Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents Leovillo C Agustin Law Offices Nelson A Loyola
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents Leovillo C Agustin Law Offices Nelson A Loyola
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents Leovillo C Agustin Law Offices Nelson A Loyola
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
which ruling has long acquired nality. It is clear, therefore, that the appellate court had
already settled the propriety of awarding repossession expenses in favor of private
respondent. The remand of the case to RTC Branch 40 was for the sole purpose of
threshing out the correct amount of expenses and not for relitigating the accuracy of
the award. Thus, the ndings of RTC Branch 40, as a rmed by the appellate court in
CA-G.R. No. 24684, were con ned to the appreciation of evidence relative to the
repossession expenses for the query or issue passed upon by the respondent court in
CA-G.R. No. 56718-R (propriety of the award for repossession expenses) has become
the "law of the case". This principle is de ned as "a term applied to an established rule
that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the cause to the lower
court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case
upon subsequent appeal." 16 Having exactly the same parties and issues, the decision in
the former appeal (CA-G.R. No. 56718-R) is now the established and controlling rule.
Petitioner may not therefore be allowed in a subsequent appeal (CA-G.R. No. 24684)
and in this petition to resuscitate and revive formerly settled issues. Judgment of
courts should attain nality at some point in time, as in this case, otherwise, there will
be no end to litigation.
At any rate, even if we were to brush aside the "law of the case" doctrine we nd the
award for repossession expenses still proper. In Filipinas Investment & Finance
Corporation v. Ridad, 17 the Court recognized an exception to the rule stated under Article
1484(3) upon which petitioner relies. Thus:
". . . Where the mortgagor plainly refuses to deliver the chattel subject of
the mortgage upon his failure to pay two or more installments, or if he conceals
the chattel to place it beyond the reach of the mortgagee, what then is the
mortgagee expected to do? . . . It logically follows as a matter of common sense,
that the necessary expenses incurred in the prosecution by the mortgagee of the
action for replevin so that he can regain possession of the chattel, should be
borne by the mortgagor. Recoverable expenses would, in our view, include
expenses properly incurred in effecting seizure of the chattel and reasonable
attorney's fees in prosecuting the action for replevin." 1 8
Anent the denial of the award for attorney's fees, we nd the same in order. The trial
court, as well as respondent court, found no evidence to support the claim for attorney's
fees which factual nding is binding on us. 1 9 We nd no compelling reason, and none was
presented, to set aside this ruling.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. prcd
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
9. Decision promulgated on May 31, 1976, penned by Justice Ramon C. Fernandez with
Justices Ricardo Puno and Del n Batacan, concurring; (RTC Records, Vol. I, pp. 214-
224).
10. Supra 1 at 8; Rollo, p. 58.
11. Supra 1 at 55.
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments;
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been constituted, should the
vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments. In this case, he shall have no
further action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price. Any
agreement to the contrary shall be void.
16. Trinidad v . Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 PHIL 881,913, citing Ballentine Law
Dictionary; Rodriguez v. COMELEC and Marquez, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996.