EN BANC

G.R. No. 139180. July 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

ROLANDO RIVERA, accused- appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a review pursuant to Rule 122, 10 of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure of the decision, 1 dated June 22, 1999, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga,
finding accused-appellant Rolando Rivera guilty of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the
offended party, Erlanie Rivera, the sum of P75,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

The information against accused-appellant charged

That sometime in the month of March 1997, in barangay

Santiago, municipality of Lubao, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO RIVERA, by
means of violence, threat and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously
succeeded in having carnal knowledge [of] his 13 year old
daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latters will and
without her consent.

Contrary to law.2 cräläwvirtualibräry

When the information was read to him in the local dialect

(Pampango) during his arraignment on September 30, 1997,
accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, 3 whereupon trial
was held.

The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant

Erlanie Rivera, her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and Dr.
Demetria Barin, who conducted the physical examination of
complainant.
Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime in March
1997, her younger sister, Zaira, 4 was taken by their parents
to the Escolastica Romero Memorial Hospital in Lubao,
Pampanga. Complainants mother stayed with her sister in
the hospital, but her father, herein accused-appellant, went
back home to Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga. At around 11
oclock in the evening of the same day, complainant was
awakened as accused-appellant started kissing her and
fondling her breasts. Complainant tried to resist by kicking
and pushing accused-appellant, but her efforts were to no
avail. Accused-appellant removed her shorts and panty,
touched her private parts, and then had sexual intercourse
with her. After he was through with her, accused-appellant
told complainant not to tell anyone what had happened or
he would kill complainants mother and sister. Hence, when
her mother came home the following day, Erlanie did not tell
her what had happened because she was afraid of accused-
appellant.

On April 9, 1997, however, Erlanie, in the presence of her

mother, told her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and her
grandmother, Maxima Payumo, that she had been raped by
accused-appellant. For this reason, she was referred to Dr.
Barin for physical examination. She also executed a sworn
statement before the police of Lubao, Pampanga. 5 cräläwvirtualibräry

Erlanie testified that she became pregnant as a result of the

rape committed against her by accused-appellant, but the
pregnancy was aborted. 6 On cross-examination, she said
she was 13 years old at the time of her testimony, the
second child in the family. She said that her parents were
not on good terms with each other and that she knew that
her father had a mistress. Atty. Mangalindan, then defense
counsel, questioned Erlanie about other supposed acts of
molestation committed by accused-appellant against her
previous to the rape subject of the present case, but, upon
objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the
question on the ground that it concerned matters not
covered by her direct examination. 7cräläwvirtualibräry

Erlanie testified that her mother, grandmother, aunt, and a

certain Nora Baluyut were present when she made her
sworn statement before the police. She said that her father
raped her only once, sometime in March 1997. She could
not remember the exact date when she was raped by
accused-appellant, but she did remember that the same
took place in March as her sister, Zaira, was hospitalized at
the time. When the rape occurred, her younger brother and
sister were in their house asleep. She did not tell her mother
after the latter had returned home that she had been raped
by accused-appellant because she was afraid of her father
who had threatened her. After the rape, accused-appellant
would only come home on Sundays. 8 cräläwvirtualibräry

Questioned further on cross-examination, Erlanie said that

she gave her sworn statement before the police and that her
answers to questions asked during her direct examination
were freely given without coaching by anyone. She could
understand Tagalog, the language used in her sworn
statement. She told the court that she struggled against
accused-appellant, kicking and pushing him, but she was
overpowered by her father. At that time, Erlanies younger
sister, Corazon, was lying beside her, but Erlanie did not
shout even when her father succeeded in penetrating her.
Erlanie could not remember how long the sexual act took
place, but she felt something like urine come out of her
fathers penis after he was finished with her. Erlanie testified
that she was 12 years old when she was raped by her
father. 9
cräläwvirtualibräry

On re-direct examination, when asked about the discrepancy

between her testimony that her mother returned home only
the day after the rape and her statement in her affidavit
that accused-appellant slept beside her mother after the
rape, Erlanie replied that she made a mistake as the
incident narrated in her affidavit referred to a different
occasion when no rape was committed against her by
accused-appellant. 10 cräläwvirtualibräry

The next witness for the prosecution was Marietta

Pagtalunan, complainants aunt and the sister of
complainants mother, Evangeline. Marietta corroborated
Erlanies testimony that the latter told her sometime in April
1997 that she had been raped by accused-appellant.
Marietta said she took complainant to Dr. Barin, who
examined complainant. 11 cräläwvirtualibräry

Dr. Demetria Barin was Chief Physician of the Escolastica

Romero District Hospital. Her findings are as follows:

P.E. FINDINGS:

- No signs of external Physical Injuries

I.E. FINDINGS:

HYMEN - healed laceration at 3:00 oclock

VAGINA - Admits one finger with ease two fingers with

difficulty

UTERUS - not enlarged

LMP - March 3, 1997

Pregnancy Test (+)12 cräläwvirtualibräry

Dr. Barin testified that on April 10, 1997, she examined

complainant Erlanie Rivera and found that the victim had an
injury in the hymen at the 3 oclock position which could
possibly have been caused by the insertion of a hard object,
such as a male organ. Dr. Barin testified that complainant
Erlanie went back to see her on May 2, 1997 because she
suffered from vaginal bleeding indicative of a threatened
abortion. She said that she found that complainant was then
pregnant. Upon examination of the patient at that time, Dr.
Barin found that abortion had not yet taken place and
prescribed medicines for the complainant. Erlanie was
subjected to another pregnancy test on May 13, 1997, but
the result was negative. Dr. Barin stated that the vaginal
bleeding suffered by complainant could have caused the
abortion of the fetus. 13 cräläwvirtualibräry

Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence. Accused-

appellant, his sister, Concepcion Sayo, and Natividad Pinlac,
Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital,
were presented as witnesses.
Accused-appellant denied that he raped Erlanie Rivera. He
alleged that the rape charge was filed against him because
his wife, Evangeline, had a paramour and resented him
because he hurt her. He explained that he saw his wife
talking with another man in their house and beat her up on
April 1, 1997 because he heard that she had a lover. He also
said that his wife was angry with him because he had a
mistress who stayed in their house for three weeks. He
further stated that his wifes relatives were likewise angry
with him because he caused the lot owned by his father-in-
law in Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga to be registered in his
name. He said that he was compelled to sign a waiver of his
rights over the land owned by his parents-in-law. 14 The
defense presented a letter to accused-appellant written by
his wife, who was asking him to sign a document so that she
could attend to it before he got out of prison. 15 cräläwvirtualibräry

The defense also offered as evidence a document,

designated as Waiver of Rights, 16 signed by accused-
appellant, in which he acknowledged that he was a tenant of
a parcel of land and that he waived and voluntarily
surrendered his right over the said landholding to the
SMPCI, recommending that a certain Ponciano Miguel be
given the land to work on the same. The document was
identified by accused-appellant in open court. He said that
Ponciano Miguel was a first cousin of his wife and that he
signed the document because his wifes relatives promised
him that he would get out of prison after signing the
document. 17 cräläwvirtualibräry

Another witness for the defense was Concepcion Sayo,

accused-appellants sister, who testified that in March 1997,
accused-appellant lived with her family in Malawak, Bustos,
Bulacan, to help her husband operate a fishpond. She said
that accused-appellant stayed in their house during the
entire month of March, except in March 19, 1997 when he
stayed with their sister, Perla, in Tibagan, Bustos,
Bulacan. 18cräläwvirtualibräry

The last defense witness was Natividad Pinlac, Records

Officer of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital, who
identified 19 a certification, dated April 29, 1999, in which it
was stated that Zaira Rivera was confined at that hospital
from March 1 to March 2, 1997. 20 cräläwvirtualibräry

On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the

dispositive portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, the court finding the accused guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged. For
having violated Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659, with the attendant
circumstances that the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is the father of the victim and
absent any circumstance that could mitigate the commission
thereof, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death by lethal injection.

In line with established jurisprudence, said accused is also

ordered to indemnify the offended party Erlanie Rivera in
the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.21 cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:

1. The lower court failed to observe the constitutional right

of the Accused-Appellant to due process and right to
counsel;

2. The lower court failed to consider the evidence of the

Accused-Appellant.22 cräläwvirtualibräry

I. Accused-appellant invokes his right to due process of law.

He claims that he was denied the same because: (a) the
trial judge disallowed his lawyer from cross-examining
Erlanie Rivera concerning the latters sworn statements on
the ground of irrelevance and immateriality; (b) the trial
court denied the motion made by accused-appellants
counsel de oficio to postpone the cross-examination of Dr.
Barin, the examining physician, because of which the said
counsel consequently waived the cross-examination of Dr.
Barin; (c) the judge propounded numerous questions to
accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the
prosecutor; and (d) the trial courts decision was
promulgated just one day after accused-appellant submitted
his memorandum.

Procedural due process simply means that a person must be

heard before he is condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a persons basic rights, not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily. 23 Considering both the evidence and the law
applicable to this case, we hold that accused-appellant has
been accorded his right to due process.

A. One basis for accused-appellants contention that he was

denied due process is the refusal of the trial judge to allow
Atty. Mangalindans questions concerning the other alleged
acts of molestation committed by accused-appellant against
complainant. Accused-appellant argues that no legal ground
exists for the trial courts ruling.

The transcript of stenographic notes concerning this incident

shows the following:

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

Q You mentioned in your testimony that you were molested

by your father since 1996.

COURT:

Are you referring to a chain of events because police station

you are referring is something there are two places this girl
testified that she was raped, you referred to us Acts of
Lasciviousness and she did not testified about that, that is
another case with another Court, we are only trying here a
rape case that is only they you never mention. Only on the
matters that she testified (sic).

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

But this is also related to the rape case your Honor because
I will confront it with another form of a question.

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q Prior to this incident, were you molested by your father?

PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

Immaterial, your Honor, whatever acts w[ere] done by the

accused is not a subject of the case at bar.

COURT:

Let us confine [questioning] to the complaint at bar which is

a rape case.

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

This is related to the incident because we are here your

Honor to prove, we are trying to discredit her testimony. We
will just direct our question touching on the direct
examination.

COURT:

Only on the matters that she only testified that is only thing
you can cross-examine. Only matters testified which is only
a rape case let us not dwell the Court knows there are other
cases Acts of Lasciviousness pending in the lower Court at
the proper Court otherwise if I will allow you to ask
questions on other matters specially I know you are
pinpointing the Acts of Lasciviousness you are prolonging
this case here (sic).

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

I am trying to discredit the witness as one where the

credibility as witness here your Honor is very important. I
stated before our main cross-examination is the accused is
not a plan in such case, although I do sympathize (sic). We
would like to propound question that will discredit her as
witness and a complainant not with her testimony alone.
Our center of cross-examination is to discredit her as
complaining witness that is why our question may not be
limited to be accepted under the rule of cross-examination
your Honor the cross-examination your Honor the cross-
examiner is not limited on the direct-testimony of the
witness but he can propound questions which may petition
or destroy the credibility of the witness that is our view
point (sic).

PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

We cannot dispute the right of accused to discredit or to

adopt our credibility of our witness, but it should be done in
the proper way, not to ask immaterial questions which are
not related.

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

The rule for cross-examination insofar as to destroy the

credibility of the witness is not only limited to what the
Honorable Fiscal we came approach of so many cross-
examinations goes allow your Honor under the rules of
Court insofar as this case is related to the present case we
are trying, this is very related because even the witness I
have transcript in my hand, testified not only the rape case
your Honor she had testified by direct-examination the
preparatory acts before the testimony of rape that she was
been molested early, finger of the father, this were testified
through by the witness, it is here direct-testimony it is not
limited (sic).

PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

Prior to this incident were you molested by your father,

obviously your Honor the question is not relevant.

ATTY. MANGALINDAN:

Your Honor please Im very disagreeable (sic), I have not

with me the transcript but I have read that you [can] ask
questions concerning the rape case.

COURT:

A question referring to events prior to the complaint at

bar.24
cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court later issued an order, dated December 9,

1997, the pertinent parts of which provided:
After private complainant testified on direct-examination,
counsel for accused attempted to cross-examine her on
matters relevant to the complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness
which was objected to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo
G. Santos on the ground that private complainant did not
testify on that matter but limited her testimony on the rape
case only. Counsel for the accused argued that although
that is correct nonetheless because [of] the sworn
statement executed by private complainant identified by
said witness in her direct examination and marked as Exhibit
C for the prosecution, he is at liberty to cross-examine the
witness on all matters stated in her sworn statement
including that portion touching on the acts of lasciviousness
subject matter of another case before another court.

The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule 132,

Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the witness may be
cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters
stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith,
with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the
issue.

The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not
testify anything about acts of lasciviousness committed upon
her person. She may not therefore be questioned on this
matter because it is not connected with her direct testimony
or has any bearing upon the issue. To allow adverse party to
cross-examine the witness on the acts of lasciviousness
which is pending trial in another court and which the witness
did not testify is improper.

Questions concerning acts of lasciviousness will not in any

way test the accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias or the reverse. On the contrary such
questions, if allowed, will unduly burden the court with
immaterial testimonies.25cräläwvirtualibräry

In another order, dated January 13, 1998, the trial court

gave accused-appellants counsel 20 days within which to
elevate its ruling to the appellate court. 26 The records
reveal, however, that no such petition was filed by Atty.
Mangalindan as regards this particular matter.

The question, therefore, is whether the trial court correctly

disallowed accused-appellants counsel from questioning
complainant as regards the other supposed acts of
lasciviousness contained in her sworn statement. On this
point, Rule 132, 6 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:

Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness

may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any
matters stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest, bias or
the reverse and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the
issue.

The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied

in Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the
accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to
face and in Rule 115, 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him. 27 The cross-examination of a
witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose
falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed
direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress,
and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters
which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him. 28cräläwvirtualibräry

The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is,

however, not without limits but is subject to the rules on the
admissibility and relevance of evidence. Thus, in People v.
Zheng Bai Hui, 29 this Court upheld the ruling of the trial
judge disallowing the questions propounded by the accuseds
counsel on the ability of the arresting officer to distinguish
between tawas and shabu without a laboratory examination,
the academic degree of his training instructor, and the
officers authorship of books on drug identity and analysis for
being irrelevant, improper, and impertinent.
In this case, accused-appellants counsel argued that his
questions to Erlanie on the other acts of lasciviousness
supposedly committed by accused-appellant against her
were for the purpose of testing her credibility. There was,
however, no showing on his part how these questions had
any bearing on complainants credibility or on the truth of
her claims. One is led to suspect that the purpose of these
questions was to confuse complainant into committing
mistakes in her answers during cross-examination that
accused-appellants counsel could later use to possibly put
complainants credibility, not to mention her character, in
question.

Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should have been

allowed to ask questions in relation to the sworn statement
executed by complainant. He cites Rule 132, 17 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence which provides that:

When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or

record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the
same subject matter may be inquired into by the other.

Neither can this rule be invoked to justify the questioning of

complainant which the trial court did not allow. As the above
provision states, this rule applies to parts of an act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record which is given in
evidence.

