FIRST DIVISION WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering

the defendant [now respondent Leocadio] to partition only the property

G.R. No. 146611             February 6, 2007 located at Maate, Famy, Laguna after plaintiff’s [Tancredo’s] reimbursement
TANCREDO REDEÑA, Petitioner, of the expenses incurred by the defendant in relation to the said lot.
vs. However, partition cannot be effected with regard to properties located at
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEOCADIO REDEÑA, Respondents. M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna and the property located at Poroza, Famy,
Laguna, as the same belong to the defendant. No pronouncement as to
DECISION costs.

GARCIA, J.: SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets supplied)

In this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of On December 11, 1997, petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of
Civil Procedure, petitioner Tancredo Redeña (Tancredo, hereafter) seeks the Appeal.4 The court gave due course to the notice and directed the elevation
annulment and setting aside of the Resolution 1 dated April 28, 2000 of the of the records of the case to the CA whereat petitioner’s appeal was
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59641, as reiterated in its Resolution 2 of docketed as CA-G.R.CV No. 59641.
November 16, 2000, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On September 28, 1998, the CA issued a resolution directing petitioner, as
The present controversy sprung from an action for partition filed by appellant, to file his appellant’s brief. Evidently, the period for filing the
petitioner Tancredo against his older half-brother, herein private brief was even extended by the CA.
respondent Leocadio Redeña (Leocadio, for brevity) before the then Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court [RTC]) of San Pablo City, Laguna, On March 9, 1999, there being no appellant’s brief filed within the extended
and thereat docketed as Civil Case No. S-241 which was subsequently period, the CA issued a resolution5 considering the appeal abandoned and
inherited by Branch 33 of the RTC, Siniloan, Laguna. accordingly dismissing the same. The dismissal resolution reads:

The basic complaint for partition alleges that plaintiff Tancredo and For failure of plaintiff-appellant [now petitioner] to file the required brief
defendant Leocadio are both sons of one Maximo Redeña: Tancredo, by within the extended period, the instant appeal is hereby considered
Maximo’s marriage to Magdalena Fernandez, and Leocadio, by Maximo’s ABANDONED and accordingly DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50,
previous marriage to Emerenciana Redeña. The complaint further alleged 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
that the parties’ common father, Maximo, left several pieces of realty, to On November 8, 1999 or eight (8) months after the CA issued the above
wit: a residential lot at M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna; a riceland at Poroza, resolution, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 6 thereof. In a
Famy, Laguna; and another parcel of land at Maate, also in Famy, Laguna. resolution7 of November 25, 1999, the CA denied the motion.
In a decision3 dated August 20, 1997, the trial court, based on the evidence Then, on December 28, 1999, in the same CA-G.R. CV No. 59641, petitioner
presented, confined the partition to only the property actually pertaining to filed a Petition for Relief8 bearing date December 27, 1999, anchored on
the estate of the parties’ deceased father and co-owned by them, namely, Section 2,9 Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In that pleading,
the parcel of land at Maate, and accordingly rendered judgment as follows: petitioner prays the CA to set aside its dismissal resolution of March 9,
1999, supra, reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period of forty-five proceedings in the Regional Trial Court, it must be filed in the same Regional
(45) days from notice within which to file his appellant’s brief. Trial Court which rendered the judgment or final order, or other
proceedings taken and in the same case. In other words, under the present
In the herein assailed Resolution10 dated April 28, 2000, the CA denied the rule, such a petition may be filed in the same court which rendered the
aforementioned Petition for Relief, thus: judgment or final order, or proceedings taken and in the same case. This is
WHEREFORE, the petition for relief dated 27 December 1999 is hereby in accordance with uniform procedure rule for Municipal and Regional Trial
DENIED. Courts.

SO ORDERED. The above construction to limit the term "any court" to Municipal Trial
Court and Regional Trial Court – and not to include the Court of Appeals –
Explains the CA in said resolution: finds support in Section 7 of the Rules which states:

