LOPO - Citizenship

G.R. No.
88831 November 8, 1990 Local Government Code, there is no legal

obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of
MATEO CAASI, petitioner,
Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R.
vs.
No. 84508).
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C.
MIGUEL, respondents. In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined
that:
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
A green card holder being a permanent
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,
resident of or an immigrant of a foreign
vs.
country and respondent having admitted
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C.
that he is a green card holder, it is
MIGUEL, respondents.
incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of
Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508. the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that
Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private he "has waived his status as a permanent
respondent. resident or immigrant" to be qualified to
run for elected office. This respondent has
not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of
These two cases were consolidated because they have the Appeals and Merito Miguel, respondents," the petitioner
same objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of the prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel,
Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents,"
Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which
January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo
holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the
America, not of Bolinao. regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further
proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the held:
decision dated January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First
Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito ... it is pointless for the Regional Trial
Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87- Court to hear the case questioning the
595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the qualification of the petitioner as resident of
disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local the Philippines, after the COMELEC has
elections on January 18, 1988. ruled that the petitioner meets the very
basic requirements of citizenship and
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a residence for candidates to elective local
petition for review of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of officials (sic) and that there is no legal
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the
petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival petitioner, considering that decisions of
candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, the Regional Trial Courts on quo
Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of warranto cases under the Election Code
his being a green card holder. are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22,
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not
Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident
United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had
convenience in order that he may freely enter the United waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to
States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the Sec. 18. Public officers and employees
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional owe the State and this Constitution
elections on May 18,1987. allegiance at all times, and any public
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the officer or employee who seeks to change
COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto his citizenship or acquire the status of an
Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that: immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.
The possession of a green card by the
respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus
establish that he has abandoned his Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
residence in the Philippines. On the SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person
contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, who is a permanent resident of or an
Respondent has sufficiently indicated his immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
intention to continuously reside in Bolinao qualified to run for any elective office
as shown by his having voted in under this Code, unless said person has
successive elections in said municipality. waived his status as permanent resident
As the respondent meets the basic or immigrant of a foreign country in
requirements of citizenship and residence accordance with the residence
for candidates to elective local officials requirement provided for in the election
(sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
L A W O N P U B L I C O F F I C E R S ( C i ti z e n s h i p ) | 1
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and deprive "any person" of life liberty, or
appointive public officials in the present administration of property without due process of law, or
President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in deny to any person the equal protection of
foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold the law, and the protection of this
elective public office in the Philippines is a question that amendment extends to the right to earn a
excites much interest in the outcome of this case. livelihood by following the ordinary
occupations of life. So an alien is entitled
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant
to the protection of the provision of the
that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Fifth Amendment to the federal
Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State)
constitution that no person shall be
which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted
deprived of life, liberty, or property
to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the
without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-
United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21
530.)
therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which
was, "Permanently." provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
the United States Department of Justice and Immigration
law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the
and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel
status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On
elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of
the back of the card, the upper portion, the following
Bolinao, Pangasinan.
information is printed:
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides:
Person identified by this card is
x x x x x x x x x
entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States." (Annex Any person who is a permanent resident
A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. of or an immigrant to a foreign country
84508.) shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the
such person has waived his status as
United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
permanent resident or immigrant of a
domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go
foreign country in accordance with the
to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor
residence requirement provided for in the
there; he entered the limited States with the intention to
election laws.'
have there permanently as evidenced by his application for
an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987
that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao
Government the requisite green card or authority to reside in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a
there permanently. permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
Immigration is the removing into one To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines,
place from another; the act of immigrating the law requires that the candidate who is a green card
the entering into a country with the holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
intention of residing in it. resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his
act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the
An immigrant is a person who removes
Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status
into a country for the purpose
as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
of permanent residence. As shown infra
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some
84, however, statutes sometimes give a
act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
broader meaning to the term "immigrant."
candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such
(3 CJS 674.)
prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card,
(3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him
which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it
during the period of his residence therein.
of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly
Aliens reading in the limited States, while bare of proof that he had waived his status as
they are permitted to remain, are in such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of
general entitled to the protection of the Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he
laws with regard to their rights of person was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
and property and to their civil and criminal
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is
responsibility.
not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he
In general, aliens residing in the United intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at
States, while they are permitted to remain the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
are entitled to the safeguards of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must
constitution with regard to their rights of possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code).
person and property and to their civil and Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a
criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien permanent resident of the United States and he resided in
friends are entitled to the benefit of the Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year)
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and
the federal constitution that no state shall
before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009
1988. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Petitioner,
vs.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who
CONRADO CRUZ, SANTIAGO P. GO, RENATO F.
are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country,
BORBON, LEVVINO CHING, CARLOS C. FLORENTINO,
the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
RUBEN G. BALLEGA, LOIDA ALCEDO, MARIO M.
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those
CAJUCOM, EMMANUEL M. CALMA, MANUEL A. RAYOS,
Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance.
WILMA L. CHUA, EUFEMIO S. ALFONSO, JESUS M.
The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have
LACANILAO, BONIFACIO N. ALCAPA, JOSE H.
cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations
SILVERIO, RODRIGO DEVELLES, NIDA R. PAUNAN,
or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who
MARIANO B. ESTUYE, JR., RAFAEL C. AREVALO,
are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such
ARTURO T. MANABAT, RICARDO O. LIZARONDO,
entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland
LETICIA C. MATURAN, RODRIGO A. ALAYAN,
for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep
LEONILO N. MIRANDA, DESEDERIO O. MONREAL,
another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign
FRANCISCO M. BAHIA, NESTOR R. FORONDA,
country of their choice in order to preserve their status as
VICENTE B. QUE, JR., AURELIO A. BILUAN, DANILO R.
permanent residents thereof.
GATCHALIAN, LOURDES R. DEL MUNDO, EMMA O.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration CALZADO, FELIMON DE LEON, TANY V. CATACUTAN,
and permanent residence in the United States, he never AND CONCEPCION P. JAO, Respondents.
really intended to live there permanently, for all that he
wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to BRION, J.:
the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court
believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under We resolve in this Decision the constitutional
false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the challenge, originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of
United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC), against the following
if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic Act ( RA) No.
to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay
giving him the best of both worlds so to speak. and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card Government Code of 1991):
attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of
to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status all barangay and sangguniang kabataan offic
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent ials after the effectivity of this Act shall be
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that three (3) years.
status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of No barangay elective official shall serve for
Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public same position: Provided, however, That
office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. the term of office shall be reckoned
from the
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the 1994 barangay elections.Voluntary
Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, renunciation of office for any length of time
and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set shall not be considered as an interruption in
aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as the continuity of service for the full term for
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. which the elective official was elected.
Costs against the said respondent.
SO ORDERED. The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged
proviso constitutionally infirm. The present petition, filed by
the Commission on Elections ( COMELEC), seeks a review of
the RTC decision.[1]

THE ANTECEDENTS

Before the October 29, 2007
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of
several barangays of Caloocan City[2] filed with the RTC
a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the
constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso, based on
the following arguments:

I. The term limit
of Barangay officials should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively.

II. Implementation of
paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164
would be a violation of the equal
protection of the law.
portion providing for the reckoning of the three
III. Barangay officials (3) consecutive term limit of barangay elective
have always been apolitical. officials beginning from the
1994 barangay elections.

