Population Council Population and Development Review

Land Use, Migration, and Natural Resource Deterioration: The Experience of Guatemala and
the Sudan
Author(s): Richard E. Bilsborrow and Pamela F. DeLargy
Source: Population and Development Review, Vol. 16, Supplement: Resources, Environment,
and Population: Present Knowledge, Future Options (1990), pp. 125-147
Published by: Population Council
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Land Use, Migration, and
Natural Resource Detexioration:
The Experience of Guatemala
and the Sudan
RICHARD E. BILSBORROW
PAMELA F. DELARGY
MANY ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING ELIMINATION of tropical forests, de-

sertification, and reductions in biodiversity, are most clearly evident in the
Third World. While rapid population growth is often considered an impor-
tant factor in this environmental degradation, solid empirical evidence on its
role is almost nonexistent. Understanding the effects of population on the
environment requires careful consideration of the full range of factors re-
sponsible for environmental deterioration and of how they interact with de-
mographic factors. The nature of this relationship is heavily determined by
land use patterns and agricultural policies adopted by governments. This
essay describes some of the relationships between population growth, mi-
gration, and natural resources with reference to agricultural practices in two
very different less developed countries, Guatemala and the Sudan.
Migration and the environment
Most studies linking population factors and the environment focus on the
impact of population growth on resource use. While population size and
growth rates are important determinants of resource use, population move-
ments also affect, and are affected by, the natural environment.
There is little research directly linking migration to environmental deg-
radation.' While international migration is also important, the focus of the
discussion below is on internal rural-to-urban migration and its significant
impact on the environment in developing countries. Migration is defined
here as a change of residence involving movement both across an adminis-
trative border (as defined in the country) and simultaneously from a rural to
an urban area (again, as defined in the country). It must be noted, however,
125
126 NATURAL RESOURCE DETERIORATION
that rural-to-rural population movements continue to be extremely impor-

tant (particularly in countries where most of the population lives in rural
areas, as throughout sub-Saharan Africa), albeit neglected in the literature,
and that urban-to-urban population movements are increasingly dominant
where most of the population already resides in urban areas, as in most of
Latin America.
Table 1 shows that the proportion of the world's population living in
urban areas is expected to continue to increase and to exceed 50 percent
around the year 2000. Shortly thereafter, urbanization in the Third World
will also surpass 50 percent. Already the proportion urban in Latin America
is well beyond that and, indeed, comparable to levels in the more developed
regions (two-thirds urban). The pace or rate of urbanization has already
passed its peak and is declining in much of Latin America, the Middle East,
and parts of Asia, simply because the cities themselves have become large
relative to the rural populations from which net migrants can be drawn. On
the other hand, in most of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the pace of
urbanization is accelerating, a trend that is likely to exacerbate the urban
environmental problems already existing in those parts of the world charac-
terized by especially low per capita incomes and urban poverty.
In the most simplistic sense, internal migration is a redistribution of
inhabitants that alters the population density of different areas within a
country. In the present context, migration is seen as a fundamental factor
determining population distribution and, hence, resource use.2 Population
redistribution has important benefits in many situations, including creating
a more efficient distribution of human capital and facilitating economies of
scale in the provision of public services and infrastructure. Increasing rural
population density, whether from natural population increase or inmigra-
tion, may also promote agricultural intensification (Boserup, 1965; Bilsbor-
row, 1987). Whether this is sufficient to increase agricultural production per
capita depends on the circumstances, but it is hard to conceive of this as
being generally likely in most contemporary Third World areas, given both
prevailing high population density (as in much of Asia) and low levels of
income, which make the adoption of new agricultural methods (embodying
expensive inputs) difficult to achieve and far from automatic.
The argument of classical economists is that higher population density
with fixed technology results in diminishing returns to labor. Increasing ap-
plication of labor on a fixed amount of land eventually leads to decreasing
levels of output per unit of input. The net effects of the struggle between
diminishing returns to labor, Boserupian intensification, and changes in the
natural productivity of the fixed resource (land) due to any environmental
degradation (e.g., soil erosion) determine farm incomes and, hence, in-
fluence rural outmigration. Thus, if the net effects are negative, outmigration
is likely to occur-to the extent conditions allow it. Moreover, such a re-
TABLE 1 Proportion of population urban, average rates of growth of rural and urba
Selected world regions and time periods
1970-80 1990-2000 20
Proportion Rate of growth Rate of Proportion Rate of growth R

urban Rural Urban urbanization urban Rural Urban urba
Worldtotal 38 1.5 2.5 0.7 44 0.8 2.4 0.
Moredevelopedregions 69 -0.3 1.3 0.5 74 -0.2 0
Lessdevelopedregions 27 1.8 3.6 1.4 36 0.9 3.4

Africa 24 2.2 4.6 1.8 36 2.0 4.8 1.8
EastAfrica 12 2.5 6.8 3.8 25 2.3 6.1 2
LatinAmerica 61 0.3 3.7 1.3 75 0.1 2.6 0

Central America 57 1.5 4.1 1.2 68 0.7 2.9
Asia 25 1.8 3.2 1.0 32 0.7 3.0 1.6
SouthAsia 23 1.8 4.1 1.7 33 0.8 3.7 1.
NOTES: Rates of growth are in percent per year. Rate of urbanization is the percentage rate of change in the proportion of po
SOURCE: United Nations, 1988: Tables 74-75.
sponse is likely even if per capita incomes are maintained or increased, to

