G. R. No.

122150 - March 17, 2003

GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U.

CARANTES, Respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE
32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED
PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO
THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE

SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH INFRINGES ON A
RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY
AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW.1

The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:

On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a complaint for damages2  for
the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the respondent bumped him on the night of December 9,
1985.3 In answer thereto, respondent contended that the criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No.
2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,4 had already been
provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to petitioners lack of
interest;5 and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent.6

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil case was not
barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to pay plaintiff George Hambon the
sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and medical expenses and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the
sum of P10,000.00 as Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorneys fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.7

On appeal,8 the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995,9 reversed and set aside the decision of
the trial court, and dismissed petitioners complaint for damages.

According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a separate civil action for
damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the
dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an
acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. 10

Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave11 should be observed, i.e., a civil action for damages
may be filed and proceed independently of the criminal action even without reservation to file the same has been
made;12 and that the requirement of reservation, as provided in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, practically
diminished/amended/modified his substantial right.13

The petition must be denied.

Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended in 1988,14 is the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

...

Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or
previously instituted.

Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court ruled that the right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code
must be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it should be dismissed;16  and that the reservation
requirement does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general
interest of orderly procedure.17

In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by Herminio Andaya that figured in a
vehicular accident with the jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo Boado. The petitioner therein initially sought for the
suspension of the civil case for damages filed against him in view of the pendency of the criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries filed against his driver. The respondent, in the
criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring the separate civil action against the petitioner or his driver. The criminal
case was later dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to prosecute its case. On appeal, the Court identified the issues
as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for damages despite the absence of reservation; (2) whether the
dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether the reservation
requirement is substantive in character and beyond the rule-making power of the Court.18

The Court expounded:

. . . 1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil
liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. In other words the right of the
injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from
quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal
action.

...

Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be
reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of
procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art.
100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action,
yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.19

While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule explicitly requires
reservation of the civil action.

x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and
thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action.

. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in
"Cañ os v. Peralta":
. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to
simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-
litigants.20

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for damages in
Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior
reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of
civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R.No. 182210: March 07, 2012]

PAZ BERNARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 07 March 2012 which reads as follows:

G.R. No. 182210 (Paz Bernardo v. People of the Philippines). - This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by
petitioner Paz T. Bernardo from the August 31, 2007 decision[2] and March 14, 2008 resolution[3]  of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR No. 28721.

In its May 28, 2003 decision,[4] the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 56, convicted the petitioner of five (5)
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 22.[5]  The trial court sentenced her to one (1) year imprisonment for
each count, and to indemnify private complainant Carmencita C. Bumanglag the amount of P460,000.00, plus 12%
interest and 5% penalty charges, from December 1, 1991 until full payment.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction, but deleted the penalty of imprisonment. It imposed a P460,000.00
fine and ordered the petitioner to indemnify private complainant Bumanglag P460,000.00, plus 12% interest from the
time of the institution of the criminal charges in court until full payment.[6]

When the CA denied her motion for reconsideration,[7] the petitioner filed the present petition.

On March 14, 2011, the petitioners counsel informed the Court of the petitioner's death on February 3, 2011, as well as
the names of the petitioner's heirs (her widower, Mapalad Bernardo, and children: Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin
T. Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos) and their address (26 Magdiwang St., Real Village 2, Tandang Sora, Quezon City).[8]

In a November 23, 2011 Resolution, the Court required the petitioner's counsel to submit a duly authenticated copy of the
petitioner's death certificate.[9]

On January 17, 2012, the petitioner's counsel submitted the petitioner's duly authenticated death certificate.[10]

It is an established principle that the death of the accused pending final adjudication of the criminal case extinguishes the
accused's criminal liability, if the civil liability directly  arose from and is based solely on the offense committed, then the
civil liability is likewise extinguished.[11] 

In this case, the petitioner’s civil liability for the recovery of the face value of the checks does not appear to directly result
from, or is based solely on, the crime of violation of B.P. 22, but on a contract of loan between the petitioner and the
private complainant, evidenced by a June 1991 promissory note. Thus, the civil liability survives and an action for
recovery can be instituted in a separate civil action either against the executor or administrator of the estate of the
petitioner.

