User Name: Ms.

Banalata1 Pradhan
Date and Time: 17 June 2020 00:43:00 IST
Job Number: 119203549

Document (1)

1. 8.3 Murder
Client/Matter: -None-

| About LexisNexis | Privacy Policy | Terms & Conditions | Copyright © 2020 LexisNexis
Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan
 8.3 Murder
KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and Materials, 9th ed
K D Gaur

KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and Materials, 9th ed > KD Gaur: Criminal Law-Cases and Materials, 9th ed >
Part II Specific Offences > 8 OFFENCES RELATING TO HUMAN BODY

Part II Specific Offences

8 OFFENCES RELATING TO HUMAN BODY

8.3 Murder
300. murder.—Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is
done with the intention of causing death, or—

Secondly.—If it is done with intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the
person to whom the harm is caused, or—

Thirdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—

Fourthly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability, cause death,
or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as aforesaid.

Illustrations

(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the
intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might
not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But
if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of
nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of
murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause
death.
(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of
nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder,
although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.

Distinction between section 299 and section 300 of the IPC, 1860— Explained—Bombay High Court—1876

Reg v Govinda9

Facts: The prisoner, a young man of 18, kicked his wife (a girl of 15) and struck her several times with his fist on the back.
These blows seemed to have caused her no serious injury. She, however, fell on the ground and then the accused put one knee
on her chest, and struck her two or three times on the face. One or two of these blows were violent and took effect on the girl’s
left eye, producing a contusion (injury without breaking skin) and discolouration. The skull was not fractured, but the blow
caused an extravasation of blood in the brain and the girl died in consequence.

The session’s judge found the prisoner guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. The case was sent up for confirmation by
the High Court.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 2 of 44
8.3 Murder

There being a difference of opinion between the judges as to what offence the prisoner had committed, the case was referred to
the third judge, Melville J for his opinion.

Justice melville held:

For the convenience of comparison, the provision, of sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, 1860 may be stated thus:

Section 299 Section 300

A person commits culpable homicide, if the act by which the death is Subject to certain exceptions, culpable homicide is murder, if the act
caused is done: by which death is caused is done:

(a) With the intention of causing death; (1) With the intention of causing death [section 300 Illustration (a)];

(2) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender
knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm
is caused [section 300 Illustration (b)];

(b) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to (3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the
cause death [section 299 Illustration (a)]; bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death [section 300 Illustration (c)];

(c) With the knowledge that... the act is likely to cause death [section (4) With the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that
299 Illustration (b)]. it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death [section 300 Illustration (d)].

Further, Melville, J stated:

...Whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon the degree of risk to human life. If death is a likely result, it is
culpable homicide; if it is the most probable result, it is murder.

...The offence is murder, if the offender knows that the particular person injured is likely, either from peculiarity of constitution, or
immature age, or other special circumstance, to be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. See illustration (b),
section 300.

It is on the comparison of clause (b) of 299 and section 300 “thirdly” that the decision of doubtful cases like the present must
generally depend. The offence is culpable homicide, if the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death; it is
murder, if such injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine, but appreciable ...It is
a question of degree of probability. Practically, it will generally resolve itself into a consideration of the nature of the weapon
used. A blow from the fist or a stick on a vital part may be likely to cause death; a wound from a sword in a vital part is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The offence is culpable homicide, and not murder. Neither was there
an intention to cause death, nor was the bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Ordinarily, it
would not cause death.

But a violent blow in the eye from a man’s fist, while the person struck is lying with his or her head on the ground, is certainly
likely to cause death, either by producing a contusion or extravasation of blood on the surface or in the substance of the brain.

Convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced to seven years imprisonment.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, sections 302, 304, Part II—Murder or culpable homicide in absence of intention to cause death
offence is culpable homicide.

Madanayya v State of Maharashtra10

The fact reads that the accused throughout night gave beating to deceased living as his wife. Cumulative effect of injuries was
that that the deceased died. Fact that deceased woke up in morning, and narrated the incident to her sister and she survived till
evening. Post-mortem report showing that she died within couple of hours after partaking a heavy meal. Held the accused had
no intention to cause death of the deceased. Conviction of accused for murder under section 302 altered to one under section
304, Part II. For culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 3 of 44
8.3 Murder

This appeal before the Apex Court was directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench
whereby it upheld the judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gadchiroli convicting the appellant under section 302
of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs 200. Allowing
the appeal the Supreme Court said:

We have gone through the post-mortem report and there is no doubt that there were number of injuries on the body of the deceased.
None of the injuries by itself was sufficient for causing death. The cumulative effect of the injuries is that the deceased died. The issue
that arises is whether the accused had the intention of causing death of the deceased. We cannot ignore the fact that the deceased woke
up in the morning and narrated the incident to her sister PW-3, and she survived till 5.00 pm in the evening. The post-mortem report
also shows that she died within a couple of hours after partaking a heavy meal. In this view of the matter, it is difficult to impute the
intention to kill to the deceased. Therefore, we convert the conviction of the accused from one under section 302 to section 304 Part II.
As the appellant has been behind bars for sixteen years, in our view, this is sufficient punishment for his crime and therefore, we reduce
the sentence after altering the sentence as aforesaid to the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellant-accused. He shall
be released forthwith.

Appeal Allowed – Offence Reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, sections 302 and 304, Part II—Culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Single fatal blow on
the head of deceased, not conclusive of intention to commit murder. No other injuries found on vital parts of the body.
Accused had no preconceived intention to commit murder. Accused committing crime of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder. Conviction of accused altered from section 302 to section 304, Part II. Accused sentenced for rigorous
imprisonment of seven years. (Paras 18 and 19)— Supreme Court—2017

Vijay Pandurang Thakre v State of Maharashtra11

Per AK Sikri, J:

In all these appeals, there were 21 appellants who were all convicted for the offences punishable under sections 302, 307, 324,
336, 427, 506-II, 148 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur upheld
by the High Court, that were however, allowed in part thereby altering the charge under section 307 IPC to section 324 of IPC.
Rest of the conviction recorded by the trial Court has been maintained.

As per the prosecution, members of the group of accused persons hatched a conspiracy to eliminate leading members of
Deshmukh family for taking revenge of their defeat in Gram Panchayat election and in furtherance of their common object,
committed the murder of Ashok Deshmukh and attempted to commit murder of Vilas Deshmukh, Vivek Deshmukh (PW-9 an
PW-8 respectively), assaulted Dinesh Deshmukh, Arun Deshmukh, Prafulla Deshmukh, Sau Kalpana Deshmukh and Smt.
Kausabai Choudhary (PW-6, PW-7, PW-13, PW-10 and PW-11 respectively), pelted stones on the houses of Deorao Nakhale
and Bhimrao Nakhale (PW-12 and PW-16 respectively) and damaged the scooter of PW-4 Sushil Deshmukh.

Apex Court while allowing the appeal partly and altering the conviction from section 302 to section 304 Part II culpable
homicide said:

No doubt, in the scuffle that took place, one blow came to be inflicted on the head of Ashok which injury proved fatal. However, this by
itself cannot be the reason to conclude that there was any intention to commit his murder. If 30 persons had attacked the members of
Deshmukh Group, there are no injuries on the vital parts of other persons who got injured in the said episode. Ashok also suffered only
one injury on his head and no other injury on vital part of his body. Had there been any common objective to cause murder of the
members of Deshmukh Group, there would have been many injuries on deceased Ashok as well as other injured persons on the vital
parts of their bodies (Para 18)

The Court accordingly held—that there was no preconceived common object of eliminating the members of Deshmukh family
and group and the assembly was not acquired with any deadly weapons either. Even the High Court has not pointed out any
such evidence. These findings are hereby set aside. The conviction of the appellants under section 302 IPC, 1860 was
converted into section 304-II IPC, 1860 for which the appellants were sentenced for rigorous imprisonment of seven years
each.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 4 of 44
8.3 Murder

Appeal partly allowed conviction altered from murder to culpable homicide under section 304 Part II IPC, 1860 and sentenced
to seven years which appellants had already served. Hence released from jail henceforth.

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) sections 302, 328—Murder and causing hurt by means of poison. Appeal against acquittal.
Sale of spurious liquor 44 persons died and 36 others lost eyesight permanently by consuming poisonous liquor.
Testimonies of injured and relatives of deceased that spurious liquor was purchased from shops of respondents. The fact
that after such tragedy respondents even tried to destroy remaining bottles. Establishes that respondents had full knowledge
that bottles contained substance methyl and also had full knowledge about disastrous consequences thereof. Case falls
within four corners of section 300 fourthly. Acquittal of respondents, erroneous and set aside. (Para 24 Supreme Court
2017)

State of Haryana v Krishan12

Per AK Sikri, J:

In December, 1980, a very brazen, bizarre and outlandish incident took place, commonly known as “hooch tragedy”. The
deleterious consequence was that 36 persons who had purchased liquor from a licensed vend in Village Kalanwali, District
Sirsa, Haryana lost their lives after consuming the same. Another 44 persons who too had purchased the liquor from the same
shop and consumed that liquor lost their eyesight permanently. Numbers of FIRs were registered in which the investigation was
carried out by the police. All these cases were clubbed together for the purpose of trial. Orders of consolidation of trials of
these FIRs were passed by the Sessions Judge resulting into a joint trial in which 48 persons were arrayed as accused. This joint
trial culminated into passing of judgment by the Sessions Judge. It resulted into conviction of only two accused persons,
namely, Krishan and Som Nath, for the offences under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with section 120B who
were directed to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay fine of Rs 10,000 each. They were also convicted for offence
under section 328 IPC, 1860 (causing hurt by means of poison) read with section 120B IPC for which they were to suffer
imprisonment for a term of five years with fine of Rs 5,000 each. Conviction against these two persons were also recorded
under section 61 (1)(a) of Punjab Excise Act 1914 for which sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs
1,000 was imposed on the two convicts. Apart from these accused persons, all other accused persons were acquitted.

The two convicts (respondents herein) challenged the order of their conviction by filing appeal in the High Court. State
preferred appeal to Apex Court. Allowing the State appeal and restoring the conviction against the respondents – accused the
Apex Court said;—

The High Court committed manifest error in observing that evidence was not produced to connect the respondents with the
tragedy. No doubt, there have been some lapses on the part of the police authorities in not investigating the case with the vigour
that was necessitated. The High Court may also be right in finding fault with the State administration for not conducting an
inquiry into the circumstances which led to the tragedy for pin-pointing the shortcomings in the system which permitted sale of
spurious liquor from licenced liquor vend. At the same time, insofar as culpability of the respondents is concerned, the same
was proved beyond doubt by producing plethora of evidence. Apex Court is of the opinion that trial Court had rightly come to
the conclusion holding respondents to be the guilty of crime.

It would be suffice to observe that adequate evidence is produced showing the culpability of the respondents, individually.
Once it is shown that the spurious liquor was sold from the local vends belonging to the respondents coupled with the fact that
after this tragedy struck, the respondents even tried to destroy remaining bottles clearly establishes that the respondents had full
knowledge of the fact that the bottles contain substance methyl and also had full knowledge about the disastrous consequences
thereof which would bring their case within the four corners of section 300. The respondents cannot be treated as mere cat’s
paw and naive. They have exploited the resilience nature of bucolic and rustic villagers.

Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents is set aside and that of the trial
Court convicting the respondents is restored. The respondents shall undergo the sentence inflicted by the trial Court.

Appeal allowed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, sections 300, 301, 498A—Murder, causing disappearance of evidence and cruelty. Appeal against
conviction. Accused husband alleged to have killed his wife by strangulation. Relationship between appellant and deceased
was not cordial because of illicit relationship between accused and another. Death of deceased was homicidal in nature
caused due to asphyxia. Evidence of witnesses that on date of incident accused asked deceased to come to field where he
would pay money to her. Sometime later deceased was found dead under a tree. Evidence found credible on all material
aspects of prosecution case. Conviction of accused under section 302 and section 201, proper—Supreme Court—2015.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 5 of 44
8.3 Murder

Eshwarappa v State of Karnataka13

Per TS Thakur, J:

This appeal arose out of a judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, whereby the High Court
had dismissed an appeal by the appellant affirming his conviction for offences punishable under sections 302, 498A and 201 of
Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The deceased-Latha and the appellant got married to each other. The marital relationship, soured when the appellant developed
illicit relations with one Sarpina. Appellant was neglecting the deceased and was residing with Sarpina, accused No 2. The
appellant to get rid of the deceased strangulated her and the body was lying dead under a tamarind tree near the land of
appellant in his village.

The death of the deceased was homicidal in nature caused due to asphyxia. The ligature marks found around the neck of the
deceased proved that there was constriction of the neck of the deceased because of exertion of force.

The appellant had piled a heap of stones and tied a rope to the branch of the tamarind tree, only to support a false plea in
defence that the deceased had committed suicide.

The High Court dismissed the appeal in toto although on the finding recorded by it the High Court could and indeed should
have set aside the conviction of the appellant under section 498A, IPC, 1860.

Apex Court dismissing the appeal held:

In the totality of the circumstances and having regard to the nature of the evidence which the Courts below have found credible on all
material aspects of the prosecution case, we do not see any compelling reason to interfere with the view taken by the Trial Court as
affirmed by the High Court.

Appeal dismissed. Conviction confirmed under section 302 and section 201, IPC, 1860. Cruelty under section 498A, IPC not
maintainable.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, sections 302, 34, 120B—Murder mens rea. Common intention or conspiracy Accused, husband
along with other co-accused committing murder of wife by strangulating her neck with rope. Prosecution proving common
intention of accused beyond doubt Accused persons cannot be acquitted of charges of murder in absence of proof of
criminal conspiracy. Conviction, proper. (Para 9)

Shantanu Sitaram alias Anil Divekar v State of Maharashtra

with

Deepak alias Ganesh S Patil v State of Maharashtra14

Per Ashok Bhushan, J:

These two appeals have been filed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dismissing three appeals filed by three
accused questioning their conviction and sentence imposed by the Additional District Judge, Satara by which they were
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine for the offence punishable under section 302 read with 34,
IPC, 1860 and further to RI for three years and fine for offence under section 201 read with 34, IPC and for three years and fine
for offence under section 120B, IPC, which was confirmed by the High Court.

Accused No 1, Shantanu married deceased Supriya on 28 April 1999. Their daughter, Mrunal was born on 22 March 2000
parents’ house. On 23 December 2000, Shantanu came to Supriya’s parents’ house and took Supriya for a ride in a car in the
evening at about 8.30 pm Shantanu took Supriya hurriedly without even permitting her to change her nightgown which she
wore at that time. Supriya along with her daughter aged about nine months sat in the Fiat Car of Shantanu driven by him. When
till 10 pm Shantanu did not return.

On the information of Shambhaji Mane, crime case under sections 394 and 302, IPC was registered. Shantanu was admitted to
the hospital and after he was released from the hospital, he was interrogated by the IO, PW-30, PSI. On the basis of the
interrogation, on 30 December 2000, the police arrested Shantanu and two other persons A2, Rafik and A3, Deepak alias

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 6 of 44
8.3 Murder

Ganesh S Patil. At the instance of A2, on 30 December 2000 itself, recovery of an amount of Rs 1,000 from his house and
recovery of gold jewellery which Supriya was wearing at the time of occurrence was made from his neighbourer, Damodar
Gade. At the instance of A2, recovery of further stick, piece of rope, knife and other articles was found. All the articles were
photographed by PW-22, Shantaram Shinde. Certain recoveries were also made at the instance of A3. Accused were charge-
sheeted. Prosecution produced 30 witnesses to prove guilt.

Dismissing the appeal apex Court held, the mere fact that evidence under section 120B had not been proved does not in any
manner affect the charge under sections 302 read with 34, IPC. A1 to A3 with common intention committed the crime which
has been proved by the prosecution and the conviction of A1 to A3 under sections 302 read with 34, IPC cannot be faulted.

Appeals dismissed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 sections 302, 324—Murder, section 320-grievous hurt section 506-criminal intimidation. Evidence
Act section 3 murder injured witness accused persons allegedly committing assault with hammer, billhook and iron rod on
head of deceased and injuring another. Accused persons coming in car on the field of deceased, identified by eye-witnesses.
Evidence of eye-witnesses and injured witness revealing repeated assaults by accused persons on head of deceased due to
enmity between parties. Medical report of deceased disclosing multiple cerebral injuries sufficient to cause death and
injuries on injured person found to be grievous. Repeated assaults on head of deceased establishing intention of accused
persons to cause death liable under section 302, IPC. Conviction of accused persons, proper. (Para 13, Para 14 and Para
16)—Supreme Court—2017

Chandrasekar v State

With

Balasubramanian v State of TN15

Per Navin Sinha, J:

The appellants stand convicted under section 302, IPC, 1860 to life imprisonment and under section 324, IPC, 1860 to six
months rigorous imprisonment.

The statement of the injured, PW-1 Lalbahadur Sastri, brother-in-law of the deceased Gnanasekaran, was recorded by the Sub-
Inspector of Police at the Udumalpet Government Hospital on 17 July 2007 at 10:00 AM with regard to the assault made by the
appellants on the deceased and the witness, the same morning at 7:30 AM. The motive was ascribed to the acquittal of the
deceased the previous day, in a criminal prosecution at the behest of appellant Govindaraj. The deceased was assaulted by the
appellants repeatedly on the head with a hammer, sickle and iron rod respectively. The witness was also assaulted by the
appellants causing injuries. FIR was registered the same day under sections 506 (ii) and 307, IPC. The deceased expired at the
hospital on the same day at 11:30 AM after which section 302, IPC was also added.

Dismissing the appeal and upholding the conviction apex Court said:

The appellants came together armed with a hammer, sickle and iron rod respectively. They assaulted the deceased
indiscriminately on the head repeatedly, a very sensitive part of the human body reflecting the individual intention of each of
them to ensure the death of the deceased. The number of injuries caused on the head speaks for itself regarding the intention of
the appellants. There is no need for us to consider and examine issues of common intention, in the facts of the case. (Para 14)

In view of the clear ocular evidence available, issues with regard to the confession statement and recovery of the weapons of
assault need not be considered for correlation. Held, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court does not find any
reason to interfere with the conviction of the appellants. Their bail bonds are cancelled and they are directed to surrender
forthwith for serving act the remaining period of sentence.