the extent income levels per person in other areas of the country rise faster,
widening the typical rural-urban gap in income and living levels. The ex-
tent of rural-to-urban migration also depends on the degree to which rural
families are aware of differences in opportunities; on the availability, acces-
sibility, and size of urban areas that can absorb potential migrants; and on
the extent to which urban areas grow economically, providing increasing
employment opportunities.
But there are other ways to look at the process. With more people, the
increased demand for food results in increased competition for arable land,
tending to change land prices. In the common situation in which farmers
with small plots have much less access to credit and new technology than
those with large plots, this may result over time in a smaller proportion of
the rural population owning land, smaller average size of plots for the ma-
jority of small farmers who continue to own land, and an increase in the
average size of large farms. This process of increasing socioeconomic differ-
entiation has been well documented in Latin America and may be occurring
in Africa and Asia as well. In addition to such an indirect process working
through economic factors, demographic factors are also important. An in-
crease in population in a closed community with privatized landholdings
often causes average plot sizes to decline over time because of subdivision
among heirs, making an increasing proportion of the small plots too small to
sustain larger families. As a result, some sell off their land to survive, result-
ing in increasing landlessness.3 Intensification of land use and changing
landownership patterns may precipitate a number of responses at the
household level. One is a shift from traditional to nontraditional crops on
small plots (such as shifting from food grains to cash crops).4 A second re-
sponse is a shift from crops to livestock, which has been observed on larger
plots, both in traditional areas of population concentration and in new areas
of tropical forest lowlands, particularly in Latin America. In forest lowlands,
the sequence has often been for small farmers to move into an area, clear
part of the forest, plant crops for a few years until the soil is depleted, and
then abandon the land or switch to raising animals, which requires a much
larger cleared area to sustain a family. Alternatively, the land is cleared and
(ironically) increased in value; wealthier farmers move in and buy up the
land. (Regarding the Brazilian Amazon, see Goodland, 1988.)
A third response is recourse to local off-farm employment. If available,
such employment can provide a supplemental source of income while the
family continues to grow food for its basic needs. The land provides a form
of basic security or insurance, while off-farm employment provides cash for
additional consumption needs.
A fourth response is for one or more members of the household, often
an older son or male household head, to migrate seasonally to earn income
RICHARD E. BILSBORROW / PAMELA F. DELARGY 129
to help sustain the family in the community of origin. Seasonal employment

may be rural, such as work on a sugar or cotton plantation at the time of
planting or harvest, or urban, such as construction work. This pattern is
very common in parts of Africa.
A fifth response, which is more disruptive to the traditional way of life
of the household and therefore may be a last resort, is for the whole family
to move, either to new agricultural lands or to urban areas, both of which
have environmental effects. Rural-to-rural migration generally involves
clearing and deforestation of new (usually marginal) areas, drainage of wet-
lands, or use of steep slopes to expand agricultural production.5
Collectively, these alternative responses of small farmers constitute a
peasant "household survival strategy." Which response or combinations of
responses occur is a function of natural conditions and the existing socioeco-
nomic and institutional structure. Government policies play a critical role in
determining which type of response is likely. For example, if food prices are
kept low by price-fixing and subsidies, then rural outmigration is likely to
occur. But if food prices are allowed to increase as a result of growing de-
mands for food, rural incomes rise, the rural-urban income gap declines,
and rural-to-urban migration declines. Some governments attempt to con-
trol migration (through such programs as Indonesia's transmigration scheme
or Tanzania's ujamaa program), but few are successful (exceptions include
socialist countries using direct controls, such as ration cards and employ-
ment assignments).
The nature of the relationship between migration and the environment
varies greatly across developing countries, as countries differ in natural re-
sources and climate, level of development, government policies, social insti-
tutions, and customs. But the two country examples described below-
Guatemala and Sudan-show that similar patterns occur in very different
settings.
Deforestation in Guatemala
In the past two decades, population growth in Guatemala (as elsewhere in

Latin America) has been close to 3 percent per year. The total population
now surpasses 9 million. Despite rapid rural-to-urban migration, impelled
by insurgency in the countryside and by the more general factors of wide
rural-urban income gaps and land inequality, the proportion of the popula-
tion urban is still only one-third, relatively low for Latin America (see Table
1). Rural population density increased from 1.8 to 2.3 persons per hectare of
agricultural land, while land in agriculture grew by only 1.2 percent per year
between the last two agricultural censuses in 1964 and 1979. Labor produc-
tivity (value added per agricultural worker) remained constant between
1970 and 1985 (SEGEPLAN, 1987). Total agricultural production grew by 4.6
percent in the 1970s but not at all in the 1980s. This was also true of food
production, with the result that per capita food production fell by nearly
one-fifth during the 1980s. The consequences are increased food imports
and food insecurity.
Government policies stimulating the production of export cash crops
to provide foreign exchange to service the growing foreign debt have un-
doubtedly contributed to the food production problem. Additionally, ex-
tremely inegalitarian land distribution is a direct cause of rural poverty
(Brockett, 1988). If poverty is defined as not having sufficient family income
to meet minimum needs for food, shelter, and clothing, then 84 percent of
the rural population of Guatemala lived in poverty in 1980. While this was
the highest percentage in Central America, over 66 percent of the rural popu-
lation in all countries of the region except Costa Rica were estimated to be
living in poverty in that year (Peek, 1986).
We examined past population trends and prepared population projec-
tions for Guatemala to assess the extent to which major problems of the
rural population, including environmental stress, are likely to be exacer-
bated by population growth and migration patterns. We made two projec-
tions, starting from a total fertility rate (TFR) of 6.0 in 1980 (observed rate),
falling slowly to 4.8 in the year 2030 in the high projection and to 2.0 (essen-
tially replacement fertility) in the low projection (details in Stupp and Bils-
borrow, 1989). Life expectancy and the proportion urban were assumed to
rise equally in the two scenarios, with the latter rising from 33 percent in
1980 to 45 percent in the year 2000 and 68 percent by 2030. The total popu-
lation rises rapidly in either case, reaching 24 million in the low run and 37
million in the high. We now consider the likely effects of these two alterna-
tive future population growth scenarios on the size of landholdings, land
distribution, rural labor demand, rural outmigration, and the environment.
Land distibution and land fragmentation
Out of a total national territory of 10.8 million hectares in Guatemala, some

