Background Brief Rough Waters Ahead Critical Review
Background Brief Rough Waters Ahead Critical Review
Background Brief Rough Waters Ahead Critical Review
1
Huong Le Thu, “Rough Waters Ahead for Vietnam-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, September 30, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/30/rough-waters-
ahead-for-vietnam-china-relations-pub-82826.
2
2
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy,” in Takashi Inoguchi, ed., The SAGE Handbook of Asian
Foreign Policy, Chapter 33, Vol. 2, 2019. 709-729, Thayer, “The Evolution of Vietnamese Diplomacy,
1986-2016,” in Le Hong Hiep and Anton Tsvetov, eds. Vietnam’s Foreign Policy under Doi Moi
(Singapore: Yusof Ishak Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2018), 23-44, and Thayer, “Vietnam’s
Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-US Competition and Increasing Domestic Political Influence,”
Asian Security, 3(2017), 183-199.
3
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Strategy of ‘Cooperating and Struggling’ with China over Maritime
Disputes in the South China Sea,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 3(2), 2016, 200-
220 and Thayer, “Vietnam: China a Partner of Cooperation and Object of Struggle,” CPI Analysis, China
3
It should be noted that “cooperation and struggle” was adopted not just to engage
China but other major powers as well, including the United States. The Central
Committee resolution on cooperation and struggle provided the ideological rationale
for inintiating defence relations with the U.S. In November 2003, for example, General
Pham Van Tra made the first visit to Washington by a defence minister from reunified
Vietnam. General Tra met with Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and the two
agreed to exchange visits on an alternating basis.
The VCP Central Committee Resolution of 2003 was reviewed and re-endorsed in
2013. It continues to provide the framework for Vietnam’s relations with its strategic
and comprehensive partners. For example, according to Vietnam’s Deputy Minister of
National Defence, Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh, speaking at the launch of the 2019
Defence White Paper,4 Vietnam struggles to promote cooperation.
The concept of “cooperation and struggle” is central to Vietnam’s foreign policy.5 Yet
the author of Rough Waters Ahead only makes fleeting reference to it without further
elaboration. She writes, “Vietnam has tried to safeguard its sovereignty while also
working with China in a spirit of ‘cooperating while struggling.’”
3. Three Nos and Four Nos
The author of Rough Waters Ahead makes much of Vietnam’s policy of “three nos”
and the inclusion of a “fourth no” in its 2019 Defence White Book. The White Book
declares:
Viet Nam consistently advocates neither joining any military alliances, siding with one
country against another, giving any other countries permission to set up military bases
or use its territory to carry out military activities against other countries nor using force
or threatening to use force in international relations (emphasis added).6
In fact, the “three nos” have appeared in all four of Vietnam’s Defence White Papers
first published in 1998 and subsequently (2004, 2009 and 2019).
With respect to the “three nos,” the 1998 Defence White Paper states, “Vietnam
neither joins any military alliances nor engages in any military operations contrary to
the spirit of safeguarding peace, nor in any operations of deterrence.”7
The 2004 Defence White Paper declares, “Vietnam consistently advocates neither
joining any military alliance nor giving any foreign countries permission to have
4
Vietnam uses the term Sách Trắng, literally White Book. The term White Paper is used here because
it is more familiar to readers.
5
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Strategy of ‘Cooperating and Struggling’ with China over Maritime
Disputes in the South China Sea,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 3(2), 2016, 200-
220.
6
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of National Defense, 2019 Viet Nam National Defence (Hanoi
2019), p. 23.
7
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Defense, Vietnam: Consolidating National Defence,
Safeguarding The Homeland (Hanoi 1998), p. 20.
4
military bases in Vietnam. Vietnam will never take part in any military activity that
uses force against any other country (emphasis added).”8 This was the first time a
“fourth no” was included in Vietnam’s Defence White Paper.
Finally, the 2009 Defence White Paper expressed the “three no’s” in these words,
“Vietnam consistently advocates neither joining any military alliances nor giving any
other countries permission to have a military bases or use its soil to carry out military
activities against other countries.”9
In the section headed Making Necessary Strategic Revisions, the author argues that
The strategic document [2019 Defence White Paper] updated Vietnam’s Three Nos
policy and included a fourth No, denouncing the use of force or threatened use of force
to settle disputes. In this way, Hanoi is communicating its red line. Despite the original
terms of the Three Nos, Hanoi appears to be carving our targeted exceptions to expand
its freedom of action. The document states that the Vietnamese government “is willing
to welcome vessels of navies, coast guards, border guards and international or ordinary
organisations to make courtesy port visits or stop over in its ports to repair, replenish
logistics and technical supplies or take refuges [sic] from natural disasters.”
Then the author jumps to the conclusion that
Vietnam’s openness to allowing ships from other countries to dock at its ports could be
viewed as an endorsement of further military collaboration with regional and global
actors. Notably, such a policy goes against China’s recommendations for ASEAN’s code
of conduct for the South China Sea, which aims to limit regional countries’ military tries
with external powers.
Four comments arise from the two paragraphs quoted above. First, the author’s use
of the term “red line” is confusing. Ordinarily, when a state declares a red line, it is
laying down conditions towards another state to limit its behaviour and warning that
state not to cross the red line or face the consequences. According to Albert Wolf:
Nearly every time a threat is issued, policy-makers refer to it as a “red line” so as to
underscore its seriousness. A “red line” can be thought of as an unequivocal threat, a
line in the sand that if crossed, the target would incur the full fury of the state that
issued the threat in the first place.10
But Vietnam’s “four nos” in its 2019 Defence White Paper cannot be viewed either as
a redline or a threat to China. In the context in which the author uses the term “red
line” it can be read paradoxically as an attempt by Vietnam to pre-empt China’s
concerns by declaring what Vietnam will not do!
Second, Vietnam’s 2019 Defence White Paper did not carve out any exemptions to its
long-standing policy of three no’s. All visits by foreign military ships to Vietnam are
regulated by Decree No. 104 (2012) on Rules for Foreign Military Vessels to the
8
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Defense, Vietnam’s National Defense in the Early Years of
the 21st Century (Hanoi 2004), p. 14.
9
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of National Defense, Vietnam National Defence (Hanoi 2009),
p. 21.
10
Albert Wolf, “Backing Down: Why Red Lines Matter in Geopolitics,” Modern War Institute, United
States Military Academy at West Point, August 17, 2016, https://mwi.usma.edu/geopolitical-costs-red-
lines/.
5
11
Nghị định 104/2012/NĐ-CP: Quy định đối với tàu quân sự nước ngoài đến nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ
nghĩa Việt Nam.
6
region, unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no
objection.”12
In summary, Vietnam’s policy of “three/four nos” is of long-standing. It reflects
Vietnam’s foreign policy of non-alignment and Vietnam’s re-evaluation of its
relationship with the Soviet Union from 1978 until the Soviet Union collapsed in late
1991.13 During the period after 1991, Vietnam and the Russian Federation became
embroiled in protracted negotiations over Vietnam’s repayment of Soviet-era debts
and Vietnam’s attempts to extract rent from Russia for its continued access to Cam
Ranh Bay. These negotiations fell through and Russia withdrew in early 2002.
Rough Waters Ahead concludes, “Hanoi has also signalled with its new Fourth No that
it is determined to defend its rights and will not limit itself as it explores options to
protect its freedom of action and keep its sovereignty intact.” Vietnam’s fourth no
says no such thing; it states: “Vietnam consistently advocates… (not) using force or
threatening to use force in international relations.”
4. South China Sea Dispute
The analysis in Rough Waters Ahead of the South China Sea dispute between China
and Vietnam is episodic and in places empirically deficient. As noted above, the author
argues that bilateral relations are “arguably one of the lowest points in the
relationship since the 1980s.” The author identifies the 2014 maritime confrontation
“as the closest Hanoi and Beijing have come to escalating into open confrontation
since the bloody incident over Johnson South Reef in 1988.” As closer examination of
the 2014 confrontation reveals otherwise as both sides kept the confrontation limited.
In May 2014, China parked the mega oil drilling rig Hai Yang Shi You (HYSY) 981 in
Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) accompanied by a flotilla of fifty or more
PLAN warships, China Coast Guard vessels, Maritime Militia trawlers and fishing boats.