Petition for relief is not among the remedies available in the Court of Sec. 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside. – Where the
Appeals. In fact, authorities in remedial law (noted authors Regalado, denial of an appeal is set aside, the lower court shall be required to give due
Herrera, and Feria) are one in their commentaries that these petitions are course to the appeal and to elevate the record of the appealed case as if a
filed with the trial courts. Not one of them has advanced an opinion or timely and proper appeal had been made.
comment that this equitable relief can be obtained in the Court of Appeals.
Under Rule 47, an annulment of judgment or final orders and resolutions Significantly, there is no specific provision in both the 1964 and 1997 Rules
may be filed before this court based on the ground of extrinsic fraud which of Court making the petition under Rule 38, applicable in the Court of
seems to be the premise of the petition. Perhaps it is worth looking into by Appeals. The procedure in the Court of Appeals from Rule 44 to Rule 55 with
the petitioner if the factual basis of the present petition for relief may the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the
qualify as an extrinsic fraud, under Rule 47. remedies available before said court such as annulment of judgment or final
orders and resolution (Rule 47); motion for reconsideration (Rule 52); and,
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned resolution new trial, (Rule 53). Nowhere is petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
was likewise denied by the CA in its equally challenged Resolution 11 of
November 16, 2000, wherein the appellate court further wrote: But even as the CA stood firm on its stand that a petition for relief from
denial of appeal is not among the remedies available before the CA itself,
Under the 1964 Rules of Court, there was only one court where a petition the appellate court, in the same Resolution of November 16, 2000, left the
for relief may be filed – the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial final determination of the question to this Court, thus:
Court. Section 1 thereof governs a petition to Court of First Instance for
relief from judgment of inferior court while Section 2 thereof governs Parenthetically, the main question presented herein is novel in that there is
petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other yet no definite and definitive jurisprudence from the Supreme Court.
proceeding thereof. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has altered the said Perhaps, the case will clarify this gray area in our adjective law for guidance
precept. Now, it must be filed before the Municipal Trial Courts or of the Bench and Bar. The issue should be elevated to that Tribunal.
Metropolitan Trial Courts for judgments or final orders or other proceedings Presently, petitioner is now before this Court via the instant recourse on his
taken in said courts, and in the same case. And for judgment, order, or other submission that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it -
I take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.
Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
XXX RULED THAT A PETITION FOR RELIEF IS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY IN promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or except
THE COURT OF APPEALS. a particular case from its operation.12
II The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the rules shall be
XXX REFUSED TO GRANT THE PETITION DESPITE A CLEAR SHOWING THAT liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
(A) PETITIONER, BY REASON OF FRAUD AND MISTAKE, WAS PREVENTED in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
FROM PROSECUTING HIS APPEAL, AND (B) PETITIONER HAS A GOOD AND proceeding. Courts, therefore, not only have the power but the duty to
SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT. construe and apply technical rules liberally in favor of substantive law and
substantial justice. Furthermore, this Court, unlike courts below, has the
We DISMISS. power not only to liberally construe the rules, but also to suspend them, in
favor of substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently belongs
In Hagonoy Market Vendor Association v. Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
to this Court, which is expressly vested with rule-making power by no less
G.R. No. 137621, February 6, 2002, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
than the Constitution.13 1awphi1.net
Reynato S. Puno, reminded us that ̶
It is equally settled, however, that this Court’s power to liberally construe
Laws are of two (2) kinds: substantive and procedural. Substantive laws,
and even to suspend the rules, presupposes the existence of substantial
insofar as their provisions are unambiguous, are rigorously applied to
rights in favor of which, the strict application of technical rules must
resolve legal issues on the merits. In contrast, courts generally frown upon
concede. The facts are borne out by the records pertaining to petitioner’s
an uncompromising application of procedural laws so as not to subvert
purported undivided share in the property at M. Calim Street, Famy,
substantial justice. Nonetheless, it is not totally uncommon for courts to
Laguna, and the property in Poroza clearly showed that these two
decide cases based on a rigid application of the so-called technical rules of
properties had been subject of an agreement (Exh. "1") whereby petitioner
procedure as these rules exist for the orderly administration of justice.
recognized respondent’s rights to said properties. This fact binds this Court,
From the petition, it is clear that this Court is called upon to relax the there being nothing on record with the trial court as to the herein alleged
application of procedural rules, or suspend them altogether, in favor of fraud against the petitioner. Upon thorough deliberation of the supposed
petitioner’s substantial rights. There is no doubt as to the power of this substantial rights claimed by the petitioner with the court below, the Court
Court to do that. In a fairly recent case, we reiterated: finds no cogent basis to favorably rule on the merits of the appeal even if it
may be given due course which is indispensable to justify this Court in
The Court has often stressed that rules of procedure are merely tools considering this case as an exception to the rules.
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and
promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. The present case will have to be decided in accordance with existing rules of
Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial procedure. We apply the settled principle that petition for relief under Rule
discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed only in
be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate
remedy.14 Hence, a petition for relief may not be availed of where a party