5.2 million hectares, or 48 percent, is classified as suitable for agriculture. Of
this, 4.4 million, or 85 percent, was already in farms in 1979, although only
about half of that was actually in use. Land is distributed extremely une-
qually in Guatemala, probably more so than anywhere else in Latin Amer-
ica. For example, in 1979 farms with less than 1.5 hectares accounted for 60
percent of all farms6 but had less than 4 percent of the land, while 2 percent
of the farms with over 35 hectares had 67 percent of the land. We now ex-
amine briefly what happened between the two agricultural census years of
1964 and 1979. First, in all regions most new farmland was concentrated in
the largest (3 5 + hectare) size category. Furthermore, such land was mainly
in the northern, semitropical forest region of the Peten (by far the largest of
the three departamentos comprising the Norte region), which accounted for
76 percent of new farmland. At the same time, most new farms that came
into existence between 1964 and 1979 were concentrated in the smallest
(less than 1.5 hectare) size category: below-subsistence farms accounted for
60 percent of all farms in Guatemala in 1979, up from 44 percent in 1964.
Also, the average size of the under-1.5 hectare holdings nationwide de-
clined from 0.7 to 0.45 hectare between 1964 and 1979. This suggests
increasing fragmentation of land by subdivision among heirs.7 Contin-
uing population growth is likely to continue to swell the number of below-
subsistence farms, leading to increasing impoverishment of the rural
population. This in turn contributes to rural outmigration.
Rural employment adequacy
The rural employment problem in Guatemala is severe. We know from

studies by SEGEPLAN (1986) and Banco de Guatemala that the intensity of
labor use per unit of land is much greater on smaller farms. On farms of less
than 1.5 hectares, 0.48 full-time-equivalent persons were employed per ha.
per year ("full-time" defined as working 150 days/yr). In the 1.5-3.5 hec-
tare category, 0.25 full-time persons were employed per ha. The 3.5-35 and
3 5 + hectare farms employed considerably less labor per unit of land in use,
specifically 0.13 and 0.10 persons/ha./yr.
The number of full-time farm workers that could be absorbed at the
intensities of labor use prevailing in 1979 was 690,000. That there was al-
ready considerable underemployment in agriculture is seen by comparing
this with the estimated agricultural labor force in 1980 (1.12 million). The
ratio of these two figures provides an "employment adequacy ratio" (a better
term than underemployment, we feel) of only 0.62.
We now compare the projected size of the future agricultural labor
force with the employment that would be provided under two scenarios of
labor intensity. We first project employment by expanding land in use at a
rate of 1.2 percent per year (the rate prevailing between 1964 and 1979), but
keeping the average intensity of labor use per unit of land constant at the
1979 national average of 0.15 persons/ha. All potential agricultural land is
then in use by 2030.8 In the second scenario, we again assume land in use
increases, but also that average labor intensity grows over time to a level of
0.25 persons per ha., the labor intensity on 1.5-3.5 ha. farms in 1979. Un-
der this latter scenario (a possible government goal, if the seriousness of the
rural employment problem were recognized), the gap between available em-
ployment and labor force size under the low fertility assumption narrows
after 2010, with the employment adequacy ratio rising to 0.86. But with
high fertility, the employment adequacy ratio rises only to 0.66, even with
the substantially increased labor intensity.
The implication is that bringing more land into production (including

tropical forest land) will not alleviate the rural employment problem unless
land is used at significantly higher levels of labor intensity and labor force
growth is slowed by lower (rural) fertility. Regarding the first point, most
agricultural research has focused on increasing yields through technologies
that require less labor per unit of land, not more. The continuing substantial
rate of growth of tractorization in Guatemala (and most other developing
countries) in recent decades also suggests that rural employment absorption
will become an increasing problem, contributing to even higher rates of ru-
ral outmigration in the future.
Environmental deterioration
We have seen that rural population growth is resulting in growing land

fragmentation, rural underemployment, and outmigration. What impact do
these trends have on the environment? The major forms of environmental
deterioration associated with population growth and urbanization in Guate-
mala include deforestation, soil degradation, watershed destruction, and ur-
ban encroachment on prime agricultural land. Figure 1 shows the areas of
Guatemala with heavy forest cover in 1950 and 1985. By comparing munici-
FIGURE 1 Forest cover in Guatemala, 1950 and 1985
1950 1 98
SOURCE: Leonard, 1987.
pio (district) data on population density and percent of land area in forests
from population and agricultural censuses between 1950 and 1981 (the lat-
est population census), and on the basis of field visits to a sample of 40 rural
municipios, Mendez (1988) finds forest cover strongly inversely correlated
with population density.
Between 1960 and 1981, some 43 percent of Guatemala's 1950 forested
area was lost. Practically no forests exist now except in the northern Peten,
where the agricultural frontier is pushing further north each year (SEGE-
PLAN, 1986: 214). While some of the larger, mature trees are floated (gener-
ally illegally) downriver westward into Mexico from the northern Peten and
sold commercially, the main cause of deforestation is not the timber indus-
try but clearing of land for agriculture, cattle ranching, and fuelwood.
(Wood provides over 90 percent of the energy of rural households.) The ad-
vancement of the agricultural frontier into the northern semitropical forest
has been aided by the penetration of roads and the lack of enforcement of
government laws forbidding the felling of trees on the vast public forest
lands.9
It is illuminating to compare this process of deforestation with data on
migration flows by region and departamento (state) since the first modern
population census in Guatemala in 1950. As the population of Guatemala
has grown at about 3 percent for over 30 years, it is now about 250 percent
greater than its 1950 level. Particularly during 1950-70 population distribu-
tion shifted from the densely populated rural highlands toward Guatemala
City, the eastern lowlands, and the Pacific coast. Of the three departamentos in
the sparsely populated, forested northern region, only the northernmost
and largest, the Peten, experienced net inmigration during this period. But
inmigration to the Peten accelerated starting in the late 1960s. The percent-
age of (lifetime) inmigrants was one-fourth in 1950 and over half by 1973.
The absolute number of net inmigrants in 1973 was 32,000, seven times that
of 1964, and this doubled again by 1981. The net intercensal inmigration
rate to the Peten was only 17 percent in 1950-64, but 47 percent in 1964-73
and 49 percent in 1973-81 (SEGEPLAN, 1986: 36), and the annual rate of
population growth varied from 4.3 to 18.7 percent during 1973-81. This
process appears to have continued throughout the 1980s. (The next census
will not be carried out until at least 1992.)
The clearing of new land for agricultural use is a response to pressures
on the land, increasing land fragmentation, and the lack of adequate off-
farm rural employment opportunities, especially in the densely populated
highlands and the eastern lowlands. Indeed, in the latter, inappropriate
marginal land is being used increasingly for agriculture as population pres-
sure rises and the agricultural frontier advances (USAID, 1987). Figure 2
identifies regions of the country where it is likely that marginal land is being
used for agriculture, with resulting environmental destruction. It shows that
the proportion of land classified as "appropriate for agriculture" already
FIGURE 2 Percent of land appropriate for agriculture already