We have always stressed that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and this
Court is empowered to suspend their operation, or make an exception of a particular case from their operation, when
their rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.[12]  To dismiss the present case and
require the private complainant to file a separate civil action will be costly, burdensome and time-consuming, and would
further delay the final disposition of this case, pending since 1993. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. A delay in
the resolution of a case is, ultimately, a delay of justice and, thus, a denial thereof. Pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, we hold that it is both necessary and appropriate to require the deceased petitioner's heirs
to appear as substitute parties in the present case with respect to the deceased petitioner's civil liability for the checks the
deceased issued. Thereafter, we shall decide the case on the merits with respect to the deceased petitioner's civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the heirs of the deceased petitioner, Paz T. Bernardo, namely: Mapalad Bernardo, Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B.
Valdez, Edwin T. Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos, are hereby ORDERED, within thirty (30) days from notice, to be
impleaded, and to appear and substitute for the deceased petitioner in the present petition on the civil liability aspects of
this case. The case shall thereafter be submitted for decision by this Court, unless these parties request for the
opportunity to submit supplemental pleadings.

SO ORDERED. 

DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 163879, July 30,
2014 DR. CLENIO YNZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 165805, July
30, 2014

DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES

RODOLFO M. PALMA and ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.
DR. CLENIO YNZON, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES
RODOLFO M. PALMA AND ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163879 & 165805 July 30, 2014

Facts:
Ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal pain to his mother, Rosario Palma. At 5 o’clock that
samea fternoon, Palma’s mother and father, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR to the clinic of accused Dr. Cabugao. Dr.
Cabugao, a general practitioner, specializing in family medicine gave medicines for the pain and told Palma’s parents to
call him up if his stomach pains continue. Due to persistent abdominal pains, they returnedto Dr. Cabugao, who advised
them to bring JR to the Nazareth General Hospital in Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said hospital
at 5:30 in the morning. Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination, the initial impression was Acute Appendicitis, and hence, he
referred the case to his co-accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon. Dr. Ynzon went to the hospital and read the CBC and ultrasound
results. The administration of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to JR were ordered. Thereafter, JR was placed on
observation for twenty-four (24) hours. JR complained again of abdominal pain and his parents noticed a swelling in his
scrotum. In the afternoon of the same day, JR vomitted out greenish stuff three (3) times and had watery bowels also
three (3) times. The nurses on-duty relayed JR’s condition to Dr. Ynzon who merely gave orders via telephone.9Accused
continued medications to alleviate JR’s abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR again vomitted twice, had loose
bowel movements and was unable to sleep. The following morning, JR’s condition worsened, he had a running fever of
38°C. JR’s fever remained uncontrolled and he became unconscious, he was given Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1
ampule). JR’s condition continued to deteriorate that by 2 o’clock in the afternoon, JR’s temperature soared to 42°C, had
convulsions and finally died. The Death Certificate dated June 19, 2000 prepared by Dr. Cabugao indicated the following
causes of death: Immediate cause: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST An Information was filed against accused for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide. At their arraignment, both accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
Negligent in the performance of their duties:
1. the accused, as the attending physicians, did not personally monitor JR in order to check on subtle changes that may
occur. Rather, they left the monitoring and actual observation to resident physicians who are just on residency training
and in doing so, they substituted their own expertise, skill and competence with those of physicians who are merely new
doctors still on training. Not having personally observed JR during this 24-hour critical period of observation, the accused
relinquished their duty and thereby were unable to give the proper and correct evaluation as to the real condition of JR. In
situations where massive infection is going on as shown by the aggressive medication of antibiotics, the condition of the
patient is serious which necessitated personal, not delegated, attention of attending physicians, namely JR and the
accused in this case.