Indeed, the records show that after Erlanie had finished with
her direct examination on November 25, 1997, the trial
judge granted the motion made by Atty. Anselmo
Mangalindan, accused-appellants private counsel, to
postpone Erlanie Riveras cross-examination to allow him
time to secure copies of the transcript of stenographic notes
of Erlanies testimony and thus enable him to fully question
complainant. 30 Erlanie was first cross-examined on
December 2, 1997, but several postponements, namely, on
January 13, 1998, 31 February 10, 1998, 32 March 12,
1998, 33 March 31, 1998, 34 April 7, 1998, 35 May 12,
1998, 36 May 26, 1998, 37 Ma y 28, 1998, 38 and June 11,
1998, 39 on Erlanies cross-examination took place because of
the failure of Atty. Mangalindan to appear on the said trial
dates. Erlanies cross-examination was continued on July 14,
1998 and July 23, 1998. Her cross-examination by accused-
appellants counsel was thorough and covered various
subjects, such as the nature of the relationship between her
parents, who were present during the execution of her
sworn statement, whether the same had been executed by
her voluntarily, the date when she was raped by accused-
appellant the reason for her delay in reporting the rape
committed by accused-appellant, her understanding of
Tagalog, who were with her in the house at the time of the
rape, the details surrounding the rape committed against
her, and her age. It is evident that accused-appellant and
his counsel were given ample opportunity to conduct the
cross-examination of Erlanie Rivera in order to test her
truthfulness.

B. The record shows that because accused-appellants

private counsel was not present when Dr. Barin testified,
Atty. Eddie Bansil was appointed by the trial court as
accused-appellants counsel de oficio for that particular
hearing. Atty. Bansil moved for the postponement of the
witness cross-examination, but the trial court denied his
request because, on the one hand, accused-appellant was a
detention prisoner and Dr. Barin was a very busy person,
while, on the other hand, Atty. Bansil had heard the
testimony of the said witness. Atty. Bansil then decided not
to cross-examine Dr. Barin. 40
cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant now contends that the trial judge denied

the motion of Atty. Bansil for postponement because he was
biased against him. Accused-appellant claims that the
counsel de oficio was not familiar with the facts of his case
and was thus in no position to cross-examine Dr. Barin.

While the Constitution recognizes the accuseds right to

competent and independent counsel of his own choice, his
option to secure the services of a private counsel is not
absolute. For considering the States and the offended partys
right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may restrict
the accuseds option to retain a private counsel if the
accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the
chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the
attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid
reason. 41 cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to

represent accused-appellant on October 6, 1998 because his
regular counsel, Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent
without any explanation. Atty. Mangalindan had previously
been granted several postponements. As this Court ruled in
another case:

. . . Courts are not required to wait indefinitely the pleasure

and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated
to promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Nor should they countenance such an obvious trifling with
the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the trial
continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was
adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to
be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent
him.42cräläwvirtualibräry

Atty. Bansil was present and heard the testimony of Dr.

Barin, the prosecution witness, on that day. Dr. Barins
testimony on direct examination was simple, containing
primarily a discussion of her findings on the hymenal
laceration sustained by complainant. Her testimony did not
require considerable study and extraordinary preparation on
the part of defense counsel for the purpose of cross-
examination. It seems Atty. Bansil no longer found it
necessary to cross-examine Dr. Barin.

Moreover, beyond stating that Dr. Barin was a vital witness,

accused-appellant has not indicated what questions his
counsel wanted to ask from Dr. Barin. It may well be that
these questions do not exist at all and that the importance
given by accused-appellant to counsel de oficios failure to
cross-examine the witness is exaggerated. Indeed, a
medical examination of the victim, together with the medical
certificate, is merely corroborative and is not an
indispensable element of rape. 43 The primordial issue in this
case remains to be whether the complainants testimony, not
Dr. Barins, established beyond reasonable doubt the crime
of rape.
C. Accused-appellant likewise points to the trial judges
questions propounded to him during his cross-examination
as an indication of the latters partiality for the prosecution.

We find no merit in this contention. Where the trial court is

judge both of the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes
necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice
for the presiding judge to re-examine a witness so that his
judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a full and clear
understanding of the facts. 44 Our reading of the transcript
of stenographic notes in this case shows that the trial judge
merely wanted to clarify certain points relating to the
defense of accused-appellant and not to establish his guilt.
It is a judges prerogative to ask questions to ferret out the
truth. 45 It cannot be taken against him if the questions he
propounds reveals certain truths which, in turn, tend to
destroy the theory of one party. 46 As this Court held:

In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some

of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the
truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a
charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident
desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the
witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded
a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses
as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the
record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are
judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be
negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted
a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a
proper question to a witness which might develop some
material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound
discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will
enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or
the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may
examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness
and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant
and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party. . .47
cräläwvirtualibräry
D. We also find no merit in accused-appellants argument
that he was denied due process considering the speed with
which the trial court rendered judgment against him, which
judgment was promulgated one day after he filed his
memorandum.

The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear

account of the facts and the law on which it is based. It
discusses in full the courts findings on the credibility of both
the prosecution and defense witnesses and its evaluation of
the evidence of both parties. What we said in the analogous
case of People v. Mercado 48 applies to this case:

. . . A review of the trial courts decision shows that its

findings were based on the records of this case and the
transcripts of stenographic notes during the trial. The speed
with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus
be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function.
Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after
all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of
diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case
long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his
decision has arrived. The one-day period between the filing
of accused-appellants memorandum and the promulgation
of the decision was sufficient time to consider their
arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long
as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly
administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless
disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for
rendering his decision with due dispatch. . .

II. Coming now to the merits of this case, we find that the
evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
accused-appellant. In reviewing rape cases, we have been
guided by the following principles: (a) An accusation for
rape is easy to make, difficult to prove, and even more
difficult to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the
prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. 49cräläwvirtualibräry
A. Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of a rape
victim, by itself, is sufficient to warrant a judgment of
conviction if found to be credible. It has likewise been
established that when a woman declares that she has been
raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that
she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the
test of credibility the accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof. This is because from the nature of the offense, the
sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the
guilt of the accused is the complainants testimony. 50cräläwvirtualibräry

Considering complainants tender age, her shy demeanor,

and manner of testifying in court, the trial court found
Erlanies testimony to be straightforward, natural, and
convincing and accorded the same full faith and credit. 51 cräläwvirtualibräry

Complainant told the court how she was awakened because

accused-appellant kissed her and fondled her breasts. She
narrated that she tried to resist accused-appellants
advances by pushing and kicking him, but the latter
succeeded in ravishing her. She told of how her father
threatened to kill her mother and her siblings if she reported
the incident. Despite the lengthy cross-examination of
accused-appellants counsel, she remained firm and
steadfast in her story of how she was raped by her father.
Her narration not only rings true and sincere but is
consistent and unshaken on its material points.
Complainants testimony is fully corroborated by the medical
findings of Dr. Barin who examined complainant shortly
after she had been raped. She found complainant to have
suffered a hymenal laceration at the 3 oclock position which
could have been caused by the penetration of a hard object,
such as a male organ.

Complainants failure to remember the date of the

commission of the rape cannot be taken against her. The
exact date when complainant was sexually abused is not an
essential element of the crime of rape. 52 Nor does the fact
that complainant was sleeping beside her sister when the
rape occurred detract from her credibility. The possibility of
rape is not negated by the fact that the presence of even
the whole family of the accused inside the same room
produced the possibility of discovery. For rape to be
committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, for
rapists respect neither time nor place for carrying out their
evil designs. 53 cräläwvirtualibräry

In sum, accused-appellant failed to show any reason why

this Court should disbelieve complainants testimony.
Indeed, the gravity of filing a case for incestuous rape is of
such a nature that a daughters accusation must be taken
seriously. It is against human experience for a girl to
fabricate a story which would drag herself and her family to
a lifetime of dishonor, unless it is the truth. More so when
her charge could mean the execution of her own father, as
in this case. 54
cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellants counsel on cross-examination made

much of the discrepancy between complainants sworn
statement where she stated that accused-appellant slept
beside her mother after the rape 55 and her testimony that
her mother returned home from the hospital only the day
after the rape took place. 56 It must be pointed out,
however, that discrepancies between a witness affidavit and
his testimony in open court does not necessarily impair his
credibility. Affidavits, which are taken ex parte, are often
incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer. 57 cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, whether accused-appellant slept alone or with

complainants mother after committing the rape of
complainant is of no moment as it is a minor point that does
not reflect on the commission of the crime itself. The rule is
that discrepancies and inconsistencies on minor matters
neither impair the essential integrity of the prosecution
evidence as a whole nor reflect on the witness honesty.
Such inconsistencies may in fact strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of the witness as they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 58 cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant contends that complainant could not have

been raped on March 1 or 2, 1997, the dates when her
sister Zaira was hospitalized, because she had her last
menstrual period on March 3, 1998 and thus she could not
have gotten pregnant as a result of the rape. He argues that
a woman who had her monthly period cannot be
impregnated as a result of sexual intercourse five days
before or five days after her last menstruation. 59 cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant does not, however, cite any legal or

medical authority for his thesis, except what he claims to be
common knowledge. On the other hand, we have previously
held that it is hard to ascertain the exact date of fertilization
inasmuch as more than two weeks is considered to be the
life span of the spermatozoa in the vaginal canal. 60 Hence,
even granting that complainant could not have been
impregnated by accused-appellant during the period alleged
by him, it remains possible for complainant to have gotten
pregnant afterwards. More importantly, it must be
emphasized that pregnancy is not an element of the crime
of rape and is, therefore, totally immaterial to the question
of accused-appellants guilt. 61 In other words, accused-
appellant being the cause of complainants pregnancy is a
non-issue in the prosecution of the crime of rape. What
should not be lost sight of is the fact that complainants
testimony constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her without her
consent, and such fully established the crime of rape.

B. Accused-appellant imputes ill motive on the part of

complainants mother and her relatives for bringing charges
against him. He claims that complainants mother resented
the fact that he used to beat her up out of jealousy and that
he had several paramours in the past. He further asserts
that his wifes relatives were angry with him because of the
land which he caused to be registered in his name to the
prejudice of the latter.

This allegation is without merit. Accused-appellant makes it

appear that complainants mother was responsible for the
filing of this case against him. This is not so. For that
matter, his wife did not testify against him. It was his
daughter, complainant, alone who denounced him in court.

Accused-appellants claim that the motivation for the filing of

this case was the animosity of his wifes relatives towards
him caused by his land-grabbing of their land is likewise
without any basis. It may be that his wifes relatives took
advantage of his incarceration and made him sign his waiver
of rights over the land. 62 But this does not necessarily mean
they conspired to persecute him. It is noteworthy that
accused-appellant never claimed that the document which
he signed (Exh. 3) existed before the filing of the criminal
complaint against him or that his wifes relatives fabricated
the charge against him because of his failure to sign the
same.

Indeed, what accused-appellants defense cannot explain is

the hymenal laceration sustained by complainant or the
steadfastness she has exhibited in pursuing the charge
against her own father. It is doubtful that complainant would
let herself be embroiled in a petty family dispute in
exchange for her honor and dignity. We cannot believe that
a young girl, like complainant, would invent a sordid tale of
sexual abuse by accused-appellant unless it was the
truth. 63 Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful
reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should
testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a
crime, her testimony is trustworthy. 64
cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant also raises the defense of denial and alibi.

But the bare denial of accused-appellant cannot overcome
the positive declarations of complainant. Denial, when
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
constitutes negative self-serving evidence which deserves
no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible
witness who testified on affirmative matters. 65 cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellants sister, Concepcion Sayo, testified that

accused-appellant lived with her family in Bulacan at the
time of the rape. No other witness not related to accused-
appellant, however, was called to corroborate her claim. We
have already held that the defense of alibi cannot prosper if
it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and
not by credible persons. It is not improbable that these
witnesses would freely perjure themselves for the sake of
their loved ones. 66 Accused-appellants defense thus fails to
convince this Court.

C. The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, we think that

the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court is
erroneous. It is settled that to justify the imposition of the
death penalty, both the relationship of the victim and her
age must be alleged and proved. 67 Thus, in People v.
Javier, 68 where the victim was alleged to be 16 years old at
the time of the commission of the rapes, it was held:

. . . Although the victims age was not contested by the

defense, proof of age of the victim is particularly necessary
in this case considering that the victims age which was then
16 years old is just two years less than the majority age of
18. In this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference
between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as
physical features and attributes are concerned. A physically
developed 16-year old lass may be mistaken for an 18-year
old young woman, in the same manner that a frail and
young-looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year old
minor. Thus, it is in this context that independent proof of
the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential
so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed
under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying
circumstances enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. In a
criminal prosecution especially of cases involving the
extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which an accused is charged must be established
by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld.

A duly certified certificate of live birth showing complainants

age, or some other official document on record, such as a
school record, has been recognized as competent
evidence. 69cräläwvirtualibräry

In this case, although complainants minority has been

alleged in the information, no independent evidence was
presented by the prosecution to prove the same.
Complainant did not even state her age at the time of the
rape during direct examination; it was only during her cross-
examination when she stated that she was 12 years old at
the time she was raped by her father. 70 cräläwvirtualibräry

Nor was her birth certificate or baptismal certificate or any

school record presented by the prosecution to prove the age
of Erlanie at the time of the rape. Not even her mother,
whose testimony could have been sufficient to prove the age
of complainant, 71 testified in this case. What was relied
upon by the trial court was that fact that the age of the
victim was undisputed by the defense. 72 It also took judicial
notice of the victims minority on account of her
appearance. 73cräläwvirtualibräry

We do not agree with this conclusion. The trial court can

only take judicial notice of the victims minority when the
latter is, for example, 10 years old or below. Otherwise, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the victims age at the
time of the rape and the absence of denial on the part of
accused-appellant does not excuse the prosecution from
discharging its burden. 74 In a similar case, People v.
Tundag, 75 in which the trial court took judicial notice of the
minority of the victim who was alleged to be 13 years
old, we ruled:

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is

improper, despite the defense counsels admission, thereof
acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section
3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a
hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of
such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by
the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the
absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were
lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence
sufficient for the purpose.

The prosecution having failed to present evidence as to

complainants age, accused-appellant can be convicted only
of simple rape, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua.

Consequently, the award of civil indemnity in the amount

of P75,000.00 made by the trial court cannot be sustained.
Such amount can only be awarded if the crime of rape was
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the death penalty is authorized by the applicable
amendatory laws. 76 Accordingly, the civil indemnity
awarded to complainant must be reduced to P50,000.00 in
consonance with current rulings. 77 cräläwvirtualibräry
The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
to complainant is correct. Moral damages is awarded in rape
cases without need of showing that the victim suffered from
mental, physical, and psychological trauma as these are too
obvious to require recital by the victim during trial. 78 cräläwvirtualibräry

In addition to the damages given by the trial court,

exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should
likewise be awarded in favor of complainant. Accused-
appellant being the father of complainant, such relationship
can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance
warranting the award of exemplary damages. In rapes
committed by fathers against their daughters, such award
may be imposed to serve as a deterrent to other parents
similarly disposed to commit the same crime. 79 cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding accused-appellant
guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the modification
that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant Erlanie Rivera
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Pardo,

Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Panganiban, and Buena, JJ.,

abroad on official business.