in farms: Guatemala, 1979
> 125 percent
100- 12 5 percent
75-100 percent
< 75 percent
SOURCE: USAID, 1987.
used in farming in 1979 was well over 100 percent in each department in the
eastern region, as well as along the Pacific coast, where together about half
the total rural population lives. As we indicated earlier, only 48 percent of
the total land area is appropriate for agriculture. Therefore, whenever the
proportion of land in farms exceeds 100 percent, it is likely that inappro-
priate marginal land is used in farms. One consequence may be that the
eastern region and Pacific coast are the two areas providing the largest nu
bers of direct migrants to the Peten-26 percent and 39 percent, respectively,
according to the 1981 census (SEGEPLAN, 1986: 56).
In Figure 3, we consider four other forms of rural environmental deg-
radation and depletion of renewable natural resources. Each is related to the
pressure of population growth and distribution on resources, whether
through exploitation of areas characterized by fragile soils and low carrying
capacity or through diversion to other uses of land appropriate for agricul-
ture. The loss of agricultural land to urban areas is primarily an issue in the
region surrounding Guatemala City, about two-thirds of whose growth in
recent decades has been due to high rates of natural increase and one-third
to net inmigration (United Nations, 1980). In every decade since 1950, the
FIGURE 3 Location of four types of environmental damage:

Guatemala, 1981
Urbanization of prime agricultural land
Soil erosion
Watershed damage
XNNO increased flooding
SOURCE: Leonard, 1987.
municipio in which Guatemala City is located received the largest number of