The RTC agreed with the respondents contention xxx
that the challenged proviso retroactively applied the three-
term limit for barangay officials under the following Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A. 9164 is not a
reasoning: mere restatement of Section 43(c) of the Local
Government Code. As discussed above, Section
When the Local Government Code of 1991 took 43(c) of the Local Government Code does not
effect abrogating all other laws inconsistent provide for the consecutive term limit rule
therewith, a different term was ordained. Here, of barangay elective officials. Such specific
this Court agrees with the position of the provision of the Code has in fact amended the
petitioners that Section 43 of the Code previous enactments (R.A. 6653 and R.A. 6679)
specifically exempted barangay elective officials providing for the consecutive term limit rule
from the coverage of the three (3) consecutive of barangay elective officials. But, such specific
term limit rule considering that the provision provision of the Local Government Code was
applicable to these (sic) class of elective officials amended by R.A. 9164, which reverted back to
was significantly separated from the provisions the previous policy of fixing consecutive term
of paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof. Paragraph limits of barangay elective officials. [3]
(b) is indeed intended to qualify paragraph (a)
of Section 43 as regards to (sic) all local elective In declaring this retroactive application
officials except barangayofficials. Had the unconstitutional, the RTC explained that:
intention of the framers of the Code is (sic) to
include barangay elective officials, then no By giving a retroactive reckoning of the three
excepting proviso should have been expressly (3) consecutive term limit rule
made in paragraph (a) thereof or, by for barangay officials to the
implication, the contents of paragraph (c) 1994 barangay elections, Congress has violated
should have been stated ahead of the contents not only the principle of prospective application
of paragraph (b). of statutes but also the equal protection clause
of the Constitution inasmuch as
xxxx the barangay elective officials were singled out
that their consecutive term limit shall be
Clearly, the intent of the framers of the counted retroactively. There is no rhyme or
constitution (sic) is to exempt reason why the consecutive limit for
the barangay officials from the three (3) term these barangay officials shall be counted
limits (sic) which are otherwise applicable to retroactively while the consecutive limit for
other elected public officials from the Members other local and national elective officials are
of the House of Representatives down to the counted prospectively. For if the purpose of
members of Congress is [sic] to classify
the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. It is up for elective barangay officials as belonging to the
the Congress whether the three (3) term limit same class of public officers whose term of
should be applied by enacting a law for the office are limited to three (3) consecutive terms,
purpose. then to discriminate them by applying the
proviso retroactively violates the constitutionally
The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 enshrined principle of equal protection of the
merely increased the term of office laws.
of barangay elective officials from three (3)
years to five (5) years. Like the Local Although the Constitution grants Congress the
Government Code, it can be noted that no power to determine such successive term limit
consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials, the exercise of the
of barangay elective officials was fixed therein. authority granted shall not otherwise transgress
other constitutional and statutory privileges.
The advent of R.A. 9164 marked the revival of
the consecutive term limit for the election This Court cannot subscribe to the position of
of barangay elective officials after the Local the respondent that the legislature clearly
Government Code took effect. Under the intended that the provision of RA No. 9164 be
assailed provision of this Act, the term of office made effective in 1994 and that such provision
of barangay elective officials reverted back to is valid and constitutional. If we allow such
three (3) years from five (5) years, and, this premise, then the term of office for those
time, the legislators expressly declared that officials elected in the 1997 barangay elections
no barangay elective official shall serve for more should have ended in year 2000 and not year
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same 2002 considering that RA No. 9164 provides for
position. The petitioners are very clear that they a three-year term of barangay elective
are not assailing the validity of such provision officials. The amendment introduced by R.A. No.
fixing the three (3) consecutive term limit rule 8524 would be rendered nugatory in view of
for the election of barangay elective officials to such retroactive application. This is absurd and
the same position. The particular provision the illusory.
constitutionality of which is under attack is that
True, no person has a vested right to a public The COMELEC also argues that the RTCs
office, the same not being property within the invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially involves the wisdom
contemplation of constitutional of the law the aspect of the law that the RTC has no right to
guarantee. However, a cursory reading of the inquire into under the constitutional separation of powers
petition would show that the petitioners are not principle. The COMELEC lastly argues that there is no
claiming vested right to their office but their violation of the one subject-one title rule, as the matters
right to be voted upon by the electorate without covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the assailed provision is
being burdened by the assailed provision of the actually embraced within the title of the law.
law that, in effect, rendered them ineligible to
run for their incumbent positions. Such right to THE COURTS RULING
run for office and be voted for by the electorate We find the petition meritorious. The RTC legally erred
is the right being sought to be protected by when it declared the challenged proviso unconstitutional.
assailing the otherwise unconstitutional
provision.
Preliminary Considerations
Moreover, the Court likewise agrees with the
petitioners that the law violated the one-act-one We find it appropriate, as a preliminary matter, to
subject rule embodied in the Constitution. x x x hark back to the pre-1987 Constitution history of
x The challenged laws title is AN ACT the barangay political system as outlined by this Court
PROVIDING FOR THE in David v. COMELEC,[5] and we quote:
SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIAN
G KABATAAN ELECTIONS, AMENDING As a unit of government,
REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND of the Philippines. The word barangay is derived
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. x x x x from the Malay balangay, a boat which
transported them (the Malays) to these shores.
xxxx Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan
missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado Benitez
To this court, the non-inclusion in the title of the wrote that the barangay was ruled by
act on the retroactivity of the reckoning of the a dato who exercised absolute powers of
term limits posed a serious constitutional government. While the Spaniards kept
breach, particularly on the provision of the the barangay as the basic structure of
constitution [sic] that every bill must embrace government, they stripped the dato or rajah of
only one subject to be expressed in the title his powers. Instead, power was centralized
thereof. nationally in the governor general and locally in
the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde
x x x the Court is of the view that the mayor and
affected barangay officials were not sufficiently the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was
given notice that they were already disqualified much later renamed cabeza de barangay, who
by a new act, when under the previous was elected by the local citizens possessing
enactments no such restrictions were imposed. property. The position degenerated from a title
of honor to that of a mere government
Even if this Court would apply the usual test in employee. Only the poor who needed a salary,
determining the sufficiency of the title of the no matter how low, accepted the post.
bill, the challenged law would still be insufficient
for how can a retroactivity of the term limits be After the Americans colonized the Philippines,
germane to the synchronization of an election x the barangays became known as barrios. For
x x x.[4] some time, the laws governing barrio
governments were found in the Revised
Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the
The COMELEC moved to reconsider this decision but the RTC Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Barrios
denied the motion. Hence, the present petition on a pure were granted autonomy by the original Barrio
question of law. Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as
quasi-municipal corporations by the Revised
The Petition Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the martial law
regime, barrios were declared or
The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is renamed barangays -- a reversion really to their
valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD No.
to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 557. Their basic organization and functions
or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be under RA 3590, which was expressly adopted as
considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, the Barangay Charter, were retained. However,
according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in the titles of the officials were changed
RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three- to barangay captain, barangay councilman, bara
term limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not ngay secretary and barangay treasurer.
penal in character may be applied retroactively when
expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
rights. As there is no vested right to public office, much less a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and
to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Baran
alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164. gay Councilmen), who shall constitute the
presiding officer and members of
the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) three consecutive terms apply
respectively were first elected on May 17, to barangay officials?
1982. They had a term of six years which began
on June 7, 1982. MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, the voting
that we had on the terms of office did not
The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed include the barangay officials because it
the term of office of local elective officials at six was then the stand of the Chairman of the
years. Under this Code, the chief officials of Committee on Local Governments that the
the barangay were the punong barangay, term of barangay officials must be
six determined by law. So it is now for the
elective sangguniang barangay members, law to determine whether the restriction
the kabataang barangay chairman, on the number of reelections will be
a barangay secretary and included in the Local Government Code.
a barangay treasurer.
MR. RODRIGO: So that is up to Congress
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, to decide.
reiterated that barangay officials shall hold
office for six years, and stated that their election MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
was to be held on the second Monday of May
nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the MR. RODRIGO: I just wanted that clear in the
same day every six years thereafter. [Emphasis record.[6] [Emphasis supplied.]
supplied.]