Sandoval-Gutierrez J., on leave.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117691. March 1, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDUARDO SAMPIOR

 y BERICO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Branch 15,
dated June 29, 1994, in Criminal Cases Nos. C-4515 and C-4516, finding
appellant Eduardo Sampior y Berico guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape. Its decretal portion reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, finding accused EDUARDO SAMPIOR Y BERICO guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in Crim. Cases Nos. C-4515 and C-
4516, punishable under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, and without the presence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, and considering that his daughter-victim was already 18 years
old at the time of the commission of the crime, he is hereby imposed with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the aforesaid criminal cases.
However, he is entitled to be credited in the service of his sentence for
whatever imprisonment he had already undergone pursuant to Art. 29 of the
same Code. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"SO ORDERED." 1

Noteworthy, appellant does not seek an acquittal, but contends that he

should have been convicted of frustrated rape only, and that the sentence on
him should be reduced, correspondingly.

The facts of this case, as gleaned from the records, are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On March 5, 1994, private complainant, who is the eldest of appellant’s nine

children, was left in their house with her two younger sisters and a 2-month
old infant brother. Appellant had gone out to harvest palay with his parents
and some of his sons. Private complainant’s mother, in turn, had left to sell
fruits in the Bagong Lipunan Trade Center in Roxas City.

Around 10.00 o’clock in the morning, appellant returned to their house alone.
He told the two small girls to go downstairs and play. The two obeyed,
leaving only the appellant, the private complainant, and the sleeping infant.
After private complainant placed her charge in his cradle, appellant suddenly
pulled her towards him and began to take off her shirt and panty. Private
complainant resisted and told him that she did not like what he was doing to
her. Appellant persisted in his efforts. He forced her to lie down on the floor
and removed her panty. The accused then removed his pants and brief and
placed himself on top of her. He held his penis and inserted it into the vagina
of the complainant. After a short while, the appellant pulled out his genital
organ, which emitted a fluid-like substance. He then told complainant to dress
up. Assuring her that he loved her, he warned her not to tell anybody about
the incident, otherwise he would kill them all. Shortly thereafter appellant left
the house.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, appellant returned
home smelling of liquor. He found private complainant alone and sexually
abused her again.

Private complainant says she did not report the rapes immediately to the
police, since she was confused and undecided about what to do. She also had
her school examinations to contend with. She finally revealed her ordeal to
her mother. They agreed to report the matter to the police, but decided to
wait for the proper time.

On March 14, 1994, private complainant, with her mother’s consent, reported
the rapes to the police.

Private complainant was examined at the Roxas Memorial General Hospital by

Dr. Michael Toledo. His findings were as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CONCIOUS (sic) COHERENT AMBULATORY

PELVIC EXAMINATION

- GROSSLY NORMAL FEMALE GENITALIA

- INTROITUS — ADMITS 1 FINGER WITH EASE

- HYMEN — INTACT — OPEN

DISCHARGE — WHITISH MUCCIS

A/P

- SPERMATOZOA DETERMINATION — NEGATIVE

- PREGNANCY TEST — NEGATIVE" 2

On March 24, 1994, private complainant filed two separate complaints for
rape against her own father. The complaints were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. C-4515 and C-4516. The complaint in Criminal Case No. C-4515
states: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about 10:00 o’clock in the morning of March 5, 1994, in the City
of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, by means of force and intimidation, and exercising moral and
parental ascendancy over the person of the complainant who is his natural
daughter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal
knowledge with EVELYN SAMPIOR, an eighteen (18) year old girl, against her
will. chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary

"CONTRARY TO LAW." 3

The complaint in Criminal Case No. C-4516 reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of March 5, 1994, in the City
of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation, and exercising moral and
parental ascendancy over the person of the complainant who is his natural
daughter, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously, had
carnal knowledge with EVELYN SAMPIOR, an eighteen (18) year old girl,
against her will.

"CONTRARY TO LAW" 4

On arraignment, appellant, assisted by the public attorney, pleaded "Not

guilty" to each charge.

The two cases were then jointly tried.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, including the complainant.

Dr. Toledo testified that he did not find any laceration of the complainant’s
hymen nor any contusions or other injuries in her body. However, he pointed
out that there are some hymens that are "thick, elastic and flexible," 5 and
thus, he could not discount the possibility that a rape victim’s hymen would
remain intact and exhibit no lacerations. 6

Appellant did not take the witness stand. He chose not to present his side of
the case. Instead, the defense presented the private complainant as a hostile
witness to testify that there was no full penile penetration of her womanhood.

On June 29, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant of two counts of rape.

On appeal before this Court, appellant assigns the following errors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE COURT OF ORIGIN ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

THE CRIME OF CONSUMMATED RAPE. chanrobles.com.ph : red

II

THE COURT OF ORIGIN ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION

PERPETUA AGAINST THE ACCUSED APPELLANT. 7

The only issue before us is whether or not the trial court erred in finding that
appellant is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt, and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law.

On the first assigned error, appellant’s argues he should not have been
convicted of rape, but only of frustrated rape. Appellant avers that since
private complainant, as hostile witness, testified that the appellant’s penis
"only touched the outer side of her vagina," 8 the two rapes were never
consummated. Appellant’s claim, however, is contradicted by the records. The
transcripts show that private complainant categorically, credibly, and
convincingly testified that there was phallic penetration of her private parts. 9
In the instant case, appellant has shown no reason why the private
complainant’s testimony should not deserve full credence. A candid narration
by a rape victim deserves credence particularly where no ill motive is
attributed to the rape victim that would make her testify falsely against the
accused. 10 For no woman in her right mind will admit to having been raped,
allow an examination of her most private parts and subject herself as well as
her family to the humiliation and shame concomitant with a rape prosecution,
unless the charges are true. 11 Where an alleged rape victim says she was
sexually abused, she says almost all that is necessary to show that rape had
been inflicted on her person, provided her testimony meets the test of
credibility. 12

Appellant vehemently insists that prosecution witness Dr. Michael Toledo

testified that he could not tell if there was penile penetration as there were no
lacerations in the private complainant’s hymen, which was still intact 13
Hence, appellant claims he should be given the benefit of the doubt and
should only be convicted of frustrated rape. But appellant’s virgo intacta
theory has already received short shrift from this Court. A broken hymen or
laceration of any part of the female genitalia is not a prerequisite for a rape
conviction. 14 Nor is a medical examination indispensable to the prosecution
of rape, as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that a conviction
for rape is proper. 15 A medical examination of the victim, as well as the
medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character. 16 What is
important, the trial court said, is that the testimony of private complainant
about the incident is clear, unequivocal, and credible. 17 A daughter would
not accuse her own father of such an unspeakable crime as incestuous rape
had she really not been aggrieved. 18

Appellant points to the old (1927) ruling in People v. Erinia, 19 where the
Court held that there being no conclusive evidence of the penetration of the
genital organ of the offended party, the defendant was entitled to the benefit
of the doubt, and could only be found guilty of frustrated rape. However, later
cases have overruled Erinia. We now hold that the crime of frustrated rape is
non-existent in our criminal law. 20 In abandoning Erinia, the Court declared
that the merest touch of the male organ upon the labia of the pudendum, no
matter how slight, consummates the rape. 21

On the second assigned error, we find that the appellant’s conviction for two
counts of rape by the trial court is well supported by the evidence. It did not
err in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Section 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. 22

We note, however, that the trial court awarded neither civil indemnity nor
moral damages to the offended party. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the
private complainant is entitled to civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count
of rape. 23 An additional P50,000.00 as moral damages should likewise be
granted for each count of rape, 24 without need of further proof. To serve as
deterrent against sexual abuse of young women by their fathers, exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should also be imposed for each count
of rape.25cralaw:red

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court sentencing appellant Eduardo

Sampior y Berico to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, for each one of the two counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that, for each count of rape, appellant shall pay complainant
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellant. chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1. Records, Crim. Case No. C-4515, p. 90.

2. Id. at 7.

3. Id. at 2.

4. Records, Crim. Case No. C-4516, p. 1.

5. TSN, May 12, 1994, p. 10.

6. Ibid.

7. Rollo, p. 53.

8. TSN, June 2, 1994, pp. 2-12.

9. TSN, May 12, 1994, pp. 31-32, 37-38; June

2, 1994, pp. 10-12.

10. People v. Henson, 270 SCRA 634, 635

(1997).

11. People v. Gastador, G.R. No. 123727,

April 14, 1999, p. 14; People v. Oliver, 303
SCRA 73, 81-82 (1999).

12. People v. Abad, 268 SCRA 246, 250-251

(1997).

13. TSN, May 12, 1994, pp. 9-10, 12, 15-16.

14. People v. Garcia, 288 SCRA 382, 399

(1998).

15. People v. Devilleres, 269 SCRA 716, 726

(1997).

16. People v. Brandares, G.R. No. 130092,

July 26, 1999, p. 6.
17. People v. Brandares, supra, citing People
v. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 (1998).

18. People v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 128875, July 8,

1999, p. 10.

19. 50 Phil. 998, 1000 (1927).

20. People v. Quiñanola and Escuadro, G.R.

No. 126148, May 5, 1999, p. 1; People v.
Orita, 184 SCRA 105, 114-115 (1990).

21. People v. Velasco, 73 SCRA 574, 581

(1976); People v. Ordonio, 68 SCRA 397, 403-
404 (1975); People v. Amores, 58 SCRA 505,
508 (1974); People v. Royeras, 56 SCRA 666,
671 (1974); People v. Carandang, 52 SCRA 259,
270 (1973); People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498,
509 (1971); People v. Obtinalia, 38 SCRA 651,
661 (1971); People v. Jose, 37 SCRA 450, 469
(1971); People v. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839
(1961); People v. Canastre, 82 Phil. 480, 483
(1948).

22. "ART. 335. When and how rape is

committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or

otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of

age or is demented.

"The crime of rape shall be punished by

reclusion perpetua."cralaw virtua1aw library

23. People v. delos Santos G.R. No. 120235,

September 30, 1999, p. 9; People v.
Pagpaguitan, Et Al., G.R. No. 116599,
September 27, 1999, p. 17; People v. Bañago,
G.R No. 128384, June 29, 1999, p. 7.

24. People v. Mosqueda, G.R. Nos. 131830-34,

September 3, 1999, p. 15; People v. Palma,
G.R. Nos. 130206-08, June 17, 1999, p. 16;
 People v. Manggasin, G.R. No. 130599-600,
April 21, 1999, p. 21; People v. Prades, 293
SCRA 411, 431 (1998).

25. Civil Code, art. 2229; People v. Avelino

Reyes Dizon, G.R. No. 128889, August 20, 1999
citing People v. Cristobal, 252 SCRA 507
(1996); People v. Calayca, 301 SCRA 194, 211
(1999) citing People v. Ramos, 293 SCRA 559
(1998).

G.R. No. 139069               June 17, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NIÑO GARIN, Appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
127, convicting the appellant, Niño Garin, of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Information against the appellant reads:

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1997 in Caloocan City, M.M. and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable
cause, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one ELEAZAR GALANG, thereby inflicting
upon the victim serious physical injuries which injuries caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

Upon arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. 2

The Case for the Prosecution 3

Eleazar Galang, a fourteen-year-old student, lived with his parents at Barangay 176,
Zone 15, Phase 8-C, Lot 19, Block 5, Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. His father eked out
4 

a living as a Metro Aide, while his mother, Florencia, was a plain housewife.
5  6

In the afternoon of April 3, 1997, Eleazar and his younger brother Mario, along with their
friends Jonathan, Demdem, Ikot, and Marlon, went swimming in a river at Phase 7,
7 

Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, to beat the scorching heat of the noonday sun. As they
8 

were bathing in the river at around 3:30 p.m., they espied the appellant, a toughie in the
community, and his notorious friends coming towards their direction. Sensing danger,
9  10 

the boys hurriedly came out of the water half-naked, and made a dash for safety uphill,
leaving behind Eleazar, who opted to get dressed first. Mario, realizing that he had left
his older brother behind, stopped short and waited for the latter.11

Meanwhile, the appellant slowly approached Eleazar, drew out his seven-inch butcher’s
12 

knife and poked it at the latter. Eleazar attempted to break away and run for his life, but
13  14 

he lost his balance, causing him to fall prostrate on the ground. Seeing Eleazar’s
15 

hapless condition, the appellant seized the moment, went on top of the victim’s back, and
stabbed him. Mario, who was about six to seven meters away, could only watch
16 

helplessly at his kuya being mercilessly stabbed to death by the appellant. 17

Thereafter, the appellant dismounted from Eleazar, checked out his victim, looked at
Mario and shouted in the vernacular "Boy, ang kapatid mo patay na, doon mo siya
makikita sa ilog." (Your brother is dead, you’ll see him in the river).18

Whereupon, Mario ran home and related the incident to his parents. Upon hearing the
19 

terrible news, the latter immediately proceeded to the place where the aforesaid incident
took place, and found the bloodied corpse of Eleazar sprawled by the riverbank.
Florencia could not believe her eyes. She embraced the lifeless body of his son. They 20 

got a tricycle and brought the victim to the Tala Hospital, where he was pronounced dead
on arrival. The victim’s father reported the incident to the Caloocan Police Station 6.
21  22

The cadaver was autopsied at the St. Matthew Funeral Homes by Dr. Dominic Aguda, a
Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His post-mortem
examination showed the following findings:

Cyanosis, lips and fingernail beds

Brain – pale

Heart – chambers, contain a small amount of clotted blood

Stab wound

- 2.5 cms. gaping, located at the back, right, 6.0 cms. from the posterior median line,
115.0 cms. from the right, one end is sharp, the other is contused, directed forward then
upwards, involving the skin, causing a clean-cut fracture on the 11th rib, posterior
entering the right thoracic cavity and severing the lower lobe of the right lung with a depth
of 8.0 cms.

Hemothorax – 2,000 cc.