inmigrants.
Soil erosion is a much more widespread problem. Deforestation re-
duces moisture retention, especially in highland areas, leading to erosion.
The problem is greatest on the Pacific slopes because the topsoil is thin and
there are concentrated periods of rainfall. Nevertheless, extensive erosion
also occurs in the western highlands, with topsoil losses of 5-35 tons/hect-
are per year in some places (Leonard, 1987). Another cause of soil loss is the
abandonment of ancient Indian practices of terracing and contour planting.
Exploitation of lowland areas of inferior quality, characterized by shallow,
lateritic soils that can sustain agriculture for only a few years, also results in
soil degradation, as in the Peten.
TIwo additional environmental problems are water-related-water-
shed damage and increased flooding. Both occur widely on the Pacific
slopes and in large areas of the Caribbean basin (Motagua River), and are
now even seen in the Peten. Every major watershed on the Pacific side of the
country has been denuded of vegetation and now suffers from erosion,
flooding, and sedimentation of rivers (Leonard, 1987). Sedimentation is also
occurring in major rivers and dams supplying water for Guatemala City.
Rapid river runoff has reduced replenishment of groundwater, the major
water source for Guatemala City.
To confront the increasingly serious environmental problems in Guate-
mala, a variety of policy interventions appear warranted, including the
provision of family planning services (particularly in underserved rural ar-
eas), land redistribution, and price and technology policies to stimulate agri-
cultural production and raise rural family incomes and labor absorption.
Finally, policies are also necessary to deal more directly with increasing
deforestation and soil erosion, including farmer education programs
and stricter enforcement of existing legislation banning unauthorized tree
cutting.
Desertification in the Sudan
Perhaps the only positive result of the recent famines in the Sudan and else-
where in sub-Saharan Africa has been to shock donors and governments
into paying greater attention to the role of renewable resources in develop-
ment. Much has been published on the causes and consequences of these
droughts and famines. Sindiga (1984) and Talbot (1986) found that rapid
population growth of the pastoralist Maasai and inmigration of sedentary
farmers increased land conflicts between the two groups and led to overgraz-
ing and soil and water exhaustion of Maasai lands. Government policies of
restricting rangelands to create tourist-attracting national parks exacerbated
the problem. In studies spanning two decades in Meru district, Kenya,
Bernard (1988) observed that increasing population density in fertile high-
land areas, road construction, and government policies promoting privatiza-
tion led to (a) deforestation and resulting soil erosion on the rich, volcanic
soil slopes and (b) a decrease in fallow periods on nearby poor-soil lowland
areas that traditionally had been used for grazing, resulting in soil degrada-
tion and desertification. In this section, we look at interrelationships be-
tween population growth, environmental degradation, and migration in the
Sudan, the largest country in Africa.
Sudan, roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi, had
a population of about 21 million at the 1983 census, resulting in one of the
lowest average population densities in the world-6 persons per km2. This
number is deceptive, though, since much of the country is arid, and popula-
tion distribution is largely determined by availability of water. The area be-
tween the White and Blue Nile Rivers near their junction is the Gezira-
which contains the world's largest agricultural project, an irrigated cotton
scheme begun in the 1920s that remains the heart of the Sudanese economy.
Modern agricultural development is heavily concentrated near the Nile and
its tributaries, but there is increasing investment in mechanized agriculture
on the wide plains of the savanna belt, where rainfed production is possible.
It is in these latter areas, however-in Darfur and Kordofan in the west and
the Eastern and Red Sea provinces in the east-that the recent famine was
most severe and environmental degradation appears most pronounced.
There are clear patterns of desertification, deforestation, and erosion due to
increasing human and animal populations and to agricultural practices-
both traditional and modern-that "mine" the vulnerable sandy and clay
soils for short-term gain, leaving them unable to regenerate (Ibrahim, 1984).
The Sudanese population is largely rural and settled, but an estimated
11 percent is nomadic, and about 20 percent reside in urban areas. Urban-
ization has been increasing rapidly, particularly since the 1984-85 famine,
and the primacy of the three-city capital area, with over 3 million people, is
pronounced. Population growth exceeds 3 percent annually, the total fertil-
ity rate is around 7, and life expectancy at birth is below 50 years. Literacy is
very low: 28 percent for men and 6 percent for women, with great regional
disparities (e.g., 58 percent in Khartoum province versus 4 percent in the
southern province of Bahr El Ghazal).
Besides nomadism, other forms of migration are significant: seasonal
labor migrants number over one million-predominantly male migrants
from subsistence farms in the west, who travel to the large agricultural
schemes in the east. '0 A large proportion of the population is seminomadic,
engaging in shifting cultivation and herding. Rural-to-urban migration is
also high, with most families having one or more members working in a
city. " Environmental degradation and drought have made it impossible for
many rural families to survive by animal husbandry and cultivation alone,
so it is common for some family members to engage in wage employment,
either in urban areas or on large farms, at some point during the year (El
Sammani et al., 1986). A high rate of emigration of semiskilled, skilled, and
professional workers to the Persian Gulf and other Arab states is producing
serious shortages of educated labor in some sectors, but remittances-over
US$3 billion in 1984-85, equivalent to 40 percent of official GDP-are cru-
cial to the economy. Finally, Sudan is host to a million political refugees
from Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad, which further contributes to fuelwood
depletion.
Sudan provides a sharp contrast to Guatemala culturally, economi-
cally, and geographically, but patterns of natural resource degradation are
depressingly similar. Sudan has a variety of ecological settings-from desert
to tropical rainforest-with a concomitant variety of land use patterns and
problems. Geographically (and culturally), the country can be seen as a mi-
crocosm of Africa. Sudan has some distinctive problems, but the major eco-
nomic and environmental ones are found in most other African countries as
well.
First, although extremely good rains led to an excellent year for agri-
culture in 1988, there has been a general decline in agricultural (especially
food) production per capita over the past 15 years despite large increases in
land used for agriculture. Many factors have contributed: climate change,
increasing inability of farmers to purchase agricultural inputs, declines in
soil productivity, and expansion of cropping onto marginal lands. The
1984-85 famine resulted not only from the well-publicized failure of rains
but also from environmental degradation. Government attempts to increase
cash crop production have included clearing land for huge mechanized
schemes to grow millet, sorghum, or groundnuts; and expanding the irri-
gated sector to increase cotton exports. Both strategies have proved harmful
to the environment, partly due to poor planning and management.
Second, increasing numbers of people and animals and the expansion
of agriculture have placed stress on rangelands. The development of new
water sources has altered nomadic patterns and resulted in concentrated ar-
eas of land degradation.
Third, deforestation has become a serious problem, because energy
demands for wood and charcoal have increased and land has been cleared
