PALAGANAS VS.

PEOPLE

Facts: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house but later
decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing.

Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas (nephew) and Virgilio Bautista. When
Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him. Jaime Palaganas got irritated and insulted. He felt
that he was being mocked by Melton Ferrer, that caused him to went to the Ferrer’s table and uttered statements
which began the fight.

Ferdinand sought help to Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the Bar and upon seeing the Ferrer’s outside,
Ferdinand pointing at the Ferrer’s instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton
and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm.

As a result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder.

Issue: Whether or not the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance which should be
appreciated by the court at the case at bar?

Held: Yes. It has been held by the Supreme Court from the precedents before the case that the use of
unlicensed firearm is now considered as a special aggravating circumstance.

The Court states that:

“Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided
for under Presidential Decree No. 1866, 63 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, 64 which is a special law. Its
pertinent provision states:”

“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”

Therefore, the decision was affirmed with certain modifications appreciating the special aggravating
circumstance in the case at bar.

FORTUNA VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Diosdada and her brother Mario Montecillo was waiting for a ride home when suddenly a mobile patrol
stopped in front of them. The policeman seated in the front right seated alighted and without a word frisked
Mario. He took Mario’s belt and pointed to the supposed blunt object and uttered “evidence”. He then
mentioned to Mario to board the car. Mario being terrified obeyed and seated himself at the back with another
policeman. Diosdada instinctively followed suit and sat beside Mario.

The driver asked Mario why he was carrying a “deadly weapon”. Mario answered that its for self-defense. They
frightened Mario that for carrying a deadly weapon he will be brought to Bicutan police station where he would
be interrogated by the police, mauled by prisoners and heckled by the press. The policeman told the
Montecillo’s that the bailband for carrying a deadly weapon would be Php 12,000.00. At this point the driver
asked them how much money they had.

Diosdada was then made to alight the car. The driver followed her and forced her to take out her wallet. He
counted her money which amounts to Php 5,000.00. He took the Php 1,500 and instructed Diosdada to tell his
companions that she only had Php 3,500.00.

Once in the car the policeman directed her to put her money in the console box. The car then proceed to
Harrison Plaza and unload Diosdada and her brother Mario.

The following day Diosdada recounted her harrowing story to her employer who accompanied her to the office of
the then General Diokno where they lodged their complaint. General Diokno directed one of his policemen to
look for the erring policemen. A line up of policemen was assembled and Diosdada recognized them.

They were found guilty of having conspired to commit a crime by the trial court and it was affirmed by the
appellate court.

However, Fortuna contends that the trial and appellate court erred in their decision that he took part in the
conspiracy. He argued that the evidenced presented by the prosecution did not support the theory of conspiracy
against him.
The supreme court, however, was convinced that the trial court and the appellate court did not erred in holding
the accused appellant Fortuna guilty for conspiring with the other policemen.

“As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert by all means the commission of an offense.  As such, he should
not have kept his silence but, instead, should have protected the Montecillos from his mulcting colleagues.  This
accused-appellant failed to do.  His silence then could  only be viewed as a form of moral support which he
zealously lent to his co-conspirators.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance under Article 14 paragraph 1 or the “abuse of public
position” should be appreciated in the case at bar?

HELD: Yes. The mere fact that the three accused were police officers at the time of the robbery placed them in
the position to perpetrate the offense. If they were not police officers the Montecillo’s would not have been
terrified on boarding the patrol car and hand them their money. Precisely on account of their authority that the
Montecillo’s believed that Mario committed a crime and would be brought to the police station for investigation
unless they gave them money.

Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision with modifications appreciating the aggravating
circumstance on the case at bar.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 135784               December 15, 2000

RICARDO FORTUNA Y GRAGASIN, petitioner,

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Perhaps no other profession in the country has gone through incessant maligning by the public in general than
its own police force. Much has been heard about the notoriety of this profession for excessive use and illegal
discharge of power. The present case is yet another excuse for such vilification.

On 21 July 1992 at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while Diosdada Montecillo and her brother Mario
Montecillo were standing at the corner of Mabini and Harrison Streets waiting for a ride home, a mobile patrol
car of the Western Police District with three (3) policemen on board stopped in front of them. The policeman
seated on the right at the front seat alighted and without a word frisked Mario. He took Mario’s belt, pointed to a
supposedly blunt object in its buckle and uttered the word "evidence." Then he motioned to Mario to board the
1 

car. The terrified Mario obeyed and seated himself at the back together with another policeman. Diosdada
instinctively followed suit and sat beside Mario.

They cruised towards Roxas Boulevard. The driver then asked Mario why he was carrying a "deadly weapon," to
which Mario answered, "for self-defense since he was a polio victim." The driver and another policeman who
2 

were both seated in front grilled Mario. They frightened him by telling him that for carrying a deadly weapon
outside his residence he would be brought to the Bicutan police station where he would be interrogated by the
police, mauled by other prisoners and heckled by the press. As they approached Ospital ng Maynila, the mobile
car pulled over and the two (2) policemen in front told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying a "deadly
weapon" was ₱12,000.00. At this point, the driver asked how much money they had. Without answering, Mario
gave his ₱1,000.00 to Diosdada who placed the money inside her wallet.

Diosdada was then made to alight from the car. She was followed by the driver and was told to go behind the
vehicle. There, the driver forced her to take out her wallet and rummaged through its contents. He counted her
money. She had ₱5,000.00 in her wallet. The driver took ₱1,500.00 and left her ₱3,500.00. He instructed her to
tell his companions that all she had was ₱3,500.00. While going back to the car the driver demanded from her
any piece of jewelry that could be pawned. Ruefully, she removed her wristwatch and offered it to him. The
driver declined saying, "Never mind," and proceeded to board the car. Diosdada, still fearing for the safety of her
3 

brother, followed and sat beside him in the car.

