions, another
reason for the transformation could be found in the inability of the organ-
ization to live up to its declared egalitarianism. The interviewed leaders
of the Initiative were aware of the threat of the “tyranny of structureless-
ness” (Freeman, 1973) which means that, in spite of a professed egalitarian
ethos, in reality decisions are made by informal in-groups.
“The problem is when you have a non-hierarchical collective without
an official structure, but rather with an implicit structure, invisible, un-
spoken but existing nevertheless [...] Newer members do not have the
same information as those who have been here longer, do not have the
same access to knowledge... Since the decision-making process lacks
clear rules, some people feel excluded. In addition, there is a consid-
erable lack of responsibility. Changes in the structure should lead to
a clearer distribution of roles and responsibilities.” (Interview 1, core
member, October 2017)
Being aware of the potential downsides of a flexible organizational
form and with the intention of becoming more transparent and effective
in their work, the leaders of the Initiative embarked upon a transformation
towards a more professionalized organizational structure with transparent
division of work, clear procedural arrangements and direct channels of in-

ternal communication. They even considered introducing some elements
characteristic of very conventional bureaucratic organizations such as a
general assembly, a supervisory board, an elected president and secretary.
“Totally old school, but it works, everything is transparent!” (Interview 1,
core member, October 2017). However, in order to avoid over-bureaucra-
tization, they opted for a middle-ground solution that combines a central
coordinating mechanism with affiliated working groups (these kinds of
groups are a typical organizational form for most horizontal movements
in Serbia, see Delibašić et al., 2019:72). Participation of the broader mem-
bership in the decision-making processes is encouraged within the work-
ing groups.
The organizational scheme (as of late 2018, still in the process of be-
ing finalised) is supposed to consist of a coordinating body as the central
organisational unit and three working groups – thematic, territorial and
operational. Each of the three groups delegates two members to the coor-
dinating body. The coordinating body manages the main activities and it is
where the strategically important decisions are made. Operational groups
perform daily activities (e.g. finance, media relations, internal communi-
cation, etc.) while thematic groups act as a forum where urban policies are
proposed, discussed and defined. Territorial groups are focused on locally
specific issues – e.g. problems within neighbourhoods (Brochure, pp. 18).
The third reason for the organizational transformation was financial
– directly related to the work of the Ministry of Space5. This organiza-
tion is, in a sense, the organizational backbone of the Initiative, since most
of the core members of the Initiative also work for the Ministry of Space.
Project proposals of the Ministry of Space have not been successful lately
as public authorities have started to perceive this organization as adversar-
ial. Therefore, the leaders of the Initiative decided to formalize the work of
the Initiative and to separate the two entities.
Financing
Recent research on social movements in Serbia show that they rely
upon several sources of income: donations, membership fees, project and
institutional funding and entrepreneurship (selling products and ser-
vices). Membership fees are most desirable because they are perceived as
an autonomous and sustainable source of financing. However, given the
current socio-economic situation in the country (poverty and a high rate
5 The Ministry of Space has been dealing with urban issues and urban policies since
2011, with an approach that could be qualified as protecting the “right to the city”.
of unemployment), social movement activists are aware that this is not

the most reliable source of income. Members of progressive movements
are, on the other hand, quite critical of project funding because it poses a
threat to their autonomy (Delibašić et al., 2019:33–5).
The Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own initiative combines several sources
of income. In the beginning, as explained by one of the leaders of the Ini-
tiative, they did not have to launch fundraising events or to collect money
from supporters. Their actions in the first two years were relatively mod-
est and the demand for resources was low, so everything could be organ-
ized on the basis of the voluntary work of a few dedicated activists. The
Ministry of Space used its “project money” to cover some expenses (e.g.
printing promotional material), and the members of the Initiative donated
smaller amounts of money to buy necessary equipment (e.g. banners). As
long as it was at the level of a couple hundred of euros, it was easy to cover
costs from either personal or organizational (Ministry of Space) resources.
However, when the Initiative began organizing protest events, the collec-
tion of donations from supporters became necessary. Fundraising activi-
ties were quite successful, since people donated enough money to cover
the organizational costs of protest marches and accompanying events. For
instance, between May 2016 and June 2017, the Initiative managed to col-
lect around 20,000 euros, with the most frequent individual contribution
being 1,000 dinars (around 9 euros) (Brochure, pp. 4–5). The donations
came mostly from Belgrade, but the largest individual contributions were
made by supporters who live abroad. As explained by one of the leaders,
the Initiative’s Facebook page and official website (where they sell t-shirts
and books) have been very important fundraising tools.
The collected money was spent on the organization of events and the
purchase of equipment, while activists continue work on a voluntary ba-
sis, without material compensation of any kind. Members of the Initiative
have other jobs – they work for different NGOs, some of them are free-
lancers or they run small businesses. The core members are employed at
the Ministry of Space, where they earn quite modest salaries – 350 to 400
euros per month each.
The Initiative does not have its own premises or office equipment.
The office of the Ministry of Space is the venue where they usually gather
and hold meetings. When it comes to the public events, such as public dis-
cussions, gatherings and round-tables, they make use of larger premises,
usually lent by friendly organizations and people who support their work.
“Our funds are not sufficient. Although they suffice for the realization
of certain ad hoc activities, they are not large enough to cover the fees
of people who get involved... I think it would be legitimate for a certain
number of people to get paid for the work they do. I do not know how
to provide funds for this type of work, but we hope we will figure it out
at some point.” (Interview2, core member, June 2017)
Although the Initiative manages to collect funds from supporters and
product sales to cover the costs of the most of its activities, they do not
have enough money to finance office rental and salaries. Therefore, the
continuation of project funding by the Ministry of Space is essential for
the maintenance of the voluntary work of the Initiative. To conclude, al-
though the Initiative has developed from the NGO community and has
evolved since, it is nevertheless, at its core, still bound to the NGO sector
and its system of project funding.
Outcomes
In recent years, there has been a growing interest by social scientists
in the outcomes of the activities of social movements. Researchers are
interested in the social, political and cultural changes induced by social
movements and the conditions that have to be met so that social move-
ments can achieve their goals (Earl, 2004; Amenta et al., 2010).
When asked to assess the overall outcome of four years of their work,
the activists stressed that, although they see some progress and positive
impact of their efforts, they are not completely satisfied, since they as-
pire to bring about more far-reaching changes to society. Accordingly, the
Initiative’s promotional motto for the Belgrade elections was “Change is
coming!”.
They see the mass protests, known under the slogan “Against Dicta-
torship”, that spontaneously broke out after the spring 2017 presidential
elections, as one of the positive effects of their work.
“I think of this ‘Against Dictatorship’ protest as a continuation of our
effort to encourage people to express their dissatisfaction in the streets.
And aesthetically, I see a lot of things that are similar to the work of the
Initiative. Another visible outcome of our work is the continuation of
different gatherings and local protests. This year it was in New Belgrade:
the local authorities wanted to let a private investor build on a green
space between some buildings and people gathered and protested and
they specified the Initiative as someone who can help them. And we did
help them. There is the effect of encouragement but, sadly, there is no
way (due to organizational constraints) that people could be involved
and work on a larger scale.” (Interview 1, core member October 2017)
The problem of scaling up is primarily seen as a consequence of the
specific organizational structure of the Initiative. Some of the Initiative’s
leaders believe that people in Serbia, accustomed to hierarchical systems

and authoritarian decision-making, expect to know who is in charge in
the organization and await to be given clear instructions on what to do.
“People here do not understand this flexible approach where there is no
clear leadership or instructions on what to do... Here in Serbia, it is not
common to work in the way we do, as a rule everything is hierarchized
... People don’t get this ‘let’s discuss it together’ approach. They reject it,
they want us to give them clear directions. Otherwise, we are perceived
as disorganized... When they see how we operate, people think: ‘What is
this, some hippies?!’ ” (Interview 1, core member October 2017)
Having in mind that a flexible organizational scheme is probably not
the most suitable arrangement for the nonparticipative political culture of
Serbia, they expect to have more success in the future with a more con-
ventional form of organising. Therefore, they abandoned the practice of
prefiguration (embodying the kind of society they want to bring about)
for the sake of greater efficacy.
The Initiative participated in the Belgrade elections in March 2018.
Unfortunately, they did not have much success. They won about 30,000
votes (3.5%) by nevertheless failed to pass the election threshold set at 5
percent and take seats in the City Assembly. After the elections, they con-
tinued to work as an oppositional movement, critiquing the government’s
moves, both at the local and national level, and supporting local initiatives.
Conclusion
Although the results of several research studies suggest that the ex-
pansion of urban activism in the larger CEE cities is the manifestation of
a new phase of civil society development in the region (Jacobsson, 2015),
our findings show that, in Serbia at least, this is still not entirely the case.
Study of Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own reveals that, although grassroots in
nature, urban activism is still at least partly dependent on foreign donors
and state support, since local fundraising capacities are not sufficient to
fully cover the costs of protest activities. Moreover, due to the specific
socio-political context – the prevailing authoritarian value system – flat
and loose organization structures seem not to be the most effective way
of organizing. Thus, from the perspective of the leaders of the Initiative,
certain level of hierarchisation and professionalisation appears to be nec-
essary in order to bring about more significant social impact. Researchers
investigating protests in Russia came to a similar conclusion, since they
observed that the flexible organizational structures of the protest move-
ments in the country, characterised by a nonparticipative political cul-
ture was disadvantageous for sustaining successful collective action for

longer periods of time (Toepfl, 2018). The experience of the Right to the
City movement from Zagreb, on the other hand, shows that movement
transformation should not be taken as a fixed and irreversible process,
since movements have proven to be very flexible and capable of strategic
shapeshifting between professionalized and grassroots forms. Changes in
tactics and strategies allow both organizational preservation and success
in inducing social change (Dolenec et al., 2017). Therefore, it would not
be wise to jump to conclusions before observing the outcomes of the cur-
rent transformation of the Initiative. It is still early to say whether this is a
permanent change or whether the Initiative will continue to strategically
shapeshift and successfully avoid the threats of Michels’ (1962) “iron law
of oligarchy” and Freeman’s (1972) “tyranny of structurelessness”.
To conclude, although we do not reject the “empowering/emanci-
pation” hypothesis and accept that civil society in Serbia – “seeded” by
foreign developmental agencies in the process of democratization and
Europeanization (Mandel, 2002) – is now developing organically, led by
the urban grassroots movements, it remains evident that the political op-
portunity structures in Serbia are highly resistant and unsuitable for the
development of participatory civil society. Moreover, although the urban
movements in Serbia might have transformative potential manifested
through their manifold influence on the practice of civic activism (e.g.
through the introduction of a new repertoire of contention and empow-
ering local people to express their grievances), the lack of resources for
independent action imposes a significant barrier to the development of an
autonomous grassroots civil society in Serbia.
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| 189
THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROTEST

AGAINST ILLEGAL DEMOLITIONS IN
BELGRADE’S SAVAMALA QUARTER*
Mladen Nikolić
Abstract: The transformation of cities and urban areas due to globalisation and
the influence of corporate capital raises many problems and challenges in con-
temporary society. Owing to the dominance of private capital in the shaping of
cityscapes, the “right to the city”, defined in the 1960s by Henri Lefebvre as the
right to use of the city, is an issue of increasing import. The market-based ap-
proach to regulating society has led to urban space and the city as a whole be-
coming the object of market speculation over which the local population has less
and less control.
The gentrification of Belgrade’s Savamala quarter has raised the issue of the right
to the city in Serbia. The Abu Dhabi-based investment in the Belgrade Water-
front project, which is responsible for the radical transformation of Savamala, has
been the subject of numerous controversies since the outset. Even so, the Bel-
grade Waterfront case culminated after the night of 24 April 2016 when unidenti-
fied, masked persons illegally demolished all of the buildings in Hercegovačka
Street precisely on the site that the state had allotted to the Eagle Hills company.
Soon after the demolition in Hercegovačka, a group of citizens gathered under
the name Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd) called on people
to protest, hoping to uncover and compel the prosecution of the perpetrators.
Nevertheless, even at the time of writing this paper, it remains unknown who per-
petrated the demolition in Hercegovačka and all state and city institutions have
denied responsibility.
This paper aims to provide a clearer picture of those who participated in the dem-
onstrations that were set off by the demolitions in Hercegovačka and the circum-
stances that led to them. On 13 July 2016, during the fifth protest organised by
Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own, we interviewed participants in the demonstration
in order to learn more about who is protesting, why and how they were mobi-
lised. We were also interested in the political leanings and political engagement
* This article was developed from a Master’s thesis entitled, “Urbana transformacija
i pravo na grad: studija slučaja beogradskog naselja Savamala”, and presented at the
Department of Sociology in 2016.
of the protesters. We believe that this paper can provide a more detailed insight
into the characteristics of the people who marched on the streets of Belgrade in
2016 under the slogan “Who’s city? Our city!” (“Čiji grad? Naš Grad!”) and will
contribute to the study of urban social movements and their impact on contem-
porary society.
Keywords: social movements, urban movements, right to the city, postsocialist
transformation, urban change in Belgrade
Introduction
Social movements are a significant agent of change in the modern
world. How powerful they can be is illustrated by the fact that Serbia’s
recent history began on 5 October 2000 when thousands of people went
out onto the streets to protest what they believed to be the rigging of par-
liamentary elections by the ruling party led by Slobodan Milošević. The
consequences of this social upheaval were Milošević’s Socialist Party re-
linquishing power and the formation of a new, pro-European government
that unblocked Serbia’s transformation into a market economy, which had
begun during the 1990s (Lazić & Cvejić, 2004).
Over the past two decades, the adoption of capitalist principles has
altered numerous aspects of society. On the one hand, Serbian society
has experienced rising levels of democracy, while on the other hand, new
problems characteristic of capitalism have emerged. All of which has re-
sulted in new social movements appearing in Serbia.
For the past two decades, Serbian elites have been guided by (neo-)
liberal ideas in which private property is seen as the basic engine driv-
ing the development of the country and, more generally, the wellbeing
of its citizens. In socialist Yugoslavia, private property existed only in the
domains of housing, small-scale entrepreneurship and agriculture, while
urban spaces, factories and institutions were commonly regarded as be-
longing to society as a whole. This understanding of space is not common
in capitalist systems, so the eventual privatisation of space was ultimately
inevitable. The privatisation of space that has led to changes in the func-
tion and appearance of the postsocialist city – the effects of which are
most evident in the country’s capital, Belgrade – has gained momentum
in recent years.
Recently, urban changes in Belgrade that stem from the activities of
private corporations have frequently run into opposition from the city’s
population. While those in power are doing everything they can to attract
investment, ordinary people do not have many opportunities to partici-
The Participants in the Protest Against Illegal Demolitions in Savamala Quarter | 191
pate in the decision-making processes that affect their local area or their
environment. Applying Lefebvre’s terminology, we could say that in Ser-
bia the exchange value of space is becoming more important than its use
value. All of which contributes to the emergence of new urban movements
that employ various methods to try to influence decision-makers so as to
attain participation in the production of space in capitalist Serbia.
The subject of this study are the people who participated in the civ-
il protests, which arose in reaction to the demolition that took place in
Hercegovačka Street in Belgrade’s Savamala quarter as part of the con-
struction of the residential and commercial Belgrade Waterfront com-
plex. The illegal demolition of privately-owned buildings along the entire
length of Hercegovačka during election night on 24 April 2016 brought
thousands of people out onto the streets in protests led by the (then still
informal) organisation, Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own. The protests, which
took place on several occasions during 2016, called for those responsible
for the demolition to be prosecuted and brought to account. During the
fifth protest, held on 13 July 2016, we conducted interviews with protest-
ers with the aim of establishing their motives for participating in the dem-
onstrations, their socio-demographic characteristics, their political lean-
ings and their overall political engagement. In that sense, this paper seeks
to contribute to the study of social movements in Serbia in the context of
the urban changes that have taken place during Belgrade’s postsocialist
transformation.
Urban Change and the Right to the City