has another adequate remedy available to him, which is either a motion for Additionally, after the dismissal of his appeal, petitioner filed with the CA a
new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is motion for reconsideration of the dismissal resolution. Unfortunately,
not prevented from filing such motion or taking the appeal. The rule is that however, the motion was filed very much late on November 8, 1999.
relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effect Expectedly, in its resolution17 of November 25, 1999, the CA denied the
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own motion for reconsideration, to wit:
negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for
relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already The last day to file a motion for reconsideration was on 06 April 1999 and as
of 18 October 1999 no such motion was ever filed; in fact on 19 October
been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in
the mode of procedure taken by counsel. 15 1999 the court resolved that an entry of judgment may now be issued. The
motion for reconsideration, however, pleas for leniency on account of his
Under Section 2 of Rule 38, supra, of the Rules of Court, a party prevented former lawyer’s inefficiency and negligence in that he failed to appeal the
from taking an appeal from a judgment or final order of a court by reason of case. This is not well taken.
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, may file in the same court
and in the same case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be given His former lawyer’s lack of fidelity and devotion to his client in the discharge
of his duty of perfecting the appeal on time without demonstrating fraud,
due course. This presupposes, of course, that no appeal was taken precisely
because of any of the aforestated reasons which prevented him from accident, mistake or excusable negligence cannot be a basis for judicial
relief. The client has to bear the adverse consequences of the inexcusable
appealing his case. Hence, a petition for relief under Rule 38 cannot be
availed of in the CA, the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction. For mistake or negligence of his counsel or of the latter’s employee and may not
be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been
sure, under the present Rules, petitions for relief from a judgment, final
order or other proceeding rendered or taken should be filed in and resolved different had he proceeded differently (Inocando v. Inocando, 100 Phil. 266)
by the court in the same case from which the petition arose. Thus, petition WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby DENIED.
for relief from a judgment, final order or proceeding involved in a case tried
by a municipal trial court shall be filed in and decided by the same court in Petitioner presents himself as a mere farmer seeking the Court’s leniency to
the same case, just like the procedure followed in the present Regional Trial the point of disregarding the rules on reglementary period for filing
Court.16 pleadings. But he fails to point out any circumstance which might lead the
Court to conclude that his station in life had in any way placed his half-
Here, the record shows that petitioner in fact filed a Notice of Appeal with brother in a more advantageous position. As we see it, petitioner failed to
the trial court, which the latter granted in its order of December 11, 1997 show diligence in pursuing his cause. His condition as a farmer, by itself
and ordered the elevation of the records to the CA. In turn, the CA, in its alone, does not excuse or exempt him from being vigilant on his right. He
resolution of September 28, 1998, required the petitioner, thru his former cannot lay the blame solely on his former lawyer. It is settled that clients are
counsel, Atty. Geminiano Almeda, to file his appellant’s brief. But petitioner bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. 18 While,
failed to comply. Consequently, in its resolution of March 9, 1999, the CA exceptionally, a client may be excused from the failure of his counsel, the
considered the appellant’s appeal as ABANDONED and DISMISSED the circumstances obtaining in this case do not convince the Court to take
same. exception.
In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because of
suffer deprivation of property without due process of law on account of the inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel. 21 The
gross negligence of his previous counsel. To him, the negligence of his Rules allow a petition for relief only when there is no other available
former counsel was so gross that it practically resulted to fraud because he remedy, and not when litigants, like the petitioner, lose a remedy by
was allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had prepared negligence.
and filed his appellant’s brief. He thus prays the Court reverse the CA and
remand the main case to the court of origin for new trial. On a final note, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be issued only
where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsel’s as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a
negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to present his case (1) duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
process of law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright or personal hostility.22 The Court finds no such abuse of discretion in this
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of case.
justice so require.19 None of these exceptions obtains here.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed resolutions
For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear of the CA are AFFIRMED.
abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown. Here, petitioner’s
No pronouncement as to costs.
counsel failed to file the appellant’s brief. While this omission can plausibly
qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to SO ORDERED.
justify the annulment of the proceedings below.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
In Legarda v. Court of Appeals,20 where the Court initially held that the Associate Justice
counsel’s failure to file pleadings at the trial court and later on appeal
amounted to gross negligence, the Court, on motion of the respondent
therein, granted reconsideration and applied the general rule binding the
litigant to her counsel’s negligence. In said case, the Court noted that the
proceedings which led to the filing of the petition "were not attended by
any irregularity." The same observation squarely applies here.

To recapitulate, petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2

of the Rules of Court. He was not prevented from filing his notice of appeal
by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, as in fact he filed one.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of
law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for
that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving