The document describes a case study reported to the Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS) where a patient's radiation therapy treatment was delivered to the wrong vertebral body. There were two contributing factors - the lack of a timeout with the radiation oncology team present, and the failure to verify the correct vertebral level with onboard imaging. To prevent similar errors, the document recommends requiring timeouts and onboard imaging to verify patient alignment, as well as establishing standard procedures for shifts greater than 2 cm.
The document describes a case study reported to the Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS) where a patient's radiation therapy treatment was delivered to the wrong vertebral body. There were two contributing factors - the lack of a timeout with the radiation oncology team present, and the failure to verify the correct vertebral level with onboard imaging. To prevent similar errors, the document recommends requiring timeouts and onboard imaging to verify patient alignment, as well as establishing standard procedures for shifts greater than 2 cm.
The document describes a case study reported to the Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS) where a patient's radiation therapy treatment was delivered to the wrong vertebral body. There were two contributing factors - the lack of a timeout with the radiation oncology team present, and the failure to verify the correct vertebral level with onboard imaging. To prevent similar errors, the document recommends requiring timeouts and onboard imaging to verify patient alignment, as well as establishing standard procedures for shifts greater than 2 cm.
The document describes a case study reported to the Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS) where a patient's radiation therapy treatment was delivered to the wrong vertebral body. There were two contributing factors - the lack of a timeout with the radiation oncology team present, and the failure to verify the correct vertebral level with onboard imaging. To prevent similar errors, the document recommends requiring timeouts and onboard imaging to verify patient alignment, as well as establishing standard procedures for shifts greater than 2 cm.
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Haley Kroeplin DOS 518 Professional Issues September 26, 2020 Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS) Case Study
Radiation therapy is a therapeutic treatment modality used to treat a wide variety of
cancer patients with curative or palliative intent. Although most treatments are delivered safely and effectively, there have been a few incidents that have received national attention in the past due to catastrophic treatment errors.1 In light of these unfortunate events, the American Society for Radiation Oncology (ASTRO) and American Association of Physicists in Medicine (AAPM) developed the Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS) in June 2014, through ASTRO’s Target Safely program.2 The mission of this national error reporting system is to promote safe and superior quality of care in radiation oncology by implementing a database for institutions to learn from each other in a secure and non-disciplinary setting in order to prevent similar mistakes occurring in their departments in the future.3 Since its introduction in 2014, more than 550 United States healthcare organizations have joined RO-ILS to provide patient safety information to the database.2 The following case was logged into the RO-ILS and will be evaluated with a focus of identifying what went wrong in the process and providing recommendations that may prevent the mistake from occurring again. The specifics of this case are as follows: for one fraction out of course of 45 fractions, a patient’s radiation therapy treatment was delivered to the wrong vertebral body. The patient was positioned in a stereotactic body fix system and aligned to their three-point tattoos. Once the patient’s tattoos were aligned with the lasers in the room, the therapists stepped out of the room to perform daily shifts from the tattoos to the isocenter. On the day that the error was made, the stereotactic system requested a shift of 2.5 cm in the sup/inf direction which was applied by the therapists. A conebeam computed tomography (CBCT) was performed thereafter and a -0.4 cm correction was made in the sup/inf direction. This resulted in a total offset from the correct isocenter to be 2.1 cm. It wasn’t until after the treatment, that a physician who was reviewing the CBCT images noticed that the radiation therapy treatment was delivered to the wrong vertebral body. Upon evaluation of this incident submitted to the RO-ILS, there are a couple contributing factors that led to this adverse event in which the radiation therapists administered a patient’s radiation therapy treatment to the incorrect vertebral body. If this error occurred during the first treatment, one of the contributing components would have been the lack of members of the 2 Haley Kroeplin DOS 518 Professional Issues September 26, 2020 radiation oncology team, such as the radiation oncologist and radiation therapists, present during the time out or procedural pause prior to treatment. Having various radiation oncology team members present to verify and agree that the correct vertebral body was localized prior to treatment delivery would have prevented this error. In addition, this would have eliminated the error being caught post treatment when a physician was reviewing the patient’s offline CBCT images. If this error occurred during a subsequent treatment, the therapists could have called a time-out to double check that the patient was setup correctly and that the correct patient chart was pulled up. If everything was correct, they should have called a physician to review images if they were questioning why the stereotactic system calculated a larger than normal shift for this patient. By taking the time to verify alignment or question unusual shifts, would have hopefully resulted in a ‘good catch’ and ‘near miss’ rather than a treatment error. The second contributing factor that led to this error is not verifying the vertebral level with onboard imaging (OBI). It is well known that without including bony landmark anatomy, such as the base of skull, first or twelfth thoracic vertebra, or the fifth lumbar spine, localization of the correct vertebral level can be difficult. During this incident, the radiation therapists could have shifted the OBI imager to include one of these landmarks in order to count the vertebral bodies and identify the correct level for treatment prior to utilizing the stereotactic system or CBCT. Furthermore, they could have also verified the vertebral level after they noticed that a greater than 2 cm shift was noted with initial imaging. Establishing institutional imaging guidelines about verifying vertebral level with OBI prior to additional imaging or requiring verification of vertebral level with OBI if shifts are greater than 2 cm in any direction would ensure that another radiation therapy treatment delivered to the wrong vertebral body would not occur. Although mistakes can happen, it is imperative that institutions learn from the errors reported in the RO-ILS and develop protocols that would prevent a similar error from occurring within their departments. As noted by Hendee et al4 empowering team members to declare a time out if they have any questions or concerns about a patient’s treatment and establishing standard operating procedures can diminish errors in radiation oncology. By incorporating these recommendations within a radiation oncology department, ensures that patient safety is the primary focus and responsibility of all team members. 3 Haley Kroeplin DOS 518 Professional Issues September 26, 2020 References
1. Terezakis SA, Pronovost P, Harris K, Deweese T, Ford E. Safety strategies in an academic
radiation oncology department and recommendations for action. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2011;37(7):291-299. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1553-7250(11)37037-7 2. Evans SB, Ford EC. Radiation oncology incident learning system: A call to participation. International Journal of Radiation Oncology Biology Physics. 2014;90(2):249-250. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijrobp.2014.05.2671 3. Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System. American Society for Radiation Oncology website. https://www.astro.org/Patient-Care-and-Research/Patient-Safety/RO-ILS. Accessed October 1, 2020. 4. Hendee WR, Herman MG. Improving patient safety in radiation oncology. International Journal of Radiation Oncology Biology Physics. 2010;38(1):78-82. https://doi.org/10.1118/1.3522875