Social movements and public expressions of dissatisfaction through
political protest have long been a neglected area of study within sociology.
Only since the appearance of numerous social movements for the rights
of women, homosexuals and minorities – as well as other pacifist and also
ethnic and religious movements that erupted during the 1960s and have
continued to this day – have increasing numbers of sociologists focused
on studying social movements and how they are manifested.
Over the past two decades we have witnessed further expansion of
social movements and new forms of their organisation, which have been
enabled by the emergence of the internet and the continued shrinking of
the world caused by globalisation. Social movements primarily emerge
due an unsatisfactory system of needs in contemporary society and go on
to call for changes to the state of affairs (Krstić, 2017: 15). They become
a significant actor in the political sphere of contemporary democratic so-
cieties as they question the status quo and strive to change or amend the
political order.
In contemporary society, urban movements have emerged as a spe-
cial type of social movement. According to Castells (1983), the concept
of “urban movement” denotes various forms of mobilisation, “from coun-
ter-cultural squatters to middle class neighbourhood associations and
shanty town defense groups” (p. 328). Despite their diversity, however,
he does believe that they share some common features: “1. They consider
themselves as urban, or citizen, in any case, related to the city (or to the
community) in their self-denomination; 2. They are locally-based and
territorially defined; 3. They tend to mobilize around three major goals:
collective consumption, cultural identity, and political self-management”
(Castells, 1983: 300).
The movements build on the theoretical legacy of Henri Lefebvre and
inspired by his idea of the “right to the city” have garnered particular at-
tention over the last twenty years. In Lefebvre’s mind, attaining the right to
the city represents gaining control of the use value of space, rather than its
exchange or market value. According to him, in industrial society, space
itself became a commodity and urbanism became an amalgam of ideology
and practice subordinated to the interests of big business (Lefebvre, 1970).
According to Lefebvre, the problems of urbanism are, on the one hand,
expressed through the formation of centres of decision-making with as yet
unknown authority, which concentrate wealth, repressive power and in-
formation. On the other hand, conflict arises due to the dissolution of old
cities, which results in segregation and the breakdown of social relations
in the broadest sense (Lefebvre, 2005: 168). Lefebvre’s work is quite revo-
lutionary, considering how applicable and easily understood it continues
to be today. Indeed, just as the new processes of the commercialisation of
space were beginning to emerge, he recognised their significance in shap-
ing the world of the future:
“Today, the social (global) nature of productive labor, embodied in
productive forces, is apparent in the social production of space. In the
recent past, there was no other way to conceive of ‘production’ other
than as an object, located somewhere in space: an ordinary object, a
machine, a book, a painting. Today, space as a whole enters into pro-
duction as a product, through the buying, selling, and exchange of parts
of space. Not too long ago, a localized, identifiable space, the soil, still
belonged to a sacred entity: the earth. It belonged to that cursed, and
therefore sacred, character, the owner (not of the means of production,
but of the Home), a carryover from feudal times. Today, this ideology
and the corresponding practice are collapsing. Something new is hap-
pening” (Lefebvre, 1970: 155).
After the 1980s, neoliberal ideology and entrepreneurial approaches

to managing local environments were on the rise, giving the idea of the
“right to the city” a new dimension and significance. According to Pur-
cell, in the neoliberal milieu management changed in three ways: 1) it was
rescaled (institutions at the subnational and supranational levels became
increasingly significant); 2) policy was reoriented away from redistribu-
tion and towards competitiveness; 3) many functions of the state were
transferred to non-state or quasi-state bodies (Purcell, 2002: 105). Accord-
ingly, today cities are experiencing growing political significance relative
to the nation state, while on the other hand, they are more vulnerable to
shifts at the global level, competition and the activities of supranational
institutions.
According to Petrović, these new circumstances lead to the “com-
pounding of the interests of various social actors in the city, whereby the
significance of the interests of those who are not residents (tourists, na-
tional/international capital, students, commuters) is on the rise. Hence,
a division emerges between the interests of the local population and lo-
cal capital, on the one hand, and the creators of urban policy in the city,
on the other” (Petrović, 2000: 11). The domination of private capital in
the production of space has destabilised the concepts of “common good”
and “public space”. As Petrović notes, “the organisation and management
of public space is increasingly being turned over to private sector actors,
who then importantly determine the content and users of these spaces”
(Petrović, 2009: 110). All of these changes over recent decades have con-
tributed to the emergence of numerous urban movements around the
world. These are often guided by the idea of the right to the city in order
to achieve a greater degree of civic participation in decision-making on
urban life and the management of urban space.
As the role of the city came to be more about attracting investment
and achieving market competitiveness, this raised the question of civic
participation in decisions on the transformation and continued expansion
of the city. Even though suffrage formally grants citizens some influence
on decisions made by government institutions following the interests of
capital, that leverage is merely partial as the state can influence only the
context in which capital is invested (through tax policy, labour law, envi-
ronmental regulations, etc.) (Purcell, 2002: 102). According to Sasen, the
city today appears as “a place for fresh demands by both global capital,
which sees it as an ‘organisational good/asset’, and by the privileged ur-
ban population, whose presence in large cities is very frequently just as
internationalised as that of capital” (Sasen, 2004: 197). Sasen claims that
the “denationalisation of urban space and new demands made by transna-
tional actors, as well as the related competition, raise the question of who
the city belongs to” (Sasen, 2004: 197).
Gentrification in Belgrade’s Savamala Quarter

Postsocialist Transformation in Serbia and Pioneer
Gentrification in the Savamala Quarter
Since the early 1990s, socio-economic transformation began to re-
shape formerly socialist cities. According to Sýkora and Bouzarovski, post-
socialist transformation occurs in three phases: 1. The short term, during
which the basic principles of political and economic organisation undergo
change; 2. The medium term, during which changes to people’s behaviour,
customs and cultural norms adapt to the new circumstances and initiate
wider social change; 3. The long term, during which the urban structure
is transformed (Sýkora & Bouzarovski, 2012: 45, according to Nedučin,
2014: 38). Today the postsocialist city has its own particular adjustment
and restructuring problems but is a largely altered environment, depend-
ent on global shifts in power and capital. The economic development of
the postsocialist city is dependent on its ability to adapt to global trends,
while global shifts influence the shaping and definition of the local.
Urban movements in Serbia can be seen also as a consequence of the
postsocialist transformation of space. The establishment of the market
economy in formerly socialist republics entailed a change in the role of
the city from a provider of services and a leveller of social inequalities to
its entrepreneurial role, in which the city authorities are focused on at-
tracting investment (Petrović, 2009). In contrast to the planned economy,
where the levelling of economic disparities between regions was one of the
duties of the state, in the neoliberal economic order the entrepreneurial
capability of the city authorities has become vital for the further devel-
opment of the city and the region. As noted by Vujović, “under social-
ism, urban development depended on the redistribution of funds from the
central budget, but in postsocialist cities development is fairly dependent
on the presence of transnational companies, foreign investment and the
local economy” (Vujović, 2008: 323).
Over the past two decades, Belgrade has begun to take on a new iden-
tity. The collapse of industrial production during its postsocialist trans-
formation has resulted in the creation of large post-industrial spaces that,
in the new system, have become functionless and disused. Due to unsuc-
cessful privatisation and a climate generally unfavourable for industrial
renewal (a consequence of fierce competition and low prices on the global
market), the reconstruction of these spaces to suit new needs has begun.
The Savamala quarter, where the Belgrade Waterfront project is planned
and where the Hercegovačka Street demolition took place, setting off sev-
eral civic protests in 2016, can serve as a good example to illustrate the
basic processes that currently impact the transformation of space, as well

as the challenges faced by local authorities and the people of Belgrade (see
more in the chapters by Vera Backović and Selena Lazić in this volume).
In Belgrade’s recent past, Savamala has been the epitome of the un-
derdeveloped neighbourhood ravaged by prostitution and crime. During
socialist times, the area exclusively had the character of a hub for industry
and transit, located as it was near the main train and coach stations, the
Sava docks and two rail and road bridges. As a postmodern approach to
development was adopted in Serbia at the beginning of the 21st century,
many experts, artists’ groups and associations began to see potential in
this industrial site. Due to the proximity of the city centre, just a kilometre
or two from Savamala, it was the tourism potential of the area that was
first recognised7.
The first wave of the transformation of the Savamala neighbourhood
was linked with the activities of the creative class. The 2007 repurposing
of the former Nolit warehouse into the Magacin cultural centre attracted
groups of young artists into the area and initiated a wave of creative in-
dustries and services opening up in the quarter. The cultural industries
launched the first wave of gentrification in the area, making it recognis-
able and authentic and changing its identity to suit the values of the arts
and youth culture. Mele calls this process pioneer gentrification. Though
perhaps lacking clear intent, pioneer gentrification, which can be defined
as branding an industrial area through the development of creative in-
dustries, sometimes leads to larger gentrification processes (Mele, 2005,
according to Petrović, 2009: 128). Such as was the case with the Savamala
quarter after the announcement of the Belgrade Waterfront project (see
more in the chapter by Koelemaij and Stefan Janković in this volume).
Belgrade Waterfront
Belgrade Waterfront is an investment by Abu Dabhi-based company,
Eagle Hills, and is an urban revitalisation plan spanning some two million
square metres along the Sava river. The project envisions the construction
of 17 percent office space, 8 percent luxurious hotel space, 60 percent elite
residential space, 5 percent commercial, 8 percent space for the largest
shopping centre in the Balkans, while 1 percent is allotted for entertain-
ment and leisure (Stokić & Radovanović, 2015: 304). Outstanding among
the planned buildings are the Belgrade Tower, which is projected to be 170
metres tall and a shopping centre that will sprawl across 148,000 square
metres. In contrast to the first phase of the area’s transformation – which
7 See: http://www.goethe.de/ins/cs/bel/prj/uic/sav/srindex.htm, accessed 10/11/2018.

demanded the involvement and participation of locals and which largely

did not have a negative impact on local residents – the transformation of
space resulting from this project has brought about a series of problems
and disadvantages for local people.
Since its announcement, the Belgrade Waterfront project has been
treated as a project of the highest priority by the national and city authori-
ties, a stance that was formalised with the Conclusion adopted in May
2014 by the Government of Serbia (Official Gazette of the Republic of
Serbia, 20148). As some of the land encompassed by the project was pri-
vately owned, the Government passed the Law on Establishing the Public
Interest and Special Expropriation Procedures and the Issuance of Con-
struction Permits for the Implementation of the Belgrade Waterfront Pro-
ject. According to Zeković et al., “what is unusual in this case is that the
public interest is determined through the construction of commercial and
residential buildings, which essentially aims to satisfy the interests of the
elite and above all international financial capital from the private sector”
(Zeković, Vujošević & Maričić, 2015: 43).
Until the adoption of this law, the public interest and expropriation
processes in Serbia could be invoked only for public purposes, such as the
construction of roads, infrastructure, parks and so forth. In accordance
with the new law, commonly known as the lex specialis, those who own
real estate in an area envisaged for the construction of a new part of the
city are forced to hand over their property to the state in exchange for a
certain amount of financial compensation. This gradually led to the dem-
olition of buildings and the eviction of companies and people. Over 200
families were displaced from the area of the Sava riverfront, as were a large
number of small and medium enterprises, commercial spaces, a football
ground, a refugee centre that was part of the Mikser House cultural centre
and other facilities with infrastructure on the ground. Since this was made
possible by the fact that the Belgrade Waterfront project is considered to
be a high-priority project of public significance, this sparked discussion of
the issue amongst the wider community9.
One of the biggest problems of this investment venture is the lack of
transparency. Information that is served to the public is frequently incom-
plete and inconsistent10. The project’s implementation has been turned
8 Odluka o izradi Prostornog plana područja namene uređenja dela priobalja grada
Beograda – područje priobalja reke Save za projekat “Beograd na vodi” (2004),
Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia), br.
58/14. (http://www.pravno-informacioni-sistem.rs/SlGlasnikPortal/eli/rep/sgrs/vla-
da/odluka/2014/58/1/reg, accessed 05/08/2018).
9 See: https://pescanik.net/deklaracija-o-beogradu-na-vodi/, accessed 07/08/2016.
10 See: http://cn4hs.org/serbia-chronicle-7-belgrade-waterfront-from-vision-to-insecu-
rity/, accessed 11/08/2016.
over to the organisation, Belgrade Waterfront LTD, and the city’s role is the
preparation of planning regulations and the securing of construction per-
mits. The local governments of Savski Venac and Novi Beograd, parts of
whose territories are encompassed by the project, are completely excluded
from the institutional framework (Lalović, Radosavljević & Đukanović,
2015). On the other hand, there was no public discussion and numerous
objections by experts and other public representatives were disregarded.
For example, during the drafting of the new Master Plan for Belgrade,
which was carried out in accordance with the needs of the Belgrade Wa-
terfront project, over 1,200 objections were submitted but every single one
of them was rejected as lacking foundation11. Consequently, in 2015 the
Architecture Academy of Serbia issued a public statement expressing the
opinion that the Belgrade Waterfront project must be suspended as it is
harmful to the citizens and the identity of the city:
“The executive authorities of the Republic and the City have coerced
all, imposter-experts and Belgrade assembly members, into making ter-
ribly dangerous changes to provisions of the General Urban Plan. Its
most important provision, that this central part of the Sava Amphi-
theatre, a belt some 300 metres deep along the right bank of the river,
could be developed predominantly for public purposes and with limits
to the maximum number of storeys, was removed. By bypassing broad-
er expert opinion and the opinions of citizens, the riverfront was not
protected as a common good that must be respected and safeguarded
against any abuse.”12
According to Zeković et al. this project is exclusionary and is being im-
plemented in the interests of the elite, which can be deduced from the adop-
tion of the Lex Specialis, the definition of the project as being of national
significance, the regulation of property ownership, the exclusion of the local
community from decision-making, the lack of sufficient information on fu-
ture activities and so forth (Zeković, Vujošević & Maričić, 2015).
Demolition in Hercegovačka Street

As a grand gentrification project – and due to all of the controver-
sies and lack of transparency that has been its hallmark – the Belgrade
Waterfront project has provoked broad discussion in Serbian society and
raised the question of who has the right to the city. The clearing of Sa-
vamala did not pass without causing some dissatisfaction but it did not
11 http://cn4hs.org/serbia-chronicle-7-belgrade-waterfront-from-vision-to-insecurity/,
accessed 11/08/2016.
12 See: http://aas.org.rs/deklaracija-aas-o-beogradu-na-vodi/, accessed 15/09/2016.
incite overt dissent until the demolition of privately-owned buildings in