for agriculture and settlement. The decline in tree and bush cover reduced
soil productivity and promoted erosion.
Finally, desertification has resulted from deforestation and removal of
ground cover. In areas nearest the desert, this has involved expansion of
dunes; in other regions, it resulted in denuded land and declining soil fertil-
ity. Deforestation is driven by both clearing of land for agriculture and use of
wood for fuel. Expansion of cultivation onto marginal land is partly due to
population growth and declining yields in existing fields (owing to soil de-
pletion, erosion, and salinization). But a critical factor has been agricultural
policy. Cultivators and pastoralists have been pushed onto marginal lands
by the expansion of rainfed, mechanized, and irrigated agriculture designed
to increase food and export crop production.
One region where these patterns have been well documented is Darfur,
the country's westernmost province, an arid area of highly variable rainfall
and traditional mixed subsistence cultivation and pastoralism. Pastoralism
is well suited to areas of variable rainfall because grazing routes make ef-
ficient use of scarce water and vegetation. Herds follow rains at calculated
intervals, allowing vegetation to replenish itself each year. Sedentary animal
husbandry, in contrast, by using the same land year-round, does not allow
for soil replenishment. As the population has grown in Darfur, palatable
grasses have virtually disappeared in areas of sedentary livestock-raising
(Ibrahim, 1984). Settlements are always built around secure sources of
water, and the many boreholes dug in the 1960s and 1970s during the na-
tional campaign to provide water to all became centers of settlement. From
the air, one now sees desertification rings around each of them.
Previous patterns of shifting cultivation are also giving way to large
agricultural projects, which involve completely clearing large areas of all
trees and vegetation, leaving bare, vulnerable soil. Topsoil is scratched and
loosened during planting and weeding and then exposed for 8-10 months
between rains. Some of this soil is blown into the atmosphere, contributing
to the increased levels of atmospheric dust.'2 Many of the large agricultural
projects in Darfur, as well as farmers on smallholdings who have gone into
cash cropping, raise millet. Recent studies have shown that productivity of
many fields has declined significantly in the past 30 years.
Traditionally, local farmers planted a variety of crops that responded
to different rain and temperature conditions to insure that, no matter what
the rainfall level, some crops would survive. This pattern of risk aversion
does not produce the highest yields in good rain years but does provide some
food in dry years. Since over the past two decades half of the years were dry,
multicropping-even if yields are low-seems a reasonable practice. The
move toward "modern" agriculture-monocropping of millet-in the re-
gion has resulted in less food security for many farmers. It is estimated that a
family of six consumes about 1500 kg of grain per year and so must cultivate
at least 15 hectares to guarantee subsistence. The population of the region
has grown tenfold since the beginning of the century, and the animal popu-
lation has increased dramatically over the last 40 years as well. This, com-
bined with the expansion of commercial farms, has put stress on the
cultivable land. A family rarely has access to 15 hectares for growing millet
(most have to use some land for animals, vegetables, etc.). The result is
chronic undernourishment. In dry years, cultivated areas are expanded to
try to meet food needs, resulting in even greater competition between
farmers and nomads. Fallow periods have shortened as pressures to produce
crops have increased. Indeed, the majority of farmers engage in permanent
cultivation without any fallow. The traditional system of rotating crops and
fallowing has thus been abandoned and a chain of land degradation has
begun. Population increase and the entry of farmers into the cash market
have led to excessive cultivation, which, in turn, has led to soil erosion and
impoverishment. Millet yields decreased by 50 percent from 1965 to 1980.
At the same time, the area cultivated with millet increased from 392,000
hectares in 1960 to 1,055,000 in 1975, bringing fresh waves of desertification
and pushing the pastoralists ever northward, where they have overgrazed
the grasslands (Ibrahim, 1984).
Overgrazing is a problem in the whole of northern Sudan. Because of
improved veterinary care and increasing demand for meat, herds expanded
dramatically from the 1940s to the 1980s. The number of livestock (cattle,
goats, sheep, and camels) quadrupled from 1956 to 1966, and by 1974 there
were over 40 million head. Although herds were increasing, the amount of
grazing land did not expand, so the carrying capacity of rangelands de-
creased due to overgrazing and replacement of perennial grasses by less pal-
atable annuals. The annuals are more conducive to brush fires, which
consume about 15 percent of the natural fodder in the savanna belt each
year.13 These patterns set the stage for disaster when the rains failed in 1983,
1984, and 1985. Large numbers of livestock died in the 1984 drought. Thou-
sands of pastoralists and rural farmers subsequently migrated to urban ar-
eas, where food was more plentiful. As a first response, men went to work
as wage laborers, leaving families behind. The first waves of migrants to re-
gional towns placed burdens on the local resources, such as fuelwood,
water, and food. Relief supplies of food eventually arrived, but there was no
relief for the natural environment. Deforestation intensified during the
drought, and rapidly growing towns began to experience fuel shortages and
increased prices as food and fuel had to come from further and further away.
Later, as conditions in rural areas became more desperate, wage earners in-
creasingly tried their luck in the capital. As livestock was sold to buy grain
or died off, and crops failed, women and children eventually were also
forced to migrate to regional towns and the capital where food was avail-
able. Many have not returned to rural areas, so the capital has grown enor-
mously since the drought. The expansion of squatter settlements and
crowding of other neighborhoods have put such stress on transport net-
works and municipal services that city services have virtually collapsed. Pol-
lution and sanitation problems are ubiquitous. The government is
encouraging people to return to rural areas, which have improved due to a
few years of good rains, but many poorer farmers have already given up
their land and have little to return to.
A study by Tully (1985) of the Masalit in western Darfur documents
the increasing difficulties of maintaining families and communities. Tradi-
tionally, the Masalit would farm an area of land until productivity declined
and then move on to establish a new community. A mix of herding and
farming provided flexibility and resilience in case of drought. During a pe-
riod of good rainfall beginning in the 1930s, herds expanded and the popu-
lation grew through natural increase and inmigration. Farmers began to
grow crops for the market. When the drought began in the 1970s, the area
under cultivation was increased, and people consumed their savings. They
also began to overexploit the forests through intensive hunting and gather-
ing. To save their animals, they concentrated around secure water sources.
Those who had to moved to towns to seek wage income. These were "nor-
mal" responses and had occurred in the past for brief periods. But the sur-
vival strategies that had worked in the past-expanding cultivation and
forest use-had now been exhausted. Many went to towns, and, as the rains
failed again and again, the degradation of land around towns and wa-
terholes intensified. The consumption of wood for cooking and other uses
led to the destruction of forests near towns. Game and wild fruit became
scarce. The larger area cultivated and grazed, and the reduced forest cover,
increased wind erosion. Lack of vegetation caused rains to run off the land
and increased gullying. Family members migrated to other agricultural ar-

