The Aristotelian Corpus: Character and Primary

Divisions
Aristotle’s writings tend to present formidable difficulties to his novice readers. To begin, he
makes heavy use of unexplained technical terminology, and his sentence structure can at
times prove frustrating. Further, on occasion a chapter or even a full treatise coming down to
us under his name appears haphazardly organized, if organized at all; indeed, in several
cases, scholars dispute whether a continuous treatise currently arranged under a single title
was ever intended by Aristotle to be published in its present form or was rather stitched
together by some later editor employing whatever principles of organization he deemed
suitable.[4] This helps explain why students who turn to Aristotle after first being introduced
to the supple and mellifluous prose on display in Plato’s dialogues often find the experience
frustrating. Aristotle’s prose requires some acclimatization.
All the more puzzling, then, is Cicero’s observation that if Plato’s prose was silver,
Aristotle’s was a flowing river of gold (Ac. Pr. 38.119, cf. Top. 1.3, De or. 1.2.49). Cicero
was arguably the greatest prose stylist of Latin and was also without question an
accomplished and fair-minded critic of the prose styles of others writing in both Latin and
Greek. We must assume, then, that Cicero had before him works of Aristotle other than those
we possess. In fact, we know that Aristotle wrote dialogues, presumably while still in the
Academy, and in their few surviving remnants we are afforded a glimpse of the style Cicero
describes. In most of what we possess, unfortunately, we find work of a much less polished
character. Rather, Aristotle’s extant works read like what they very probably are: lecture
notes, drafts first written and then reworked, ongoing records of continuing investigations,
and, generally speaking, in-house compilations intended not for a general audience but for an
inner circle of auditors. These are to be contrasted with the “exoteric” writings Aristotle
sometimes mentions, his more graceful compositions intended for a wider audience
(Pol. 1278b30; EE 1217b22, 1218b34). Unfortunately, then, we are left for the most part,
though certainly not entirely, with unfinished works in progress rather than with finished and
polished productions. Still, many of those who persist with Aristotle come to appreciate the
unembellished directness of his style.
More importantly, the unvarnished condition of Aristotle’s surviving treatises does not
hamper our ability to come to grips with their philosophical content. His thirty-one surviving
works (that is, those contained in the “Corpus Aristotelicum” of our medieval manuscripts
that are judged to be authentic) all contain recognizably Aristotelian doctrine; and most of
these contain theses whose basic purport is clear, even where matters of detail and nuance are
subject to exegetical controversy.
These works may be categorized in terms of the intuitive organizational principles preferred
by Aristotle. He refers to the branches of learning as “sciences” (epistêmai), best regarded as
organized bodies of learning completed for presentation rather than as ongoing records of
empirical researches. Moreover, again in his terminology, natural sciences such as physics
are but one branch of theoretical science, which comprises both empirical and non-empirical
pursuits. He distinguishes theoretical science from more practically oriented studies, some of
which concern human conduct and others of which focus on the productive crafts. Thus, the
Aristotelian sciences divide into three: (i) theoretical, (ii) practical, and (iii) productive. The
principles of division are straightforward: theoretical science seeks knowledge for its own
sake; practical science concerns conduct and goodness in action, both individual and societal;
and productive science aims at the creation of beautiful or useful objects (Top. 145a15–
16; Phys. 192b8–12; DC 298a27–32, DA 403a27–b2; Met. 1025b25, 1026a18–19, 1064a16–
19, b1–3; EN 1139a26–28, 1141b29–32).
(i) The theoretical sciences include prominently what Aristotle calls first philosophy, or
metaphysics as we now call it, but also mathematics, and physics, or natural philosophy.
Physics studies the natural universe as a whole, and tends in Aristotle’s hands to concentrate
on conceptual puzzles pertaining to nature rather than on empirical research; but it reaches
further, so that it includes also a theory of causal explanation and finally even a proof of an
unmoved mover thought to be the first and final cause of all motion. Many of the puzzles of
primary concern to Aristotle have proven perennially attractive to philosophers,
mathematicians, and theoretically inclined natural scientists. They include, as a small sample,
Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, puzzles about time, the nature of place, and difficulties
encountered in thought about the infinite.