Hercegovačka. According to reports by ordinary citizens, on election night
and with no warning or permission masked individuals using demolition
equipment and bulldozers flattened privately-owned buildings along the
whole street. Everyone they encountered was held by force, without being
shown any official identification or given any explanation. The then Om-
budsman, Saša Janković, reacted to these events. According to a statement
he issued a few days after the incident:
“In the early morning of 25 April, an organised, motorised group of sev-
eral tens of individuals wearing black uniforms and ski masks, equipped
with expandable barons and powerful flashlights, temporarily, for around
two hours, effectively took control of the part of Belgrade known as
Savamala. In a street that they blocked with two construction vehicles,
applying and threatening physical force, they brazenly and violently
pulled citizens from buildings and cars, seized their personal means of
communication, impeded their movement, preventing them even from
looking into the blacked out windows of cars with no number plates that
patrolled the neighbourhood, searched their vehicles and buildings, con-
fiscated two pistols and a hunting rifle they found in one of the offices,
confiscated video material recorded by security cameras and threatened
citizens not to tell anyone what had happened. Through their activities
they cleared the area and secured the demolition of several buildings,
which was carried out using several construction vehicles.”13
By the next day it was already clear that no relevant institution of the
city or the state had participated in the demolition of these buildings and
even at the time of writing there is no information on who was responsi-
ble. Meanwhile, the official position of all institutions is that the demoli-
tion of these buildings was illegal. Nevertheless, this incident was widely
seen as being connected to the Belgrade Waterfront project and at one
point the then Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, stated that the demoli-
tion had been initiated by the leadership of the city government14.
The Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own organisation emerged from within
the activities of an organisation called the Ministry of Space (Ministar-
stvo prostora) and from the very beginning of the Belgrade Waterfront
endeavour has engaged in pointing out the negative consequences of this
project for the people of Belgrade and Serbia (see more in the chapter by
Jelisaveta Petrović in this volume). This organisation, which bases its ac-
tivities on the idea of the right to the city, has been active in urban policy
circles in Belgrade for a few years, through the implementation of pro-
jects, direct action, public discussion and the occupation of space. After
13 http://www.zastitnik.rs/, accessed 07/09/2016.
14 https://www.krik.rs/vucic-gradska-vlast-iza-rusenja-u-savamali/, accessed 12/05/2018.
the demolition of buildings in Hercegovačka, the Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)

own initiative launched a series of protests that gathered large numbers of
people with the aim of establishing who was responsible for the demoli-
tion and calling for their resignations or for them to be held responsible.
The slogan of the protest, “Whose city? Our city!”, strongly recalls Lefeb-
vre’s struggle for the right to the city.
Method
On 13 July 2016, an opinion survey was conducted among the par-
ticipants in one of the protests initiated by the then still informal group,
Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own, in reaction to the demolition of buildings
in Savamala. The methodological approach was developed on the basis
of the approach used in a project called, “Caught in the Act of Protest:
Contextualising Contestation” (Klandermans et al., 2011). The aim of the
conducted research was to establish who participated in the protests, why
they had decided to get involved, how they were mobilised, what their
political leanings were and the degree of their civic activism. The ques-
tionnaire comprised three rounds of questions that sought to provide a
more detailed insight into the socio-demographic characteristics of the
participants, their political opinions and their motives for participating in
the protest. The questionnaire also included open and closed questions, as
well as Likert scale questions.
Particular methodological difficulties arose from the fact that the
participants of the protest were questioned during the protest march itself,
which lasted around two hours. Consequently, it was necessary to clearly
identify the methodological guidelines that would ensure the objectivity
and scientific usefulness of the research. A sample of 90 subjects were se-
lected at random. Seven interviewers15 were located in various sections
of the mass of protesters as they moved from point A to point B and they
selected respondents at random (they would select every third row behind
or in front of them and every third person to their right or left, depending
on their starting point). Some of the interviewers began from the front of
the protest, some from the back, while others were evenly distributed on
the left and right flanks of the protest. As they moved through the crowd,
each of the interviewers was assigned a direction, so as to avoid overlap.
According to the authors of “Caught in the Act of Protest”, “the procedure
is meant to guarantee that all groups of demonstrators, no matter whether
15 Nataša Lenđel, Milan Škobić, Danica Popović, Jelena Nikolić, Nikola Stojanović, Ana
Račubolk and Mladen Nikolić. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of
those involved for their assistance in gathering data.
their members prefer to walk in the first part of a march or as one of the
last groups (this issue is also linked to questions of the visibility of a group
in a march), have an equal chance to be part of the sample” (Klandermans
et al., 2011).
Research Findings
The Socio-Demographic Characteristics
of Protest Participants
There are no particular gender or age characteristics distinguishing
the analysed group. The sample equitably represents both the sexes – 51
percent of respondents were male and 49 percent female. Also, the age
structure does not reveal a significant share of any generation. People of
all ages participated in the protest and the average age of the participants
was 35. In the sample itself, the youngest respondent was 16, the oldest
was 70, while the most common age group (mode) was 25.
Education emerged as the factor distinguishing the cohort from the
general population (table 1). That is, most of the participants, as many as
80 percent, have post-secondary or higher education attainment, with 18
percent having completed post-graduate degrees. According to the 2011
Census, only 16 percent of the Serbian population have post-secondary or
higher education attainment16. Therefore, we can conclude that this pro-
test has a significant factor that distinguishes its participants from the rest
of the population. Based on the analysed data, it can be concluded that
this was a protest of highly educated members of society.
Table 1 Level of education among the protest participants
Post-graduate level 18%

Graduate 47%
Post-secondary 7%
Secondary 17%
Elementary 1%
Total 100%
16 http://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2018/Pdf/G20182051.pdf, accessed 10/11/2018.

When it comes to place of residence, most participants were residents

of Belgrade (88%), while the remainder lived in other Serbian cities or
came from abroad. In the analysed sample, there was not a single partici-
pant who lived in a rural part of Serbia. Therefore, the second characteris-
tic of this protest is that this was a citizens’ protest in the original sense of
the word “citizen” – based on the Latin civitas, meaning city.
Regarding the breakdown of Belgrade participants by municipality,
there are certain consistencies here also. The most common municipali-
ties in which the participants lived are Vračar, Novi Beograd, Stari grad,
Zvezdara and Palilula. It is clear that the respondents largely live in central
locations and that respondents from the more peripheral municipalities
are not present in the sample.
Most respondents were in employment (55.6%). The breakdown of
employment categories is such that the proportion of respondents in full-
time employment is 34 percent, part-time 9 percent, self-employed or
freelancers 5.6 percent and entrepreneurs 7 percent. The rest of the re-
spondents were students or pupils (19%), unemployed (14%) and pen-
sioners (9%).
The participants of the protest were mostly mobilised via the inter-
net (74%), primarily via the social network, Facebook. Beyond that, they
learned about the protest from their friends (16%) or via traditional media
(8%).
Motives for Participating in the Protest

The question that aimed to capture the motives and reasons people
had to participate in this specific protest was formulated as an open ques-
tion and was posed as follows: “What is the reason that led you to par-
ticipate in this protest?” The respondents’ responses were, based on their
frequency, grouped into eight categories. The most numerous reasons for
participating in the protest were topics defined as “The decline of democ-
racy in society” (35%) and “Rebelling against those in power” (25%). The
protest participants largely based their involvement on the specific inci-
dent of the illegal demolition in Hercegovačka and the lack of response
from the authorities in the days that followed:
“Because a whole slew of laws was broken, threatening the institutions
and endangering citizens.” (A17)
“I’m protesting because all aspects of the institutions have been violat-
ed, because the state has vanished, but not in a good sense. No pillar of
democracy remains when someone can demolish part of the city with-
out restraint.” (A44)
“Nobody has the right to occupy territory from behind masks, and for
the police to ignore calls by the public.” (A51)
The next most common motive for protesting present in the sample
was “Rebelling against those in power” (25%):
“To express my dissatisfaction and anger with the boorish, corrupt, ma-
fia-like authorities.” (A84)
“To rise up against the authorities and the system.” (A17)
By “authorities” most respondents are referring to the state, rather
than the local government. This shows how significant the functioning of
the national authorities is for local problems and for the specific problem
of the Hercegovačka demolition incident. Only two respondents gave their
reason for attending the protests as revolt against the city authorities.
Some of the protest participants considered their involvement to be a
civic duty (12%) while 9 percent of respondents saw their role as support-
ing Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own. Only 7 percent of respondents cited lies
and the misleading of the public as their primary reason to protest, while
6 percent directly attributed their involvement to opposing the Belgrade
Waterfront project. The remaining 6 percent explain their involvement in
the protest through emotional, political and other reasons. Overall, the
respondents’ answers indicate that they largely participated in the protest
because they believe the act of illegal demolition in Hercegovačka Street
violated democratic values and independent institutions and that they
most commonly see the leaders of the state as the culprits (Table 2).
Table 2 Reasons for participating in the protest
The decline of democracy in society 35%

Rebelling against the those in power 25%
Fulfilling civic duty 12%
Support for Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own 9%
Opposing lies and deceit 7%
Opposing the Belgrade Waterfront project 6%
Emotional reasons (displeasure, anger) 2%
Political reasons 2%
Other 2%
Total 100%
According to 33 percent of the sample, the blame for the civic pro-
tests lies with the leaders of the state. Beyond that, the protesters most
often blamed the then Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić (16%).
In third place is the “failure to react/non-existence of institutions” (12%).
Moreover, as many as 6 percent of people referred specifically to the po-
lice who failed to respond during and after the Hercegovačka demolition.
Only 11 percent of respondents blame the city authorities and 6 percent
believe that political parties are to blame for the circumstances that led
to the protest. Additionally, participants also blame themselves for allow-
ing this to happen, the previous government, the poor economic situation,
the lack of information, capitalism and so forth. Responding to the state-
ment that, “the Belgrade Waterfront project is a good idea but is not being
implemented in a good way”, 64.4 percent of participants disagreed, 23.4
percent agreed and 16.9 percent were undecided.
When asked for their opinion on how the problem should be solved, the
answers varied. Most respondents (15.7%) thought that the protests should
continue and expand in order to solve the problem. Further, respondents
also thought that those responsible for the Hercegovačka demolition should
face criminal charges (13.5%) or resign (13.5%). Finally, 10 percent of re-
spondents see a change of government as the solution, while 6 percent call
for institutional reform. Table 3 lists the solutions proposed by respondents.
Table 3 Respondents suggestions on how to solve

the problem that led to the protests
Continue and expand the protests 15.7%

Bring criminal charges against those responsible for demolition
13.5%
in Savamala
Those responsible for demolition in Savamala should resign 13.5%
Change of government 10.1%
Institutional reform 5.6%
Greater citizen participation in decision-making at the local
4.5%
level
Radicalisation of the protest/Initiation of a revolution 4.5%
Greater transparency 3.4%
Raising public awareness 3.4%
Change of the system as a whole 3.4%
The organisation of violence against people and property 2.2%
Halting the Belgrade Waterfront project 2.2%
Total 100%
The respondents’ reasons for participating in the protest were also

measured indirectly. Statements were read to the respondents and they were
asked to express their degree of agreement or disagreement. We asked re-
spondents whether they participated in the protest in order to protect their
own interests, to express their opinion, to exert pressure on politicians, to
raise public awareness, to express solidarity or to fulfil their moral duty.
Most respondents expressed disagreement in response to the statement,
“I’m protesting to protect my own interests”. In response to this statement
13.5 percent of respondents replied “I completely disagree” or “I partially
disagree”, while 14.6 percent responded “I neither agree nor disagree” and
7.2 percent responded with “I completely agree” or “I partially agree”.
Most participants in the protest agreed with the following statements:
“I’m protesting in order to raise public awareness” (99%); “I’m protesting
to express solidarity” (94%); “I’m protesting to exert pressure on politi-
cians” (92%) – even though all of the statements were evaluated as posi-
tive (Table 4).
Table 4 Goals of participating in the protest
To protect To express To exert To raise To To fulfil

my own my pressure on public express my moral
interests opinion politicians awareness solidarity duty
I completely
43.8% 67.4% 84.3% 80% 85.4% 74.2%
agree
I partially
28.1% 23.6% 7.9% 17.8% 10.1% 12.4%
agree
I neither
agree nor 14.6% 3.4% 5.6% 1.1% 2.2% 9%
disagree
I partially
disagree 5.6% 1.1% 1.1% 0% 0% 2.2%
I completely
7.9% 4.5% 1.1% 1.1% 2.2% 1.1%
disagree
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The protest participants were not overly optimistic when assessing

whether the goals of the protest would be achieved in the near future. One
in eight respondents (13.3%) thought that the goals of the protest would
not be achieved at all, while nearly one in three (29%) thought that not
much would be achieved. On the other hand, 37 percent of respondents
thought that the goals of the protest would, in the near future, be achieved
“in part”, one in five of the respondents (18%) thought that “quite a lot”
would be achieved, while only 3 percent of respondents thought that the
goals of the protest would be fully achieved.
The participants did not identify themselves with the protest organis-
ers to a great degree. As such, 6.7 percent did not identify at all, 10 per-
cent – not much, 27.8 percent – a little, 37.8 percent – quite a lot, while
only 17.8 percent identified with the organisers completely. The protesters
mostly did identify with the other participants in the protest: 6.7 percent
– not much, 26.7 percent – a little, 51.1 percent – quite a lot, and 14.4 per-
cent identified with the other participants completely.
Political Orientation and Civic Participation

One of the aims of the questionnaire was to examine the political
orientation of the protesters, their attitudes and their participation in
politics. Respondents had the opportunity to define themselves along a
left-to-right political scale, where 0 was considered to be a completely left-
wing orientation and 10 a completely right-wing orientation. Most people
characterised themselves as leaning more to the left than the right, even
though the respondents’ replies tend to converge towards the centre of the
scale, where the mode average also lies (Figure 1).
Figure 1 Political orientation on a left-right scale
Most respondents did not agree with the notion that even the most
important public services and enterprises should be privatised. In re-
sponse to this assertion, 51.7 percent completely disagree, 18 percent
partially disagree, while 12.4 percent partially agree. When asked wheth-
er they agree with the following statement, “The Government should

redistribute earnings from those who have more to those who are less
fortunate”, 20.2 percent of respondents disagree, while 64.5 percent ei-
ther partially or completely agree. This indicates that the protesters are
generally not inclined to support privatisation of the public sector and,
in large part, still see the state as a leveller of inequalities among the
population.
Compared with other institutions, the respondents expressed the
least trust in the Government of Serbia. As many as 77.8 percent of re-
spondents do not trust the Government at all, 20 percent trust it a little,
while only 2.2 percent exhibited “some” trust. Levels of trust are also low
for the National Assembly: 68 percent of respondents do not trust the
Assembly at all, 19 percent trust it a little and 3 percent expressed some
trust. There is also no trust in the legal system – 58 percent of the sam-
ple – 25.8 trust it a little and 15.7 percent expressed some trust. Most
respondents have little trust in trades unions but more so than for gov-
ernment bodies (not at all – 48.9%, not much – 27.3%, some – 19.3%,
quite a lot – 4.5%). From analysis of the sample it is clear that respond-
ents exhibit greater trust in supranational institutions such as the United
Nations and European Union than they do in Serbian institutions. Even
though here trust levels were also low, they are nonetheless positive to
some extent. Complete trust in European Union was exhibited by 2.2
percent of respondents, quite a lot of trust by 9 percent, some by 30.3
percent, a little by 31.5 percent and none by 27 percent of respondents.
As regards the UN, none of the respondents exhibited complete trust,
quite a lot was expressed by 10.2 percent, some by 34.1 percent, not
much by 29.5 percent and none by 26.1 percent.
The surveyed protesters exhibited a high level of political engage-
ment. This can, above all, be concluded from their tendency to vote in
elections and their appraisal of their right to do so as being very impor-
tant in contemporary society. As many as 86.5 percent of the protesters
vote in elections. Given that the turnout at the April 2016 elections was
56 percent17, it can be noted that the right to vote is highly valued by the
cohort. When examining their attitudes, respondents were asked to assess
to what extent they agreed with the following statement, “I see no point
in voting as the political parties will do what they want anyway”. Most re-
spondents expressed partial or complete disagreement with this statement
(61.1%), while 29 percent partially or completely agreed.
17 http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/doc/izbori-2016/rezultati/1.%20Zbirni_rezultati.
pdf, accessed 10/11/2018.
Nevertheless, even though most respondents vote in elections and

value their right to do so, most did not identify with any particular po-
litical party (70%). When they did identify with a party, they mostly
cited Enough is Enough (Dosta je bilo – DJB). Considering that those
who identify with this party make up 21 percent of the sample, it can be
said that those whose views are represented by the values of this party
made up an important part of the protest. This can be linked to calls by
the leader of DJB, Saša Radulović, for citizens to join the protest, which
indicates how significant political parties can be in mobilising the popu-
lation. Even though the organisers of the protest distanced themselves
from political parties and other political groups, people who were mem-
bers of parties were invited to the protest in their capacity as ordinary
citizens. As a result, this protest was often perceived in the public eye
as a protest organised by opposition parties, in spite of the organisers
protests to the contrary. In addition to respondents who identify with
DJB, there were also those who identified with other political parties
(the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia, the Liberal Dem-
ocratic Party, the Serbian Left) who together amounted to 5 percent of
the sample. Given that the respondents did not identify with the ruling
parties, this shows that the protest did have a somewhat oppositional
character.
When looking at levels of civic engagement, 28 percent of respond-
ents are members of an organisation or association (be it political, sports,
civic, non-governmental or other). Those who are active in various or-
ganisations are mostly engaged in the NGO sector, cultural associations or
political parties.
Wishing to explore the various forms of political engagement that can
be applied to encourage change – or indeed, discourage it – the partici-
pants in the protest were asked whether in the preceding two years they
had: contacted a political representative or institution; donated money to
a political organisation; boycotted a product; participated in industrial ac-
tion; signed a petition or open letter; purchased a product for ethical or
political reasons; participated in direct action or blockades; participated in
politically motivated violent actions against persons or property. The aim
was to explore the political engagement of respondents and the directness
of their approach to solving the problems that arise around them. The
results show that the protest participants are characterised by a propensity
for activism. As many as 74.4 percent had signed a petition in the last two
years, while 57.8 percent had participated in direct action such as block-
ades, occupations or civil disobedience (Table 5).
Table 5 Political engagement by participants