eas to seek work, but this alleviated the problem only temporarily.
The pressures of market production, higher urban consumption levels,
and rural population densities resulted in the more intense use of land and
the expansion of cultivation onto unsuitable lands-both of which resulted
in degradation.
Temporary male migration to seek work has long been common
among the Masalit, but Galal-el-Din (1978) documents that net outmigra-
tion quadrupled from the 1950s to the 1970s. In the sample villages in Dar
Masalit, Tully (1985) finds that among men aged 31-40, 100 percent had
emigrated at least once, many citing land shortages as a motivating factor.
The migrants, most of whom went to work on mechanized farms in eastern
Sudan, normally were unable to help their families with remittances but
sometimes brought clothing or tools back with them. Although traditionally
only men had migrated, in the late 1970s women and families began to
move, too. Some went to nearby richer agricultural areas-Kordofan or
Southern Darfur-and others crossed the country to eastern Sudan, where
prices were higher for crops and lower for consumer goods. There are few
firm data on the fate of the Masalit during the drought and famine of the
early 1980s, but it seems clear that outmigration increased tremendously-
first to other agricultural areas in search of employment, and then to towns
and cities in search of food.
The eastern savanna is also experiencing environmental degradation
because of both population growth and inappropriate agricultural practices
associated with mechanization. Rainfed mechanized farming was once con-
sidered the hope of development for the Sudan. It began in the 1940s when
the British were concerned with feeding their troops in east Africa and in-
creased at an annual compound growth rate of 21 percent from 1946 to 1976
(Affan, 1982). Millions of dollars were invested by the wealthy Arab states in
sorghum, groundnut, and sesame schemes across the savanna belt, but par-
ticularly in the eastern region, in the 1960s and 1970s. Sudan was intended
to become the "breadbasket of the Middle East," providing food security to
the Arab world. This money was followed by large loans to local investors by
the World Bank and other lenders, and the area under cultivation in this
region expanded dramatically to cover 4 million acres by 1976-or 27 per-
cent of the total land under cultivation in the country. Mechanization
seemed a useful way to expand production and increase yields on the broad
plains. Tractors could break up the heavy, clay soil, and wage laborers could
do the planting, weeding, and harvesting. In the short term, this provided
employment for many workers at good wages and increased production of
crops dramatically. The planning of the farms led to problems, however.
Low-interest loans were given to owners (who actually only rented the land
at very low cost from the government), and the use of machinery was subsi-
dized. Owners, often urban merchants, exploited the lands for maximum
production (and profits), leaving no fallow time and providing no modern
inputs. The result was rapidly declining yields and land degradation. So
much land was available that owners found it easier to "use up" one area
and then rent another rather than to conserve the land. One OXFAM report
on mechanized farming in the area calls it "environmental hit-and-run."
The social implications of mechanized farming were negative as well.
Family farmers were forced off their land to make way for the mechanized
farms, and though some found wage employment the living standards of
many others declined. Modern farms were primarily owned by urbanites,
and the profits from them went back to the city, so the infrastructure and
services of the region were not improved. The farms also blocked traditional
nomadic grazing paths and increased conflicts between nomads and
farmers. The use of savanna land for cultivation meant that herders were
forced to intensify grazing in the marginal areas because they had to stay
there year-round. This, in combination with the increase in human and ani-
mal populations, led to desertification patterns in the east similar to those in
Darfur and Kordofan in the west.
Landless farmers settled in towns that grew at a rapid rate and that also
serve as centers for Ethiopian refugee settlement, since they are near the bor-
der. The population of Gedaref, a major town in the east, grew from 17,537
in 1956 to 70,355 in 1970, 122,000 in 1976, and over 200,000 people in the
late 1980s. In a study of wage workers in Gedaref in 1982, only 11 percent
reported being born in the region (ILO/UNHCR, 1984). Gedaref is a crowded
town with little sanitation, erratic electricity, and chronic water shortages.
Social conflict between refugees and the various Sudanese ethnic groups is
high, in part because of competition for employment on the large farms,
which has depressed wages.
An accompanying problem throughout northern Sudan is deforesta-
tion due in part to the cutting of trees for fuel and building materials for the
growing population. Nearly all rural households depend on wood for fuel.
In Darfur, for example, the average consumption of wood per family is 50-
70 kg a week. Over a year, it is estimated that a family uses about 195 trees
and shrubs, but replanting is virtually nonexistent.
The implications of this wood use are severe. In 1980 the country con-
sumed the energy equivalent of 7 million tons of oil. Eighty-five percent of
this was in the form of wood and charcoal, 93 percent of which was con-
sumed by households for cooking. Nine million tons of wood were cut and
used directly; 16 million tons were made into charcoal. This means 70 mil-
lion m3 of wood were cut for energy use. In the north, 52 million m3 were cut
and only 15 million m3 regenerated. Because of the scarcity and high cost of
other energy sources, wood use is not expected to decrease. The country's
National Energy Administration predicts that within ten years all of north-
ern Sudan will lack wood for energy if forests are not actively regenerated.
Thus, the cost of wood is expected to continue to increase, leaving the poor-
est without fuel.
Mukhtar (1982) estimated the average per capita consumption of fuel-
wood at 1.62m3 in 1962 and 2.00m3 in 1976. Estimates of urban consump-
tion are as high as 2.8m3. With an increasing population and consumption
per capita also rising due to urbanization, shortages of fuelwood will grow
more serious. The average distance traveled to obtain wood increases con-
stantly, adding additional burdens to already overworked women in rural
areas and raising transport costs of fuelwood to urban areas. For example,
the distance for transport of wood to Khartoum has increased from 5 -10 km
to as much as 200 km in the past two decades. The price of wood and char-
coal has skyrocketed over the past ten years due largely to rising transport
costs.
The rapid growth of Khartoum, although exacerbated by war dis-
placement, is still largely fueled by migration from rural areas. Landless
farmers have also settled in secondary towns, which are growing at about 7
percent per year."4 This urbanization contributes to deforestation since ur-
ban industrial and service sectors use wood or coal as fuel. In 1984 total
industrial fuelwood consumption in Khartoum province was almost
200,000 tons, double that of 1980 (Abdel Salaam, 1985).
Sudanese people have always been mobile, but most movement has
been of pastoralists and seasonal migrants. The dramatic increase in "per-
manent" migration over the past 10-15 years is due to a number of factors-
war, drought, poverty-but environmental degradation clearly plays an in-
creasingly important role. The degradation is a result of both development
policies and population growth. And, as in Guatemala, migration, espe-
cially to urban areas and marginal lands, has negative indirect and direct
effects on the environment.
Conclusions
The increasing severity of environmental problems in the Third World is