Visceral organs – pale

Stomach – 1/3 filled with partially digested food particles

CAUSE OF DEATH:

STAB WOUND, BACK, RIGHT 23

Dr. Aguda opined that the assailant used a sharp, single-bladed instrument. He added
that the assailant must have been behind the victim at the time the stabbing occurred,
considering that the stab wound was located at the back. The doctor could not tell,
however, whether the assailant was a southpaw or right-handed. 24

Florencia Galang, the bereaved mother of the victim, testified that she experienced
anxiety by reason of her son’s death. The entire family felt despondent and could not
accept that Eleazar was no longer with them. For the week-long wake, they spent
25 

₱5,000. As shown by the certification of St. Matthew Funeral Homes, the Galangs spent
26 

₱12,500 for funeral services. They paid the amount of ₱1,500 to El Ruaro Funeral
27 

Homes where the cadaver was first brought. They also spent ₱12,000 for the burial lot,
and paid ₱800 for vehicles they hired during the occasion. However, no receipts were
issued for these amounts. 28

Meanwhile, the appellant could not be located. In February 1998, the appellant was
arrested for illegal possession of firearm and detained in the Caloocan City jail for
investigation. When the Galangs learned of the appellant’s arrest, they wasted no time
and proceeded to the police station. Florencia and Mario executed their
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay before SPO1 Emilio B. Mabalot concerning the
29 

stabbing incident. After the usual preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor
Aurelio R. Ralar, Jr. recommended the filing of an information for murder against the
appellant. 30

The Case for the Appellant 31

Appellant Niño Garin claimed that he was born on June 5, 1981 and adduced in evidence
a birth certificate under the name of "Noe Garing." He denied any participation in the
crime, contending that he was misidentified as the culprit. He added that he did not know
the Galang family from Adam. 32

The appellant testified that he was seventeen years old. At about 1:00 p.m. on April 3,
1997, he went on swimming with his barkadas, Larry Perito, Jeffrey Mendoza, Junior
Bron and Dennis Manalo, at the neighboring Barangay of Tungko, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. After an hour of swimming in the river, they headed for home. Along the way,
they indulged picking mangoes from trees. When they reached Phase 7, Bagong Silang,
Caloocan City, at about 3:00 p.m., they passed by a teenage boy who turned out to be
Eleazar, fetching water from an artesian well. One of their companions, Dennis, played
with Eleazar but before they knew it, the two were already quarreling with each other.
Eleazar punched Dennis, who retaliated. But, when Eleazar was about to hit Dennis with
his pingga (a carrying pole), the appellant intervened to separate the protagonists. 33

Meanwhile, Eleazar’s father, angered by what he saw, immediately stepped out of his
nearby house and called for reinforcements. Moments later, ten persons, eight males and
two females, who were all armed, ran after them. He and his companions ran downhill,
jumped into the water and swam away for safety. Children who were also bathing in the
river panicked and hurriedly got out of the water.
34

Across the river, the appellant and Larry stopped. They saw a man approach Eleazar,
and suddenly stab the latter. Thereafter, the assailant dumped Eleazar’s body in the river
and shouted, "Maghanda na kayo ng kabaong" (Better be ready with a coffin). When the
35 

dust settled down, he passed the day at Larry’s place. Thereafter, Larry saw him off to
his house. 36

Larry Perito corroborated the appellant’s testimony and recounted that he himself saw
Eleazar being stabbed by an unidentified assailant. He was with the appellant from the
time they went swimming, up to the time of the commotion and the stabbing and,
thereafter, the two of them stayed in their house. When they crossed the river after being
chased by a number of armed persons, he and the appellant stopped uphill. When they
looked back, they saw the assailant stab Eleazar at the back. Eleazar was then naked
and in the process of putting on his shorts. After stabbing Eleazar, the assailant threw the
poor boy’s body onto the river. Thereafter, the assailant shouted at them, saying, "Be
ready with a casket." Before they proceeded home, he saw someone take Eleazar’s body
out of the water. Upon returning home, he reported the incident to their purok leader and
the police authorities. He accompanied the lawmen to the place of the incident and,
thereafter, to the house of the assailant. When they reached the latter’s house, they were
too late because the assailant was no longer around. He described the killer as "Kulot,
37 

maitim, semi-flat top, long hair up to the nape and a small person with a muscular body." 38

Rosario Sabalza, a vegetable vendor, corroborated Larry’s testimony. On the same

afternoon that Eleazar was killed, at about 3:30 p.m., while washing her goods, she saw
the lifeless body of a boy floating on a river very near her house. At the same time, she
saw a man wielding a knife walking away from the cadaver. She saw the assailant, but
the latter’s back was turned against her. She was, however, certain that it was not the
appellant. The appellant did not fit the description of the killer: "maitim na mama (black
39 

man), pandak (short), and medium built." After the killer left, she asked someone to
40 

report the crime to the barangay and to take the body out of the water. She volunteered
41 

to testify because she was sympathetic to the appellant’s plight. 42

Rodrigo Resurreccion, a barangay purok leader, was the last to testify for the defense.
He testified that when he got wind of the incident in the late afternoon of April 3, 1997, he
recorded the same in the barangay blotter. The next day, policemen came into his house,
and the victim’s father asked to be accompanied to the crime scene. He was also told
that it was a person with an alias "Togo" who killed the child. They proceeded to the
crime scene and, thereafter, to the suspect’s place, but the latter was, by then, nowhere
to be found. 43

After trial, the lower court, in its Decision dated June 2, 1999, convicted the appellant of
44 

murder qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the prosecution having established the guilt of
Accused NIÑO GARIN @ NIÑO GALIS of the crime of Murder as defined and
panalized (sic) under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, this
Court, in the absence of any generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance, hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the legal heirs of
the deceased the civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00; to pay the private complainant actual
damages of ₱12,500.00 plus moral damages of ₱60,000.00 and to pay the costs without
any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The preventive imprisonment suffered by the Accused shall be credited in full in the
service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED. 45

In convicting the appellant, the trial court gave full credence to the eyewitness account of
the victim’s brother, Mario Galang, who positively identified the appellant as the killer.
The court a quo also noted that the medical findings jibed with Mario’s narration. The
court made short shrift of the defense of denial raised by the appellant for being weak,
and concluded that the killing was qualified by treachery, because the victim was totally
defenseless and had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate when stabbed.

Hence, this appeal.

The appellant seeks a reversal of the appealed decision asserting as follows:

 I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN THE CASE AT BAR.

II

ASSUMING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, HE SHOULD

ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE AS THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT
ALLEGED WITH SPECIFICITY SO AS TO QUALIFY THE KILLING TO
MURDER PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 8 AND 9 OF THE REVISED
RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 46

In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole case open for review and the appellate
court may correct such errors it may find in the appealed judgment, even if they have not
been specifically assigned. Thus, the Court shall address the following matters: (1) the
47 

sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence; (2) the presence of qualifying circumstances;

(3) the award of damages; and, (4) the proper penalty.

The Sufficiency of the

Prosecution’s Evidence

We have carefully examined the records of the case and find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the trial court that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of killing
Eleazar Galang. A detailed account of the killing was furnished by the fourteen-year-old
prosecution eyewitness, Mario Galang. His testimony regarding the identity of the
assailant, the assault, and the weapon used, was direct, positive and categorical. Thus,
Mario testified:

Prosecutor Sison/Witness:

q In the stabbing incident, will you tell the Honorable Court how it happened?

a While taking a bath at the river, the group of Niño Garin came and then we decided to
get dress (sic).

q After dressing up, what happened?

a Niño Garin approached my brother and drew out a knife and poked it to my brother, Sir.

q And then what happened?

a "Nagpumiglas ang kuya ko, at nadapa po siya."

q What happened after that?

a That was the time he stabbed my brother, Sir.

q While your brother was on the ground?

a Yes, Sir.
q How did your brother fall, is (sic) it face down?

a Face downward, Sir. 48

...

q What part of the body was hit by that stab thrust?

a At the back, right side, Sir.

q Was that (sic) followed by other stab thrust?

a Only one, Sir. 49

...

COURT

q We go back to that time you left your brother after Niño Garin stabbed your brother, did
the accused say anything?

a When he saw me uphill, he said, "Boy, ang kapatid mo, patay na, doon mo siya
makikita sa ilog." 50

...

q Mr. Witness, can you describe the weapon used by accused Niño Garin in stabbing
your brother?

a Butcher’s knife, Sir.

q Can you demonstrate how long is (sic) that knife used by Niño Garin?

a (Witness demonstrating about 7 to 8 inches.) 51

And on cross-examination, he elaborated as follows:

Atty. Espa/Witness:

q How long did you know the accused, Niño Garin?

a Two (2) years, Sir.

q At the time you allegedly saw your brother being stabbed by the accused, Niño Garin
also saw you, isn’t it?

a Yes, Sir.

q How far were you then from the position where your brother was stabbed?

a About 5 to 6 meters, Sir. 52

Not only was Mario’s testimony convincing and unequivocal, the same was backed up by
the physical evidence, which is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth. The 53 

congruence between the testimonial and the physical evidence leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the prosecution did not prevaricate its case. 54

The appellant’s defense is a palpably weak one. The probability that Mario misidentified
the appellant is remote. Mario knew the appellant because they lived in the same
barangay. He positively identified him in court. The crime was committed in broad
55 

daylight and Mario was merely five to six meters away from where the stabbing incident
occurred. The appellant even boastfully faced Mario and shouted at him that his brother
56 

is lying dead in the river. Accordingly, where conditions of visibility are favorable, and the
57 

witness does not appear to be biased, his assertion as to the identity of the malefactor
should be accepted as trustworthy. Jurisprudence further recognizes that for witnesses
58 

of criminal violence, it is even more natural to strive to see the faces and general
appearance of the assailants and to observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. 59

The records also show that no ill motive could be attributed to Mario for imputing such a
grave offense against the appellant. The absence of evidence of improper motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses to testify against the appellant strongly tends to sustain
the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that their testimonies are worthy
of full faith and credit. Moreover, Mario, being the younger brother of the victim, would
60 

naturally be interested in having the real culprit punished.61

Neither can the appellant take refuge in the testimonies of the defense witnesses Larry
Perito, Rosario Sabalza, and Rodrigo Resurreccion. There are strong indications that
Larry is a biased witness. A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause or
to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his
statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false. Larry would
62 

naturally testify in favor of the appellant since he is the latter’s close friend.

The negative testimony of Rosario is open to doubt. Rosario saw the alleged assailant for
only a fleeting moment as the latter walked away from the corpse of the victim. In fact,
she admitted that she merely saw the back of the killer. As between the straightforward
63 

and positive testimony of Mario and Rosario’s negative testimony, the former undeniably
is entitled to credence and deserves great weight. Under the rules of evidence, a
negative testimony cannot prevail over the positive statement of a witness. 64

As to the testimony of Rodrigo, the same cannot be given too much weight coming from
a party who is not an eyewitness. He only heard about the identity of the assailant from
whispered rumors. 65

Worth reiterating here are the words of Vice Chancellor Van Fleet of New Jersey: 66

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever
is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.

At the court below, the appellant made much of the fact that it took the Galangs months
to report the crime and to execute their respective affidavits. He also noted the
discrepancies between the affidavit of Florencia and her testimony in court regarding the
reason why it took them time to formally charge the appellant.
We have held that affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to open court
testimonies. Affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the affiants have in mind
because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiants simply
sign them after the same have been read to them. 67

There was no delay in reporting the incident because the victim’s father reported the
killing right after it happened. As testified to by SPO1 Emilio Mabalot of the Caloocan City
Police, the case was reported sometime in April 1997, and was investigated by a certain
PO3 Silvino, though he had not monitored the progress of the case. Indeed, more than
68 

eight months had elapsed before Florencia and Mario executed their
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay. But, as explained by Florencia in her testimony, the
family feared for their safety, since the appellant, a notorious toughie, was still at large.
69 

Verily, this alleged delay which was explained by the witness herself, is too
inconsequential to dent the prosecution’s compelling evidence against the appellant.

On the whole, we have found nothing in the records that would compel us to disturb the
findings of fact and assessment of credibility of the witnesses by the trial court. There is
nothing to indicate that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have affected the result of
the case. Thus, we must yield to the oft-repeated rule that the trial court’s evaluation of
the testimony of a witness is accorded the highest respect because it had the direct
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and to determine if they were telling
the truth or not. Appellate magistrates, on the other hand, do not have this privilege. As
this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning values to declarations at
the witness stand is best and most competently performed or carried out by a trial judge
who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the accused’s
behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. 70

The Presence of Qualifying/

Aggravating Circumstances

According to the appellant, if he were to be held criminally liable, it should only be for
homicide, and not for murder. He maintains that treachery was not proven, being
unsupported by the evidence on record. He argues that the evidence on record disclosed
that (1) the victim had been forewarned of the danger to his life and had even
attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to escape from his attacker; (2) there was absolutely no
evidence to show that appellant consciously and deliberately employed a particular
method or manner of killing the victim that would eliminate any risk to himself; and, (3)
the killing was done impulsively or on the spur of the moment. 71

The appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive.

Contrary to the appellant’s claim, the trial court correctly appreciated treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against a person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated, two
72 

elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that would insure the
safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving the latter
without an opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution
employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The essence of
73 

treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting

victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to himself. 74
Indeed in the case at bar, the victim seemed to have expected trouble, considering that
upon seeing the appellant and the latter’s friends, they got out of the river and moved
away. Nevertheless, treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was warned
of danger to his person; what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
75

There is no question that the elements of alevosia were proven by the prosecution. As

vividly narrated by the prosecution witness, the victim, Eleazar, had absolutely no
opportunity to defend himself from the appellant’s aggression. He was unarmed and the
appellant gave no warning. Eleazar was then totally unprepared to even guess that the
appellant was carrying a knife. That the victim tripped and fell prostrate on the ground
before the appellant mounted him and stabbed him at the back, does not mean that he
had an opportunity to escape. He had none. At this point, Eleazar was distracted, hurt
and helpless. He was caught by surprise and unaware of the fatal attack that befell him.

For sure, the appellant deliberately sought the manner of attack. He approached the
victim, armed with a butcher’s knife. As earlier mentioned, the deceased was already
rendered completely helpless and defenseless when he was stabbed at the back by the
appellant. Although the victim was able to evade the attack at half a moment, he had
absolutely no means of defending himself from the appellant, who was armed with a
butcher’s knife and bent on finishing him off. The victim had nothing, absolutely nothing,
to parry off the fatal blow. To repeat, the victim was defenseless, had no opportunity to
escape and posed no risk to the appellant when he was stabbed.

In sum, the assault was indisputably sudden and the victim’s premonition of peril did not
negate the treacherous nature of the attack.

The appellant next argues that, assuming that treachery was duly proven, the same,
notwithstanding, cannot qualify the killing to murder as treachery was not alleged in the
information with specificity. He cites as bases for his argument the cases of People v.
Alba and People v. Manlansing, wherein the Court disregarded the qualifying
76  77 

circumstances of treachery for the reason that it failed to specify treachery as a

circumstance, qualifying the killing to murder pursuant to Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the said cases, treachery was considered only a
generic aggravating circumstance; thus, the crime committed was only homicide and not
murder. 78

We do not agree.

The appellant can no longer rely on our ruling in these cases because in the recent case
of People v. Aquino, we held that qualifying circumstances need not be expressly stated
79 

as such to qualify the offense. It is enough that the same is stated in the information,
whether it be as qualifying or generic aggravating. In the much recent case of People v.
Paulino, this Court, citing Aquino, held that:
80 

[T]he Court has repeatedly held, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive
words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense.

...

Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the –

"... qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know ... (the) qualifying and aggravating
circumstances ..."

Thus, even the attendant circumstance itself, which is the essential element that raises
the crime to a higher category, need not be stated in the language of the law. With more
reason, the words "aggravating/qualifying circumstances" as used in the law need not
appear in the Information, especially since these words are merely descriptive of the
attendant circumstances and do not constitute an essential clement of the crime. These
words are also not necessary in informing the accused that he is charged of a qualified
crime. What properly informs the accused of the nature of the crime charged is the
specific allegation of the circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the crime to a
higher category.

The rules require the qualifying circumstances to be specifically alleged in the Information
in order to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused
to prepare fully for his defense to prevent surprises during the trial.

...

Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information shall "state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances." (Emphasis supplied). Section 8
merely requires the Information to specify the circumstances. Section 8 does not require
the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" to refer to the circumstances which
raise the category of an offense. It is not the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by"
that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an attendant
circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category.

...

We, therefore, reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the
Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the
law to qualify the offense. These circumstances need not be preceded by the words
"aggravating/qualifying," "qualifying," or "qualified by" to be considered as qualifying
circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to
apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his
defense, thus, precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically
alleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime,
and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to
impose the higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in proper
cases.

In this case, the Information clearly passes the test as it specified treachery as an
attending circumstance in the commission of the crime. The allegation, although not
preceded by the words "aggravating/qualifying," "qualifying," or "qualified by," is sufficient
to apprise the appellant of the charge against him as to enable him to prepare fully his
defense. 81

As to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, we also affirm the trial court’s
finding that it was not present in the commission of the crime. The prosecution did not
even attempt to prove the three elements necessary before evident premeditation may
be appreciated as a qualifying aggravating circumstance, namely, (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused has clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such a
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 82 
The principal eyewitness was not even aware of any prior incident or possible reason
which could have led the appellant to attack the victim.

As to Damages

The trial court had ordered the appellant to pay the heirs of Eleazar Galang civil
indemnity of ₱50,000; actual damages of ₱12,500; and ₱60,000 as moral damages.

In line with current jurisprudence, we sustain the award of civil indemnity. This may be
granted without need of proof other than the fact that a crime has been committed and
that the accused was responsible therefor. 83

In support of the claim for actual damages, the victim’s mother testified that she spent a
total ₱31,800 for the funeral service and other expenses during the wake. To justify an
award of actual damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party,
the actual amount of loss. Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the only receipt presented
by the prosecution was for the payment made to St. Matthew Funeral Homes in the
amount of ₱12,500. 84

However, in the case of People v. Dela Cruz, it was held that when actual damages
85 

proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than ₱25,000, as in the present case,
the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages for a
lesser amount. This Court ratiocinated that it was anomalous and unfair that the heirs of
the victim who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages amounting to less than
₱25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts
at all but would be entitled to ₱25,000 temperate damages.

Sufficient evidence was given by Mrs. Florencia Galang, the victim’s mother, to prove
that she suffered sleepless nights, anxiety, moral shock and wounded feelings. Hence,
the award for moral damages is proper. However, the trial court’s award of ₱60,000 is
excessive, and should be reduced to ₱50,000. 86

The trial court, likewise, erred in not awarding exemplary damages. Exemplary damages
must be awarded too in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, the qualifying
87 

circumstance of treachery being present. Current case law pegged it at ₱25,000. 88

The Proper Penalty

In its decision, the court a quo found the appellant’s birth certificate doubtful because
there was a discrepancy between the name stated thereon and the name being used by
the appellant. It also took into consideration the fact that the document was belatedly
registered by the appellant’s father, who appeared to have supplied the necessary
information so that his son may avail of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The trial court ratiocinated as follows:

It needs to stress at this juncture that this Court is not convinced to accord to the
Accused the beneficent provision of P.D. 603 otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code re suspension of sentence on youthful offenders considering that the
Certificate of Birth (Exh. "I") presented by the defense in support of its stance that the
Accused was born on 5 June 1981 or less than 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense, bears the name "NOE GARING" and no further evidence was
presented to prove that the Accused NIÑO GARIN and this "NOE GARING" are one and
the same person. Further, the timing in which the "Late registration" of the said birth
certificate was effected on 28 February 1998 when Accused was already brought behind
bars, casts doubt on the veracity of the fact it purports to prove. In Peo. vs. REYES, et.
al, C.A. 48, O.G. 1022, the appellate court held that "in cases where the age of the culprit
is at issue as a basis for claiming an exempting or mitigating circumstance, it is
incumbent upon the accused to establish that circumstance as any other element of
defense. 89

We do not agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court. The mitigating
circumstance of minority, being favorable to the appellant, all doubts should be resolved
in his favor. The Court notes that the birth certificate adduced in evidence by the
90 

appellant to prove his minority is that of "Noe Garing." Hence, the said certificate does
not prove the appellant’s minority when he committed the crime. However, when he
testified on April 6, 1999, he stated that he was only seventeen years old. No 91 

contradictory evidence was presented by the prosecution. Thus, when the crime was
committed on April 3, 1997, the appellant was about sixteen years of age. As such, the
appellant is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under the second
paragraph of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

In People v. Calpito, a case on all fours with the issue of this case, we held that the
92 

minority of the appellant may be proved by his own declaration before the trial court:

At the outset, it must be borne in mind that in assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being
more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this court has appreciated this
circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.

This Court emphasizes that while the submitted birth certificate is not entirely
satisfactory, a careful review of the records reveals other evidence of appellant’s
minority. In the December 19, 1994 hearing, upon being asked by the trial court,
appellant declared that he was 20 years old, consequently indicating that on November
21, 1990, he must have been only 16 years old ... This Court held that the claim of
minority by an appellant will be upheld even without any proof to corroborate his
testimony, especially so when coupled by the fact that the prosecution failed to present
contradictory evidence thereto. In this case, the prosecution only questioned the
submitted birth certificate, but did not adduce any evidence to disprove appellant’s claim
of minority when he committed the crime. Accordingly, the mitigating circumstance of
minority should, as a matter of fairness, be appreciated in favor of appellant, especially in
light of the compassionate liberality this Court has granted to minors involved in serious
crimes.

Parenthetically, inasmuch as the appellant is now almost twenty-three years old, he is no

longer entitled to a suspended sentence under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369,
otherwise known as the Family Court Act of 1997. In People v. Clores, Jr., we said –
93 

We are not impervious of Section 5, Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as the
Family Courts Law, which took effect on November 23, 1997. It provides that the
sentence of the youthful offender shall be suspended without need of application
pursuant to P.D. No. 603:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age
but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at
the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor, if found guilty, the
court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may
have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth
Welfare Code;"…

As a general rule, the said provision may be applied retroactively, considering that it is
favorable to the accused. However, we can no longer do so because the appellant is by
now, more than twenty-four (24) years old.

Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules
shall be observed:

...

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Murder is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Because the killing of Eleazar
Galang, although qualified by treachery, was not attended by any other aggravating
circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Considering the
privileged minority of the appellant, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal,
which is the penalty next lower than that prescribed. There being no other modifying
circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the duration of which is from
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be
taken from the full range of prision mayor, the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion
temporal, the duration of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127, in
Criminal Case No. C-54178 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The appellant, Niño
Garin, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery, defined
in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. There
being a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in his favor, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of from nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, and ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim, Eleazar Galang, Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000) as civil indemnity ex
delicto; Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000) as moral damages; Twenty-Five Thousand
Pesos (₱25,000) as temperate damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000)
as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Records, p. 1.
1 
 Id. at 15.
2 

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Mario Galang, Dr. Dominic Aguda,
3 

SPO1 Emilio Mabalot and Florencia Galang.

Exhibit "E," Folder of Exhibits, p. 5.

4 

TSN, 10 February 1999, p. 5.

5 

TSN, 2 February 1999, p. 2.

6 

TSN, 17 February 1999, p. 11.

7 

Id. at 3.
8 

TSN, 10 February 1999, p. 11.

9 

10 
TSN, 17 February 1999, p. 9.

11 
Id. at 6.

12 
Id. at 9.

13 
Id. at 6.

14 
Id. at 4.

15 
Id.

16 
Id. at 10.

17 
Id.

18 
Id. at 6.

19 
Id. at 5.

20 
TSN, 2 February 1999, pp. 5-6.

21 
TSN, 17 February 1999, p. 5.

22 
TSN, 10 February 1999, p. 6.

23 
Exhibit "E," supra.

24 
TSN, 15 February 1999, p. 7.

25 
TSN, 2 February 1999, pp. 9-10.

26 
Id. at 8.

27 
Exhibit "G-1," Folder of Exhibits, p. 8.
28 
TSN, 10 February 1999, 2-5.

29 
Exhibits "A," "B" and "C," Folder of Exhibits, pp. 1-3.

30 
Records, p. 4.

The defense presented four witnesses, namely, Niño Garin, Larry Perito, Rosario
31 

Sabalza and Rodrigo Resurreccion.

32 
TSN, 6 April 1999, p. 17.

33 
Id. at 4-7.

34 
Id. at 7-11.

G.R. No. 125937 August 28, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROBERTO MOSTRALES, Accused-

Appellant.

PUNO, J.:

Teodocia Mabunga, a married woman and a mother of five (5), accused Roberto Mostrales
of raping her, allegedly committed as follows: 1

That on or about June 14, 1992, in the Municipality of Enrile, Province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Roberto Mostrales y Nicolas, armed with a gun with lewd design
and by the use of force, violence, threat and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the
offended party, Teodocia A. Mabunga, against her will.

Contrary to law.

Accused pleaded "not guilty" upon arraignment and underwent trial.

The prosecution evidence came chiefly from the testimonies of Teodocia Mabunga, her
husband, Pedro Mabunga, Dr. Susan Tan, and SPO4 Paulo Gammad.

The records show that in the evening of June 14, 1992, spouses Teodocia and Pedro
Mabunga were resting in their hut ("kalapao") situated in the middle of their two-hectare
farm in Enrile, Cagayan. Teodocia was then 40 years old while Pedro was 63 years old.
At about 10:00 p.m., they heard three (3) gunshots fired at one minute interval. After the
third gunshot, the accused, Roberto Mostrales, then 24 years old, barged into their hut.
The spouses recognized him as he was their neighbor in Liwan Norte and he is related by
affinity to Pedro. 2 Pointing a short gun at the spouses, the accused informed them that he
is a member of the New People's Army (NPA) and bragged that his firearm belongs to their
commander. He told Pedro that their commander wanted to talk to Teodocia and warned
him not to follow them because his NPA companions posted outside the hut might kill him.
Pedro got scared and did not inquire why the alleged NPA commander wanted to speak to
his wife. 3

The accused led Teodocia to an empty hut several meters away from their hut. When
accused undressed, she begged him: "Berto, please don't use me, I am pregnant and you
are calling me your Auntie and my husband your Uncle." Accused then undressed her,
forced her to lie down and forcibly took off her panty at gunpoint. Teodocia failed to resist
nor shout while she was being raped by the accused as she felt her effort would be
fruitless. Accused had carnal knowledge with her three (3) times. 4

At about 12:00 midnight, accused brought Teodocia back to their hut. After accused had
left, she tearfully revealed to Pedro that she was raped. Pedro, however, did not take any
immediate action as he knew that accused was armed with a gun. They stayed awake that
night discussing what they should do. 5

After a few days, they reported the rape to the army detachment in Enrile and accused's
firearm was confiscated. 6 They also informed the barangay chairman about the incident.

On June 18, 1992, Teodocia was examined by Dr. Susan Tan, a medical health officer at
the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital. Dr. Tan's examination showed that Teodocia was
five (5) months pregnant and her sexual organ had no traces of spermatozoa. 7

On June 19, 1992, upon the advice of their barangay chairman, the spouses went to the
Enrile Police Station. They executed their sworn
statements 8 before then SPO3 Paulo Gammad. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed
against accused. 9

The defense gave a different version of the incident through the sole testimony of the
accused.

Accused claimed that he and Teodocia are lovers. Allegedly, their liaison began when she
borrowed from him two hundred and thirty pesos (P230.00) during a gambling session in
the house of a friend. On December 17, 1991, he tried to collect the debt. She was unable
to pay, instead, they engaged in sex in his house. That same month, he again went to her
house to collect the debt. She still had no money and she invited him into her room where,
once more, they had intercourse. Her only companion then was her child, about two or
three years old. Their next sexual tryst took place on January 10, 1992, inside the
bathroom in the house of Teodocia. 10

Accused alleged that on June 14, 1992, they agreed to meet in a farm hut. They arrived in
the hut at around 10:00 a.m. After their sexual liaison, he accompanied Teodocia back to
her hut. She was scolded by Pedro who was waiting for her. 11

The next day, June 15, 1992, he met Teodocia in a gambling house owned by Armando
Lucas, a neighbor. They again had sex before they parted ways. That was their last
meeting. Teodocia was never able to pay her debt. Even then, accused did not inform his
uncle Pedro about his wife's debt. 12

After trial, accused was found guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the
judgment 13 of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Roberto Mostrales guilty beyond all

reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized by Article 335
 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify Teodocia Mabunga P30,000.00 as moral
damages. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

In this appeal, accused-appellant contends:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE

TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT WHICH IS INCREDIBLE UNRELIABLE
THEREFORE NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT WHEN THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN THEIR
ERROR (sic) BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code 14 provides:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or
intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of

reason or otherwise unconscious;
and

3. When the woman is under twelve

years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx xxx xxx

The evidence shows that the victim was forced to submit to appellant's bestial desires
through intimidation. The appellant used a gun to take the victim to an isolated hut where
the crime was committed. He also warned the victim's husband not to follow them as his
NPA companions were surrounding their place. Inside the hut, the appellant undressed the
victim at gunpoint.

Nonetheless, appellant claims that his representation of membership in the NPA does not
constitute intimidation. He further contends that the victim consented to have sex with him
as she did not shout nor resist during the incident.

Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim. It is subjective and its presence cannot
be tested by any hard-and-fast rule, but must be viewed in the light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of the crime. 15
In the case at bar, at the time the crime was committed, the victim was forty years old,
five (5) months pregnant, unarmed and married to a person older than her by almost
twenty years. In contrast, appellant was in his twenties, armed with a gun and purportedly
in the company of several NPA members. The crime happened in the evening and in a
place where help was impossible. The nearest neighbor of the victim is some three (3)
kilometers from their hut. Considering all these circumstances, we hold that the victim was
intimidated to submit to the lustful desire of the appellant. We quote the testimony of the
victim: 16

(FISCAL REMUDARO):

Q: After firing three (3) shots, do you

remember if Roberto Mostrales ever came in?

(VICTIM):

A: Yes, Sir, he went inside.

Q: When he was there, what happened?

A: While inside, he told us that he was a

member of the New People's Army (NPA) and
while there, he told us that his gun is owned
by the Commander and he used that gun to
threaten us.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Where did accused bring you?

A: Then he brought me to another hut and

while there, he told me to talk to the
Commander and while inside the hut, the
Commander was not there and I did not see any
person inside and I was surprised he
undressed me and forced me to lie down.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: . . . what did the accused do next?

A: While inside the Kalapao - farm hut, he

forced me to lie down, he did everything to
me that he wanted to do, I wanted to shout
but I cannot shout and he used me.

Q: What (sic) he did something to you, what

do you mean?

A: He had sexual intercourse on (sic) me

three (3) times.
 Q: You said he had sexual intercourse with
you three (3) times, what do you mean?

A: Successive, that while inside the hut, he

used me and forced me and I told him not to
touch me because I am pregnant and married,
but despite my pleas to him, he insisted and
used me when I was forced to lie down and he
did it three times, Sir.

Q: You said that he had sexual intercourse

with you three (3) times, is it by force?

A: Yes, he forced me because I pleaded to him

and still he insisted.

Q: Did he use a gun?