of the protest in the preceding two years
Type of political engagement YES NO

Participation in violent actions (aimed at people or
6.7% 93.3%
property)
Participated in direct action (blockades, occupations,
57.8% 42.2%
civil disobedience)
Purchased products for political/ethical/ecological
31.1% 68.9%
reasons
Signed a petition/open letter 74.4% 25.6%
Participated in industrial action 37.8% 62.2%
Boycotted a certain product 41.1% 58.9%
Donated money to political associations/organisations 18.9% 81.1%
Contacted a politician, institution or the city authorities 33.3% 66.7%
Participants in the protest believe that an organised group of citizens

can be an agent for political change in Serbia. When presented with this
statement, “An organised group of citizens can influence the shaping of
policy in Serbia”, 45.5 percent partially agreed and 33 percent agreed com-
pletely. Only 13.6 percent of respondents expressed disagreement. This
shows that activism is valued by those in the survey sample. The respond-
ents also expressed faith in change through international networking. Al-
most three quarters of them (74.5%) agreed in part or completely with the
following statement: “If the citizens of different countries join forces, they
can influence international politics”.
Conclusion
In postsocialist Serbia, which is faced with many political and econom-
ic issues, protests that are the result of urban change are a new phenomenon.
With this in mind, we can say that the protests against the demolition in
Hercegovačka are just an introduction into a redefinition of public priorities
and the beginning of the struggle for the right to the city. The results of this
research indicate that participants in this protest value activism highly and
see an organised group of citizens as a potential agent for change. Those at-
titudes are the basic building blocks for future collective action. The partici-
pants in the protest were highly educated residents of Belgrade, living mostly
in central municipalities. The most common reason for participating in the

protest was the decline of democracy – i.e. dissatisfaction with government
institutions and their inaction during and after the violent demolition of
privately-owned buildings in Hercegovačka Street. Additionally, people took
part in the protests in order to oppose the high-handed behaviour of the
authorities. They see top state officials and the inaction of the institutions
as bearing the blame and the holding to account or criminal prosecution of
those responsible as the solution. The level of political engagement and civic
activism of the sample cohort was relatively high compared with the rest of
the population. In order to solve problems in their environment, partici-
pants in the protest had in the past turned to various forms of political ac-
tivism, such as participation in direct action and similar. They were mostly
mobilised via the internet and social media. Even though they expressed a
high degree of dissatisfaction with government institutions, participants in
the protest valued political suffrage and voted in elections, which indicates
some faith in the institutional order and democratic values.
The slogan of the protests, “Whose city? Our city!”, shows that this pro-
test was part of the struggle for the right to the city. Nevertheless, in their
responses respondents rarely noted the wider structures of power – such
as global capitalism and the interests of private capital – and blame for the
circumstances that led to the protest is laid squarely at the feet of the politi-
cal elite. It is interesting that participants in the protest largely do not believe
that their demands will be met. Considering the fact that social movements
emerge in order to accomplish certain goals, that people were motivated to
protest without any hope of achieving their aims raises fresh research ques-
tions. Moreover, the low level of identification respondents exhibited with
the protest organisers and with other protesters is also of interest.
The process of transformation that the Savamala quarter is undergo-
ing is emblematic of many of the challenges and problems faced by the
contemporary postsocialist city. On the one hand, without an influx of
investment and the accumulation of international capital achieved via
the application of the entrepreneurial function of the city in contempo-
rary society, cities expose themselves to various economic problems. On
the other hand, urban transformation initiated by the interests of capital
frequently excludes the local population from shaping the environment
in which they live and impacts their daily lives, perhaps leading to their
displacement. Certainly, the gentrification of Savamala through the im-
plementation of the Belgrade Waterfront project is a radical approach to
urban renewal. The eviction of locals, the lack of transparency in expro-
priating land, the proclamation of the project as being in the public inter-
est and especially the violent and illegal night-time demolition of part of
the city raises the question: Whose city is it? Urban transformation influ-
enced by global trends and private capital is yet to come, so in the future
we can expect a clearer articulation of views on investor-led urbanism,
new movements for the right to the city and, consequently, new research
questions and projects.
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| 211
THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL SECTOR IN

THE URBAN TRANSFORMATION OF THE
SAVAMALA NEIGHBOURHOOD
Selena Lazić
Abstract: During the last couple of years, the Savamala neighbourhood, located
along the Sava riverbank in Belgrade, has been going through a complex process
of socio-spatial transformation. Due to the lack of a clear strategy or plan for its
urban development and the absence of interest from powerful investors, urban
transformation of this neighbourhood began as the result of various civil sector
initiatives. Creative entrepreneurs, NGOs and artists initiated the revival of Sava-
mala through adaptive re-use of abandoned spaces for various cultural, artistic
and educational programmes. This model of urban transformation that gained
particular momentum from 2012 until 2015 can be characterised as a “bottom-
up”, culture-driven urban transformation.
To understand the role of the civil sector in the urban transformation of Savama-
la, it is necessary to analyse the motives and goals of all the relevant actors, their
resources, as well as the level of communication and cooperation both among
them and with the public sector – i.e. the local and city authorities and planning
institutions. Having in mind that some of the activities were envisioned as tempo-
rary and that some of the actors have retreated from Savamala in the meantime,
the durable effects of their activities are questionable, especially considering the
on-going Belgrade Waterfront megaproject, which aims at transforming the wider
waterfront area including Savamala.
Keywords: civil sector, Savamala, urban transformation, culture-led urban revi-
talisation
Introduction
Waterfront revitalisation in the cities of developed capitalist societies
has represented one of the visible manifestations of the wider structural
changes that these societies have undergone since the 1970s. New trends
on the local political level, noted in this period, involve the expansion of
212 | Selena Lazić
the urban political system towards the inclusion of a great number of non-
governmental participants and the creation of new competitive forms of
urban development in which cities intensively compete to attract invest-
ment and global capital (Mayer, 1998:1; Mayer, 1999:210–211). The shift
from “managerialism” to “entrepreneurism” (Harvi, 2005) refers to the in-
creased investment by local governments into proactive economic strate-
gies and their shift towards empowering, mobilising and coordinating lo-
cal development potential and entrepreneurial initiatives. The shift from
“government” to “governance” refers to a move away from centralised and
hierarchical structures of government towards a collaborative approach
with social agencies and non-governmental actors, including the private
sector (Hirst, 2000: 20–21). Almost all of the relevant strategic documents
on urban development in the EU specifically stress the role of the civil
sector and oblige local governments to actively cooperate with citizens re-
garding all important urban policies and practices (Čukić, 2016:160).
As a neighbourhood on the right bank of Sava river in Belgrade, Sava-
mala has been going through a dynamic process of socio-spatial transfor-
mation during the last couple of years. It is important to have in mind that
in this period there have been two conflicting approaches taking place here:
culture-driven “bottom-up” transformation, on the one hand, and “top-
down” gentrification through the Belgrade Waterfront megaproject, on the
other1. The first model, which gained particular momentum from 2012 un-
til 2015, is characterized by the great role of civil sector agents who were the
first to recognize the spatial, social and economic potentials of Savamala, ac-
tivating unused spaces and reviving this part of the city by introducing new
functions. The Belgrade Waterfront project was announced at the beginning
of 2014 as an urban development project that would completely transform
the Sava riverbank through the construction of a luxury residential and
commercial complex across around 100 hectares of city land. The national
government found an investor from United Arab Emirates2, proclaimed the
project as one of national importance and undertook a series of legislative
changes in order to enable its implementation. Public planning institutions
were involved as mere executors of the already devised project and other
urban actors were excluded from the decision-making process3 (see more in
the chapter by Jorn Koelemaij and Stefan Janković in this volume).
1 For more about these models, see: Lazić (2018).

2 An Abu Dhabi-based private real estate investment and development company
known as Eagle Hills.
3 In the public consultation phase for amendment of Belgrade’s General Urban Plan –
for the purposes of the Belgrade Waterfront project – there were hundreds of objec-
tions, all of which were disregarded without any serious explanation. Many experts
(architects, urbanists, sociologists, economists, etc.) and activists warned of the det-
rimental social, economic and urbanistic consequences of the Belgrade Waterfront
The Role of the Civil Sector in the Urban Transformation of the Savamala Neighbourhood | 213
The aim of this chapter is to analyse civil sector activities and to exam-
ine their role in the urban transformation of Savamala. This needs to be put
in the context of the postsocialist transformation of Belgrade after 2000, a
period marked by the unblocking of transition, consolidation of the market
economy and multiparty parliamentary democracy and gradual incorpora-
tion of the country into the global economy. Belgrade as a city has been
coping ever since with the difficulties of adapting its socialist legacy to the
new capitalist system. The process of Savamala’s urban transformation is an
example of the implementation of Western patterns of urban development
but in a specific socio-economic, political and cultural context.
The Role of Culture in the Transformation of Cities:

Culture as a new driver of city economies
In contemporary, postmodern societies, culture has been redefined as
a resource and has been increasingly used as the means for resolving both
political and socio-economic problems, including those of the city (Miles
& Paddison, 2005: 834). The instrumentalization of arts and culture as a
means of urban revitalization began with large-scale and flagship projects
but then moved to policy aimed at creating spaces, quarters4 and milieus
for cultural production and creativity5 (Mommaas, 2004: 507–508). Lo-
cal authorities are increasingly supporting and fostering creativity and
cultural clustering as an instrument of economic development that offers
employment opportunities and induces changes to the image of an area or
neighbourhood (Gainza, 2017:954–956).
Cultural clustering has been criticized mostly for inducing gentri-
fication. Depending on the type of actors who initiate gentrification, it is
possible to distinguish between pioneer gentrification (artists), private-led
gentrification (entrepreneurs, investors and construction companies) and
state-led gentrification (public sector). Artists (gentrification “pioneers”)6
project. In addition, a series of protests were organised in Belgrade to oppose the

project, however the government has ignored all critical voices.
4 Cultural districts emerge in inner city areas, often centring on the large stock of der-
elict post-industrial sites, attractive to artists and creative entrepreneurs who re-use
and adapt them according to their specific needs and tastes.
5 A mixture of cultural functions and activities are grouped together in various spatial
forms. Along with purely artistic and cultural activities, they also incorporate multi-
ple leisure and entertainment elements.
6 They are in a specific position due to the fact that they have high levels of cultural
and low levels of economic capital, so they are attracted to dilapidated city areas both
for practical (low rents and the availability of large, abandoned spaces that can be
used for studios) and aesthetic reasons.
214 | Selena Lazić
initiate gentrification by physically transforming the neighbourhood and

offering a lifestyle attractive to more affluent members of the middle class.
In the next stage of private-led gentrification, capital follows the artists into
gentrified localities, commodifying its cultural assets and displacing local
residents and even the pioneers themselves. Alongside this process, new
cultural industries and boutiques are opening up and the neighbourhood
is marked as “safe” for commercial investment that will eventually upgrade
services and raise rents (Zukin & Braslow, 2011; Cameron & Coaffee, 2005;
Gainza, 2017) (see more in the chapter by Vera Backović in this volume).
The temporary use of space7 has also become a major urban trend,
increasingly attracting popular, policy and academic attention. It is cel-
ebrated as a catalyst for change and a progressive force giving local com-
munities and activists a stronger place as participants in urban trans-
formation (Madinapour, 2018:1094). Temporary use developments in
derelict sites can be defined as a set of practices with short-term returns,
developed in a context of economic, urban and political disorder in a
more or less unplanned manner. Temporary uses are spurred by weak
planning, defined by its complex, fluid, flexible and permissive charac-
ter, typical stemming from a context of crisis and disorder in the econ-
omy, the city and in the land use and development process – such as
in the postsocialist period in Belgrade. Weak planning is characterised
by lack of co-ordination, strategic guidelines, clear objectives and con-
trol by any higher authority. Temporary occupants, for a short period of
time, obtain the power and ability to shape the space. Weak planning is
opposed to master-planning which relates to the process of designing
and implementing a development vision for the site and beyond. Mas-
ter-planning involves an entrepreneurial approach in which the power
of place-making has been reattributed to key decision-makers, particu-
larly developers (Andres, 2013: 759–763).
Contextual Framework: The postsocialist

transformation of Belgrade
The postsocialist period in Belgrade is characterized by a chaotic
development pattern generated by the retreat of central authorities, the
appearance of a multitude of new players, as well as uncritical implemen-
7 The most typical types of temporary use programmes for urban residual areas are
related to youth culture (e.g. music, clubbing etc.), the art world, leisure/sports, start-
up businesses, alternative cultures, migrant cultures, social services or flea markets/
car boot sales (Oswalt et al., 2013).
tation of western development models. After the fall of socialism, a dom-

inant impact in city development came from the political and economic
elite, as opposed to the general population as users of the city and carri-
ers of expert knowledge, whose autonomy receded substantially8. Urban
plans are often adopted or amended to suit the initiatives of investors,
by applying non-transparent procedures and also quite frequent corrupt
practices. These circumstances, in which politicians retain more power
than they are entitled to and where investors’ private interests dominate
in shaping city-planning policy is called “investor-led urbanism” (Vujović
& Petrović, 2006: 172–173). Postsocialist city governments are adopting
entrepreneurial strategies but these are characterised by favouring eco-
nomic actors and non-transparent decision-making processes (Petrović,
2009:65). Civic participation in decision-making on Belgrade’s socio-spa-
tial development is also on a very low level and it is reduced to “public
insight” into already completed planning documents, thus representing
a pure formality. In addition, civic initiatives on urban requirements are
sparse and isolated cases9.
It has been recognized that after 2000 the planning system and
planning practice in Serbia suffer from the so-called “democratic defi-
cit” syndrome and fail to introduce a more strategic mode of develop-
ment guidance and control, thus chaotic decision-making predominates
(Vujosevic, 2010). An underdeveloped urban development strategy (ad
hoc decision-making and a reactive approach), together with insuffi-
cient national and local funding, results in an uncertain fate for various
city locations, especially those that have not attracted strong economic
actors – i.e. investors. Also, a large number of locations remain unused
or derelict for a long period of time, due to unsuccessfully implemented
privatization processes, delayed restructuring of state-owned enter-
prises, the owners’ financial difficulties, etc. In such circumstances,
those locations may attract other actors who require space the for ac-
8 Although during socialism the impact of political decision on spatial and urban
planning was huge, the position of experts was more favourable, given that planning
was considered a very important social function (Čaldarović & Šarinić, 2008: 373;
Vujović, Petrović, in: Stanilov, 2007:374).
9 These are usually merely reactive, situational initiatives, following the tradition of
how middle-class residents organise themselves in the West. Called NIMBY (Not in
My Back Yard) initiatives, which endeavour to preserve their existing privileges and
quality of life, often by preventing or opposing new undesirable developments or res-
idents in their immediate vicinity (Lazić, 2010: 40). Proactive initiatives in Belgrade
are rare but important. An example is the NGO the Ministry of Space, founded in
2011, which focuses its activities on research of urban development, cultural practic-
es and city interventions, https://www.facebook.com/MinistarstvoProstora/, accessed
20/11/2016.
216 | Selena Lazić
commodation of their own needs, like small entrepreneurs, non-profit

organisations, activists, artists, etc., which is exactly what happened in
Savamala. Due to the lack of clear strategy and plan for its urban de-
velopment and the absence of the interests of powerful investors, urban
transformation of this neighbourhood began as the result of various
civil sector initiatives.
This neighbourhood, which entered the 21st century as a run-down,
neglected area, can be characterised as a “soft” location for urban revi-
talisation (Marcuse & Van Kempeen, 2000), that offers opportunities for
functional conversion – introducing new, more productive and/or more
profitable uses10. To understand what makes Savamala “soft” as a loca-
tion, we should briefly turn to its historical development. The period
of intensive social and economic development of this district includes
the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century when
it emerged as the commercial hub of Belgrade, as well as the centre of
its social and cultural life. This was facilitated by its favourable posi-
tion along the right bank of the Sava river where Belgrade’s first docks
and customs house were located. During this period, notable residential
buildings11, trade and banking facilities, hotels, taverns, etc. were built,
as was the main railway station and the accompanying railroads. Dur-
ing the First World War, many buildings were destroyed and more still
were looted, followed by two more rounds of bombardment during the
Second World War (Dulović, 2015:6). After the Second World War, in
accordance with a new socialist model of urban development, the focus
was shifted to the development and construction of other locations and
activities (industrial development, construction of large residential ar-
eas, etc.), while the historical cores of city were not of great importance
to the socialist authorities. The main bus station was built in Savamala
in 1966 which, together with the heavy traffic that flowed through the
quarter, gave this area the character of a busy transit hub. Due to the
noise and pollution, the quality of life in the area decreased dramatically.
In the postsocialist period, Savamala is undergoing a re-evaluation as a
specific cultural and historical entity of great architectural and atmos-
pheric value, attracting various local and international organisations and
cultural entrepreneurs.
10 As well as other postsocialist cities, Belgrade has a lot of “soft” locations due to the
“under-urbanization” (Szelenyi, 2006) inherited from socialist period, which makes a
valuable space resource.
11 Many of them are protected by law as cultural assets and some as cultural assets of
great importance.
The Role of the Civil sector in