2. the accused failed to address the acute appendicitis which was the initial diagnosis. They did not take steps to find out if
indeed acute appendicitis was what was causing the massive infection that was ongoing inside the body of JR even when
the inflammatory process was located at the paraumbilical region where the appendix can be located

3. There may have been other diseases but the records do not show that the accused took steps to find outwhat disease
exactly was plaguing JR. It was their duty to find out the disease causing the health problem of JR, but they did not
perform any process of elimination. Appendicitis, according to expert testimonies, could be eliminated only by surgery
but no surgery was done by the accused. But the accused could not have found out the real disease of JR because they
were treating merely and exclusively the symptoms by means of the different medications to arrest the manifested
symptoms. In fact, by treating the symptoms alone, the accused were recklessly and wantonly ignoring the same as signs
of the graver health problem of JR. This gross negligence on the part of the accused allowed the infection to spread inside
the body of JR unabated

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners’ conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged
medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.

Ruling:
AS TO DR. YNZON’S LIABILITY:
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure
to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it bewithout malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence;
and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.14

With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly established by the evidence on record. The
court a quoand the appellate court were one in concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the required standard of care
expected from doctors.

In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was necessary to perform surgery on JR
immediately. Even the prosecution’s own expert witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo. From the witness examination, it is clear that
if JR’s condition remained unchecked it would ultimately result in his death, as what actually happened in the present
case. Another expert witness for the defense, Dr. Vivencio Villaflor, Jr. testified on direct examination that he would
perform a personal and thorough physical examination of the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6 hours.
From the testimonies of the expert witnesses presented, it was irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon failed to practice that
degree of skill and care required in the treatment of his patient.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon revealed want of reasonable skill and care in attending to the
needs of JR by neglecting to monitor effectively the developments and changes on JR’s condition during the observation
period, and to act upon the situation after the 24-hour period when his abdominal pain persisted and his condition
worsened.
Lamentable, Dr. Ynzon appeared to have visited JRbriefly only during regular rounds in the mornings. He was not there
during the crucial times on June 16, 2000 when JR’s condition started to deteriorate until JR’s death. As the attending
surgeon, he should be primarily responsible in monitoring the condition of JR, as he is in the best position considering his
skills and experience to know if the patient’s condition had deteriorated. Indeed, it is reckless and gross negligence of
duty to relegate his personal responsibility to observe the condition of the patient. Again, acute appendicitis was the
working diagnosis, and with the emergence of graver symptoms after the 24-hour observation, Dr. Ynzon ruled out
surgery for no apparent reason.
Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the
conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of
precaution.

It is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under
the operation of the penal law. This is because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct is all that is
required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused.24 Quasi offenses penalize the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight, the “imprudencia punible,” unlike
willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.25 This is precisely where this Court found Dr. Ynzon to be
guilty of – his seemingly indifference to the deteriorating condition of JR that he as a consequence, failed to exercise lack
of precaution which eventually led to JR’s death.

To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of his patient is
to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under
similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of
medical science.
In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He,
therefore, has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that degree of care and precaution demanded
by the circumstances.
AS TO DR. CABUGAO’S LIABILITY:

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things — the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all
the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the
crime. Based on the above disquisitions, however, the prosecution failed to prove these two things. The Court is not
convinced with moral certainty that Dr. Cabugao is guilty of reckless imprudence as the elements thereof were not proven
by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

Neither the shown evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been negligent or lacked the necessary precaution in his performance of
his duty as a family doctor. On the contrary, a perusal of the medical records would show that during the 24-hour
monitoring on JR, it was Dr. Cabugao who frequently made orders on the administration of antibiotics and pain relievers.
There was also repetitive instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer JR to Dr. Ynzon as it appeared that he is suspecting
appendicitis. The referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon, is actually an exercise of precaution as he knew that appendicitis is
not within his scope of expertise. This clearly showed that he employed the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to
JR’s condition, even after the referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon. To be sure, the calculated assessment of Dr. Cabugao to refer JRto
a surgeon who has sufficient training and experience to handle JR’s case belies the finding that he displayed inexcusable
lack of precaution in handling his patient.