Appeal dismissed.

Ranbir Penal Code sections 302, 341 Jammu and Kashmir Evidence Act section 3—Murder circumstantial evidence.
Accused allegedly hurling abuses and later attacked deceased on his head with iron rod resulting in death. Assault on
account of tussle same day of incident. Independent witness providing scuffle between parties in which accused threatened
deceased that he will see him anytime. Iron rod recovered from instance of accused, proved, post-mortem report revealing
injuries on head of deceased sufficient to cause death. Evidence of eye-witness, father of deceased supporting chain of
events and found to be reliable. Guilt of accused established. Conviction, proper. (Para 18, Para 19, Para 20, Para 23, Para
27, Para 28, Para 33)

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 7 of 44
8.3 Murder

Khurshid Ahmed v State of J&K16

Per NV Ramana, J:

This appeal is directed against the judgment passed by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu reversing the order of
acquittal passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Bhaderwah against the appellant, and convicted him for the offences
punishable under sections 302/341 of Ranbir Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
Rs 1,000 for the offence punishable under section 302, RPC and to pay a fine of Rs 500 for the offence under section 341, IPC,
1860 wrongful restraint with the direction to realize the fine amount from his estate. While dismissing the appeal preferred by
the accused appellant apex Court held, that the direct oral evidence available on record coupled with the medical evidence,
points at the guilt of the accused and not proving the motive for commission of the offence lost its significance in the facts of
the case.

The power of the appellant Court in an appeal against acquittal is the same as that of an appeal against conviction. But, in an
appeal against acquittal, the Court has to bear in mind that the presumption of innocence is in favour of the accused and it is
strengthened by the order of acquittal. At the same time, appellate Court will not interfere with the order of acquittal mainly
because two views are possible, but only when the High Court feels that the appreciation of evidence is based on erroneous
considerations and when there is manifest illegality in the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. In the present case, there was
manifest irregularity in the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court. The High Court based on sound principles of criminal
jurisprudence, has interfered with the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court and convicted the accused as the
prosecution was successful in proving the guild of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 32)

In view of the foregoing discussion and a conspectus of all the material would pave way to conclude that the prosecution has
proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and the appeal preferred by the accused is bereft of any substance and accordingly
dismissed. (Para 33)

Appeal dismissed conviction upheld (Supreme Court 2018).

Appreciation of evidence – Sections 302, 304 Part I and 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 facts did not commend to conclude
that the Appellant had the intention of eliminating any one of those fired at, though he had the knowledge of the likely fatal
consequences thereof. The conviction of the Appellant ought to be moderated to one under section 304 Part 1 and 307 of
Code, 1860 as against under section 302, IPC, 1860. Further, the sentence for the offences was reduced from life
imprisonment to the period already undergone. —Supreme Court—2016

Gurpal Singh v State of Punjab17

Per Amitava Roy J:

It is alleged by the prosecution that on the exhortation of Harpartap, the Appellant opened fire, which hit the informant on the
side of his head. Meanwhile drawn by the commotion, Paramjit Kaur, the wife of the informant, Jatinder Singh and Lakhwinder
Singh, friends of Jugraj rushed to the terrace. On seeing them, the Appellant fired from his gun towards them, which hit
Paramjit and Jatinder on their abdomen and Lakhwinder on his mouth and head. On hue and cry being raised, the Appellant and
the accused fled the scene.

The injured were rushed to the Guru Nanak Dev Hospital, Amritsar where they were treated. However, Jatinder succumbed to
the injuries sustained.

High Court concurred with verdict of Trial Court in convicting appellant for offence under sections 302 and 307 of Code, 1860
for murder and attempt to murder, while acquitting co-accused. Hence, present appeal before apex Court the question is –
Whether conviction was sustainable. Facts: The High Court concurred with the verdict of the Trial Court in convicting the
Appellant for the offence under sections 302 and 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 while acquitting the co-accused, his son.
Following his conviction, the appellant had been awarded sentence of life imprisonment and fine with default sentence under
section 302 of Code, 1860 and five years rigorous imprisonment and fine with default sentence under section 307 of IPC, 1860.
Hence, the present appeal by the appellant.

Held, while allowing the appeal partly;

(i) The eye-witnesses including the informant offered a consistent coherent and convincing narration thereof which did
not admit of any doubt of their trustworthiness. The plea of their family relationship to discredit them did not

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 8 of 44
8.3 Murder

commend for acceptance. The medical evidence revealed injuries on the deceased and the injured compatible with the
weapon used. The charges levelled against the appellant thus were proved beyond doubt.
(ii) Incidentally, twelve years had elapsed since the occurrence. The appellant was overpowered by an uncontrollable fit
of anger so much so that he was deprived of his power of self-control and being drawn in a web of action reflexes,
fired at the deceased and the injured, who were within his sight.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the conviction of the appellant is converted to one under section 304 Part 1
and 307 IPC from section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of life imprisonment is reduced to the period already
undergone (12 years of imprisonment). In this view of the matter, as a corollary, the appellant is hereby ordered to be set at
liberty forthwith, if he is not required to be detained in connection with any other case.

Sections 302 read with section 34, IPC, 1860 conviction upheld under section 304 Part I. Having regard to the fact that
deceased survived for 62 days and that his condition was stable when he was discharged from the hospital, the Court cannot
draw an inference that the intended injury caused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death so as to
attract clause (3) of section 300 Indian Penal Code. [13] Hence, conviction altered under section 304 Part I.—Supreme
Court—2016

Sanjay v State of UP18

High Court upheld conviction of appellants under sections 302 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – These
criminal appeals have been filed assailing the impugned judgment passed by the High Court dismissing the criminal appeals
and upholding the conviction of the appellants for offences under sections 302, 307 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code and
section 452 Indian Penal Code, 1860. Allowing the appeals in Part A.

The appellants used firearms country-made pistol and fired at Roop Singh at his head as the accused had the intention of
causing such bodily injured as is likely to cause death. As the bullet injury was on the head, vital organ, second appellant
intended of causing such bodily injury and therefore conviction of the appellant is altered from section 302 Indian Penal Code
to section 304 Part I Indian Penal Code. [15] C. Both the appellants indiscriminately fired from their country-made pistols at
Roop Singh-deceased and Sheela (PW-2) respectively. The conduct of the appellants and the manner in which the crime has
been committed is sufficient to attract section 34 Indian Penal Code as both the appellants acted in furtherance of common
intention. [14] D. Conviction of the appellants-was modified to section 304 Part I read with section 34 Indian Penal Code
respectively. [16] Conviction modified and upheld under section 304 Part I.

Injury sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death falls under section 300, clause “thirdly” of Indian Penal Code,
1860—Supreme Court—1958

Virsa Singh v State of Punjab,

AIR 1958 SC 465 : [1958] 1 SCR 1495

Justice Bose held:

The appellant Virsa Singh has been sentenced to imprisonment for life under section 302 of IPC, 1860 for the murder of one
Khem Singh.

There was only one injury on Khem Singh as the result of a spear thrust and the doctor who examined Khem Singh while he
was still alive said that it was ...sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

It was argued that the facts set out above do not disclose an offence of murder because the prosecution has not proved that there
was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Section 300
“Thirdly” was quoted:

If it is done with the intention of causing injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death.

It was said that the intention, which the section requires, must be related, not only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the
clause,

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 9 of 44
8.3 Murder

and the bodily injury, intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

This argument is fallacious. If there is an intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature, then the intention is to kill and in that event, the clause “thirdly” would be unnecessary because the act would fall under
the first part of the section, namely:

If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death.

The two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective, and the other— “If it is done with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person”—is objective.

...To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under section 300:

First, it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;

Second, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations;

Third, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved, to be present, the inquiry proceeds
further; and,

Fourth, it must be proved that the injury set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the
inquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

Once these four elements are established by the prosecution, the offence is murder under section 300.

The question is ...whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved, the
intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.

If the totality of the circumstances justifies an inference that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by
accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, then of course the offence is not murder. But that is
not because the prisoner did not intend the injury to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict
the injury in question at all. His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury.

The difference is not one of law but one of fact; and whether the conclusion should be one way or the other is a matter of proof.

It is held, in the absence of any circumstances to show that the injury was caused accidentally or unintentionally, the
presumption would be that the accused had intended to cause the inflicted injury.

The conviction is upheld. The appeal is dismissed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 sections 300, 34 and 141 – Murder - Deceased tried to run away but was chased by accused -
While one accused exhorted others, all the others effectively participated in inflicting injuries on the body of deceased -
Common intention thus, coming into existence at spur of moment. All accused continuing to assault deceased causing fatal
injuries even after he fell on ground, showing their common intention or object to cause death. Prosecution witness
explained occurrence by attributing specific role to each accused - 30 injuries inflicted on the body of one deceased and 33
on the other deceased - Injuries inflicted on spine, which is vital part of body, establishes that acts were going to result in
death of deceased - Hence, it is not a case where offence under section 302 IPC can be converted to offence under section
304 IPC Part I or Part II - For culpable homicide not amounting to murder - Merely because another view is possible, it is
no reason for Supreme Court to interfere in acquittal of an accused

State of Haryana v Shakuntala19

Per Swatanter Kumar J:

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 10 of 44
8.3 Murder

The case relates to conviction of all the nine accused. For commission of the offence punishable under section 148 of IPC, 1860
as well as under sections 325/302 IPC read with section 149 IPC, for inflicting injuries by a deadly blow, hitting Manohar Lal
as well as Sushila, who ultimately died on way to hospital. They were sentenced to life imprisonment under section 309 IPC,
1860 and sentenced under section 300, 304, 34, 141 and 149 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and fine and various other
sentences to run concurrently.

The High Court of Haryana upheld the conviction of the accused nos 1 to 4 and 7 and 9, which resultantly acquitted accused
nos 5, 6 and 8. The state went in appeal against the acquittal of the accused nos 5, 6 and 8.

While dismissing the state appeal, the Apex Court held that:

…merely because another view is possible, it would be no reason for Supreme Court to interfere with order of acquittal. Since the
accused nos 1 to 4, 7 and did not go in appeal their sentences remain intact.

First, Lakshmi opened assault by giving an iron blow hitting Sushila on her leg. The accused gave a deadly blow on Manohar Lal’s
head, who fell down and all started beating him and Sushila. Both died on their way to the hospital. All accused persons were convicted.

Appellant liable to be convicted for murder under section 302 IPC, 1860 read with section 34 IPC for hitting the head of the
deceased with a piece of wood lying at the place of occurrence when the blow given by the appellant was sufficient to cause
death as per post mortem evidence—Supreme Court—2012

Lokesh Shivakumar v State of Karnataka,

AIR 2012 SC 956 : (2012) 3 SCC 196

Per Aftab Alam and R Dave, JJ:

While dismissing the appeal against conviction for committing murder under section 302, IPC, 1860 read with section 34, IPC
for rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs 500/- for hitting Dharmraj’s (deceased) head with a wooden piece on the
right side of his head resulting in severe bleeding injures on head, face and nose, that resulted in Dharmraj’s death, the apex
court said that injury was sufficient to cause death as per the post mortem evidence.

Bodily injury likely to cause death–culpable homicide falls under clause (b) to section 299, IPC—Supreme Court—1976

Jayaraj v State of TN,

AIR 1976 SC 1519 : 1976 CR LJ 1186 : (1976) 2 SCC 788

Facts: Jayaraj, appellant (A-1), and six others were tried by the session’s judge, for causing the death of one Pattu Nadar. All
were acquitted. There was political rivalry between the deceased and the appellant and election fever was raging at the time.

On appeal by the State, the High Court set aside the acquittal of A-1 and convicted him under section 302, IPC, 1860 for the
murder of Pattu Nadar and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. Hence, this appeal by A-1.

Justice RS Sarkaria stated:

...the prosecution must prove the following before it can bring a case under section 300, IPC, Thirdly clause.

(1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

(2) The nature of the injury must be proved, these are purely objective investigations.
(3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict mat particular injury, that is to say, it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was not intended.
(4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above, was sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the inquiry is purely objective and inferential and has
nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 11 of 44
8.3 Murder

In case the fourth element has not been objectively and clearly established, there is no escape from the conclusion that the
prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this injury on the abdomen of the deceased was sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature. The act of the appellant did not amount to murder, the nature of the offence committed
would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The guilty intention in the first two conditions under section 299, IPC,
1860 contemplates the intended death of the person harmed or the intentional causing of an injury likely to cause his death.

The knowledge in the third condition contemplates knowledge of the likelihood of the death of the person.

The first clause of section 300 reproduces the first part of section 299. Therefore, ordinarily, if the case comes within clause (a)
of section 299 it would amount to murder. If the act of the accused falls under clause (b) of section 299, ie, if the intended
bodily injury is likely to cause death as distinguished from one which is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature, clause 3 of section 300 would not apply.

This is exactly the situation in the present case. The offence committed by the appellant would, therefore; fall under clause (b)
of section 299 punishable under the first part of section 304, IPC, 1860.

The appeal is partly allowed.

Section 302, IPC—Murder and culpable homicide: Distinction between clause Thirdly of section 300 and clause Secondly
of section 299 depends on the nature of injury, intention of the accused—Appeal Dismissed, Conviction upheld—Supreme
Court—2008

Bavisetti Kameshwara Rao @ Babai v State of AP20

Per VS Sirpurkar, J:

The apex court in Kameshwara Rao held that, when injury is caused on a vital part of the body with savage force resulting in
instantaneous death, injury is sufficient to cause death within section 300 clause Thirdly and amounts to murder punishable
under section 302 IPC murder irrespective of a solitary injury.

Accused appellant, a motor mechanic, on verbal altercation between an unarmed deceased plugged screw driver in the
abdomen with such savage force so as to cause 12 cm deep injury damaging liver and spleen resulting in his death almost
instantaneously.

The doctor who conducted the post-mortem opined that21 the deceased had died of hemorrhagic shock due to injuries to liver
and spleen. A glance at these injuries would suggest that it was injury No 3 (see footnote) which was fatal and it was in the
region of the, abdomen which was a vital part of the body of the deceased.

The trial court on the basis of the medical report that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
under section 300 clause Thirdly sentenced the accused under section 302 IPC,1860 for murder, which was confirmed by the
High Court. Hence, appeal to the Supreme Court.

An important question raised before the apex court was that:

Whether a solitary injury (single injury) could be considered sufficient to cause death of the accused.

The accused appellant pleaded that since this was the case of a single injury that too, the weapon used was a screw driver which
was in the regular use of the accused as a tool, the accused being a motor mechanic: it could not be said that his intention was
to cause death and also to cause such bodily injury as would be sufficient to cause death of the deceased within clause Thirdly
of section 300 IPC, 1860.

It was further pleaded that since it was only a single injury and, even if in the knowledge of the accused that such injury was
likely to cause the death of the deceased, the offence at the most would be culpable homicide under clause (ii) to section 299
punishable under section 304 Part II of IPC.

Dismissing the appeal and upholding the conviction the apex court held that a careful perusal of the facts of the case and
medical report would reveal that when the screw driver was plucked with savage force into the vital part of the body with it, it
cut his liver and spleen, which clearly demonstrates that this was a case, “where the act was done with the intention of causing
bodily injury and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death”
covered by “Thirdly” of section 300 of Penal Code, 1860.”

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 12 of 44
8.3 Murder

And even if there was a single injury caused, it was with such a force and on such a vital part of the body that it caused almost
instantaneous death. The deceased, after he was injured he went to the police station and before he could reach to the hospital,
he breathed his last.

Appeal Dismissed.

Single blow on the neck in a sudden quarrel causing death—culpable homicide —within clause (ii) to section 299 IPC,
1860—Supreme Court—1992

Patel Rasiklal Becharbhai v State of Gujarat,

AIR 1992 SC 1150 : 1992 Cr LJ 2334 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 217

Facts: The appellant, A-3, along with five others were tried for offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 302, 324, 326 and
447, read with section 149 of the IPC, 1860. Though the trial court acquitted all of them, the High Court convicted A-3 under
section 302, IPC. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction under section 302 and instead convicted him under section 304
Part II of IPC.

It was held that facts of this case would show that there is a reasonable doubt whether the accused intended to cause that
particular injury in which case the offence is one punishable under section 304 Part II of IPC. For culpable homicide, since the
accused must have had knowledge that he was likely to cause the death.

Only injury caused to the child by throwing on the ground causing congestion in the brain does not necessarily result in
death—culpable homicide—and not murder—Supreme Court—1982

Sarabjeet Singh v State of UP,

AIR 1983 SC 529 : (1984) 1 SCC 673 : 1983 Cr LJ 961 : 1982 (2) Scale 1354

Facts: Transaction of sale of land led to a quarrel in which, one of the 17 men lifted the four year old child of G and threw the
child on the ground. The child died. The autopsy surgeon stated that the only injury caused to the child in the brain was
congestion and that congesting of the brain does not necessarily result in death. The court held:

(1) Part I of section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 will not be attracted because it could not be said that the act
which caused death was done with the intention to cause death.
(2) If you deal with a young child in harsh manner that is likely to cause injury, you are presumed to know that such a
young infant with under-developed bones and muscles may suffer death.

It was held that the accused in this case was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder vide clause (ii) to section 299
IPC and, therefore; punishable under Part II of section 304 of IPC.

Appellant liable to be convicted for murder under section 302, IPC, 1860 read with section 34, IPC for striking a blow on
the head of the deceased with wood lying at the place of occurrence when the blow given by the appellant was sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature, as per post-mortem evidence - Supreme Court.