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
The 1987 Philippine Constitution extended the barangay election originally scheduled by Batas
constitutional recognition to barangays under Article X, Pambansa Blg. 881[7] on the second Monday of May
Section 1 by specifying barangays as one of the territorial 1988 was reset to the second Monday of November 1988
and political subdivisions of the country, supplemented by and every five years thereafter by RA No. 6653.[8] Section 2
Section 8 of the same Article X, which provides: of RA No. 6653 changed the term of office
of barangay officials and introduced a term limitation as
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local follows:
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no SEC. 2. The term of office
such official shall serve for more than three of barangay officials shall be for five (5)
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the years from the first day of January
office for any length of time shall not be considered following their election. Provided,
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for however, That no kagawad shall
the full term for which he was elected. [Emphasis serve for more than two (2)
supplied.] consecutive terms. [Emphasis supplied]

The Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 8 Under Section 5 of RA No. 6653, the punong barangay was
show that the authority of Congress to legislate relates not to be chosen by seven kagawads from among themselves,
only to the fixing of the term of office of barangay officials, and they in turn, were to be elected at large by
but also to the application of the three-term limit. The the barangay electorate. The punong barangay, under
following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission are Section 6 of the law, may be recalled for loss of confidence
particularly instructive on this point: by an absolute majority vote of the Sangguniang
Barangay, embodied in a resolution that shall necessarily
MR. NOLLEDO: One clarificatory question, include the punong barangays successor.
Madam President. What will be the term of the
office of barangay officials as provided for? The election date set by RA No. 6653 on the
second Monday of November 1988 was postponed yet again
MR. DAVIDE: As may be determined by law. to March 28, 1989 by RA No. 6679 whose pertinent
provision states:
MR. NOLLEDO: As provided for in the Local
Government Code? SEC. 1. The elections
of barangay officials set on the second Monday of
MR. DAVIDE: Yes. November 1988 by Republic Act No. 6653 are
hereby postponed and reset to March 28,
x x x x x x x x x 1989. They shall serve a term which shall
begin on the first day of May 1989 and
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994.
comment? Is there any objection to this
proposed new section as submitted by There shall be held a regular election
Commissioner Davide and accepted by the of barangay officials on the second Monday of
Committee? May 1994 and on the same day every five (5)
years thereafter. Their term shall be for five (5)
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, does years which shall begin on the first day of June
this prohibition to serve for more than following the election and until their successors
shall have been elected and qualified: Provided,
That no barangay official shall serve for This law started the direct and separate election of
more than three (3) consecutive terms. the punong barangay by the qualified voters in
the barangay and not by the seven (7) kagawads from
The barangay elections shall be among themselves.[9]
nonpartisan and shall be conducted in an
expeditious and inexpensive manner. Subsequently or on February 14, 1998, RA No.
8524 changed the three-year term of office
Significantly, the manner of election of the punong of barangay officials under Section 43 of the LGC to five (5)
barangay was changed years. On March 19, 2002, RA No. 9164 introduced the
Section 5 of the law provided that while the following significant changes: (1) the term of office
seven kagawads were to be elected by the registered voters of barangay officials was again fixed at three years on the
of the barangay, (t)he candidate who obtains the highest reasoning that the barangay officials should not serve a
number of votes shall be the punong barangay and in the longer term than their supervisors; [10] and (2) the
event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the challenged proviso, which states that the 1994
supervision of the Commission on Elections. election shall be the reckoning point for the
application of the three-term limit, was
More than two (2) years after the introduced. Yet another change was introduced three years
1989 barangay elections, RA No. 7160 (the LGC) after or on July 25, 2005 when RA No. 9340 extended the
introduced the following changes in the law: term of the then incumbent barangay officials due to expire
at noon of November 30, 2005 under RA No. 9164 to noon
SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x of November 30, 2007. The three-year term limitation
x x punong barangay shall be elected at large x x provision survived all these changes.
x by the qualified voters therein.

SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term Congress Plenary Power to
of office of all local elective officials elected after Legislate Term Limits for Barangay Officials and
the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) Judicial Power
years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or
such date as may be provided for by law, except In passing upon the issues posed to us, we clarify
that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That at the outset the parameters of our powers.
all local officials first elected during the local
elections immediately following the ratification of As reflected in the above-quoted deliberations of
the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has plenary authority under
June 30, 1992. the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the
duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the
(b) No local elective official shall application to them of a consecutive term limit. Congress
serve for more than three (3) consecutive invariably exercised this authority when it enacted no less
terms in the same position. Voluntary than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987.
renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the Through all these statutory changes, Congress had
continuity of service for the full term for which determined at its discretion both the length of the term of
the elective official concerned was elected. office of barangay officials and their term limitation. Given
the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987
(c) The term of office Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the
of barangay officials and members of term duration and limition of barangay officials under the
the sangguniang kabataan shall be for Constitution, we consider it established that whatever
three (3) years, which shall begin after the Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters
regular election of barangay officials on the are political questions beyond the pale of judicial
second Monday of May 1994. scrutiny,[11] subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the
courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any
SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. law contrary to the Constitution.[12]
-- (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong
barangay, seven (7) sangguniang Political questions refer to those questions which,
barangay members, the sangguniang under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
a barangay treasurer. discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government; it is
x x x x x x x x x concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure. [13] These questions,
SEC. 390. Composition. previously impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be
-- The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative inquired into under the limited window provided by Section
body of the barangay, shall be composed of 1, Article VIII. Estrada v. Desierto[14] best describes this
the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the constitutional development, and we quote:
seven (7) regular sanguniang barangaymembers
elected at large and the sanguniang To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
kabataan chairman as members. [Emphasis narrowed the reach of the political doctrine
supplied.] when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also limit has been there all along as early as the
to determine whether or not there has been a second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Constitution took effect; it was continued under the
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any LGC and can still be found in the current law. We find
branch or instrumentality of this obvious from a reading of the historical
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has development of the law.
focused on the thou shalt nots of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of The first law that provided a term limitation
its jurisdiction. With the new provision, for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed
however, courts are given a greater a two-consecutive term limit. After only six months,
prerogative to determine what it can do to Congress, under RA No. 6679(1988), changed the two-
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of limit. This consistent imposition of the term limit gives no
any branch or instrumentality of hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to
government. Clearly, the new provision did provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 the LGC
not just grant the Court power of doing followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as
nothing. In sync and symmetry with this originally worded, for a three-term limit
intent are other provisions of the 1987 for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC analysis of this
Constitution trimming the so called political issue.
thicket. xxxx Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC
on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters
Thus, we can inquire into a congressional enactment despite dealing with a wide range of subject matters, all relating to
the political question doctrine, although the window local elective officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and
provided us is narrow; the challenge must show grave abuse Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession (Chapter
of discretion to justify our intervention. II), c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall
(Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local
Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts Legislation (Chapter III).
can declare a law invalid when it is contrary to any provision
of the Constitution. This requires the appraisal of the These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all
challenged law against the legal standards provided by the local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly
Constitution, not on the basis of the wisdom of the provided. A contrary application is provided with respect to
enactment. To justify its nullification, the breach of the the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it
Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply
or equivocal one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption to barangay officials whose length of term is specifically
of constitutionality.[15] These are the hurdles that those provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of
challenging the constitutional validity of a law must an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under
overcome. Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to
all local elective officials who must perforce
The present case, as framed by the respondents, include barangay officials.
poses no challenge on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion. The legal issues posed relate strictly to An alternative perspective is to view Sec. 43(a), (b)
compliance with constitutional standards.It is from this prism and (c) separately from one another as independently
that we shall therefore resolve this case. standing and self-contained provisions, except to the extent
that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a)
The Retroactive relates to the term of local elective officials,
Application Issue except barangay officials whose term of office is separately
provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b), by its express terms,
a. Interpretative / Historical Consideration relates to all local elective officials without any exception.
Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials
The respondents first objection to the challenged without any exclusion or qualification.
provisos constitutionality is its purported retroactive
application of the three-term limit when it set the Either perspective, both of which speak of the same
1994 barangay elections as a reckoning point in the resulting interpretation, is the correct legal import of Section
application of the three-term limit. 43 in the context in which it is found in Title II of the LGC.

