FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-1787. August 27, 1948.]

Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ , petitioner-appellee, vs .

AGUSTIN LIBORO , oppositor-appellant.

Tirona, Gutierrez & Adorable for appellant.

Ramon Diokno for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; PAGING; PURPOSE; OMISSION OF PAGE NUMBER SUPPLIED BY

OTHER MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION. — The purpose of the law in prescribing the
paging of wills is to guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the
substitution or of detecting the loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil.,
476.) The omission to put a page number on a sheet, if that be necessary, may be
supplied by other forms of identi cation more trustworthy than the conventional
numeral words or characters.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES, CREDIBILITY OF; CONTRADICTIONS ON
INCIDENTS. — contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set
out in the appellant's brief are incidents, not all of which every one of the witnesses can
be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.
Far from being an evidence of falsehood, the contradictions constitute an evidence of
good faith.
3. ID.; SIGNATURE BY MARK. — A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is
satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSION OF FURTHER EVIDENCE AFTER PARTY HAS
RESTED; DISCRETION OF COURT. — It is within the discretion of the court whether or
not to admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this
discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused.
5. ID.; ID.; ADMISSION OF FURTHER EVIDENCE AFTER MOTION FOR
NONSUIT OF DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; DISCRETION OF COURT. — It is within the
sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for
the further introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a nonsuit, or a
demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened after the court has announced
its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has
denied the same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been written,
or entered upon the minutes or signed.
6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE ALLOWABLE AFTER DIRECT PROOFS. — After the
parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only, but the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit
them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong & Co. vs. Ylagan, 43
Phil., 393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So, generally, additional evidence is allowed
when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered.
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 7. ID.; LANGUAGE; KNOWLEDGE OF TESTATOR NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED
IN WILL; PROOF "ALIUNDE." — There is no statutory requirement that the testator's
understanding of the language used in the will be expressed therein. It is a matter that
may be established by proof aliunde.

DECISION

TUASON , J : p

In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully

the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto
Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six
months after the document in question was executed. In the court below, the present
appellant speci ed ve grounds for his opposition, to wit: (1) that the deceased never
executed the alleged will; (2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3)
that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as
mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not
executed and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental
witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of
fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and in uence on the part of the
bene ciaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and
the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud or trick.
In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in these
words: "That the court a quo erred in holding that the document Exhibit "A" was
executed in all particulars as required by law." To this objection is added the alleged
error of the court "in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that Exhibit "A" was
written in a language known to the decedent after petitioner rested his case and over
the vigorous objection of the oppositor."
The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of
a separate sheet. The rst sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals.
This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against
fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of detecting the loss of any
of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.) In the present case, the omission to
put a page number on the rst sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of
identi cation more trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or characters. The
unnumbered page is clearly identi ed as the rst page by the internal sense of its
contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning
and coherence, the rst and second lines on the second page are undeniably a
continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which
starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page
contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that
the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the logical
order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the maker's property.
Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause,
the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by
any possibility be taken for other than page one. Abangan vs. Abangan, supra, and
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 Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are decisive of this issue.
Although not falling within the purview and scope of the rst assignment of error,
the matter of the credibility of the witnesses is assailed under this heading. On the
merits we do not believe that the appellant's contention deserves serious
consideration. Such contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as
are set out in the appellant's brief are incidents not all of which every one of the
witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which
they occurred.
"Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the eld of
experimental psychology show that the contradictions of witnesses generally
occur in the details of a certain incident, after a long series of questionings, and
far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good
faith. Inasmuch as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like
manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions they should not agree in
the minor details; hence, the contradictions in their testimony." (People vs. Limbo,
49 Phil., 99.)
The testator a xed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his
name. The reason for this was that the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis."
While another in testator's place might have directed someone else to sign for him, as
appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing curious or suspicious in the
fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It
was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be
"signed" is satis ed if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs.
Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)
With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the opinion
that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant to offer
evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in which the will
is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had moved for
dismissal of the petition on the ground of insu ciency of evidence. It is within the
discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party offering
the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has
clearly been abused. (64 C. J., 160.) More, it is within the sound discretion of the court
whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of
evidence after a motion or request for a nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the
case may be reopened after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the
request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the same, or after the
motion has been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon the minutes
or signed. (64 C. J., 164.)
In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced
their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it
has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit
them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong & Co. vs. Ylagan, 43
Phil., 393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So, generally, additional evidence is allowed
when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered.
(I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., 545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The
omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been
deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight.
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 Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the will
for its silence on the testator's understanding of the language used in the testament.
There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will
itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly
ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will written in
Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact,
there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that the testator
resided in a Tagalog region, from which the court said "a presumption arises that said
Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect."
The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament
of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed, with costs.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

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