the Urban Transformation of Savamala
Actors and Activities
Several actors initiated activities and projects that have transformed
Savamala’s spaces: the Second Scene platform12, the civil associations Cul-
tural Front13 and Mikser14 and the local branch of the German cultural
organization, the Goethe Institute15. Second Scene is a platform that has
long argued for the development of an alternative cultural centre in Bel-
grade and eventually came to an agreement with city authorities in 2007.
As the formal owner of a derelict warehouse that previously belonged to
the publishing company Nolit in Kraljevića Marka Street in Savamala, the
city authorities allowed Second Scene to use this space, via an intermedi-
ary – city of Belgrade’s cultural institution, the Youth Centre. Warehouse
in Kraljevića Marka (MKM) was the first case of the functional conversion
of space in Savamala. It operated as a cultural centre for non-institutional
production in the field of culture and contemporary art, but the legal sta-
tus of this space remained unregulated even 11 years since its formation.
In 2009, Cultural Front and the Felix Meritis Foundation from Amster-
dam, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and
the Belgrade Municipality of Savski Venac, founded the European Cen-
tre for Culture and Debate: CITY16 in one of the dilapidated warehouses
in Braće Krsmanović Street. From its opening until today, this cultural
centre organises various activities such as exhibitions, concerts, debates,
conferences and workshops. The Mikser association has initiated sever-
al projects in the Savamala neighbourhood: the Mikser Festival, Mikser
12 Second Scene is a platform that gathers autonomous formal organizations, informal

groups and individuals active in the contemporary art, theory, culture, media and
activism scenes in Belgrade.
13 The Cultural Front civic association was founded in 2000 with a focus on pro-
grammes in the field of contemporary art, design, cultural policy, literature and inter-
national cooperation. Among the most important projects of this association are the
Cross Radio regional network (2001–2006), the Refract Festival (2002–2011), Take-
Away Fashion (2005-today), the Belgrade of Lights Festival (2008–2011), Forum Bel-
grade – A Soul for Europe (2007-today), as well as the everyday programme of KC
Grad from 2009 until today.
14 The Mikser association was founded in 2002 with the goal of promoting creative
production.
15 The Goethe Institute is the international cultural institute of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many that promotes knowledge of the German language abroad and also initiates and
supports a wide variety of cultural projects, including those that address urban issues.
16 http://www.gradbeograd.eu/info.php, accessed 20/01/2017.
218 | Selena Lazić
House and humanitarian centre called Miksalište. The Multimedia Mikser

festival, first held in Savamala in 201217, was promoted as “the largest re-
gional festival of creativity and innovation” and had a key role in attract-
ing public attention to Savamala. The Mikser festival included exhibitions,
an arts market, a rich musical programme performed on several stages in
the streets and buildings in Savamala, as well as educational programmes
and temporary artistic installations18. In 2013, the initiators of the Mikser
festival founded a centre called Mikser House19 in one of the derelict struc-
tures in the very heart of Savamala and renovated for that purpose20. Mik-
ser also initiated a project Miksalište in 2015 – a humanitarian centre for
helping refugees and migrants in Savamala. The Urban Incubator Project:
Belgrade (UIB) initiated and financed by the Goethe Institute in Belgrade
and supported by the Belgrade Municipality of Savski Venac was launched
in March 2013. There was a competition for projects and the winners were
invited to work in Savamala from March through November 2013. Partici-
pants included architects, artists, theorists, political scientists and scholars
from the fields of architecture, design and cultural studies. The majority of
the projects were international but some were proposed by local actors or
included cooperation with them. UIB projects involved various forms of
exploration and/or experimentation in the Savamala neighbourhood with
the aim of testing the possibilities of its “bottom-up” urban transforma-
tion and offering alternative models for its future development that would,
to a greater or lesser extent, also include local residents. After the end of
its initial year, there was a conference where the results of the project were
presented and evaluated and the future of the project was debated. Several
international project-teams within UIB wanted to continue their work,
so the Urban Incubator Association was founded in April 2014, also sup-
ported by Goethe Institute, and which carried out more projects in Sava-
mala21. The focus of the project in this period shifted towards including
17 In the two previous years the festival was held in the derelict industrial complex of
Žitomlin, situated in an industrial zone at the opposite end of the city, albeit also on
the riverbank and in approximately equidistant from the city centre.
18 The Mikser Festival was held once a year in Savamala from 2012 until 2016.
19 On its official website, Mikser House was presented as a “new concept of [a] cultural
institution that brings together cultural, educational as well as commercial activities
in a multifunctional space created via creative transformation of an abandoned ware-
house”, http://house.mikser.rs/o-nama/, accessed 20/11/2016.
20 Mikser House was closed in the beginning of 2017.
21 For example, after the pavilion in the Spanish House was disassembled in 2014, the
building was turned into an urban garden called Zdravamala. In 2015 the School of
urban practices project took collaborative residency in the Spanish House and used
the building as an open, participative space for action and made it accessible to out-
side parties. In late 2015, the Goethe Institute Belgrade lost permission to use the
more local projects. However, financial support decreased dramatically,

due to Goethe Institute policy, which forbids the same project receiving
a large amount of money two years in a row. Some of the project teams
found ways to continue their work whereas others simply ceased to exist.
The civil associations Mikser and Cultural Front as well as the Ur-
ban Incubator Association that evolved from the project, are a mixture of
professional22 and participative23 type of organisations. Members of these
associations are highly educated individuals (and sometimes students),
mainly from the fields of architecture, urbanism, the arts and social sci-
ences. They often have a rich expert experience and skills necessary for
accessing funds and implementing projects. Local residents are not mem-
bers of these organisations, nor have they moved on from their local prob-
lems and needs.
Motives and Goals

An important difference between the civil sector organisations active
in Savamala relates to their motives for settling in this area. On the one
hand, there are those who were looking for available space to accommo-
date their activities and by chance found such space in Savamala (MKM
and the European Centre for Culture and Debate: CITY 24). On the other
hand, there were those who wanted to actively engage in the process of Sa-
vamala’s urban transformation (Mikser and UIB). The explicit, declarative
goal of the Mikser organisation was precisely the revival of Savamala and
its transformation into a creative district. The organizers of the Mikser
Festival had identified the specific “spirit” of this neighbourhood and its
cultural and historical identity as the key characteristics that drove them
to this part of the city. This is in tune with current concepts of develop-
ment where, in the quest for comparative advantage, local distinctiveness
building. Since the beginning of the 2016 the building stands abandoned and empty
once again.
22 Professional organizations are managed by a steering committee, they have employed
staff, they are financed through sponsorship by third parties and members are mostly
part of the “new middle class”.
23 Participative organizations develop as a reaction by citizens who are directly affected
by a given problem, their topics are local, they are financed from their members’
personal incomes and members make decisions together, democratically.
24 In an interview for the www.casopiskus.rs, Ljudmila Stratimirović, a co-founder of
this cultural centre, in an interview for the www.casopiskus.rs says: “We didn’t really
target Savamala. It was important that the space suits our needs. That neighbourhood
was probably uninteresting for everyone else, but for us it was interesting because it
was near the river, close to the city centre and didn’t accommodate any other cultural
content”.
220 | Selena Lazić
and authenticity stand out more and more. This also includes the use of
cultural and historical heritage as a resource, as well as engaging in its
revaluation and redesign. It is the revaluation and the bringing of this
heritage up-to-date that Mikser’s project of urban regeneration of Sava-
mala had strived to accomplish, simultaneously rebranding this part of the
city as a creative, dynamic neighbourhood, attractive for entertainment,
consumption and leisure. Mikser aimed to position itself as the key ac-
tor of Savamala’s transformation and advocated for partnership with the
public and corporate sectors in this process. Mikser’s representatives also
advocated for public-private partnership in the sphere of culture and for a
new cultural strategy that would acknowledge the effort and importance
of “private cultural institutions” such as Mikser House. According to the
official website of the project, the objectives of the UIB were to:
“[...] improve the quality of life of local residents, arguing strongly in
favour of a city on a human scale, and to encourage the residents of
Savamala to take charge of their quarter. It is the quarter’s cultural and
social values that should have driven Savamala’s re-vitalization, rather
than commercial and real-estate business interests25“.
The project coordinator of UIB stated26, however, that the use of
the expression “urban revitalisation” was partly motivated by the need to
gaining public support for the project and that the actual idea was to give
an incentive to the local initiative and the existing cultural content of Sa-
vamala.
Spatial and Financial Resources

Spaces for civil sector initiatives in Savamala were mostly provided
by the local government, primarily the Municipality of Savski Venac.
However, this collaboration didn’t always run smoothly. The example
of MKM reveals that the willingness of city authorities to support these
initiatives was inconsistent and discontinuous. The independent cultural
scene was supposed to get access to a spatial complex in Kraljevića Marka
Street (numbers 4, 6 and 8) to establish an alternative cultural centre but
the city of Belgrade’s cultural institution, Youth Centre, was appointed as
an administrator of this space and never signed any contracts with or-
ganisations from this scene, so the Warehouse in Kraljevića Marka still
functions in an un-regulated manner. At the end of 2014, Youth Centre
ordered organisations from MKM to move out but the eviction was pre-
25 http://urbanincubator.rs/portfolio-item/about/, accessed 25/06/2018.

26 An interview conducted in August 2018.
vented thanks to the Independent Cultural Scene of Serbia Association27

that has run MKM ever since. Another attempt of eviction in 2016 was
also prevented, with the help of numerous artists, cultural workers, public
figures and citizens.
By making direct agreements, the Municipality of Savski Venac grant-
ed the use of an old hardwood floor storage facility on Braće Krsmanović
Street to the European Centre for Culture and Debate: CITY, and also
provided five locations in Savamala for the Urban Incubator Project, the
most significant being: The Spanish House on Braće Krsmanović Street
and premises at number 8 Kraljevića Marka Street (KM8)28. Interestingly
enough, in 2007, these premises were meant for organisations active in
MKM, but in 2013, the Belgrade Youth Centre granted use of them to the
Goethe Institute, which took upon itself to fix them up and make them
usable, i.e. to repair them and to cover all the service costs (electricity, in-
ternet and maintenance). Their contract terminated in late 2016 and since
then the space has been used by the Probate Gallery (Ostavinska galerija)
and the Bike Kitchen29.
When it comes to financial resources, the European Centre for Culture
and Debate: CITY and Mikser are recognised as having an unclear and non-
transparent funding structure – they receive some public funding but they
are also partly profit oriented – they incorporate profitable services such as
cafés and bars, shopping areas, concerts and other lucrative events and ac-
tivities (Cvetinović et al., 2016: 19). KC Grad ensured funding for the first
three years of their operation via the MATRA programme of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and later continued to finance their
operations with some support from the Municipality of Savski Venac. The
Mikser Festival had a large number of sponsors, which, apart from some big
companies and Serbian media also included public enterprises and the city
administration, as well as foreign contributors, whereas Mikser House was a
private enterprise that financed itself. The UIB project was financed by the
Goethe Institute, but it also received some funding from the EU through
different projects such as Youth in Action.
27 The Independent Cultural Scene of Serbia was founded in 2011 and 53 organisa-
tions from 15 towns and cities in Serbia are its members (http://nezavisnakultura.net/
misija-i-ciljevi/, accessed 25/06/2018.)
28 Other locations were Number 5 Crnogorska Street for the School of Urban Practices
and City-Guerilla Platform Projects, number 3 Svetozara Radića Street for the Bureau
Savamala (later the Streets for Cyclists NGO), a small basement shop at number 2
Gavrila Principa for the Next Savamala Project, and the old Steamship Župa on the
Sava.
29 More in: Knežević-Strika et al. (2017) The Magazine Cultural Centre on Kraljevića
Marka Street, Belgrade: Independent Cultural Scene of Serbia Association.
222 | Selena Lazić
Communication and Cooperation

Cooperation with local authorities, especially with the Municipality
of Savski Venac and its importance for the projects in Savamala has al-
ready been stressed several times in this chapter. The municipality recog-
nised the importance and benefits of such initiatives for the development
and branding of Savamala and provided them with space to accommo-
date their activities as well as some financial support. The UIB project was
publicly supported by the former Belgrade mayor, Dejan Vasović, who an-
nounced this project as a new model for planning and development in
Belgrade. Of all the analysed actors, Mikser cooperated the most with the
public sector, among others with the Touristic Organisation of Belgrade,
the Chamber of Commerce of Serbia in Brussels and the Serbian Embassy
in Belgium30.
When it comes to cooperation between these organisations and pro-
jects, it is mainly characterised by mutual support – technical, organisa-
tional and declarative, especially between Mikser and UIB31. However,
one of the UIB’s projects, Bureau Savamala was critical toward Mikser’s
activities, interpreting them as commercial and focused on narrow per-
sonal interests, rather than the well-being of residents. The participation
of the same individuals in different projects is also indicative of their mu-
tual cooperation and similar goals. For example, architect Dr Ivan Kucina
was a member of the artistic board of the UIB project as well as a pro-
gramme director of the Mikser Festival, and Dejan Ubović, a co-founder
of the European Centre for Culture and Debate: CITY was also a member
of the artistic board of the UIB.
In most cases, local residents were not active participants in civil sec-
tor initiatives in Savamala and were mostly involved as visitors of various
programmes and activities. However, two UIB projects explicitly aimed
to engage Savamala residents. In the Next Savamala project, children,
students and adults from Savamala developed several visions and ideas
and set the framework for its future development. Five different scenarios
were discussed at several workshops and meetings with local communi-
30 In Brussels in 2013 the Mikser Festival participated with a project called Serbia in
Redesign: Mixer & Guests, initiated by the director of the Serbian Chamber of Com-
merce representative office in Brussels, wishing to “present to the European public
an [sic] authentic creative potential of Serbia and the values it has and offers”, source:
https://www.blic.rs/kultura/vesti/mikser-u-briselu-krajem-januara/654kjjd, accessed
20/06/2018.
31 As an example, The Model for Savamala project was displayed in Mikser House,
along with accompanying programmes such as expert guidance through the exhibi-
tion and debates with Savamala residents about the future of the quarter.
ties, stakeholders and government officials32. An exhibition of The Citi-

