Golango v. Jone B. Fung
Golango v. Jone B. Fung
Golango v. Jone B. Fung
FACTS:
2. A special civil action for certiorari commenced by the petitioner Golango to assailing RTC
Manila’s order in the case People v. Jone Fung declaring that Prosecution to have terminated the
presentation of further evidence and required the Prosecution to file a written offer of evidence
within 20 days, furnishing a copy of the offer to the accused who in turn had to comment on the
offer within 15 days from receipt.
3. A libel case was initiated by the petitioner as the complainant against the respondent alleging that
respondent had issued an office memorandum dated May 10, 1995 maliciously imputing against
the petitioner the commission of bribery and had sent copies of the memorandum to the
petitioner's superiors in the POEA and to other public officers and personalities not connected
with the POEA, causing damage and prejudice to the petitioner.
4. After almost 6 years, the Prosecution had presented only two witnesses in the said. On February
16, 2001, the Prosecution requested that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to and served
on Atty. Oscar Ramos, Resident Ombudsman of the POEA, to compel him to testify in the
criminal case on February 20, 2001. The hearing of February 20, 2001 was, however, reset to
May 23, 2001 due to the unavailability of Atty. Ramos.
5. On May 23, 2001, the Prosecution still failed to present Atty. Ramos as its witness because no
subpoena had been issued to and served on him for the purpose. The prosecution is given 20
days from today to make its formal offer with copy furnished the defense counsel who is given 15
days from receipt to make his comment and thereafter the offer will be deemed submitted for
resolution.
6. However, the petitioner, on his own, assailed on certiorari in the Court of Appeals the order dated
May 23, 2001, claiming that the RTC judge thereby committed grave abuse of discretion for not
issuing the subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify in the May 23, 2001 hearing.
He contended that his prior request for the subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should
have been treated as a continuing request for the subpoena considering that the Rules of Court
did not require a party to apply for a subpoena again should it not be served in the first time.
7. The CA dismissed the petition. Then, again, as correctly observed by the court a quo, from
February 20, 2001 to May 23, 2001, a good three (3) months period passed without the
prosecution requesting for a subpoena for its intended witness. When the respondent court, as a
consequence, deemed the prosecution evidence terminated and required it to formally offer its
evidence, it was not committing any error nor abuse of discretion. Here, petitioner created its own
predicament and should suffer from its adverse effect.
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari of the petitioner.
RULING:
1. YES. The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals. He thereby ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable
parties due to his objective being to set aside the trial court's order dated May 23, 2001 that
concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case. The omission was fatal and already enough cause
for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari.
2. The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General to his petition
for certiorari. At the very least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari to the
OSG prior to the filing thereof, but even that he did not do. Thereby, he violated Executive Order
No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), which mandates the OSG to represent "the
Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent
the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts
or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party."
3. Although the petition for certiorari bore the conformity of the public prosecutor (i.e., Assistant City
Prosecutor Danilo Formoso of Manila), that conformity alone did not suffice. The authority of the
City Prosecutor or his assistant to appear for and represent the People of the Philippines was
confined only to the proceedings in the trial court.
4. The criminal case had been pending since 1995 and the petitioner as the complainant had
presented only two witnesses as of the issuance of the assailed order. The trial court had not
been wanting in giving warnings to the Prosecution on the dire consequences should the
Prosecution continue to fail to complete its evidence.
5. The Prosecution had retained the duty to ensure that its witnesses would be present during the
trial, for its obligation to the administration of justice had been to prove its case sans vexatious
and oppressive delays. Yet, the warnings of the trial court had gone unheeded. Instead, the
Prosecution would deflect the responsibility for the delays to the failure of the trial court to issue
the subpoena to its proposed witness and to cause the subpoena to be served. Such attitude of
the Prosecution, which included the petitioner as the complainant, manifested a lack of the
requisite diligence required of all litigants coming to the courts to seek redress.
6. the trial court's assailed order terminating the Prosecution's presentation of evidence was merely
interlocutory. This fact surely adds justification to the Court of Appeals' rejection of the petition for
certiorari, because it is the settled rule that certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order,
but only a final judgment or order that terminates the proceedings. Certiorari will be refused
where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought
is still pending and undetermined in the lower court. Indeed, a writ of certiorari is not intended to
correct every controversial interlocutory ruling unless the ruling is attended by grave abuse of
discretion or tainted by whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, for the
function of certiorari is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieving
persons from its arbitrary acts - acts that courts or judges have no power or authority in law to
perform.
7. Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner was to proceed in the action until judgment, which,
once rendered, might then be reviewed on appeal, along with the assailed interlocutory order. As
long as the trial court acted within its jurisdiction, its alleged error committed in the exercise of its
jurisdiction amounted to nothing more than an error of judgment that was reviewable by a timely
appeal, not by a special civil action of certiorari.