A: Yes, Sir, he was holding his gun.

Q: You said that he had sexual intercourse

with you, how do you know that he had sexual
intercourse with you for three (3) times?

A: I said with force because he kept on

inserting his penis in my vagina and while he
was inserting his penis in my vagina I felt
it, despite my plea, he kept doing what he
wanted to do. (emphasis ours)

Pedro Mabunga, the victim's husband, corroborated her testimony that appellant
threatened them with a gun. He himself was paralyzed by fear. He failed to question
appellant's real motive in taking Teodocia with him. He could not even react after he
learned that his wife had been violated by appellant. 17 If the husband himself was
intimidated, there is more season to hold that the wife was shackled with fear when she
was being raped by the appellant.

Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations

dissimilarly. 18 Thus, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether or not a
woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. 19 Jurisprudence holds that even
though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet if by array of physical forces he so
overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance through fear of
greater harm, the consummation of unlawful intercourse by the man is rape. 20

In the present case, we note that the victim could not have physically resisted appellant's
unchaste urge because of her condition at that time - she was five (5) months pregnant.
Thus, instead of engaging appellant in a struggle that could have endangered her unborn
child and her health itself, she chose to appeal to his conscience by reminding him that she
is his auntie, a married woman and pregnant. Her lack of physical resistance cannot be
considered as consent. Indeed, the evidence shows that the appellant undressed the
victim, forced her to lie down, forcibly took-off her underwear at gunpoint and then had
sex with her. That is rape in any language.

Appellant's claim that their illicit relationship is consensual is contradicted by the evidence
on record. If she really consented to the sexual intercourse with appellant, she would not
have informed her husband about the incident. 21 Nor would she have reported the incident
to the public authorities. No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny and
humiliation to foist a false charge of rape. Neither would she take the risk of being
alienated from her husband and her family. The fact that the victim resolved to face the
ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret evinces
that she did so to obtain justice. 22 Her willing ness and courage to face the authorities as
well as to submit to medical examination are mute but eloquent confirmation of her
sincere resolve. 23

Appellant's "sweetheart theory" cannot be given credence for it lacks corroboration.

Indeed, he gave conflicting accounts of his sexual trysts with the victim. Thus, he claimed
that the last time he had sex with her was on June 15, 1992. Upon further questioning,
appellant contradicted himself by stating that they did not meet again after June 14,
1992. 24 Also, on direct examination, appellant claimed that he had sex with the victim
when he went to her house in December 1992 to collect her debt. However, on sur-
rebuttal, appellant testified it was on November 15, 1992, when he went to her house and
had sex with her. 25

Appellant's attempt to picture the victim as a woman of loose morals cannot succeed. It is
unnatural for a married woman, a mother of five (5) children, living in a rural community
where almost everybody knows everybody, to prostitute herself for a measly sum of two
hundred and thirty pesos.

Appellant also failed to establish any reason why the victim would charge him falsely with
rape. 26 In the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely
testify against the appellant, her testimony deserves credence. 27

We note that the appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages. It is error
for the trial court to consider the award of moral damages as the civil indemnity mandated
by the Revised Penal Code. In the recent case of People vs. Prades, 28 we stressed that
civil indemnity ex delicto is distinct from moral damages, thus:

Jurisprudence has elucidated that the award authorized by the criminal law
as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount
authorized by prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil
law. For that matter, the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised
Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation and indemnification, all
correspond to actual or compensatory damages in the Civil Code since the
other damages provided therein are moral, nominal, temperate or
moderate liquidated and exemplary or corrective damages which have
altogether different concepts and fundamentals.

We reiterate here that said civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of
the fact of rape: it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral
damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by
the court in the exercise of sound discretion. Evidently, therefore, the
lower court actually intended the award of - P50,000.00 as indemnification
to be paid to the victim.

On this score, we have to take note of a new policy adopted by the Court.
The recent judicial prescription is that the indemnification for the victim
shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.00 if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws. . . .

One other cognate development in the case law on rape is applicable to the
present disposition. The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape,
such as that under consideration, moral damages may additionally be
awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the
 Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis
thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional
requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially
civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecution for rape with
the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed
wherein such allegations can be made.

Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by
the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such
agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary
implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through the
superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade. (emphasis
supplied)

The victim in the case at bar is thus entitled to both moral damages and civil indemnity.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we AFFIRM the trial court's judgment sentencing appellant ROBERTO
MOSTRALES y NICOLAS to reclusion perpetua. In line with the new
jurisprudence, 29 appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Teodocia Mabunga, in the amount
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00, as moral
damages. 30

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., in on leave.

Endnotes:

1 Information dated July 22, 1992; Original Records, p. 17.

2 Pedro's first wife is a cousin of the mother of the accused.

3 TSN, July 9, 1993, pp. 5-7; TSN, August 9, 1993, pp. 3-5, 13.

4 TSN, July 9, 1993, pp. 7-9, 19, 21.

5 Ibid., p. 10; TSN, August 9, 1993, pp. 5, 15.

6 The record is silent whether accused was duly authorized to carry a

firearm.

7 Exhibit "C".

8 Exhibits "B" and "D", Original Records, pp. 4-5.

9 TSN, July 9, 1993, p. 11-12; TSN, August 9, 1993, p. 6-7.

10 TSN, June 20, 1994, pp. 2-7.

11 TSN, June 20, 1994, p. 4.

12 Ibid., pp. 2, 4, 6.
13 Decision, dated January 15, 1996; Rollo, pp. 51-59.

14 As amended by R.A. No. 2632, approved on June 18, 1960, and R.A.
No. 4111, approved on June 20, 1964.

15 People vs. Oarga, G.R. Nos. 109396-97, July 17, 1996, 259 SCRA 90.

16 TSN, July 9, 1993, pp. 7-10.

17 Exhibit "D", Original Records, p. 5.

18 People vs. Atuel, G.R. No . 106962, September 3, 1996, 261 SCRA 339.

19 People vs . Gumahob, G.R. No. 116740, November 28, 1996, 265 SCRA
84.

20 44 Am Jur 918.

21 People vs. Espanol, G.R. No. 105676, April 10, 1996, 256 SCRA 137,
145.

22 People vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996, 252 SCRA
507, 516.

23 People vs. Cabaluna, G.R. No. 118077, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA
596.

24 TSN, June 20, 1994, p. 7.

25 TSN, August 17, 1995, pp. 4-5.

26 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 7.

27 People vs. Cristobal, supra, note 22.

28 G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998.

29 People vs. Prades, supra.

30 People vs. Caballes, G.R. Nos. 102723-24, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA
83; People vs. Leoterio, G.R. Nos. 119405-06, November 21, 1996, 264
SCRA 608. People vs. Conde, G.R. No. 112034, January 31, 1996, 252
SCRA 681; People vs. Cañada, G.R. No. 112176, February 6, 1996, 253
SCRA 277.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 145730. March 19, 2002.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARMANDO

ALVARADO, Accused-Appellant.
 DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 52, finding accused-appellant Armando Alvarado guilty of
rape of his 14-year old daughter Arlene and sentencing him to suffer the
death penalty and to pay the latter the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The information against accused-appellant reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the midnight of July 26, 1997, in [B]arangay Rawis,

[M]unicipality of Donsol, [P]rovince of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
had carnal knowledge of his own daughter, ARLENE B. ALVARADO, a 14-year
old minor, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice.

The offense is aggravated by relationship, the accused being the father of the
victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

Upon arraignment, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon trial

ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution is as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On the night of July 26, 1997, Accused-appellant Armando Alvarado and his

friends had a drinking spree near his house in Rawis, Donsol, Sorsogon, as a
result of which he became drunk. When he returned to his house, he saw his
eldest daughter, complainant Arlene Alvarado, and kissed her on the cheeks
and on the lips. In fright Arlene fled to the kitchen. She heard her father call
complainant’s younger sister, Analene, so that, he said, he could look at her
private parts. Then accused-appellant left and returned to his friends.

At around midnight of the same date, Accused-appellant went home and

proceeded to the room where Arlene was sleeping. He removed Arlene’s
shorts and panties and went on top of her. Arlene could not shout because
her father threatened to kill her and her family if she did so. Overcome with
fear, Arlene submitted to her father’s advances. Accused-appellant held her
hands on her sides and stretched her legs forward. He then inserted his penis
into her vagina, which hurt her. After satisfying his lust, Accused-appellant
went to his room and slept beside his wife Lonelisa and their youngest child
Armando, Jr. Arlene cried and went to sleep. The following morning, Arlene
had difficulty urinating because her vagina was very painful. She saw blood
coming out of her genitals.

Arlene told no one of her ordeal, lest her father harmed her. She believed
that accused-appellant was capable of killing his entire family for accused-
appellant was a violent man. 3 In August 1997, Arlene worked as househelper
and babysitter of a couple, Arnulfo and Mely Ocharan, who were also
residents of Donsol, Sorsogon. During her stay with the Ocharans, Arlene
suffered dizziness and fainting spells. This alarmed her employers, who
summoned her mother. Arlene was taken to a doctor and given some
medicines, but Arlene’s condition did not improve. 4 Arlene was often
observed to stare blankly, as if in deep thought, but she would not say what
was wrong with her. As Mely Ocharan had already paid in advance Arlene’s
one month salary of P800.00 to the latter’s grandmother, Maria, the Ocharans
decided to let Arlene finish the month and afterward to let her go home. 5

At the end of August 1997, the Ocharan couple informed Arlene that she was
going home. Arlene told them that she did not want to do so because she was
afraid of her father. As the couple insisted to know why, Arlene was prevailed
to tell them that she had been raped by her father. Mely Ocharan promised to
help her, after which Arlene was sent home. In September 1997, she
reported complainant’s case to Nida Balictar, a social worker of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development in Donsol, Sorsogon. Arlene
was eventually placed in the custody of the DSWD.

On September 18, 1997, Balictar accompanied Arlene to the Donsol Police

Station where she executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay 6 regarding the incident.
The following day, Arlene was examined at the Donsol District Hospital by
Medical Officer IV Ester Espedido-Villarosa, M.D. 7 Dr. Villarosa’s medical
certificate, dated September 19, 1997, 8 contained the following findings: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

P.E.

There are no physical findings. No marks, contusion and hematoma on all

parts.

I. Exam: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Introitus: Admits small ring finger, middle and forefinger with ease, but with
thumb, shows some difficulty.

- Healed laceration at 9:00 o’clock

- Pregnancy test (-)

On September 22, 1997, Arlene filed a criminal complaint 9 for rape against
her. father before the Municipal Trial Court of Donsol, Sorsogon. In the
meantime, Accused-appellant was detained by the Donsol police. 10

Lonelisa Alvarado, Arlene’s mother, also testified for the prosecution. She said
she married accused-appellant in April 1996 in Pilar, Sorsogon, after three
children had already been born to them, namely, Arlene, Analene, and
Armando, Jr. Arlene, the eldest, was born on November 23, 1983. Lonelisa
testified that she never had any problem with Arlene, who was obedient in
helping with the household chores and doing errands. Arlene finished only the
fifth grade and was no longer attending school when she was raped. Lonelisa
testified that her husband was a trouble-maker whenever he was drunk.
According to Lonelisa, at the time of the incident, her family lived in Donsol,
Sorsogon together with her mother-in-law Maria, her nephew Fermin, and her
niece Maylene. The house they lived in had two rooms. She, Accused-
appellant, and their youngest child Armando, Jr. occupied one room, Arlene
occupied the other, while the rest slept in the sala.

Lonelisa confirmed that Arlene worked for the Ocharan family for about a
month only because she became sick. She said that after Arlene had returned
home from the Ocharans’ household, she stayed in the DSWD.
Later, Accused-appellant was arrested. It was only then that Lonelisa learned
that Arlene had accused her father of rape. Lonelisa said she was caught by
surprise since she did not notice anything unusual about the relationship
between Arlene and Accused-Appellant. When she confronted her husband
and her daughter, Accused-appellant told her the charge was false, but
Lonelisa did not believe him. On October 1997, Lonelisa left their house in
Donsol with Analene and Armando, Jr. and transferred to Barangay
Sapnangan, Pilar, Sorsogon. 11

Accused-appellant anchored his defense on denial and alibi. According to him,

at about midnight of July 26, 1997, he was at the wake for Pining Go in
Rawis, Donsol, Sorsogon, about 250 meters away from his house. He arrived
at the wake at around 3:00 p.m., and came home at 5:00 a.m. of the
following day. When he arrived home on July 27, 1997, he cooked breakfast
for their family. At that time, only two of his children, Analene and Armando,
Jr., were at home. His eldest daughter Arlene, then 14 years old, was away
working as a babysitter for the Ocharan family, whose house in Donsol,
Sorsogon was about 700 meters away. Accused-appellant returned to the
wake to help in cooking for the family of the deceased, and went home only
at about 10:00 a.m. of July 28, 1997.

Accused-appellant also testified that he did not know that Arlene had filed a
rape charge against him until he was invited over to the station by the police
of Donsol, Sorsogon. No warrant of arrest was shown to him, but when he
arrived at the precinct, he was shown Arlene’s complaint, after which he was
detained. He denied raping Arlene and threatening to kill her. He did not
know of any reason why she filed a case against him. He expressed hurt at
what Arlene had done in spite of his being a good father to her. He denied
maltreating Arlene and stated that he only wished her well. Accused-appellant
also stated that he never wanted Arlene to work, and his daughter’s working
for the Ocharan couple was his wife’s idea. He wanted Arlene to finish
schooling, but she reached only Grade 5 because he claimed that all she
wanted to do was to attend dances and to flirt with boys. Accused-appellant
surmised that, although there was nothing abnormal about Arlene, she might
have accused him of rape because she had many boyfriends. Accused-
appellant presented in evidence three letters 12 written by Arlene to Jisos,
Isus, and Rine, turned over to him while he was already in jail by his mother,
Maria. The letters had been found among Arlene’s things.

To corroborate his testimony, Accused-appellant presented as witnesses his

niece Maylene, his mother Maria, and his brother Nelson.

Maylene Alvarado testified that her father Seferino was the brother of
accused-appellant and that their family resided in Giron, Pilar, Sorsogon. She
stayed in the house of her paternal grandmother in Rawis, Donsol, Sorsogon
from June 1997 up to March 1998 because she was then studying at the
Donsol National Comprehensive High School. According to her, on July 26,
1997, she was at her grandmother’s house, but Arlene was not staying there
since she was working in Pilar, Sorsogon. Maylene saw her uncle, Accused-
appellant, at 9:00 a.m. that day, but he attended a wake in the evening.
Maylene stated that she only saw Arlene on August 7, 1997, when the latter
returned home because she was bitten by a dog. She also knew that three or
four days after her return, Arlene started working with the Ocharan couple.
She did not know what was the nature of her cousin’s work. Arlene stayed
with her employers until the end of August 1997. She also did not know why
Arlene left her job.