Natural philosophy also incorporates the special sciences, including biology, botany, and
astronomical theory. Most contemporary critics think that Aristotle treats psychology as a
sub-branch of natural philosophy, because he regards the soul (psuchê) as the basic principle
of life, including all animal and plant life. In fact, however, the evidence for this conclusion
is inconclusive at best. It is instructive to note that earlier periods of Aristotelian scholarship
thought this controversial, so that, for instance, even something as innocuous-sounding as the
question of the proper home of psychology in Aristotle’s division of the sciences ignited a
multi-decade debate in the Renaissance.[5]
(ii) Practical sciences are less contentious, at least as regards their range. These deal with
conduct and action, both individual and societal. Practical science thus contrasts with
theoretical science, which seeks knowledge for its own sake, and, less obviously, with the
productive sciences, which deal with the creation of products external to sciences
themselves. Both politics and ethics fall under this branch.
(iii) Finally, then, the productive sciences are mainly crafts aimed at the production of
artefacts, or of human productions more broadly construed. The productive sciences include,
among others, ship-building, agriculture, and medicine, but also the arts of music, theatre,
and dance. Another form of productive science is rhetoric, which treats the principles of
speech-making appropriate to various forensic and persuasive settings, including centrally
political assemblies.
Significantly, Aristotle’s tri-fold division of the sciences makes no mention of logic.
Although he did not use the word ‘logic’ in our sense of the term, Aristotle in fact developed
the first formalized system of logic and valid inference. In Aristotle’s framework—although
he is nowhere explicit about this—logic belongs to no one science, but rather formulates the
principles of correct argumentation suitable to all areas of inquiry in common. It
systematizes the principles licensing acceptable inference, and helps to highlight at an
abstract level seductive patterns of incorrect inference to be avoided by anyone with a
primary interest in truth. So, alongside his more technical work in logic and logical theory,
Aristotle investigates informal styles of argumentation and seeks to expose common patterns
of fallacious reasoning.
Aristotle’s investigations into logic and the forms of argumentation make up part of the
group of works coming down to us from the Middle Ages under the heading
the Organon (organon = tool in Greek). Although not so characterized in these terms by
Aristotle, the name is apt, so long as it is borne in mind that intellectual inquiry requires a
broad range of tools. Thus, in addition to logic and argumentation (treated primarily in
the Prior Analytics and Topics), the works included in the Organon deal with category
theory, the doctrine of propositions and terms, the structure of scientific theory, and to some
extent the basic principles of epistemology.
When we slot Aristotle’s most important surviving authentic works into this scheme, we end
up with the following basic divisions of his major writings:
 Organon
o Categories (Cat.)
o De Interpretatione (DI) [On Interpretation]
o Prior Analytics (APr)
o Posterior Analytics (APo)
o Topics (Top.)
o Sophistical Refutations (SE)
 Theoretical Sciences
o Physics (Phys.)
o Generation and Corruption (Gen. et Corr.)
o De Caelo (DC) [On the Heavens]
o Metaphysics (Met.)
o De Anima (DA) [On the Soul]
o Parva Naturalia (PN) [Brief Natural Treatises]
o History of Animals (HA)
o Parts of Animals (PA)
o Movement of Animals (MA)
o Meteorology (Meteor.)
o Progression of Animals (IA)
o Generation of Animals (GA)
  Practical Sciences
o Nicomachean Ethics (EN)
o Eudemian Ethics (EE)
o Magna Moralia (MM) [Great Ethics]
o Politics (Pol.)
 Productive Science
o Rhetoric (Rhet.)
o Poetics (Poet.)
The titles in this list are those in most common use today in English-language scholarship,
followed by standard abbreviations in parentheses. For no discernible reason, Latin titles are
customarily employed in some cases, English in others. Where Latin titles are in general use,
English equivalents are given in square brackets.