zens’ Vision of Savamala 2030 was organized in the C5 exhibition space
to encourage locals and the broader public to discuss, comment and give
feedback on the presented scenarios. The outcome of the project was a
book, “The Citizens’ Vision of Savamala 2030”, that was presented to of-
ficial institutions and governmental officials of the City of Belgrade33. The
C5 project stands out as an example of failed participation. The idea was
to include residents in the activity of transforming their courtyard into
a common space. However, some residents refused to participate and a
group of residents even managed to organize a petition that was delivered
to the president of the municipality in which they asked to be left alone34.
This indicates some mistrust and scepticism among Savamala’s residents
towards civil sector initiatives. NGOs may have been perceived as outsid-
ers trying to impose their own visions and ideas in Savamala without con-
sidering the actual needs and problems of its residents. This lack of trust
and cooperation between the civil sector and local residents significantly
weakened the potential for “bottom-up” urban transformation.
The Belgrade Waterfront project brought powerful new actors and
new dynamics into the process of socio-spatial transformation of the Sava
waterfront. In 2014 Mikser and UIB representatives talked to the Tanjug
news agency about the necessity of modifying their projects and adapting
to the new context of the Belgrade Waterfront project and they expressed
the belief that the other side will recognise their efforts and appreciate
their initiatives. They emphasized the importance of initiating a dialogue
with representatives of the Belgrade Waterfront project in order to syn-
chronise their goals and establish cooperation. On the same occasion, the
deputy of the president of the Municipality of Savski Venac also spoke
about the uncertain fate of existing projects in Savamala. He said that al-
though it would be useful that the municipality mediates between the two
parties, this still is not possible since there are no formal mechanisms for
that35. Evidently, the dialogue between organisations and projects in Sa-
vamala and the representatives of the Belgrade Waterfront project never
took place. In January 2015 a press release36 was issued by Savamala’s crea-
32 During soup kitchen meetings of the Savamala Community in the spring of 2014,
during the Mixer Festival in June 2014, as well as during a meeting with the Critical
Mass Belgrade movement.
33 http://urbanincubator.rs/portfolio-item/nextsavamala/, accessed 25/06/2018.
34 http://urbanincubator.rs/portfolio-item/school-of-urban-practices/, accessed 25/06/2018.
35 https://www.b92.net/kultura/vesti.php?nav_category=1087&yyyy=2014&mm=12&d
d=27&nav_id=941134, accessed 20/06/2018.
36 They were protesting against the “unannounced and semi-illegal visits of the Belgrade
Waterfront representatives who [were] measuring apartments, galleries, restaurants,
cultural centres with vague explanations about the reasons for that”, source:http://
224 | Selena Lazić
tive entrepreneurs (including Mikser and the European Centre for Culture
and Debate: CITY37) and the local Association of Savamala-lovers who
called for a meeting with the Mayor of Belgrade in order to be informed
about the real plans for the area. After this release, no further action was
taken, neither collective nor individual. The process of socio-spatial trans-
formation of the Sava riverbank continued under the complete dominance
of political and economic actors, excluding all other stakeholders.
Concluding Remarks
The concentration of numerous small-scale cultural projects in a rela-
tively short period of time in Savamala gave the impression that an alterna-
tive model of its bottom-up urban transformation might evolve. However,
these activities were supported by municipal and city authorities as a tem-
porary solution for the neighbourhood’s problems in the context of weak
planning. They offered an opportunity for public authorities to avoid the
image of decline and for creative entrepreneurs to access low-cost space.
However, they were never implemented in strategic planning documents,
thus their effects were small in scope. The capacities of the civil sector
for the urban transformation of Savamala were low and to a large extent
dependent on political will and support as well as on short-term project
funding. At the moment when the government found a strong partner in-
terested in investing a large sum of money in the waterfront area, civil
sector initiatives lost their impetus. The most noticeable changes that can
relate to civil sector initiatives in Savamala from 2012 to 2015 refer to its
re-branding and commodification. The initiatives analysed herein, sup-
ported by local and foreign38 media, have attracted the attention of local
entrepreneurs to this part of the city, thus during this period there has
been a huge increase in the numbers of cafés, bars, clubs, snack shops and
hostels, while the hardware stores and tire-fitters once typical of Savama-
la have nearly all disappeared39. New offerings attracted mostly younger
and more affluent middle-class citizens and tourists rather than Savama-
www.seebiz.eu/udruzenje-savamalaca-protestuje-zbog-uznemiravanja-stanovnika-
savamale/ar-104248/, accessed 21/06/2018
37 The release was also signed by owners of cafés and clubs Mladost, Ludost, Radost,
Ben Akiba, Brankow, Čorba Cafe, Berliner, Tranzit, Dvorištance, Prohibicija, Cafe
SFRJ, Concept Bar Zavod and the galleries Štab and 12HUB.
38 Among other media, American TV channel CNN, American magazine Business In-
sider and British daily newspaper The Guardian reported about the urban transfor-
mation of Savamala and the role of the Mikser Festival and Mikser House in this
process.
39 For more details, see: Krusche, J. & Klaus, P. (eds.) (2015).
la residents. During this period Savamala has not been affected by large
real estate investments and its existing building stock mostly remained
unchanged. In addition, having in mind that artists and creatives are not
permanently residing in this area and that there was no displacement of
existing residents through an influx of higher-income individuals40, it can
be argued that the civil sector actors did not initiate gentrification.
The announcement of the Belgrade Waterfront project marked the
beginning of a new phase where weak planning was replaced by master-
planning and the power of place-making was reattributed to key decision-
makers – national and local government and an international investor. It
is difficult to predict the future outlook of the Savamala neighbourhood,
having in mind that the details of the forthcoming phases of the project
are not known and that no new plans regulating this area were adopted.
Changes caused by the Belgrade Waterfront project in Savamala so far in-
cluded the renovation of the Belgrade Credit Union building as a space
for the promotion of the project41, demolition of several structures in Sa-
vamala, including the Dvorištance Club (2015) and Miksalište (2016)42,
renovation and illumination of the façades on one of the main streets in
Savamala, Karađorđeva. All of this has improved the area aesthetically,
enhancing its (symbolic) value, marking it as an appealing place for lei-
sure and consumption and certainly for further private sector investment.
In 2018, the famous Bristol Hotel was closed, which was just one of the
buildings in the Savamala area that was passed to the Belgrade Waterfront
Company for management after undergoing renovation. The most im-
portant changes so far are related to clearing the land for new construc-
tion, thus the existing railway infrastructure was removed from the area
and the main railway station was relocated in June 2018. Belgrade’s main
coach station is also to be relocated from Savamala. This huge infrastruc-
ture presented one of the most serious obstacles that was cutting the link
between Belgrade’s city centre and its rivers43. However, the Belgrade Wa-
terfront project usurped the Sava riverbank in a different way, with large
buildings44 inappropriate for this part of the city and functions that do
not take into account the actual needs of Belgrade citizens nor any aspects
of the local context. Evidently, over time the Savamala neighbourhood
became incorporated into the Belgrade Waterfront project of private-led
40 Having in mind that most Savamala residents own their flats, their displacement con-
tinues to remain unlikely.
41 In 2016, a posh 1905 Salon restaurant was also opened in this building.
42 Miksalište was reopened on another location, also in Savamala, in Gavrila Principa Street.
43 For a detailed analysis, see: Vuksanović Macura, Z. (2015).
44 Until now, two residential buildings have been completed and a few others are under
construction, as is a large shopping mall.
226 | Selena Lazić
gentrification and its character has changed, pushing the civil sector ini-
tiatives out and nullifying the cultural infrastructure that had been built
by them.
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| 229
BRUSHING OVER URBAN SPACE:

BETWEEN THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE RIGHT TO THE CITY AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF THE NEOLIBERAL
MODEL THROUGH THE EXAMPLE OF
BELGRADE MURALS AND GRAFFITI*
Marina Čabrilo
Abstract: This chapter deals with the practice of painting murals and graffiti in
the context of the contemporary city – here the chosen example is Belgrade. The
analysis of painting in urban space is approached from the theoretical perspective
of French sociologist and philosopher, Henri Lefebvre. The basic question the paper
seeks to address is: bearing in mind the specific context of Belgrade, is the practice
of painting murals and graffiti a form of struggle for the right to the city or is it a
means for the reproduction of the neoliberal model of the production of space?
The research was conducted using the method of the structured interview. The
research was carried out in September 2018, when interviews were conducted
with 21 graffiti artists from Belgrade. The findings of the research indicate how
bounded this practice is by the two different systems of functioning of the con-
temporary city. It emerged that there exists, among the interviewees, a shared
awareness of certain social issues, which they incorporate into the messages that
they directly or indirectly send out through their work. Accordingly, the findings
indicate that, on the one hand, the act of painting murals or graffiti is a response
by the artists to the existing representation of space and that, as such, it contains a
certain potential for change in service of the right to the city. On the other hand,
however, this practice has adapted to the laws of the neoliberal model of the pro-
duction of space and, in the subjective assessment of the respondents, it can be a
career and the artist’s main source of income.
Keywords: neoliberalism, the city, urban, Lefebvre, right to the city, production
of space, the practice of painting, graffiti
* This article was developed from a Bachelor thesis entitled, “Grafiti i ulična umetnost:
crtanje kao borba za pravo na grad ili kao sredstvo reprodukovanja neoliberalne ma-
trice u proizvodnji prostora?”, and presented at the Department of Sociology in 2018.
Introduction
The starting point of this paper is the understanding that cities repre-
sent a particular framework for the manifestation of social relations. So-
cial actors, in constant interaction with the space around them, shape it by
assigning it new material and symbolic properties. The research focused
on the practice of painting murals and graffiti, which was approached
as a practice of marking space. Hence the aim was to explore the extent
to which the artists’ impact public space, as well as the interactions be-
tween them. The main aim was to examine the degree to which this kind
of painting is part of the struggle for the right to the city. The analysis
relies on the theoretical approach of French sociologist and neo-Marxist
philosopher, Henri Lefebvre, and his concepts: the city and the urban,
spatial practice, representation of space and spaces of representation, the
production of space and the right to the city. In that sense, painting in
urban space is approached as a practice that emerged as the result of ac-
tion, as the result of attempts by social actors to realise and express their
identity and the possibility of participating in the change of public space
that belongs to them as residents of the city. However, the intrusion into
and conquest of urban space by neoliberal capitalism opens up the poten-
tial for painting to fall into the service of profit, which somewhat dulls its
critical edge. The spatial locus of this research is the central urban core of
Belgrade, which provides a highly specific context, given the background
of its postsocialist transformation.
How Urban Space is Understood

in the Theory of Henri Lefebvre
A multitude of social processes and relationships collide and inter-
act in the city, further shaping its reality. The socio-historical context is
the main factor in understanding the changing characteristics of cities be-
cause, “every space contains within itself traces of its predecessors and is
preparing anew for those who are coming, creating the complex historical
geography of various social spaces” (Borden et al., 2002: 6). The key aspect
of that dialectical understanding is the transformation of the city’s identity
and urban identity (Grbin, 2013: 476). Lefebvre saw the industrial revolu-
tion as the main milestone in that process. “The domination of the econ-
omy by industrial capital forced economic planning to incorporate into
itself planning of the production of space, thus the means of producing
Brushing over Urban Space: Between the Struggle for the Right to the City... | 231
material spatial forms became industrialised and new urban spaces be-
came industrial products. From the production of objects in space, there
emerged the all-encompassing production of space itself ” (Grbin, 2013:
476). This means also that with the industrial revolution the use value that
had been the basis of cities until that time was replaced by exchange value
and suppressed by the forces of commodification and surplus production.
Nevertheless, Lefebvre continues to consider use value to be necessary for
urbanisation to be complete and deems socialist production of space to
be the only way for use value to overcome exchange value and, in so do-
ing, to ensure the more equitable participation of all social groups in that
process. Such production would have to ensure the appropriation of space
and make use value accessible to all users (workers), while urban space
must be a place for meetings, play and a varied cultural and social life
(Vujović & Petrović, 2005: 39). It is important to understand the concept
of the production of space itself. Urban space contains within itself the
assumptions of the dominant ideological system – in this case capitalism
– that are incorporated into each of its segments. The architecture and
spatial planning of urban space shapes and organises it so that it can fur-
ther replicate the capitalist system. All of which results in processes of the
homogenisation, fragmentation and hierarchization of space (Lefebvre,
1996: 212).
Homogenisation implies that, by adapting to market principles, cities
become similar to one another, both materially and in terms of overall
social life. Even though cities vary on the basis of territorial capital and lo-
cal specificities, their basic structure and their production and purposing
of space are elements that contribute to their homogeneity. Fragmentation
is a process that involves the establishment of boundaries between space
intended for living, work, leisure, production, consumption, traffic, and
so forth, which breaks up space and reproduces it in fragments that differ
according to their function and the social groups that inhabit them. The
next step of capitalist domination of urban space is hierarchization, which
is reflected in the establishment of hierarchies of various spatial segments.
“Hierarchization is established among various points of space: centres of
power, wealth, leisure and information, material and spiritual exchange,
on the one hand, and the periphery, with different internal levels of hier-
archy, dependent on its distance from primary or secondary centres, all
the way to areas abandoned ‘by gods and men’ ” (Grbin, 2013: 477). Since
the 1970s, the transition to a post-Fordist model of capitalist accumulation
and the strengthening of the neoliberal economy, the points of fragmenta-
tion and hierarchization have increasingly been moving further apart. In
line with these changes, Lefebvre sees transformation in cities themselves
during a given period as follows: “the street becomes the focus of a form
of repression that was made possible by the ‘real’ – that is, weak, alien-
ated, and alienating-character of the relationships that are formed there.
Movement in the street, a communications space, is both obligatory and
repressed [...] The street became a network organized for and by consump-
tion” (Lefebvre, 1970: 20).
Lefebvre’s Triad
By distinguishing the two spheres of reality that together constitute
urban space and allow for the reproduction of social relations, living (eve-
rydayness) and urban reality, Lefebvre came upon a dual manifestation of
space: as the subject of production and as a context in which production
takes place. As the material characteristics of cities are, on the one hand,
managed by urban planners, scientists, technocrats, engineers, city author-
ities and directly or indirectly associated private sector representatives, so,
on the other hand, do real social actors use and shape space, assigning
it meaning. Accordingly, mural and graffiti artists are social actors who,
through their urban practice – i.e. painting – are able to use, modify and
assign new meaning to the urban space that belongs to them as residents
of the city. “In the street and through the space it offered, a group [...]
took shape, appeared, appropriated places, realized an appropriated space-
time. This appropriation demonstrates that use and use value can domi-
nate exchange and exchange value” (Lefebvre, 1970: 19). In order to better
understand this process, Lefebvre used three concepts that simultaneously
come to be expressed. The first is spatial practice, the link between a cer-
tain space and a given social activity. Spatial practice pertains to physical
and material flows (individuals, groups, goods), circulations, transfers and
interactions in space, structured in such a way that they maintain the ex-
isting model of reproduction of social life (Grbin, 2013: 478). The notion
of representation of space refers to the clearly conceptualised function and
properties of space defined by decision-makers: the leaders of the govern-
ment, the city authorities, scientists, engineers, technocrats, urban plan-
ners, etc. What links these actors as a group is their elevated position of
power and knowledge on the basis of which they acquire the legitimacy
to conceptualise the functions of space, which is equally their lived real-
ity, bounded on one side by dominant social patterns contained in spatial
practices and representation of space and, on the other, by the attribution
of new meanings through relevant images and symbols. Spatial represen-
tations are in themselves frequently the bearers of potential change or, at
least, the critique of dominant social conventions.
The Right to the City

Founded on Marxist principles, the idea of the right to the city is a
form of representing and fulfilling urban strategies in social totality. The
attainment of this right would mean the realisation of the urban, which
would above all imply a completely new dimension of social organisa-
tion and functioning. At the beginning of the 21st century, a number of
conventions were held that dealt with the attainment of the right to the
city, finally resulting in the 2006 constitution of the World Charter for the
Right to the City, formalising the idea and ushering it into the process of
institutionalisation as a step towards it becoming an internationally rec-
ognised human right (Grbin, 2013: 486). The basic starting point of the
idea is that all citizens make equal use of the city, therefore it is a form of
struggle for the appropriation of the city and a critique of the dominance
of the city’s exchange value over its use value. Subsumed within the aegis
of neoliberal politics, the right to the city is positioned so that it enables
the participation of citizens in urban reality – the reality that, in his triad,
Lefebvre called representation of space. The focus is, therefore, on attaining
the right to the city as part of lived reality.
The practices through which actors assign a particular meaning to
a given space can vary greatly and are always linked to the political mes-
sage being sent. In that case, “activities and spatial practices that promote
art, play, creativity and rebellion (graffiti, performance, subculture) and/or
break down the fragmentation barriers of urban space and negate the ar-
chitectural prescription of behaviour (street skateboarding, parkour, meet-
ings, protests): are the closest to Lefebvre’s original concept of the right to
the city. These activities reach deeper and further than how the urban citi-
zenry define the right to the city: beyond civic, political and social rights
(that somebody else should secure and guarantee). They are closer to the
original understanding precisely because of their insolence and directness
in appropriating urban space” (Grbin, 2013: 486). As an example of such
practices, we can highlight squatting as the occupation of space without
the permission of its owner, with the proviso that the space in question is
usually public or its ownership is unclear and is in most cases abandoned.
In the absence of an adequate way of satisfying their social, cultural, exis-
tential and other needs, squatters find their way to realising their needs in
a given building. The everyday life in the city and the bounding of frag-
mentary and designed representations of space result, on the one hand, in
numerous spatial practices of its negation and violation, on the other. In
that regard, flea markets are an interesting example of how city space can
be redefined through deviations from the formalised markets. The exist-
ence of places such as flea markets is a reflection of many aspects of con-