Lokesh Shivakumar v State of Karnataka,

AIR 2012 SC 956 : (2012) 3 SCC 196 : 2012 (2) Scale 430 : 2012 (2) JT 357

Per Aftab Alam, J (Anil R Dave, J):

While dismissing the appeal against the conviction for committing murder under section 302, IPC read with section 34, IPC for
rigouros imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs 500 for hitting Dharanmraj (deceased) with a wooden piece and a large stung
(wound by) brick on the right side of his head resulting in severe bleeding injuries on head, face and nose, that resulted in
Dharmaraj’s death, the Apex Court said that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature vide
section 300 clause Thirdly, IPC, as per the post-mortem evidence.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 300—Evidence Act, section 3—Murder taking place when deceased, alongwith wife were
returning home - Evidence of wife that deceased was assaulted by accused by weapons used for cutting, corroborated by
evidence of two other chance witnesses of being assaulted, cannot be disbelieved on ground that she was an interested

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 13 of 44
8.3 Murder

witness - Other two witnesses had gone to house of deceased to get loan from LIC, as deceased was an LIC agent - While
returning to their house, they witnessed assault - Witnesses cannot be branded as chance witness and sympathizers of party
to which deceased belong as partisan witness

Myladimmal Surendran v State of Kerala,

AIR 2010 SC 3281 : 2010 (9) Scale 10 : JT 2010 (9) SC 282

with

Arayakkamdy Sukumaran v State of Kerala, 2006 Cri LJ 976

Per Surinder Singh Nijar, J:

These appeals have been filed against the common judgment passed by the High Court of Kerala, at Ernakulum in a criminal appeal,
filed by the accused/appellants No 1 and No 3 and No 5 respectively, whereby, the High Court confirmed the conviction of the
accused/appellants under sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 302 read with section 149, IPC, but partly allowed their appeals to the extent that
the sentence of death was converted to imprisonment for life.

Dismissing the appeal, the Apex Court, while disapproving the attitude of the court to regard casually material witnesses to crimes of
violence, as chance witnesses as observed in the case of Sachchey Lal Tiwari v State of UP,22 said that:

Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses, soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the
inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passerby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be
brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is
borrowed from countries where every man’s home is considered his castle and everyone must have and explanation for his presence
elsewhere or in another man’s castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at
any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.

Upon due consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the court was of the considered opinion that the
judgment of the High Court did not call for any interference. The appeals were dismissed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 sections 302, 304, Part I Honour killing accused found guilty of murdering his pregnant daughter
for marrying into lower caste. Deceased in public toilet found lying in pool of blood with cut to her neck. Testimony of
witness that she saw accused coming out from public toilet with blood stained sickle found truthful, reliable and
corroborated by proved circumstances and evidence of other prosecution witnesses. Accused not only had strong motive to
kill his daughter but also responsible for her death. No interference with finding of guilt recorded against accused. (Paras
24, 25, 27) Sentence of 10 years imprisonment for offence under section 304, Part I enhanced to life imprisonment. (Paras
29, 30, 31)—Supreme Court—2017

Gandi Doddabasappa alias Gandhi Basavaraj v State of Karnataka23

Am Khanwilkar, J:

This criminal appeal arises from the judgment and final order passed by the High Court of Karnataka. The High Court has set
aside the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court and instead convicted the appellant (accused) for an offence
punishable under section 304, Part I of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and sentenced him to undergo 10 (ten) years of
rigorous imprisonment for killing his daughter, Shilpa.

The couple returned to their village Taranagar to stay with the parents of Ravi Kumar (PW-16), PW-17 and PW-18. When this
marriage came to the knowledge of Shilpa’s father, the accused, he bitterly opposed the same and reportedly berated PW-16
and his family on several occasions, stating that they had brought down the honour of his family and that he would “finish” his
daughter for marrying into a lower caste, and finally killed her.

After hearing Shilpa’s cry coming from a public toilet near her residence which she often used, her mother-in-law rushed
towards the toilet and saw the appellant emerging from the toilet with a blood-stained sickle. Upon seeing PW-18, the appellant
(accused) threw the sickle into a manure dung pit nearby and ran away. The Sessions Court, acquitted the accused inter alia on
the ground that mere intent on the part of the accused to commit the crime was not sufficient to record a finding of guilt.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 14 of 44
8.3 Murder

In appeal by the State, the High Court recorded a finding of guilt against the appellant but went on to convict the appellant for
offence under section 304, Part I of IPC and sentenced him to 10 years of imprisonment. This order of conviction and sentence
has been challenged by the appellant.

Dismissing the appeal and enhancing the sentence by recording conviction of the appellant under section 302 of IPC, 1860 and
imposing sentence of imprisonment for life, said:

Suffice it to observe that none of the five exceptions24 in section 300 of IPC is attracted in the present case. It would necessarily follow
that the accused (appellant) committed murder of his daughter Shilpa who was in the advanced stage of pregnancy and for which he was
liable to be punished with either imprisonment for life or death under section 302 of IPC alone. In the peculiar factual background of
this case, we do not find it a fit case to impose death penalty.

Appeal dismissed.

Section 302 read with section 34 of IPC, 1860—Honour killing and section 313 and 161 CrPC, 1973 - Evidence of a child
(the youngest member of the family) cannot be believed on the ground that he could not recapitulate the ghastly incident of
murder of six members of the family that took place years ago in his tender age - Minor discrepancies not touching the core
of the case cannot be a ground for rejection of evidence—Supreme Court—2010

State of UP v Krishna Master,

AIR 2010 SC 3071 : (2010) 12 SCC 324 : JT 2010 (8) SC 240 : 2010 (7) Scale 597

Per AK Pattnaik, J:

The State of Uttar Prasdesh preferred appeal to Apex Court against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court acquitting all the
18 accused persons convicted by the trial court for eliminating seven persons of Harijan family. The respondents belonging to
Thakur caste literally butchered seven totally innocent persons belonging to the Harijan caste, and to wipe out the entire
evidence of their atrocities. After shooting, they were thrown in river Ganges where currents were very strong. Out of seven,
even the bodies of five persons could not be recovered.

On the intervening night of 9-10 September 1979, in the village Lohari, Police Station Hussainganj of Fatehpur District in Uttar
Pradesh, 20-22 accused persons committed dacoities in the Harijan locality by breaking open the doors of the main gate of the
house of Jasodiya and Kallu (PW 14). They looted the house. Thereafter, Kallu, Jasodiya, Din Dayal, Sukhlal, Tulsi, Ganga
Ram, Deo Nath alias Madan were tied with rope and were taken to the bank of the river Ganges, pushed in the boats and
brutally murdered, thereafter, all of them were thrown into the river Ganges, at a point where there were strong currents. Out of
seven, five dead bodies could not even be retrieved. Kallu (PW 14) jumped into the stream of the river Ganges and saved his
life. Jasodiya, wife of Kallu was recovered from the river Ganges in an injured and unconscious state and after she regained
consciousness, she got a written report lodged at the police station.

Jasodiya succumbed to the injuries next day on 11 September 1979. However, before her death, a dying declaration was
recorded by the Medical Officer at midnight of 10 September 1979, in which she narrated the entire incident elaborately.

The sessions Judge, Fatehpur, in an elaborate, exhaustive and well considered judgment, sentenced the 18 accused persons
under section 302 read with section 149 IPC, 1860 for life imprisonment for committing the murder of Jasodiya, Ganga, Tulsi,
Deo Nath alias Madan, Din Dayal, Sukhla and Shripal; and also sentenced to undergo four years, with rigourous imprisonment
under section 201 IPC, 1860 for eliminating of evidence of murder by throwing the dead bodies of the seven persons in the
river Ganga.

The Apex Court on a careful examination of the case said that the High Court had failed to appropriate the circumstances in
which Kallu had survived by jumping into the river, and hiding at certain places. In a genocide and massacre which was
witnessed by him, wherein all of his seven close relatives, including his wife were killed one after the other, in his presence and
were thrown in the river Ganga, his escaping the death was a miracle. Hiding and saving his life from a mighty cruel upper
caste group was a normal human instinct. Any reasonable or prudent person would have behaved in the same manner.

While reversing the judgment of acquittal of the High Court, the Apex court summarised the entire legal position and observed
that the court would be justified in interfering in the judgment of the High Court in the following circumstances, which are
illustrative, and not exhaustive:

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 15 of 44
8.3 Murder

(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of the law by ignoring the settled legal position;
(ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;
(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage
of justice;
(iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of
the case;
(v) The apex court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the courts below;
(vi) The court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court
have recorded an order of acquittal.

The following principles emerge from the aforementioned cases:

(i) The appellant court may review the evidence in appeal against acquittal under sections 37825 and 38626 of Criminal
Procedure Code 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire
evidence on record. It can review the trial Court’s conclusion with respect to both facts and law.
(ii) The accused is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was
before the trial court. The High Court’s acquittal supports the presumption that he is innocent.
(iii) There must be also substantial and compelling reasons for reversing an order of acquittal.

After going through a catena of cases, and critically examining the law, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that the court
would be justified in interfering substantially and with compelling reasons to discard the High Court decision.

The Apex Court accordingly allowed the appeal filed by the State and the acquittal of six accused (namely (1) Mathura Singh
@ Vijay Bahadur Singh R/o Village Lohari, District Fatehpur, (2) Udai Bhan Singh @ Lallan Singh R/o Kasraon District
Patehpur, (3) Dhirendra Singh R/o Mawaiya, District Fatehpur, (4) Munruz son of Ram Lrzl R/o District Banda, (5) Ram
Niwas Singh alias Challa Singh R/o Siyari, District Patehpur, and (6) Vijay Karan Singh R/o Bhainsahi, District Fatehpur)
recorded by the High Court was set aside, and their conviction as recorded by the trial court was restored.

While concluding the case the court said:

It is absolutely imperative to abolish the caste system as expeditiously as possible for the smooth functioning of Rule of Law and
Democracy in our country.

However, on the contrary, the caste system instead of withering away, has taken an ugly form which is evident from the spate
of “honour killings” taking place all over the country, in which young couples defying the verdict of khap (caste) panchayats,
marrying outside the caste or within the same gotras are brutally murdered by persons no less than their own kith and kin;27
brothers shooting sisters, grandmother killing granddaughter, mother strangling to kill by squeezing the throat with hands of
daughter father arranging son’s death, etc.

In a bizarre story, unfolding in northwest Delhi’s Ashok Vihar, a misplaced sense of caste loyalty, a twisted, medieval idea of
honour and blinding rage seem to have turned some youngsters virtually into serial killers. Honour killings’, which seemed to
be a grotesque and macabre dance of death being enacted in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, are now taking place within a
metropolitan city like Delhi, close enough to send a chill down the spines of the capital’s residents.

In just 48 hours, between the 20 to the 22 June 2010 three bodies were found of two young women and a man, with bullet
wounds in the head. Monica Gurjar Singh (24) and her husband, Kuldeep Singh (26), were found to have been killed on the
night of 20th June, 2010. On 2 June 2010, the body of Monica’s cousin, Shubha Nagar (20), was found with a hole in the head,
left to rot in a Santro car in Ashok Vihar’s H Block, barely a kilometre away from the Ashok Vihar police station,28 in Delhi.

It is horrifying to note that nineteen honor killings took place just in 80 days between April to 30 June 2010, which comes to
one murder every four days.

It is high time that a serious thought should be given as suggested by apex Court followed by concerted efforts taken in the
direction of abolishing caste system and caste based politics before it is too late.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 16 of 44
8.3 Murder

Section 302, IPC, 1860 - Cold blooded murder of Jessica Lal calls for conviction of Manu Sharma under section 302, IPC
for the rest of the his life - Supreme Court -2010

Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v State (NCT of Delhi),

(2010) 6 SCC 1 : AIR 2010 SC 2352 : 2010 (4) SCR 103 : 2010 (4) Scale 1

Per Sathasivam, J:

In a sharp 239 page judgment, a Bench comprising Justices P Sathasivam and Swatanter Kumar of the Supreme Court on the
19 April 2010 sealed Manu Sharma’s fate by upholding his conviction under section 302, IPC awarded by the Delhi High
Court, and sentenced the convict to jail for the rest of his life for the cold blooded murder of model Jessica Lal in 1999, saying
his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

On the night of 20-30 April 1999, Jessica, a 34 year-old bartender, was shot dead by Manu Sharma (33) at a restaurant called
the “Tamarind Cafi”, owned by socialite Bina Ramani at Qutub Colonade, South Delhi. The court said there was little doubt
that Manu fired from his Italian make .22 P Beretta pistol, first at the roof and then at the right temple of Jessica Lal after her
refusal to serve him liquor. She and Malini Ramani tried to make him understand that, “the party at Tamarind Court restaurant
was over and there was no liquor available”

On 21 February 2006, a trial court acquitted all the accused, including Vikas Yadav, son of Uttar Pradesh politician DP Yadav,
and former MNC executive.

This led to a public outrage, and a “Justice for Jessica” campaign. And on 18 December 2006, the Delhi High Court reversed
the order and sentenced Sharma to life imprisonment under section 302 IPC, 1860 for murder of Jessica Lal vide clause (1) to
section 300, IPC. Yadav and Gill got four years jail term for destruction of evidence.

While dismissing the appeals of the three against the High Court verdict, terming them “devoid of merit”, the apex court said
the evidence regarding the actual incident, the testimonies of witnesses, the evidence connecting the vehicles and cartridges to
the accused — Manu Sharma as well as his conduct after the incident absconding for a while and false answers to 11 material
questions posed to him by the trial court judge, prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court observed:

(i) The presence of the accused (Manu Sharma) at the scene of the crime is proved through the ocular testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, which were corroborated by the three calls made to the police control room after the incident.
(ii) He did not even have an explanation for his licensed pistol, used in the commission of the offence. Thus, an adverse
interference has to be drawn against him for non—explanation of the whereabouts of the pistol... the burden thus
shifts on him.
(iii) As regards reporting of sensitive cases, the court cautioned all modes of media to extend their cooperation to ensure
fair investigation, trial, and defence of the accused, and non-interference in the administration of justice in matters sub
judice.
(iv) The distinction between trial by media and informative media should be maintained, trial by media should be avoided,
particularly at a stage when the suspect is entitled to the constitutional protections. Invasion of his rights is bound to
be held impermissible.

Taking a serious view of “media trial” in high-profile and sensitive cases, the Supreme Court cautioned the print and electronic
media to ensure that there was no interference in the pending investigation/trial of the case while reporting it. While writing the
judgment, Justice Sathasivam said:

The freedom of speech protected under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution has to be carefully and cautiously used, so as to avoid
interference in the administration of justice and leading to undesirable results in matters sub judice.

The Bench said:

Presumption of innocence of an accused is a legal presumption and should not be destroyed at the very threshold through the process of
media trial and that too when the investigation is pending. In that event, it will be opposed to the very basic rule of law and would
impinge upon the protection granted to an accused under Article 21.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 17 of 44
8.3 Murder

The Bench further said:

It is essential for the maintenance of the dignity of courts and is one of the cardinal principles of rule of law in a free democratic country
that criticism or even reporting, particularly in sub judice matters, must be subjected to checks and balances so as not to interfere with
the administration of justice.

Referring to the High Court’s criticism of the trial court, which acquitted the prime accused, Manu Sharma, the Bench said:

The respect of the judiciary and for the judiciary is of paramount consideration. Every possible effort should be made and precaution
taken which will help in preservation of the public faith and individual dignity.

A judicial consensus would require that the judgment should be set aside or affirmed as the case may be, but preferably without offering
any undesirable comments, disparaging remarks or indications which would impinge upon the dignity and respect of judicial system,
actus curiae nemi nem gravabit.

This is a welcome judgment, and will go a long way in giving a lesson to like minded persons as Manu Sharma, who prefer to
take law in their own hands as a result of vanity, greed and their lust for power.

In this context it is important to point out, as highlighted by the apex court that, legislation is needed for a robust witness
protection system, that would protect witnesses from being intimidated by the powerful and the mafia in the society.

Sections 364, 376, 377, 302 and 201 of IPC, 1860 - Life sentence till death - Death sentence of a young person aged 28 years
converted to life imprisonment for murder and rape of child, considering the possibility of reform in the absence of record
of any previous crime of kidnapping, rape or murder on any earlier occasion - Supreme Court - 2012

Amit v State of UP,

AIR 2012 SC 1433 : 2012 AIR SCW 1628 : 2012 (4) SCC 107 : 2012 Cr LJ 1791 : 2012 (2) Scale 675

Per Justice AK Pattnaik (Swatantar Kumar J):

While upholding the conviction, the apex court partly allowed the appeal and converted the death sentence to life
imprisonment, with a direction that the life sentence will extend to full life, subject to any remission or commutation at the
instance of the government for good and sufficient reason.

The appellant accused, Amit, took away Monika, aged 3 years from the house of her parents on the pretext that he would give
biscuits to her, but never returned. It was found that the appellant raped Monica and murdered her. After investigation, charge-
sheet was framed against the appellant under sections 364, 376, 377, 302 and 201, IPC and trial court found the accused guilty
under the said sections of the Code.

The trial court took the view that this is one of those rarest of the rare cases in which the appellant was not eligible for any
sympathy of the court and imposed the sentence of death which was confirmed by the High Court.

Section 302 IPC, 1860—When circumstantial evidence fully establishes the guilt of the accused conviction under section
302 IPC for murder is proper— Supreme Court—2010

G Parshwanath v State of Karnataka29

Per Jm Panchal, J:

Circumstantial evidence.—The wife and son of the accused burnt to death in the house of the accused. The deceased had
informed her parents a few hours before incident about the cruelty meted out to her over the telephone. The accused left the
place of the incident just after the incident took place and locked the door of the house from the outside. Thus, the possibility of
any other person visiting the deceased was excluded. Medical evidence showing the presence of kerosene on the dead bodies
and the fact that the deceased was found lying on floor of the room rule out the possibility of suicide. Accused suspected the
character of the deceased and wanted to marry another girl. This constitutes sufficient motive and the circumstances lead to the
conclusion of guilt of the accused-husband.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 18 of 44
8.3 Murder

The marriage of the deceased Chethana took place with the appellant in 1987 and in 1988 the deceased gave birth to a male
child. Initially the relations between the appellant and the deceased were cordial, but, after sometime bickering started taking
place between the two of them. As the days passed by, this bickering grew into discordiality resulting in the harassment and
cruelty to the deceased by the appellant.

The deceased used to complain about the harassment and cruelty meted out to her, to her father, mother and sister when she had
the occasion to meet them.

On 13 May 1993 around 1.45 pm the neighbours of the appellant noticed smoke and fumes emitting from the house of the
appellant, which was situated at Ganesh Temple Street, Bellary.