Once in the car, Diosdada was directed by the policeman at the front passenger seat to place all her money on
the console box near the gearshift. The car then proceeded to Harrison Plaza where the Montecillos were told to
disembark. From there, their dreadful experience over, they went home to Imus, Cavite.

The following day Diosdada recounted her harrowing story to her employer Manuel Felix who readily
accompanied her and her brother Mario to the office of General Diokno where they lodged their complaint. Gen.
Diokno directed one of his men, a certain Lt. Ronas, to assist the complainants in looking for the erring
policemen. They boarded the police patrol car and scoured the Mabini area for the culprits. They did not find
them.
When they returned to the police station, a line-up of policemen was immediately assembled. Diosdada readily
recognized one of them as the policeman who was seated beside them in the back of the car. She trembled at
the sight of him. She then rushed to Lt. Ronas and told him that she saw the policeman who sat beside them in
the car. He was identified by Lt. Ronas as PO2 Ricardo Fortuna. A few minutes later, Gen. Diokno summoned
the complainants. As they approached the General, they at once saw PO2 Eduardo Garcia whom they
recognized as the policeman who frisked Mario. The following day, they met the last of their tormentors, the
driver of the mobile car who played heavily on their nerves - PO3 Ramon Pablo.

The three (3) policemen were accordingly charged with robbery. After trial, they were found guilty of having
conspired in committing the crime with intimidation of persons. They were each sentenced to a prison term of six
(6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor, to restitute in favor of private complainants
Diosdada Montecillo and Mario Montecillo the sum of ₱5,000.00, and to indemnify them in the amount of
₱20,000.00 for moral damages and ₱15,000.00 for attorney’s fees. 4

The accused separately appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 March 1997 the appellate court affirmed the
lower court's verdict. Accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
5 

Hence, this petition by Fortuna alone under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He contends that the appellate court
erred in holding that private complainants gave the money to the accused under duress, the same being
negated by the prosecution’s evidence, and in affirming the decision of the court below. He argued that the
evidence presented by the prosecution did not support the theory of conspiracy as against him. 6

The issues raised by accused-appellant, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, are purely factual. We
have consistently stressed that in a petition for review on certiorari this Court does not sit as an arbiter of facts.
As such, it is not our function to re-examine every appreciation of facts made by the trial and appellate courts
unless the evidence on record does not support their findings or the judgment is based on a misappreciation of
facts. The ascertainment of what actually happened in a controverted situation is the function of the lower courts.
7 

If we are to re-examine every factual finding made by them, we would not only be prolonging the judicial process
but would also be imposing upon the heavily clogged dockets of this Court.

We do not see any infirmity in the present case justifying a departure from this well-settled rule. On the contrary,
we are convinced that the trial and appellate courts did not err in holding that accused-appellant Fortuna
conspired with the accused Pablo and Garcia in intimidating private complainants to give them their money.

We are convinced that there was indeed sufficient intimidation applied on the offended parties as the acts
performed by the three (3) accused, coupled with the circumstances under which they were executed,
engendered fear in the minds of their victims and hindered the free exercise of their will. The three (3) accused
succeeded in coercing them to choose between two (2) alternatives, to wit: to part with their money or suffer the
burden and humiliation of being taken to the police station.

To our mind, the success of the accused in taking their victims' money was premised on threats of prosecution
and arrest. This intense infusion of fear was intimidation, plain and simple.

Accused-appellant further argues that assuming arguendo that the element of intimidation did exist, the lower
court erred in holding that he conspired with his companions in perpetrating the offense charged.

This indeed is easy to assert, for conspiracy is something which exists only in the minds of the conspirators,
which can easily be denied. However, conspiracy may be detected and deduced from the circumstances of the
case which when pieced together will indubitably indicate that they form part of a common design to commit a
felony; and, to establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof evincing that all of the
conspirators took a direct part in every act, it being sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.8

In the present case, accused-appellant would want to impress upon this Court that his silence inside the car
during Mario’s interrogation confirmed his claim that he did not participate in the offense.

We do not agree. As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert by all means the commission of an offense. As
such, he should not have kept his silence but, instead, should have protected the Montecillos from his mulcting
colleagues. This accused-appellant failed to do. His silence then could only be viewed as a form of moral
support which he zealously lent to his co-conspirators. 1âwphi1
In one case, we ruled that in conspiracy all those who in one way or another helped and cooperated in the
consummation of a felony were co-conspirators. Hence, all of the three (3) accused in the present case should
9 

be held guilty of robbery with intimidation against persons.

We however observe that the courts below failed to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of "abuse of public
position." The mere fact that the three (3) accused were all police officers at the time of the robbery placed them
10 

in a position to perpetrate the offense. If they were not police officers they could not have terrified the Montecillos
into boarding the mobile patrol car and forced them to hand over their money. Precisely it was on account of
their authority that the Montecillos believed that Mario had in fact committed a crime and would be brought to the
police station for investigation unless they gave them what they demanded.

Accordingly, the penalty imposed should be modified. Under Art. 294, par. (5), of The Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for simple robbery is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. In
view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum
period while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto
11 

mayor maximum to prision correccional medium in any of its periods the range of which is four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the trial court finding accused-
appellant Ricardo Fortuna guilty of robbery and ordering him to pay complaining witnesses Diosdada Montecillo
and Mario Montecillo ₱5,000.00 representing the money taken from them, ₱20,000.00 for moral damages and
₱15,000.00 for attorney's fees, is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna is
SENTENCED to the indeterminate prison term of two (2) years four (4) months and twenty (20) days of the
medium period of arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years two
(2) months and ten (10) days of the maximum period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium,
as maximum.

Costs against accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur