G. R. No. 33264, March 31, 1931: Supreme Court of The Philippines

Supreme Court of the Philippines
55 Phil. 877
G. R. No. 33264, March 31, 1931

CARMEN VILLAFRANCA ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS.
PAULINA CRISTOBAL ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
DECISION
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted on May 28, 1928, by Carmen Villafranca and her
two daughters Soledad and Felicidad, of the surname of Gomez, for the
purpose of recovering from the defendants Paulina, Luis, Josefa, and
Paciencia, of the surname Gomez y Cristobal, eight parcels of land located in
the sitio of Jabay, municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, together with
the sum of P4,000, the value of two warehouses alleged to be the property
of the plaintiffs usurped by the defendants, and the further sum of P20,000,
alleged to be due to the plaintiffs as compensation earned by Marcelino
Gomez while administering in trust certain properties belonging to the
defendants. Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendants
from the demands for money but gave judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for
the eight parcels of land, declaring them to be owners of the same and, as
such, entitled to possession. From this judgment the plaintiffs appealed,
alleging error in the decision in so far as it refused to grant to the plaintiffs
compensation for the two warehouses mentioned in the second cause of
action, and the compensation for services rendered in the amount of
P20,000, as claimed in the third cause of action; while the defendants
appealed from the decision with respect to the award to the plaintiffs of the
eight parcels of land.
This case is an aftermath of the litigation which was decided in this court
in the case of Cristobal vs. Gomez (50 Phil., 810), in which litigation the
position of the adverse litigants was different from the position occupied by
them in the present litigation, those who were plaintiffs in that case being
defendants here and those who were then defendants (after the death of
Marcelino Gomez) being now plaintiffs. An intelligent understanding of the
situation now before us presupposes, therefore, a knowledge of the issues
involved in that litigation; and the following resume, with certain additional
facts, is necessary to a proper understanding of the present case. The
general situation revealed by reference to the case referred to is that, in 1907,
Marcelino Gomez and his sister, Telesfora Gomez, under took to assist
their brother, Epifanio Gomez, in getting back some property which he had
lost under contract of sate with pacto de retro to Luis R. Yangco. To this
end a kinsman named Bibiano Banas agreed to advance the requisite money,
while Marcelino Gomez and his sister Telesfora agreed to become joint
and several sureties to Bañas for the money advanced by him. In the contract
made thereupon, evidencing the relations and rights of the parties, it was
agreed that Marcelino Gomez should administer the property until the capital
advanced by Banas should be paid off, after which the property should be
returned to Epifanio Gomez. The stipulation upon this point was in the
following words, to wit:
"(i) As soon as the capital employed, with its interest and other incidental
expenses, shall have been covered, said properties shall be returned to our
brother Epifanio Gomez or to his legitimate children, with the direct
intervention, however, of both parties, namely, Don Marcelino Gomez and
Dona Telesfora Gomez, or one of them."
However, after the property had been administered for many years by
Marcelino Gomez, and after he had by transfer taken over the interest held in
trust by his sister Telesfora, Marcelino Gomez began to think of the property
in question as his own, and after the property had been cleared of the
indebtedness, he refused to surrender it to the heirs of Epifanio, who was
then dead. This led to the litigation which was concluded by the decision in
Cristobal vs. Gomez (50 Phil., 810), wherein the heirs of Epifanio Gomez
recovered the property, which was the subject of that litigation. The action
referred to involved two parcels of land, but we are here concerned with
only one of said parcels, the parcel indicated as parcel B in the complaint in
that case. Said parcel was there described an the following words:
"Parcel B.—A land located in the sitio of Jabay, of the municipality of

Bacoor, Cavite. It contains 8 hectares, 69 ares, and 24 centares, a little more
or less. It is bounded on the north by the estero called Mestizo and the lands
of D. Juan Gonzalez; on the east, by the Jabay road and lands of D. Isidoro
Reyes; on the south, by lands of D. Lorenzo Bailon, of D. Ambrosio
Cuevas, of D.a Juana Reyes, of D. Cayetano Adriano, of D. Laureano Peria,
of D. Ponciano Peredo, of D. Pio Peredo, of D.a Matea Peredo, and of
Doroteo Reyes; and on the west, by the estero called Mabolo and by lands of
Matea Gomez and of Da Inocencia Cuenca."
After the action mentioned had been concluded an execution was sued out by
the successful plaintiffs, and the sheriff delivered to them a property
corresponding precisely to the above description in so far as boundaries are
concerned. This property is correctly shown in Exhibit 2 of the herein
defendants, which corresponds very nearly with that shown in Exhibit N of
the plaintiffs. It will be noted that the parcel thus delivered by the sheriff to
the defendants has natural boundaries on three sides, namely, the Mestizo
River on the north, the Jabay Road on the east, and the Mabolo River on the
west. These boundaries are fixed and admit of no error. Moreover, the
present owners of the contiguous parcels, as shown in Exhibit 2, are all
successors in interest of the owners of the contiguous parcels called for in
the description contained in the complaint referred to above. To be specific,
Juan Gonzalez, mentioned as one of the adjoining owners on the north, is
now sue ceeded by his son, Zacarias Gonzalez, in Exhibit 2. Isidoro Reyes,
mentioned in the description in the complaint as an adjoining owner on the
east, has been succeeded by his son, Simeon Reyes, and one Aquilino
Rafael. One of the witnesses for the plaintiffs gives Evarista Ignacio instead
of Aquilino Rafael, but Evarista is the wife of Aquilino, and there is
therefore no inconsistency in the descriptions.
According to the description of parcel B in the complaint, there are a number

of owners whose lands are contiguous with the parcel in question on the
south; and so it appears in Exhibit 2, where the present occupants,
successors in interest to those mentioned in the description in the complaint,
are indicated as adjoining owners. The description in the complaint calls for
Matea Gomez and Inocencia Cuenca as the owners of the contiguous parcels
on the west in the part not bounded by the Mabolo River. The present
owners, as shown in Exhibit 2, are the same Inocencia Cuenca and
Leodegario Sarino, successor to Matea Gomez. There can be no doubt
whatever, therefore, that the Exhibit 2 correctly indicates the boundaries of
the land turned over to the successful plaintiffs in the former case (now
defendants). In addition to this it should be borne in mind that this tract or
parcel of land is now laid out in salt beds according to Chinese fashion, the
boundaries of which are naturally well denned on the ground, easy also of
transference to paper by any competent person drawing a sketch of the
property.
The trouble in this case has arisen over the fact that the description
contained in the complaint in the former action describes this property as
having an area of 8 hectares, 69 ares, and 24 centares, when, as a matter of
fact, the area shown in Exhibit 2 is 14 hectares, 80 ares, and 95 centares, and
the present action was brought by the present plaintiffs for the purpose of
recovering a parcel having an area representing the excess over the 8
hectares, 69 ares, and 24 centares. In this connection it should be clearly
impressed on the mind that all of the eight parcels which the plaintiffs now
seek to recover are located within the confines of the Exhibit 2. Their own
plan Exhibit N and related documents sufficiently show this, and Marcelino
Gomez, the original defendant in the former case, testified that all of the
parcels of which recovery is now sought had been consolidated by him in the
parcel B. In other words the plaintiffs are seeking to recover a part of a
larger parcel which they lost by a conclusive judgment in the former
action. The impossibility of maintaining such an action, against the plea
of res judicata interposed by the defendants, is of course manifest at once.
No rule of law is better settled than the rule that a judgment in an action to
recover a parcel of land is not vitiated by an erroneous statement relative to
area, where it appears that the land is so described by boundaries as to put
its identification beyond doubt. That which really defines a piece of ground
is not the area calculated with more or less certainly, mentioned in its
description, but the boundaries therein laid down as in closing the land and
indicating its limits. (Loyola vs. Bartolome, 39 Phil., 544.) This doctrine is
decisive of the controversy.
It is true that the plaintiffs in this case have shown that some of the land
contained in the plot delivered to the defendants (the successful plaintiffs
in the other case) as a result of the former litigation was not originally a
part of land belonging to Epifanio Gomez, which was taken over in 19D7
for administration in trust by Marcelino Gomez, and it is admitted by the
present defendants that there "is contained in the parcel recovered by them
in the former case an area of something more than 1 1/3 hectares which was
not originally a part of the land which belonged to Epifanio Gomez.
Furthermore, in order to compensate the present plaintiffs for that land and
be rid of the threat of this litigation, the present defendants, at the time this
case was brewing, offered to pay the present plaintiffs the sum of P6,000.
The plaintiffs refused to accept this offer, under the erroneous impression,
apparently, that they could recover the entire excess of area over the 8
hectares and a fraction mentioned in the complaint in the other case.
It is undeniable that in the former action the plaintiffs recovered somewhat