The respondents argued that the term limit, To be sure, it may be argued, as the respondents
although present in the previous laws, was not in RA No. and the RTC did, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 43
7160 when it amended all previous barangay election are the general law for elective officials (other
laws. Hence, it was re-introduced for the first time by RA No. than barangay officials); and paragraph (c) is the specific
9164 (signed into law on March 19, 2002) and was applied law on barangay officials, such that the silence of paragraph
retroactively when it made the term limitation effective from (c) on term limitation for barangay officials indicates the
the 1994 barangay elections. As the appealed ruling quoted legislative intent to exclude barangay officials from the
above shows, the RTC fully agreed with the respondents application of the three-term limit. This reading, however, is
position. flawed for two reasons.

Our first point of disagreement with the First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to the
respondents and with the RTC is on their position that a exclusion of Section 43(c), is not justified by the plain texts
retroactive application of the term limitation was made of these provisions. Section 43(a) plainly refers to local
under RA No. 9164. Our own reading shows that no elective officials, except elective barangay officials. In
retroactive application was made because the three-term comparison, Section 43(b) refers to all local elective officials
without exclusions or exceptions. Their respective coverages than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
therefore vary so that one cannot be said to be of the same position.
kind as the other. Their separate topics additionally
strengthen their distinction; Section 43(a) refers to the Mr. Speaker, I think it is the position of the
term of office while Section 43(b) refers to the three-term committee that the first term should be reckoned
limit. These differences alone indicate that Sections 43(a) from election of what year, Mr. Speaker?
and (b) cannot be read together as one organic whole in the
way the RTC suggested. Significantly, these same REP. MACIAS. After the adoption of the Local
distinctions apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c). Government Code, Your Honor. So that the first
election is to be reckoned on, would be May 8,
Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed because of 1994, as far as the Barangay election is concerned.
its total disregard of the historical background of Section
43(c) a backdrop that we painstakingly outlined above. REP. LOBREGAT. Yes, Mr. Speaker. So there was an
election in 1994.
From a historical perspective of the law, the
inclusion of Section 43(c) in the LGC is an absolute necessity REP. MACIAS. Then an election in 1997.
to clarify the length of term of barangay officials. Recall that
under RA No. 6679, the term of office of barangay officials REP. LOBREGAT. There was an election in
was five (5) years. The real concern was how Section 43 1997. And there will be an election this year
would interface with RA No. 6679. Without a categorical
statement on the length of the term of office REP. LOBREGAT. election this year.
of barangay officials, a general three-year term for all local
elective officials under Section 43(a), standing alone, may REP. MACIAS. That is correct. This will be the third.
not readily and completely erase doubts on the intended
abrogation of the 5-year term for barangay officials under xxx xxx
RA No. 6679. Thus, Congress added Section 43(c) which
provided a categorical three-year term for these REP. SUMULONG. Mr. Speaker.
officials. History tells us, of course, that the unequivocal
provision of Section 43(c) notwithstanding, an issue on what THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.) The
is the exact term of office of barangay officials was still Honorable Sumulong is recognized.
brought to us via a petition filed by no less than the
President of the Liga ng Mga Barangay in 1997. We fully REP. SUMULONG. Again, with the permission of my
resolved the issue in the cited David v. Comelec. Chairman, I would like to address the question of
Congressman Lobregat.
Section 43(c) should therefore be understood in
this context and not in the sense that it intended to provide THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.).
the complete rule for the election of barangay officials, so Please proceed.
that in the absence of any term limitation proviso under this
subsection, no term limitation applies REP. SUMULONG. With respect to the three-
to barangay officials. That Congress had the LGCs three- year consecutive term limits of Barangay
term limit in mind when it enacted RA No. 9164 is clear from Captains that is not provided for in the
the following deliberations in the House of Representatives Constitution and that is why the election
(House) on House Bill No. 4456 which later became RA No. prior to 1991 during the enactment of the
9164: Local Government Code is not counted
because it is not in the Constitution but in the
MARCH 5, 2002: Local Government Code where the three
consecutive term limits has been placed.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). [Emphasis supplied.]
Majority Leader.
which led to the following exchanges in the House
REP. ESCUDERO. Mr. Speaker, next to interpellate Committee on Amendments:
is the Gentleman from Zamboanga City. I ask that
the Honorable Lobregat be recognized. March 6, 2002

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). The COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS
Honorable Lobregat is recognized.
REP. GONZALES. May we now proceed to
REP. LOBREGAT. Thank you very much, Mr. committee amendment, if any, Mr. Speaker.
Speaker. Mr. Speaker, this is just
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Gonzalez). The Chair
REP. MACIAS. Willingly to the Gentleman recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the
from Zamboanga City. Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.

REP. LOBREGAT. points of clarification, Mr. REP. SYJUCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 2, line 7, after
Speaker, the term of office. It says in Section 4, the word position, substitute the period (.) and add
The term of office of all Barangay and sangguniang the following: PROVIDED HOWEVER THAT THE
kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE
shall be three years. Then it says, 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. So that the amended
No Barangay elective official shall serve for more Section 4 now reads as follows:

SEC. 4. Term of Office. The term of the electorate without being burdened by a law that
office of all barangay and sangguniang effectively rendered them ineligible to run for their
kabataan officials after the effectivity of this incumbent positions. Again, the RTC agreed with this
Act shall be three (3) years. contention.

No barangay elective local official We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no such
shall serve for more than three (3) right under the Constitution; if at all, this claimed right is
consecutive terms in the same merely a restatement of a claim of vested right to a public
position COLON (:) PROVIDED, HOWEVER, office. What the Constitution clearly provides is the power of
THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE Congress to prescribe the qualifications for elective local
RECKONED FROM THE posts;[18] thus, the question of eligibility for an elective local
1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. Voluntary post is a matter for Congress, not for the courts, to
renunciation of office for any length of time decide. We dealt with a strikingly similar issue
shall not be considered as an interruption in in Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections [19] where we
the continuity of service for the full term for ruled that SK membership which was claimed as a property
which the elective official was elected. right within the meaning of the Constitution is a mere
statutory right conferred by law. Montesclaros instructively
The House therefore clearly operated on the premise that tells us:
the LGC imposed a three-term limit for barangay officials,
and the challenged proviso is its way of addressing any Congress exercises the power
confusion that may arise from the numerous changes in the to prescribe the qualifications for SK
law. membership. One who is no longer
qualified because of an amendment in the
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the law cannot complain of being deprived of a
challenged proviso has been there all along and does not proprietary right to SK membership. Only
simply retroact the application of the three-term limit to those who qualify as SK members can
the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated contest, based on a statutory right, any
the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming act disqualifying them from SK
up with the challenged proviso. membership or from voting in the SK
elections. SK membership is not a
With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional property right protected by the
challenge to the proviso based on retroactivity must fail. Constitution because it is a mere
statutory right conferred by
b. No Involvement of Any law. Congress may amend at any
Constitutional Standard time the law to change or even
withdraw the statutory right.

Separately from the above reason, the A public office is not a property
constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental right. As the Constitution expressly states,
reason the respondents retroactivity objection does not a [P]ublic office is a public trust. No one
involve a violation of any constitutional standard. has a vested right to any public office,
much less a vested right to an expectancy
Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a of holding a public office. In Cornejo v.
constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code, Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already
[16]
not the Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides ruled:
that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary
is provided. The application of the Civil Code is of course Again, for this petition to come
self-explanatory laws enacted by Congress may permissibly under the due process of law
provide that they shall have retroactive effect. The Civil Code prohibition, it would be necessary
established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard. to consider an office a property. It
is, however, well settled x x
The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get x that a public office is not
to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive property within the sense of
application will impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a the constitutional guaranties
right has already vested in an individual and a subsequent of due process of law, but is a
law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process issue public trust or agency. x x x The
may arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested basic idea of the government x x x
right to life, liberty or property, as these are the ones that is that of a popular representative
may be considered protected by the due process clause of government, the officers being
the Constitution. mere agents and not rulers of the
people, one where no one man or
In the present case, the respondents never raised set of men has a proprietary or
due process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, contractual right to an office, but
the respondents themselves concede that there is no vested where every officer accepts office
right to public office.[17]As the COMELEC correctly pointed pursuant to the provisions of the
out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post in view law and holds the office as a trust
of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises. for the people he represents.

Aware of this legal reality, the respondents Petitioners, who apparently desire
theorized instead that they had a right to be voted upon by to hold public office, should realize from
the very start that no one has a any form of term limitation for determination by Congress
proprietary right to public office. While the through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment
law makes an SK officer an ex- recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that
officio member of a local government the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No
legislative council, the law does not confer equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
on petitioners a proprietary right or even a
proprietary expectancy to sit in local From another perspective, we see no reason to
legislative councils. The constitutional apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the
principle of a public office as a public trust challenged proviso did not result in any differential
precludes any proprietary claim to public treatment between barangayofficials and all other elective
office. Even the State policy directing officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the
equal access to opportunities for public retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not
service cannot bestow on petitioners a involve any retroactive application.
proprietary right to SK membership or a
proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public
offices. Violation of the Constitutional
One Subject- One Title Rule
Moreover, while the State policy
is to encourage the youths involvement in Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
public affairs, this policy refers to those only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
who belong to the class of people defined thereof. Farias v. Executive Secretary [21] provides the
as the youth. Congress has the power to reasons for this constitutional requirement and the test for
define who are the youth qualified to join its application, as follows:
the SK, which itself is a creation of The proscription is aimed against the evils of the
Congress. Those who do not qualify so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as
because they are past the age group well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered
defined as the youth cannot insist on being encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of
part of the youth. In government service, an act relating to its subject finding expression in its
once an employee reaches mandatory title.
retirement age, he cannot invoke any
property right to cling to his office. In the To determine whether there has been compliance
same manner, since petitioners are now with the constitutional requirement that the subject
past the maximum age for membership in of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid
the SK, they cannot invoke any property down the rule that
right to cling to their SK membership.
[Emphasis supplied.] Constitutional provisions relating to the
To recapitulate, we find no merit in the subject matter and titles of statutes should
respondents retroactivity arguments because: (1) the not be so narrowly construed as to cripple
challenged proviso did not provide for the retroactive or impede the power of legislation. The
application to barangay officials of the three-term limit; requirement that the subject of an act shall
Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164 simply continued what had be expressed in its title should receive a
been there before; and (2) the constitutional challenge reasonable and not a technical
based on retroactivity was not anchored on a constitutional construction. It is sufficient if the title be
standard but on a mere statutory norm. comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute
The Equal Protection Clause Issue seeks to effect, without expressing each
and every end and means necessary or
The equal protection guarantee under the convenient for the accomplishing of that
Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which object. Mere details need not be set
provides: Nor shall any person be denied the equal forth. The title need not be an abstract or
protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed index of the Act.
under this clause is equality under the same conditions and
among persons similarly situated. It is equality among xxxx
equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are
different from one another on the basis of substantial x x x This Court has held that an act
distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things having a single general subject, indicated
or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may in the title, may contain any number of
be treated differently in law.[20] provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality inconsistent with or foreign to the general
provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no subject, and may be considered in
basis exists in the present case for an equal protection furtherance of such subject by providing
challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently for the method and means of carrying out
from other local elective officials because the Constitution the general subject.
itself provides a significant distinction between these elective
officials with respect to length of term and term xxxx
limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution
itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year x x x Moreover, the avowed purpose of the
term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the constitutional directive that the subject of a
length of term and the application of the three-term limit or bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
G.R. No. 185740 July 23, 2013
nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES
which have not received the notice, action NORTE, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O.
and study of the legislators and the public. TYPOCO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, Respondent.
proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule.

First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act Providing for DECISION
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Electio
ns, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, states the BRION, J.:
laws general subject matter the amendment of the LGC to We resolve the Provincial Government of Camarines Norte's
synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other (petitioner) petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the
purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and Decision2 dated June 25, 2008 and the Resolution 3 dated
SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the December 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is SP No. 97425, reinstating respondent Beatriz O. Gonzales as
necessary. Closely related with length of term is term the Province of Camarines Norte’s provincial administrator,
limitation which defines the total number of terms for which or to an equivalent position.
a barangay official may run for and hold office. This natural
linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to
the general subject expressed in the title of the law. Factual Antecedents

Second, the congressional debates we cited above Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of
show that the legislators and the public they represent were the Province of Camarines Norte by then Governor Roy A.
fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the laws Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a
provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice, permanent capacity. On March 8, 1999, Governor Jess B.
consideration, and action from both the legislators and the Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to
public. explain in writing why no administrative charges should be
filed against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy
Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in in the course of official duties, and conduct grossly
the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all prejudicial to the best interest of the service; this was later
the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not what the on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales
constitutional requirement contemplates. submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the found her guilty of the charges against her, and
petition and accordingly AFFIRM the constitutionality of the recommended to Governor Pimentel that she be held
challenged proviso under Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic administratively liable.4 On September 30, 1999, Governor
Act No. 9164. Costs against the respondents. Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee’s
recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.5
SO ORDERED.
Proceedings before the Civil Service Commission
Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel’s decision to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). The CSC issued Resolution No.
0014186 modifying Governor Pimentel’s decision, finding
Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six
months. This decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel,
which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 001952. 7
Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification

of Resolution No. 001418, in which she claimed that she had
already served her six-month suspension and asked to be
reinstated. The CSC issued Resolution No. 002245, 8which
directed Gonzales’ reinstatement.
Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial

administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her
services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a
letter9 to the CSC reporting his compliance with its order,
and Gonzales’ subsequent dismissal as a confidential
employee. In his letter, Governor Pimentel cited Resolution
No. 0001158,10 where the CSC ruled that the provincial
administrator position is highly confidential and is
coterminous in nature.
The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008, 11 which

again directed Gonzales’ reinstatement as provincial
administrator. It clarified that while the Local Government reconsideration against Resolution No. 002245, and hence, it
Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160) made the is no longer alterable.
provincial administrator position coterminous and highly
The petitioner sought a reconsideration 17 of the CA’s
confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to
Decision, which the CA denied in a Resolution 18 dated
prejudice officials who were already issued permanent
December 2, 2008.
appointments as administrators prior to the new law’s
effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a
vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial The Present Petition
administrator and is entitled to continue holding this office
despite its subsequent classification as a coterminous In its present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner
position. The conversion of the provincial administrator argues that the provincial administrator position has been
position from a career to a non-career service should not converted into a highly confidential, coterminous position by
jeopardize Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of
the Constitution. As a permanent appointee, Gonzales may tenure to the position she held prior to RA 7160’s enactment.
only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing.
Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a
permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline under existing In her Comment19 and Memorandum,20 Gonzales maintained
laws. that the provincial administrator remained a career service
position. Section 721 of Presidential Decree No. 807, which
was one of the bases of the Court in Laurel V v. Civil Service
In a letter12 dated February 17, 2005, Gonzales wrote the Commission22 to declare the provincial administrator as a
CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines career service position, is a verbatim copy of Section
Norte’s incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her. The 7,23 Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code. This classification,
CSC responded with Resolution No. 061988, 13 which ordered established by law and jurisprudence, cannot be altered by
Gonzales’ reinstatement to the provincial administrator the mere implementing rules and regulations of RA 7160.
position, or to an equivalent position.Thus, the petitioner, And assuming arguendo that the provincial administrator
through Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review before position has indeed become a primarily confidential position,
the CA, seeking to nullify the CSC’s Resolution No. 030008 this reclassification should not apply retroactively to
and Resolution No. 061988. Gonzales’ appointment on a permanent capacity prior to RA
7160’s effectivity.
The Appellate Court’s Ruling

Issues
The CA supported the CSC’s ruling that reinstated Gonzales
as provincial administrator or to an equivalent position. 14 The parties’ arguments, properly joined, present to us the
following issues:
1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial
Citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission,15 the CA administrator position from a career service to a
emphasized that an appointee acquires a legal right to his primarily confidential, non-career service position;
position once he assumes a position in the civil service under and
a completed appointment. This legal right is protected both
by statute and the Constitution, and he cannot be removed 2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over
from office without cause and previous notice and hearing. her position as provincial administrator of the
Appointees cannot be removed at the mere will of those Province of Camarines Norte.
vested with the power of removal, or without any cause.
The Court’s Ruling

The CA then enumerated the list of valid causes for a public
officer’s removal under Section 46, 16 Book V, Title I, Subtitle
A of the Revised Administrative Code (Administrative Code), We find the petition meritorious.
and noted that lack of confidence was not in the list. Thus,
the CA concluded that Gonzales’ dismissal on the ground of
loss of confidence violated her security of tenure, and that Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator
she has the right to be reinstated with payment of position as a primarily confidential, non-career position
backwages.
We support the CSC’s conclusion that the provincial
The CA further held that Gonzales’ dismissal was illegal administrator position has been classified into a primarily
because it was done without due process. The proceedings confidential, non-career position when Congress, through RA
under Administrative Case No. 001 cannot be the basis for 7160, made substantial changes to it. First, prior to RA 7160,
complying with the requirements of due process because Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the old Local Government Code
they are separate and distinct from the proceedings in the (LGC), did not include a provincial administrator position
present controversy. Thus, Gonzales was illegally terminated among the listing of mandatory provincial officials, 24 but
when she was dismissed for lack of confidence, without any empowered the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to create such
hearing, the day after she was reinstated. other offices as might then be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the provincial government. 25 RA 7160 made the
position mandatory for every province. 26 Thus, the creation
Lastly, the CA noted that Resolution No. 002245, which of the provincial administrator position under the old LGC
modified Governor Pimentel’s decision, has long been final used to be a prerogative of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
and executory. The petitioner did not file any petition for
Second, in introducing the mandatory provincial xxxx
administrator position, RA 7160 also amended the
(4) Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor
qualifications for the provincial administrator position. While
and mayor, as the case may be, on all other matters relative
Section 48027 of RA 7160 retained the requirement of civil
to the management and administration of the local
service eligibility for a provincial administrator, together with
government unit. [emphases and italics ours]
the educational requirements, it shortened the six-year work
experience requirement to five years. 28 It also mandated the
additional requirements of residence in the local government As the CSC correctly noted in Resolution No. 0001158, 29 the
concerned, and imposed a good moral character administrator position demands a close intimate relationship
requirement. with the office of the governor (its appointing authority) to
effectively develop, implement and administer the different
programs of the province. The administrator’s functions are
Third, RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position
to recommend to the Sanggunian and to advise the governor
coterminous with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as
on all matters regarding the management and administration
a non-career service position that is primarily confidential.
of the province, thus requiring that its occupant enjoy the
governor’s full trust and confidence.
Before RA 7160 took effect, Laurel classified the provincial
administrator position as an open career position which
To emphasize the close relations that the provincial
required qualification in an appropriate examination prior to
administrators’ functions have with the office of the
appointment. Laurel placed the provincial administrator
governor, RA 7160 even made the provincial administrator
position under the second major level of positions in the
position coterminous with its appointing authority. 30 This
career service under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No.
provision, along with the interrelations between the
807. This provision reads:
provincial administrator and governor under Section 480,
renders clear the intent of Congress to make the provincial
administrator position primarily confidential under the non-
Section 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service.
career service category of the civil service.
(a) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to
which requires examinations shall be grouped into three
major levels as follows: Congress’ reclassification of the provincial administrator
position in RA 7160 is a valid exercise of legislative power
xxxx
that does not violate Gonzales’ security of tenure
2. The second level shall include professional, technical, and
scientific positions which involve professional, technical, or
scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity Having established that Congress has changed the nature of
requiring at least four years of college work up to Division the provincial administrator position to a primarily
Chief level. confidential employee, the next question to address would
be its impact on Gonzales’ security of tenure. According to
the petitioner, Gonzales lost her security of tenure when the
Section 480 of RA 7160 made the provincial administrator’s provincial administrator position became a primarily
functions closely related to the prevailing provincial confidential position. Gonzales, on the other hand, retorted
administration by identifying the incumbent with the that the conversion of the position should not be
provincial governor to ensure the alignment of the retroactively applied to her, as she is a permanent
governor’s direction for the province with what the provincial appointee. Both the CA and the CSC ruled in favor of the
administrator would implement. In contrast with the general latter, and gave premium to Gonzales’ original permanent
direction provided by the provincial governor under the appointment under the old LGC. They posit that Gonzales
Manual of Position Descriptions cited in Laurel, Section acquired a vested legal right over her position from the
480(b) of RA 7160 now mandates constant interaction moment she assumed her duties as provincial administrator.
between the provincial administrator and the provincial Thus, she cannot be removed from office except for cause
governor, to wit: and after due hearing; otherwise such removal would
amount to a violation of her security of tenure.
(b) The administrator shall take charge of the office of the