temporary social reality, living conditions, critiques of consumer society
and commodification, as well as the dehumanised and formalised inter-
actions of exchange. From the viewpoint of the residents of a city they
represent a means to redefine all fields of lived reality and the dialectics
between the formal and informal, between necessity and symbolic value.
Paths trodden through a green space or passages made through shrubbery
as shortcuts, the jumping of fences, etc. are also examples of adapting the
space to the needs of lived reality. Hence, the painting of murals or graf-
fiti in urban space is also part of the struggle for the right to the city. It is
important, however, to ascertain here whether that purpose of painting
prevails over its use in service of the neoliberal model of the production
of space.
Graffiti and Murals as a Means

for the Socialisation of Space
The socio-historical context for the beginning and development of
what we have today come to know as modern graffiti subculture is of-
ficially located on the streets of New York in the late sixties and early sev-
enties, with the appearance of the first tags – i.e. signatures – as a form of
individual expression by New York teenagers. “Tagging represents the first
step of a writer’s career, his/her ‘roots’, the credentials that make him/her a
writer” (Macdonald, 2001: 75). Therefore, tags, the writing of names, con-
tain the function of focusing the writer themselves as a real social actor
who communicates, speaks, diverts attention onto themselves and says, “I
am present”, “I use this city”.
In time, the masterpiece graffiti developed, requiring significantly
more time and material to complete, but representing a greater challenge
for artists with experience and the desire to stand out. The practice of
creating graffiti exhibits its power to imprint new meaning through the
element of risk and danger that goes with it. The growth of graffiti into a
genuine subculture began with writing on New York subway cars, giving
them the epithet of travelling artworks and enabling them to cover wider
urban locations. Writing on such large surfaces as subway cars involved
exposing the writers to greater risks, a fact that was highly valued within
the subculture itself.
In the late eighties the city authorities began to react to graffiti with
increasing frequency – initially simply removing graffiti-covered cars
from service, which led to the relocation of graffiti to other visible plac-
es such as highways, walls, bridges, advertising billboards, freight trains,

buses and trucks. The ubiquity of graffiti on the streets gave it a broader
presence in the public eye and already in the eighties some of the first
documentary films1 were made with the aim of exploring the percep-
tion of urban space and the practice of writing graffiti from the point of
view of the writers as the central subjects of lived reality. Moreover, they
showed the simultaneous development of this subculture and the hip-hop
scene, which was a significant urban platform for its growth. The mem-
bers of this subculture were initially mostly African-American teenagers
and teenagers from working class families. Clearly, the greatest contribu-
tion to their placement in the illegal sphere came very much from the
power structures that left them without any other free space. Graffiti came
to represent confirmation of their presence, a symbol of their existence.
The image of this spatial practice presented in the media or perceived
by the observer is most often “mindless, senseless vandalism”, due to its
impenetrable motives and meanings (Macdonald, 2001: 2). This reaction
placed the graffiti writers even deeper into the sphere of the illegal and
what is considered destructive to the community, leading to the practice
being criminalised and to attempts to eradicate it through various laws
and programmes. The arguments mainly revolve around the high costs of
removing graffiti from public areas. Laws and programmes for the eradica-
tion of graffiti are, however, generally applied selectively, favouring murals
as painting that is more socially acceptable than “ordinary” tags or graf-
fiti. Certainly, the perception that graffiti is vandalism is not in question.
However, the perception of graffiti as mindless vandalism is completely
irrelevant as – using Lefebvre’s triad as a springboard – purpose, motive
and meaning are more than imbued within the spatial practice of graffiti
writing. Graffiti frequently transforms the space handed down to us in the
form of a representation of those in power into a space for self-expression
and for imprinting meaning and symbols that defy the monopolistic con-
trol of urban space. Creating, in this way, spaces of representation.
Murals, as a form of painting, are classified into a broader category
called street art, which includes various forms of expression in urban
space. Painting for the purpose of creating street art does not exclusively
represent a subculture and a creative form of expression, but also a contri-
bution to the promotion of human communication (Zimmermann, 2005).
Paintings and performances that arise for the purpose of creating street
art are more specific and focus on certain social issues, which enables pas-
sers-by to relate to the topics with which they deal and, hence, grants them
broader social acceptance. Murals are mostly painted onto larger surfaces,
1 “Wild Style” (1982), “Style Wars” (1983)
such as the façades of buildings, and are often seen as a way of aestheti-
cizing urban space, which grants them greater legitimacy. The legalised
power to aestheticize that mural painting entails can be understood as an
attempt by those in power to redefine the meaning of the practice of paint-
ing or drawing in public space, which dulls the practice’s critical edge. By
the second half of the eighties the establishment recognised street art and
began exploiting it for profit and what had previously symbolised the street
quickly found its way into art galleries – as was the case with the work of
Jean Michel Basquiat2 and Keith Haring3. Today the situation has evolved
to the point that graffiti is used in advertising, as a means to make a place
recognisable and attractive to potential consumers.
Taking graffiti and mural artists as social actors who are not in a po-
sition of power as a starting point, the focus is on their activity and ap-
proach to their work as the practice of appropriating and socialising space.
In other words, the practice of attaining the right to the city. This notion is
in direct opposition to the purpose that is given to painting by those who
are in positions of power.
The Practice of Painting in the Context of the

Gentrification of Urban Space in Belgrade
During the process of de-industrialisation many urban sites lose their
original purpose and become characterised by degradation and ravaged
urban and living conditions, which leads to gentrification, revitalisation
and investment into physical improvements to the urban environment
becoming important strategies for the city (the functional conversion of
industrial buildings into apartments or entertainment and commercial
spaces) (Harvi, 2005). On the other hand, postmodern cities are becoming
consumer paradises overflowing with images and messages that stimulate
consumption and the reproduction of the system. The properties of rep-
resentation of space are reflected in the fact that city authorities and the
private sector identify a particular location as a space that has the poten-
tial to yield greater accumulation of capital and the realisation of surplus
value. Space adapts to the market, buildings are repurposed, they become
commercialised, which accelerates the process of gentrification. The goal
of those in power is to turn these locations into centres of entertainment
and consumption.
2 http://basquiat.com, accessed 23/08/2018.
3 https://smarthistory.org/keith-haring-subway-drawings/, accessed 23/08/2018.
Gentrification is not merely a change in function and the physical res-

toration of certain parts of the city, it is also the alteration of the social struc-
ture, focusing the interests of the middle class and enabling it to actively
participate in the use and planning of urban space. Taking a cue from Henri
Lefebvre’s thesis on the homogenisation of cities as one of the processes that
results from the reproduction of capitalism, gentrified spaces are seen as
free of classical homogenisation and more can be said of their distinctive-
ness relative to other city spaces, where the consumption of space can be
influenced through authenticity and which represent a good foundation for
the establishment and growth of the culture and tourism industries (Lefe-
bvre, 1996: 212). The agents of representation of space make key decisions
on organisation and use, on what will be visible and what will not, on how
much freedom and space will be available for spatial representation. “Con-
temporary cities owe their survival to a more abstract symbolic economy,
which is managed by ‘entrepreneurs of place’, representatives of the authori-
ties and investors, whose ability to work on ‘symbols of growth’ produces
real results in the development of real estate and new jobs” (Backović, 2015:
21). Therefore, how much space is left for the practice of painting will de-
pend on the prescribed symbolic and aesthetic criteria. Painting contributes
to the visual appearance of space, on which the image and identity of the
city depends, especially in gentrified localities where it has the function of
adapting space to the needs of the middle class.
In Belgrade’s central core we can identify several locations that are en-
capsulated by the process of gentrification and that, as such, include the
spatial practice of painting. One of them is Savamala, a quarter recognised
as a space suitable for revitalisation and urban renewal (see more in the
chapter by Selena Lazić in this volume). The streets of Savamala throng
with numerous cafés and chill zones with restored old furniture, palettes,
and an ambient that emanates the vintage, places that promote recycling,
cycling, healthy diets and so forth. The area is hemmed in by numerous
small industrial facilities and warehouses but also by older buildings from
the early twentieth century, many of which are slowly deteriorating. On
the other hand, in the vicinity is the (as of recently) former Main Railway
Station4, the Main Coach Station and the Belgrade docks, which lost their
main purpose with the coming of de-industrialisation. The urban revitali-
sation of Savamala in the context of post-industrialisation involved numer-
ous projects that brought together the private and public sectors but also,
in a sense, the third, non-governmental sector, whose representatives called
for the revival of traditional crafts, cultural production and the physical
4 https://www.danas.rs/ekonomija/zatvara-se-glavna-zeleznicka-stanica/, accessed
20/08/2018.
restoration of rundown areas, foreseeing in this way the quarter’s economic

development. In addition to the creation of jobs intended for members of
the creative class, a large number of the jobs created actually involve poorly
paid service sector work. Moreover, even as they contribute to the reviv-
ing and revitalisation of these spaces the artists are faced with a generally
unfavourable environment for cultural production in Serbia and are forced
to satisfy themselves with short-term contracts and spaces to show their
work, which they see as a possible opportunity for future progress. That
is to say, gentrification does not involve the rehabilitation or improvement
of living conditions for the residents of a given quarter, it only involves the
introduction of new, exclusionary and differing elements that yield profit
for a few. “During gentrification, the elements of the everyday life that pre-
ceded it fade away, to be replaced by attractive (Disneyfied) semi-public
space, intended for new
residents who will settle
new gated communities.
Gentrification understood
in this way – known as
profitable gentrification – is
characteristic of postsocial-
ist cities and is led by the
private sector” (Backović,
2015: 92).
One of the long-term
projects in the area was
Image 1 Mikser House, Savamala, Belgrade
the Mikser Festival and
Source: http://house.mikser.rs/ Mikser House as its ven-
ue (Images 1 & 2), which
constituted their ideas by
calling for a golden age for
Savamala – recalling the
area’s history from before
the First World War.5 The
urban advertising used by
Mikser left behind, sup-
pressed and covered up
a whole historical period
– the socialist period, a
Image 2 Murals and Mikser House (2015), time when Savamala was a
Belgrade workers’ quarter – as well
as the de-industrialisation that took place over the last two decades and
which is itself the reason so many previously industrial buildings stand
empty and ready to be part of the revival project.6
In recent years Savamala has been the subject of a much broader ur-
ban development, the luxury architectural Belgrade Waterfront project
(see more in the chapters by Vera Backović and Jorn Koelemaij and Stefan
Janković in this volume). This project is also responsible for changes to
the gentrified areas of Savamala, with many projects, galleries and cafés
dislocated to other parts of the city, especially to Dorćol. Dorćol is one of
Belgrade’s oldest and most central quarters. It is home to some of the city’s
oldest buildings, museums, galleries, schools and institutions, which gives
the area an important and
unique place both in Bel-
grade’s history and its pre-
sent. One of the more em-
blematic examples of the
gentrification of Dorćol is
an area that was formerly
the BIP Brewery in Cetin-
jska Street, nowadays often
referred to as Dorćolmala
(Image 3). It has become
one of the most popular Image 3 Picasa (2016): Polet4, Cetinjska, Belgrade
meeting places for young
people belonging to the Source: http://bellegrade.com/2016/04/25/bel-
grades-new-hotspot-cetinjska-street-15/
hipster subculture.
In the area around the aforementioned spaces there are a large num-
ber of murals and other street art mediums, which aestheticize, symbol-
ise and imbue these localities with the image that entrepreneurs have
identified as being profitable. Calls for tolerance – which is understood
as the acceptance of diversity of nationality and sexuality and gender
equality (Backović, 2015) – and messages against discrimination of all
kinds and for the protection of human rights and freedoms are present-
ed to visitors in the shape of the murals themselves. Also, the streets
of the aforementioned Belgrade neighbourhoods are awash with graffiti,
tags and alternative forms of street art behind which lie various mes-
sages and which were created as part of the struggle for the right to the
city, through the self-organisation of artists dissatisfied with the space
available to them for their personal promotion and for the unhindered
marking of space.

Method
The aim of the research was to address the question of whether the
practice of painting murals and graffiti, in the specific context of Belgrade,
is a form of struggle for the right to the city or whether it is in the service
of reproducing the neoliberal model of the production of space. The re-
search applied snowball sampling, that is the first respondents were con-
tacted on the basis of personal acquaintance and because they are well-
known artists who have worked at central Belgrade locations. They were
then asked to recommend other artists who would be interested in par-
ticipating in the research. The interviews were conducted in the second
half of September 2018. A total of 21 graffiti artists were interviewed – of
whom 19 were male and only two were female. The underrepresentation
of women in the practice of painting in public space was one of the sig-
nificant and interesting topics covered by the research. On the basis of the
gathered socio-demographic data, it emerged that the respondents were
22 to 37 years old and that most of the interviewees (18) were graduates,
two were students and one interviewee had a secondary level education.
Most respondents were in some form of employment and two declared
themselves to be unemployed. Half of the respondents worked in fields
that were in some way linked to art or painting – architecture, graphic
design, painting, illustration or street art.
Research Findings
The first set of questions put to the interlocutors pertained to the
practice of painting in public space itself and formed a kind of guide
through the personal stories of the interviewees and their development
and growth as artists. The first question read: “How long have you worked
on painting in public space?” – the answers to which ranged from 10 to
25 years, which leads to the conclusion that the practice of painting plays
an important part in the lives of the respondents. Subsequently the inter-
viewees were asked to express their subjective feelings and opinions about
painting as a practice, through the following question: “What does paint-
ing mean to you?”
“Therapy for the brain. It’s the moment when you can relax and, at the
same time, focus but you’re not thinking about anything else.” (Inter-
viewee 13, 28 yrs., male)
“The best way to express my ideas, mood, thoughts. It’s the release valve
for everyday life, an escape from reality, enjoyment and the desire to
leave something beautiful behind... [There are] many reasons why I
found myself in precisely that [activity].” (Interviewee 16, 34 yrs., male)
“The best satisfaction I can give myself without the help of someone
else.” (Interviewee 17, 24 yrs., male)
These responses represent the subjective experiences of the majority

of the interviewees, showing that they are highly attached to painting as a
social practice. For a large number of the interviewees, painting represents
a certain escape from reality and their subjective mode of dealing with the
society in which they live. On the other hand, we also encountered some
other interesting responses:
“A freedom of expression, mostly. Also, I believe that its part of human
consciousness – the marking of space and the paths along which I move
and I have a need to do that. Since ancient times humans have writ-
ten their names on things or interpreted what they saw by drawing on
walls.” (Interviewee 6, 30 yrs., male)
“Drawing is my need to beautify the environment around me.” (Inter-

viewee 12, 30 yrs., female)
The first set of responses to the question shows that the practice of
painting affects the psychological state and inner satisfaction of the artist,
while, on the other hand, the other responses show painting approached
as the link between themselves and their environment. It should be noted,
however, that in response to the question, “Do you want to send a message
with your painting?”, 10 interviewees stated that they had no intention of
sending a message.
“I never tried to send any kind of message through my work. People
subjectively experience a work and interpret it in their own way. It was
always important to me that what I do is beautiful and works in a given
environment.” (Interviewee 16, 34 yrs., male)
“No, it’s subjective, I aim for recognisability and authenticity without
a signature or any kind of message. Let’s say the message is when the
passer-by or individual understands the work in their own way.” (Inter-
viewee 21, 29 yrs., male)
Some artists do not specify a message, leaving passers-by, as their au-

dience, a degree of freedom to perceive the work in their own way. On the
other hand, more than half of the painters stated that they do aim to send
a message through their work.
The gathered respons-

es display a high degree
of analogy-making from
which it can be deduced
that the respondents have
developed an awareness of
certain social issues as well
as opinions on the existing
representation of space and
the way in which space is
today used and organised.
Image 4 Aleksandar Đorđević aka Đalek (2016): Through their work, many
Tica of the respondents seek to
Source: http://beogradskigrafiti.com highlight personal but also
social dissatisfaction, as
well as existential problems and dissatisfaction with the political situation
in Serbia and the world:
“The messages change along with my personality. They cover mostly
environmental, social topics, but recently the very beauty of existence
has also been very important to me.” (Interviewee 3, 32 yrs., male)
“Generally, the message is that public space should belong to everyone,
it should be varied, and sometimes the message can be dissatisfaction
with the conditions I live in, that the state provides.” (Interviewee 6, 30
yrs., male)
When presented with the statement, “It is important to me that peo-
ple understand the message in my work”, 7 interviewees agreed, 10 disa-
greed, while 4 said they were undecided. Half of all respondents agreed
with the statement, “It is important to me that people see the aesthetic
value of my work”, while the other half either disagreed or remained unde-
cided. On the basis of these
responses we can conclude
that the interviewees value
the aesthetic and symbolic
meaning of their work
equally even though they
are representatives of vari-
ous forms of painting in
urban space and adopt dif-
Image 5 Travnička-grafit (2016), Savamala, Belgrade ferent perspectives in their
Source: http://gayecho.com/news/beograd- interpretation.
unisten-gej-grafit/
Among members of the graffiti subculture the message is intended