Maylene further testified that she and Arlene were close. She claimed that
Arlene confided to her about her boyfriend, Rico. She allegedly learned from
Arlene that Rico stayed with the Ocharans. According to her, she thrice saw
Arlene and Rico together in August 1997. The first time was at the plaza
when she was invited one evening, around 9:00 p.m., by Arlene’s sister,
Analene, to accompany her. Maylene saw Rico with Arlene at the back of a
store, the former fondling the latter in different parts of her body. The second
time the witness saw Arlene was at the Rawis Elementary School. It was also
in the evening, around 8:30 p.m. Analene was also the one who invited her to
come along. Arlene wanted to go there and told her that she would study in
that school. The third time was at a place near the house of a certain Tonga.
Arlene invited her to join her and Rico to find Arlene’s belt, which was lost
somewhere in that place. Maylene later saw Rico pressing Arlene with his
body. 13

Nelson Alvarado, Accused-appellant’s younger brother, testified that he lived

only three meters away from his mother’s house, where accused-appellant
and his family also resided. According to him, the charge of rape against
accused-appellant could not be true because the latter was not home on the
night of July 26, 1997. Nelson vouched for his brother’s absence since
accused-appellant was at a wake located about 200 to 300 meters away from
his house. Accused-appellant left at 9:00 p.m. on that date and did not go
home for the rest of the night. In fact, Nelson was sent by his mother to look
for Accused-Appellant. He found him at the wake at around 9:30 p.m. Nelson
also testified that Arlene was also not home on that date as she was working
as a stay-in helper at the Ocharan household. 14

Maria Alvarado, the mother of accused-appellant, also testified that her son
Armando was not home on the night of July 26, 1997. She knew this for a
fact because, before leaving, Accused-appellant asked permission from her
and his family to attend a wake at the farthest portion of Rawis, which could
be negotiated by more than an hour’s walk. She confirmed accused-
appellant’s statement that he returned only at 5:00 a.m. the following day.
She likewise testified that Arlene was absent as she was then a babysitter of
the Ocharan couple. She knew about Arlene’s alleged boyfriend Rico, the
cousin of Mely Ocharan. 15

On June 15, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Armando

Alvarado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. II,
RA 7659 and he is hereby sentence[d] to suffer the maximum penalty of
DEATH and to pay the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, without pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED. 16

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that —

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED IS GUILTY, THE COURT A QUO

NONETHELESS ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT INDEPENDENT
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT’S ALLEGED MINORITY. 17 chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Except for the penalty imposed by the trial court upon accused-appellant, we
find no cogent reason to overturn its decision.

First. Accused-appellant argues that complainant’s testimony should not have

been given credence. He contends that, although Dr. Villarosa found that
complainant had sexual intercourse recently, it could not have been with
accused-appellant since the examining physician testified that complainant
might have had sexual intercourse either a week or a month before her
examination on September 19, 1997, and complainant had sexual
relationships with different men in August 1997. He contends that the trial
court should have given greater weight to his defense as the same
purportedly conformed to the findings of the expert witness.

We disagree. It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court

with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not
finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to
appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course
of their testimonies. The only exception is if there is a showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the case. 18 In this case, we
find no compelling reason to depart from this rule. Indeed, complainant
proved herself to be a credible witness. Her narration of how she was sexually
assaulted by her own father remained, as also noted by the trial court, plain,
candid, straightforward, and unflawed by serious contradictions 19 in spite of
the lengthy and tedious cross-examination by the defense counsel. It is also
noteworthy that, in the course of her testimony, Arlene’s eyes overflowed
with tears, 20 which only revealed the depths of the shame and suffering she
endured as a consequence of the violation of her virtue and personhood, and
the truthfulness of her charge. 21 She was not impelled by any bad motive to
testify falsely against accused-appellant, as shown by the admissions by the
latter and his mother that they did not know of any reason why Arlene filed
the rape charge against him. 22 The reasons offered by accused-appellant
that Arlene had many boyfriends and that he would always scold her for
attending dances and entertaining suitors 23 are flimsy. In fact, when the
trial judge asked her if her accusation against her father was true considering
that the death penalty could be imposed on him, Arlene unhesitatingly
answered in the affirmative. Thus, she testified: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q You filed a case of rape against your father. Do you know [that] if the court
finds that your complaint is true, he will be sentenced to [the] death penalty;
do you still insist that your complaint is true?

a Yes, your Honor.

q Do you still insist that your complaint or that rape is true?

a Yes, your Honor. 24

Indeed, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young

daughter, even if filled with a desire for revenge, to fabricate a sordid tale of
such a serious crime as sexual molestation in the hands of her own father,
which could put the latter in jail for the most part of his life, or, worse, put
him to death, and expose herself and her family to scandal and shame if the
charge is not true.25 cralaw:red

Neither can Dr. Villarosa’s testimony, that Arlene could have had sexual
intercourse either a week or a month before September 19, 1997, the date of
the medico-legal examination, undermine Arlene’s credibility. On this matter,
Dr. Villarosa testified: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Prosecutor Gabito: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q In your findings, it is stated here "healed laceration", what could have

caused this laceration?

a Sexual intercourse but most probably, it was done a month or week ago.

q A month or week before the sexual intercourse?

a Because it has been healed. 26

On cross-examination, Dr. Villarosa further testified as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q So, if this laceration have been sustained one week before?

a One week or more.

q So, this laceration could have been caused between the first week of
September or the last week of August?

a Possibly. 27

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the estimated time of occurrence of

the sexual intercourse made by Dr. Villarosa was merely a probability 28 and
was made on the basis of her finding that the hymenal laceration had already
been healed. It does not preclude the possibility that the incident happened
even more than a month before the examination considering that such
laceration may also be found even two months after the same was incurred.
Nor was there any finding that the same was freshly healed as accused-
appellant misleadingly posits it to be. 29 Be that as it may, it is settled that a
medical examination is merely corroborative and is not indispensable in the
prosecution of rape cases, so long as complainant’s testimony as to how the
incident occurred meets the standard of credibility, such as was proven in this
case. 30

On the other hand, the version of accused-appellant based on denial and alibi
cannot be given weight in the face of his positive identification by Arlene as
the author of the crime. 31 For alibi to prosper, not only must accused-
appellant prove that he was at another place at the time of the commission of
the crime, but also that it was impossible for him to be at the crime scene at
the appointed time. 32 In this case, Accused-appellant claimed that he was at
a wake on the midnight of July 26, 1997. However, it was established that the
wake was also in Rawis, within the same barangay, at a place just 250
meters away from his mother’s house where his family stayed. Thus, even
assuming that he was indeed at the wake that night, it would not be
impossible for accused-appellant to have gone home to commit the crime.

Likewise, Accused-appellant’s claim that there is "overwhelming" evidence to

show that Arlene had many boyfriends and had sexual relations is without
any basis. A reading of Arlene’s letters, which accused-appellant proffered in
evidence, does not in any way show that the persons she wrote letters to had
romantic relationships with her. At most, Arlene manifested that she liked
them and was asking them if they liked her too. In the end, she merely
referred to them as friends. 33 It is noteworthy that accused-appellant
himself admitted that these letters were found among Arlene’s personal
belongings and he did not know if they were even sent. 34 Indeed, if they
were still among her belongings they could have not been sent. At any rate,
even accused-appellant agrees that the letters do not indicate that Arlene had
sexual affairs. 35

Nor can Maylene’s testimony that she twice saw Arlene and the latter’s
alleged boyfriend Rico in a passionate pose be given credit. For one, it is
questionable that Maylene was really a close confidant of Arlene as she did
not even know the nature of Arlene’s job at the Ocharan household. 36 For
another, Maylene distinctly remembered August 7, 1997 allegedly as the date
Arlene went home because she was bitten by a dog, but this witness could
not recall if Arlene ever went home whenever she would transfer from one
employer to another. Maylene even admitted on cross-examination that she
remembered the date August 7, 1997 only for the purposes of her testimony.
37

Neither do the testimonies of Maria and Nelson Alvarado convince us as to the

veracity of accused-appellant’s defense. Their attempt to establish that Arlene
was not home on the midnight of July 26, 1997 because she was then
employed by the Ocharan couple was contradicted by Maylene, who testified
that Arlene started working for the Ocharans in August 1997. Such patent
inconsistency could only cast doubt on the truth of their testimonies. 38 What
is more, it was established on cross-examination that Maria
Alvarado, Accused-appellant’s mother, would insist that the incident did not
happen, being a cause for shame, and would want her son to be released
from jail and the whole family to forget the matter altogether. 39
Accused-appellant’s claim that Arlene had sexual intercourse with Rico and
not with him cannot be given credence. Neither accused-appellant nor his
mother ever met Rico, who allegedly had sexual trysts with Arlene. They only
learned this from Maylene, whose testimony was shown to be doubtful.
Although Arlene admitted that she knew Rico, she denied that he was her
boyfriend.

For these reasons, Accused-appellant’s prayer for acquittal must be denied.

Second. We agree, however, that accused-appellant should not have been

meted the death penalty on the ground that the age of complainant was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The information alleged that, on July 26,
1997, the date of the rape, Arlene was 14 years old. In her testimony, Arlene
stated that she was 14 years old at the time of the incident. Accused-
appellant confirmed this during the presentation of the defense evidence, but
Lonelisa Alvarado, complainant’s mother, testified that Arlene was born on
November 23, 1983, which would mean she was only 13 years old on the
date of the commission of the crime. No other evidence was ever presented,
such as her certificate of live birth or any other document, to prove Arlene’s
exact age at the time of the crime. As minority is a qualifying circumstance, it
must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. There
must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial
by Accused-Appellant. 40 Since there is doubt as to Arlene’s exact
age, Accused-appellant must be held guilty of simple rape only and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.

Third. In view of the reduction of the penalty, the civil indemnity awarded to
Arlene should correspondingly be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. 41 The award of moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 should be upheld in view of the victim’s injury inherently
concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. 42
In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be
awarded to complainant in order to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior from preying upon their own young
daughters. 43

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant guilty of

rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon
him is reduced to reclusion perpetua and the civil indemnity to be awarded
the complainant to P50,000.00. In addition, however, Accused-appellant is
ordered to pay complainant exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00. The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is
upheld.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena,

Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1. Per Judge Honesto A. Villamor.

2. Rollo, p. 14.

3. TSN (Arlene Alvarado), pp. 5-10, 12, July

14, 1998.

4. Id., p. 11; TSN (Arlene Alvarado), pp. 3-

6, Aug. 6, 1998.

5. TSN (Arnulfo Ocharan), pp. 5-16, Nov. 22,

1999.

6. Exh. B.

7. TSN (Arlene Alvarado), p. 2, Aug. 7, 1998.

8. Exh. A.

9. Exh. C.

10. Records, p. 9.

11. TSN (Lonelisa Alvarado), pp. 2-12, July

13, 1998.

12. Exhs. 2, 3, and 4, respectively.

13. TSN (Maylene Alvarado), pp. 2-10, Dec.

14, 1998.

14. TSN (Nelson Alvarado), pp. 2-6, June 17,

1999.

15. TSN (Maria Alvarado), pp. 2-4, Oct. 7,

1999.

16. Rollo, p. 33.

17. Id., pp. 54-55.

18. People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 137889,

Mar. 26, 2001; People v. Osing, 349 SCRA 310
(2001).

19. Records, p. 31.

20. TSN (Arlene Alvarado), p. 8, July 14,

1998; TSN, p. 3, Aug. 7, 1998.
 21. People v. Garcia, 349 SCRA 67 (2001).

22. TSN (Armando Alvarado), p. 11, Oct. 20,

1999; TSN (Maria Alvarado), p. 3, Oct. 7,
1999.

23. TSN (Armando Alvarado), pp. 11-12, Oct.

20, 1999.

24. TSN (Arlene Alvarado), p. 15, July 14,

1998.

25. People v. Alipar, G.R. No. 137282, Mar.

16, 2001.

26. TSN (Dr. Ester Villarosa), p. 4, Aug. 5,

1998.

G.R. No. 138335             May 20, 2004

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
OSCAR ALCANZADO, appellant.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision1 dated April 5, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66)
of Makati City (RTC for brevity) in Criminal Case No. 98-1634, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused OSCAR

ALCANZADO y ORQUEZA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER, with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the unidentified victim the sum of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Makati City, Metro Manila, April 5, 1999.2

However, a careful examination of the records reveals that the assailed decision will have
to be set aside and the records remanded back to the RTC for reception of evidence for
the defense.
Appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on July 30, 1998. Trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution rested its case on October 13, 1998. 3 Upon motion of appellant,
the RTC issued an Order dated November 10, 1998 allowing appellant to file a demurrer
to evidence.4 On November 19, 1998, appellant filed his Demurrer to Evidence 5 which
was opposed by the prosecution. 6 On April 22, 1999, the RTC promulgated herein
assailed decision convicting appellant. 7

The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision after denying the
demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of court, without first giving
appellant the opportunity to present his evidence.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court
may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative
after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused
filed with prior leave of court.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused filed such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution.

Contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was
denied,8 the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order denying
appellant’s demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently,
the trial court violated the aforequoted provisions of Section 15, Rule 119. Appellant had
filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC and
therefore upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have
given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally astonishing is the fact
that appellant’s counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC or in this
Court. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process.

Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of
the proceedings in the RTC,9 a remand of the case for reception of defense evidence is
warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been
violated.10

So that appellant may be spared from further delay, the Court deems it necessary to treat
the herein assailed judgment as a mere resolution denying the demurrer to evidence and
ascertain whether the RTC has committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting the
same.

The RTC made the following findings of fact and law, viz:

In brief, the evidence for the prosecution show that on the early morning of June 17,
1998, the Barangay Tanods of Bel-Air, while on duty, which is adjacent to TGIF American
Bar, heard two (2) shots; when they investigated they found a dead body of the victim
with two (2) gunshot wounds inside the storeroom of TGIF being guarded by the
accused. The accused, who was the security guard of the TGIF, surrendered his service
firearm (Exhibit "D") to policeman Bagon which was found to have spent two (2) spent
shells. The ballistic report states that the two (2) spent shells were fired from the gun
surrendered by the accused to policeman Bagon.
The accused opted to file demurrer to evidence which was denied by the Court, instead
of testifying and could have explained what really happened and why he surrendered his
service firearm.

The Court finds the presence of a qualifying circumstance of treachery, when the
accused fired at the victim one on his shoulder and another at his head in close range
(TSN dated October 13, 1998, p. 36).11

There was no eye-witness to the shooting incident. The RTC relied principally on the
admission of appellant to the police officer that he shot the unknown victim when he
surrendered his service firearm.

In his demurrer to evidence, appellant pointed out the following:

I. There is no evidence that the firearm marked and offered as Exhibit D belonged or was
assigned to the accused.

II. There is no evidence that the accused had recently fired a gun in the early morning of
June 17, 1998.

III. There is no evidence that the firearm marked and offered as Exhibit D was the same
firearm that killed the unknown victim in this case.

IV. There is reasonable doubt that the body examined by the medico-legal witness was
the same body recovered from the scene of the killing.

V. The extrajudicial admission made by the accused to the police officer and his alleged
voluntary surrender of the .38 caliber revolver cannot be admitted in evidence against the
accused for having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.

VI. Without any admission on the part of the accused or an unbroken chain of
incriminating circumstances, the accused is entitled to acquittal since the prosecution
failed to prove his culpability for the death of the unknown victim here beyond a
reasonable doubt.12

Considering that the first four items as above enumerated involve questions of fact, the
Court will not pre-empt the RTC in rendering its findings of fact after it shall have received
the defense evidence as well as rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence, if parties find it
necessary.