Moreover, while both appeared to be the attending physicians of JR during his hospital confinement, it cannot be said that
the finding of guilt on Dr. Ynzon necessitates the same finding on the co-accused Dr. Cabugao. Conspiracy is inconsistent
with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.32 Thus, the accused-doctors to be found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, it must be shown that both accused-doctors demonstrated an act executed without
malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence. Noteworthy, the evidence on record
clearly points to the reckless imprudence of Dr. Ynzon; however, the same cannot be said in Dr. Cabugao’s case.
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES v. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, GR No. 166836, 2013-09-04
Facts:

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business,
purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B.
Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized... rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC),[2] 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañ aque, containing a total area of
44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The... transactions were embodied in three separate
deeds of sale.

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business,
purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B.
Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized... rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC),[2] 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañ aque, containing a total area of
44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The... transactions were embodied in three separate
deeds of sale.[

The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20
TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565... square meters purchased under the third deed of
sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not delivered
to San Miguel Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third
deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being
meanwhile replaced as receiver by

FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC.

BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a
complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñ as City (OCP Las Piñ as) charging respondent directors
and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of... titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of
Presidential Decree No. 957

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-
082400-11183),[6] praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñ as rendered its resolution,[10] dismissing San Miguel Properties' criminal complaint
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without
leave from the

SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively
pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of
the criminal action until after the issue on... the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en
banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no
probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories... in the three deeds of sale.

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñ as to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ
Secretary denied the appeal... the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties' petition, holding and ruling as follows:

From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question generally applies to civil and
criminal actions only.

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case, an issue in an
administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted
the suspension of... the latter until after termination of the administrative proceedings.

Issues:

whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the
proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a
prejudicial... question.

Ruling:
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question

BF Homes' posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that
must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be
resolved is correct.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of
the criminal case, but the... jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal.

The rationale... behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.[23] The essential elements of
a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil
action... involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties'
submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question
arose was pending, the action for... specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to
suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25[24] of Presidential Decree No.
957. This is true simply because the action for specific... performance was an action civil in nature but could not be
instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.[25]

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on
whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues
raised in the criminal complaint for the violation... of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in
the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two
cases involved is thus necessary.

the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally
entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF
Homes' directors... and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must
obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of
the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the... authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership
having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal... case.

Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in
order to sustain the further... prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single... piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have
rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a
question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law,
was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be
brought only in the HLURB. This... situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a
proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to... defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of controversies but to
rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that
one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and the... determination of private rights under
contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts.

LEONILO DONATO, petitioner, vs. HON ARTEMON LUNA and

PAZ ABAYAN, respondents.
April 15, 1988

Facts:
On September 28, 1979, respondent Paz B. Abayan filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a
civil action for the declaration of nullity of marriage with petitioner Donato. Abayan contends that she had no idea that
Donato has been married prior to the contracted marriage. Donato on the other hand interposed the defense that his
second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation, and
undue influence were employed by Abayan to obtain petitioner’s consent on the marriage. Petitioner subsequently filed
for the suspension of the proceedings of the said case contending that civil case filed for the nullity of his marriage with
respondent raises a prejudicial question which must be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. Hon.
Artemon D. Luna on the other hand ruled otherwise directing the proceedings in he criminal case to proceed as
scheduled.

Issue:

Whether or not criminal case proceedings should be suspended in view of the prejudicial question raised by the filed civil
case.

Ruling:

A prejudicial question is defined to be one in which resolution is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the said case,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The requisites of a prejudicial question was not obtain in  the
case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of
the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. The records
reveal that prior to petitioner’s second marriage, he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for
more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner’s averments that his consent was obtained through
force and undue influence is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which
stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage for more than five years before
the subsequent marriage was contracted. As such, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, GR No. 138509, 2000-07-31

Facts:

respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled,
nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis... and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.

an information for bigamy was filed against respondent

Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage
on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in... the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case.