administrator and shall: The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by
(1) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval the CA reflect a conceptual entanglement between the
thereof by the governor or mayor, as the case may nature of the position and an employee’s right to hold a
be, implement the same particularly those which position. These two concepts are different. The nature of a
have to do with the management and position may change by law according to the dictates of
administration-related programs and projects which Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is
the governor or mayor is empowered to implement a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee,
and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide but may itself change according to the nature of the
for under this Code; position.
(2) In addition to the foregoing duties and

functions, the administrator shall: Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce
(i) Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of substantial changes in the provincial administrator position
the local government unit, under the supervision, direction, and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career
and control of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, service position. Flowing from the legislative power to create
he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of public offices is the power to abolish and modify them to
the local government unit; meet the demands of society;31 Congress can change the
qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory permanent appointment of a public officer, despite
offices. When done in good faith, these acts would not subsequent changes in the nature of his position.
violate a public officer’s security of tenure, even if they result
in his removal from office or the shortening of his
term.32 Modifications in public office, such as changes in Citing Gabriel v. Domingo,36 the dissenting opinion quotes
qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good our categorical declaration that "a permanent employee
faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the remains a permanent employee unless he is validly
incumbent.33 terminated," and from there attempts to draw an analogy
between Gabriel and the case at hand.
In Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon, 34 for instance,

Congress enacted a law modifying the offices in the Board of The very first sentence of Gabriel spells out its vast
Dental Examiners. The new law, RA 546, raised the difference from the present case. The sole and main issue in
qualifications for the board members, and provided for a Gabriel is whether backwages and other monetary benefits
different appointment process. Dr. Alfonso C. Salcedo and could be awarded to an illegally dismissed government
Dr. Pascual Ignacio, who were incumbent board members at employee, who was later ordered reinstated. From this
the time RA 546 took effect, filed a special civil action for sentence alone can be discerned that the issues involved
quo warranto against their replacements, arguing that their related to the consequences of illegal dismissal rather than
term of office under the old law had not yet expired, and to the dismissal itself. Nowhere in Gabrielwas there any
neither had they abandoned or been removed from office for mention of a change in the nature of the position held by the
cause. We dismissed their petition, and held that Congress public officer involved.
may, by law, terminate the term of a public office at any
time and even while it is occupied by the incumbent. Thus,
whether Dr. Salcedo and Dr. Ignacio were removed for Further, key factual differences make Gabriel inapplicable to
cause or had abandoned their office is immaterial. the present case, even if only by analogy: first, the public
officer in Gabriel received a Memorandum stating that he
would be appointed as Transportation District Supervisor III
More recently, in Dimayuga v. Benedicto II, 35 we upheld the under their office reorganization. Second, the Court in
removal of Chona M. Dimayuga, a permanent appointee to Gabriel clearly pointed out that the reason for his eventual
the Executive Director II position, which was not part of the appointment as a casual employee, which led to his
career executive service at the time of her appointment. termination from service, was due to a pending protest he
During her incumbency, the CSC, by authority granted under filed before the CSC – indicating that there was no ground
Presidential Decree No. 1, classified the Executive Director II for him to not receive the appointment earlier promised. In
position to be within the career executive service. Since contrast, the issue of Gonzales is whether the appointing
Dimayuga was not a career executive service officer, her authority’s lack of trust and confidence in the appointee was
initially permanent appointment to the position became sufficient cause for the termination of employment of a
temporary; thus, she could be removed from office at any primarily confidential employee. And third, there was a
time. change in the position held by the public officer in Gabriel.
He was a permanent employee who was extended a
different appointment, which was casual in nature, because
In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not of a protest that he earlier filed. In contrast, the current case
abolish the provincial administrator position but significantly involves a public officer who held the same position whose
modified many of its aspects. It is now a primarily nature changed because of the passage of RA 7160.
confidential position under the non-career service tranche of
the civil service. This change could not have been aimed at
prejudicing Gonzales, as she was not the only provincial The dissent also quotes the penultimate paragraph of Civil
administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted. Service Commission v. Javier37 to support its contention that
Rather, this change was part of the reform measures that RA permanent appointees could expect protection for their
7160 introduced to further empower local governments and tenure and appointments in the event that the Court
decentralize the delivery of public service. Section 3(b) of RA determines that the position is actually confidential in
7160 provides as one of its operative principles that: nature:
(b) There shall be established in every local government unit The Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on
an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational the tenure of other corporate secretaries in various GOCCs.
structure and operating mechanism that will meet the The officers likely assumed their positions on permanent
priority needs and service requirements of its communities. career status, expecting protection for their tenure and
appointments, but are now re-classified as primarily
confidential appointees. Such concern is unfounded,
Thus, Gonzales’ permanent appointment as provincial however, since the statutes themselves do not classify the
administrator prior to the enactment of RA 7160 is position of corporate secretary as permanent and career in
immaterial to her removal as provincial administrator. For nature. Moreover, there is no absolute guarantee that it will
purposes of determining whether Gonzales’ termination not be classified as confidential when a dispute arises. As
violated her right to security of tenure, the nature of the earlier stated, the Court, by legal tradition, has the power to
position she occupied at the time of her removal should be make a final determination as to which positions in
considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment at government are primarily confidential or otherwise. In the
the time she entered government service. light of the instant controversy, the Court's view is that the
greater public interest is served if the position of a corporate
secretary is classified as primarily confidential in nature. 38
In echoing the CSC and the CA’s conclusion, the dissenting
opinion posits the view that security of tenure protects the
The quoted portion, however, even bolsters our theory. Read A reading of EO 503’s whereas clauses confirms that it
together with its succeeding paragraph, the quoted portion applies only to national government employees whose
in Civil Service Commission v. Javier 39 actually stands for the functions are to be devolved to local governments:
proposition that other corporate secretaries in government-
owned and –controlled corporations cannot expect
protection for their tenure and appointments upon the WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
reclassification of their position to a primarily confidential Local Government Code of 1991, hereinafter referred to as
position. There, the Court emphasized that these officers the Code, transfers the responsibility for the delivery of basic
cannot rely on the statutes providing for their permanent services and facilities from the national government agencies
appointments, if and when the Court determines these to be (NGAs) concerned to the local government units (LGUs);
primarily confidential. In the succeeding paragraph after the
portion quoted by the dissent, we even pointed out that
there is no vested right to public office, nor is public service WHEREAS, the Code stipulated that the transfer of basic
a property right. Thus: services and facilities shall be accompanied by the transfer of
the national personnel concerned and assets to ensure
continuity in the delivery of such services and facilities;
Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the country's constitutional
system that "public office is a public trust," and that there is
no vested right in public office, nor an absolute right to hold WHEREAS, responsive rules and regulations are needed to
office. No proprietary title attaches to a public office, as affect the required transfer of national personnel concerned
public service is not a property right. Excepting constitutional and assets to the LGUs. [underscores, italics and emphases
offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary ours]
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in
an office. The rule is that offices in government, except
those created by the constitution, may be abolished, altered, Thus, paragraph 8, section 2(a) of EO 503 cannot apply to
or created anytime by statute. And any issues on the Gonzales, a provincial administrator. As explained earlier, the
classification for a position in government may be brought to existence of the provincial administrator position was a
and determined by the courts.40(emphases and italics ours) prerogative of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, and was not
even a mandatory public office under the old LGC. It is
clearly not a national government position whose functions
Executive Order No. 503 does not grant Gonzales security of are to be devolved to the local governments.
tenure in the provincial administrator position on a
permanent capacity
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, argues that EO
503 does not apply to national government employees only.
In extending security of tenure to Gonzales’ permanent According to the dissent, the phrase "and for related
appointment as provincial administrator, the dissenting purposes" in EO 503’s title could encompass personnel not
opinion cites as authority Executive Order No. (EO) 503 necessarily employed by national government agencies but
which provided certain safeguards against the termination of by local government units such as the administrator, the
government employees affected by the implementation of legal officer and the information officer, as enumerated in
RA 7160. According to the dissenting opinion, EO 503 is an Section 2(a), paragraph 8 thereof. This provision, according
obvious indication of the executive department’s intent to to the dissent, fills the crucial gap left by RA 7160 which did
protect and uphold both the national government and the not provide whether the term of an incumbent provincial
local government employees’ security of tenure. It cites administrator would automatically become coterminous with
Section 2(a), paragraph 8 (providing for the tenure of an that of the appointing authority upon RA 7160’s effectivity.
administrator) to prove its point:
This kind of construction effectively adds to EO 503’s object