However, the Court is constrained to resolve the question arising from the fifth and sixth
claims of appellant, which is: Whether or not the admission made by appellant to the
police officer is admissible in evidence. It is the only link that would positively connect
appellant to the shooting of the victim, for the service gun may belong to him and it may
have been used in the shooting of the victim, but the missing link is the ascertainment of
whether he was the one who shot the victim. Without the testimony of the police officer
that appellant had verbally acknowledged to him having shot the victim, the herein-before
quoted circumstantial evidence enumerated by the RTC do not support the conviction of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 12 (1) and (3), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. The rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

...

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

The rights of the accused as provided therein may be invoked only when a person is
under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody investigation" 13 which has "been defined
as the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way"
[People vs. Caguioa, G.R. No. L-38975, January 17, 1980, 95 SCRA 2, 9 citing Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436].14

SPO1 Rolando Bagon, the police officer of Precinct 9, Makati City, who responded to the
report of the shooting incident, testified as follows:

Q: What time did you arrive there at TGI Friday’s Restaurant?

A: When we arrived there it was at around 5:15 to 6:00.

Q: A.M.?

A: June 17, Sir.

Q: When you arrived there, what did you do, Mr. Witness?

A: The barangay tanod present at that time pointed to us and turned over to us the
alleged suspect who is the security guard of the said establishment then we went to the
security guard and he voluntarily surrendered himself to us, together with the firearm, a .
38 caliber.

Q: What did he tell you when he surrendered and gave to you his .38 caliber Mr.
Witness?

...

WITNESS:

A: That he allegedly hold (sic) a robber inside "while stealing" according to him a
cash register of the bar and some assorted goods.

COURT:

Q: Who told you that?

WITNESS:

A: The security guard, the alleged suspect Sir.

FISCAL FLORES:

Q: What else did he tell you?

A: Nothing Sir, he fired his gun at the victim.

...

FISCAL FLORES:

Q: After the said accused surrendered himself and his firearm, what else did you do at
the said bar?

A: Sir, we invited him to our precinct to shed light or to answer what he

committed.15 (Emphasis supplied).

and, on his cross-examination, he testified as follows:

Q: Is it not true that when the accused Oscar Alcanzado in this case approached you, he
was not evasive and that he voluntarily turned over the firearm and his person to you?

A: Yes, Sir.16

The cross-examination of homicide investigator PO2 Rio S. Bucalan who proceeded to

the shooting incident, revealed the following:

Q: Mr. Witness, when you arrived at the scene of the incident in questioned in this case,
is it correct to say that you conducted the investigation right there and then?

Witness:

A: Yes sir.

Atty. Alikpala:

And at that scene at that time was the accused in this case, Osca Alcanzado, is that
correct?

Witness:

Yes sir.

...

Atty. Alikpala:

Mr. Witness, isn’t it also true that at that time you conducted an investigation you spoke
with the accused in this case?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Alikpala:

And when you spoke to the accused, did you tell him about his right to remain silent and
his right to counsel?
Witness:

He is not still turn-over to me by the police officer.

...

Atty. Alikpala:

Mr. Witness, so at that time that you conducted your investigation, you spoke to the
accused?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Alikpala:

And did you tell him about his right to remain silent and his right to counsel?

Witness:

In fact I don’t know that he is the accused during my initial inquiry.

Atty. Alikpala:

But you knew that he was a Security Guard?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Alikpala:

And so could you tell us what happened when you talked to him?

Witness:

During the initial inquiry he claimed that . . . . he verbally claimed that he shot the
victim because of self-defense.

...

COURT:

He claimed that he shot the victim?

Witness:

Yes, Your Honor.

Atty. Alikpala:

And this was in the course of your investigation, correct?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Alikpala:

And the accused in this case, did not execute any written waiver of his right to remain
silent, is that correct?

Witness:

No sir.

Atty. Alikpala:

And also the accused in this case did not execute any written waiver of his right to
counsel, is that correct?

Witness:

No sir.

COURT:

What do you mean no?

Witness:

He did not execute, sir.

Atty. Alikpala:

And it is also correct that the time he was talking to you there was no lawyer present
assisting the accused, is that correct?

Witness:

Yes sir.17

Under the above circumstances, the Court finds that while the admission made by
appellant to PO2 Bucalan may not be admitted in evidence considering that the alleged
verbal admission made by appellant before him as homicide investigator was made
without appellant being informed of his right to remain silent and right to counsel and
after appellant had been established as the suspect by the police officers who had
arrived at the scene of the crime before PO2 Bucalan came.

However, the Court cannot disregard the testimony of SPO1 Bagon who, together with
his co-police officers, responded to the call of the barangay tanod and immediately upon
his arrival, appellant spontaneously told him that he had shot the victim. This particular
admission was made when appellant has not been taken into custody by the police
officers and therefore admissible in evidence. The constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning by
the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused readily admitted
having committed the crime.18
Consequently, for purposes of determining whether the demurrer to evidence should
have been granted, the connection between the service gun and appellant as the
perpetrator of the shooting, without any countervailing evidence, had been sufficiently
established. Thus, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
demurrer to evidence BUT it committed grave abuse of discretion in outrightly convicting
appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua when
appellant has not been given the opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, pursuant
to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

Further, the attendant justifying, mitigating or aggravating circumstance such as self-

defense, treachery and voluntary surrender could only be ascertained fully after the
defense evidence, rebuttal and sur-rebuttal, if any, shall have been adduced and
evaluated by the RTC in the rendition of its judgment on the case.

Had Presiding Judge Rosario, Jr. not compulsorily retired from the Judiciary, he could
have been admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated April 5, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 66), Makati City is SET ASIDE for being null and void. Let
the records of Criminal Case No. 98-1634 be remanded to said trial court for reception of
defense evidence and further proceedings. The presiding judge is directed to conduct the
trial of the case and render judgment thereon with immediate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Puno , Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

*

Footnotes

* 
On official leave.

**
 Acting Chairman

1
 Penned by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr..

2
 Rollo, p. 54.

3
 TSN, October 13, 1998, pp. 56-60.

4
 Records, p. 72.

5
 Id., p. 77.

6
 Id., p. 101.

7
 Id., p. 113.

8
 Id., p. 106.

9
 People vs. Molina, 372 SCRA 378, 389 (2001).

10
 People vs. Yambot, 343 SCRA 20, 38 (2000).

11
 Rollo, pp. 53-54.
12
 Rollo, p. 51.

13
 Sebastian, Sr., vs. Garchitorena, 343 SCRA 463, 470 (2000).

14
 People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47, 61 (1990).

15
 TSN, October 1, 1998, pp. 10-14.

16
 Id., p. 21.

17
 TSN, October 8, 1998, pp. 26-27, 29-30, 31-35.

 People vs. Hermoso, 343 SCRA 567, 579 (2000), citing People vs. Andan, 269 SCRA
18

95 (1997) and People vs. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994).

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127845. March 10, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and

appellee, v. LODRIGO BAYYA, defendant and appellant.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

For automatic review here is a judgment handed down by

Branch 161 of the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela,
finding appellant Lodrigo2 Bayya guilty of incestuous rape
and sentencing him to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.

Filed on October 9, 1995 by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor

Pacifico Paas and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2467, the
accusatory portion of the Information indicting appellant,
alleges:

"That on or about the year 1994 and for sometimes (sic)

thereafter in the municipality of Burgos, province of Isabela,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused armed with a knife, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal
knowledge with his own daughter ROSIE S. BAYYA for
several times against the latters (sic) will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW."3 cräläwvirtualibräry

After appellant pleaded Not Guilty upon arraignment on Nov.

22, 19954 , trial ensued.

From the decision of Nov. 15, 1996 under review, it can be

gleaned that:

"This is a case of a father raping his own daughter, a minor,

aged 12 when she was first sexually assaulted up to July 12,
1995, the last molestation having done on her on said date
(sic).

xxx xxx xxx

xxx it appears that Rosie Bayya, a minor, revealed to her

aunt, Trinidad Garcia, her horrible tale at the hands of her
father, the accused herein, six (6) days after the last sexual
assault on her when Rosie was asked by her to baby-sit for
another aunt of hers at Santiago, Isabela. She was
compelled to reveal what befell her when she was informed
that her father asked her to go back home but never wanted
to (sic), knowing that her father would continue raping her.
She told her aunt Trining that she does not like to go home
because her father used to have sexual intercourse with her.

With the revelation made by Rosie Bayya, her aunt Trining

went back to Malasin, Burgos, Isabela to inform Melquiades
Bayya, Rosies granduncle who in turn informed a certain
Major Turingan of the PNP what the accused did to his
daughter (sic). The girl was brought to the PNP station of
Burgos to give her statement which she did where she
divulged what her father did to her.

The gist of her testimony in court is that sometime in 1994

when she was still 12 years old, her father, the accused,
forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse
with her in the family house at Malasin, Burgos, Isabela.
Being afraid as he threatened her, the accused succeeded in
undressing the young daughter and he inserted his penis
into her vagina. She felt pain as a result and just kept to
herself what her father did fearing that her father would
make good his threats if she squealed on him. She just cried
helplessly.

The first sexual molestation happened at an unholy hour at

noon time (sic) when her mother and the rest of the siblings
were out, her mother working in the field at the time. Her
father repeated this bestial act in their house about twice a
week when her mother was not at home; at times only a
sister six years of age was present but probably did not
know what her father was doing to her elder sister. Then
later, he used her four (4) times a month and the last that
she remembered was on July 12, 1995. After she was
advised to file a complaint at her behest, she was brought to
the PNP station at Burgos to continue and wind up her
ordeal with a physical examination of her by a public
physician, Dr. Elvie5 Amurao of the Roxas District Hospital at
Roxas, a nearby town of Burgos.

Dr. Amurao found old lacerations compatible with the claim

of the complainant that she was raped months before her
examination."6 cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellant and his wife, Cecilia Bayya, took the witness stand
for the defense.

Appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge

of his daughter, Rosie Bayya, twice but theorized that he
was "out of his mind"7 when he did the lecherous acts on
her. He traced his criminal behavior to a childhood that was
neglected and forlorn in the mountains of Isabela, let alone
the maltreatment endured in the hands of his very own
parents.8cräläwvirtualibräry

On the other hand, Cecilia Bayya, mother of the victim and

wife of appellant, manifested on the witness stand her
"neutral" stance9 in the case. Nonetheless, she disclosed
that she had forgiven her husband for his salacious conduct
since they are poor and she cannot eke out a living without
appellant as breadwinner.10 cräläwvirtualibräry
Finding the facts established by the evidence falling squarely
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the lower court, after trial on the
merits, rendered a judgment of conviction, sentencing
appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of DEATH, disposing
thus:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the offense charged, the court hereby sentences
the accused LODRIGO BAYYA to suffer the supreme penalty
of death without award to any form of damages for obvious
reasons.

SO ORDERED."11 cräläwvirtualibräry

At the outset, it bears stressing that having admitted

authorship of the offense charged, appellant does not
dispute the trial courts finding of guilt. However, appellant
questions the penalty imposed below, contending that since
the information made no reference to Republic Act No.
7659, it was a reversible error to convict thereunder. And
because the only penal provision relied upon by the
prosecution is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, he
could only be sentenced to the maximum penalty
of reclusion perpetua in accordance therewith.

Therefore, the only issue raised by appellant is whether

there was a transgression of his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him, in view of the
fact that the Information is silent about the applicability of
R.A. No. 7659.

While departing from appellants strained reasoning, the

Court nonetheless agrees with and adopts his submission
that the trial court erred in imposing the capital punishment
on him.

A careful perusal of the Information indicting appellant

reveals a crucial omission in its averments of the minority of
the victim, Rosie S. Bayya.

Instructive in this regard is Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules

of Court, which reads:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all

of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

The purpose of the above-quoted rule is to inform the

accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law
of the land.12 Elaborating on the defendants right to be
informed, the Court held in Pecho vs. People13 that the
objectives of this right are:

1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the

charge against him as will enable him to make the defense;

2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for

protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
and

3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may

decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.

It is thus imperative that the Information filed with the trial

court be complete - to the end that the accused may
suitably prepare his defense. Corollary to this, an indictment
must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged
to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials
of a crime which delineates the nature and cause of
accusation against the accused.

The Court held recently that to sustain a conviction under

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the prosecution must allege and
prove the basic elements of: 1) sexual congress; 2) with a
woman; 3) by force and without consent, and in order to
warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional
elements that 4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the
time of the rape; and 5) the offender is a parent (whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.

In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege

the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya, although the
same was proven during the trial as borne by the records.
The omission is not merely formal in nature since
doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than
what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused
cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the
Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein
necessarily included. He has a right to be informed of the
nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is
put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than
that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is
tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right.16
cräläwvirtualibräry

The Information under consideration charges nothing more

than simple rape defined and penalized in the first and
second paragraphs of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
that is - having carnal knowledge of a woman by means of
force and intimidation and against her will. The additional
allegation that the offender is a parent of the offended party
can only be deemed a generic aggravating circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to allege the age of the victim
has effectively removed the crime from the ambit of Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659 prescribing the death penalty
"when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consaguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim".

Previously, this Court had occasion to hold that the death

penalty may be imposed only If the information alleges and
the evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her
relationship to the offender.17 This theory of "concurring
allegations" finds support in the earlier case of People vs.
Ramos18 where the Court enunciated that the concurrence of
the minority of the victim and her relationship with the
offender gives a different character to the rape defined in
the first part of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
having, as it does, the effect of raising the imposable
penalty for rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and
supreme penalty of DEATH.

The Court explained in Ramos that relationship and minority

must be alleged jointly if the death penalty is sought to be
imposed because the same partakes of the nature of a
special qualifying circumstance which has the effect of
increasing the prescribed penalty by degrees. When either
one of the said circumstances is omitted or lacking, that
which is pleaded in the information and proven by the
evidence may be considered merely as a generic
aggravating circumstance in accordance with the general
principles of criminal law. But since the penalty for simple
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is the
single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, the generic
aggravating circumstance cannot effectively augment the
criminal liability of appellant, it being required that the
single indivisible penalty prescribed by law is to be applied
regardless of any modifying circumstance in attendance.

Since the appellant had been informed of the elements of

simple rape under the information indicting him and nothing
more, he could only be convicted of simple rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as prescribed by law.19 cräläwvirtualibräry

In conclusion, the Court also takes note of the fact that the
trial court failed to award an indemnity ex delicto to the
victim pursuant to Article 10020 in relation to Article 10421 of
the Revised Penal Code. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence, moral damages should also be awarded to
the victim in such amount as the court deems just22 . The
award of exemplary damages is also indicated considering
that the relationship between the offender and the victim
aggravates the crime of rape, such as in the present case.

WHEREFORE , the judgment of conviction under review is

AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant LODRIGO
BAYYA is adjudged guilty of simple rape and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further
ordered to pay the victim, ROSIE S. BAYYA, P50,000.00 as
indemnity ex delicto, apart from P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P 25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs
against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,

Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official leave.