now widely recognized. Its causes are not well known, although continuing
population growth and the nature of development are widely considered
responsible. Clearly, far more and better data-and analyses of data to sort
out underlying causes in particular ecological contexts-are needed.
In principle, the major forms of environmental damage now so wide-
spread in the Third World-deforestation of tropical forests, desertification,
and soil degradation-could be greatly alleviated by appropriate govern-
ment policies and private practices. The literature is replete with recommen-
dations to this effect, which often purport to show that neither population
growth nor development (increased production) per se is a serious problem

for the environment, since it is possible to improve standards of living while
maintaining the environment. Ideally, political systems could be changed.
But these are dreamers' "wish lists." While policy changes are desirable, one
must consider realistically what is technically and financially feasible in
most countries of the Third World. How can such countries implement poli-
cies to achieve permanent, "sustainable development," or increase produc-
tion while maintaining the natural productive capacity and beauty of the
world for future generations? Lowering population growth rates in the Third
World would surely be beneficial for both the environment and the people,
but wouldn't a slower expansion of per capita incomes and consumption in
the industrialized countries make an even greater difference to the global
environment? Over a quarter of the cultivable land in the Third World is
currently used to grow crops for markets of the industrialized countries. In-
deed, Third World agricultural exports have been increasing by 17 percent
annually since the 1970s (often at low prices), while food imports have in-
creased by about 20 percent per year (Vergopoulous, 1984). In the United
States, fertilizer use per capita has increased fivefold since 1950. Most Third
World countries do not have the economic resources to purchase fertilizer
to restore the fertility of overused soils. Could not increased resource trans-
fers to the Third World or even a restructuring of the global economy reduce
the degradation of the environment associated with extreme poverty and
ignorance?
Development and environmental protection policies need to change
soon to reduce damage. Moreover, some forms of environmental degrada-
tion are irreversible: While some damaged land can be reforested or irrigated
and fertilized to be agriculturally productive again, losses of topsoil and of
species diversity are essentially permanent. Long-run policy changes are
also needed. Policies to slow population growth, like other human resource
development policies, have little effect in the short run but powerful effects
in the long run on reducing the potential for environmental deterioration.
Migration policies, particularly those regulating access to and exploitation of
fragile lands, are important even in the short run. Slowing rural-to-urban
migration is also critical to alleviating urban environmental problems.
The need to develop, to increase incomes and consumption, will con-
tinue to have priority over environmental protection because of massive
poverty. Because this poverty is concentrated in the rural areas where most
of the environmental damage in the Third World is occurring, assurance
of development will continue to outweigh environmental considerations.
With a clearer understanding of the environmental problems and their un-
derlying causes, we can learn to recognize that environmental protec-
tion and economic development can be reconciled. But the concept that
embodies both-sustainable development-should be linked to a slower-
growing population.
Notes
1 In 1983 the United Nations organized 6 Farms in the category of < 1.5 hectares
two conferences, one on migration and the are considered by the national planning orga-
other on population and the environment, in nization (SEGEPLAN) as insufficient to sup-
preparation for the 1984 International Confer- port an average rural family.
ence on Population in Mexico City. In neither 7 Land inheritance practices apparently
volume are the linkages between migration vary from one Indian/Ladino region/subcul-
and environmental degradation considered. ture of Guatemala to another, but land is usu-
2 The inherent role of migration in devel- ally divided either among all sons or among
opment processes is widely recognized and all children, ensuring fragmentation of exist-
embodied in economic models, such as Lewis ing farm plots unless children migrate away.
(1954), and in empirical studies, such as 8 Thus, land reform/redistribution, as
Rodgers et al. (I1978). crucial as it would be for redistributing con-
3 Brockett (1988) documents that the trol over resources, reducing poverty and
proportion landless of rural households in "buying time," is ultimately not sufficient in
most countries of Central America, including itself: fertility must also fall dramatically by
Guatemala, is approximately one-fourth, and 2030.
that this has increased in recent decades be- 9 The National Forestry Institute was
cause of the combination of demographic placed under the Ministry of Agriculture in
pressures, increasing fragmentation, and ex- 1988 in an attempt to improve the situation.
port-oriented agricultural policies. Increasing
10 The return migration of workers from
landlessness is also occurring in parts of Asia
central agricultural and urban areas back to
and Africa.
their homes in the west has introduced a
4 The downside of such a shift from tra- number of nonindigenous diseases to the re-
ditional food crops to horticulture in some gion, including tuberculosis, meningitis, ma-
highland communities in Guatemala is a de- laria, and hepatitis.
crease in the food security of small farmers,
11 In 1984-85 about a million persons-
since they no longer produce their own food.
"environmental refugees"-migrated perma-
While the value of the vegetables they pro-
nently from the west to the Khartoum area
duce is currently much higher than that of the
because of the drought. Also, about a million
corn and beans previously produced, they are
persons have migrated from the war-torn
now subject to the vagaries of the interna-
south to the Khartoum area. The rapid growth
tional market for their basic food needs and to
of the capital has resulted in large squatter set-
exploitation by intermediaries. In Sudan, the
tlements with few services, increasing strain
shift to cash crops has also led to nutritional
on transportation systems and health ser-
problems. Whereas farmers previously would
vices, high unemployment, and increasing
have planted a mix of crops to ensure the har-
crime. There are an estimated 20,000 "street
vest of some regardless of climate patterns
children"-a phenomenon unheard of in Su-
during the growing season, dependence on
danese society ten years ago.
one crop has increased their vulnerability to
weather conditions. 12 Thick dust storms, called "haboob,"
are common in the spring in northern Sudan;
5 Other induced responses neglected in
an estimated 200 million tons of fertile topsoil
this essay include (long-run) reductions in fer-
are blown from the Sahel into the atmosphere
tility and postponement of marriage (Davis,
each year.
1963; Bilsborrow, 1987). Our feeling, how-
ever, is that such purely demographic re- 13 Another example of this occurs in the
sponses are less likely to occur in the usual central region. In 1978 the Sudan Environ-
Third World situation unless there are strong ment Conservation Society estimated the car-
government policy efforts. Such efforts, of rying capacity of the central region's grazing
course, have been made in a number of coun- lands at 12 hectares per unit per year, which
tries-e.g., Mexico, Colombia, Tunisia, would mean that 800,000 animals could sur-
China. vive by grazing. If feed were augmented by
crop residues, an additional 1 million could 14 Barnes (1986) notes the effect of urban
be supported, totaling 1.8 million. That same firewood demand on creating rings of defor-
year there were 5 million animals in the re- estation of up to 100 km radius around many
gion. This is probably due to high demand for cities in sub-Saharan Africa.
beef and lamb in urban areas in and near the
region; urban consumption of beef per person
is ten times that of rural consumption.
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Land Use, Migration, and Natural Resource Deterioration: The Experience of Guatemala and

MANY ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING ELIMINATION of tropical forests, de-

Migration and the environment

that rural-to-rural population movements continue to be extremely impor-

Proportion Rate of growth Rate of Proportion Rate of growth R

Worldtotal 38 1.5 2.5 0.7 44 0.8 2.4 0.

Moredevelopedregions 69 -0.3 1.3 0.5 74 -0.2 0

Lessdevelopedregions 27 1.8 3.6 1.4 36 0.9 3.4

LatinAmerica 61 0.3 3.7 1.3 75 0.1 2.6 0

sponse is likely even if per capita incomes are maintained or increased, to

to help sustain the family in the community of origin. Seasonal employment

In the past two decades, population growth in Guatemala (as elsewhere in

Land distibution and land fragmentation

Out of a total national territory of 10.8 million hectares in Guatemala, some

Rural employment adequacy

The rural employment problem in Guatemala is severe. We know from

The implication is that bringing more land into production (including

We have seen that rural population growth is resulting in growing land

FIGURE 1 Forest cover in Guatemala, 1950 and 1985

SOURCE: Leonard, 1987.

FIGURE 2 Percent of land appropriate for agriculture already

> 125 percent

SOURCE: USAID, 1987.

FIGURE 3 Location of four types of environmental damage:

Urbanization of prime agricultural land

XNNO increased flooding

SOURCE: Leonard, 1987.

municipio in which Guatemala City is located received the largest number of

Desertification in the Sudan

and increased gullying. Family members migrated to other agricultural ar-

The increasing severity of environmental problems in the Third World is

growth nor development (increased production) per se is a serious problem

Abdel Salaam, A. A. 1985. "Use of firewood in traditional industries: Khartoum province,"

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