8. Incumbents of positions, namely administrator, legal matters that it did not explicitly provide for. The phrase "and
officer, and information officer declared by the Code as for other related purposes" can only add to EO 503 matters
coterminous, who hold permanent appointments, shall related to the devolution of personnel, basic services and
continue to enjoy their permanent status until they vacate facilities to local government units. The impact of the change
their positions. in a local government position’s nature is clearly different
from the implementation of devolution and its ancillary
effects: the former involves a change in a local government
At first glance, EO 503 does seem to extend the provincial position’s functions and concept of tenure, while the latter
administrators’ security of tenure in their permanent involves (among other things) the transfer of national
appointments even beyond the effectivity of RA 7160. EO government employees to local government units. This
503, however, does not apply to employees of the local difference is highlighted by the fact that EO 503, as reflected
government affected by RA 7160’s enactment. The title of by its whereas clauses, was issued to implement Section 17
EO 503 clearly provides for its scope of application, to wit: of RA 7160. In contrast, the change in the nature of the
provincial administrator position may be gleaned from
Section 480 of RA 7160. Hence, by no stretch of reasonable
Executive Order No. 503. Providing for the Rules and construction can the phrase "and for other related purposes"
Regulations Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and in EO 503’s title be understood to encompass the
Assets, Liabilities and Records of National Government consequences of the change in the local government
Agencies whose Functions are to be Devolved to the Local position’s nature.
Government Units and for other Related Purposes.
[underscore, italics and emphases ours]
Furthermore, construing that the administrator position in
Section 2(a), paragraph 8 pertains to city, municipal and/or
provincial administrators would result in a legal infirmity. EO Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public
503 was issued pursuant to the President’s ordinance powers officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed
to provide for rules that are general or permanent in except for cause, as provided by law and after due process.
character for the purpose of implementing the President’s It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office
constitutional or statutory powers. 41 Exercising her despite a change in the nature of the office held. In other
constitutional duty to ensure that all laws are faithfully words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled
executed, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 503 to that the petitioner violated Gonzales’ right to security of
ensure the executive’s compliance with paragraph (i), tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause
Section 17 of RA 7160, which requires local government from her position, but the situation had since then been
units to absorb the personnel of national agencies whose changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but
functions shall be devolved to them. 42 This is reflected in EO her services were subsequently terminated under the law
503’s title and whereas clauses, and its limited application as prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e.,
discussed earlier. she was then already occupying a position that was primarily
confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer
enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing authority.
Thus, the dissenting opinion’s interpretation would result in Thus, Gonzales’ termination for lack of confidence was
the judicial recognition of an act of the Executive usurping a lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial
legislative power. The grant of permanent status to administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable
incumbent provincial administrators, despite the clear position. This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to
language and intent of RA 7160 to make the position Gonzales’ entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits,
coterminous, is an act outside the President’s legitimate and future employment in government service.
powers. The power to create, abolish and modify public
offices is lodged with Congress. 43 The President cannot,
through an Executive Order, grant permanent status to WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the
incumbents, when Congress by law has declared that the petition, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated
positions they occupy are now confidential. Such act would June 25, 2008 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2008
amount to the President’s amendment of an act of Congress of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 97425.
– an act that the Constitution prohibits. Allowing this kind of
interpretation violates the separation of powers, a
constitutionally enshrined principle that the Court has the SO ORDERED.
duty to uphold.44
The dissent counters this argument by pointing out that

Section 2(a), paragraph 8 of EO 503 enjoys the legal
presumption of validity. Unless the law or rule is annulled in
a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity
stands. The EO’s validity, however, is not in question in the
present case. What is at issue is a proper interpretation of its
application giving due respect to the principle of separation
of powers, and the dissenting opinion’s interpretation does
violence to this principle.
Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily

confidential employee
To be sure, both career and non-career service employees

have a right to security of tenure.1âwphi1 All permanent
officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of
whether they belong to the career or non-career service
category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be
removed from office except for cause provided by law and
after procedural due process. 45 The concept of security of
tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily
confidential employees due to the basic concept of a
"primarily confidential" position. Serving at the confidence of
the appointing authority, the primarily confidential
employee’s term of office expires when the appointing
authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens,
the confidential employee is not "removed" or "dismissed"
from office; his term merely "expires" 46 and the loss of trust
and confidence is the "just cause" provided by law that
results in the termination of employment. In the present
case where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably
eroded, we cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s exercise of
discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust
his confidence in Gonzales.

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G.R. No.

88831 November 8, 1990 Local Government Code, there is no legal

Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification

Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial

The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008, 11 which

The Appellate Court’s Ruling

The Court’s Ruling

(b) The administrator shall take charge of the office of the

(2) In addition to the foregoing duties and

In Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon, 34 for instance,

This kind of construction effectively adds to EO 503’s object

The dissent counters this argument by pointing out that

Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily

To be sure, both career and non-career service employees

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