for other members of the subculture and remains within its confines.
Through tags or masterpiece graffiti, painters express a strong self-con-
cept (Macdonald, 2001: 92).
Image 5 shows a once well-known Savamala mural of two figures
hugging, one of whom has rainbow coloured leggings, a recognisable sym-
bol of the LGBT community. The right-hand portion of Image 5 shows a
response to the initial message, which we can characterise as homopho-
bic. Therefore, mural and graffiti painters do often transmit messages, to
which they can receive responses from the environment, thus turning the
street into a space for communication.
In addition to graffiti whose mes-
sage is figurative, there are also works
whose message is clear and those that
can even be said to be a kind of prop-
aganda for a given idea or lifestyle. On
the streets of Belgrade, it is almost im-
possible to miss the graffiti promoting a
vegan lifestyle, ideas about animal rights
and those criticising the problem of bar-
riers that prevent the raising of environ-
mental awareness (Image 6).
The next question posed to the
interviewees aimed to broaden under-
standing of the contextualisation of spa-
tial issues and read: “How do you choose
the locations in which you work?” Be-
yond the physical state of the work sur- Image 6 Aleksandar Đorđević aka
face on which they paint, the respond- Đalek (2017), Friend Not Omelet,
ents’ key criteria for selecting a location Belgrade
was whether it is permissible to paint in Source: http://beogradskigrafiti.com
a given space:
“Without much planning, I choose mostly those work surfaces that do
not affect private property or cause problems with the authorities.” (In-
terviewee 8, 27 yrs., male)
“I choose tried and tested walls where I know I can paint legally with-
out any problems. Sometimes, if I see a wall in a good location, I try to
ask for or get permission.” (Interviewee 16, 34 yrs., male)
Three of the respondents said that they work on request. On the other
hand, some artists also took into account the visibility and accessibility
of a work surface, in the sense that they frequently choose spaces and
buildings that have been abandoned or are in a state of disrepair. Some re-
spondents who prefer painting on train carriages stated that they need to
be well organised, that a given train is “staked out” for days and that their
“operations” take place at night. Overall analysis of the responses to this
question indicates the presence of both aspects examined by this paper
among the interviewees: representation of space and the critical potential
of the practice of painting that leads to spaces of representation.
Agreement with the statement that, “It does not matter to me whether
I have permission to work” was expressed by approximately two-thirds of
respondents, while others disagreed or remained undecided. Addition-
ally, none of the interviewees agreed with the statement that, “People
who paint only when they have permission to do so are not true artists”.
It seems that, however great the distance between their opinions and at-
titudes towards space, there is a certain degree of respect among the artists
and that greater and more profound differences are actually linked more
with existing representation of space and the way in which those in power
produce and reproduce space.
The following quotation from a daily newspaper clearly illustrates
how space is produced by those in power (in this case relaying the opinion
of Belgrade City Manager, Goran Vesić): “Vesić stated that not all graffiti
is an eyesore but, unfortunately, most graffiti in Belgrade is and added
that, as well as punitive measures, educational programmes will be intro-
duced, as will places where graffiti is permitted. ‘We will launch an educa-
tional programme that will feature celebrities and actors who will explain
why this should not be done and, on the other hand, we will call on all
those who create graffiti as art to do so at certain locations. In the coming
period we will devote ourselves to murals.’ He also announced a commis-
sion that will determine what is to be considered art.”7 Moreover, many
Belgrade buildings are subject to planned artwork and artists frequently
ask a building’s residents for permission to realise their ideas.
The next set of questions concerns the perception of the practice
of painting as a career, that is, its incorporation in to today’s dominant
economic system. The first question in this section read as follows: “How
much time per week do you devote to painting in urban space?” The record-
ed responses varied, from just a few hours, through 15 hours per week, to
as much as 20 and 30 hours per week. The following two sets of responses
are important in order to better understand the difference between devot-
ing and spending a particular amount of time to the practice of painting.
In response to the statement that, “Painting is my hobby”, 11 respondents
7 http://mondo.rs/a773201/Info/Drustvo/Kazna-za-grafite-povecana-na-20.000-di-
nara.html, accessed 01/09/2018.
disagreed, while 9 agreed and only one respondent remained undecided.

As is to be expected, the respondents agreed with the following statement
at the same rate, “Painting is both my hobby and my career”, but the re-
sponses were inverted so 11 agreed, 9 disagreed and one respondent re-
mained undecided. Therefore, more than half of the interviewed artists
saw their work as a career, as their profession.
When asked whether they have ever painted for a private company
and whether they were paid for that work, all of the interviewees respond-
ed in the affirmative to both questions. Two interviewees highlighted the
fact that painting is their main source of income. Also, the respondents
confirmed that Savamala and Dorćol are the centres for painting in urban
space in Belgrade and 15 interviewees stated that they had participated in
various projects in these locations, in addition to having worked there on
their own initiative.
The breadth of importance given to murals within the creative in-
dustries can also be deduced from the existence of organised tours of the
most famous murals and other types of street art in the Savamala and
Dorćol quarters, which adds to this practice the property of market good.
In addition to the tours, it is also possible to participate in numerous
workshops where visitors are able to meet and talk with Belgrade street
artists. The prices of these activities range from 12 to 25 euros8 and can
be found exclusively on the internet and in this currency, which speaks to
an attempt to construct a global image for the city. Beyond Savamala and
Dorćol, these tours also take in the area of the former Trudbenik brick-
works, now known as Ciglana: A club for lovers of heavy industry. This
long-abandoned factory on the outskirts of Belgrade is today a space that
attracts numerous artists from various disciplines.
Responses to the question of how often and when they have been en-
gaged to paint by a private company or creative industry – and whether
they have been asked to paint something that does not give them pleasure
or the opportunity to express themselves – reveal a situation that is essen-
tially unavoidable because it takes on the form of an employer/employee
relationship and functions according to market principles. This can be
seen from the following responses:
“Generally something like that does happen. They ask for impossible
things and when they hear the price they cross themselves.” (Interview-
ee 1, 25 yrs., male)
“It is always, but always, a pleasure to take their money.” (Interviewee

13, 28 yrs., male)
8 https://putujsigurno.rs/vesti/street-art-grafiti-i-murali-beograda-dostupni-uz-street-
tours, accessed 01/09/2018.
It seems that, on the one hand, the respondents feel deprivileged

when their work is valued and transformed into economic capital. Howev-
er, considering the fact that all of the interviewees were artists with many
years of experience, they confirmed that these situations occurred more
frequently when they were just starting to create for others and that they
have, in time, learned how to incorporate the requests of clients into a
style that they have made their own. A few of the more representative re-
sponses are presented here:
“At the beginning there were more offers like that. In time and with
experience everything changes to your advantage.” (Interviewee 7, 34
yrs., female)
“It happens a lot but even in those situations I try to smuggle in my

own style.” (Interviewee 16, 34 yrs., male)
Therefore, painting in urban space has adapted to the capitalist model
of production of space, which was in a way to be expected as the artists
themselves sell their work as a source of personal income. Presented with
the statement, “I think it is possible to earn a good living from painting”,
half of the respondents agreed, one-third agreed completely, with the rest
remaining undecided. On the other hand, around half of the respondents
agreed with the statement, “It doesn’t matter to me whether I receive fi-
nancial compensation for my work”, while the rest disagreed.
Although it is established as a career, this practice is still structured in
a manner that takes into account the interviewees’ awareness of the space
in which they live and on the basis of personal interpretations of spaces
of representation – in other words, their ability to redefine that space. At-
taining the right to the city requires a given social practice and space of
representation to work together. Consequently, the last set of questions
pertained to certain social practices that have the potential to foster the
change that leads to attainment of the right to the city.
This stage of the interview began with the following statement: “Over
the past five years I have participated in a protest at least three times”, to
which 8 interviewees responded positively and were then asked to state
what motivated them to protest. The responses were grouped into the
categories of either student protests or political protests. Five of the re-
spondents confirmed that they had participated in the latest round of pro-
tests organised by Don’t Let Belgrade D(r)own to oppose to the Belgrade
Waterfront project. This initiative was itself guided by some of the basic
principles of the right to the city (more on this in the chapters by Mladen
Nikolić and Jelisaveta Petrović in this volume).
The interlocutors were

also asked about their opin-
ions of squatting (“I think
that it is justified for people
who do not have reliable
housing or space in which to
work to occupy abandoned
buildings and to adapt them
to their needs”). In response
to this statement, 17 re-
spondents said they agreed,
with the other 4 remain- Image 7 Aleksandar Đorđević aka Đalek (2017):
ing undecided. Indeed, this Patka/Beograd nije mali, Belgrade
breakdown of responses Source: http://beogradskigrafiti.com/galerija/pat-
need not be surprising. The ka-beograd-nije-mali/
practice of squatting imply
struggle against the barriers with which social actors are faced in a given rep-
resentation of space and which they endeavour to change or adapt to their
needs. In this way, this practice moves towards the establishment of spaces of
representation, which will further enable the creation of the right to the city.
When asked whether they themselves had ever been in a similar situ-
ation or participated in organised squatting or similar, 16 of the interview-
ees responded in the affirmative.
“Of course I have! I’m a member of the group that revived the old Cigla-
na. I think we succeeded. (Laughter).” (Interviewee 3, 32 yrs., male)
“By writing graffiti you’re constantly occupying space. It’s unavoidable.”

(Interviewee 4, 34 yrs., male)
Concluding Thoughts
This study has shown that among the respondents there is a devel-
oped and shared awareness of certain social problems and issues, which
they try to incorporate into the practice of painting. For the respondents,
painting represents a practice through which they express themselves in
both a psychological and a social sense. The differences between them
emerge in the directness and specificity of the message they are trying to
convey through their work.
In addition to its expressive and aesthetic function, the practice of
painting murals and graffiti is, for the artists themselves, a career and a
source of income, hence it is subject to the laws of the neoliberal pro-

duction of space. Despite the fact that most of the interviewees have at
least once been paid for their work, it transpires that their creative expres-
sion was often curtailed by the requests of their clients – a state of affairs
that could only be changed with the development of their skill, experi-
ence and the maturing of their own personal style, which allowed them to
stand out. Also, the planned production of space functions according to
the principle of selection, thus placing in space and enabling the visibility
only of what is in line with the dominant ideology and has the possibil-
ity of yielding profit. In that sense, the practice of painting, especially of
painting murals, becomes a part of the market that is particularly prized
in gentrified neighbourhoods, which enables the practice’s survival or fur-
ther reproduction.
The practice of painting in public space emerges as a response and
critique of the existing representation of space and the socio-economic
status quo in the country and hence has the potential to introduce social
change in service of the right to the city. The respondents were aware of
the limits and hurdles established by the planned production of space –
i.e. representation of space – to which they respond through the practice
of painting, choosing topics that highlight those limits or, at least, redefine
the relationship between space in the sense of legal/illegal. Bounded be-
tween the public and the private, the legal and the illegal, between their
aspiration to adapt space to their needs and the real possibility to do so
at a given moment, it seems that artists remain trapped between two dif-
ferent systems of functioning: on one side is what we might call the right
to the city, on the other is their integration into capitalism as a system in
which everything could be commodified.
References
Backović, V. (2015) Džentrifikacija kao socioprostorni fenomen savremenog grada,
Doktorska disertacija, Beograd: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.
Borden, I., Kerr, J., Rendell, J., Pivaro, A. (2002) The unknown city, Contesting Ar-
chitecture and Social Space, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Grbin, M. (2013) Lefevrova misao u savremenoj urbanoj sociologiji, Sociologija
55(3): 475–491.
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ologija (pp. 208–217), Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.
Lefebvre, H. (1970) The Urban Revolution, Minneapolis, London: University of
Minnesota Press.
Lefebvre, H. (1996) Writings on Cities, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Macdonald, N. (2001) The Graffiti Subculture: Youth, Masculinity and Identity in
London and New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Vujović, S., Petrović, M. (eds.) (2005) Urbana sociologija, Beograd: Zavod za
udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.
Zimmerman, S. (2005) Berlin Street Art, Berlin: Prestel.
CIP – Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд
316.334.3(4-12)”20”(082)
316.443(4-12)”20”(082)
323.21(4-12)”20”(082)
EXPERIENCING Postsocialist Capitalism : Urban
Changes and Challenges in Serbia / edited by Jelisaveta
Petrović and Vera Backović. – 1st ed. – Beograd : Faculty
of Philosophy, Institute for Sociological Research, 2019
(Beograd : Službeni glasnik). – 249 str. : ilustr. ; 24 cm
Tiraž 200. – List of Contributors: str. 7. – Str. 11–19:
Introduction / Jelisaveta Petrović and Vera Backović.
– Napomene i bibliografske reference uz radove. –
Bibliografija uz svaki rad.
ISBN 978-86-6427-136-3 (FP)
а) Друштвене промене -- Србија -- 21в -- Зборници
б) Цивилно друштво -- Политичка партиципација --
Србија -- Зборници
COBISS.SR-ID 281480716

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University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy │ 2019

This edited volume results from the project

PART I: NEOLIBERALIZED SOCIO-SPATIAL

PART II: URBAN (RE)ACTIONS: AWAKENING

171 | Jelisaveta Petrović

Ana Pajvančić – Cizelj – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy,

Barend Wind – Department of Spatial Planning and Environment, Uni-

Ivana Spasić – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, University

Jelena Božilović – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, Uni-

Jelisaveta Petrović – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy,

Jorn Koelemaij – Department of Geography, Ghent University, Belgium

Marina Č abrilo – Master’s student, Department of Sociology, Faculty of

Mladen Nikolić – Master of Sociology, Department of Sociology, Faculty

Selena Lazić – PhD candidate, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Phi-

Stefan Janković – Institute for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philoso-

Vera Backović – Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, Univer-

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana; Anđelina Svirčić Go-

Belgrade, 29 October 2019

Jelisaveta Petrović and Vera Backović

The aim of this volume is to explore current urban developments in

1 Although there have been attempts such as – cities after transformation/transition,

at the 8th Cities after Transition conference held in Belgrade in September

2 https://catference2019-belgrade.rs, accessed 01/11/2019.

However, although we continue to use the term “postsocialist city”, we

By taking postsocialist capitalism as the main contextual framework

power to shape urban development, while politicians have an opportunity

The Structure of the Book

Both chapters stress the tremendous socio-spatial changes induced by ur-

the superperipheral Balkan context the ECoC project produces numer-

THE SPECIFICITY OF GENTRIFICATION

Abstract: Gentrification is a general pattern of urban core transformation with

gentrification unites several important dimensions of urban transforma-

The Socio-Spatial Transformation

3 To examine gentrification in various contexts it is necessary to appreciate the socio-

The dominance of heavy industry and the neglect of the production

activities, which brought about a considerable commercialisation of space

In postsocialist cities pioneer gentrification grows at a slow pace, but

The Presence of the Phenomenon

est number of domestic and foreign investors in Serbia. The economy

ployed by foreign firms. In Belgrade33 only 6.1% of employees are em-

so in the forthcoming period smaller complexes are again planned (Col-

The Belgrade Waterfront Project:

These processes do exhibit certain characteristics of “pioneering”

changed so as to fit the investor’s proposal. In July 2014, amendments to

is commonplace elsewhere in the world, and offers no unique or local

The BWP (commercial and residential luxury space) is an example of

Table 1 Increase of spatial concentration of highly educated

Municipality / Year 1991 2002 2001

Enyedi, G. (1996) Urbanization under Socialism, in: G. Andrusz; M. Harloe; I.

Petrović, M. (2009) Transformacija gradova: ka depolitizaciji urbanog pitanja, Be-

BEHIND THE FRONTLINE OF THE

Jorn Koelemaij and Stefan Janković

Abstract: In 2012, plans were announced to develop a large-scale mixed-use wa-

The main intention is to reflect upon existing power relations behind

1. World City Entrepreneurialism

2. Doing Global Urban Research Relationally:

3. A New Skyline for Belgrade:

emphasised by those directly involved. Moreover, Vučić himself, the prime

Belgrade D(r)own in English) with whom we spoke indicated that they

The top-down implementation of the project was reaffirmed by em-