Fire brigade officials rushed to the house on information, opened the front door and noticed two completely burnt and charred
bodies of a woman and a child in one of the rooms. The appellant was not present in the house, and came back only after the
information about the fire having taken place in his house was conveyed to him.

The appellant was found guilty for commission of offences punishable under sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Feeling aggrieved the appellant preferred appeal, which was dismissed by the High Court, which gave rise to the
appeal before the Supreme Court.

Dismissing the appeal, the Apex Court held that, in a case based on circumstantial evidence where proved circumstances
complete the chain of evidence, it cannot be said that in the absence of motive, the other proved circumstances are of no
consequence.

The effect of the absence of motive would depend on the facts of each case. The prosecution alleged that the appellant disliked
his deceased wife as he suspected that he had not fathered her child and he was contemplating to marry another girl. Some of
the letters produced by the prosecution would indicate that the deceased was suffering a lot because of the unnatural conduct of
the appellant towards her. The evidence of the mother of the deceased would also show that the deceased was subjected to
harassment. The finding recorded by the High Court that from a letter relied upon by the defence i.e. Exhibit D-2 it transpires
that the appellant was harassing the deceased and treating her with cruelty because he was desirous of marrying some other girl
cannot be ignored.

This constitutes sufficient motive on the part of the appellant to kill his wife and child. The court also mentioned that the
appellant had initiated divorce proceedings against the deceased. Those proceedings were dismissed for default.

If all the circumstances mentioned above are taken together, coupled with the absence of any material to indicate that Chethana
had committed suicide with the child, they lead to only one inference that in all human probability the murders of the deceased
were committed by the appellant alone and none else.

The Supreme Court held that the evidence on record has been rightly appreciated by the trial court and the High Court. On
appreciation of evidence, the appellant is found guilty. Neither the reasons given by the trial court nor the High Court can be
termed as perverse so as to call for interference of this court in the instant appeal.

Appeal is dismissed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 302 Murder Circumstantial evidence testimony of eye-witnesses having seen deceased
going on bicycle with accused previous evening. Deceased not returning at night. Corpse of deceased recovered next
morning hidden in heap of fodder in fields. Post-mortem report- opinion death of deceased due to strangulation. Time
elapsed since death of deceased estimated in post-mortem report as 24 to 36 hours coinciding with when deceased was last
seen with accused FIR lodged promptly.

No evidence led by accused regarding his not being in company of deceased or that they had parted their ways. Recovery of
bicycle as also milk-can on confession of accused, identified by witness belonging to him and abscondence of accused after
incident are additional factors completing links in chain of circumstances. Conviction of accused, proper. (2018)

Satpal v State of Haryana30

Per Navin Sinha, J:

The appellant assails his conviction under section 302 read with section 201, IPC, 1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Hissar affirmed by the High Court, based on the last seen theory.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 19 of 44
8.3 Murder

Dismissing the appeal Apex Court held, an FIR is not to be read as an encyclopedia requiring every minute detail of the
occurrence to be mentioned therein. The absence of any mention in it with regard to the previous altercation, or the presence of
the milk-can, cannot affect its veracity so as to doubt the entire case of the prosecution. The altercation suffices to establish
motive. The appellant has not led any evidence regarding his not being in the company of the deceased or that they had
subsequently parted ways.

The deceased Kapil Kumar was 13 years old hardly in a position to resist the appellant. We see no reason why the two
witnesses being related to the deceased would depose falsely and shield the real offender, especially when the appellant has not
given any reason or led any evidence for his false implication.

The recovery of the atlas cycle on the confession of the appellant, identified by PW-7 (uncle of deceased) as belonging to him,
as also the recovery of the milk-can on the same basis with the name of PW-7 inscribed on it with nail polish and the fact that
the appellant was absconding after the occurrence till his arrest on 16 September 2007 are additional incriminating factors
which complete the links in the chain of circumstances. The recovery having been proved by PW-7, the failure to examine the
other seizure witness, Kheda, is of no consequence.

In the entirety of the fact and circumstances of the case, the Court found no reason to interfere with the conviction of the
appellant.

Appeal dismissed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 302—Evidence Act section 3 Murder Circumstantial evidence. Guilt of accused must be
established by prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and circumstances must be consistent only with guilt of accused. (Para
9) Accused allegedly causing death or deceased while taking her to her sister’s place. Accused informing that she had stayed
back at her sister’s place followed by his ascendance after incident sufficient to hold accused guilty. However, strong
suspicion in itself, not sufficient to establish guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt—Material contradiction and failure
in establishing complete chain of circumstances and to exclude every hypothesis other than guilt of accused. Conviction
unsustainable. (Para 13)—Supreme Court—2017. Appeal allowed.

Ganpat Singh v State of MP31

Per Dr DY Chandrachud, J:

This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in its bench at Indore. The High
Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Shantabai was a widow. Her husband Mangilal had died about a decade earlier. She resided together with her son Rakesh, who
was a minor. The prosecution alleges that the appellant would visit her frequently.

The Additional Sessions Judge found the Appellant guilty of an offence under section 302 of the IPC, 1860 and sentenced him
to imprisonment for life. The case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances which weighed with the trial
court were that; (i) the deceased was last seen accompanying the appellant; (ii) the deceased had taken with her the jewellery of
PW-1 and PW-2 which was recovered from the appellant; and (iii) the appellant had no explanation of how the articles were
found in his possession.

The High Court did not rely upon the alleged recovery of the silver ornaments which were material circumstances which the
Additional Sessions Judge had found to link the appellant with the murder of Shantabai. Nonetheless, three circumstances
weighed with the High Court in affirming the conviction of the appellant. These are summarized in the following extracts of the
judgment of the High Court:

Thus, to summarize the facts:—

(i) The deceased was last seen in the company of the accused.
(ii) The accused made false statement to the son of the deceased Rakesh (PW-4) that her mother had gone to the maternal
aunt.
(iii) That the body of the deceased was recovered at the instance of the accused.

Allowing the appeal Apex Court said in a case which rests on circumstantial evidence, the law postulates a two-fold
requirement. First, every link in the chain of circumstances necessary to establish the guilt of the accused must be established

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 20 of 44
8.3 Murder

by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Second, all the circumstances must be consistent only with the guilt of the
accused. The principle has been consistently formulated thus:

The normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to
be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing
towards the guilt of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from
the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation
on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence.32

The mere circumstance that the appellant was last seen with the deceased is an unsafe hypothesis to base a conviction on a
charge of murder in this case. The lapse of time between the point when the appellant was last seen with the deceased and the
time of death is not minimal. The time of death was estimated to be between two to four weeks prior to the recovery of the
body.

Appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances and to
exclude every hypothesis other than the guilt of the Appellant. (Para 3)

Appeal allowed the conviction of the Appellant under section 302 of the IPC, 1860 was set aside.

Appeal allowed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 302—Evidence Act section 106. Murder. Circumstantial evidence Theory of last seen.
Accused asking deceased to accompany him for cleaning safety tank. Family members of deceased deposing about last
seeing deceased leaving with accused. Burden on accused, to explain what happened to deceased. Accused not discharging
his obligation, by providing any explanation regarding whereabouts of deceased. Accused misleading family member of
deceased, to approach police for searching her husband. Dead body of deceased found thereafter. Irrespective of unreliable
recovery of weapon and severed head by accused, strong circumstances against accused, inconsistent with his innocence.
Conviction, proper. (Para 8)—Supreme Court—2017

Dilip Mallick v State of WB33

Per L Nageswara Rao, J:

This appeal is filed against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta by which the conviction of the appellant under section
302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentence of life imprisonment by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track 2nd Court,
Siliguri was confirmed.

A decapitated body and the cut head of the deceased was found lying in the Chandmuni Tea Estate near Himachal Behar
Abasan Project at 1.30 pm hours on 3 February 2004. On the basis of a written complaint made by Bhupendra Nath Singh
(PW-12), the investigation commenced and the appellant along with Hira Routh and Khogesh Bansfore were arrested.

The Trial Court held that the chain of circumstances was clearly established by clinching evidence which proved that the
accused persons had committed the offence.

The High Court re-appreciated the evidence on record and upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellant qua section 302
IPC, 1860.

The three circumstances relied upon by the High Court are that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, that the
accused attempted to mislead regarding the whereabouts of the deceased and that the accused did not offer any explanation
about the events of accused.

Dismissing the appeal and upholding conviction apex Court said:

PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5 who are the family members of the deceased were consistent in their testimonies that the deceased and accused
were last seen together at around 2:00 pm on 2 February 2004. There is a burden on the accused to give an explanation about what
happened after they left the house of the deceased. No explanation was given about the events of 2 February 2004 after they left from
the house of the deceased.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 21 of 44
8.3 Murder

We are in agreement with the conclusion of the High Court that though the recovery was not proved, the other circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused. Accused is directed to surrender before the jail authorities immediately
to undergo the remaining part of the sentence.

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), sections 300, 309— section 3 - Evidence Act (1 of 1872)—Suicide or homicide

In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn
should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances shall be complete
and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.—Supreme Court—Appeal allowed,
conviction quashed.

Satish Nirankari v State of Rajasthan34

Per AK Sikri, J:

Pooja, daughter of Pramod Bhatnagar (Informant) went missing on 1 November 1995. On that day, she had left her home at
5.30 pm to attend her MBA classes. However, she did not return. Accused was charged and convicted under section 300 IPC,
1860 for murder of the deceased Pooja. The conviction was confirmed by High Court. Allowing the appeal apex Court said:

The deceased and appellant had gone to the place of incident together.

Since the parties are in love with each other and families are against it, they decided to get married. It is established that
deceased was wearing bindi, make-up, sindoor (vermillion) and 12 red bangles. From the place of incident following articles
were removed – bindi, vermillion, bangles, rose garland, make up material, metal glass, one tumbler containing copper sulphate
water, fruit juice that Pooja could arrange the poison from a house belonging to a stranger. Second reason was that after
consuming poison, a lonely girl could not fathom strength to hang herself. These are mere conjectures. There had to be a
positive evidence that the appellant had administered poison to the deceased, which is missing. Moreover, following
circumstances are assumed by the High Court, which are again unwarranted.

The appellant made sure that deceased was taken to hospital to save her.

If appellant’s intention was to commit murder of the deceased and escape, he could have just left the deceased at the spot and
deceased would have died of poisoning. It was pointless and futile for appellants to additionally hang deceased. Moreover, if
such was the intention of the appellant, he would not have called for help or raised alarm with neighbours. The appellant also
would not have committed the murder in the place where he worked and operated from. (Para 36)

If appellant’s intention was to commit murder, he could have run away from the spot of incident. (Para 37)

If appellant’s intention was to commit murder, he would not have directed his brother – Ashok to call for deceased’s parents,
which he admittedly did. (Para 38)

Admittedly appellant also consumed poison and was in hospital for 50 days. Appellant is also convicted for section 309 IPC,
1860 for attempting to commit suicide.

We have pointed out above that the High Court had made two observations as reasons in support of the conclusion that it is the,
appellant who committed murder. First reason was that it was highly unbelievable.

“(i) Deceased might have fallen in love with appellant while she was a teenager, but at the age of 23 years having
ambition to become IAS officer, it cannot be believed that she wanted to marry appellant.
(ii) Possibility cannot be ruled out that appellant was desperately wanting to marry deceased and took her to a lonely
place. When deceased did not agree, appellant first offered poison with thumbs-up and later ties cable wire to the neck
of the deceased and pushed her head on the wall. The appellant later put vermillion and bangles on the body of the
deceased.” (Para 40)

Coming to the cause of death, learned counsel for the appellant had argued before us, as well as in the High Court, that as per
Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence & Toxicology there are 16 main distinctions in death caused by hanging or strangulation.
According to medical evidence second ligature mark was ending towards back of the neck and it was oblique going upwards
and ligature mark was shining. The hyoid bone was intact there was no fracture of larynx and trachea. There were no scratches,
abrasions and bruises on face, mouth and ears. There were no abrasions and ecchymosed around about the edges of ligature
mark. Subcutaneous tissues under ligature mark were white, hard and glistering. There were no injuries to muscles of neck. The

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 22 of 44
8.3 Murder

saliva was dribbling. If the death would have been strangulation then fracture of larynx and trachea and hyoid bone was a must
there should have scratches abrasions and fingernail marks and bruises on the face neck and other parts of the body. Saliva
would not have dribbling, ligature mark would have been horizontal and not oblique it would have lower down in the neck and
not upwards to the chin. There should have been abrasions and ecchymosed round about the edges of the ligature marks.
Subcutaneous tissues should have ecchymosed there should have been some injuries to muscles of neck carotid arterier,
internal coat should have been ruptured, whereas there was no such rupture. The prosecution failed to prove that the cause of
death was homicidal. Dr SK Pathak (PW-3) did not say that death was homicidal in nature. Post-mortem Report (Ex. P-4) also
does not say that it was homicidal. (Para 41)

This aspect is not even dealt with by the High Court. Further, the alleged weapon, i.e., cable wire was not sent to CFSL and to
any scientific laboratory to confirm fingerprints of the appellant. All the aforesaid factors amply demonstrate that the
prosecution has not been able to bring out and prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. There are lurking
doubts in the story of the prosecution and many missing links which are pointed out above.

The court said therefore, it is of the opinion that prosecution has not been able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. As a consequence, this appeal is allowed setting aside the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the
IPC.

Appeal allowed.

Section 300 IPC, 1860—Conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence: In case of Evidence of “Last seen together”
theory being not trustworthy to establish chain of circumstances that could link the accused with crime, accused is entitled
to be acquitted—Appeal Allowed—Supreme Court—2008

Sattatiya @ Satish Rajanna Kartalla v State of Maharashtra35

Per GS Singhvi, J:

The appellant—accused was convicted under section 302 IPC, 1860 for murder of one Satish who was found lying on the right
side of the stairs of “Pratap building” 173, Dadiseth Agyari Lane, Mumbai in a pool of blood on 1 October 1994 and sentenced
to life imprisonment.36

The accused-appellant and one Devabhuma Badapatti were arrested on 3 October 1994. On questioning by the police about the
murder the accused took the police to room No. 45 of the third floor of Ganesh Bhawan and got recovered his paint and shirt
with blood stains and one half portion of the blade alleged to have been used for the commission of the offence. A handkerchief
was found near the body of the deceased which was said to have been purchased by the appellant from one Mohammed Farid
Abdul Gani’s shop. It was stated by one Raju Chandur Pujari that he saw the accused with the deceased on the night of the
incident, on 30 September 1994 at 10.45 pm.

The trial court relying on the prosecutions’ contention of circumstantial evidence of “last seen together theory,” recovery of
blood stained paint and shirt and blood stained half blade and handkerchief found near the body of the deceased convicted both
the accused under section 302 read with section 34 IPC, 1860 and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

On appeal the High Court upheld the conviction of the appellant but acquitted Devabhuma Badpatti on the premises that there
was no evidence trustworthy that he was party to the crime.

Allowing the appeal the apex court said that on a careful scrutiny of the facts of the case it is evident that the prosecution has
failed to establish the chain of circumstances leading to an inescapable conclusion that the appellant had committed the crime.
The very fact that the prosecution did not produce any document containing the recording of the statement allegedly made by
the appellant expressing his desire to facilitate recovery of the cloth and half blade and purchase of handkerchief is highly
suspect and not trust worthy. The credibility of the evidence relating to recovery is substantially dented by the fact that even
though as per the chemical Examiners Report the blood stains found on the shirt, paint and half blade were those of human
blood, the same could not be linked with the blood of the deceased. The court refereed to a number of cases in support of its
contention that has been listed in the footnote.37

Appeal allowed.

Section 302 of IPC, 1860—Conviction of appellant for murder under section 302 IPC merely on the basis of extrajudicial
confession coupled with recovery of weapon of crime at his instance—Not proper—Supreme Court—2010

Podyami Sukada v State of MP (New Chhattisgarh)38

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 23 of 44
8.3 Murder

Per CK Prasad, J:

The appellant confessed that on the night of 8 December 1999, his mother (deceased) Madvi Mase scolded him alleging that he
wanders after consuming liquor which enraged him and he picked up a burning wooden plank assaulted her which caused her
death. On the basis of what has been disclosed in the meeting with PW 1 Madvi Rama, the accused was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment under section 302 IPC, 1860 on the basis of an extra-judicial confession. The High Court while
concurring with the decision of the lower court said:

In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that extrajudicial confession regarding causing death of his mother attacking her
with the teak wood plank was made by the accused before the panchayat, this evidence of extrajudicial confession by accused before
these witnesses inspire confidence of the court as the same stands corroborated by FIR Recovery of weapon of offence as well as
medical evidence also corroborates the confession. Therefore, the finding of the trial court convicting the accused for the offence under
section 302 is based on the legal evidence and we do not find any circumstance to differ from the view taken by the trial court.

While allowing the appeal and setting aside the conviction, the apex court said that the evidence of both the prosecution
witnesses is slippery and it is difficult to hold with certainty from their evidence that any extra judicial confession in fact was
made by the appellant. The court said that this state of evidence leaves the court in doubt. The court opined that the witness of
the extrajudicial confession did not inspire confidence and merely on the ground of recovery of weapon of crime at the instance
of the appellant, it shall be unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellant. Accordingly, the court granted the appellant the
benefit of doubt.

Appeal was allowed.

Conviction under sections 302, 323 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. A valid dying declaration may be made
without obtaining a certificate of fitness of the declarant by a medical officer. No reason to question the reliability of the
dying declaration of the deceased for the reason that at the time of recording his statement by Head Constable, Manphool
Singh, he was found to be mentally fit to give his statement regarding the occurrence. Further, evidence of Head Constable
Manphool Singh was shown to be trustworthy and has been accepted by the Courts below. The view taken by the High
Court does not suffer from any infirmity and the same is in order. Conviction upheld.

Gulzari Lal v State of Haryana39

Per V Gopala Gowda, J:

The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment passed in by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh,
whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant upholding the judgment and order of the learned District &
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Hisar whereby the learned Sessions Judge had convicted the appellant under sections 302,
323 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life, along with a fine of Rs
200. While dismissing the appeal. The Apex Court said that the question raised by the appellant on the issue that no blood
stained earth was recovered from the place of crime is not relevant. On this count, the High Court had also noted the laxity on
the part of the police and rightfully concluded that the conviction was valid in light of the statements made by the deceased and
the witnesses.