The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case

Petitioner... filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Issues:

whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy.

Ruling:

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it...
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative... of the criminal case.

Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal
action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.

Its two essential elements are:... the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and... the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed... to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a
crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single
evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the... allegations in the information on the
ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code... requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly... the accused, to determine the validity or
invalidity of the marriage.

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter
to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous... bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of... the first. A party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such...
scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy.

Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,... and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.

No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be
resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the

Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render.

Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,... he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being... prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.

The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code

, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have
validly entered into the second marriage.

a marriage though void still needs a... judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the
second marriage will also be void.

he reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at
bar,... respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner.[... gainst this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent... entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

the petition is GRANTED

ARTHUR TE v. CA, GR No. 126746, 2000-11-29

Facts:

petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31
August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP  No. 23971[1] and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178[2] and the
Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on  September 14, 1988.

did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly.

after private respondent gave birth to a girl on

April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting... petitioner contracted a second marriage
with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella)... complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990,... an
information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9,...
1990.

Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409... on July 20, 1990... petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment
of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her.

alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of... their marriage and that she was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations

On November 8, 1990,... respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case
against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they
committed acts of immorality by living... together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at
the time of their marriage,... respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his... marriage
contract with Santella that he was still single... prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy... petitioner filed 
a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and
animosity towards petitioner's counsel during the hearings of said... case.

trial court denied petitioner's demurrer to evidence... the same could not be granted because the prosecution had
sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused

RTC also denied... petitioner's motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,... alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo... or (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner's counsel...
violating the requirements... of due process by denying petitioner's [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to
evidence even before the filing of the same

(3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court...
and (4) ruling that in a criminal... case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused.

CA-G.R. SP No.  23971

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board),... a motion to suspend the proceedings
therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his... marriage to private respondent and criminal case
for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.

the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991,... petitioner filed with the Court... of Appeals another
petition for certiorari... that the Board gravely abused its discretion in:

(1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case
pending before it;

(2) not holding that the... continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner's right
against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him;

(3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the

Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC
Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent involving the
same set of facts in other courts or... tribunals.

CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.

two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals,... rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions... appellate court
upheld the RTC's denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner's failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial
court judge... exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case.

also ruled that the denial of petitioner's motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in
accord with law.

likewise affirmed the RTC's denial... of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive
grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the
elements of bigamy.

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board's Order denying petitioner's motion
to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question... held that no prejudicial
question existed... since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a
civil case.

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of

Court of Appeals

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

Issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO
SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner's marriage to private respondent has rendered
the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy... and the administrative case for... revocation of
petitioner's engineering license... moot and academic... the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to
emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case
for bigamy be suspended until said civil... case is terminated.

tcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy... because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first... marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted

The ruling in People vs. Mendoza... and People vs. Aragon... cited by petitioner that no... judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned.

prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code... states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not
be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void... under the
law, a marriage, even one which is void or... voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.

In Landicho vs. Relova

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such... declaration the presumption of marriage exists... the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate
the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board.
ruled that... there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil

The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion... the Court... of Appeals did not find any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court... denial of the demurrer on two grounds:... first, the prosecution
established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner's allegations in the... demurrer
were insufficient to justify the grant of the same.

the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve
the... case.

declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner's guilt.

because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in... order that petitioner may present evidence in his
defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show
that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case.

In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals... this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as
valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough.

There should be clear and... convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality... since the grounds raised by
petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons
other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner's motion to inhibit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

[ GR No. 159186, Jun 05, 2009 ]

JESSE Y. YAP v. MONICO G. CABALES +

DECISION

606 Phil. 415

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Decision[2] dated April
30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company
Primetown Property Group.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of
said purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn.  Thereafter,
spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.