more land than had been included in the land taken over by Marcelino Gomez
from Epifanio Gomez for administration; and the parcels bearing the numbers
1, 3, 4, 5, and 8, in the present complaint, are such parcels, for Marcelino
Gomez undoubtedly acquired these small parcels from other persons. These
parcels have a combined area of about 1 hectare, 37 ares, and 43 centares.
With respect to the parcels indicated as Nos. 2, 6, and 7, in the plaintiffs'
complaint, we are of the opinion that it can fairly be made out that these
parcels really belonged originally to Epifanio Gomez, being apparently
parcels which were formerly hypothecated to different persons after
Epifanio Gomez had sold them under contract of sale with pacto de retro to
Luis R. Yangco, as explained in Cristobal vs. Gomez (50 Phil, 810), and
which Marcelino Gomez had found it necessary to redeem, in the manner
there stated. But this point is not necessary to our decision, it being
sufficient to know that all of the land claimed by the plaintiffs in the present
action is within the boundaries of the parcel which was the subject of
revindication in the other case. In this connection it should be pointed out
that no question was made by the defendants in the other case with respect to
the several small lots contained in parcel B, which Marcelino Gomez held in
his own right by purchase from persons other than Epifanio Gomez. If any
such contention had been raised, it is probable that the defendants in that
action could have maintained their right to these lots, but no such issue was
raised. The defense made in that case was planted precisely upon the alleged
right of Marcelino Gomez as owner in fee simple of the whole parcel B. If
we understand the contention of the plaintiffs in this case rightly, their case
is planted upon the proposition that the only land really involved in the
pleadings in the former case, and as to which any controversy existed, was
the particular land which had been owned by Epifanio Gomez and which
had been transferred in trust to Marcelino Gomez. It is accordingly claimed
that any land as to which Marcelino Gomez derived title from other sources
than Epifanio Gomez was not really in litigation in that case. But this idea is
untenable. The former action was instituted for the purpose of recovering a
specific parcel of land, having precise and determinable boundaries, and the
title to that piece of land was there determined, the judgment being res
judicata, upon the issue of the title to that parcel. The circumstance that the
defendants in that case had a valid title to a part of the parcel B, derived from
an entirely different source from that of the rest, was proper matter for
defense in that case, but the defense was not interposed.
In conclusion we may point out that the contention of the present plaintiffs
to the effect that the original holdings of Epifanio Gomez did not comprise
more than 8 hectares, 69 ares, and 24 centares, as stated in the complaint in
the other case, is wholly unfounded, since Epifanio Gomez had declared for
taxation under some six or seven different tax declarations a total area, in
this locality, amounting to about 14 hectares, 60 ares, and 95 centares; and
after Marcelino Gomez took the property over for administration, he
declared the same property under several different declarations, of equivalent
area, the whole being later consolidated in one single tax declaration. Our
conclusion is that the erroneous statement of the area in the complaint in the
other case misled nobody, and has only been seized upon by the plaintiffs in
this case as promising a possible means of escape from part of the effects of
our former decision.
From what has been said it is evident that the judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs on the first cause of action is erroneous and the same must be
reversed. We are further of the opinion that the appeal of the plaintiffs upon
the second and third causes of action is not well founded. The title to the
warehouses was evidently determined by the decision in the former case,
awarding the land upon which said warehouses are located to the plaintiffs,
no exception having been made in said decision with respect to the
improvements on the property. The claim of the plaintiffs for
compensation, amounting to P20,000 for services supposed to have been
rendered by Marcelino Gomez as administrator, is also clearly unfounded.
Under the terms of the contract under which he took over the administration
of the property, the expenses of administration were chargeable against the
trust, and the claim was necessarily involved in the former action wherein
the real property, the subject of that action, was recovered from the heirs of
Marcelino Gomez, as trustee, and it needs to be remembered that the
defendants in that case were absolved from a large claim for damages and an
accounting, it being considered that such claim was compensated by the
obligations incident to the trust. It results that the judgment of the trial court
in refusing to grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs under their second and
third causes of action was correct, and the same will be affirmed.
The judgment favorable to the plaintiffs upon the first cause of action is
reversed and the defendants are absolved from the complaint with respect to
said cause of action; while the judgment in favor of the defendants on the
second and third causes of action is affirmed. So ordered, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Malcolm, J., voted to reverse, but was absent at the time of the promulgation
of the opinion and his name does not appear signed thereto,—
AVANCEÑA, C. J,
Batas.org

G. R. No. 33264, March 31, 1931: Supreme Court of The Philippines

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G. R. No. 33264, March 31, 1931: Supreme Court of The Philippines

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

G. R. No. 33264, March 31, 1931: Supreme Court of The Philippines

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Supreme Court of the Philippines

G. R. No. 33264, March 31, 1931

"Parcel B.—A land located in the sitio of Jabay, of the municipality of

According to the description of parcel B in the complaint, there are a number

It is undeniable that in the former action the plaintiffs recovered somewhat

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

You might also like

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.