Dismissing the appeal Apex Court held it did not find any infirmities with the statements made by the deceased and recorded
by the head constable Manphool Singh.

Appeal dismissed. (Supreme Court 2016)

Accused and co-accused jointly stabling deceased causing death leading to recovery of blood-stained knives. FSL (Forensic
Science Laboratory report) report establishing blood of deceased on one knife seized clothes of accused showing blood of
deceased. Reliable testimony of eye-witnesses about both accused going to house of deceased and assaulting him with knives
after taking him away. Failure of prosecution to establish motive, inconsequential. Both accused liable to be convicted
under sections 302/34 IPC.

Kara Bhai v State of Gujarat,

AIR 2017 SC 5413

Dismissing the appeal held Accused 1 (Bhima) and accused 2 (Kara Bhai), who had jointly gone to the house of the deceased

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 24 of 44
8.3 Murder

and had called him out and had taken him away. Immediately thereafter the incident had taken place in course of which both
accused Nos 1 and 2 had attacked the deceased with knives. In view of the said evidence on record, the prosecution would not
be required to establish that it is any one particular accused who is responsible for causing the fatal injury inasmuch as the
ingredients of sections 302 and section 34 IPC, 1860 would be squarely (fairly attracted) attracted in the present case.

Dying declaration (Ex PF/1) was properly recorded and was rightly relied on by the Courts below for resting the appellant’s
conviction. We also hold that it was corroborated by the testimony of Pyarelal (PW-3), who proved the motive behind the
incident and also proved the incident in question by identifying the accused.—Supreme Court—2016. Appeal dismissed,
conviction restored.

Shama v State of Haryana40

Per Abhay Manohar Sapre, J:

This appeal is filed against the judgment passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh whereby the High
Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant and upheld the judgment/order of conviction and sentence rendered under
section 302 read with section 34 IPC, 1860 by the Trial Court.

Naurang-the deceased was an inhabitant of Malia Mandi, Hansi. About 8-9 months prior to the occurrence, his daughter Suman
was married to son of Sube Singh (accused No 3). However, the relations between the two families had become strained due to
this marriage.

On 9 October 1997, at about 9.15 pm, Naurang-the deceased was going on his bicycle to attend his duty at Hafed Spinning
Mill, Hansi. When he reached near the nursery, Sube Singh, his brother-Shama (appellant herein) and one fat man-Jai Singh
came on a scooter, Jai Singh asked Naurang about his name and when he told his name, he fired a shot from his pistol on
Naurang’s abdomen, which hit a little above his navel. Some passers-by took Naurang to the General Hospital, Hansi. Dr SK
Gupta (PW-1) Medical Officer of the hospital, informed the police about the admission of injured Naurang in hospital. After
receiving information, Mam Chand, Inspector came to the hospital and made an application seeking opinion of the doctor about
the fitness of Naurang so as to enable him to record his statement. After getting the opinion of the Doctor that Naurang was fit
to make statement, Mam Chand, Inspector recorded the statement of Naurang (Ex. PF/1), the subsequently expired.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Hisar convicted all the three accused for the offence punishable under section 302/34 Indian
Penal Code, 1860. Accused Jai Singh was held guilty under section 25 of the Arms Act also were sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs 10,000 each under section 302/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860.

In view of the foregoing discussion, Apex Court said the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Conviction restored.

Dying declaration—Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 implicating husband of the deceased. The evidence available
on record and the sole evidence of the father of the deceased implicating husband of the deceased as compared to the dying
declaration of the deceased exonerating husband did not inspire confidence to make it the basis for the conviction of the
respondent. Hence, the appeal failed and was accordingly dismissed.—Supreme Court—2016

State of Gujarat v Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Vari41

Per RK Agrawal, J:

Rekhaben (since deceased) was married to Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu, the respondent, was residing along with her in-laws. The
deceased was admitted to the Government Hospital with 90% burn injuries. She stated that in the morning, when all other
family members were sleeping in the house, an unknown person came near her and told her that he had come to take her. By
saying so, he took her into the kitchen, poured kerosene on her and by lighting the matchstick set her on fire and went away
from the place and, consequently, she started burning in flames. She further gave a statement that the unknown person was an
outsider who was wearing white clothes. On hearing her cries, other family members also woke up and admitted her in the
hospital. The said FIR was registered on the basis of the statement given by the deceased herself in the hospital to the police
official which was treated as a complaint. In the said statement, the thumb impression of the deceased was identified by the
father of the deceased. On the very same day, she made a statement before the Executive Magistrate and narrated the whole
incident. In the afternoon, the deceased succumbed to her injuries. On the basis of the statement given by the deceased, the
Sessions Judge convicted the respondent under section 302 Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved by the order acquitting the respondent of all the charges, the State filed present appeal by way of special leave
before present Court.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 25 of 44
8.3 Murder

Held, apex Court while dismissing the appeal;

(i) The dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Executive Magistrate after following the due process of
law. In both the statements, the deceased had not named her husband/the respondent or his family members. Both the
statements were consistent and there was no contradiction as to the role of the respondent. There was no involvement
of the respondent in the commission of offence.
(ii) The Courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not
available for the cross-examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. There were two sets of
evidence, one was the statement made before the police officer and the Executive Magistrate and the other was the
oral dying declaration made by the deceased before her father. It could not be said that there were contradictions in
the statements made before the police officer and the Executive Magistrate as to the role of the respondent in the
commission of the offence and in such circumstances, one set of evidence which was more consistent and reliable,
which in the present case being one in favour of the respondent, required to be accepted and conviction could not be
placed on the sole testimony of father of deceased.
(iii) The conviction basing reliance upon the oral dying declaration made to the father of the deceased is not reliable and
such a declaration can be a result of afterthought. This was the reason the Court also insisted that the dying
declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. It cannot be laid
down as an absolute Rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is
corroborated. The Rule requiring corroboration is merely a Rule of prudence.
(iv) The prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and it is also the Rule of justice in
criminal law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other towards his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.

Appeal dismissed.

Section 302 IPC, 1860 and section 3 of Evidence Act—Murder of wife by Husband: The very fact that the husband was
absconding for a month from the date of murder of the wife by pouring kerosene on her body in the room in which they
were living confirms that husband must have caused death when the plea of alibi could not be substantiated. Conviction can
be based on dying declaration alone, subject to the satisfaction of the court—Accused Liable—Supreme Court—2008

Amarsingh Munnasingh Suyawanshi v State of Maharashtra42

Per B Sinha, J:

The appellant was unemployed and was addicted to liquor. His wife, Kamlabai, the deceased used to work as labourer and was
being ill treated by her husband.43 On the fateful day of 7 June 1990 when she was serving food to the appellant at 9.00 pm he
took out kerosene from the lamp, poured it on her body and set her ablaze and thereafter, fled away from the place. On hearing
her cries, the neighbours came and extinguished the fire, and was taken to hospital next day where she succumbed to the
injuries. In the hospital she made two dying declarations—one before the constable and the other before the Special Judicial
Magistrate in which she charged “her husband of setting fire”. Husband r emained absconding for a almost a month and finally
surrendered only on 5 July 1990.

In the absence of any explanation whatsoever as to why for about a month the accused was absconding in a situation of this
nature where admittedly the husband, wife and children were residing in one room at the time of the occurrence it was he and
the deceased alone were residing, it was for the appellant-accused to prove that how the deceased had met her death. Since the
accused was unable to explain cause of the homicidal death of his wife, it was obvious that it was none other than the accused
himself who caused the death of his wife. The guilt of the accused is further supported by the dying declaration of the deceased
that affirms the role of the accused in pouring kerosence on her and setting her ablaze.

Relying on the dying declaration, the trial court sentenced the appellant to Life imprisonment under section 302 IPC, 1860,
which was confirmed by the High Court. Accused appealed to the apex court.

While dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that:

It is now a well settled principle of law that a judgment of conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone subject
of course to the satisfaction of the court that the same was true and voluntary.44

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 26 of 44
8.3 Murder

Conviction upheld.

Section 302 IPC, 1860—Accused strangulated his fiance (with whom he was engaged) on her refusal to marry-Absconding
and Attempting to hide his identity—Guilty of Murder—Supreme Court—2008

Kuchibotla Saran Kumar v State of AP45

Harjit Singh Bedi, J:

Accused and the deceased P Sesha Sudha, an ad hoc (temporary) lecturer in a college in Vishakapatnam, were in love with each
other. The marriage was fixed on 23 March 2000 at Vishakhapatnam. However, the difference surfaced between the two and
the marriage was called off. The accused became upset and annoyed with the cancellation so much so that he threatened in case
the deceased would not marry him she would be killed as he would not tolerate her marriage to any one else.

Since the accused did not succeed in his efforts, he planned to get rid of the deceased. He telephoned the deceased to meet her
in the College in the Electrical Engineering Laboratory on 8 February 2000. Since it was a sports day no one was in the lab on
that day. He took her there wrapped her chunni (Dupatta) around her and strangulated her to death. He left the body into corner
beyond sight of the persons and left the place. The lab was locked at 4.00 pm. When the lab was opened next morning, i.e., 9
February 2000 the body of the deceased was found lying on the floor.46

The accused was prosecuted under 302 IPC, 1860 for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, which was confirmed by the
High Court. The apex court dismissed the appeal as having no merit.

Conviction confirmed.

Rape with murder—Death penalty commuted to life imprisonment: Chain of circumstantial evidence complete to prove the
offence beyond reasonable doubt— Supreme Court—2010

Aftab Ahmad Anasari v State of Uttaranchal,47

AIR 2010 SC 773 : (2010) 2 SCC 583 : 2010 (1) Scale 408 : JT 2010 (1) SC 424

The deceased went missing in the evening of 5 February 1998 when she was playing near her house. Her naked dead body was
found at about 6 am on 8 February 1998 lying on a public way in front of her neighbor’s house. She was found to be subjected
to rape and died a homicidal death. The appellant, who is the accused, was seen fleeing away from near the place where the
dead body of the deceased was lying at about 4.30 am on 8 February 1998. Blood stained frock and blood stained underwear of
the deceased concealed in the house of sister of the appellant were recovered pursuant to voluntary disclosure statement made
by the appellant while in police custody. Underwear of the appellant seized during the course of investigation was found to be
stained with blood and semen. The appellant’s evidence relating to extra judicial confession made by accused to ex-pradhan of
village found to be reliable.48

The appellant and one Mumtaz were prosecuted for rape and murder of Yasmeen aged five years daughter of Nayeem Ahmad
and for causing the disappearance of evidence of those offences. The Sessions Judge, Nainital, convicted the appellant and
Mumtaz under sections 302, 376 and 201 of the Indian penal Code and imposed death sentence under section 302 IPC as well
as for life imprisonment under section 376 IPC, 1860 for rape. However, the High Court in appeal though confirmed the
conviction but modified the sentence to life imprisonment under section 302 IPC.49

Upholding the conviction and dismissing the appeal the apex court held that the cumulative effect of the above mentioned facts
taken together is conclusive proof beyond reasonable doubt in establishing the guilt of the appellant. The chain of
circumstances is such as to show that within all human probability the rape and murder of the deceased were committed by the
appellant and none else and he had also caused disappearance of evidence of those offences.

8.3.1 Exceptions to Murder Treated as Culpable Homicide not Amounting to murder Punishable under section 304,
Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 300 of IPC, 1860 speaks of five exceptions in which, if a murder is committed, it is treated as “culpable homicide not
amounting to murder”. The exceptions are justified on the ground that in such cases the deceased is equally responsible for his
death. Accordingly, the criminal liability of the accused is reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder
punishable under section 304, IPC.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 27 of 44
8.3 Murder

(i) Whilst the accused was deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation; Exception 1 to section
300, IPC; or
(ii) In the exercise of the right of private defence; Exception 2 to section 300, IPC; or
(iii) In the exercise of legal powers; Exception 3 to section 300, IPC; or
(iv) In a sudden fight; Exception 4 to section 300, IPC; or
(v) With the consent of the deceased; Exception 5 to section 300, IPC.

8.3.1.1 Grave and Sudden Provocation

Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of
the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes
the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—

First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any
person.

Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful
exercise of the power of such public servant.

Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a
question of fact.

Exception 1 not applicable in case of lapse of sufficient time between act and incident after provocation—Appeal
Dismissed—Supreme Court—1962

KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra,

AIR 1962 SC 605 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR 567

The appellant KM Nanavati, second in command of the Indian Naval Ship “Mysore” was sentenced to life imprisonment under
section 302 by the Bombay High Court for the murder of Prem Ahuja, a businessman of Bombay, for having illicit relationship
with his wife Sylvia, who confessed to Nanavati of her illicit intimacy with Ahuja. Enraged at the conduct of Ahuja, Nanavati
went to his ship, took from the stores of the ship a semiautomatic revolver and six cartridges on a false pretext, loaded the
same, went to Ahuja’s apartment, entered his bedroom and shot him dead. Thereafter, the accused, surrendered himself to the
police.

His defence was that when he shot the deceased he was deprived of the power of self-control caused by sudden and grave
provocation.

The question before the court was whether a reasonable person placed in the same position as the accused, would have reacted
to the confession by his wife in the manner as the accused did.

Justice Subba Rao held:

Under this exception culpable homicide is not murder if the following conditions are complied with:

(1) The deceased must have provoked the accused.

(2) The provocation must be grave.
(3) The provocation must be sudden.
(4) The offender, by reason of the said provocation, shall, have been deprived of his power of self-control.
(5) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control.
(6) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by
mistake or accident.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 28 of 44
8.3 Murder

Chief Justice Goddard in R v Duffy, [1948] 1 All ER 932, said:

Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the deceased to the accused which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually
causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for
the moment not master of his mind.

The Indian Law on the subject may be considered from two aspects, namely,

(1) whether words or gestures unaccompanied by acts can amount to provocation, and
(2) what is the effect of the time lag between the act of provocation and the commission of the offence.

The Madras High Court in Boya Munigadu v The Queen, (1881) ILR 3 Mad 33, upheld the plea of grave and sudden
provocation, in the following circumstances. The accused saw deceased when she had cohabitation with his bitter enemy; that
night he had nothing to eat; next morning he went to the ryots for his wages when he saw his wife eating along with her
paramour. He killed the paramour with a bill hook. Held, the accused had sufficient provocation to bring the case within the
first exception to section 300.

Where a woman was leading a notoriously immoral life, and on the previous night mysteriously disappeared from the bed side
of her husband and the husband protested against her conduct, she vulgarly abused him, whereupon the husband lost his self-
control, picked up a rough stick, and assaulted her ...the Lahore High Court, in Jan Muhammad v Emperor,50 held:

In judging the conduct of the accused, one must not confine himself to the actual moment when the blow, which ultimately proved to be
fatal, was struck, that is to say, one must take into consideration not only the event which took place immediately before the fatal below
was struck. ...but also the whole unfortunate affair should be looked at as one prolonged agony on the part of the husband which must
have been preying upon his mind and led to the assault upon the woman, resulting in her death.

...Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of “grave and sudden” provocation?

No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends
upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the
society to which an accused belongs. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision, it is for the
court to decide in each case depending upon the facts and circumstances. However, following guidelines may be stated as
follows:

(1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the
accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.
(2) Words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to
bring his act within the first exception to section 300.
(3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining
whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence.
(4) The fatal blow should be traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had
cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving scope for premeditation and calculation.

Bearing these principles in mind, let us look at the facts of this case. When Sylvia confessed to her husband that she had illicit
intimacy with Ahuja, the latter was not present. We will assume that he had momentarily lost his self-control. But, if his
version is true—it shows that he was only thinking of the future of his wife and children and also of asking for an explanation
from Ahuja for his conduct. This attitude of the accused clearly indicates that he had not only regained his self-control, but, on
the other hand, was planning for the future. Then he drove his wife and children to a cinema, left them there, went to his ship,
took a revolver on a false pretext, loaded it with six rounds, did some official business there, and drove his car to the office of
Ahuja and then to his flat, went straight to the bedroom of Ahuja and shot him dead. Between 1.30 pm when he left his house
and 4.20 pm when the murder took place, three hours had elapsed, and, therefore, there was sufficient time for him to regain his
self-control, even if he had not regained it earlier.

On the other hand, his conduct clearly shows that the murder was a deliberate and calculated one. The mere fact that before the

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 29 of 44
8.3 Murder

shooting, the accused abused the deceased and the abuse provoked an equally abusive reply could not conceivably be a
provocation for the murder.

Held, the facts of the case do not attract Exception 1 to section 300.

The appeal is dismissed.

Act of sodomy on the son of the accused by deceased was sufficient provocation under exception I to section 300, IPC,
1860—Accused entitled to right of private defence—Supreme Court—1977

Hansa Singh v State of Punjab51

The accused on seeing one Gurbachan Singh (the deceased) committing sodomy on his son, assaulted him resulting in death.
The court held that the accused (appellant) had done so under sudden and grave provocation which led him to commit
murderous assault. The appeal of the accused was allowed. Conviction of the accused was reduced from life imprisonment
under section 302 to imprisonment for seven years under section 304, Part II of IPC, 1860 vide Exception I to section 300, IPC.

Constant harassment by throwing garbage and rubbish into one’s shop/home may lead to grave and sudden provocation
resulting in deprivation of power of self control, exception 1 to section 300, IPC applicable—Supreme Court—2007

Muthu v State of TN52

The Supreme Court in Muthu v State of TN, on 2 November 2007 held that constant harassment may lead to deprivation of the
power of self control amounting to grave and sudden provocation. The accused Muthu angered by a ragpicker-Siva’s daily
habit of throwing waste into his shop, took out a knife and stabbed him to death. Differentiating between a pre-planned crime
and a crime resulting from a fit of rage, the court said this was not a murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder
punishable under section 304 IPC, 1860. In so doing, the apex court placed littering several notches higher on the scale of
offence.

Justice Katju, writing the judgment for the bench said:

In the heat of the moment and in a fit of anger people some times do acts which may not have been done after premeditation. Hence, the
law provides that while those who commit acts in a fit or anger should also be punished, their punishment should be lesser than that of
premeditated offences… We are satisfied that Muthu was deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation which
led him to commit the offence. If rubbish is thrown into one’s house or shop, one would naturally get very upset. It is evident that the
accused had no motive or intention to cause death since he was not carrying the knife from before, and only picked it up during the
scuffle with Siva (deceased).

Appeal was partly allowed and the life term reduced to five years giving the accused the benefit of Exception I to section 300 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Effect of provocation on a reasonable man is the determining factor to justify verdict of manslaughter—House of Lords—
1941

Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions,

(1941) 3 All ER 272 (HL) : [1942] AC 1

Facts: Fletcher, an enemy of the appellant and Distleman, entered a club, whereupon the appellant attacked Fletcher. Distleman
came to Fletcher’s aid seized the appellant and aimed a blow at him. The appellant whipped out a dagger, mortally wounded
Distleman and cut Fletcher’s hand severely. The appellant pleaded that his action had been taken in private defence, when
Distleman attacked him with the open penknife.

The test to determine whether provocation will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter is that of the effect of the
provocation upon a reasonable man, so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely on
provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did. In applying the test, it is of particular importance—

(i) to consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to cool, and

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 30 of 44
8.3 Murder

(ii) to take into account the instrument with which the homicide was effected, for to retort in the heat of passing induced
by provocation by a simple blow is a very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a concealed
dagger.

In short, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation, if the offence is to be reduced to
manslaughter.

The jury found the appellant guilty of murder and his appeal to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords was dismissed.

A reasonable man is one having power of self control of an ordinary man of that age and sex as that of the accused—House
of Lords—1978

Director of Public Prosecutions v Camplin,

(1978) 2 All ER 168 (HL) : [1978] UKHL 2 : [1978] AC 705

Facts: The respondent Camplin, who was 15 years of age, killed Mohammed Lal Khan, by splitting his skull with a chapati
pan. At the time of the incident, the two of them were alone in Khan’s flat. Camplin’s defence was that Khan had buggered him
despite of his resistance and had then laughed at him whereupon Camplin had lost his self-control and attacked Khan fatally
with a chapati pan.

The jury found Camplin guilty of murder. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, allowed the appeal and substituted a
conviction for manslaughter on the ground that the provocation was enough to have made a reasonable person of the same age
as the appellant in the same circumstances do as he did.

The point of law of general public importance involved in the case is:

Whether, on the prosecution for murder by a boy of 15 years, where the issue of provocation arises, the jury should be directed
to consider the question, under section 3 of Homicide Act 195753 whether the provocation, was enough to make a reasonable
man do as he did by reference to a reasonable adult or by reference to a reasonable boy of 15.

It was held that section 3 of Homicide Act 1957 was intended to mitigate in some degree the hardness of the common law of
provocation as it had been developed by various decisions. It recognises and retains the dual test. The provocation must not
only have caused the accused to lose his self-control, but also be such as might cause a reasonable man to react to it as the
accused did. Age of the accused, i.e. 15 years was held to be relevant at the time of killing.

The appeal was dismissed.

Grave and Sudden Provocation: To invoke the defence of provocation, and accused (defendant) is to be judged by the
standard of a reasonable person having ordinary powers of control. The standard is a constant objective, standard in all
cases—Privy Council—2005

Attorney General for Jersey v Holley,54

(2005) 3 All ER 371 (PC)

While allowing the appeal the court (Privy Council) by a majority of 6:3 held that the defence of provocation was to be judged
by the objective standard of a reasonable man having ordinary powers of control. After having assessed the gravity of the
provocation to the defendant, the standard of self control by which his conduct was to be evaluated for the purpose of the
defence of provocation was the external standard of a person having and exercising ordinary powers of “self control”.

The defendant, a chronic alcoholic, was charged with the murder of his long standing girlfriend. He admitted killing her with an
axe while under the influence of alcohol and the sole issue at his trial was provocation. In the instant case, evidence that the
defendant was suffering from chronic alcoholism had not been a matter to be taken into account by the jury, when considering
whether in their opinion, having regard to the actual provocation and their view of its gravity, a person having ordinary powers
of self control would have done what the defendant did. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

Distinction between section 300 Exception 1 and 4 IPC, 1860: In case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-
control, whereas in case of Exception 4 there is heat of passion that clouds men to do things which they would not otherwise
do—Supreme Court—2008

Thankachan v State of Kerala55

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 31 of 44
8.3 Murder

Dr Arijit Pasayat held:

Exception 4 to section 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 deals with a case of prosecution not covered by Exception 1. Both the
Exceptions are founded upon the same principle, namely, absence of premeditation. However, in case of Exception 1 there is
total deprivation of self control, whereas in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men’s sober
reason and urges them to deed which they would not otherwise do. Of course, there is provocation in Exception 4 as in case of
Exception 1; but injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation.56

On 7 February 1997 at or about 6.45 pm in a village in the district of Kotayam in the State of Kerala a scuffle took place
between the accused (1, 2, 3 and 4) and the deceased, who was sitting in the varanda of his house. Accused 2 caught hold of the
deceased by the tuck (fold) of his dhoti and dragged him on to the road. The deceased picked up a soda bottle from the parapet
of his house.

Seeing this A2 went and picked a soda bottle from the adjacent grocery shop and struck the deceased on the head with soda
bottle. Thereupon the deceased also hit A2 on the head with soda bottle in his hand and inflicted an injury. Seeing this A2
sprinkled chilly power on the eyes of the deceased, who stood there with both hands held against his face and rubbing his eyes.
A1 then exhorted A2 and A3 to cut the deceased to death. Thereupon, A2 drew a chopper from inside his shirt and cut the
deceased on his head inflicting injuries and A3 stabbed the deceased on his right arm with a knife inflicting injury. The
deceased fell on the road and succumbed to the injuries at about 2.10 pm on 8 February 1997.

All the four accused were charged and convicted under section 302, IPC, 1860 read with section 34 for murder by the trial
court. However, the High Court upheld the conviction of the accused 2 and 3, but acquitted accused 1 and 4 for want of
sufficient evidence for killing the deceased.

Allowing the appeal partially holding the accused liable under section 304 Part I instead of section 302 IPC, 1860 giving the
benefit of Exception 4 to section 300 IPC, the apex court held that since the deceased first assaulted one of the accused with
broken bottle causing injury, the accused had given the knife blow to the deceased in sudden quarrel in the heat of passion, the
accused is entitled to the benefit of the Exception 4 IPC.

8.3.1.2 Private Defence

Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of
person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising
such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of
such defence.

Illustration

Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A
believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not
committed murder, but only culpable homicide.

The framers of the Code commented as follows:57

It will always be expedient to make a separation between murder and what we have designated as voluntary culpable homicide in
defence. A man, who deliberately kills another in order to prevent him from pulling his nose if allowed to go absolutely unpunished,
would be most dangerous. The law punishes and ought to punish such killing, but we cannot think that the law ought to punish such
killing as murder, for the law itself has encouraged the slayer to inflict on the assailant any harm short of death which may be necessary
for the purpose of repelling the outrage; to give the assailant a cut with a knife across the finger which may render his right hand useless
to him for life, or to hurl him downstairs with such force as to break his legs; and it seems difficult to conceive that circumstances which
would be a full justification for any violence short of homicide, should not be a mitigation of the guilt of homicide. That a man should
be merely exercising a right by fracturing the skull and knocking out the eye of an assailant, and should be guilty of the highest crime in
the code if he kills the same assailant, that there should be only a single step between perfect innocence and murder, between perfect
impunity and liability to capital punishment, seems unreasonable. In a case in which the law itself empowers an individual to inflict any
harm short of death, it ought to hardly, we think, to visit him with the highest punishment if he inflicts death.

Exception 2 to section 300, IPC, 1860 does not apply when injury caused more harm than necessary—Patna High Court—
1960

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 32 of 44
8.3 Murder

Lachmi Koeri v State of Bihar,

AIR 1960 Pat 62 : 1960 Cr LJ 271

Justice Sahai held:

The sessions judge of Patna convicted appellant Lachmi Koeri under section 302, and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.
The appellant was suspected of having committed theft in a dwelling house punishable under sections 380 and 457 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860. Havildar, hereinafter H and constable S were deputed to arrest him. While they were proceeding they
saw the appellant coming out of a toddy shop. They chased him and he ran. However, H managed to catch him at a short
distance. There was a scuffle between H and the appellant. The appellant then took out a chhoora from his waist and gave a
blow with it on H’s arm. He fell down in a nala. The appellant then gave several blows to H, got out of the nala and fled. H
was brought to the hospital where he died at 9.15 am.

The question is whether the appellant had a right of private defence against H who was a public servant.

There was nothing to show that the appellant knew that the man who had caught him was a havildar of police and a public
servant. H was not in uniform. There is no doubt that the appellant initially had the right of private defence, but, it is clear from
the evidence, that the appellant could not entertain any fear of grievous hurt or death from H.

The question was whether he can be held to have merely exceeded the right of private defence in committing the murder.

The evidence showed that the first blow given with the chhoora by the appellant to H, fell on the forearm, and H fell in the
nala. The appellant also fell on him in the nala and thereafter the appellant gave him incessant blows with his chhoora. As a
result, no less than nine incised injuries were caused to H, most of them, including the fatal one, were caused when H was lying
helpless under him.

On a consideration of the facts and circumstances mentioned above, initially the appellant had the right of private defence, he
does not come under Exception 2 to section 300 and it cannot be held that his right of private defence extended up to the
causing of H’s death. He was held guilty under section 302 of IPC, 1860 and the appeal was dismissed.

8.3.1.3 Exercise of Legal Powers

Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the
advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes the death by doing an act which he, in good
faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards
the person whose death is caused.

Exception applicable—public servant acting in good faith for advancement of justice if exceeds power—Allahabad High
Court—1955

Dakhi Singh v State,

AIR 1955 All 379 : 1955 Cr LJ 905

The appellant, a constable of Railway Protection Police (RPF) was convicted under section 302, IPC, 1860 and sentenced to
death. He shot a thief suspected to be tampering with sugar bags from goods wagon on order by the Havildar and pleaded that
he did so in discharge of his duty and that it was just an accident that he hit the fireman instead. Section 46 of CrPC58 lays
down that when a police officer arrests a person and such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him or attempts to
evade the arrest, such police officer may use all means necessary to effect the arrest, but this does not give a right to cause the
death of the person unless he is accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

It was held that the case would be covered by Exception 3 to section 300 of IPC, 1860. The said exception provides that
culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant, or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of
public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith thinks to be
lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as a public servant without ill-will towards the person whose death he
has caused. In the present case, there was no ill-will between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant was a public servant
and his object was the advancement of public justice. He caused the death of the fireman by doing an act which he, in good
faith, believed to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty. In such circumstances, it was held that the offence

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 33 of 44
8.3 Murder

committed was culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Pt II of section 304, of IPC and not murder. The
conviction under section 302 was set aside.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, sections 300 Exception 3, 304, Part II [Public Servant when exceeds the Power]. Culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. Custodial death, appreciation of evidence. Plea of alibi, Accused, police personnel
causing death of deceased in police custody. Deceased, hale and hearty at time of arrest. Deceased found in cabin of
accused during investigation. Accused persons putting deceased in female lockup when only four persons present in male
lockup. Post-mortem report showing 14 ante-mortem injuries. Failure of accused persons to offer any explanation as to how
deceased died in their custody. Accused putting up false plea of alibi by fudging station diary, lockup register and arrest
register to cover up death in police custody. Facts and circumstances showing that only accused persons responsible for
death of deceased causing death of deceased in police custody. Rigorous imprisonment of 10 years under section 304, Part
II, proper. (Para 13)—Supreme Court—2017

State through CBI Spl Crime Branch, Mumbai v Sanvlo Naik59

Seven accused were charged for the offence under section 302 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. All of them
have been acquitted of the said charge. accused No 2 (SV Caeiro) and accused No 5 (Sanvlo Naik), who are respondents in the
present appeals, were, however, convicted for the offence punishable under section 304 Part II read with section 34 IPC, 1860
and sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment of three years and two years respectively along with fine. Aggrieved, the
convicted accused respondents filed separate appeals before the High Court of Bombay. Which allowed their appeal and
acquitted.

Aggrieved, the State through Central Bureau of Investigation went in appeal before the Apex Court.

Allowing the appeal apex Court said, the circumstances culled out above would be sufficient to enable the Court to come to the
conclusion that it is the accused respondents and nobody else who are responsible for the injuries on the deceased. Having
regard to the circumstances and the absence of any cogent explanation on the part of the accused respondents and taking into
account the fact that the deceased was in police custody and death had occurred in such custody, we are of the view that it is the
accused respondents (accused Nos 2 and 5) who, to the exclusion of any other persons, were responsible for the injuries that
caused the death of the deceased Abdul Gaffar Khan.

We, therefore, take the view that the acquittal of the accused respondents of the offence under section 304, Part II read with
section 34 IPC, 1860 cannot be legally sustained.

This will bring the Court to a consideration of the adequacy of the sentence imposed on the accused respondents. The
maximum punishment that is awardable in case of offence under section 304, Part II IPC is ten years. The accused respondents
are police personnel whose duty was to act in accordance with law. Death had occurred when the deceased was in police
custody. The accused had fudged the General Diary Register of the police station to put up their defence and had put up a false
plea of alibi. In view of the evidence of PW-5 that the memo sending the deceased to the hospital was recorded by him after the
deceased was already declared to be dead would indicate that accused No 2 had prepared a false memo sending the deceased to
the hospital when he was already dead. Taking into account all the above, it is our considered view that the accused respondent
having been found guilty of commission of the offence under section 304, Part II read with section 34 IPC, 1860 should suffer
the maximum sentence awardable under the said section. We, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court; convict the
accused respondents of the offence under section 304, Part II read with section 34 IPC and sentence them to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for a period of ten years.

8.3.1.4 Sudden Fight

Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heart of
passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

8.3.1.5 Assault not premeditated taking place in sudden fight

Indian Penal Code, 1860, sections 302, 300, Exception 4, 304, Part II. Evidence Act, section 3. Murder or culpable homicide
not amounting to murder—Appreciation of evidence. Accused persons allegedly causing death of deceased by inflicting
injuries with knife on neck of deceased. Evidence of eye-witnesses revealing one accused person inflicting injuries with
knife, another giving fist blows and other two accused persons holding deceased. Homicidal death proved by medical report
of deceased. Death and occurring due to altercation taking place during discussion and in sudden fight, accused persons

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 34 of 44
8.3 Murder

assaulted deceased. Conviction of accused persons modified from section 302 to section 304, Part II and sentence reduced to
period already undergone. (Para 7)

Shahajan Ali v State of Maharashtra

with

Sikandar Ali v State of Maharashtra,60

AIR 2017 SC 2614 : 2017 (2) Crimes 423

Per L Nageswara Rao, J:

The appellant was convicted for an offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to life
imprisonment. The appeal preferred by him was dismissed by the High Court. The appellants who were tried along with the
appellant were acquitted by the Trial Court. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted them under section 302 and
sentenced them to life imprisonment.

Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants have filed the above appeals before the Apex Court.

Apex Court while holding the accused liable for death of the deceased modified the sentence from section 302 IPC, 1860 and
section 304 Part II. Apex Court said:

We have no doubt about the complicity of all the accused in the homicide of Sarfraj. A-1 attacked the deceased with the knife
and caused injury on his neck which resulted in his death. The other accused assisted him in committing the crime by holding
the hands of the deceased. However, the only question that falls for consideration is whether the accused are liable to be
punished for an offence section 302 IPC, 1860. After scrutinizing the material on record, we are of the opinion that the accused
are not liable to be convicted under section 302 IPC. We are convinced that there was neither prior concert nor common
intention to commit a murder. During the course of their business activity the accused reached the dhaba where the deceased
was present. An altercation took place during the discussion they were having behind the dhaba. That led to a sudden fight
during which A-1 attacked the deceased with a knife. Exception 4 to section 300 IPC, 1860 is applicable to the facts of this
case. As we are convinced that the accused are responsible for the death of Sarfraj, we are of the opinion that they are liable for
conviction under section 304 Part II of IPC, 1860. We are informed that A-1 has undergone a sentence of seven years and that
A-2 to A-4 have undergone four years of imprisonment. We modify the judgment of the High Court converting the conviction
of the accused from section 302 to section 304 Part II of IPC, 1860 sentencing them to the period already undergone. They
shall be released forthwith.

Order accordingly.

Exception 4 to section 300, IPC, 1860 does not apply in case of an unarmed person who makes no threatening gesture—
Supreme Court—1956

Narayanan Nair Raghavan Nair v State of Travancore-Cochin,

AIR 1956 SC 99 : 1956 Cr LJ 278 : 1956 (0) Ker LT 92 SC

The appellant was convicted under section 302, IPC, 1860 and sentenced to death for murdering A, with whom there was a
litigation regarding partition of property. It was argued that this was a case of sudden fight.

The court held that it was not a case in which death sentence was called for, and reduced the sentence to life sentence.

The court observed:

The exception requires that no undue advantage be taken of the other side. It is impossible to say that there is no undue advantage when
a man stabs an unarmed person who makes no threatening gestures and merely asks the accused’s opponent to stop fighting.

Then also, the fight must be with the person who is killed. Here, the fight was between Velayudhan (PW 1), son-in-law of the deceased
and the appellant. The deceased had no hand in it. He did not even try to separate the assailants. All he did was to ask his son-in-law,
Velayudhan, to stop fighting and said that he would settle their dispute.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 35 of 44
8.3 Murder

There was no premeditation and the death sentence was reduced to one of transportation for life. The appeal succeeds, on the question
of sentence only.

The appeal is partly allowed.

Exception 4 applicable—injury inflicted in sudden fight with the knife— Supreme Court—1976

Amrithalinga Nadar v State of TN,

AIR 1976 SC 1133 : (1976) 2 SCC 194 : 1976 Cr LJ 848

In one village, non-payment of Rs 5 to an artist resulted in the death of one of the villagers. The High Court convicted appellant
(accused) under section 302, IPC, 1860. On examining the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the fatal injury was
caused by the appellant to the deceased without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel
and that Exception 4 to section 300 applies to this case. The appeal was partly allowed.