The flotilla formed a series of protective concentric rings around the HYSY 981 with
PLAN warships forming the inner ring. Chinese military aircraft regularly overflew the
area.
Over the course of two and a half months there were daily confrontations between
China Coast Guard, Maritime Militia and Chinese fishing boats, on the one hand, and
the Vietnam Coast Guard and Fisheries Surveillance Force, on the other. The
confrontations at sea took the form of ramming and the use of high-powered water
cannons mainly by Chinese flagged vessels. At least one Vietnamese fishing boat was
capsized. Vietnam, for its part, stood its ground and won a propaganda coup by
embedding foreign media on its maritime law enforcement vessels to record the daily
confrontations to a global audience.
12
Quoted in Carl Thayer, “A Closer Look at the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of
Conduct,” The Diplomat, August 3, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/a-closer-look-at-the-
asean-china-single-draft-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/. I was leaked a copy of the draft.
13
On November 3, 1978 Hanoi and Moscow signed a twenty-five year Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a
quasi-alliance. See: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396337908441794?src=recsys.
7
There is little evidence that this confrontation ever reached the brink of armed
violence. Vietnam prudently kept its naval warships and military aircraft well out of
the area near the HYSY 981. How and why the confrontation ended is discussed below.
Remarkably, Rough Waters Ahead does not discuss key events further south in waters
surrounding Vanguard Bank three years later. As a result of Chinese political pressure
and reported threats of force, Vietnam twice terminated oil exploration operations in
the Vanguard Bank area by Repsol of Spain, the first in mid-2017 and the second in
March 2018.
In May 2019, China dispatched the Hai Yang Dizhi 8 to the Vanguard Bank area to
conduct seismic surveys in Vietnam’s EEZ. The Hai Yang Dizhi 8 was accompanied by
a naval escort of China Coast Guard vessels and Maritime Militia trawlers. China Coast
Guard vessels also harassed oil exploration activities nearby at Bock 06-1 conducted
by Russia’s Rosneft.
Vietnam mobilized a number of Coast Guard and Fishery Surveillance Force vessels
plus some fishing boats to maintain a low-key watching brief. Unlike 2014, Vietnam
kept a tight lid on press reporting in the domestic media and did not embed foreign
journalists on its maritime law enforcement vessels. Vietnam did, however, publicly
call for support from the international community. The United States responded with
a loud and clear criticism of China.
Only one serious incident was reported in 2019 at the beginning of the five-month
maritime confrontation. China only used high powered water cannons and sirens to
warn off Vietnamese maritime law enforcement vessels if they ventured too close to
Chinese ships. There were no reports of ramming. This confrontation came to an end
when Vietnam cancelled the operations of a survey ship leased to Rosneft before it
could commence operations in Block 06-1.
The importance of the events of 2017-19 is that Vietnam backed down in the face of
Chinese intimidation and halted all oil exploration activities in the disputed area near
Vanguard Bank. One source reports that Vietnam had to absorb one billion dollars in
debt for its suspension of oil exploration operations.14 By backing down in the face of
Chinese intimidation it will be extremely difficult for Vietnam to resume operations in
this area. In effect, Vietnam seemingly forfeited the right to develop its own
hydrocarbon resources that are needed for economic development.
The following section critiques nine assertions made by the author concerning various
developments in the South China Sea.
First, in the section on Seas Apart, the author begins her discussion by focusing on
disputes in the Gulf of Tonkin throughout the 1990s in very general terms, without
mentioning the parallel emergence of disputes in the South China Sea at the same
time. For example, there is no mention of China’s 1992 Law on Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone which claimed the land features and waters in the South China Sea.
Nor is there any mention of the maritime confrontations between China and Vietnam
between 1992 and 1996 following China’s grant of an exploration lease to the U.S.
14
Bill Hayton, “China’s Pressure Costs Vietnam $1 Billion in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, July
22, 2020.
8
15
Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Structure of Vietnam-China Relations, 1991-2008,” Journal of International
Culture [Chosun University], (December 2008), 1(2), 45-98.
16
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam and Rising China: The Structural Dynamics of Mature Asymmetry,” in
Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 2010. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
390-391 and Thayer “The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South
China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33(3), 2011, 350.
17
Thayer, “Vietnam and Rising China: The Structural Dynamics of Mature Asymmetry,” 392-393 and
Thayer “The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China Sea,”
351.
18
Thayer “The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China
Sea,” 351 and 357,
9
• Coast Guard Joint Patrols. In 2000, Vietnam and China signed two important
documents: Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones
and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin and Agreement on Fishing
Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin. The latter led to joint patrols by their respective
Coast Guards. In April 2020, the nineteenth joint Coast Guard fishery patrol was
successfully concluded.
• Navy-to-Navy Cooperation.19 In October 2005, the Chinese and Vietnamese
Defence Ministers reached agreement on the conduct of joint naval patrols in the
Gulf of Tonkin. The inaugural joint patrol was conducted in April 2006. In June
2020, the Vietnam People’s Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy
completed their twenty-eighth joint patrol. The two navies also host friendly port
visits.
• Hotlines. Vietnam and China established several hotlines, the first over a decade
ago. In 2008, China and Vietnam agreed to set up a hotline between their heads
of state to deal with urgent issues; it was activated the following year. In 2011,
Vietnam and China established a hotline between their ministries of national
defence. In 2013, Vietnam and China established a hotline between their navies.
During the 2014 HYSI 981 confrontation, Vietnam utilised multiple channels of
communication, including hotlines, to establish contact with China. This was to no
avail as China refused to respond. In October 2014, Vietnam and China signed a
technical Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of direct
communication lines between their respective defence ministries. In 2015,
Vietnam and China set up a hotline between their coast guards.20
Third, the author’s discussion of the 2014 confrontation erroneously treats China and
Vietnam as equally culpable and overstates the likelihood of armed conflict. For
example, the author asserts, “Chinese and Vietnamese vessels harassed each other
intensely and appeared to be on the brink of violence.” China was responsible for the
lion’s share of incidents through deliberate ramming of Vietnamese maritime law
enforcement vessels and the use of high-powered water cannon to de-mast their
communications antennae. As noted previously, Vietnam kept its naval warships well
away from the confrontation around the HYSY 981 thus reducing the risk of armed
conflict.
Fourth, the author blithely asserts that “the [2014] incident was eventually resolved.
And the CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Company) withdrew the oil rig ahead of
its scheduled departure.” How and why was this incident resolved apparently so
easily?
The incident was resolved because pressure built up within the VCP to convene a
special meeting of the Central Committee to consider “exiting China’s orbit” (thoát
19
Thayer, “Vietnam and Rising China: The Structural Dynamics of Mature Asymmetry,” 393-394.
20
Carl Thayer, “China-Vietnam Establish Defense Hot Line – What’s Next?” cogitAsia, October 23, 2014.
http://cogitasia.com/china-vietnam-establish-defense-hot-line-whats-next/.
10
trung) and leaning closer to the United States.21 China caught wind of this
development and took pre-emptive action. China withdrew the HYSY 981 declaring it
had completed its mission and as a safety measure due an approaching tropical storm.
China’s actions took the wind out of the sails of those advocating a special Central
Committee meeting. Shortly after, China received a special envoy of Vietnam’s party
Secretary General and tensions abated.
Fifth, the author asserts that in 2016 Vietnam “enthusiastically supported the final
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal that heard the case brought by the Philippines against
Vietnam.” The record shows that Vietnam was much more circumspect. On the day
the Award was issued, a spokesperson for Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry stated, “Viet
Nam welcomes the fact that, on 12 July 2016, the Tribunal issued its Award in the
arbitration between the Philippines and China. Viet Nam will make a statement on the
content of this Award… Viet Nam strongly supports the settlement of disputes in the
East Sea by peaceful means, including legal and diplomatic processes…”22
Sixth, the author writes, “Vietnam has garnered praise for its ability to successfully
‘compartmentalise’ the maritime disputes with China and cooperate on other fronts,
including economic development, infrastructure, education, and even political
dialogues. But this relative equilibrium has been steadily eroding in recent years.”
Later the author asserts that “Beijing’s transformation has left no more room for other
aspects of Sino-Vietnamese ties to flourish, as the South China Sea now dominates the
relationship.”
Since normalization of relations in 1991 Vietnam’s trade deficit with China and the
South China Sea have been a hardy perennial in the relationship. Nonetheless, two
aspects of bilateral relations have “flourished” – stability along the land border and
two-way tourism (pre-COVID). Vietnam and China conduct an annual friendly border
exchange hosted by their respective defence ministers. There is also day to day
cooperation by border provinces including joint security patrols.
The author’s use of the word “flourish” may be something of a strawman. What is
needed is a nuanced and balanced evaluation of how both Vietnam and China are
managing their bilateral relations under the stress of their South China Sea dispute.
Vietnam and China are comprehensive strategic cooperative partners a designation
no other country holds with Vietnam. At the recent twelfth meeting of the Steering
21
Carlyle A. Thayer, “4 Reasons China Removed Oil Rig HYSY-981 Sooner Than Planned,” The Diplomat,
July 22, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/4-reasons-china-removed-oil-rig-hysy-981-sooner-
than-planned/.
22
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Remarks of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet
Nam on Viet Nam’s reaction to the issuance of the Award by the Tribunal constituted under Annex VII
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the arbitration between the Philippines and
China,” 12 July 2016; http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns160712211059. See also: Carlyle
A. Thayer, “The Southeast Asia Claimant States, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute,” in The South
China Sea in the Broader Maritime Security of the Indo-Pacific Region, NASSP Issue Brief Series, National
Asian Security Studies Program Issue Brief No. 6.1, December 2016, 1-9.
https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/nassp-
pdf/6.1%2C%20The%20Southeast%20Asia%20Claimant%20States%2C...pdf.
11
Committee for Bilateral Cooperation the Vietnam News Agency reported on 21 July
2020:
Cooperation between ministries and agencies, and exchanges between localities have
also been expanded.
Two-way trade rose 4.5% in the first half of this year despite the impact of the
pandemic.
Chinese investment in Vietnam surged in 2019, and China now ranks seventh among
132 countries and territories investing in Viet Nam.
Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, China had been the biggest source of tourists to Viet
Nam for many consecutive years, and Viet Nam was among the top countries in ASEAN
with large numbers of holidaymakers visiting China.
On the positive side of the ledger, the two sides agreed “that the management of
border lines, boundary markers and border gates has been implemented well, while
cross-border economic activities have been promoted despite the complicated
developments of COVID-19 pandemic. They agreed to strengthen coordination in
border management and protection…”
On the negative side of the ledger were a number of outstanding issues such as
Vietnam’s trade deficit, sluggish progress on various projects funded and managed by
Chinese contractors, and slow implementation of Chinese loans and non-refundable
aid. With respect to trade, Vietnam has long pressed China to facilitate cross border
trade, import more Vietnamese agricultural produce, and step up Chinese investment
in hi-tech and environmentally friendly sectors in Vietnam. Finally, the two sides
“engaged in candid discussion about the recent situation at sea and their differences
regarding sea-related issue(s).”
The outcome of the twelfth meeting of the Steering Committee for Bilateral
Cooperation suggests that both sides have continued to compartmentalize their South
China Sea dispute from impacting negatively on cooperation programs currently
underway. Finally, the two sides agreed “on stronger cooperation in science-
technology, environmental protection, transportation, agriculture, health care,
culture, education, tourism and people-to-people exchanges…”
Seventh, the author writes that “Brunei, Malaysia and even the Philippines in recent
years have taken to downplaying their claims vis-à-vis China far more than they use
to. This is especially true of the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte….” Facts
demonstrate the opposite in the case of the Philippines.
On 22 April 2020, Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. lodged two
diplomatic protests with the Chinese Embassy in Manila. The first diplomatic note
protested China’s actions including Philippine territory as part of Hainan province. The
second diplomatic note protested the actions of a Chinese warship that pointed its fire
control radar at a Philippine Navy ship in Philippine waters. Locsin said both actions
constituted “violations of international law and Philippine sovereignty.”
On 2 July 2020, the Philippine Secretary of Defence Delfin Lorenzana described China’s
military exercises in the South China Sea as “very concerning, we view that with alarm.
Doing it in the contested areas then that will, you know, sound the alarm bells for all
the claimants. That’s highly provocative.”
12