In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks
were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the  "Account is Closed." Demands were
made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the
latter failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and   attorney's fee
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.[3] On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and
instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.[4]

Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
General Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and
Criminal Case No. 35522-I.[5]

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial
question and  motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.[6]  Petitioner prayed that
the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.

The MTCC, in its Orders[7] dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit.   Petitioner filed a
Partial Motion for Reconsideration[8] relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.[9] The subsequent motions were denied in the
Order[10] dated October 18, 2000.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction[11] before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[12] denying the petition.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.[14]

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the
Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[15] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision[16] dismissing the petition for lack of merit.  The CA opined that Civil Case
Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The CA ruled:

In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is not the
validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are
entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It
behooves this Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and distinct
from each other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question, but rather the
rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the
validity of the sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is contested in the
subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the
annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if
Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom
that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of  B.P. Blg. 22.[17]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[18] which was denied in the Order[19] dated July 17, 2003.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

 1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE
CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS
ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE
CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME
CHECKS).

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.[20]

The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the
present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and
damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of  B.P. Blg. 22.  He further alleged that, in the pending civil
cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of
consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of  B.P. Blg. 22.  For if the court
rules that there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that
he could not also be held liable for violation of  B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check should have been
issued for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be
rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop
payment and to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to the failure
of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos.
6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation   of  B.P. Blg. 22
against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but
whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the checks.  These checks were issued by the
petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants.  The checks were
subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely
no bearing on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of   B.P. Blg. 22.[21]

The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the
suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC.

We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative  juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[22]

If  both  civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the
other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in
the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking
up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[23] Neither is there a prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.[24]

The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is
whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they
have rediscounted from Evelyn.

The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and
damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.[25]

In Jose v. Suarez,[26] the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void,
such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being  contra bonos mores, and
thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not the interest rate
imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg.
22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks.  In fact, the primordial
question posed before the court hearing  the  B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing
check has been issued."

Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,[27] that:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because
of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an
evidence of debt - though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary check and would
fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

x x x x

x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing
debt - is malum prohibitum.

To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the
faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in
trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for
which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum.[28]

Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul[29] is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a
deed of sale on the ground of an alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for  estafa was filed
against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil
complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense in the civil case was based
on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the  estafa case.

The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the private
respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the
material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or
condition of its issuance.

Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the  determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and
6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases
against him. The validity and merits of a party's defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of
testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated during trial proper.

Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to put
to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a well designed machinery termed  "trial."  Thus, all the
defenses available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the
proper forum that should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the  decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO, GR No. 186597, 2015-06-17

Facts:

Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo),
Domingo Reyes (Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia
Reyes. Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped) was... incorporated as part of the estate planning or as conduit to hold the properties
of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.

Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint for estafa
against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City.
He alleged that Victoria failed... to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of the commercial apartments
was transferred to Anaped.

On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of
the pendency of two intra-corporate cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City and Makati City.

In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor
particularly the issues of whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation
and whether they are duly authorized to make a... demand for remittance would necessarily result in their acquittal in the
criminal case.

the trial court, through Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of the proceedings. The
trial court reasoned that the issue in the SEC cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to act for and in behalf of...
the corporation, has a direct link to the issue of the culpability of the accused for estafa

The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging the authority of Buban, then the validity of Buban’s
demand to turn over or remit the rentals is put in question. The appellate court concluded that if the supposed authority
of Buban is found to be defective, it... is as if no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.

Issues:

whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a prejudicial question which calls for the suspension of
the criminal proceedings before the trial court.

Ruling:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution... of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial question to the
criminal case for estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale,
injunction, receivership and... damages. Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged
free from criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow that an accounting of corporate funds and properties and
annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets would result in... the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.

With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ finding that a prejudicial question
exists.

prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the... issue is the
authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the corporation.

it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who does not own either by
himself or in behalf of Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot demand
remittance of the rentals on... the property and Victoria does not have the obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban.
Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt of respondents in the criminal case for
estafa.

Principles:

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately... connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the... resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.