Benefit of Exception 4 to section 300, IPC, 1860 is available only if offender has not taken “undue advantage” or acted in a
cruel manner—or not taken unfair advantage—Supreme Court—2007

Naveen Chandra v State of Uttaranchal61

Justice Arijit Pasayat held:

The fourth exception of section 300, IPC, 1860 covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with case of
prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is
founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is
total deprivation of self control. In case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men’s sober reason and
urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do.

There is provocation in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation.

In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in
the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts
them in respect of guilt upon equal footing.

A sudden fight implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to
unilateral provocation, not in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more
appropriately applicable would be exception 1. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without
weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel is sudden or not
must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that
there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue
advantage or acted in cruel of unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair
advantage”.

Altercation between two families in morning of fateful day—deceased receiving injury on his head—conciliation arranged
through Panchayat—in course of conciliation deceased who had sustained head injury in morning got in fury and started
abusing accused—in altercation that ensued accused causing injuries to two persons who were unarmed and also chasing other
members of their family— Accused in circumstances not entitled to plead right of self defence.

Appellant was convicted for offence punishable under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.. While
the appellant was awarded death sentence, the other two were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. All the three accused
persons were convicted for offence punishable under section 302 read with section 34, IPC, 1860.

Sections 102 and 105 of IPC, 1860 deal with commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of body and
property respectively. The right commences, as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an
attempt, or threat, to commit the offence, although the offence may not have been committed but not until there is that
reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev
v State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 612 : [1963] 3 SCR 489, it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 36 of 44
8.3 Murder

disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of
private defence.

The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right circumscribed by the governing statute i.e. IPC is available only
when the circumstances clearly justify it. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a vindictive,
aggressive or retributive purpose of offence. It is a right of defence, not of retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggression
and not as retaliatory measure.

Though the accused was exercising right of private defence, but had exceeded the same by continuing the attacks even after the
threat to life had ceased.

Appeal dismissed.

Exception 4 to section 300 of IPC, 1860 is applicable when the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or
unusual manner—Supreme Court—2006

Pappu v State of MP62

Justice Arijit Pasayat held:

For application of Exception 4 to section 300 IPC, 1860 it is not sufficient to show that there was sudden quarrel and there was
no premeditation. It must further be shown that offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. It
must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression
“undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair advantage”.

It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever one blow is given section 302, IPC is ruled out. It would
depend upon the weapon used, size of the weapon in some cases, force with which the blow was given, part of the body where
it was given and several such relevant factors.

Considering the factual background in the case at hand it will be appropriate to convict the appellant under section 304, Part II
IPC, instead of section 302, IPC as has been done by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. Custodial sentence of eight
years would meet the ends of justice.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

Appeal partially allowed.

Exception applicable—death caused in sudden quarrel does not indicate cruel act by taking undue advantage—Supreme
Court—1989

Surinder Kumar v Union Territory of Chandigarh,

AIR 1989 SC 1094 : (1989) 2 SCC 217

The appellant had an argument with the deceased and PW 2. In the course of this heated exchange, PW 2 is alleged to have
showered filthy abuses and also threatened to throw out the utensils and lock the kitchen. Since PW 2 was uttering filthy abuses
in the presence of the appellant’s sister and the deceased brother, Nitya Nand did not restrain him, the appellant got enraged,
went into the kitchen and returned with a knife with which he inflicted one blow on the neck of PW 2 causing a bleeding injury.
In the mean time, the appellant inflicted three knife blows to Nitya Nand—one on the shoulder, the other on the elbow and the
third on the chest, as a result whereof Nitya Nand collapsed to the floor and later died while on the way to the hospital.

Considering the fact that there was no ill will between the parties, the court held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of
Exception 4 to section 300 of IPC. Thus, the accused was convicted under section 304, instead of section 302, IPC, 1860.

Exception applicable—death caused in sudden fight without premeditation and not taking undue advantage—Supreme
Court—1992

Suraj Mal v State of Punjab,

AIR 1992 SC 559 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 639 : 1992 Cr LJ 520 : 1991 (2) Scale 1177

The dying declaration of the deceased stated that it was only during the quarrel that ensued between the deceased and the

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 37 of 44
8.3 Murder

appellant, that the appellant stabbed the deceased once with a knife. As the appellant acted without premeditation in the heat of
passion upon a sudden quarrel, the court allowing the appeal, held that since exception 4 is attracted to the facts of this case, the
offence is punishable under section 304, but not under section 302, IPC, 1860.

Exception IV to section 300 IPC, 1860—A fight on the spur of the moment between the two male groups on the issue of
taking possession of cattle shed with no intention to kill anyone – And, in absence of any overt act attributed to any of the
appellants towards ‘S’, the deceased lady, for inflicting any injury to her - Appellants could not be convicted for murder of
‘S’ so as to attract rigour of section 302 IPC, 1860 - Held, this is a case where the appellants should be convicted for the
offence punishable under section 304 instead of 302 IPC - Supreme Court - 2015

Balu s/o Onkar Pund v State of Maharashtra,

2015 (2) SCC (Cr) 252 : 2015 (1) Crimes 181 : 2015 (2) Scale 147 : JT 2015 (1) SC 36

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J:

A (A-1) and M (PW-3), both resident of same village were good friends S, the deceased. Was the wife of M. Around 25-30
years back, M had purchased land from A for his cattle shed in the same village and he was also placed in its possession.
However, no sale deed was executed between them yet M continued to remain in passion of cattle shed all through. Due to
election for the post of Sarpanch, relations between them were not noyt as cordial as they used to be in the past. Thereafter, A
started pressurising M to vacate the land and hand over the possession of cattle shed. On 15 January 2008, the appellants armed
with weapons barged in the cattle shed and started removing iron sheets fixed to the roof. M requested the appellants not to
remove the sheets. Since the appellants did not listen to M and continued their operation in moving the sheets, M resisted and
made an attempt to stop them. At that time, S and M’s son U (PW 5), who were present on the spot, intervened and resisted
appellants from removing the sheets. This led to scuffle between both parties. Accused 1, 3 and 4 beat M and threw him out of
the cattle shed. A (A-1) poured kerosene on the cattle shed and SH (A-4) set the cattle shed on fire. S, who was resisting the
appellants, caught in contact of fire and received severe burn injuries. On notifying this, M tried to enter in cattle shed to save
his wife SG (A-2) then inflicted an axe-blow on M’s head due to which he sustained bleeding injury. S was taken to the civil
hospital where she succumbed to her injuries.

The session judge convicted the appellant-accused. The High Court dismissed their appeals and confirmed the conviction and
sentenced awarded by the trial court. The appellants argued that it was not a case of murder, but ‘it was a case falling under
section 304 Part I of Indian Penal Code, 1860. There was neither any intention on the part of any the appellants to commit the
murder of S nor had the appellants visited the spot with any such intention. The only intention of the appellants was to take
passion of cattle shed caught fire causing burning injuries to S, which unfortunately resulted in her death.

Allowing the appeals partly, the Supreme Court held: It is for the reason that firstly, neither there was any motive nor any
intention on he part of any of the appellants to eliminate S. Secondly, there was no enmity of any kind with S in person with
any of the appellants. Thirdly, the appellants had gone there to take possession of the cattle shed and not with an intention to
kill any member of the family of M. Fourthly, if at all, there was some kind of animosity or jealousy then it was towards A-1
who had won the election. S had nothing to do with the election because she never contested the election. Fifthly, despite the
appellants being armed with weapons, none of them inflicted any injury or gave blow to S but single bow was inflicted only on
M, who fortunately survived. Sixthly S died due to sustaining of burn injuries, which she suffered because on it. In other words,
if the appellants had not set the cattle shed ablaze by pouring kerosene on it, then, the incident of death of S would not have
occurred. Seventhly, it was a fight on the spur of moment between the two male groups on the issue of taking passion of cattle
shed with no intention to kill anyone and lastly, in the absence of the overt act attributed to any of the appellants towards S for
inflicting any injury to her, the appellants could not have been convicted for inflicting any injury to her, the appellants could
not have been convicted for act of committing murder of S so as to attract the rigour of section 302 IPC, 1860 and instead they
should have been convicted for an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304 Part I IPC.

8.3.1.6 Consent

Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years,
suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.

Illustration

A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen years of age, to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth,
he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 38 of 44
8.3 Murder

Consent of the deceased to suffer death reduces the crime from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder—
Patna HC—1992

Dasrath Paswan v State of Bihar63

Justice Chaudhury stated:

The appellant was convicted under section 302, IPC, 1860 for the murder of his wife and sentenced to transportation for life.
He was a student of class tenth. He had failed in the annual examination for three years in succession and was very much upset
at these failures. He took his last failure so much to heart that he decided to end his life and informed his wife, who was a
literate woman, of about 19 years of age, of his decision. His wife asked him to first kill her and then kill himself. In
accordance with the pact, the accused killed his wife but was arrested before he could kill himself. He appealed.

The question is whether Exception 5 to section 300, IPC, 1860 is applicable in this case since the deceased was above the age
of 18 years and that she had suffered death with her own consent?

It was contended on behalf of the prosecution that the consent in the present case was obtained by putting pressure upon her,
the pressure being communication by the appellant to his wife that he had decided to end his own life, and so the prospect of
widowhood prompted the unfortunate women to agree to suffer death at the hands of her husband.

Rejecting the contention, the court said it cannot be accepted that the deceased gave consent under fear or injury or under
misconception of fact that will be invalid under section 90, IPC, 1860. The conviction of the appellant was accordingly altered
from murder under section 302, IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the first part of section 304, IPC.

Having regard to the extraordinary nature of this case, the court held that a moderate sentence is proper. The appellant, an
immature young man, was suffering from an inferiority complex. The loss of a devoted wife has already been a great
punishment to him appellant was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment. Subject to this modification the appeal was
dismissed.

Murder Suicide Pact—Defence of abandonment of plan to kill the children is not applicable when the accused did not do
more than mere promise not to take part in the suicide pact. In the absence of reasonable steps taken either to neutralize the
effect of participation or prevent commission of the offence accused is liable for offence.

R v Gauthier,

[2013] 2 SCR 403 : 2013 SCC 32 (CanLII) : 360 DLR (4th) 1

Defense of Abandonment: Air of Reality Test the accused and her husband settled in Chibougamau in Canada in 2000,
where they had two children. Throughout the following years, misfortune seemed to plague the family, as the accused and her
husband both fell into psychological distress. Unable to find stable jobs, despite having moved to another area of Quebec, the
couple was forced to go bankrupt. On 31 December 2008, accused was told by her husband that they should commit suicide
and take their children with them. At one point during evening, the husband prepared drinks for all family members, causing
them to fall asleep.

When she woke up the next morning, the accused found her husband and their children dead. She called 911 and told the
operator that “it was a pact” and that “we told ourselves we wouldn’t start in 2009.” When the police arrived they found several
documents, some in the accused’s hand, revealing that the couple had decided together to end their and their children’s lives.
The accused was arrested and charged under section 2164 of Criminal Code of Canada with first degree murder of her three
children. At trial, the accused claimed that she was in dissociative state at the relevant time.

The accused was convicted, and she appealed on the basis that defense of abandonment should have been put to injury. The
Court of Appeal pointed out that if accused was in dissociative state, as she claimed, she could not also assert that she had
abandoned pact. The Court of Appeal concluded that trial judge had not erred in refusing to put defense of abandonment to
jury. Accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The accused claimed that she had told her husband that she had changed her mind and no longer intended to participate in the
common purpose. However, the Court was of the view that this claim was not sufficient to meet the air of reality test, even if it
were assumed that this claim would be sufficient for jury to reasonably conclude that accused had communicated her intention
to withdraw from the plan, that communication would not on its own have sufficed, in circumstances of this case, for judge to
put defence of abandonment to jury. Since evidence showed that accused did more than merely promise to take part in the

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 39 of 44
8.3 Murder

murder-suicide pact, she had to do more to either neutralise the effects of her participation or to prevent commission of offence.
Therefore, trial judge did not err in deciding not to put defence of abandonment to jury.

There are two main issues in this appeal. First, was it appropriate to exclude the defence of abandonment from the defences put
to the jury on the basis that it was incompatible with the defence’s principal theory, the absence of mens rea? If not, did the
defence of abandonment meet the air of reality test? The court answered both questions in the affirmative.

While dismissing the appeal by a majority 5 to 165 the Supreme Court of Canada held that since the evidence showed that the
accused did not do more than merely promise to take part in the murder-suicide pact she had to do more either to neutralize the
effects of her participation or to prevent the commission of the offence. Therefore, the trial judge did not err in deciding not to
put the defence of abandonment of the jury.

Per Fish J (dissenting):

The trial judge was bound to put abandonment to the jury if there was evidence that the accused had changed or abandoned her
earlier intention to aid or abet the murder of her children, and had adequately communicated to her husband that she had
withdrawn from their pact. Here, there was evidence upon which a properly instructed jury might well have found that the
accused had abandoned the suicide pact in respect of which she was charged and convicted of murder, or at least have been left
with a reasonable doubt on this issue, which would of course have sufficed to warrant an acquittal. It would be fundamentally
unfair at this stage to fault the accused for failing to demonstrate anything more than a change of intention to aid or abet the
murder of her children.

8.3.2 Sudden Infant Death Syndrome

The petition for a writ of certiorari challenging petitioner’s conviction for death of her 7-week-old grand-child by sudden
infant death syndrome (SIDS) 1 US Supreme Court, 2011.

Cavazos v Smith [Skhank Baby Case]

132 S Ct 2 (2011) : 181 L Ed 2d 311 : 2011 US Lexis 7603

This case concerns the death of seven-week-old Etzel Glass. On 29 November 1996, Etzel’s mother, Tomoka, put Etzel to sleep
on a sofa before going to sleep herself in another room. Respondent Shirley Ree Smith- Tomekas’s mother slept on the floor
next to Etzel. Several hours later, Smith ran into Tomeka’s room, holding Etzel, who was limp, and told her that “[s] omething
[was] wrong with Etzel.” By the time emergency officials arrived, Etzel was not breathing and had no heart beat. Inmate’s
seven-week old grandchild died. The prosecution’s three experts attested that the child’s death was sudden infant death
syndrome (SIDS) and not Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) as claimed by the defence.

In an interview with the police a few days later, Smith said that she had shaken Etzel, but then she corrected herself and said
that she had twisted him to try to elicit a reaction.

Smith was arrested and charged with assault on a child resulting in death under California Penal Code section 273ab which
states:

Any person who, having the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age, assaults the child by means of force that to a
reasonable person would be likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child’s death, shall be punished by imprisonment... .

The defence expert, pediatric neurologist Dr William Goldie, testified that Etzel’s death was due to SIDS (Sudden Infant Death
Syndrome). He noted that Etzel was born with jaundice, a heart murmur, and low birth weight-making him more susceptible to
SIDS. Dr Goldie testified that pathologists had not been able to determine the cause of Etzel’s death and that the bleeding could
be attributed to the resuscitation efforts.

The jury found Smith guilty. Concluding that the jury “carefully weighed” the “tremendous amount of evidence” supporting
the verdict the trial judge denied Smith’s motion for a new trial and sentenced her to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in
prison.

On direct review, Smith contended that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that Etzel died from Shaken Baby
Syndrome (SBS). Respondent inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus [pursuant to 28 USCS section 2254] asserting a
claim of in sufficient evidence regarding her conviction under California Penal Code section 273ab. The district court denied

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 40 of 44
8.3 Murder

the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed with instructions to grant the writ. Petitioner
warden sought review.

The Supreme Court of the United States granted the inmate’s petition for a writ of certiorari and motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. The Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 6-3 per curiam
decision.

Certiorari Granted.

8.3.2.1 Mercy Killing—An Exception to Murder under section 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860

There is a growing body of opinion that a new exception to section 300, IPC be enacted under the caption “mercy killing or
compassionate killing”66 subject to two years imprisonment. This provision should be invoked to cover cases where a person,
out of compassion, kills another in order to relieve a person from incurable suffering. In such a case the person deserves
different treatment than an ordinary case of murder. For instance, where a person kills a man believing on reasonable grounds
that the victim was:

(i) permanently subject to great bodily pain or suffering; or

(ii) permanently helpless from bodily or mental incapacity; or
(iii) subject to rapid and incurable bodily or mental degeneration.

In such a case, the killing (whether spontaneous or premeditated) is generally prompted by the knowledge of the victim’s
severe handicap, imminent death or severe pain and a compassionate decision that the victim would be better off dead.
However in India, the judiciary has no statutory provision to decide such cases.

In England, the courts have invoked section 2 of Homicide Act 1957, which allows “diminished responsibility” as an exception
to murder to cover such cases of mercy killing.

For instance in R v Taylor, (1980) CLY 540, a father had killed his child who was autistic (abnormal) by battering him on his
head with an axe and cutting his throat, was not held liable for murder, though he was a very loving father.

Sentencing the father to 12 months probation, Heilborn J of the Court of Appeal outlined the factors contributing to his
abnormality of mind and impairment of responsibility which included his emotional reaction to the child’s handicap and
depression and at the prospect of the child being removed to an institution. The judge, considering that the accused would
suffer enduring punishment in the knowledge of what he had done, concluded that, it was her public duty not to add to that hell
by sentencing him to imprisonment.

Jones: In R Jone,67 the accused a 29 year old man, suffocated his mother who was at an advanced stage of the terminal
cancer.68 The accused, who had watched his father suffer a painful and lingering death by the same disease, was in a condition
of severe anxiety and despair. Watkins J, while stating that he could not condone killing, held that the appropriate sentence in
these circumstances was a conditional discharge.

The above cases are not unusual and reflect a well established practice of accepting the plea of diminished responsibility on
charges of murder by involving section 2 (1) of Homicide Act 1957 discussed below, dealing with diminished responsibility in
cases of mercy killing.

8.3.2.2 Diminished Responsibility, Exception to Murder Under English Law—Section 2 of Homicide Act—1957

In England, 114 years after the promulgation of the Mc’Naughten Rules, the law of murder was amended by Homicide Act
1957. The rules were retained, but the Scottish “defence” of diminished responsibility was introduced. The Homicide Act was
essentially a compromise solution to the controversy over capital punishment. It appeased the retentionists by retaining as
capital offences certain categories of murder, including murder by shooting and murder in the course or furtherance of theft;
but the remainder, numerically more significant, carried a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.

The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 made all murders punishable by life imprisonment alone. Section 269 of
Homicide Act 1957 introduced the “defence” of diminished responsibility. Strictly speaking, it is not a defence but operates to
alter the category of the crime. The effect was to give the court the widest discretion in passing the sentence. Instead of a
mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment, the court could impose imprisonment for life or any lesser period, a fine, or a
conditional or unconditional discharge under Criminal Justice Act 1948.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 41 of 44
8.3 Murder

Jury Trial: Murder or manslaughter (culpable homicide) Failure of Trial Judge to give proper direction to the Jury
amounts to material irregularity and may lead to miscarriage of justice in case of the accused having killed the deceased by
strangulation depriving her of oxygen-Conviction quashed; House of Lords—2006

R v Coutts,70

(2006) 4 All ER 353 : [2006] UKHL 39 : [2006] 1 WLR 2154

Lord Bingham of Cornhill

The appellant, Graham James Coutts was charged with the murder of his girl friend Jane Longhurst on 14 March 2003. The
trial judge on the basis of the facts of the case directed the jury71 that they have to choose between convicting the appellant of
murder or acquit him on the ground of accident. Considering the facts and nature of the case the jury decided to convict the
appellant of murder he was therefore sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal to the Court of Appeal on the ground that the
trial judge has misdirected the jury resulting in miscarriage of justice was rejected. The Judge should have also given an option
to the jury either to convict the appellant for (i) murder, or (ii) manslaughter (=culpable homicide), or (iii) acquit the accused
taking into consideration the fact of the case. Thereupon the appellant moved the House of Lords.

It is alleged that the appellant murdered the deceased in his flat on 14 March 2003 in order to obtain sexual stimulation and that
having strangulated her with a pair of tights around the neck with a knot on the right hand side. He did her with a pair of tight
around the neck with a knot on the right hand side. He did have some sexual contact with her body. He stored her body first in
his car, then in his shed, then in a commercial storage facility. On 19 April 2003 he took her body to an area of woodland some
distance away and set her fire on it. When found, the body was burning and unclothed.

The expert pathologist told that the cause of the deceased’s death was compression of her neck by the ligature (something
which binds), causing her to be asphyxiated (suffocation). The appellant testified that he and the deceased had consensual
asphyxial sex, and that her death had been a tragic accident. He testified that with her consent, when they were face to face on
the bed, he had put a ligature, in the form of a pair of tights around the deceased’s neck. The sight of the ligature was intended
to stimulate him sexually, and the restriction to the body of the deceased’s brain was intended to heighten the sexual pleasure.
According to the appellant, when he was on his back and she was above him, he held the end of the tights behind her neck with
his left hand, while masturbating (rubbing) with his right hand. At some time before he ejaculated, he must have closed his
eyes. When he opened them again, he was aware of the deceased lying over him and not moving. In fact, she was dead.

Allowing the appeal the House of Lords held that the judge’s failure to leave a manslaughter verdict to the jury was a material
irregularity and hence the conviction is quashed.

9 (1876) ILR 1 Bom 342. Gurdev Raj v State of Punjab, 2007 (11) Scale 729 : (2007) 13 SCC 380 : [2007] 10 SCR 835; appellant
picked up a quarrel with his wife and mother-in-law and with an iron mungli, administered two blows on the head of the his
mother-in-law as a result where of she died. Modifying his sentence from murder under section 302 to culpable homicide under
section 304, Pt II, the apex court held fatal injury could have been caused by single blow and was not sufficient in an ordinary
course of nature to cause death.
10 AIR 2017 SC 3064 : 2017 (2) Crimes 333 : 2017 (7) Scale 1. Ashok Bhushan and Deepak Gupta, JJ delivered the judgment.
11 AIR 2017 SC 897 : (2017) 4 SCC 377 : 2017 (2) Scale 236, AK Sikri and RK Agrawal, JJ, delivered the judgment.
12 AIR 2017 SC 3125 : (2017) 8 SCC 204 : 2017 (7) Scale 141, AK Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ, delivered the judgment.
13 AIR 2015 SC 3037 : 2015 Cr LJ 4034 : 2015 (6) JT 462 : 2015 (8) Scale 159, TS Thakur and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ, delivered the
judgment.
14 AIR 2017 SC 4970 : 2017 (4) Crimes 280, AK Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
15 AIR 2017 SC 2600 : 2017 (3) Crimes 397, L Nageswar Rao and Navin Sinha, JJ, delivered the judgment.
16 AIR 2018 SC 2457 : 2018 Cr LJ 4442 : 2016 (2) JKJ 91 : JT 2018 (5) SC 145, NV Ramana and S Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
17 AIR 2017 SC 471 : (2017) 2 SCC 365 : 2016 All MR (Cr) 5373 : 2016 (12) Scale 410 : JT 2016 (11) SC 425, Dipak Misra and
Amitava Roy, JJ delivered the judgment.
18 AIR 2016 SC 1, TS Thakur, CJI and R Banumathi, J, delivered the judgment.
19 AIR 2012 SC 2123 : 2012 (4) JT 287 : 2012 Cr LJ 2850 : 2012 (4) Scale 526, AK Patanaik and Swatanter Kumar, JJ.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 42 of 44
8.3 Murder

20 AIR 2008 SC 1854 : (2008) 15 SCC 725 : 2008 Cr LJ 2987 : JT 2008 (5) SC 350, VS Sirpurkar, J (SB Sinha,J).
21 The Doctor found the following injuries: 1. An incised wound on lateral aspect of left pam 2 cm+1\2 2 cm, black in colour; 2. An
incised wound above wound No 1 on lateral aspect of left palm. 2cm+1\2cm +2cm, black in colour; 3. An incised wound on
epigastria region of abdomen just below xiphi sternum 2 cm+1 cm+ 12 cm (length, breadth, depth respectively); 4. An abrasion
from right upper arm above elbow joint 5+4 cm, black in colour; 5. An abrasion on medical aspect of left leg, 2cm+1\2 cm, black in
colour; 6. Another abrasion in front of left leg 1 cm +1\2 cm, black in colour. The driver plunged the screw into the vital part of the
body of the deceased. It cut his liver and spleen. Hence, the offence at the most would be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder punishable under section 304 Part II of the IPC.
22 AIR 2004 SC 5039 : (2004) 11 SCC 410.
23 AIR 2017 SC 1208 : 2017 (1) Crimes 350 : 2017 Cr LJ 2028 : 2017 (3) Scale 236, Kurian Joseph and AM Khanwilkar, JJ.
24 Five Exceptions under section 300 IPC are: (1) Grave and Sudden Provocation, (2) Exceeding Right of Private Defence, (3) Public
Servant Exceeding his Power, (4) Sudden Fight, (5) Consent.
25 CrPC, 1973 section 378 provides provisions for appeal in case of acquittal.
26 CrPC, 1973 section 386 describes the powers of the appellate court, at length.
27 Dwalapayan Ghosh, Times of India dated 14 June 2010.
28 Ankita Ghosh, Times of India, July 2010.
29 AIR 2010 SC 2914 : (2010) 8 SCC 593 : JT 2010 (8) SC 633 : 2010 (8) Scale 315, Harjit Singh Bedi and JM Panchal, JJ delivered
the judgment.
30 AIR 2018 SC 2142 : (2018) 6 SCC 610 : JT 2018 (4) SC 622, Kurian Joseph, Mohan M Shantanagoudar and Navin Sinha, JJ.
31 AIR 2017 SC 4839 : 2017 AIR (SCW) 4839 : 2017 (4) Crimes 55, NV Ramana and Dr DY Chandrachud, JJ, delivered the
judgment.
32 See Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1985 SCR (1) 88; Ramreddy
Rajeshkhanna Reddy v State of AP, AIR 2006 SC 1656 : (2006) 10 SCC 172 : 2006 (3) SCR 348 : JT 2006 (4) SC 16; Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan v State of Maharashtra, 2006 AIR SCW 5300 : (2006) 10 SCC 681 : JT 2006 (9) SC 50 : 2007 Cr LJ 20; Venkatesan
v State of TN, AIR 2008 SC 2369 : (2008) 8 SCC 456 : 2008 Cr LJ 3052 : JT 2008 (6) SC 640; Sanjay Kumar Jain v State of Delhi,
(2011) 11 SCC 733 : AIR 2011 SC 363; Madhu v State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399 : AIR 2012 SC 664 : 2012 Cr LJ 1230; Munna
Kumar Upadhyaya alias Munna Upadhyaya v State of AP, (2012) 6 SCC 174 : AIR 2012 SC 2470 : 2012 Cr LJ 3068; Vivek Kalra
v State of Rajasthan, 2013 AIR (SCW) 1155 : 2013 Cr LJ 1524 : 2013 (2) Scale 515 : JT 2013 (3) SC 209.
33 AIR 2017 SC 1133 : 2017 (1) Crimes 328 : JT 2017 (2) SC 415, SA Bobde and L Nageswara Rao, JJ, delivered the judgment.
34 AIR 2017 SC 3051 : 2017 Cr LJ 4055 : JT 2017 (7) SC 54, AK Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ, delivered the judgment.
35 AIR 2008 SC 1184 : (2008) 3 SCC 210 : 2008 Cr LJ 1816 : 2008 (1) Crimes 191, GS Singhvi and GP Mathur, JJ.
36 On 1 October 1994 one Dr Dhoni resident of Pratap building, 173 Dadiseth Agyari lane, Mumbai telephonically informed the
police that a man who was later identified as Satish, was lying on the right side of the stairs of the building in a pool of blood. API
Gaekwad reached the spot and removed the person to the GT Hospital where he was declared brought dead.
37 See Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v State of MP, AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cr LJ 129; Padala Veera Reddy v
State of AP, (1989) Supp (2) SCC 706 : AIR 1990 SC 79; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra, 1984 AIR 1622 :
1985 SCR (1) 88; State of UP v Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992) 2 SCC 86 : AIR 1992 SC 840; Bodhraj Altas Bodha v State of
J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 : AIR 2002 SC 3164; Bharat v State of MP, (2003) 3 SCC 106 : AIR 2003 SC 1433.
38 AIR 2010 SC 2977 : (2010) 12 SCC 142 : 2010 Cr LJ 161 : 2010 (7) Scale 168, Harjit Singh Bedi and Chandramauli Kumar
Prasad, JJ.
39 AIR 2016 SC 795 : 2016 (95) All CC 478 : 2016 (93) All CC 475 : 2016 All MR (Cr) 880 : 2016 Cr LJ 1349 : 2016 (1) Crimes 80
(SC) : 2016 (1) JCC 731 : 2016 (2) RLW 1364 (SC) : 2016 (2) Scale 118 : (2016) 4 SCC 583 : 2016 (3) SCJ 62 : 2016 (1) UC 378,
TS Thakur, CJI and V. Gopala Gowda, J, delivered the judgment.
40 2016 (4) Crimes 390 : 2017 (2) JT 224 : (2017) 11 SCC 535, AK Sikri and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ, delivered the judgment.
41 AIR 2016 SC 3218 : 2016 (14) SCC 151 : 2016 (6) Scale 708 : 2016 (4) Crimes 347 : 2016 (2) UC 1513 : 2016 All MR (Cr) 3567,
Kurian Joseph and RK Agrawal, JJ, delivered the judgment.
42 AIR 2008 SC 479 : (2007) 15 SCC 455 : 2007 (12) Scale 587. SB Sinha, and HS Bedi JJ; Rameshwar Dass v State of Punjab, AIR
2008 SC 890 : (2007) 14 SCC 696 : 2007 (14) Scale 378. Accused husband held liable for dowry death. Held, A pregnant woman
ordinarily would not commit suicide unless relationship with her husband comes to such a pass that she would not be compelled to
do so. The very fact that the accused-appellant remained absconding for six days after the incident of suicide of his wife without
any justification goes to prove accused’s involvement in the suicide.
43 Kamlabai, the deceased was married to the appellant 15 years prior to the incident which took place at about 9.00 pm on 7 June
1990. The couple had five children-two daughters and three sons-all being minor at the material time.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 43 of 44
8.3 Murder

44 State of Rajasthan v Parthu, (2007) 11 Scale 460 : AIR 2008 SC 10 : (2007) 12 SCC 754; Mehhiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf v State of
Karnataka, (2007) 9 Scale 473 : AIR 2007 SC 2666 : (2007) 13 SCC 112. Relied on.
45 AIR 2008 SC 1877 : (2008) 11 SCC 478 : 2008 Cr LJ 2610 : JT 2008 (5) SC 364, Harjit Singh Bedi and SB Sinha, JJ.
46 The matter was reported by the Principal of the College. The appellant was named as the prime accused in the FIR. After hectic
search the police arrested the accused on 13 February 2000 at about 3.30 pm.
47 JM Panchal and TS Thakur, JJ.
48 State of UP v MK Anthony, AIR 1985 SC 48 : (1985) 1 SCC 505 : 1985 Cr LJ 493 : 1984 (2) Scale 728.
49 Pulukuri Kottaya v Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67; State of UP v MK Anthony, AIR 1985 SC 48 : (1985) 1 SCC 505 : 1985 Cr LJ 493 :
1984 (2) Scale 728; Vasa Chandrasekhar Rao v Ponna Satyanarayana, (2000) 6 SCC 286 : AIR 2000 SCC 2138 : 2000 Cr LJ
3175; and Geetha v State of Karnataka, (2000) 10 SCC 72 : AIR 2000 SC 3475.
50 AIR 1934 All 833 : AIR 1929 Lah 861.
51 AIR 1977 SC 1801 : (1976) 4 SCC 255 : 1977 Cr LJ 1448. See also Yeshwant Rao v State of MP, AIR 1992 SC 1683 : 1993 Supp
(1) SCC 520 : 1992 Cr LJ 2779.
52 AIR 2008 SC 1 : 2007 (4) Crimes 240 : 2007 (12) Scale 795. The Times of India November 6, pp 1, 7, Justice AK Mathur and K
Markandey Katju. The offence took place at a town in Tamil Nadu, where a tea stall and a waste paper shop did business next to
each other. Muthu worked with the waste paper merchant and used to arrange the articles inside the shop.
53 Homicide Act 1957 (of United Kingdom), section 3 reads:
Provocation.—Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged was provoked
(whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was
enough to make a reasonable man do as he did, shall be left to be determined by the jury and in determining that question the jury
shall take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable
man.
54 The Bench consisted of Lord Bingham, Nicholls, Hoffmann, Hope, Scott, Rodger, Walker, Baroness Hole and Lord Carswell.
55 AIR 2008 SC 406 : (2007) 14 SCC 501 : 2007 (4) Crimes 263 : 2007 (13) Scale 69, Dr Arijit Pasayat and P Sathasivam, JJ.
56 2006 AIR SCW 1678 Relied on.
57 Draft Penal Code, note M, pp 146, 147.
58 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, section 46, reads:

Arrest how made.—(1) In making an arrest the police officer shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be
arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by words or action.

Provided that where a woman is to be arrested, unless the circumstances indicate to the contrary, her submission to custody on
an oral intimation of arrest shall be presumed and, unless the circumstances otherwise require or unless the police officer is a
female, the police officer shall not touch the person of the woman for making her arrest.

(2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or other
person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest.

(3) Nothing in this section gives a right to cause the death of a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death
or imprisonment for life.

59 AIR 2017 SC 4976 : 2017 AIR (SCW) 4976 : 2017 (4) Crimes 275, Ranjan Gogoi and Navin Sinha, JJ, delivered the judgment.
60 L Nageswara Rao and Navin Sinha, JJ, delivered the judgment.
61 AIR 2007 SC 363 : 2006 Supp (9) SCR 668 : 2006 (12) Scale 456 : 2007 Cr LJ 874, Per Arijit Pasayat and Lokeshwar Singh Panta,
JJ; see Pappu v State of MP, AIR 2006 SC 2659 : (2006) 7 SCC 391.
62 AIR 2006 SC 2659 : (2006) 7 SCC 391 : 2006 Cr LJ 2640 : JT 2006 (6) SC 308, per Arijit Pasayat and SH Kapadia, JJ.
63 AIR 1958 Pat 190 : (1958) 6 BLJR 60 : 1958 Cr LJ 548, per Sahai and HK Chaudhury, JJ.

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan

 Page 44 of 44
8.3 Murder

64 Section 21 of Criminal Code of Canada read as follows:

21. (1) [Parties to offence] Every one is a party to an offence who

(a) actually commits it:
(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it: or
(c) abets any person in committing it.

(2) [Common intention] where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist
each other therein an any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought
to have known that the commission of offence would be probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to
that offence.
65 Per Wagner, J. (LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, JJ. Concurring).
66 Roger Leng, “Mercy Killing and the CLRC”, New Law Journal, 1982, pp 76-79.
67 “The Guardian”, 4 December 1979.
68 See John A Robertson, The Rights of the Critically Ill, Bantam Books, New York, 1983, pp 80-96, 161.
69 Homicide Act 1957, section 2, reads: Persons suffering from diminished responsibility.—
(1) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such
abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or
induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party
to the killing.
(2) On charge of murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the person charged, is by virtue of this section, not liable to be
convicted of murder.
(3) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal or as accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be liable
instead to be convicted of manslaughter.
(4) The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder shall not affect the question
whether the killing amounted to murder in the case of any other party to it.
70 [Lord Bingham of Cornhil, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hutton, Lord Rodgel of Earlserry and Lord Mance].
71 Jury Trial: In England, America and most of the common law countries jury assist the court in criminal cases to ascertain the guilt
of the accused. A panel of Jury consisting of distinguished persons from different walks of life in the locality is selected to assist the
judge (court) in criminal trial to decide the factual position in a case. The judge explains the jury legal issues involved in the case
and seeks opinion of the jury on the basis of the facts of the case. Judge as per the advice of the jury decides the case according to
law.

End of Document

Ms. Banalata1 Pradhan