Evolution Indonesia Participation Global Value Chains

THE EVOLUTION OF
INDONESIA’S PARTICIPATION IN
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
OCTOBER 2019
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

THE EVOLUTION OF
INDONESIA’S PARTICIPATION IN
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
OCTOBER 2019
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

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On the cover. Top row, left to right. Neighbors helping each other pull a fishing net in Gentuma
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Printed on recycled paper

Contents
Tables, Figures, and Boxes v
Foreword by the Vice-President for Knowledge viii

Management, Asian Development Bank
Foreword by the Vice-President, Country Programs, xi

Islamic Development Bank
Acknowledgments xiii
Abbreviations xv
Highlights xvi
1. Introduction 1
2. Indonesia’s Production and Value-Added Exports 9
2.1 Domestic Production and Consumption of Intermediate Goods 10

and Services
2.2 Value-Added Sources in Final Products 13
2.3 What Comprises Indonesia’s Exports? Decomposing Indonesia’s 16
Exports into Value-Added Terms
2.4 Tracing Indonesia’s Value-Added Links through Network Analysis 23
3. Indonesia’s Participation, Position, and 29

Specialization in Global Value Chains
3.1 Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains 29

3.2 Indonesia’s Position in Global Value Chains 42
3.2.1 Indonesia’s Average Position in Global Value Chains 43
3.2.2 Positions of Indonesia’s Sectors in Global Value Chains 48
3.3 Indonesia’s Specialization in Global Value Chains 52
3.4 Evolution of Participation, Position, and Specialization in Indonesia 58
iv Contents
4. Examining Other Aspects of Global Value Chains: 63

The Case of Indonesia
4.1 Agglomeration in Indonesia 63

4.2 Jobs and Technology in Indonesia 70
4.3 Indonesia Amidst Trade Conflict 73
4.4 Attracting Foreign Direct Investment for Global Value Chains 83
4.4.1 The Global Value Chain-Foreign Direct Investment Nexus 83
4.4.2 Foreign Direct Investment as a Driver of Factory Asia 84
4.4.3 Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia: A Closer Look 86
4.4.4 The Inextricable Link Between Foreign Direct Investment, 92
Uncertainty, and Policy
5. Reaping the Benefits of Global Value Chain 95

Participation: Conclusion and Policy
Recommendations
AppendixES
1 List of Economies in the ADB Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables 99

2 List of Sectors in the ADB Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables 101
3 New Revealed Comparative Advantage and Agglomeration Index 103
Regression Results
References 107
v
Tables, Figures, and Boxes
TABLES
2.1 Use of Intermediate Imports and Production of Intermediate Exports, 12

Indonesia, 2000, 2007, and 2017
4.1 Sector and Economic Block Descriptions and Color Legend 63
for Dot- Plot Matrices
4.2 Agglomeration Indices of Broad Sectors in Indonesia, 2000, 2007–2017 67
4.3 Change in Labor Demand in Indonesia, by Broad Economic Sector, 71
2005 versus 2015
4.4 Change in Manufacturing and Services Labor Demand in Indonesia, 71
by Occupation Type, 2005 versus 2015
4.5 Tariff-Affected Commodities Bilaterally Traded by Indonesia with 82
the United States and the People’s Republic of China
4.6 Top Recipients of Foreign Direct Investment (Balance of Payment) 85
in Asia, 2001–2018
4.7 Top Sources of Foreign Direct Investment (Balance of Payment) 87
to Indonesia, 2001–2018
4.8 Top Recipient Industries, 2003–2018 89
Box 8 Table: Classification of Occupations 72
FIGURES
2.1 Structure of Production and Use of Intermediates, Indonesia, 2000–2017 10

2.2 Structure of Intermediate Imports and Exports, Indonesia, 2000, 2007, 11
and 2017
2.3 Share of Domestic Value-Added in Total Global Value Chain Income, 14
2000–2017
2.4 Share of Domestic Value-Added in Total Sectoral Global Value Chain 15
Income, 2000–2017
2.5 Indonesia’s Share in Other Economies’ Global Value Chain Income, 16
2000, 2007, and 2017
2.6 Foreign Value-Added Shares of Industrial Sectors, Developing Asia, 2017 19
2.7 Decomposition of Gross Exports, by Economy and by Broad Sector 20
Category, 2000–2017
vi Tables, Figures, and Boxes
2.8 Changes in Value-Added Components of Exports, 2000 versus 2007 22

and 2007 versus 2017
2.9 Networks of Value-Added Trade, 2000, 2010, and 2017 26
3.1 Decompositions of Value-Added and Final Production, Indonesia, 33
2000–2017
3.2 Global Value Chain Participation Across Manufacturing Hubs,
2000–2017 34
3.3 Simple and Complex Global Value Chain Participation in Indonesia, 36
2000–2017
3.4 Simple and Complex Global Value Chain Participation in Indonesia, 38
by Sector, 2000–2017
3.5 Trends in Upstreamness Across Economies, 2000–2017 44
3.6 Changes in Upstreamness Across Economies, 2000 versus 2017 46
3.7 Upstreamness of Indonesia’s Industries Across Time, 2000–2017 50
3.8 Industrial Gross Output in Total Gross Output Across Time, 51
2000–2017
3.9 Revealed Comparative Advantage of Broad Sectors in Indonesia, 54
2000–2017
3.10 Ranking of Sectoral Revealed Comparative Advantage in Indonesia, 56
2000, 2007, and 2017
3.11 Revealed Comparative Advantage in Indonesia’s
Medium- and High-technology Manufacturing Sector, 2000–2017 59
3.12 Revealed Comparative Advantage in Indonesia’s
Low-technology Manufacturing Sector, 2000–2017 59
3.13 Participation, Position, and Revealed Comparative Advantage, 60
2000 versus 2017
4.1 Dot Plots, Indonesia’s Technical Coefficient Matrices, 2000, 2007, 64
2010, and 2017
4.2 Gross Domestic Product Impact of the United States and 78
the People’s Republic of China Trade Conflict
4.3 Intra-Asia versus Rest of the World Foreign Direct Investment 88
(Balance of Payment) to Indonesia, 2001–2018
4.4 Firm Level Foreign Investment Activity in Indonesia, 88
by Mode of Entry, 2003–2018
4.5 Firm-Level Foreign Investment Activity in Indonesia, 91
by Broad Industrial Sector, 2003–2018
4.6 Levels of Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 92
1990–2018
4.7 Overall Ease of Doing Business in Indonesia, 2014–2019 94
4.8 Ease of Doing Business—Indonesia in a Comparative Context, 94
2014 versus 2018
Tables, Figures, and Boxes vii
Box 1 Figure: A Stylized Representation of a Multi-Regional Input–Output 3

Box 2 Figure: Decomposition of Gross Exports in Value-Added Terms 17
Box 4 Figure: Decomposition of GDP and Final Goods Production 31
by Country-Sector
Box 10 Figure: Measures Included in the Current Scenario 75
BOXES
1 The Structure of a Multi-Regional Input–Output Table 3

2 Decomposing Exports into Value-Added Terms 17
3 Examining Networks of Value-Added Trade 24
4 Measuring Countries’ Participation in Global Value Chains 30
5 Upstreamness 42
6 Calculating Measures of Revealed Comparative Advantage 53
7 Calculating the Agglomeration Index 68
8 Decomposing Changes in Employment in the Context of 72
Global Value Chains
9 Making Indonesia 4.0 74
10 Estimating the Effects of the Trade Conflict on Developing Asia 75
viii
Foreword by the Vice-President

for Knowledge Management,
Asian Development Bank
T
he last two decades were a time of global value chain (GVC) revolution.
Since the 1990s, the rise of GVCs—that is, complex network structures
of production processes across countries—has changed our economic
landscape in fundamental ways. At the same time, events such as the financial
crisis of 2008 and the escalating trade tensions have shaken global production
and affected trade governance in many economies. While many developing
economies have taken advantage of global production reallocation, others
are still figuring out their role in GVCs.
The vast global interconnection of economies in production and trade helps

developing economies to produce goods, not just assemble them. Asia’s tiger
economies are slowly learning and catching up by linking into GVCs. Instead
of having to build an entire value chain, developing economies can participate
in GVC production relatively easily by specializing in those activities where
they have comparative advantage, thereby augmenting their income and
allowing them to further learn and upgrade their production. Therefore,
GVCs allow economies to build their comparative advantage, and thus, to
accelerate industrialization.
However, quantitative analysis on GVCs shows that developing economies

accrue varying levels of benefits from participating in production sharing
arrangements. This is in part due to the diverse characteristics of supply chains,
depending on the products involved, production structures adopted, and
markets served. Production activities involved in such supply chains can be of
high value addition, or on the contrary very low value addition. Therefore, for
governments to strategize their economies’ participation in GVCs, they must
analyze the value they bring to domestic sectors by discerning production
and trade in value-added terms.
There is a growing body of literature on reconfiguring trade data to reveal the

complex value-added structure in GVCs and the impact of participation in
GVCs on economies. Today, two-thirds of global trade involves intermediate
goods, complicating the task of measuring value-added without double
counting. Trade statistics shift substantially when measured in value-added
terms rather than in terms of gross flow of exports and imports. Breaking
Foreword ix
down the composition of value-added in final products, imports, and exports

provides a clearer picture of a country’s production structure. The Evolution
of Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains does a commendable job
in decomposing Indonesia’s production to reveal its economy’s specialization
and role in global trade.
Through the case study of Indonesia, this report provides an in-depth review
of the many concepts and indicators of GVCs that have been discussed in
economic literature since the current phase of economic globalization took
hold in early 1990s. The critical concepts used in these GVC indicators are
complex, and this report gives an accessible introduction to these measures
and how they can be used to interpret the evolution of Indonesia’s participation
in GVCs. It provides insights into structural shifts within the country’s domestic
sectors that warrant further consideration to develop governance and policy.
The Indonesian economy saw a steady slowdown of growth since peaking in

2010, characterized by declining exports and falling global commodity prices,
and steadily weakening competitiveness. Following a discernible shift toward
the domestic market, production in the country appears to have reverted from
a strategy of export orientation back to import substitution. Thus, Indonesia’s
participation in GVCs remains low as its domestic sectors continue to grow,
but its main role in GVCs is still as a supplier of primary goods. This report
comes at an opportune time.
Statistical analysis shows that Indonesia’s declining participation in GVCs

appears related to the growth of its domestic sectors. The GVC indicators
presented in this report show that developing the manufacturing sector
needs to be a policy priority. One clear message is the need to promote
domestic value addition through manufacturing. The indicators also
demonstrate the need to allow for a certain extent of export promotion
or increased GVC participation in manufacturing to boost industrial
competitiveness. An economy’s strategy cannot be separated from GVCs.
Participation in GVCs improves productivity and thus, competitiveness,
leading to sustainable development fueled by a continuous process of
increased specialization and further foreign investments.
Much of recent economic literature is coming to the conclusion that

economies participating in GVCs are experiencing faster growth, but a
greater understanding of the inner working of an economy and the domestic
and foreign linkages of its sectors is required to inform policy. This report is
valuable, then, as it captures the complexity of Indonesia’s economy at the
crossroads of globalization. The report also brings into focus the major trends
on the domestic sectors’ role in GVCs.
x Foreword
Overall, this report is an excellent resource, which will open more

discussions on policy recommendations to promote Indonesia’s economic
development through its greater participation in GVCs. The Evolution
of Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains is intended as a key
reference for policymakers, development practitioners, government
officials, researchers, students, and for the general public. It is a necessary
contribution to support trade policy decisions for economic development
that are founded on evidence.
Bambang Susantono
Vice-President for Knowledge Management
xi
Foreword by the Vice-President,

Country Programs,
P
rodigious advances have recently been made in information,
communication, manufacturing, and transportation technologies.
These advances, together with concerted initiatives taken to attenuate
policy barriers to trade and mobility over the last three decades, have been
enabling enterprises to fragment, segment, and modularize goods production
processes and globally distribute them to benefit from location specific
comparative advantages. The rapid emergence of a number of East and
Southeast Asian countries as hubs for global manufacturing and the stark
decline of traditional industries in advanced economies demonstrate the reach
and impact of this phenomenon of economic globalization. When economic
sectors of various countries are systematically integrated into a cross-border
network to supply a product to the final consumers, they form a global value
chain (GVC). Interestingly, the paradigm shift in product development and
delivery effected by more recent innovations in web and other technologies
has facilitated the development of specific service GVCs while transforming
those related to goods.
The proliferation of cross-border production arrangements enables especially

the developing countries to grow their economies by participating in specific
GVCs without having the resources, infrastructure, and ecosystem required
to produce the relevant goods or services end-to-end domestically. On the
other hand, value chain participation catalyzes diversification in primary
sector-oriented economies. By attracting and localizing segments of GVCs,
countries make value contributions to the relevant supply networks as well
as generate income for their residents. Further, by fostering a conducive
environment for transferring technology and technical know-how, the
globalized production systems contribute to economic upgrading of the
participant countries.
There is also strong evidence that globalization of production results in

better labor welfare. Increased demand for labor has resulted not only in
greater participation of women in the workforce but also in greater gender
wage parity in many countries. Improvement in average working conditions,
growth in wages, and other benefits due to implementation of labor welfare
standards throughout GVCs is also observed. Furthermore, it is noteworthy
xii Foreword
that globalization has increased the awareness on environmental issues and

climate change. Now, there is more impetus on businesses, especially those
engaged in cross-border production sharing, to produce more eco-friendly
goods and services in eco-friendly conditions. Studies also show that foreign
direct investment tend to concentrate more along value chain segments
thereby catalyzing infrastructure development along value chain nodes
and hubs. Thus, economic globalization contributes to the achievement of
certain key sustainable development goals (SDGs).
The ongoing collaboration among the Asian Development Bank (ADB),

Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), and other international development
organizations has previously produced evidence based reports on Indonesia.
In 2010, ADB and IsDB, along with the International Labour Organization,
released the report on Indonesia Critical Development Constraints. This was
followed by the publication titled Diagnosing the Indonesian Economy: Towards
Inclusive and Green Growth in 2012.
This report, The Evolution of Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains,

adds to the ADB-IsDB efforts in providing knowledge solutions by analyzing
the evolution of Indonesia’s participation in GVCs since 2000. It employs
well- structured economic data, especially the inter-country input–output
tables, and cutting-edge quantitative methods to develop a framework for
succinctly depicting value chain participation of the country’s sectors and
studying the consequent economic effects. The report also looks at the
challenges and opportunities posed by current and emerging phenomena
such as trade conflict and automation. Given that it identifies key trends in
Indonesia’s GVC participation, it is envisaged that this study would serve as
a useful reference for policymakers and analysts. I would like to congratulate
the ADB and IsDB officials along with the consultants working on this
collaboration for producing this important statistical analysis which will
certainly facilitate evidence-based policymaking.
Mansur Muhtar
Vice-President, Country Programs
xiii
Acknowledgments
T
his report is a product of an ongoing collaboration between the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Islamic Development Bank
(IsDB) in providing knowledge solutions to key socioeconomic issues.
Specifically, the report analyzes the state and evolution of Indonesia’s
participation in global value chains (GVCs) since 2000. It employs well-
structured economic data, especially the inter-country input–output
tables for 2000–2017, together with cutting-edge quantitative methods,
to develop a framework for depicting global value chain participation of the
country’s sectors and its economic consequences. The report also looks
at the challenges and opportunities posed by current and emerging global
phenomena such as the trade conflict and rapid automation of economies.
Given that it identifies key trends in Indonesia’s GVC participation, this study
would certainly serve as a useful reference for policymakers and analysts.
We gratefully acknowledge Vice-President for Knowledge Management

and Sustainable Development of ADB, Bambang Susantono and Vice-
President for Country Programs of IsDB, Mansur Muhtar who provided strong
leadership and indispensable guidance from the very beginning of this study.
We also thank Joseph Ernest Zveglich Jr., Edimon Ginting, Rana Hasan, and
Kaushal Joshi of ADB and Areef Suleman, Abu Camara, Amadou Diallo,
Ibrahim Shoukry, and Mustafa Yagci of IsDB for their valuable support in
undertaking this overarching initiative. I would like to especially acknowledge
the initiatives taken by Vicky Tan of ADB and Hayat Sindi of IsDB in promoting
and disseminating GVC related knowledge products including this report.
Mahinthan Joseph Mariasingham of ADB led the team of consultants

comprising Kristina Baris, Donald Jay Bertulfo, Janine Elora Lazatin, and
Angelo Jose Lumba to accomplish this study. The ADB Multi-Regional
Input–Output Tables (MRIOT) forming the quantitative framework for GVC
analysis were prepared by Kristina Baris, John Arvin Bernabe, Donald Jay
Bertulfo, Marc Alvin Ermino, Krizia Anne Garay, Janine Elora Lazatin, Angelo
Jose Lumba, Julieta Magallanes, Sarah Mae Manuel, Dianne Lara Monis,
Maria Denise Peña, Reizle Jade Platitas, Ana Francesca Rosales, Clara Delos
Santos, Janine De Vera, and Jonarie Vergara. We also acknowledge the Joint
Research Centre of the European Commission for sharing the industry and
country data from World Input–Output Database (WIOD).
xiv Acknowledgments
Maricris Jan Tobias edited the publication. The cover was designed by Maria
Denise Peña and Joe Mark Ganaban led the typesetting process. Eric B. Suan
organized and coordinated the preparation of this report. The publishing
team in ADB’s Department of Communications and Office of Administrative
Services Logistics Management Unit (Printing) provided general guidance on
production issues. I appreciate the concerted efforts of people very much
who have been involved in making this report.
Yasuyuki Sawada
Chief Economist and Director General
xv
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
EU European Union
FDC foreign value-added double counted in exports
FDI foreign direct investment
FVA foreign value-added
GDP gross domestic product
GFC global financial crisis
GVC global value chain
IMF International Monetary Fund
IsDB Islamic Development Bank
M&As mergers and acquisitions
MRIOT multi-regional input–output table
NEC not elsewhere classified
NRCA new revealed comparative advantage
PDC pure double counted terms
PRC People’s Republic of China
RCA revealed comparative advantage
R&D research and development
R&D&D research, development, and design
SDGs sustainable development goals
SMEs small market enterprises
TiVA trade in value-added
TRCA traditional revealed comparative advantage
TSNR technically specified natural rubber
US United States
WIOD World Input–Output Database
xvi
Highlights
T
his report analyzes Indonesia’s participation in, and contribution to,
global value chains (GVCs) during the period 2000–2017. It applies
cutting-edge methods on well-structured economic data to discern
the nature, position, and intensity of such participation by various sectors of
the country’s economy and estimate the income accruing to its residents as a
result of such participation.
Indonesia’s Production and Value-Added Exports
•• Indonesia’s production and use of intermediates generally increased

between 2000 and 2017. However, data indicate a period of decline
from 2009 to 2014 in domestic intermediate production and use. On
average, more than 80% of the intermediates used in the country’s
production was sourced domestically, while over 75% of the locally
produced intermediate goods and services stayed within the economy.
•• The use of foreign intermediates declined across the economic

sectors, except for medium- and high-technology manufacturing.
More than 60% of the intermediate imports was used by manufacturing
industries which, in turn, accounted for nearly three-fifths of the
country’s intermediate exports, signifying the relative intensity in the
participation of these sectors in GVCs.
•• Domestic value-added in the final products of all sectors increased

notably. At the economy level, the domestic share in production
increased from 83.2% in 2000 to 89.9% in 2017. It is worth noting
that although Indonesia’s value-added contribution to the production
processes of other economies was small, it grew markedly between
2000 and 2017.
•• Domestic value-added constituted over 90% of Indonesia’s gross

exports from 2000 to 2017. A large portion of this was either embedded
in final exports used by direct importing economies or embodied in
intermediate exports used directly by importing economies in their
production of final goods for domestic consumption. The share of
Highlights xvii
foreign value-added in Indonesia’s gross exports was generally low.

Foreign value-added made up 13.2% of gross exports by Indonesia’s
industrial sectors in 2017, while this share was 6% and 4.1% for the
services and primary sectors, respectively.
•• Domestic value-added embedded in the primary sector’s intermediate

exports that were re-exported by partner economies increased from
27.7% of the sector’s gross exports in 2000 to 35.1% in 2017. Except
in the primary sector, the share of domestic value-added embedded
in intermediate exports that underwent multiple border crossings
declined from 2000 to 2017.
•• In 2000, only the United States imported a significant amount of

Indonesia’s value-added. However, by 2010, the list of key importers
grew with the inclusion of Germany; Hong Kong, China; the People’s
Republic of China; Singapore; and the United Kingdom. In 2017,
many emerging and developing economies in Asia and the Pacific
were also importing Indonesia’s value-added for their intermediate
and final consumption.
Indonesia’s Participation, Position, and Specialization in

Global Value Chains
•• Trade-related value-added generated in Indonesia as a share of its

total value-added declined from 31.8% in 2000 to 17.6% in 2017. On
the other hand, trade-related value-added as a share of the economy’s
final production also declined from 27.8% in 2000 to 15.0% in 2017.
•• Indonesia’s participation in GVCs through both forward and backward

linkages declined from 2000 to 2017. Forward GVC participation
declined from 21.5% in 2000 to 12.9% in 2017, while backward
participation declined from 16.9% to 10.1% during the same period.
The country’s forward GVC participation, however, stayed consistently
above backward participation, indicating the economy’s greater
involvement in upstream activities.
•• Indonesia’s international trade was more bilateral than global. From

the forward perspective, a larger portion of Indonesia’s domestic
value-added was used by its direct importers to produce their final
products for domestic consumption. Meanwhile, from the backward
perspective, most of the value-added embedded in Indonesia’s
intermediate imports were used in final production for domestic
consumption rather than for export.
xviii Highlights
•• From 2000 to 2017, the primary sector increased its forward GVC
participation. Moreover, data show increased border crossing
by the sector’s value added, indicating its growing involvement
in more complex GVCs. The low-technology manufacturing sector
was more engaged in downstream and simple GVC activities, while
participation was moderately higher for industries in the medium- and
high-technology sector. The service sector’s GVC participation was
generally low in Indonesia.
•• Country-sector specific upstreamness indices from 2000 to 2017

show that Indonesia’s production moved closer to final use, contrary to
the world trend. This is operationalized by the country’s upstreamness
decreasing from 2.06 to 1.96 during the period. Further, final products
in gross output rose by 3.6 percentage points. These numbers imply
that Indonesia’s intermediate supply links with other countries
weakened and became simpler between 2000 and 2017.
•• Indonesia’s comparative advantage was concentrated in the industries

constituting the primary and low-technology manufacturing sector.
Many of these industries, including “food, beverage, and tobacco”
manufacturing, “rubber and plastics” manufacturing and “small
equipment” manufacturing increased their comparative advantages
between 2000 and 2017. Notably, “mining and quarrying” industry’s
comparative advantage fell from 3.4 in 2000 to 2.5 in 2017 and
that of “coke, refined fuel, and petroleum” manufacturing dipped to
2.7 from 8.2. The economy, however, gained comparative advantage
in “chemicals and chemical products” manufacturing in 2017.
Other Aspects of Global Value Chains
•• Indonesia’s production processes tended to rely more on domestic,

own-sector sources for intermediate inputs during periods of economic
crisis (e.g., global financial crisis of 2008).
•• For Indonesia, the strength of the local supply chains estimated by

backward linkage-based agglomeration indices was highest for low-
technology manufacturing and business services. Moreover, the local
supply chain for business services was relatively strong based on the
forward linkage measure. The country’s medium- and high-technology,
and primary industries displayed weak forward and backward ties.
Nonetheless, analysis shows no evidence of association between the
strength of domestic links and revealed comparative advantage as far
as Indonesia’s industries are concerned.
Highlights xix
•• Technological development and transfer associated with GVCs

contributed to the decline in labor demand across all economic sectors
(–29%) in Indonesia from 2005 to 2015 with agriculture suffering
the largest impact (–49%) and services the least (–9%). For the same
period, task relocation was associated with an 8% and 5% increase in
demand for labor in manufacturing and services, respectively. Results
also indicate that the change in own-country income from 2005 to
2015 was associated with a 79% increase in employment in services
and 45% in manufacturing.
•• Decomposing changes in employment by type of occupation for the

manufacturing sector shows that employment in nonroutine cognitive
occupations grew by 110%, while routine cognitive occupations
contracted by 36%. Meanwhile, for services, employment in routine
manual occupations increased by 176%, while employment in
nonroutine cognitive and routine cognitive occupations increased by
77% and 21%, respectively.
•• Country-level efficiency was associated with a decline in employment

for all types of occupation in the manufacturing sector. In the services
sector, it was associated with a 30% decrease in employment in routine
manual occupations and 22% decrease in employment in nonroutine
cognitive occupations.
•• Indonesia is one of the countries that would benefit the least from
trade redirection brought about by the current trade conflict between
the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Analysis
indicates that, in 2–3 years, it could gain only 0.06% to 0.14% of
its gross domestic product as a result of trade redirection, under
various assumptions of tariff imposition. However, Indonesia can still
potentially benefit in a protracted trade conflict as it could become a
strong alternative source of palm kernel, babassu oil, natural rubber,
and sports footwear for the United States. It also has the capacity to
be an alternative source of lignite, palm vegetable oil, and wood pulp
for the People’s Republic of China.
•• In Asia and the Pacific, Indonesia was the 6th largest recipient of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2018, with investment inflows
amounting to almost $22 billion. Singapore, Japan, and the People’s
Republic of China were the largest investors in Indonesia. Moreover,
more than 90% of FDI inflows to Indonesia was from Asian economies.
Only 41% of foreign-owned firms in Indonesia, however, engaged
in international trade, indicating low GVC participation from an
FDI perspective.
xx Highlights
•• Greenfield investment in Indonesia amounted to $39 billion in 2018,

while investment through mergers and acquisitions totaled $3.5 billion.
Greenfield investments have traditionally been natural resource based,
but alternative/renewable energy displaced coal, oil, and natural gas as
the top recipient of greenfield investment come 2018. Manufacturing
also attracted an increasing amount of greenfield investment, with 2018
recording the highest greenfield committed investments to date. The
top recipients of investments linked to mergers and acquisitions in 2018
were software and IT services; food and tobacco; and financial services.
Reaping the Benefits of Global Value Chain Involvement
•• To effectively and beneficially participate in GVCs, Indonesia needs

to institute a coordination mechanism to ensure consistency and
coherence in industrial policies, address governance bottlenecks, and
further develop its manufacturing sector. Domestic linkages among
firms should be strengthened by bridging infrastructure investment
gaps to facilitate efficient transportation and fast transmission of
information. Production processes should also be facilitated through
highly reliable utility services.
•• Labor policies that would incentivize the movement of workers from

agriculture and other primary sectors towards manufacturing and
services should be instituted. Proper human resource development
strategies should be implemented to ensure a steady supply of skilled
workers sensitive to industry needs. The capacity for innovation
should be developed by encouraging local and foreign investments
in non-extractive and research and development-oriented industries
that have the potential to strengthen their production links with other
sectors in the economy, as well as with the rest of the world.
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
A
n exemplar of a country that has escaped the so-called “resource
curse” (Rosser 2007), Indonesia maintains a steady growth path.
Its growth in the first quarter of 2019 fared at 5.1%, following a
stable growth pattern ranging from 4.9% to 5.3% in the last 14 quarters
(World Bank 2019). A complex myriad of factors, including a large domestic
demand base, suitable demographic structures and rapid urbanization,
constitutes relevant “pull forces” of economic growth that enabled Indonesia
to grow despite weak reliance on exports (Das 2018; World Bank 2014).
To illustrate, the share of working-age population in Indonesia is projected
to reach a peak of 70% in 2031 from 67% in 2016 (IMF 2018), providing
opportunities for Indonesia to reap gains from demographic dividends.
Indonesia is also currently the fourth most populous nation in the world with
a population of over 270 million as of 2019, providing the country with a
strong domestic market base for its production.
Studies have shown that Indonesia’s economic policies enabled it to

weather global shocks (Basri and Rahardja 2010; Blanchard, Das, and
Faruqee 2010). In fact, an analytic decomposition of domestic versus
external contributors to Indonesia’s real output growth performed in
Das (2018) revealed that domestic factors dominated external factors in
explaining real output growth in Indonesia, especially before the global
financial crisis. However, since late 2013, decomposition results show
that despite Indonesia’s insularity from external forces, global factors
became a stronger countervailing force against domestic forces. This may
be due to the stronger linkages in the global economy which allow for the
indirect transmission of output shocks along value chains. The increasing
fragmentation of global production activities makes countries that are
predominantly domestic oriented, such as Indonesia, unanticipatedly
vulnerable to global developments and shocks.
While Indonesia displays stable and robust macroeconomic performance,

literature contends that the country may be suffering from an unsustainable
lack of global competitiveness. Aswicahyono and Rafitrandi (2018)
maintained that Indonesia’s suboptimal performance in terms of global
competitiveness has resulted in weak ties with global production networks.
While current policies target revitalizing the country’s manufacturing
2 The Evolution of Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains
sector, Indonesia’s economic progress remains impeded by lack of clarity

and coherence in industrial policy, a predominant focus on downstreaming
industries and a gravitation towards increasing domestic value-added share
in production (Aswicahyono and Rafitrandi 2018). Drawing from a sectoral
perspective, Soejachmoen (2016) showed that factors such as restrictive
foreign investment policies, high trade costs, protectionism in the auto
sector, and quality of labor explain why Indonesia was lagging peers in terms
of export performance in auto and auto parts.
Against this policy and contextual backdrop, this report describes Indonesia’s
participation in global production networks by examining patterns of
involvement in global value chain (GVC) related activities by its economic
sectors. In the next few paragraphs, the concept of GVC is discussed together
with the data frameworks used in measuring GVC-related indicators.
Economic globalization catalyzed by dramatic improvements in information

and communication, transportation, and production technologies has
drastically reduced the costs of moving goods, services, people, and even
technologies. This phenomenon underpinned the rise of GVCs, which
involve extensive cross-border production sharing arrangements resulting
in the dispersion of segments of production processes worldwide. In a GVC
world, the status of gross exports as a reliable indicator of economic growth
is contested. To properly account for the income generated across GVCs,
recent theoretical and empirical advances in gross trade accounting have
emerged as the principal frameworks for analysis (Johnson and Noguera
2012; Koopman, Wang, and Wei 2014; Wang, Wei, and Zhu 2018).
To elaborate, consider an iPod designed and finalized in the United States.

Parts assembled to produce this iPod originated from different countries in
the world. Materials used to produce the parts also require inputs. Likewise,
inputs employed to produce the materials utilized to create these parts may
constitute a separate network of production processes, which can occur in
multiple parts of the globe. However, when an iPod is exported from the
United States, traditional gross trade accounting indicates that its total value
shall be counted as exports by the United States. This is not necessarily
correct because the value of this finished product is an agglomeration of
value-added originating from different country-sectors. In other words, in
the creation of final products, value-added is generated across and between
production processes that are dispersed throughout the world.
In this report, Indonesia’s involvement and participation in GVCs during the

time period 2000–2017 are measured and analyzed. To address measurement
issues that pervade accounting for intermediates mentioned above, cutting-
edge empirical frameworks are adopted. The GVC indicators presented in this
Introduction 3
report were generated using multi-regional input–output tables (MRIOTs)

(Box 1) compiled by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), augmented with
those made available through the World Input–Output Database (WIOD)
(Timmer et. al 2015).
Box 1: The Structure of a Multi-Regional Input–Output Table
In a multi-regional input–output framework, outputs are produced using domestic primary

factors of production, i.e., labor and capital, combined with intermediate inputs that are
sourced either domestically or from foreign suppliers. These can either be used for final
consumption or be utilized to produce more goods or services at home or abroad, i.e., be
used as intermediates (Timmer et al. 2015).
Multi-regional input–output tables (MRIOTs) present the global production recipe,

viewed from a country-sector perspective. The tables can be read using two interrelated
perspectives. Reading the MRIOTs along the row, output by country-sectors can either be
used for final consumption at home or abroad (final demand) or for further production by
other country-sectors (intermediate demand). Reading the MRIOTs column-wise shows,
for each country-sector, purchases of goods and services from country-sectors plus the
value-added by primary factors of production. A stylized representation of an MRIOT is
shown in Box 1 Figure below.
Box 1 Figure: A Stylized Representation of a Multi-Regional Input–Output
Z f x
v’
x’
where Z is the matrix of intermediate demand, f is the matrix of final demand, x is the vector
of gross output and v is the vector of value-added. Market clearing conditions imply that, at
the country-sector level, total gross output is equal to total inputs. Many of the indicators
in this report were generated from the multi-regional input–output tables compiled on an
annual basis by the Asian Development Bank. As of this writing, the Asian Development
Bank MRIOTs cover 35 sectors, 5 final demand categories, and 63 economies (including
24 economies in developing Asia and 132 countries aggregated as rest-of-the-world).
Source: M. P. Timmer, E. Dietzenbacher, B. Los, R. Stehrer, R. and G. J. de Vries. 2015.

An Illustrated User Guide to The World Input–Output Database: The Case of Global
Automotive Production. Review of International Economics. 23(3) pp. 575–605.
The use of a multi-regional input–output approach in analyzing GVCs offers

at least two advantages. First, it makes tracing the flow of value-added from
source to destination possible at a remarkable level of granularity. Second, it
adheres to the basic principles of national income accounting.
The report mainly intends to elucidate trends that demonstrate Indonesia’s

role in GVCs. In section 2, the analysis begins with an examination of the
structure of the country’s use and production of intermediates and proceeds
to discuss the value-added content of its final production. Gross exports are
then decomposed into value-added terms to uncover structural changes in
the factor content of Indonesia’s gross exports across time.
To what extent is Indonesia’s production dependent on domestic sources of

intermediates? Data and analysis indicate that a large portion of the country’s
domestic production of intermediates stayed within the economy. Moreover, a
significant share of intermediates used by Indonesia was sourced domestically.
Sectoral analysis shows that manufacturing industries that used significant
shares of imported manufactured intermediates also accounted for the highest
shares in the country’s total intermediate exports of manufactured goods.
Thus, the data indicate high export activity in industries that utilized foreign
inputs in production.
How much of total value of final production in Indonesia is accounted for by

production activities occurring in other parts of the world? Results indicate that
final production in Indonesia was generally dependent on domestic value-
added. Final products of the primary sector embedded the highest domestic
value-added content; the share was the lowest in the final products of the
medium- and high-technology manufacturing.
How important are production activities occurring in Indonesia to the production

of goods and services consumed abroad? Analysis shows that Indonesia
contributed a small but growing share of its value-added to the final
production of other economies, such as (i) France and Germany in Factory
Europe; (ii) India; Malaysia; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and
Thailand in Factory Asia; and (iii) Canada, Mexico, and the United States
in Factory America. Moreover, Indonesia’s contributions to final production
in neighboring Asian economies were greater than its contributions to
economies in other parts of the globe.
What types of value-added are embedded in Indonesia’s gross exports? Export

decomposition analysis reveals that the character of Indonesia’s involvement
in GVCs was more bilateral than global. Much of value-added generated in the
production of the country’s exports crossed international borders only once.
Introduction 5
To elaborate, a significant portion of the domestic value-added generated in

the production of Indonesia’s exports was either embedded in final products
consumed by direct importers or contained in intermediate imports used
by a direct partner country to produce final products that were consumed
domestically.
An analysis of broad sectors reveals diverse patterns in the value-added

composition of products. First, the composition of the primary sector’s gross
exports changed over time. An increasing proportion of value-added became
more involved in production activities that crossed borders more than once.
Second, gross exports of Indonesia’s manufacturing sectors embodied
higher foreign value-added than those of the services and primary sectors.
Lastly, services exports predominantly contained domestic value-added that
crossed administrative borders only once.
Closing the section is a visualization of Indonesia’s forward GVC links.

Network analysis reveals that, over the years, Indonesia had established
stronger forward ties with central GVC hubs, namely Germany, the People’s
Republic of China, and the United States. Moreover, its forward GVC links
with services-oriented economies such as Hong Kong, China and Singapore
were also on the rise.
Section 3 discusses Indonesia’s participation, position, and revealed

comparative advantage in global production networks. Is Indonesia’s role more
on the supply-side of GVCs, or is it more involved in the purchase of goods and
services produced elsewhere? A decomposition of Indonesia’s value-added
and final production indicates that Indonesia was relatively more involved
in upstream, or supply-side, activities. At the country-level, forward GVC
participation dominated backward participation. However, the data exhibit
a declining trend in both forward and backward GVC participation rates.
This coincides with a relative increase in the proportion of domestic value-
added generated in the production of domestically consumed goods and
services. Findings echo their current policy stance which promotes domestic
production capacity and encourages utilization of domestically sourced
products. A further decomposition of GVC participation rates suggests that
Indonesia was participating more in simple GVCs than in complex GVCs,
supporting the observation that Indonesia’s involvement in GVCs was more
bilateral than global.
A sector analysis of participation in GVCs indicates that the primary sector

was more involved in complex GVCs. Manufacturing sectors displayed
the highest involvement in GVCs, both from the forward- and backward-
linkage perspectives. Participation of services sectors in GVCs, meanwhile,
was generally lower compared to the primary and manufacturing sectors.

A high proportion of value-added generated in services was involved in the
production of final goods and services that served both domestic and foreign
markets, rather than in the production of exported intermediates. Results
also indicate that Indonesia’s services sectors relied heavily on value-added
generated within the domestic economy.
Is Indonesia moving closer to domestic markets, or is it becoming more involved

in longer production chains? Upstreamness indices are calculated to gauge
how far the outputs of Indonesia’s industries were from final consumers. The
country’s upstreamness index displayed a downward trend, suggesting that
the goods and services produced in Indonesia were moving closer to the final
consumer. This contrasts with the world average and many other economies
that exhibited increasing trends in upstreamness. While Indonesia was more
involved in upstream than downstream GVC activities, declining trends in the
upstreamness index point to the economy moving downstream relative to the
global average. This implies weakening intermediate supply links with other
economies and a rising share of final goods and services in total gross output.
Indonesia’s declining gross output weighted average upstreamness can

also be attributed to the increasing proportion of total gross output from
sectors that were, on average, one step or less away from final consumers.
Such sectors produced goods and services largely for domestic final
consumption and for the use by direct importers in final production. This
coincides with Indonesia’s declining participation in GVCs and its bilateral
export orientation.
In which sectors does Indonesia display a comparative advantage? Using

a forward-linkage based value-added indicator to measure revealed
comparative advantage, the analysis reveals a gradual shift in comparative
advantage towards low-technology manufacturing sector. Although
resource-rich Indonesia retained its comparative advantage in the primary
sector, the indicator for the sector has declined over time.
Following the presentation of trends and patterns concerning Indonesia’s

participation in GVCs, section 4 discusses specific input–output applications
and GVC analyses in the Indonesian context. Analyses show that the country
was highly reliant on domestic production. But how strong are domestic
linkages within Indonesia? An examination of agglomeration indices reveals
that Indonesia tended to rely more on domestic, own-sector sources of
intermediate inputs during the crisis, and less so during non-crisis periods.
Domestic backward linkages suggest that low-technology and business
services sector received relatively more domestic inputs than others. On
the flipside, Indonesia’s business services sector exhibited strong domestic
Introduction 7
forward links, implying that their outputs were crucial to domestic sectors’
production activities.
To what extent have improvements in global production processes (e.g., relocation

of tasks along value chains or technology-induced efficiency increases along GVCs)
influenced labor demand in Indonesia? A structural decomposition is employed
to break down the labor demand change in Indonesia into several determinants.
The data indicates that from 2005 to 2015, employment in services grew
faster than in manufacturing. Structural decomposition analyses reveal that
technology within GVCs was associated with a decline in labor demand across
all broad sectors considered, with the largest negative impact occurring in
manufacturing jobs. Task relocation, meanwhile, was associated with growth
in employment in manufacturing and services. Lastly, changes in income and
preferences were associated with an increase in labor demand, with positive
partial impacts on employment in services and manufacturing.
Labor demand change can also be decomposed by type of occupation and by

sector. A breakdown of employment into four broad occupation groups shows
that nonroutine cognitive occupations experienced the highest increase
while routine cognitive occupations contracted. In the manufacturing
sector, country-level efficiency was associated with a decline in all types
of occupations. However, holding other factors constant, uptakes in the
overall level of total factor productivity in Indonesia affected nonroutine
cognitive occupations the most. Technology within GVCs was associated
with a reduction in demand for nonroutine cognitive, routine cognitive, and
nonroutine manual occupations in manufacturing. Task relocation effects
were mixed, while the income effects generally had positive effects on labor
demand across all types of occupations in manufacturing.
In services, routine manual occupations exhibited the largest increase in

employment, followed by nonroutine cognitive, and then routine cognitive
occupations. Country-level efficiency was associated with reduced demand
for all types of service occupations, while technology within GVCs was
associated with an increase in demand for routine manual occupations.
Task relocation and income effects were also positive for routine manual
occupations, suggesting that the largest activity in services employment in
Indonesia occurred in routine manual jobs.
How vulnerable is Indonesia to shocks arising from a global trade conflict? The
trade conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China
offers an interesting case study when viewed from a GVC vantage point.
Analysis reveals that Indonesia was among those that would benefit the least
from potential trade redirection partly due to Indonesia’s weak trade ties with
the two countries, as well as with the economies that serve the GVCs oriented
towards the two countries. Because tariffs imposed on each other’s products
by the two countries do not directly affect Indonesia, its economy could
serve as a viable alternative source of products such as palm kernel, babassu
vegetable oils, natural rubber, and sports footwear for the United States.
Similarly, Indonesia could also serve as an alternative source of lignite, palm
vegetable oil and wood pulp for the People’s Republic of China.
What does the GVC-FDI nexus look like in Indonesia? Economies in Asia and
the Pacific accounted for significant shares in global inward and outward
foreign direct investment (FDI), which is reflective of the increasing trade
and investment openness in the region. This trend was observed over
time, whether it be through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) or greenfield
investments. FDI is historically linked to GVCs, driven mostly by cost
minimization objectives of multinationals. Indonesia consistently ranked
among the top destinations for inward FDI with most sources based in the
Asia and the Pacific. Greenfield investments generally dominated M&As
however, unlike in the rest of the region, the country’s top FDI recipients
tended to be natural resource dependent industries.
Section 5 concludes and, based on the analysis presented in the report,

provides policy recommendations on the steps Indonesia could consider
taking to participate more in globalized production processes and,
consequently, generate greater income for its residents. That Indonesia
lagged other economies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in GVC participation could be attributed to many factors including
economic policy, the quality of governance, infrastructure, and the state of
business environment. The right changes, and improvements, on these fronts
are expected to deepen the participation of its manufacturing and services
industries in GVCs and move away from natural resource dependence.
9
Chapter 2
Indonesia’s Production and
Value-Added Exports
I
mproved transportation, faster transmission of information, and wage
differences gave rise to the fragmentation of production processes and their
distribution across international borders (Baldwin 2016). The offshoring
of segments of the production process allowed economies to enter the
production of goods and services at various stages, depending on their factor
endowment advantages. Thus, the focus of production became less about
producing for final consumption and more about producing intermediate
goods and services.
As global value chains (GVCs) began to dominate production and trade,

traditional trade statistics became inadequate in discerning the issue of
double counted exports. The problem stems from the back and forth trading
of goods, and increasingly services, across international borders. As double
counting became more pervasive, gross trade and production data became
less reliable in capturing various economy-sectors’ value-added contribution
to the globalized production processes, rendering tracing value-added across
global production networks through innovative methods a necessary feat.
Given this background, this section focuses on analyzing Indonesia’s

production and use of intermediate goods and services, as well as on
tracing value- added in both final production and exports. It makes use
of multi- regional input–output tables (MRIOTs) to analyze domestic
production and consumption of intermediates in the first subsection. The
second subsection follows Timmer et al.’s (2013) backward perspective
approach in tracing the sources of value- added in Indonesia’s final products.
It also analyzes how much value- added in other economies’ final products
were sourced from Indonesia. In the third subsection, gross exports are
decomposed into value-added terms using the methodology espoused
by Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018). This decomposition provides a backward
perspective on the sources of value-added embodied in an economy- sector’s
outputs and exports. Finally, the last subsection shifts to the forward
perspective and uses network analysis to trace where Indonesia’s domestic
value-added goes.
2.1 Domestic Production and Consumption of

Intermediate Goods and Services
An analysis of GVCs requires a careful examination of patterns concerning
the use and production of intermediates for two main reasons. First,
embedded in imported intermediates are knowledge and technology-
related intangibles from foreign sources. Second, back-and-forth trade in
intermediate goods and services signify high GVC activity (Wang, Wei, and
Zhu 2018). Therefore, understanding Indonesia’s role as a purchaser and
supplier of intermediates globally helps illuminate its influence as a player in
global production networks.
Data from the ADB MRIOTs indicate that the nominal value of Indonesia’s
total production and use of intermediates generally increased from 2000 to
2017 (Figure 2.1). During this time period, Indonesia obtained 80% to 88% of
its total use of intermediates from domestic sources while 75% to 84% of its total
production of intermediates remained within domestic bounds. The remaining
16% to 25% were exported as intermediates to other nations. Trend analysis
revealed that during the post global financial crisis (from 2009 to 2014), both
Figure 2.1: Structure of Production and Use of Intermediates, Indonesia,

2000–2017
1,000 90
88
800 86
84
Percentage Share
600 82
$ billion
80
400 78
76
200 74
72
0 70
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Intermediates used and Total intermediates use Total intermediates

produced domestically ($ billion) production
($ billion) ($ billion)
Domestic intermediates use Domestic intermediates production

to total intermediates use to total intermediates production
(%) (%)
Sources: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2000, 2007–2017, Asian Development Bank;

World Input–Output Database, 2001–2006; Asian Development Bank estimates.
Indonesia’s Production and Value-Added Exports 11
the share of domestic sources in total use and production of intermediates fell.
The trend reversed in 2014 before slumping again in 2016. On the other hand,
the share of domestic intermediate supply in total supply of intermediates
declined sharply from 2009 to 2011 before increasing and then sinking back
again in 2016. These findings suggest an erratic trend in the relative structure
of production and use of intermediates post global financial crisis.
Disaggregating the use and production of intermediates by broad sector

category, the data reveal that more than 60% of total intermediate imports were
used by manufacturing sectors. Likewise, manufacturing sectors accounted
for more than three-fifths of Indonesia’s total exports of intermediates
(Figure 2.2). The share of medium- and high-technology manufacturing in
total use of intermediate imports grew by 9 percentage points from 28.1% in
2000 to 37.1% in 2017. This was accompanied by a large decline in the share
of business services in total use of imported intermediates, which shrank from
25.2% in 2000 to 17.2% in 2017. Moreover, the imports of low-technology
manufacturing sectors for further production remained steady at around
34%, while the share of primary products and personal and public services
displayed marginal changes.
Figure 2.2: Structure of Intermediate Imports and Exports, Indonesia,

2000, 2007, and 2017
100 4.5 0.8 0.8 0.7
6.4 6.3 5.3 5.0
7.5
90 17.2
25.2 19.8
80 30.9
35.7
70 39.2
60 37.1
Percentage
32.2
28.1
50
28.5 36.2
40 30.1
30
34.8 34.6 34.1
20
29.8 27.2
10 22.4
5.5 7.0 7.2
0
2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017
Use of Imports Production of Exports
Primary Business services

Low-technology manufacturing Personal and public services
Medium- and high-technology manufacturing

While intermediate imports of medium- and high-technology manufacturing

increased as a share of total intermediate imports, its share to total exports
of intermediates fell from 39.2% in 2000 to 30.9% in 2017. Exports of low-
technology manufacturing shrank from 30.1% in 2000 to 28.5 in 2007, but
then picked up thereafter, reaching 36.2% in 2017. The opposite was observed
in personal and public services, whose share of intermediate exports in the
total increased from 22.4% in 2000 to 29.8% in 2007 but then fell afterwards.
By 2017, its share to total intermediate exports stood at 27.2%.
Table 2.1 below lists the 14 aggregate manufacturing industries covered in the

MRIOTs, along with their contribution to Indonesia’s total exports production
and share to total use of imported intermediates. In general, industries
Table 2.1: Use of Intermediate Imports and Production of Intermediate Exports,

Indonesia, 2000, 2007, and 2017 (% Share of Total)
Use of Production of
Imports Exports
Sector 2000 2007 2017 2000 2007 2017
Low-technology Manufacturing
Food, beverages, and tobacco 6.7 6.8 6.3 4.8 11.1 17.3
Rubber and plastics 3.9 4.2 5.0 4.8 6.3 8.5
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, 3.3 2.2 1.8 5.9 4.2 3.7
and publishing
Wood and products of wood and cork 1.0 0.6 0.6 8.2 3.3 2.6
Textiles and textile products 6.2 3.2 3.5 5.1 3.0 2.4
Manufacturing, NEC; recycling 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.8
Leather, leather products, and footwear 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.7
Medium- and high-technology Manufacturing

Chemicals and chemical products 5.6 5.8 5.0 6.3 6.7 8.0
Coke, refined petroleum, and 3.8 5.6 15.5 15.3 10.3 7.5
nuclear fuel
Basic metals and fabricated metal 6.1 7.4 6.0 5.1 9.6 7.1
Electrical and optical equipment 4.8 5.3 4.2 7.2 4.5 4.4
Transport equipment 3.6 3.6 2.2 1.1 2.2 2.4
Machinery, NEC 3.1 3.1 1.9 2.6 1.3 0.8
Other nonmetallic minerals 1.1 1.6 2.3 1.5 1.0 0.6
Total Manufacturing 51.3 50.8 55.9 69.2 64.2 66.9

Total (all sectors) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
NEC = not elsewhere classified.
Note: Industries are arranged by their percentage contribution to total intermediate exports in 2017.
Sources: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2000, 2007 and 2017, Asian Development Bank; Asian
Development Bank estimates.
that accounted for a large share in total use of imported intermediates

also contributed significantly to the production of intermediate exports.
Examples of such industries in low-technology manufacturing are “food,
beverages, and tobacco” and “rubber and plastics.” In medium- and high-
technology manufacturing, exemplar industries include “coke, refined
petroleum, and nuclear fuel,” “chemicals and chemical products,” and “basic
and fabricated metals.”
Interestingly, manufacturing industries experienced a decline in their share

in total use of imported intermediates from 2007 to 2017. This goes in
contrast with what was observed in the period 2000 to 2007, when many
medium- and high-technology industries showed increases in intermediate
use shares. Notable exceptions include “coke, refined petroleum, and
nuclear fuel” (which experienced a steep increase in use share from 5.6% in
2007 to 15.5% in 2017) as well as “garments and textiles” and “rubber and
plastics.” Meanwhile, the shares of “food, beverages, and tobacco,” “rubber
and plastics,” as well as “chemical and chemical products” to total production
of intermediate exports rose from 2007 to 2017.
From 2007 to 2017, Indonesia’s trade in intermediate products displayed

rather erratic but generally declining use of foreign intermediates, increasing
utilization of imported intermediates by medium- and high-technology
manufacturing sectors relative to others, and a cursory link between high use
of foreign intermediates and high relative export orientation particularly in
non-primary sectors.
2.2 Value-Added Sources in Final Products
The rise in cross-border production sharing has led to a new area of research
which focuses on analyzing how production processes are fragmented and
distributed across countries and industries within countries. One strand
of inquiry attempts to systematically quantify the amount of value-added
originating from economy-sectors worldwide that is embodied in final goods
and services as well as exports. Such a decomposition relates to work done by
Johnson and Noguera (2012; Timmer et al. (2013); Koopman, Wang, and
Wei (2014); and Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018).
Timmer et al. (2014) defines a GVC as a country-industry pair that delivers

a good or service to its final use. Final products refer to goods and services
that are consumed by the final demand sector without being subjected to
further processing. Intermediate inputs, together with value-added—that
is, the contributions of labor, capital, government, and entrepreneurial
effort—are used to produce final products. However, the production of some
intermediates also requires further intermediate inputs (plus the primary
inputs). Hence, value-added is generated directly and indirectly in the process

of producing final products. This implies that in order to properly trace sources
of value-added generated from the production of final products, both direct
and indirect channels should be accounted for. This underpins the concept
of “GVC income.” Timmer et al. (2013) provide a neat framework that allows
one to trace the sources of value-added that is ultimately embodied in a given
final product. Using this as a guide, economies’ value-added contributions to
the total value of Indonesia’s final products were estimated. Results show that
the domestic value-added content of Indonesia’s final products rose in the
past decade (Figure 2.3). The share of Indonesia’s domestic value-added to
its total GVC income was 89.9% in 2017, about 6.7 percentage points higher
than its ratio in 2000. Not surprisingly, the 2008 global financial crisis seemed
to have reverted Indonesia’s production back to domestic, as indicated by
the abrupt spike in the domestic value-added content of Indonesia’s final
products in 2009.
Examining trends by broad sectoral categories, results show the rising

contribution of domestic value-added to sectoral GVC incomes (Figure 2.4).
Despite this commonality, differences across broad sectors are worth
noting. In Indonesia, primary sectors had the highest share of domestic
value-added to the total sectoral value of final production. This trend was
consistent across all years from 2000 to 2017. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s final
industries generally had the lowest domestic value-added content, although
it rose during the more recent years covered in the analysis. To illustrate,
Figure 2.3: Share of Domestic Value-Added in Total Global Value Chain Income,

2000–2017
100
91.3 89.9
90 86.6 84.7 88.0 87.0 86.2 85.7 85.5 85.3 87.2
83.2 83.0 85.3 83.3 85.7 86.0 84.7
Percent of Total GVC Income
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2004
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
GVC = global value chain.

Note: Asian Development Bank estimates are based on the methodology of Timmer et al. (2013).
Figure 2.4: Share of Domestic Value-Added in Total Sectoral Global Value Chain

Income, 2000–2017
100
Percent of Total Sectoral
90
GVC Income
80
70
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2004
2014
2015
2016
2017
Primary Low−technology Medium- and high-technology
manufacturing manufacturing
Business services Personal and public services GFC
GFC = global financial crisis, GVC = global value chain.

the domestic value-added content of low-technology final industries in

Indonesia climbed 6.9 percentage points from 81.0% in 2000 to 87.9% in
2017. In 2000, 75.1% of the total value of final products by the medium- and
high-technology manufacturing sectors was attributable to value-added from
domestic sources. This share rose to 79.5% in 2017.
To measure Indonesia’s involvement in the production of final products

by selected economies, Indonesia’s contribution in the total GVC income
of other economies are also examined (Figure 2.5). Results show that
Indonesia’s value-added accounted for a small but growing proportion of
final production of other economies. Value-added generated in Indonesia
accounted for an increasing proportion of GVC incomes in “factories”
such as (i) France and Germany in Factory Europe; (ii) India; Malaysia; the
Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand in Factory Asia; and
(iii) Canada, Mexico, and the United States in Factory America. Indonesia’s
contributions were, not surprisingly, largest in Factory Asia due to proximity.
For instance, in 2017, the value-added generated by Indonesia accounted
for 1.1% and 1.7% of Singapore’s and Malaysia’s GVC incomes respectively.
Final products produced by other Asian economies such as the Philippines;
Republic of Korea; Taipei,China; Thailand; and Viet Nam also contained
relatively significant value-added content coming from Indonesia.
Figure 2.5: Indonesia’s Share in Other Economies’ Global Value Chain

Income, 2000, 2007, and 2017
2.00
1.67
Economies’ GVC Income
Percentage of Other
1.50
1.07
1.01
0.98
0.96
0.86
0.84
1.00
0.83
0.75
0.73
0.69
0.67
0.61
0.55
0.51
0.47
0.46
0.39
0.36
0.36
0.35
0.50
0.33
0.32
0.31
0.28
0.27
0.23
0.20
0.19
0.16
0.13
0.10
0.08
0.12
0.09
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.07
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.00
CAN
MAL
MEX
HKG
THA
KOR
GER
UKG
USA
FRA
PRC
IND
TAP
JPN
PHI
SIN
VIE
Factory Factory Factory
Europe Asia North America
2000 2007 2017
CAN = Canada; FRA = France; GER = Germany; GVC = global value chain; HKG = Hong Kong, China;
IND = India; KOR = Republic of Korea; SIN = Singapore; TAP=Taipei,China; JPN = Japan;
MAL = Malaysia; MEX = Mexico; PHI = Philippines; PRC = People’s Republic of China;
THA = Thailand; VIE = Viet Nam; UKG = United Kingdom; USA = United States.
Sources: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2000, 2007, and 2017, Asian Development Bank;
Asian Development Bank estimates.
2.3 What Comprises Indonesia’s Exports?

Decomposing Indonesia’s Exports into Value-Added Terms
Decomposing gross exports into value-added terms allows for a more
detailed look at the country-sector contribution to a country’s export
basket. Box 2 shows how such a decomposition is carried out using MRIOTs.
Figure 2.7 shows a time-series breakdown of Indonesia’s gross exports in
value-added terms, where four trends relating to Indonesia’s trade in value-
added can be observed.
First, Indonesia’s gross exports had a generally stable and sizeable domestic
value-added content. In fact, more than 80% of the total value of Indonesia’s
gross exports was generated by domestic production factors. A huge
fraction (63.2% in 2000 and 62.7% in 2017) of this domestic value-added
was embedded in final exports that were consumed by a partner country
(DVA_FIN), or embodied in intermediate exports that were used by a direct
importing country to produce final goods and services ultimately absorbed
by the partner country (DVA_INT). This suggests that the character of
Indonesia’s export activity was more bilateral than global, a fact that will be
revisited in the subsequent sections.
Box 2: Decomposing Exports into Value-Added Terms
In a world where global value chains (GVCs) define new patterns of production and
specialization, accounting for value creation along GVCs necessitates a careful and systematic
analysis. Because back-and-forth trade characterizes GVC activity, it makes sense to analyze
trade flows. One empirical question concerns how exports should be counted if multiple
countries contribute to their production. To answer this question, one can take the full value
of exports and identify, using information from multi-regional input–output analysis, how
much value-added embedded in exports are accounted for by domestic or foreign production
factors. Such a decomposition is accomplished in Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018), which
proposed a systematic way of quantifying international production sharing by decomposing
gross exports in value-added terms (Box 2 Figure).
Box 2 Figure: Decomposition of Gross Exports in Value-Added Terms
Domestic value-added Vertical specialization
Domestic
Domestic value-
Pure
value- added first Gross exports Foreign
double
added exported value-
counted
absorbed and then added
terms
abroad returned (FVA)
(PDC)
(VAX_G) home
(RDV_B)
Intermediates Foreign
Pure Pure
Final Intermediate sent to first value- Foreign
double double
goods exports importer added value-added
counting counting
and absorbed and then contained contained in
from from
services by direct re-exported to in final intermediate
domestic foreign
(DVA_ importer third country exports exports
sources sources
FIN) (DVA_INT) (DVA_ (FVA_ (FVA_INT)
(DDC) (FDC)
INTrex) FIN)
Source: Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018).
Gross exports can be decomposed into two major categories: domestic value-added and
vertical specialization. Domestic value-added may be embedded in exports that are ultimately
consumed as final goods abroad (VAX_G) while some may be embedded in exports that
ultimately return home (RDV_B). VAX_G may be further broken down into a part that is
embedded in final exports (DVA_FIN), that which is first embedded in intermediate exports
that are used by the direct importer to produce final products (DVA_INT) and lastly, that
which is embedded in intermediates sent to the first importer and then re-exported to a third
country (DVA_INTrex).
Vertical specialization, meanwhile, consists of foreign value-added (FVA) and pure double
counting terms (PDC). Foreign value-added can be further decomposed into two: FVA
embedded in final exports (FVA_FIN) and FVA embedded in intermediate exports (FVA_
INT). Pure double counting occurs due to the back-and-forth trade in intermediates. The
greater the value of PDC, the greater the intensity of cross-border production sharing activities.
Source: Z. Wang, S. Wei, and K. Zhu. 2018. Quantifying International Production Sharing at the
Bilateral and Sector Levels. NBER Working Paper No. 19677. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Second, Indonesia’s domestic value-added embedded in the exports of

primary goods displayed a notable structural shift. To elaborate, the share
of Indonesia’s value-added embedded in the intermediate exports of the
primary sector that was re-exported to other economies (DVA_INTrex)
increased from 27.7% in 2000 to 35.1% in 2017. This reflects strengthening
forward ties with the GVCs to which Indonesia’s primary sector contributed
during the period.
Third, Indonesia’s manufacturing sectors benefited from foreign sourced

value-added more than services and primary sectors. In 2017, foreign
value-added used by manufacturing comprised 13.2% of sectoral gross
exports, while foreign value-added in exports of services and primary
sectors comprised about 6% and 4.1% of sectoral gross exports, respectively.
However, compared to other economies in developing Asia, Indonesia’s
foreign value-added share to total industry exports remained quite low
(Figure 2.6). It is noteworthy that, from 2000 to 2017, foreign value-added
shares in the exports of manufacturing industries in services-oriented
economies such as Hong Kong, China and Singapore ranged between
40% and 50%. Indonesia, meanwhile, joined resource-rich economies
Brunei Darussalam and Kazakhstan and an increasingly domestically oriented
People’s Republic of China in the list of countries for which foreign value-
added share to total exports was the lowest.
Lastly, Indonesia’s exports of services were mostly driven by domestic

production activities that were not involved in GVCs (DVA_FIN) and domestic
production factors that were not part of complex GVCs (DVA_INT). In the
business services sector, the combined shares of DVA_FIN and DVA_INT
made up between 64.2% and 73.4% of gross exports during 2000– 2017.
In the same period, DVA_FIN and DVA_INT comprised between 75.6% and
82.9% of gross exports of the personal and public services sector.
In Figure 2.8, changes in nominal values of each decomposition term are

depicted. Two time periods, 2000 to 2007 and 2007 to 2017, were selected
for purposes of comparison. The former corresponds to the period before the
global financial crisis, while the latter pertains to the post crisis period. Value-
added components changed marginally in both time periods, with greater
transformation occurring during 2000–2017.
In the period 2000–2007, domestic value-added embedded in intermediate

exports from Indonesia that were re-exported to other economies (DVA_
INTrex) increased across all major economic sectors except business services.
It should be noted that this type of value-added in exports is related to
multiple cross-border production sharing arrangements and is therefore highly
GVC- related. DVA_INTrex grew by 6.8 percentage points in primary goods,
1.0 percentage point for personal and public services, and by 3.5 percentage
Figure 2.6: Foreign Value-Added Shares of Industrial Sectors,

Developing Asia, 2017 (% of Sector Exports)
Hong Kong, China
Singapore
Viet Nam
Sri Lanka
Nepal
Fiji
Thailand
Malaysia
Philippines
Taipei,China
Maldives
Korea, Republic of
Cambodia
Mongolia
Bhutan
India
Japan
Pakistan
Kyrgyz Republic
15.4
Indonesia 11.4
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
China, People’s Republic of
Bangladesh
Brunei Darussalam
Kazakhstan
0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
Medium- and high-technology manufacturing Low-technology manufacturing
Note: Asian Development Bank estimates are based on the methodology of Wang, Wei,
and Zhu (2018).
Source: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2017, Asian Development Bank;
Figure 2.7: Decomposition of Gross Exports, by Economy and

by Broad Sector Category, 2000–2017
All Sectors
100
80
Gross Exports
Percent of
60
40
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2007
2004
2005
2006
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
DVA_FIN DVA_INT DVA_INTrex RDV DDC FVA_FIN FVA_INT FDC
Low−Technology Manufacturing
100
80
Percent of Sectoral
Gross Exports
60
40
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Business Services
100
80
Percent of Sectoral
Gross Exports
60
40
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2007
2008
2004
2005
2006
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
continued on next page

Figure 2.7 continued
Primary
100
80
Gross Exports
Percent of
60
40
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Medium- and High−Technology Manufacturing

100
80
Percent of Sectoral
Gross Exports
60
40
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2007
2004
2005
2006
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Personal and Public Services

100
80
Percent of Sectoral
Gross Exports
60
40
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2007
2008
2004
2005
2006
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
DDC = domestic double-counted, DVA_FIN = domestic value-added in final product exports,

DVA_INT = domestic value-added in intermediate product exports, DVA_INTrex = domestic
value-added in intermediate product exports that are re-exported, FDC = foreign double-counted,
FVA_FIN = foreign value-added in final product exports, FVA_INT = foreign value-added in
intermediate product exports, RDV = returned domestic value-added.
Note: Asian Development Bank estimates are based on the methodology of Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018).
22
Figure 2.8: Changes in Value-Added Components of Exports, 2000 versus 2007 and 2007 versus 2017
2000 versus 2007
The Evolution of Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains

Percentage Point Change 20
10 6.8 5.8 4.4

3.5 3.5 3.6
0.1 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1
0 –0.0 –0.1 −0.0−0.2 −0.5 −0.3 −0.0 −0.0−0.4 −0.0
–1.7 −2.0 −0.3 −0.3−1.8 −0.3−0.9
−3.7 −2.5 −1.6 −2.1
−5.0 −1.4
–6.9
−10
−20
Primary Low−Technology Medium− and High− Business Services Personal and
Manufacturing Technology Manufacturing Public Services
2007 versus 2017

20
Percentage Point Change
10 8.3
5.2 5.5
2.8
0.3 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0
0 −0.2 −0.0
−1.9
−0.0 −0.5 −0.0−0.5 –0.5 −0.9 −0.2 −1.2 −0.7 −0.0
−1. 1 −1. 1 −0.6 −1.1
−2.6 –1.1 −2.2 −1.5 −4.1 −2.4
−10
−20
Primary Low−Technology Medium− and High− Business Services Personal and
Manufacturing Technology Manufacturing Public Services
DVA_FIN DVA_INT DVA_INTrex RDV DDC FDC FVA_FIN FVA_INT
DDC = domestic double-counted, DVA_FIN = domestic value-added in final product exports, DVA_INT = domestic value-added in intermediate product exports ,
DVA_INTrex = domestic value-added in intermediate product exports that are re-exported, FDC = foreign double-counted , FVA_FIN = foreign value-added in final product
exports, FVA_INT = foreign value-added in intermediate product exports, RDV = returned domestic value-added.
Note: Asian Development Bank estimates are based on the methodology of Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018).
Sources: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2000, 2007, and 2017, Asian Development Bank; Asian Development Bank estimates.
points both in medium- and high-technology manufacturing goods as well

as low-technology manufacturing goods. This increase in DVA_INTrex was
accompanied by a decline in DVA embedded in final goods (DVA_FIN)
produced by manufacturing sectors. DVA_FIN contracted by 5.0 percentage
points in low-technology manufacturing goods and 2.5 percentage points in
medium- and high-technology manufacturing goods.
Meanwhile, during 2007–2017, Indonesia’s domestic value-added embedded

in intermediate exports used by partner economies to produce final products
consumed within their boundaries (DVA_INT) increased in low-technology
manufacturing and services sectors. Coincidentally, DVA_ INTrex declined
(albeit marginally) in all broad sectors considered, except for the primary
sector. The rather significant changes in these two value-added terms
imply that, in general, Indonesia participated less in complex GVCs, which
characteristically cross at least two administrative borders.
2.4 Tracing Indonesia’s Value-Added Links through

Network Analysis
Network analysis using the time series ADB MRIOTs is undertaken to visualize
where Indonesia fares in the entire landscape of global production networks,
and how its involvement in GVCs has evolved over time. Box 3 presents a brief
exposition on how graph networks may aid in understanding the evolution of
GVC. In the analysis presented in this section, the GVC networks for the years
2000, 2010, and 2017 are visualized using domestic value-added statistics
derived from the ADB MRIOTs (Figure 2.9).
As different representations of GVC networks may be generated based on

varying indicators, it is helpful to first define the elements of the network charts
presented below. The set of nodes comprises economies in ADB MRIOTs,
excluding “rest-of-the-world,” which serves as a catch bin of all countries
that are not yet individually modeled in the ADB MRIOTs. The size of the
nodes pertains to the amount of domestic value-added that is ultimately
involved in GVC-related activities (i.e., the monetary value of forward GVC
participation). Whereas, the thickness of the edges, or the lines connecting
any two nodes, represents the monetary value of domestic value-added that
is embedded in bilateral exports of one node (country) to another.1 The size
of the nodes signifies the importance of countries as a supplier of value-added
in GVCs while edges depict the extent of cross-border production sharing
(in value-added terms) occurring across countries.
1 A minimum threshold value of $5 million was set for the edges. Transaction values that show
levels lower than this threshold do not appear in the network charts. Countries that do not have
links with other countries were omitted from the charts.
Box 3: Examining Networks of Value-Added Trade
In a global value chain (GVC) world, countries and industries are highly interdependent.
Network analysis presents a way to visualize this interdependence (Jackson 2014).
Presenting GVCs as a network of interconnected players enables one to analyze both the
intensive and extensive margins of trade in value-added (TiVA). In a directed network, the
intensive margin reflects the volume of trade activity (thickness of edges) while the extensive
margin displays the frequency of links in the network (number of indegrees and outdegrees).
Research on international trade has started utilizing networks in examining the evolving
nature and dynamics of international trade. For example, Amador and Cabral (2016)
use data on bilateral foreign value-added (FVA) embedded in exports covering the years
1995 to 2011. The authors find that directed FVA networks have become denser, more
complex and intensively connected over time, which affirms the expansion and deepening
of GVCs as recognized in trade literature. Moreover, networks of value-added trade are
characterized as centralized and asymmetric, exhibiting a hierarchical structure dominated
by central countries that act as hubs. These structural properties are important as they
have material consequences on the propagation of shocks (Acemoglu et. al 2012). Other
notable recent applications of complex network analysis in the context of GVCs include
Amighini and Gorgoni (2014), Cerina et al. (2015), and Ferrarini (2013).a
a Amighini and Gorgoni (2014) utilized trade data at the detailed product level in analyzing how
emerging players in the global value chain have caused a structural change in the international
organization of auto production. Cerina et al. (2015) use data from harmonized multi-regional
input–output tables in the World Input–Output database in mapping the network of monetary
goods flows across economy-sectors. Ferrarini (2013) generated networks reflecting vertical
trade using product-level trade data.
Sources: D. Acemoglu, V. Carvalho, A. Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi. 2012. The Network Origins
of Aggregate Fluctuations. Econometrica. 80(5) pp. 1977–2016.
J. Amador and S. Cabral. 2016. Global Value Chains: A Survey of Drivers and Measures.
Journal of Economic Surveys. 30(2) pp. 278–301.
A. Amighini and S. Gorgoni. 2014. The International Reorganisation of Auto Production.
The World Economy. 37(2) pp. 923–952.
F. Cerina, Z. Zhu, A. Chessa, and M. Riccaboni. 2015. World Input–Output Network.
PLoS ONE. 10(7) pp. 1–21.
M. Jackson. 2014. Networks in the Understanding of Economic Behaviors. Journal of
Economic Perspectives. 28(4) pp. 3–22.
In defining the layout of the network charts, a Force-Atlas algorithm (Bastian,

Heymann, and Jacomy 2009) was utilized. There are two main features in
this algorithm. First, it pushes hubs (i.e., those with the highest number of
output links) towards the periphery while it puts authorities (i.e., those with
the highest number of input links) toward the center of the network chart.
The push-and-pull forces defined by linkages influence the relative position
of the nodes in the charts. Likewise, forces created by linkages balance out
such that the topological structure of the charts depends on the strength of
input and output links.
As the charts show (Figure 2.9), in 2000, the major players in global
production networks were Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Indonesia, seen in the periphery, exhibited strong forward ties
with only one country—that is, the United States. Also, the United States
exported its value-added into Indonesia which ultimately became embedded
in Indonesia’s exports. The network graph for 2000 also shows that Indonesia
had no significant forward link with its neighboring Asian economies.
In 2010, the shape and structure of GVCs became more complex. Asia’s
former hub was replaced by the People’s Republic of China and more
forward links were established among economies. The social network
graph in 2010 shows that Indonesia managed to establish forward ties with
Germany; Hong Kong, China; the People’s Republic of China; Singapore;
the United Kingdom; and the United States. It also became a significant
destination for value- added from Australia, Germany, France, and a number
of Asian economies.
By 2017, Indonesia further strengthened its forward ties with France;

Germany; Hong Kong, China; the People’s Republic of China; Singapore;
the United Kingdom; and the United States. The charts, however, show that
Indonesia did not interact intensively with ASEAN neighbors. It supplied
value- added that ultimately became embedded in exports of central
countries in Factory Asia, Factory North America, and Factory European
Union, as well as of resource-scarce economies such as Singapore and
Hong Kong, China. This trend is similar to the trade patterns seen for the
People’s Republic of China where developed economies become increasingly
important as export destinations.
An examination of the list of products exported from Indonesia to

Hong Kong, China and Singapore reveals that among the major imports of
these two economies from Indonesia were resource-based and low-technology
manufacturing products such as pearls and semi-precious stones; mineral fuels
and oils; electrical machinery, equipment and parts; dairy products; tobacco;
fish; crustaceans; tin; and chemical products.
26
Figure 2.9: Networks of Value-Added Trade, 2000, 2010, and 2017

A. 2000
Belgium Hong Kong, China
People’s Republic of China India

Portugal
Spain
Taipei,China
Japan
Poland Austria France Thailand
Czech Republic
Netherlands
Canada
Hungary Australia
Republic of Korea
Germany Italy
Russian Federation
Mexico Malaysia
Switzerland Indonesia
Turkey Singapore
United States
United Kingdom
Sweden
Denmark
Philippines
Norway
Ireland
Brazil

B. 2010
Luxembourg
Portugal
Switzerland
Spain
Belgium
Indonesia
Ireland
France
Hong Kong, China Austria Greece
Italy
Mexico
Canada
Indonesia’s Production and Value-Added Exports

Singapore
Romania
Netherlands
Poland
Malaysia
Hungary
Taipei,China
Philippines Germany Czech Republic
United States
United Kingdom
Australia
Japan Slovak Republic

Turkey
Russian Federation Kazakhstan

India
Brazil
People’s Republic of China

Thailand Denmark
Lithuania
Sweden Norway
Viet Nam Republic of Korea

Finland
27
28
C. 2017

Kazakhstan
Turkey
Russian Federation Romania

Bangladesh
Poland Czech Republic
Philippines Indonesia Slovak Republic
Italy
Austria Spain
Portugal
Thailand Japan
France
Republic of Korea
Australia Canada
Hungary
Germany
India
Netherlands
Switzerland
Mexico
Malaysia People’s Republic of China
Belgium
United Kingdom
Pakistan Taipei,China
Norway
United States
Sweden
Hong Kong, China
Singapore
Viet Nam
Luxembourg Finland
Ireland Denmark
Brazil
DVA = domestic value-added.

Note: Chart shows economies with the highest levels of domestic value-added involved in GVC-related activities. Node size corresponds to the monetary value (in $)
of DVA that is ultimately involved in GVC-related activities (forward GVC participation). DVA embedded in exports of source economy to a destination economy
defines the edges of the network charts. Line thickness indicates the size of domestic value-added produced by the economy that is absorbed abroad. Asian
Development Bank estimates are based on the methdology of Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018).
Sources: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2000, 2010, and 2017, Asian Development Bank; Asian Development Bank estimates.
29
Chapter 3
Indonesia’s Participation, Position, and
Specialization in Global Value Chains
F
or countries, participating in global value chains (GVCs), directly or
indirectly, is inevitable in a highly globalized world where production
processes are largely fragmented across borders. When, where, and how
economies enter any given GVC depends on their endowments. However,
it should not be assumed that the intensity and position of an economy’s
participation in value chains and its product or process specialization are
static. Instead, depending on multiple factors—such as economic conditions
and the goals of policy makers—economies can shape their involvement in
cross-border production arrangements.
This section analyzes how Indonesia’s involvement in GVCs evolved since

the start of the millennium. Using indicators derived by applying Wang, Wei,
Yu, and Zhu (2017), this section presents stylized facts on the country’s
participation in GVCs. It also assesses Indonesia’s position in GVCs using
the upstreamness index discussed in Antràs and Chor (2013, 2018),
Fally (2012), and Miller and Temurshoev (2017). Finally, Indonesia’s evolving
comparative advantage is also analyzed through a new measure of revealed
comparative advantage (RCA). Following Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018), this
new measure uses domestic value-added through forward linkage instead of
gross exports in computing country-sectors’ comparative advantages.
3.1 Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains
An economy’s production activities can be divided into three categories: first,

those related to domestic trade; second, those linked to bilateral trade of
final products; and third, those attributed to intermediates trade. The third
category is considered GVC-related activity and determines the extent to
which an economy participates in global production networks.
Economies can participate in GVCs in two ways. In the forward perspective, an

economy can supply domestic value-added by exporting intermediate products
to other economies. On the other hand, in the backward perspective, it can
use intermediate inputs from other economies in its production of final goods
and services. Box 4 discusses in detail how production can be decomposed and
how participation in the forward and backward linkages can be measured.
Box 4: Measuring Countries’ Participation in Global Value Chains
Wang et al. (2017), hereafter WWYZ (2017), proposed a value-added based decomposition
of final production at the economy-sector level from two interrelated perspectives: forward
and backward linkage. On the one hand, value-added generated by one country-sector
contributes to its own or another country-sector’s final production. Tracing where a focal
country-sector’s value-added “goes to” corresponds to the forward linkage perspective. On
the other hand, an economy-sector’s final production may be decomposed into value-added
contributions made by economy-sectors worldwide. Tracing the origin of value-added given
a fixed focal destination economy-sector corresponds to the backward linkage perspective.
When tracing the origin or destination of value-added in the context of GVCs, it is not only
the perspective (i.e., backward or forward) that matters. Quantifying the GVC-related
value-added requires that source and destination geographical markers be made clear.
Explicitly accounting for geographical flows, WWYZ (2017) characterized value-added
into three major categories: (a) value-added that is domestically produced and consumed;
(b) value-added that is embedded in final product exports or imports; and (c) value-added
that is embodied in intermediate exports or imports. Only value-added associated with
trade in intermediate goods (i.e., item c) is considered GVC-related.
A simplified framework for decomposing gross domestic product (GDP) and final goods
production is shown in Box 4 Figure. In WWYZ (2017), the forward-linkage decomposition
relates to separating a country-sector’s total value-added into several components. If the
goal is to understand which types of production and trade are GVC- related activities, one
can decompose GDP into three component parts: (1.a) value-added associated with the
production of final products sold in the domestic market (pure domestic), (1.b) value-
added associated with the production of final products exported to a direct importing
country (traditional trade) and (1.c) value-added associated with the production of
intermediate exports (GVC-related value-added).
Meanwhile, the backward-linkage decomposition concerns breaking down the total final
goods and services production of a country-sector into several components. If the goal is to
estimate the part of final goods and services production that were involved in GVC-related
activities, one can break final production into three component elements: (2.a) domestic
value-added embedded in domestically-used final products (pure domestic); (2.b) domestic
value-added embedded in final exports (traditional trade); and (2.c) domestic and foreign
value-added embedded in intermediate imports used to produce final goods and services
(GVC- related value-added).
To reiterate, the broad definition entails that value-added associated with intermediate
exports (1.c) or imports (2.c) are classified as generated from or involved in GVC-related
activities. From the forward GVC perspective, value-added generated in the production of
intermediate exports that is ultimately absorbed by the direct importer constitutes simple
GVC-related activities. On the other hand, value-added generated through the production
of intermediate exports that are re-exported or re-imported to the source country is
classified as belonging to complex GVC-related activities. From the backward perspective,
creation of value-added embedded in intermediate imports that are used in the production
of goods and services consumed domestically constitutes simple GVC-related activities
while the creation of value-added embedded in the production of exported goods and
services are classified as belonging to complex GVC-related activities.
Indonesia’s Participation, Position, and Specialization in Global Value Chains 31
Box 4 continued
Box 4 Figure: Decomposition of GDP and Final Goods Production by

Country-Sector
Decomposition of GDP by Decomposition of Final Goods

Country- Sector Production by Country-Sector
(Which types of production and trade are (Which part of final goods production and
GVC activities?) trade belong to GVCs?)
A country-sector’s total Production of final goods and

value-added (V) GDP services by country-sector (Y)
by industry Output by industry
0 1 0 1
In
production In In Domestic Domestic
of final production production VA in Domestic and foreign
products to of final of domestically VA in final VA in
domestic exports intermediate used final exports intermediate
market directly exports products (Y_RT) imports
directly (V_RT) (V_GVC) (Y_D) (Y_GVC)
(V_D)
1 ≥2 1 ≥2
Absorbed Partner VA in
Re-export/
by direct production In production
re-import
importer of domestic of exported
Complex
Simple used products
GVCs
GVCs products (Y_GVC_S)
(V_GVC_S)
(V_GVC_S) (V_GVC_S)
Source: Wang, Wei, Yu, and Zhu (2017).
The decomposition framework presented above is used to estimate measures of

GVC participation. In particular, the fraction of value-added associated with trade in
intermediates from the forward linkage perspective denotes the level of forward GVC
participation in WWYZ (2017). It is operationally defined, for each country-industry, as
the domestic value-added generated through GVC-related activities as a share of total
value-added. The strength of backward GVC participation is indicated by the fraction of
value-added associated with trade in intermediate products from the backward linkage
perspective. It measures the percentage of an economy-sector’s total production of final
goods and services that represent value-added involved in GVC activities.
Source: Z. Wang, S. Wei, X. Yu, and K. Zhu. 2017. Measures of Participation in Global Value Chains
and Global Business Cycles. NBER Working Paper No. 23222. Cambridge, MA: National
From 2000 to 2017, trade-related activity as a percentage of value-added

and final goods and services production declined in Indonesia (Figure 3.1.A).
The combined domestic value-added generated in the production of final
exports and in GVCs made up 31.8% of total value-added, but this share
declined by over 14 percentage points to 17.6% by 2017. As in the forward
linkage, decomposition of final products also showed a declining share of
trade-related activities (Figure 3.1.B). In 2000, 27.8% of final production
could be traced to trade-related activities. This share declined by almost
13 percentage points to 15 percentage points in 2017.
Figures 3.1.A. and 3.1.B. show that much of the decline in trade-related
activities in both the forward and backward linkages could be attributed to
declines in traditional trade, or trade in final exports. Meanwhile, trade in
intermediates experienced slower declines as percentages of total value-
added and final production in the forward and backward linkages, respectively.
As discerned earlier through other indicators, Indonesia’s participation in

GVCs declined between 2000 and 2017. In 2000, Indonesia’s forward GVC
participation was 21.5% of total value-added, above all hubs’ forward GVC
participation (Figure 3.2.A). By 2017, the ratio declined to 12.9%, below
Germany’s 19.8% and the world average of 13.3%. Likewise, Indonesia’s
backward GVC participation also declined during the period. The country’s
backward GVC participation was 16.9% of total final production in 2000,
but the share declined to 10.1% in 2017. However, data also show a
slightly increasing trend in backward participation from 2009 to 2014,
before a downward trend from 2014 to 2016 and a slight rebound in 2017
(Figure 3.2.B). This decline in GVC participation, beginning in 2014,
coincided with the enactment of the New Trade Bill, which emphasizes the
importance of domestic trade.
A comparison of the forward and backward GVC participation indices can

be used to discern an economy’s or economy-sector’s relative position in
various GVCs. A higher forward GVC participation compared to backward
GVC participation indicates that an economy, or a sector therein, is more
engaged in relatively upstream activities. On the other hand, a higher backward
participation index versus forward participation index implies that an economy
or economy-sector is engaged in relatively more downstream activities.
Data show that Indonesia was more actively engaged in upstream production.
The country’s forward GVC participation was higher than its backward
participation across all years (Figure 3.3). This implies that, in the aggregate,
the economy’s intermediate exports contained a higher proportion of domestic
value-added than foreign value-added and returned domestic value-added
put together. In other words, over the period considered, Indonesia supplied
more domestic value-added than its use of foreign value-added and returned
domestic value-added in production-sharing activities.
Figure 3.1: Decompositions of Value-Added and Final Production, Indonesia,

2000–2017
A. Value−Added Decomposition
100
Percent of Value−Added
80
60
40
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Domestic value−added Domestic value−added Domestic value−added
generated in the production generated in the production in GVCs
of domestic final demand of final product exports
B. Final Goods Production Decomposition
100
Percent of Final Goods
80
Production
60
40
20
0
2009
2010
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Domestic value−added Domestic value−added Foreign value−added

contained in domestic contained in final and returned domestic
final demand product exports value−added in GVCs

Note: Asian Development Bank estimates are based on the methodology of Wang, Wei, Yu,
and Zhu (2017).
Figure 3.2: Global Value Chain Participation Across Manufacturing Hubs,

2000–2017
A. Forward GVC Participation
30
GVC Participation Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2004
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
B. Backward GVC Participation
30
GVC Participation Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Indonesia China, People’s Republic of Germany Japan

United States World GFC
GFC = global financial crisis, GVC = global value chain.

and Zhu (2017).
Indonesia’s trade in intermediates was also dominated by value-added that

crossed border only once from both the backward and forward perspectives.
Figure 3.3 shows that simple GVCs dominated complex GVCs regardless
of the perspective. In the forward perspective, this implies that most of the
domestic value-added generated in the country’s production of intermediate
exports was used by direct importers in their final production. The data
on the backward perspective imply that most of Indonesia’s intermediate
imports came from bilateral trading partners and were used in the making
of domestically consumed products. In contrast, in complex GVCs, foreign
value-added and returned domestic value-added are used in significant
measures in export production.
A sector-wise dissection shows Indonesia’s orientation towards primary

exports in intermediate trade. Its primary sector consistently showed the
highest forward participation ratios since 2007 (Figure 3.4). This reflects the
country’s position as the second largest exporter of coal briquettes and as
a major exporter of agricultural products during 2000–2017. Participation
ratios in the medium- and high-technology manufacturing sector were also
relatively high compared to other sectors.
Trends in participation indices also varied by sector in Indonesia. Except

in the medium- and high-technology sector, both forward and backward
participation indices showed markedly higher proportions of simple GVCs
compared to complex GVCs (Figure 3.4). Complex GVCs generally dominated
simple GVCs in the backward linkages in the medium- and high-technology
sector. Forward participation was also higher than backward participation for
the primary sector, whereas the reverse was the case in the low-technology
manufacturing, and personal and public services sectors. Interestingly, for the
medium- and high-technology manufacturing and business service sectors,
backward participation exceeded forward participation in some years while
lagging during others.
Indonesia’s primary sector was more involved in upstream activities that largely
exported intermediates used by direct importers in their production of final
products. Forward participation indices for the primary sector in Indonesia
ranged between 23.8% to 35.9%, whereas backward participation indices for
the primary sector fell below 6% for all years considered (Figure 3.4). Thus,
the primary sector was strongly oriented towards supplying domestic value-
added in intermediate exports rather than using foreign value-added and
returned domestic value-added in production. Moreover, a higher proportion
of simple GVCs in the forward linkage implies that the domestic value-added
embodied in Indonesia’s primary sector intermediate exports was used by
direct importers largely in the production for their domestic consumption.
Figure 3.3: Simple and Complex Global Value Chain Participation in Indonesia,

2000–2017
A. Forward GVC Participation
30
GVC Participation
20
Index
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
B. Backward GVC Participation
30
GVC Participation
20
Index
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Simple GVCs Complex GVCs
GVCs = global value chains.

and Zhu (2017).
Through the years, an increasing portion of Indonesia’s primary sector’s

intermediate exports crossed border more than once. In 2000, value-
added generated in the production of intermediate exports that were used
in domestic final production of direct importers made up 68.7% of total
intermediate exports production. However, by 2017, this share declined
to 62.1%. Thus, Indonesia’s primary sector was engaged in relatively more
complex GVCs as already seen in Section 2.3.
Indonesia’s low-technology manufacturing sector was generally more

involved in downstream activities relative to upstream activities, and most of
the GVC activities within the sector involved single border crossings. The data
on the country’s low-technology manufacturing sector show that the sector’s
forward GVC participation fell below its backward participation for all years
considered (Figure 3.4). Additionally, simple GVCs constituted more than
two-thirds of total GVC-related activities in the forward linkage, whereas

at least 58% of total GVC-related activities in backward linkage could be
categorized as simple GVCs (Figure 3.4). In the forward linkage perspective,
this means that at least two-thirds of domestic value-added generated in
Indonesia’s production of low-technology manufacturing intermediates
exports were used by direct importers to produce final goods and services that
were consumed locally. Meanwhile, in the backward perspective, over 58% of
value-added embodied in the sector’s intermediates imports was foreign
value-added from partner economies that Indonesia used in the production
of goods and services consumed domestically.
Forward and backward GVC participations by the medium- and high-

technology sector in Indonesia were relatively high compared to other
sectors. On the one hand, 22.1% to 36.2% of gross value-added generated
by the medium- and high-technology sector was through the production of
intermediate exports (Figure 3.4). The two largest contributors to domestic
value-added in intermediate exports were “coke, refined petroleum, and
nuclear fuel” manufacturing and “chemicals and chemical products”
manufacturing. On the other hand, foreign value-added and returned
domestic value-added contained in intermediate imports in the sector ranged
between 17.8% and 25.8% (Figure 3.4). Intermediates used in “electrical and
optical equipment” manufacturing and “transport equipment” manufacturing
contained the most foreign value-added and returned domestic value-added
in the sector.
Engagement in simple and complex GVCs was also more proportional in the
backward linkages of Indonesia’s medium- and high-technology sector. In
some years, participation in simple backward GVCs exceeded that in complex
backward GVCs (Figure 3.4). This was true in 2007, 2008, 2016, and 2017.
In other years, foreign value-added and returned domestic value-added in
intermediate imports used in the production of the sector’s exports exceeded
foreign value-added in intermediate imports used in the production of
domestically consumed products. In other words, participation in complex
GVCs was higher in those years.
Indonesia’s service sectors showed low to moderate participation in GVCs.

Participation in both the backward and forward linkages in the business
services sector consistently fell below 15%, and the values of both the indices
were similar year after year (Figure 3.4). In the personal and public services
sector, the difference between forward GVC participation and backward GVC
participation was larger. Forward GVC participation shows that, at most, only
2.9% of the sector’s gross value-added was generated in the production of its
intermediate exports (Figure 3.4). This is not surprising given that services
were mostly rendered within the domestic economy. On the other hand,
backward GVC participation for the sector ranged between 5.6% and 14.4% of
Figure 3.4: Simple and Complex Global Value Chain Participation in Indonesia,

by Sector, 2000–2017
A. Forward GVC Participation − Primary
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
B. Forward GVC Participation − Low−Technology Manufacturing
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
C. Forward GVC Participation − Medium− and High−Technology Manufacturing
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

D. Backward GVC Participation − Primary
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
E. Backward GVC Participation − Low−Technology Manufacturing
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
F. Backward GVC Participation − Medium− and High−Technology Manufacturing
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017


G. Forward GVC Participation − Business Services
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
H. Forward GVC Participation − Personal and Public Services
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
total final production (Figure 3.4). Thus, a portion of value-added contained

in the final services of the sector could be attributed to foreign value-added
and returned domestic value-added embodied in intermediate imports.
Overall, from 2000 to 2017, Indonesia’s participation in GVCs declined in the

aggregate and across sectors. Its participation, through both the forward and
backward linkages, was on a downward trend when comparing 2000, 2007
and 2017 levels (Figure 3.3). The negative trends in the economy-wide GVC
participation indices were also observed at the five-sector level (Figure 3.4).
Moreover, the decline was evident even before the global financial crisis
of 2008, with participation indices declining from 2000 to 2007. Notable
increases in participation could be seen after the crisis for some industries, but
generally participation declined from 2007 to 2017.

I. Backward GVC Participation − Business Services
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
J. Backward GVC Participation − Personal and Public Services
40
GVC Participation
30
Index
20
10
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
GVCs = global value chains.

and Zhu (2017).
Declining trends in participation indices in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 imply
that Indonesia became less integrated in intermediate supply chains and
more involved in final goods trade and production for domestic consumption.
The value-added and final production decompositions in Figure 3.1 show
that Indonesia became less involved in GVC activities as larger portions
of domestic value-added became attributable to final products. In other
words, the country’s links to the intermediates supply network weakened.
Thus, despite Indonesia engaging more in upstream activities (as shown by
the higher forward participation compared to backward participation), its
position in GVCs trended downstream.
3.2 Indonesia’s Position in Global Value Chains
An economy-sector’s position in GVCs can be quantified through the

upstreamness index as proposed by Fally (2012) and Antràs and Chor (2013).
The upstreamness of an economy-sector is simply its average distance from
final use (Box 5). An economy-sector is said to be relatively upstream if its
output goes through several stages before reaching final use (Miller and
Temurshoev 2017). A simpler measure of upstreamness also relates the
share of gross output of an economy-sector that is sold to final consumers.
Box 5: Upstreamness
Fally (2012) and Antràs and Chor (2013) develop a measure of distance of a production
sector from final demand called upstreamness. Succinctly, the upstreamness of sector r in
economy i, or Uir, is the average distance from final use and is given by:
F ri ∑Ss=1 ∑Jj=1 ari sj F sj ∑Ss=1 ∑Jj=1∑St=1 ∑Jk=1 ari sj asj tkFkt

Uir = 1× + 2× + 3× + ...
X ri X ri X ri
where F is final demand, X is gross output, superscripts refer to sector, and subscripts
refer to in economy. Moreover, airsj is the dollar amount of sector r’s output from economy i
needed to produce one dollar worth of sector s’s output in economy j.
Antràs and Chor (2018) show that given ∑Ss=1 ∑Jj=1 ari sj <1 for all j–s pairs, then the numerator
of U ri is just the ([i–1]×S+r)–th element of the J×S by 1 column matrix (I–A)–2F, where A is a
J×S by J×S matrix whose ([i–1]×S+r,[ j–1]×S+s)–th element is ari sj, while F is a column matrix
whose ([i–1]×S+r)–th row is F ri. Furthermore, given that the gross output column matrix
satisfies, X=(I–A)–1F, the numerator of U ri is also equal to the ([i–1]×S+r)– th element of
the J×S by 1 matrix (I–A)–1X, where X is a J×S by 1 column matrix whose ([i–1]×S+r)–th
row is Xri.
Note that U ri ≥1, and that the higher U ri is, the higher is the upstreamness of the output from
sector r in economy i. A sector that sells a higher proportion of output to final consumers
would appear to be relatively downstream (i.e., relative low U ri ), while a sector that sells a
smaller proportion to final consumers would be relatively more upstream (i.e., relatively
high U ri ).
Antràs and Chor (2018) also present upstreamness as the share of gross output in sector r in
economy i that is sold to final consumers. Mathematically, this is given by the ratio F ri / X ri ,
where F ri is the total final use of output from sector r in economy i and X ri is the gross output
of sector r in economy i. In this case, the higher F ri /X ri is, the more downstream sector r in
economy i is.
Sources: P. Antràs and D. Chor. 2013. Organizing the Global Value Chain. Econometrica. 81(6)
pp. 2127–2204.
P. Antràs and D. Chor. 2018. On the Measurement Of Upstreamness and
Downstreamness in Global Value Chains. NBER Working Paper No. 24185. Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
T. Fally. 2012. Production Staging: Measurement and Facts. University of Chicago
Boulder (mimeo).
In this case, an economy-sector that sells a large amount of its output for
intermediate use, i.e., it has a lower ratio between final use and total output,
is said to be relatively upstream.
3.2.1 Indonesia’s Average Position in Global Value Chains
Weighted average upstreamness indices can be used to trace the evolution

of economies’ average positions in GVCs. Antràs and Chor (2018) and
Miller and Temurshoev (2017) make use of gross output shares as weights in
aggregating upstreamness indices. Figure 3.5.A presents the weighted average
upstreamness indices for several economies. While Figure 3.5.B presents the
average total final use to gross output ratio of the same economies, which is
computed by aggregating total final use of all sectors within each economy
and then dividing them by each of their corresponding total economy
gross output.
Indonesia’s upstreamness indices point to it moving relatively downstream

or closer to final use, a trend contrary to those of the world and of
many manufacturing hubs (Figure 3.5.A). The country’s gross output
weighted- average upstreamness was in decline from 2000 to 2017. In 2000,
its weighted-average upstreamness was 2.06, above the world average
(2.01), Germany (2.00), Japan (1.98), and the United States (1.85). Since
then, however, the world, Germany, and Japan showed generally increasing
upstreamness, whereas the indices for Indonesia and the United States
declined. By 2017, upstreamness in Indonesia (1.96) had diverged from,
and fallen below, the world average (2.26) and that of Germany (2.12) and
Japan (2.04).
Indonesia’s intermediate supply links with other countries weakened

over 2000–2017 although the change in Indonesia’s upstreamness was
marginal (0.10 units), meaning that a larger share of its gross output was
used to satisfy final demand. Thus, it was supplying less intermediates to
other economies. Furthermore, declining upstreamness also implies that the
country’s intermediate supply links with other economies were becoming
simpler and weaker as production shifted towards final goods and services.
Meanwhile, Germany, Japan, and the world showed increased shares of
intermediates in their gross output and strengthened intermediate supply
links with other countries.
Higher final use to gross output ratios also imply that Indonesia was moving
relatively downstream (Figure 3.5.B). An increasing final use to gross output
ratio implies that the share of intermediates in gross output was decreasing.
Figure 3.5: Trends in Upstreamness Across Economies, 2000–2017
A. Weighted Average Upstreamness
3.0
Upstreamness Index
Weighted Average
2.5
2.0
1.5
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2004
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
B. Total Final Use to Gross Output
60
Total Final Use to Gross
Output Ratio (%)
50
40
30
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Indonesia China, People’s Republic of Germany Japan

United States World GFC
GFC = global financial crisis.

Note: Asian Development Bank estimates are based on the methodologies of Antràs and
Chor (2018) and Miller and Temurshoev (2017).
Thus, the country was supplying less intermediates to other economies for
further processing. On the other hand, the final use to gross output ratios
for the world, Germany, and the People’s Republic of China declined from
2000 to 2017.
Indonesia was among the economies that moved downstream, as measured

by changes in the upstreamness index and the total final use to gross
output ratio. Figure 3.6.A shows the percentage changes in the weighted
average upstreamness indices of economies from 2000 to 2017. Meanwhile
Figure 3.6.B shows the percentage point changes in total final use to gross
output ratio of economies for the same period. Indonesia was among the
15 (out of 62) economies that registered a decrease in weighted average
upstreamness index from 2000 to 2017 and among the 23 (out of 62)
economies that showed increases in their total final use to gross output
ratio from 2000 to 2017. Other economies where weighted average
upstreamness decreased include India, Malaysia, and the United States. For
the period studied, Indonesia registered a 4.9 percentage point decrease in
its upstreamness index and a 3.6 percentage point increase in its total final
use to gross output ratio. Meanwhile, most economies experienced rising
upstreamness indices and declining total final use to gross output ratios.
These economies include the People’s Republic of China and Viet Nam.
Therefore, as GVCs were becoming more complex, with many economies
strengthening their links to the intermediate supply chains, Indonesia was
participating less in intermediate products trade and delving more in final
goods and services trade.
Given that Indonesia’s weighted-average upstreamness index is constructed

using gross output weighted sectoral upstreamness indices, trends in the
aggregate economy’s upstreamness can be traced back to sectoral changes.
The next subsection tackles trends and patterns in the positions of the
country’s sectors in GVCs.
Figure 3.6: Changes in Upstreamness Across Economies, 2000 versus 2017

A. Weighted Average Upstreamness
Mongolia 25.8%
Bulgaria 21.2%
Lithuania 20.1%
Greece 18.7%
Taipei,China 18.4%
Viet Nam 18.1%
Slovenia 17.4%
Bhutan 17.0%
Austria 15.7%
Republic of Korea 15.5%
Luxembourg 15.1%
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 13.9%
Rest of the World 13.0%
Poland 11.8%
Estonia 11.3%
People’s Republic of China 10.9%
Cambodia 10.5%
Mexico 10.0%
Thailand 9.4%
Netherlands 9.3%
Spain 8.9%
Portugal 8.7%
Bangladesh 8.2%
Cyprus 7.4%
Latvia 6.0%
Germany 5.9%
Sri Lanka 5.8%
Hungary 5.8%
Czech Republic 5.7%
Croatia 5.0%
Malta 5.0%
Australia 4.8%
Hong Kong, China 4.3%
Philippines 3.8%
Belgium 3.8%
Romania 3.8%
Turkey 3.7%
Japan 3.2%
Brazil 3.1%
Singapore 2.9%
Denmark 2.3%
France 2.1%
Russian Federation 2.0%
Canada 1.7%
United Kingdom 1.5%
Switzerland 1.4%
Sweden
0.5%
Finland
0.3%
Slovak Republic
−0.9%
India
−1.4%
Ireland
−1.7%
Italy
−2.8%
United States
−3.4%
Indonesia
−4.9%
Maldives
−4.9%
Brunei Darussalam
−5.1%
Norway
−5.4%
Malaysia
−9.1%
Pakistan
−9.4%
Kyrgyz Republic
−15.3%
Nepal
−17.5%
Fiji
−20.1%
Kazakhstan
−21.7%
–20.0 –10.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0

B. Total Final Use to Gross Output
Kazakhstan 14.5
Fiji 14.0
Nepal 12.5
Kyrgyz Republic 11.3
Pakistan 5.9
Malaysia 5.9
Norway 5.6
Indonesia 3.6
Italy 3.3
Maldives 3.2
Ireland 3.1
Brunei Darussalam 2.8
Russian Federation 2.2
United States 2.1
Finland 1.1
India 0.9
United Kingdom 0.8
Sweden 0.8
France 0.7
Australia 0.6
Slovak Republic 0.4
Japan 0.3
Switzerland 0.1
Denmark −0.1
Turkey −0.2
Brazil −0.5
Canada −1.0
Belgium −1.3
Philippines −1.3
Croatia −1.5
Romania −1.8
Rest of the World −2.0
Malta −2.2
Germany −2.2
Czech Republic −2.2
Singapore −2.2
Mexico −2.3
Portugal −2.4
Hong Kong, China −2.4
Hungary −2.6
Spain −2.6
People’s Republic of China −3.6
Thailand −3.9
Netherlands −4.0
Latvia −4.1
Cyprus −4.2
Bangladesh −4.8
Republic of Korea −5.2
Sri Lanka −5.4
Cambodia −5.4
Poland −5.7
Estonia −6.3
Greece −6.5
Taipei,China −6.7
Austria −7.4
Lithuania −8.0
Luxembourg −8.2
Mongolia −8.4
Bhutan −8.5
Lao People’s Democratic Republic −8.6
Slovenia −8.7
Viet Nam −8.8
Bulgaria –11.0
−10.0 −5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0
Note: Asian Development Bank estimates are based on the methodologies of P. Antràs and
D. Chor (2018) and Miller and Temurshoev (2017).
3.2.2 Positions of Indonesia’s Sectors in Global Value Chains
The heatmap in Figure 3.7 orders Indonesia’s industries according to

their average upstreamness from 2000 to 2017. It shows, industry-wise,
the relative upstreamness across time. “Mining and quarrying” had an
upstreamness index of 3.87 in 2011, the economy’s highest value for the
index from 2000 to 2017 (Figure 3.7). This means that this industry was
approximately three to four stages away from final use in the relevant GVCs.
On the other hand, “education” and “construction,” among others, had
upstreamness indices close to 1, implying that they provided their outputs
directly to final consumers.
Except for “mining and quarrying,” Indonesia’s top industries in terms of

gross output displayed upstreamness indices near 2, driving the country
average close to that number. The leading industries in terms of gross
output were “construction”; “food, beverages, and tobacco” manufacturing;
“agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing”; “mining and quarrying”; and
“wholesale trade” (Figure 3.8). Except for “mining and quarrying,” the average
upstreamness index of which across 2000 to 2017 was at 3.71, the average
upstreamness indices from 2000 to 2017 of the other four industries ranged
only from 1.14 to 2.15. In 2017, these industries contributed to over 39% of
Indonesia’s total gross output.2
Moreover, industries with upstreamness indices less than 2.5 for each year
from 2000 to 2017 accounted for 74% to 80% of the total gross output.
In 2017, for example, the combined contribution of all industries with
upstreamness indices less than 2.5 was 77.7% of the total gross output.
Six industries in Indonesia with upstreamness indices averaging less than

1.5 contributed between 17.5% to 26.7% to total gross output from 2000 to
2017. These industries, which provided almost all their outputs directly
to final consumers, were “other manufacturing and recycling”; “public
administration, defense and compulsory social security”; “health and
social work”; “education”; “construction”; and “hotels and restaurants.” In
2000, these industries contributed 17.5% of the total gross output; by 2017
the share increased to 25.9%.
Twenty industries with average upstreamness indices from 1.5 to less than
2.5 made up between 50.9% to 57.9% of the total gross output from 2000 to
2017. These industries, which were positioned roughly one stage away from
final use, included “real estate activities”; “retail trade”; “wholesale trade”;
2 For the same year, the contribution of “mining and quarrying” to the economy’s total gross
output was 5.65%.
“textiles and textile products” manufacturing; “water transport”; “transport

equipment” manufacturing; “post and telecommunications”; “other
community, social and personal services”; “other machinery” manufacturing;
“electrical and optical equipment” manufacturing; “sale, maintenance and
repair of motor vehicles and retail sale of fuel”; “renting of machinery and
equipment and other business activities”; “other supporting and auxiliary
transport activities”; “activities of travel agencies”; “other non-metallic
mineral” manufacturing; “food, beverages, and tobacco” manufacturing;
“financial intermediation”; “air transport”; “agriculture, hunting, forestry, and
fishing”; “leather and footwear” manufacturing; and “inland transport.” Their
contribution to gross output declined from 57.6% in 2000 to 50.9% in 2012
but increased to 53.5% by 2017.
Industries with average upstreamness indices in the range 2.5 to 3.5 provided
14.7% to 19.0% of Indonesia’s total gross output. Such industries were roughly
two to three stages away from final use. Their contribution to total gross
output was at 18.2% in 2000 and peaked at 19.0% during the global financial
crisis (2008). Thereafter, their combined shares declined and reached 14.9%
in 2017. Seven industries were in this category: “wood and products of wood
and cork” manufacturing; “rubber and plastics” manufacturing; “coke, refined
petroleum, and nuclear fuel” manufacturing; “basic metals and fabricated
metal” manufacturing; “pulp and paper production, and printing and
publishing”; “electricity, gas, and water supply”; and “chemicals and chemical
products” manufacturing.
As noted earlier, only “mining and quarrying” had an average upstreamness

index above 3.5; and it contributed between 5.3% to 8.4% of total gross
output from 2000 to 2017. While “mining and quarrying” accounted for a
large share of Indonesia’s exports, the industry’s contribution to gross output
was only at 6.6% on average for all years considered. From 2000 to 2009, the
contribution of “mining and quarrying” to gross output fared between 6.1% to
6.9%. This share climbed after the global financial crisis to reach 7.5% in 2010
and 8.4% in 2011 before declining to 5.6% in 2017.
In summary, Indonesia’s upstreamness index was driven close to 2 largely

due to its key industries moving more downstream—with industry-specific
upstreamness indices ranging between 1.5 and 2.5. Moreover, the downward
movement of average upstreamness in Indonesia can be attributed to the
growing share of gross output that is generated by industries that were closer
to final use and the decline in the share of those that were further upstream.
Figure 3.7: Upstreamness of Indonesia’s Industries Across Time, 2000–2017
Mining and Quarrying
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing, and Publishing
Coke, Refined Petroleum, and Nuclear Fuel
Chemicals and Chemical Products
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
Rubber and Plastics
Financial Intermediation
3.866
Renting of Machinery and Equipment and
Other Business Activities
Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport 3.555
Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies
Weighted Average Upstreamness Index

Machinery, NEC
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 3.243
Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade,
Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 2.931
Other Non−Metallic Mineral
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing 2.620
Post and Telecommunications
Water Transport 2.308
Inland Transport
1.996
Electrical and Optical Equipment
Other Community, Social and Personal Services 1.684

Air Transport
Real Estate Activities 1.373

Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor
Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel
1.061
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco
Transport Equipment
Textiles and Textile Products
Leather, Leather and Footwear
Hotels and Restaurants
Manufacturing, NEC; Recycling
Health and Social Work

Public Administration and Defence;
Compulsory Social Security
Construction
Education
2000
2001
2002
2003
2006
2007
2004
2005
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Note: Sectors are ranked according to average upstreamness across time. Asian Development
Bank estimates are based on the methodologies of Antràs and Chor (2018) and Miller
and Temurshoev (2017).
Figure 3.8: Industrial Gross Output in Total Gross Output Across Time, 2000–2017
Mining and Quarrying
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing
Coke, Refined Petroleum, and Nuclear Fuel
Chemicals and Chemical Products
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
Rubber and Plastics

15.35
Sectoral Gross Output to Total Economy Gross Output (in %)

Financial Intermediation
Renting of Machinery and Equipment and
Other Business Activities
Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport 13.69
Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies
Machinery, NEC
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and
12.02
Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, 10.35
Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
Other Non−Metallic Mineral
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing

8.68
Post and Telecommunications

7.01
Water Transport
Inland Transport 5.34

Electrical and Optical Equipment
Other Community, Social and Personal Services 3.67

Air Transport
2.00
Real Estate Activities
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles
and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 0.33
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco
Transport Equipment
Textiles and Textile Products
Leather, Leather and Footwear
Hotels and Restaurants
Manufacturing, NEC; Recycling
Health and Social Work

Public Administration and Defence;
Compulsory Social Security
Construction
Education
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Note: Sectors are ranked according to average upstreamness across time. Asian Development
Bank estimates are based on the methodologies of Antràs and Chor (2018) and Miller
and Temurshoev (2017).
3.3 Indonesia’s Specialization in Global Value Chains
Understanding patterns of specialization across countries has been a long-

standing policy concern in international trade research. Knowing “what
a country does more efficiently” than other countries guides industrial
policy and aids in crafting an evidence-based approach to determining key
sectors. Revealed comparative advantage offers a way to quantify and rank
product-specific specialization in trade across economies. Box 6 discusses
how traditional and new measures of revealed comparative advantage can be
derived using exports and domestic value-added data.
A country is said to have a comparative advantage in a certain sector if

the share of that sector in total country exports exceeds its share in total
world exports (Balassa 1965). Otherwise, it is said to have a comparative
disadvantage in that sector. Policymakers use traditional revealed comparative
advantage (TRCA) measures to identify key sectors in the economy; in fact,
it is taken to be a measure of export competitiveness (Serin and Civan 2008;
Tripa et al. 2018).
In view of recent empirical advances in GVC analysis, the concept of

“revealed comparative advantage” can be revised to incorporate information
on exports of domestic value-added. Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018) proposed
a new measure of revealed comparative advantage based on forward-linkage
based domestic value-added exports. This measure, called new revealed
comparative advantage (NRCA), is analogous to Balassa’s measure except
that it is based on domestic value-added.
From 2000 to 2017, Indonesia’s comparative advantage shifted towards low-

technology manufacturing. NRCA values of the broad sectoral categories
in Figure 3.9 show that the country’s comparative advantages were in the
primary and low-technology sectors. During 2011–2018, its comparative
advantage (as measured in value-added terms) in low- technology sectors
exhibited a gradual rise. NRCA values increased from 1.4 in 2000 to 1.5 in
2007 and 1.8 in 2017.
Primary sectors, on the other hand, showed a decline in competitiveness

with NRCA values of 3.1 in 2000 and 2.8 in 2007. Post global financial
crisis, NRCA indices of primary sectors declined to 2.6 in 2017. Despite
the decline, data indicate that Indonesia’s comparative advantage in the
low- technology sectors continued to have the highest NRCA values
across all years covered. While, during 2000–2017, Indonesia consistently
lagged with a comparative disadvantage in services, and medium- and high-
technology sectors.
Box 6: Calculating Measures of Revealed Comparative Advantage
The traditional measure of revealed comparative advantage follows Balassa (1965).

The measure is obtained by dividing the share of a country-sector’s gross exports with
the sector’s gross exports from all countries as a share of world total gross exports. More
formally, TRCA can be expressed as
er
i
∑Ni= 1 eri
TRCAri = ∑Gk = 1 e ki
∑Ni∑Gk = 1 e ki
where er*i is country r’s exports of products from sector i, N is the number of products
(or industries in the input–output setting), and G is the number of countries in the world
economy. A country r is said to have a comparative advantage (with respect to the world)
in the production of product i if TRCAri >1. Otherwise, it is said to have a comparative
disadvantage in product i.
Balassa’s index more accurately reflects cross-country differences in comparative

advantage in a world that exclusively trades finished products. As argued in theoretical
literature, TRCA may not be the most appropriate measure of comparative advantage in
a GVC world characterized by intensive and extensive networks of trade in intermediates.
There are at least two reasons for this. First, TRCA ignores the fact that a country-sector’s
value-added may be exported indirectly via the country’s exports in other sectors. Hence,
a more conceptually correct measure should be able to account for value-added exported
indirectly across country-sectors. Second, TRCA neglects the fact that a country-sector’s
gross exports may partly carry foreign value-added content. Therefore, a conceptually
correct measure should exclude foreign value-added content embedded in exports.
The abovementioned empirical complications may be evaded by using forward-linkage

based domestic value-added in exports (DVA_F) in lieu of gross exports. A particular
country-sector’s DVA_F refers to the domestic value-added that is originated from that
country-sector and ultimately embodied in exports regardless of where these exports are
finally consumed. Intuitively, DVA_F may be interpreted as a measure of a country-sector’s
significance as a supplier of value-added in exports. Rewriting Balassa’s index by replacing
gross exports with DVA_F yields a new RCA measure that more accurately depicts patterns
of specialization in a GVC world. Here, new revealed comparative advantage of country r in
product i is obtained using the following formula:
DVA_F ri
∑Ni= 1 DVA_F ri
NRCAri = ∑Gk = 1 DVA_F ki
∑Ni∑Gk = 1 DVA_F ki
As in TRCA, country r is said to have a comparative advantage (with respect to the

world) in the production of good i if TRCAri >1. Otherwise, it is said to have a comparative
disadvantage in product i.
Sources: B. Balassa. 1965. Trade Liberalisation and “Revealed” Comparative Advantage.

The Manchester School. 33(2) pp. 99–123.
Z. Wang, S. Wei, and K. Zhu. 2018. Quantifying International Production Sharing at the
Bilateral and Sector Levels. NBER Working Paper No. 19677. Cambridge, MA: National
Figure 3.9: Revealed Comparative Advantage of Broad Sectors in Indonesia,

2000–2017
4.0
3.0
RCA Index
2.0
1.0
0.0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2004
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Primary Low−technology Medium− and high− Business
manufacturing technology manufacturing services
Personal and NRCA = 1 GFC

public services
GFC = global financial crisis, NRCA = revealed comparative advantage based on value-added
terms, RCA = revealed comparative advantage.
and Zhu (2018).
From a sectoral perspective, data reveal that the activities in which Indonesia
had comparative advantage tended to be concentrated in a small number of
primary and low-technology industries. Figure 3.10 compares NRCA rankings
for the years 2000, 2007, and 2017 across the 35 industries presented in the
ADB MRIOTs.
Indonesia remained very competitive in low-technology manufacturing

industries such as “textiles”; “food, beverages, and tobacco”; and “rubber
and plastics.” Moreover, for some of these industries, the country’s
competitiveness indices had increased. In 2000, “food, beverages, and
tobacco” manufacturing had an NRCA index of 2.0, whereas in 2017 its
value was 3.8. For “rubber and plastics” manufacturing, the NRCA indices in
2000 and 2017 were 1.1 and 1.5, respectively. Indonesia continued to show
a comparative disadvantage in construction. However, the index steadily
inched up from 0.2 in 2000 to 0.8 in 2017.
Indonesia’s “other manufacturing” industry gained comparative advantage.

Starting with a comparative disadvantage in 2000 with NRCA value of 0.8,
this industry achieved an NRCA value of 1.0 by 2017. This means that
Indonesia had managed, albeit slowly, to gain a comparative advantage in the
production of certain types of low-technology manufacturing goods.
However, competitiveness indices of most of Indonesia’s medium- and

high-technology industries declined post global financial crisis. For “coke,
refined fuel, and petroleum” manufacturing, for example, the NRCA value
decreased sharply from 8.2 in 2000 to 2.7 in 2017, reflecting the country’s
declining oil and gas products exports. Data show that nearly all the products
supplied by the oil and gas industry experienced declining prices as well
as weakening global demand. Much of the slowdown in exports of these
industries could be attributed to the weakening Chinese economy, a major
export market for Indonesia, as well as the slowdown in global trade due to
the trade conflict.
Other medium- and high-technology industries such as “other non-metallic”

and “other machinery” manufacturing also declined in competitiveness.
While the former saw a drop in NRCA value from 0.8 in 2000 to 0.3 in
2017, the latter’s index declined from 0.4 to 0.2 during the same period.
However, “chemicals and chemical products” manufacturing notably gained
comparative advantage, with the industry’s index increasing from 0.6 to
1.1 from 2000 to 2017.
Given the primary sector’s contribution to Indonesia’s exports, it is important

to highlight the country’s decreasing competitiveness in this sector. The
decline was mostly driven by the “mining and quarrying” industry, the NRCA
value of which decreased from 3.4 in 2000 to 2.5 in 2017.
Figure 3.10: Ranking of Sectoral Revealed Comparative Advantage in Indonesia,

2000, 2007, and 2017
Coke, Refined Petroleum, and Nuclear Fuel, 8.2
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork, 4.3
Leather, Leather and Footwear, 4.1
Mining and Quarrying, 3.4
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing, 2.6
Textiles and Textile Products, 2.1
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco, 2.0
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel, 1.5
Hotels and Restaurants, 1.3
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods, 1.2
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing, 1.2
Rubber and Plastics, 1.1
Financial Intermediation, 0.9
Manufacturing, NEC; Recycling, 0.8
Other Non−Metallic Mineral, 0.8
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles, 0.6
Chemicals and Chemical Products, 0.6
Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies, 0.6
Electrical and Optical Equipment, 0.5
Real Estate Activities, 0.5
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal, 0.5
Water Transport, 0.5
Other Community, Social and Personal Services, 0.4
Machinery, NEC, 0.4
Inland Transport, 0.4
Post and Telecommunications, 0.3
Health and Social Work, 0.3
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply, 0.3
Air Transport, 0.3
Education, 0.2
Construction, 0.2
Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security, 0.2
Transport Equipment, 0.2
Renting of Machinery & Equipment and Other Business Activities, 0.1
Private Households with Employed Persons, 0.0
NRCA NRCA
2000 2007

4.4, Leather, Leather and Footwear

3.8, Food, Beverages, and Tobacco
2.8, Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing
2.7, Coke, Refined Petroleum, and Nuclear Fuel
2.5, Mining and Quarrying
2.4, Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
2.0, Textiles and Textile Products
1.5, Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel
1.5, Rubber and Plastics
1.3, Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing
1.2, Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods
1.1, Chemicals and Chemical Products
1.0, Manufacturing, NEC; Recycling
1.0, Air Transport
0.9, Hotels and Restaurants
0.8, Post and Telecommunications
0.8, Construction
0.6, Transport Equipment
0.6, Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
0.5, Electrical and Optical Equipment
0.5, Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
0.5, Health and Social Work
0.5, Other Community, Social and Personal Services
0.5, Financial Intermediation
0.5, Water Transport
0.4, Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security
0.4, Inland Transport
0.4, Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies
0.3, Other Non−Metallic Mineral
0.3, Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply
0.2, Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Other Business Activities
0.2, Education
0.2, Real Estate Activities
0.2, Machinery, NEC
0.0, Private Households with Employed Persons
NRCA NRCA
2007 2017
NEC = not elsewhere classified, NRCA = revealed comparative advantage based on value-added terms.
Note: Sectors colored in blue represent primary sectors. Sectors in green represent low-technology manufacturing
sectors. Sectors colored in orange represent medium- and high-technology manufacturing sectors. Sectors
colored in black represent business services. Sectors colored in grey represent personal and public services.
Asian Development Bank estimates are based on the methodology of Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018).
Sources: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2000, 2007 and 2017, Asian Development Bank; Asian Development
Bank estimates.
Research shows evidence of divergence between TRCA and NRCA measures

(Brakman and van Marrewijk 2016; Wang, Wei, and Zhu 2018), lending
support to the assertion that measures of revealed comparative advantage
need to be more oriented towards the forward linked valued-added export
concept given the ever increasing trade in intermediates.
Figure 3.11 uses Indonesia’s comparative advantage indices in the medium-

and high-technology sector to illustrate that NRCA and TRCA for a
given sector can differ. By failing to net out foreign value-added and pure
double counted valued-added that is originated abroad, the TRCA makes
the medium- and high-technology sector appear to have a comparative
advantage. This higher TRCA compared with NRCA is due in part to the large
share of foreign value-added that is embodied in the exports of the sector.
Thus, NRCA index shows that Indonesia in fact did not have a comparative
advantage in the medium- and high-technology sector.
Moreover, a comparison of the two measures in Figure 3.12 suggests that

Indonesia’s comparative advantage in the low-technology manufacturing
sector was lower than indicated by the traditional approach. Although both
measures show increase in the competitiveness of this sector, it was more
gradual than indicated by the TRCA measure. However, regardless of the
measure used, Indonesia still displayed comparative advantage in the low-
technology manufacturing.
3.4 Evolution of Participation, Position,

and Specialization in Indonesia
To tie the concepts of GVC participation, value chain position, and revealed
comparative advantage together, Figure 3.13A maps the relevant indices in
a scatter plot for 2000, while Figure 3.13.B shows the picture in 2017. The
x-axis and y-axis correspond to the forward and backward participation,
respectively, of Indonesia’s industries. The nodes refer to industries and the
size of each node corresponds to an industry’s NRCA, or revealed comparative
advantage based on forward-linked value- added exports. Those industries
which Indonesia specializes in, or those with NRCA>1, are labeled with their
industry codes and colored according to their respective upstreamness values.
Comparative advantage industries with upstreamness values less than 1.5 are
colored dark blue. Those with upstreamness values greater than or equal to
1.5 but less than 2.5 are colored light blue. Those with upstreamness values
greater than or equal to 2.5 but less than 3.5 are colored green. Finally, those
with upstreamness values greater than or equal to 3.5 are colored orange.
Figure 3.11: Revealed Comparative Advantage in Indonesia’s

Medium- and High-technology Manufacturing Sector, 2000–2017
5.0
4.0
RCA Index
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2010
2011
2004
2009
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
NRCA TRCA RCA = 1 GFC
terms, RCA = revealed comparative advantage, TRCA = revealed comparative advantage based
on gross exports.
and Zhu (2018).
Figure 3.12: Revealed Comparative Advantage in Indonesia’s

Low-technology Manufacturing Sector, 2000–2017
5.0
4.0
RCA Index
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2004
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
NRCA TRCA RCA = 1 GFC

terms, RCA = revealed comparative advantage, TRCA = revealed comparative advantage based
on gross exports.
and Zhu (2018).
Figure 3.13: Participation, Position, and Revealed Comparative Advantage,

2000 versus 2017
A. 2000
50
40
Backward Participation
30 c10
c19 c5 c4 c7
20
c3 c6
c22 c8
10 c21
c1
c2
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Forward Participation
B. 2017
50
40
Backward Participation
c8
30
c10
20 c4
c5 c9
c16
c7
10 c6
c19 c3 c2
c21
c1
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Forward Participation
Note: The nodes refer to sectors and the size of each node corresponds to the sector’s revealed
comparative advantage based on value-added terms. Only sectors with comparative
advantage are labeled with their sector codes (Appendix 2) and colored according to their
respective upstreamness values. Comparative advantage sectors with upstreamness values
less than 1.5 are colored dark blue. Those with upstreamness values greater than or equal
to 1.5 but less than 2.5 are colored light blue. Those with upstreamness values greater than
or equal to 2.5 but less than 3.5 are colored green. Finally, those with upstreamness values
greater than or equal to 3.5 are colored orange. Asian Development Bank estimates are
based on the methodologies of Antràs and Chor (2018); Wang, Wei, Yu, and Zhu (2017);
and Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018).
Sources: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2000 and 2017, Asian Development Bank;
In both 2000 and 2017, Indonesia specialized in both upstream and

downstream industries as represented by the colored nodes. However,
Indonesia had comparative advantage in more industries in 2017 than it did
in 2000. In 2000, Indonesia had comparative advantage in 12 industries. By
2017, it had lost its comparative advantage in “hotels and restaurants” services
but gained advantage in “chemicals and chemical products” manufacturing
and “other manufacturing.”
It is noteworthy that three of the top five industries in 2000 in terms of

NRCA were also those that had upstreamness values greater than 2.5. These
industries were “coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel” manufacturing;
“wood and products of wood and cork” manufacturing; and “mining and
quarrying.” They also showed higher forward participation indices compared
to most other industries, but their backward participation indices were below
15%. By 2017, both their forward participation and comparative advantage
had decreased. Also noticeable was the increased backward participation of
“coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel” manufacturing in 2017.
In 2017, Indonesia’s “rubber and plastics” manufacturing also had a higher

upstreamness index as it increased its forward participation and revealed
comparative advantage. Meanwhile, “wood and products of wood and
cork” manufacturing experienced decreases in its comparative advantage,
upstreamness, backward participation, and forward participation from 2000
to 2017. The “pulp, paper, printing and publishing” industry, on the other
hand, saw decreases in upstreamness and forward and backward participation
in 2017, but its revealed comparative advantage increased.
Another noticeable change from 2000 to 2017 was Indonesia’s growing

comparative advantage in the other industries with upstreamness indices that
were less than 2.5. Of the eight that had indices less than 2.5 in 2000, five
gained comparative advantage by 2017. Four industries saw decreases in their
upstreamness and participation indices while increasing their comparative
advantages. These industries include “agriculture, hunting, forestry, and
fishing”; “leather and footwear” manufacturing; “sale, maintenance and repair
of motor vehicles and motorcycles”; and “retail sale of fuel.” Meanwhile, for
“food, beverages, and tobacco” manufacturing and the “rubber and plastics”
manufacturing, increases in comparative advantages were accompanied
by increases in upstreamness and forward participation and decreases in
backward participation.
This was also true for the “other manufacturing and recycling” industry which
had comparative advantage in 2017, but not in 2000. Meanwhile, “textiles
and textile products” manufacturing, along with “hotels and restaurants”
services, experienced decreases in NRCA and participation indices but had
an increase in upstreamness. All four indicators declined for “retail trade”
from 2000 to 2017.
Overall, a number of trends can be discerned from the various indicators

discussed. Firstly, Indonesia specialized in industries with different positions
and levels of participation in GVCs. This can be seen by the presence of the
different node colors in both years. Moreover, for its industries, there were
no strong correlations between NRCA and upstreamness (0.24), between
NRCA and forward participation (0.47), and between NRCA and backward
participation (0.12).
Secondly, throughout 2000–2017, backward participation was generally on

the low side for all Indonesian industries which had participation indices less
than 45%. This means intermediate imports (which were made up of foreign
value-added and returned domestic value-added) had a relatively lower level
of contribution to the country’s final production.
Lastly, in general, increases in upstreamness were accompanied by increases

in forward participation. For Indonesia, the correlation between upstreamness
and forward participation was 0.70, considering all values of these two
indicators for 2000 and 2017.3 Intuitively, as the forward participation of an
industry increases, the domestic value-added generated by its production
of intermediates as a share of its total domestic value-added also increases.
This also implies that the share of intermediates in gross output will increase.
Consequently, the upstreamness of an industry increases as larger shares of
its output go through more stages of processing before reaching final use, or
in other words, as larger shares of its output become intermediate inputs of
other industries.
3 When considering all country-sectors across 2000 to 2017 and taking out outliers, the
correlation between upstreamness and forward GVC participation goes up marginally to 0.72.
63
Chapter 4
Examining Other Aspects of Global
Value Chains: The Case of Indonesia
T
his section adopts analysis on different GVC-related domains and
applies them to the Indonesian case. First, Indonesia’s domestic supply
chains are analyzed using the agglomeration indices developed by
Mercer- Blackman, Foronda, and Mariasingham (2017). Second, the impacts
of GVC-related factors on jobs in Indonesia are studied following Bertulfo,
Gentile, and de Vries (2019). Third, following Abiad et al. (2018), input–output
analysis is used to quantify the potential impacts of the trade conflict between
the United States and the People’s Republic of China on Indonesia. Lastly,
GVC-linked foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in Indonesia are examined
using balance of payments (BOP) and firm-level data.
4.1 Agglomeration in Indonesia
Dot plot matrices were created to visualize the evolution of Indonesia’s

domestic supply chains over time (Figure 4.1). These matrices were
computed using the domestic technical coefficients derived from Indonesia’s
input–output tables, specifically for the years 2000, 2007, 2010, and 2017.
The size of the dot corresponds to the magnitude of the technical coefficient,
which is larger if the column sector uses a substantial amount of intermediate
inputs from the row sector.4 In this regard, these dot plot matrices may also
be interpreted as input dependency matrices. Table 4.1 below shows the
economic blocks considered and their corresponding color codes in the dot
plot charts.
Table 4.1: Sector and Economic Block Descriptions and Color Legend

for Dot- Plot Matrices
Economic Block Color Code in Dot Plot Matrix

Primary
Low-technology manufacturing
Medium- and high-technology manufacturing
Business services
Personal and public services
4 For visualization purposes, technical coefficients less than 0.02 are ignored.
64
Figure 4.1: Dot Plots, Indonesia’s Technical Coefficient Matrices, 2000, 2007, 2010, and 2017
Indonesia, 2000 Indonesia, 2007

1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

Indonesia, 2010 Indonesia, 2017

1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
Examining Other Aspects of Global Value Chains

14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Note: Asian Development Bank estimates of revealed comparative advantage are based on Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2018).
Source: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2000, 2007, 2010, and 2017, Asian Development Bank; Asian Development Bank estimates.
65
Sectors depend highly on inputs from domestic own-sector if the diagonal

entries in the dot plot matrices are large. From Figure 4.1, domestic own-
sector dependency had consistently been pronounced in low-technology
manufacturing sectors (green), and medium- and high-technology
manufacturing sectors (red orange), but the size of the dots along the
diagonal of the dot plot matrices were larger during 2007 and 2010, years that
characterize the onset of the 2007 global financial crisis and its aftermath,
respectively. This suggests that Indonesia tended to rely more on domestic
own-sector sources for intermediate inputs during the crisis years, and less
during non-crisis periods.
The dot plot matrices in Figure 4.1 also show the sectors that comprised
the set of Indonesia’s comparative advantage industries, and how its
composition changed over time. In particular, the highlighted rows
correspond to the country’s comparative advantage industries, based on the
new revealed comparative advantage index developed by Wang, Wei, and
Zhu (2018). In 2000, the country had a revealed comparative advantage
in “agriculture, fishery and forestry,” “mining and quarrying,” and low-
technology manufacturing industries such as “food and beverages,” “rubber
and plastics,” “textiles and textile products,” among others. In services, data
indicate a revealed comparative advantage in “sale and repair of motorcycles
and vehicles,” “retail sale of fuel,” “retail trade,” and “hotels and restaurants.”
Comparative advantage in “sale and repair of motorcycles and vehicles,” as
well as in “retail trade,” was lost in 2007 and reappeared in 2010. By 2017,
Indonesia lost its comparative advantage in “hotels and restaurants.” This
coincided with a gain in revealed comparative advantage in “chemicals and
chemical products” and “other manufacturing including recycling.” Overall,
domestic production structures did not show evidence of any gradual or
abrupt structural change or transformation. Competitiveness in many
industries stayed stagnant from 2000 to 2017.
Table 4.2 shows the agglomeration indices for the years 2000 and 2007 to
2017. Agglomeration based on backward linkages was the strongest in low-
technology manufacturing sectors, as well as business services, indicating that
domestic supply chains in these broad sector categories received relatively
more (domestic or foreign) intermediate inputs than others. Personal and
public services, meanwhile, did not have strong backward linkages. In fact,
their agglomeration indices via backward linkages fell below zero across all
years considered.
The broad sector category that exhibited the strongest agglomeration

index via forward linkages in Indonesia was business services, hinting that
production activities in other sectors had strong services-related value-
added embeddings. However, this does not say anything about the quality of
services that became ultimately embedded in production activities.
Table 4.2: Agglomeration Indices of Broad Sectors in Indonesia, 2000, 2007–2017
Agglomeration index
2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Overall
Primary –0.79 –0.82 –0.92 –0.74 –0.77 –0.78 –0.91 –0.78 –0.69 –0.64 –0.85 –0.87 –1.05
Low-technology manufacturing 0.55 0.66 0.62 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.70 0.72 0.63 0.44
Medium- and high-technology manufacturing 0.28 0.47 0.57 0.53 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.42 0.44 0.39 0.06
Business services 1.32 1.19 1.03 1.06 1.01 1.01 0.95 1.00 1.07 1.10 1.07 1.02 0.88
Personal and public services –1.55 –1.01 –1.22 –1.05 –1.09 –1.10 –1.10 –1.07 –1.06 –1.03 –1.07 –1.08 –1.10

Based on backward linkages
Primary –1.97 –2.23 –2.22 –1.91 –1.91 –1.92 –2.21 –1.93 –1.70 –1.51 –1.93 –1.94 –2.26
Based on forward linkages
Primary 0.39 0.59 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.16
Note: Asian Development Bank estimates are based on Mercer-Blackman, Foronda and Mariasingham (2017).
Source: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2000, 2007, 2010, and 2017, Asian Development Bank; Asian Development Bank estimates.
67
Box 7: Calculating the Agglomeration Index
Mercer-Blackman, Foronda and Mariasingham (2017) constructed a numerical measure

that reflects the information presented in the dot plot matrices. This indicator is named the
agglomeration index, which quantifies the degree of clustering within a domestic economic
block. The agglomeration index has two components—the first is based on backward
linkages while the second is based on forward linkages. The agglomeration index, ultimately,
is derived by simply taking the arithmetic average of its two components.
The agglomeration index based on backward linkages for any economic block k of country
c is defined as
l
∑li=1∑ng=1Pg,i
AGG(b)kc = ln m(b)i *
l*n
i=1
where m(b)i is the sum of the Leontief inverse coefficient values along the column
corresponding to sector i, l is the total number of sectors in the economic block, n is
the total number of sectors in the economy, and Pg,i is a binary variable set to one if the
corresponding technical coefficient ag,i of row sector g and column sector i is greater than
the threshold 0.02a and 0 otherwise.
The construction of the agglomeration index based on forward linkages follows the same
logic, but sums the Leontief inverse coefficient m(f)i and binary variable pj,h along sector
rows of an economic block,
l
∑li=1∑nh=1Pg,i
AGG(f )kc = ln m(f )i *
l*n
i=1
where m(f)j is the sum of the Leontief inverse coefficients along the row corresponding
to sector j, l is the total number of sectors in the economic block, n is the total number of
sectors in the economy, and pj,h is a binary variable set to one if the corresponding technical
coefficient aj,h of row sector j and column sector h is greater than the threshold 0.02a and
0 otherwise.
The indices are higher for economic blocks with stronger linkages among sectors
(as embodied by the first factor, e.g., ∑li=1m (f )j for forward-based agglomeration index)
and higher degree of participation within the economic block (as represented by the
∑li=1∑nh=1Pg,i
second factor, e.g., for forward-based agglomeration index). This means
l*n
that if sectors belonging to the economic block demand intermediate inputs from more
domestic sectors and in larger quantities, the agglomeration index based on backward
linkages is higher. The same goes for the agglomeration index based on forward linkages.
If sectors within an economic block contribute to the production processes of more
domestic sectors and in larger degrees, this index becomes larger.

Examining Other Aspects of Global Value Chains 69
Box 7 continued
Finally, these two components are summarized into one indicator defined as the total
agglomeration index,
AGG(b)kc + AGG(f)kc
AGG ck =
2
The total agglomeration index simply takes the average between the indices based on
backward linkages and forward linkages.
a Threshold set by the authors of the index.
Source: V. Mercer-Blackman, A. Foronda and M. Mariasingham. 2017. Using Input–Output

Analysis Framework to Explain Economic Diversification and Structural Transformation
in Bangladesh. ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 513. Manila:
Asian Development Bank.
Analyzing the two agglomeration indices together shows that Indonesia

had strong forward and backward linkages in business services and low-
technology manufacturing. On the other hand, medium- and high-technology
manufacturing appeared to have weak forward and backward ties, indicating
that the potential of this sector to link domestic and foreign firms together in
value chains was at its nascent stage. Primary sectors, meanwhile, had weak
forward and backward ties. Linking the primary sector to manufacturing and
services activities may enable production of primary goods that carry more
value-added. Since Indonesia has had a comparative advantage in resource-
based products, enhancing the domestic links of primary sectors to other
sectors should be an industrial policy priority in order to reap the economic
benefits of greater multiplier effects.
It is often argued that developing domestic sectoral linkages and increasing

the strength of local value chains could facilitate entry into GVCs and
help sectors gain comparative advantage (World Bank 2016). Regression
analysis was used to test whether stronger domestic links are associated with
stronger comparative advantage (see Appendix 3). Results were, however,
inconclusive and no statistically significant association was found between
agglomeration and NRCA.
4.2 Jobs and Technology in Indonesia
A structural decomposition analysis of labor demand in Indonesia reveals

interesting patterns (Table 4.3). First, demand for labor in services
accelerated the fastest during the period 2005 to 2015. Employment in the
sector grew by 62%, compared to 25% in manufacturing. Second, technology
within GVCs was associated with a decline in labor demand across all broad
sector categories. However, the associated ceteris paribus change was most
pronounced in agriculture and was least apparent in services. Third, task
relocation was associated with a positive change in demand for labor in both
services and manufacturing, suggesting that the GVC phenomenon may have
spurred a reallocation of labor demand from other countries into Indonesia.
In fact, holding other factors constant, task relocation accounted for 8% of
growth in manufacturing employment and 5% growth in services employment
in the period 2005 to 2015. Fourth, the effect associated with changes in
consumption levels driven by increases in own-country income and from
rest-of-the-world appeared to have had a positive impact on employment in
Indonesia in the period studied. Results of structural decomposition analyses
indicate that the change in own-country income was associated with a
79% uptake in services employment and 45% in manufacturing.
Decomposing changes in manufacturing and services employment by type

of occupation gives a more nuanced view of the interplay between jobs and
technology in Indonesia (Table 4.4). For manufacturing, estimates show that
employment in nonroutine cognitive occupations experienced the highest
increase, while routine cognitive occupations contracted the most. In fact,
nonroutine cognitive occupations grew by 110% while routine cognitive
occupations shrank by 36%.
Structural decomposition results suggest that country-level efficiency

was associated with a decline in employment for all types of occupation
in Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, although its impact was most felt in
nonroutine cognitive occupations. While technology within GVCs was
associated with a marginal negative impact on employment in nonroutine
cognitive occupations, it appeared to have had a sizeable impact on both
routine cognitive and nonroutine manual occupations. To illustrate, the
increase in efficiency within GVCs cut labor demand in routine cognitive and
nonroutine manual occupations by 67 and 52%, respectively, ceteris paribus.
Task relocation effects were mixed, with a substantial positive impact on
nonroutine cognitive occupations (51%) and a rather significant negative
ceteris paribus effect on routine cognitive occupations (–11%). Income
effects explain 86% of the change in nonroutine cognitive occupations while
it was only associated with a 53% increase in routine cognitive occupations,
holding other things constant.
Table 4.3: Change in Labor Demand in Indonesia, by Broad Economic Sector, 2005 versus 2015
Employment Country-level Technology Task Consumption Income

2015 2005 Change efficiency within GVCs relocation composition Own-country Rest-of-the-World
(’000 persons) (% change from 2005 value)
Agriculture 39,394 41,933 –6 –15 –49 4 –17 62 9
Manufacturing 14,922 11,946 25 –18 –32 8 2 45 19
Services 58,525 36,030 62 –21 –9 5 1 79 7
All Sectors 122,698 95,464 29 –18 –29 5 –7 68 9
Source: Bertulfo, Gentile, and de Vries (2019).
Table 4.4: Change in Manufacturing and Services Labor Demand in Indonesia, by Occupation Type, 2005 versus 2015

A. MANUFACTURING
2015 2005 Change efficiency within GVCs relocation composition Own-country Rest-of-the- World
(’000 persons) ( % change from 2005 value)
Nonroutine cognitive 1,227 583 110 –25 –3 51 2 60 26
Nonroutine manual 675 691 –2 –15 –52 3 0 43 18
Routine cognitive 334 526 –36 –13 –67 –11 1 35 18
Routine manual 12,686 10,146 25 –18 –32 8 2 45 19
B. SERVICES
2015 2005 Change efficiency within GVCs relocation composition Own-country Rest-of-the- World
(’000 persons) ( % change from 2005 value)
Nonroutine cognitive 32,917 18,635 77 –22 1 6 1 84 7
Nonroutine manual 9,396 9,557 –2 –15 –55 –2 1 62 7
Routine cognitive 4,210 3,490 21 –17 –54 16 73 4
Routine manual 12,002 4,348 176 –30 82 21 –9 102 11
Source: Bertulfo, Gentile, and de Vries 2019.
71
Box 8: Decomposing Changes in Employment in the Context of

Global Value Chains
A structural decomposition analysis using the multi-regional input–output tables augmented

with task-specific employment information helps dissect the economic factors that
drive changes in employment over time. One such decomposition is implemented in
Bertulfo, Gentile and de Vries (2019), which decomposed changes in occupational labor
demand in developing Asia into six determinants: (a) changes in efficiency or total factor
productivity, (b) changes in GVC technology, (c) relocation of intermediate production
stages, (d) relocation of final production stages, (e) changes in consumption composition
and (f) changes in consumption levels. Each of the effects are evaluated ceteris paribus—
that is, assuming all factors other than the one that is being evaluated are held constant.
The same decomposition framework is applied in de Vries et al. (2019) with jobs classified
by business function (i.e., research and development, fabrication, logistics, and sales and
marketing).
In Bertulfo, Gentile, and de Vries (2019), employment is classified into four major groups
of occupations: routine manual, routine cognitive, nonroutine manual, and nonroutine
cognitive, following the taxonomy of occupations developed by Autor, Levy, and Murnane
(2003) (Box 8 Table). Routine occupations are loosely defined as jobs that can be
accomplished by following an explicit set of rules. Nonroutine occupations, on the other
hand, require problem-solving and complex communication skills that cannot be codified
in terms of overt guidelines. Manual occupations are those that demand more dexterity,
eye-hand coordination, or physical labor while cognitive occupations require more
analytical faculties.
Box 8 Table: Classification of Occupations
Routine Nonroutine
Manual Craft and related trade workers Services and sales workers [51–54]
[71–75]
Plant and machine operators and
assemblers [81–83]
Elementary occupations [91–96]*
Cognitive Clerical support workers [41–44] Managers [11–14]
Professionals [21–26]
Technicians and associate
professionals [31–35]
* E
lementary occupations involve the performance of simple and routine tasks which may require
the use of hand-held tools and considerable physical effort. The numbers in brackets refer to
ISCO–08 codes, excluding Agriculture [61–63] and Armed forces [01–03].
Sources: D. Autor, F. Levy, and R. Murnane. 2003. The Skill Content of Recent Technological
Change: An Empirical Exploration. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 118 (4)
pp. 1279–1333.
D. Bertulfo, E. Gentile, and G. de Vries. 2019. The Employment Effects of Technological
Innovation, Consumption and Participation in Global Value Chains: Evidence
from Developing Asia. ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 572. Manila: Asian
Development Bank.
G. de Vries, Q. Chen, R. Hasan, and Z. Li. 2019. Do Asian Countries Upgrade in Global
Value Chains?: A Novel Approach and Empirical Evidence. Asian Economic Journal. 33 (1)
pp. 13–37.
For services, it is routine manual occupations which saw the greatest positive
increase in employment (176%), followed by nonroutine cognitive (77%) and
routine cognitive (21%). Country-level efficiency had the largest negative
ceteris paribus impact on routine manual (30%) and nonroutine cognitive
occupations (22%). Also, routine manual occupations experienced the
largest positive impact working through technology within GVCs (82%),
task relocation (21%), and income effects (113%). These findings suggest
that the largest activity in services occurred through routine manual jobs, at
least for Indonesia. Routine cognitive and nonroutine manual occupations
were adversely affected by technology. They also benefited the least from
demand-driven income effects underpinned by domestic and foreign
economic activities.
The implications of a changing workforce structure is important in light of

the administration’s current policy to ride the tide of Industry 4.0 (Box 9).
Through reviving the country’s manufacturing sector, Making Indonesia 4.0
aims to improve the country’s net exports contribution to gross domestic
product (GDP), increase productivity-to-cost ratios, and establish local
innovation hubs.
A major segment of the national priorities under Making Indonesia 4.0 is

workforce reskilling through training and bridging programs to enhance talent
competitiveness and mobility. Workforce automation is expected to double
in Indonesia by 2021 (Willis Towers Watson 2018) amid a slower workforce
growth rate, fueling concerns over the possible substitution of automation
for labor. In fact, the Labor Institute Indonesia estimates that about 100,000
jobs in Indonesia were lost due to automation in 2018 (Asia News Insider
2019), making skills enhancement a key policy concern in Indonesia.
4.3 Indonesia Amidst Trade Conflict
Trade conflicts pose potentially nontrivial impacts on international trade

and macroeconomic landscape in an era where production processes are
typically carried out in multiple locations across the globe. In the early
2018, a trade conflict broke out between the United States (US) and the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), two of the world’s major economic
superpowers that are also central to global production networks. In this
section, the impact of the trade conflict on the global economy and individual
countries are assessed. Specific implications for Indonesia are also discussed.
Box 10 provides a brief exposition of how the effects of the trade conflict in
developing Asia are estimated using multi-regional input–output tables.
Box 9: Making Indonesia 4.0
Launched on the second quarter of 2018, “Making Indonesia 4.0” aims to groom the
country into becoming one of the top ten economies globally by 2030 through reviving
Indonesia’s manufacturing sector. This initiative is underpinned by three main goals:
(a) achieve 10% contribution of net exports to GDP, (b) double current productivity-to-
cost ratio and (c) build local innovation capabilities by aiming an R&D spending-to-GDP
ratio of 2%.
Indonesia has set 10 national priorities under “Making Indonesia 4.0”:
a. Improve the flow of goods. Enhance domestic upstream material production.

b. Redesign industrial zones. Build a single nationwide industry zoning roadmap
(e.g., industry belts); resolve zoning inconsistency challenges.
c. Embrace sustainability. Grab opportunities under global sustainability trends
(e.g., electric vehicles, biofuels and renewables).
d. Empower small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Empower 3.7 million SMEs with
technologies (e.g., build SME e-commerce, technology banks).
e. Build nationwide digital infrastructure. Advance network and digital platforms
(e.g., transition from 4G to 5G, adopt Fiber speed 1Gbps, data centers and cloud).
f. Attract foreign investments. Engage top global manufacturers with attractive offers
and accelerate technology transfer.
g. Upgrade human capital. Redesign curriculum under the Fourth Industrial Revolution
era; create professional talent mobility programs.
h. Establish innovation ecosystems. Enhance R&D&D (research, development and
design) centers by promoting synergistic ties between the government, private sector
and universities.
i. Incentivize technology investment. Introduce tax exemptions/subsidies for
technology adoption and provide support funding.
j. Reoptimize regulations and policies. Build more coherent policies/regulations
through cross-ministry collaborations.
Five priority industries were selected under the initiative, namely food and beverage, textile
and apparel, automotive, electronics, and chemicals. Aspirations were set for each of the
abovementioned focus sectors.
Ultimately, “Making Indonesia 4.0” endeavors to massively uplift overall gross

domestic product, improve manufacturing contribution to GDP, and create more jobs.
Key macroeconomic success indicators include
(a) cascading real GDP growth from approximately 5% to an average of 6% to 7% during

2018 to 2030,
(b) generating 30 million new jobs by 2030 and
(c) pulling manufacturing’s contribution to GDP from 16% to 20% by 2030.
Source: Kementerian Perindustrian Republik Indonesia. 2018. Making Indonesia 4.0. Jakarta,
Indonesia.
Box 10: Estimating the Effects of the Trade Conflict on Developing Asia
Abiad et al. (2018) utilized the ADB Multi-Regional Input–Output Table (version 2017)
to tease out potential effects of the trade conflict occurring via trade channels. Modeled
effects include:
(i) direct effects which impact tariff-affected country-sectors;

(ii) indirect effects which work through both local and international supply chain
linkages; and
(iii) potential trade redirection which accounts for potential reallocation of trade (in the
medium- to long-run) toward countries not directly affected by tariffs.
The results reported in this section show the implications of three separate trade conflict
scenarios examined in the study, updated as of September 2019. The first scenario
(“current scenario”) reflects all tariff measures imposed by countries involved in the trade
conflict as of Sept. 1, 2019. Included in the “current scenario” are the series of tariffs slapped
by the United States (US) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on each other’s exports
(Box 10 Figure). At the end of 2018, the US hit with tariffs a total of $253.3 billion of Chinese
exports while PRC responded by imposing tariffs on $113 billion worth of US goods. In the
second quarter of 2019, both the US and the PRC implemented tariff hikes on $200 billion
and $60 billion worth of previously affected goods. The latest batch considered in “current
scenario” is the $125 billion worth of Chinese goods which the US hit with additional
15% tariffs and PRC’s response of additional 5%–10% of tariffs slapped on around $33.3 billion
US products, most of which are already covered in the previous product lists. The “bilateral
escalation” scenario adds, on top of the current scenario, 30% blanket tariffs on all PRC
exports to the US. It is assumed that the PRC retaliates by imposing the same rate (30%) on
all US exports to the PRC. Lastly, the “worse-case” scenario adds, on top of the “bilateral
escalation” scenario, US blanket tariffs of 25% on all imports of automobiles. It is assumed
that all other countries will retaliate to this action by slapping 25% tariff on all autos and auto
parts imported from the US.
The direct impact of the trade conflict on the level of exports is first evaluated at the product
level. Published lists of tariff-affected commodities were gathered and matched with detailed
trade data from the BACI database and the United States Census Bureau. Then, the implied
Box 10 Figure: Measures Included in the Current Scenario

United States actions:
Value of Imports from the People’s Republic of China (2018): $539.7 billion
Tariff Rates:
0%–10%
>10%–15%
>15%–25%
March September September December
$553.3 billion $553.3 billion >25%–30%
$3.3 billion $253.3 billion
July/August May October
$53.3 billion $553.3 billion $553.3 billion
People’s Republic of China actions: Tariff Rates:

Value of Imports from the United States (2018): $129.0 billion 0%–10%
>10%–15%
>15%–25%
March September September December >25%–30%
$3.0 billion $113.0 billion $116.2 billion $124.0 billion
July/August June
$53.0 billion $113.0 billion
2018 2019
Source: Asian Development Outlook 2019 Update, 2019, Asian Development Bank.
Box 10 continued
reduction in nominal import values from tariff-affected trading partners are computed using
several assumptions about import demand elasticities. Results presented in this section
assume that country-level import demand elasticities are equivalent to those published in
Tokarick (2010). In Abdul et al. (2018), this assumption yielded the maximal impact across
all elasticity assumptions explored. Changes in the nominal value of imports at the product
level are then aggregated by industry and type of use categories that are both consistent
with what is employed in building the ADB MRIOTs and at par with international statistical
classifications. Changes are then applied to the benchmark 2017 ADB MRIOT in order to
yield modeled scenario tables. These tables are used as inputs to the multi-regional analysis
conducted in the next stage of the modeling process, done in order to compute for the impact
on output, employment, and value-added associated with shocks occurring via the trade
channels explored in the study.
Sources: A. Abiad, K. Baris, J. Bernabe, D. Bertulfo, S. Camingue-Romance, P. Feliciano, M.J.

Mariasingham, and V. Mercer-Blackman. 2018. The Impact of the Trade Conflict
on Developing Asia. ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 566. Manila: Asian
Development Bank.
ADB. 2018. Asian Development Outlook Update 2018: Maintaining Stability Amid
Heightened Uncertainty. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
ADB. 2019. Asian Development Outlook Update 2019: Fostering Growth and Inclusion
in Asia’s Cities. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Tokarick, S. 2010. A Method for Calculating Export Supply and Import Demand Elasticities.
IMF Working Paper No. 10/180. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Figure 4.2 presents estimates of the impact of the US–PRC trade conflict on the
main protagonists, the US and the PRC, as well as the European Union, Japan,
and developing Asian economies. Under the current scenario (Figure 4.2.A), the
direct and indirect impacts of the trade war may potentially cut world GDP by
0.19%. Redirection effects are poised to ease this negative impact to 0.09% of
global GDP. As it currently stands, the trade conflict could potentially hurt the
PRC economy, shaving 0.65% off its GDP in 2–3 years, assuming trade redirection
takes place. The relevant negative effect to the US is substantially lower at
0.13%. Meanwhile, both the European Union and Japan could benefit marginally
from trade redirection. Estimates suggest that all trade channels considered could
potentially account for a 0.06% increase in GDP in both economies.
Economies in developing Asia, especially Malaysia; Taipei,China; and Viet Nam

are poised to be the biggest winners in the current scenario. In fact, Viet Nam
could grow by as much as 0.58%, owing to trade redirection effects offsetting
the upfront direct and indirect negative shock of the conflict. Anecdotal
evidence corroborates this result. News reports state that firms are now moving
their production activities to either Malaysia or Viet Nam, which is consistent
with what is shown in the charts. For instance, Viet Nam has already started
attracting Chinese companies into its borders, driving land and labor costs
up. Touted as “the New Guangdong,” Viet Nam managed to draw in Chinese
manufacturers, as evidenced by the 86.2% rise in FDI into Viet Nam with
almost half of it accounted for by Chinese firms (Zhou and Bermingham 2019).
While Viet Nam’s comparative advantage has, for long, been on the manufacture
of garments and footwear, the trade conflict has induced a massive relocation
of medium- and high-tech manufacturing operations into the country. Among
the giants reported to have invested in Viet Nam are Samsung, Nintendo,
Fox Conn, and Apple (Zhong 2019). However, not all indications are positive
for the new favorite of manufacturing production in Asia. In fact, news reports
indicate that the sudden influx of Chinese firms into Viet Nam is having tangible
negative externalities on labor supply (e.g., talent shortages) and urbanization
outcomes, such as more severe traffic jams and more crowded roads (Zhou
and Bermingham 2019; Huifeng 2019).
A more protracted bilateral tension (Figure 4.2.B) could double the potential

negative impact to both the US and the PRC, trimming down these countries’
GDP by 0.24% and 1.22%, respectively, subject to the assumption that half of
trade lost due to tariffs are redirected to other potential suppliers in the global
market. Under the bilateral escalation scenario, world GDP is estimated to
shrink by as much as 0.34% with no trade redirection, and 0.17% with trade
redirection. Net impacts to both the European Union and Japan are slightly
higher at 0.12% and 0.11% of their respective GDPs. Viet Nam; Malaysia; and
Taipei,China remain the top gainers in the bilateral escalation scenario, but
the impact for Viet Nam is now more than 4 times higher than the estimates
reported in the current scenario. Taipei,China and Malaysia stand to gain
0.76% and 0.65%, respectively in terms of GDP, assuming 50% redirection.
Net impacts on developing Asia as a whole shrink in the worse-case scenario

compared to those in the bilateral escalation scenario (Figure 4.2.C). This
coincides with negative impacts for developed economies and the PRC.
In fact, under the worse-case scenario, the PRC’s GDP stands to shrink
by 1.25% while the decline is substantially lower at 0.27% for the US.
Japan, meanwhile, is projected to experience a net decrease in GDP by
0.19%. Redirection effects to the rest-of-the-world are also marginally lower,
yielding slightly lesser positive impacts to all economies in developing Asia as
compared to estimates in the bilateral escalation scenario.
Notably, across all scenarios examined, Indonesia appears to be among those

economies that would see the least gains from trade redirection effects.
Estimates suggest that in a span of 2–3 years, allowing for partial redirection of
trade, Indonesia would gain only 0.06% under the current scenario, 0.14% in
the bilateral escalation scenario, and 0.11% under the worse-case scenario.
While the trade conflict presents an opportunity for developing Asian
economies to expand production and trade, especially for those countries
that complement goods in the bilateral trade basket of the US and the PRC,
analysis suggests that, due to its weak direct and indirect linkages with the
US- and the PRC-oriented GVCs, Indonesia is unlikely to capitalize on the
opportunity in the short- to medium-term.
78
Figure 4.2: Gross Domestic Product Impact of the United States and the People’s Republic of China Trade Conflict
A. Current Scenario
% GDP
3 PRC and G3 Developing Asia
1 0.58
0.19 0.36
0.11 0.15 0.15 0.23
0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05
0
-0.09 –0.13
–1 –0.65
–2
World PRC USA EU JPN DA ex HKG KOR SIN TAP INO MAL PHI THA VIE Other
PRC
Direct and Indirect Effects Trade Redirection Effects Net Impact (Partial Redirection)
DA = developing Asia; G3 = European Union, Japan, and United States; GDP = gross domestic product; EU = European Union; HKG = Hong Kong, China;
INO = lndonesia; JPN = Japan; KOR = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; PRC= People’s Republic of China; PHI= Philippines; SIN= Singapore; TAP = Taipei,China;
THA = Thailand; USA = United States of America; VIE = Viet Nam. Other here refers to Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Bhutan, Cambodia, Fiji, Kazakhstan,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
Note: Asian Development Bank estimates are based on the methodology of Abiad et al. (2018).
Source: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2017, Asian Development Bank; Asian Development Bank estimates.
B. Bilateral Escalation Scenario
% GDP
2.40
2
0.76
0.65
1 0.41

0.43
0.31 0.09 0.24
0.12 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.11
0
–0.17 –0.24
–1
–1.22
–2
PRC
Source: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2017, Asian Development Bank; Asian Development Bank estimates. continued on next page
79
80
C. Worse-case Scenario
% GDP
2 2.31
0.59
1
0.18 0.10
0.05
0.55
0 0.20 0.30
0.09 0.03 0.11
0.00 –0.19
–0.28 –0.27
–1
–1.25
–2
PRC
Source: Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables, 2017, Asian Development Bank; Asian Development Bank estimates.
The next few paragraphs examine in greater detail where Indonesia could
potentially benefit or lose in the trade conflict. Though the country is not
directly involved in the current conflict, analyses show that its indirect linkages
with the US, the PRC, and other economies along the GVCs encompassing
the US and the PRC cause the transmission of the trade conflict shocks
into Indonesia.
Panels A and B of Table 4.5 show which commodities, among those affected

by the tariffs imposed by the US and the PRC, are heavily exported by
Indonesia to the US and the PRC, respectively. Products such as palm kernel
and babassu vegetable oils, natural rubber and sports footwear are in the
US’s tariff-affected commodities basket which Indonesia exports heavily
to the US (Table 4.5 Panel A). Furthermore, bilateral trade between the
US and Indonesia on these commodities constitutes a substantial share of
global product trade. To illustrate, 14.05% of global exports of palm kernel
and babassu vegetable oils is accounted for by Indonesia’s exports to the US.
For natural rubber and sports footwear, bilateral Indonesia–US product
shares stand at 11.67% and 11.52%, respectively. Since Indonesia is not
affected by tariffs imposed on these products, it could emerge as a strong
alternative source of exports to the US if sourcing decisions change in a
protracted trade conflict.
Turning to the PRC’s basket of tariff-affected commodities, Table 4.5 Panel

B shows that among the products traded heavily by Indonesia with the PRC
(based on 2017 export values) are: lignite ($2.4 million), palm vegetable oil
($2.1 million) and wood pulp ($1.6 million). Indonesia–PRC trade on some
of these commodities account for more than 20% of product trade. Examples
include Indonesia’s exports to the PRC of lignite (73.37%), ferro-alloys
(33.21%), and palm vegetable oil (23.15%). Thus, Indonesia can potentially
benefit from trade redirection, particularly by becoming an alternative source
of supply for specific items affected by the conflict.
News reports offer a more grounded perspective on the current situation

in Indonesia against the backdrop of the trade conflict. Even in the early
stages of the trade conflict, effects on the footwear industry already started
to manifest. In 2018, exports of footwear from Indonesia rose by 6.5%, way
above the 3.5% growth in 2017. Gain in footwear exports to the US stood at
4.7%, compared to 3.5% in 2017. This is taken to be a sign of trade redirection,
especially since exports of footwear from the PRC to the US are reported to
have contracted by 1% in 2018 (Yeung 2019). Garments and footwear are
regarded as Indonesia’s strong suit, and the economy is well-equipped to
adequately bridge the supply gap in the US footwear and apparel markets
resulting from the trade conflict.
Table 4.5: Tariff-Affected Commodities Bilaterally Traded by Indonesia with

the United States and the People’s Republic of China
Panel A. US tariff-affected commodities

Exports to US Share in World
HS–12 Commodity description ($ millions) Exports (%)
400122 Rubber; technically specified natural rubber (TSNR), 980.6 11.67
in primary forms or in plates, sheets or strip (excluding
latex and smoked sheets)
401110 Rubber; new pneumatic tyres, of a kind used on 628.2 1.65
motor cars (including station wagons and racing cars)
270900 Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from 622.3 0.11
bituminous minerals, crude
151190 Vegetable oils; palm oil and its fractions, other than 585.0 2.38
crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically
modified
844331 Printing, copying, and facsimile machines; machines 420.8 2.41
which perform two or more of the functions of
printing, copying or facsimile transmission, capable of
connecting to an automatic data processing machine
or to a network
640319 Sports footwear; (other than ski-boots, snowboard 381.8 11.52
boots or cross-country ski footwear), with outer soles
of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and
uppers of leather
611020 Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waistcoats and similar 356.1 2.11
articles; of cotton, knitted or crocheted
151329 Vegetable oils; palm kernel or babassu oil and their 353.8 14.05
fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined,
but not chemically modified
940360 Furniture; wooden, other than for office, kitchen or 328.6 1.35
bedroom use
640399 Footwear; NEC in heading no. 6403, (not covering the 289 1.15
ankle), outer soles of rubber, plastics or composition
leather, uppers of leather
Panel B. PRC tariff-affected commodities
Exports to Share in
PRC World
270210 Lignite; whether or not pulverised, but not 2,397.40 73.37
agglomerated, excluding jet
151190 Vegetable oils; palm oil and its fractions, other than 2,068.90 8.41
crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically
modified
470329 Wood pulp; chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate, 1,628.40 11.9
(other than dissolving grades), semi-bleached or
bleached, of non-coniferous wood

Table 4.5 continued
Exports to US Share in World

270119 Coal; (other than anthracite and bituminous), 1,555.10 12.41
whether or not pulverised but not agglomerated
270112 Coal; bituminous, whether or not pulverised, 1,156.10 1.22
but not agglomerated
720260 Ferro-alloys; ferro-nickel 1,132.40 33.21
271111 Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; 998.8 1.46
liquefied, natural gas
151329 Vegetable oils; palm kernel or babassu oil and their 582.8 23.15
fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined,
but not chemically modified
270900 Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from 543.7 0.1
bituminous minerals, crude
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 451.4 0.82
NEC = not elsewhere classified, PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States.
Source: UN Comtrade Database, 2019, United Nations.
Recently, Indonesian officials called for a strategic approach to managing

risks arising from the trade conflict, effectively prioritizing the issue in the
national policy agenda. Effective strategizing will help anticipate potential
ramifications and plan appropriate actions. The need for a cautious approach
supported by regulations that aid (not impede) industry players cannot be
overemphasized. Furthermore, expanding beyond the traditional markets
to explore opportunities in regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and
South America should be part of any strategy. Policymakers maintain that
an aggressive business-oriented approach would help cushion against the
negative impacts of the trade conflict (Razi Rahman/Suharto 2019).
4.4 Attracting Foreign Direct Investment for

Global Value Chains
4.4.1 The Global Value Chain-Foreign Direct Investment Nexus
In the developing world, there exists a complementarity between foreign direct

investments (FDI) and GVC participation—a fact that has been supported
both by theory and empirics. Participating in GVCs requires local firms to be
at par with the requirements of international markets and be able to meet
increasingly complex demand (Amendolagine et al. 2019), which intensifies
the need for developing and adapting innovative approaches and measures in
product supply. It has been observed that, to facilitate such improvements,
transfers of knowledge and technology from worldwide leaders to local firms
have been occurring within relevant supply chains or GVCs over the years.
This local push for innovation, combined with external sources of productivity-

driven progress, creates better business environments which could ultimately
attract more foreign investments.
Attracting FDI, however, is not enough to achieve and sustain gains in economic
development—or what modern literature recognize as “spillovers”.5 Foreign
firms must be willing to impart their technical and managerial knowhow to
local suppliers, thus improving human capital as well as the productivity of
inputs to production.6 Since these are viewed as costly by profit-driven firms,
there must be enough incentives for them to pursue such measures. In this
regard, existing literature (Amendolagine et al. 2019) points out that the type
(apart from the degree) of GVC involvement serves as a key determinant for
capitalizing on the potential benefits from FDI.
Specializing in more upstream stages of production in GVCs signals to foreign

investors that a local economy is more concentrated in the production of
key intermediates than merely focusing on the assembly of imported inputs.
Thus, more upstream economies are expected to have higher shares of inputs
sourced locally by foreign investors. In addition, it has been observed that, the
willingness of foreign investors to provide support to local suppliers increases
with upstream specialization, thereby making the transmission of positive
spillovers to the local economy more likely (Amendolagine et al. 2019).
Given the potential positive impact of FDI on productivity, local suppliers

linked to GVCs can become even more competitive, leading to substantial
gains in the long run that are driven mostly by a continuous process of increased
specialization and further investments by firms from across the globe. In this
regard a holistic analysis of GVCs cannot overlook the importance of FDI,
which is the focus of this subsection.
4.4.2 Foreign Direct Investment as a Driver of Factory Asia
Asia and the Pacific remained the largest destination for FDI worldwide,
receiving almost 43.1% of the $1.3 trillion global total in 2018, up from
11% ($132 billion) in 2000—reflecting the ever-increasing trade and
investment openness in the region. The People’s Republic of China continued
to be the most attractive destination for inward FDI despite the recent
geopolitical tensions and trade conflicts (Table 4.6).
5 Includes improvements in development finance, domestic employment, capital formation,

among others (Amendolagine et al. 2019)
6 Aside from outright increases in the savings rate of economies, neoclassical models of economic
growth point to technological progress as a key pathway to sustained / improving long run per
capita consumption.
Asia also emerged as a major investor, contributing to 49.4% of global FDI in

2018. A significant share of the region’s outward FDI was now directed within
the region, with the growth particularly pronounced since the global financial
crisis. The share of intra-Asian FDI in total Asia-bound FDI increased from
32% in 2007 to almost 50% in 2018. The slow pace of recovery in the global
economy and increasing protectionism in advanced economies, along with
the ensuing trade conflicts, may have prompted Asian investors to turn
towards investment opportunities within the region.
Historically, the surge in FDI to the region was linked to GVCs, mainly in the
manufacturing sector. It was driven by multinationals, notably from Japan and
the Republic of Korea, that relocated downstream parts of their production
process in search of lower labor costs mainly through greenfield investments
Table 4.6: Top Recipients of Foreign Direct Investment (Balance of Payment)

in Asia, 2001–2018 ($ million)
2001–2007 2008–2016
China, People’s Republic of 68,555 China, People’s Republic of 120,538
Hong Kong, China 36,251 Hong Kong, China 92,247
Singapore 27,303 Singapore 50,146
Australia 17,090 Australia 47,019
India 12,680 India 35,763
Korea, Republic of 10,387 Indonesia 14,171
Thailand 7,286 Kazakhstan 10,867
Japan 6,592 Korea, Republic of 9,692
Malaysia 5,164 Viet Nam 9,285
Kazakhstan 5,124 Malaysia 9,281
2017 2018
China, People’s Republic of 134,063 China, People’s Republic of 139,043
Hong Kong, China 110,685 Hong Kong, China 115,662
Australia 42,294 Australia 60,438
India 39,904 India 42,286
Indonesia 20,579 Indonesia 21,980
Korea, Republic of 17,913 Viet Nam 15,500
Viet Nam 14,100 Korea, Republic of 14,479
Japan 10,430 Thailand 10,493
Malaysia 9,399 Japan 9,858
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2019, World Investment Report
2019 Statistical Annex Tables.
that entail building assets from the ground up. It is worth noting that empirical
evidence suggests that greenfield investments are more linked to GVCs and
trade promotion compared to mergers and acquisitions (M&As).7
The link between FDI and GVCs was quite evident in Asia. About 60% of all
foreign-owned firms in the continent (and around 70% in the manufacturing
sector) were engaged in GVC-related activities. Asian-owned firms were
even more likely to be engaged in GVC-related activities compared to those
owned by non-Asian multinationals (67% versus 45%). Japan was the largest
source of GVC-linked FDI in Asia followed by Republic of Korea, while, at
least since 2001, the People’s Republic of China remained the most popular
host despite recent trends in investment redirections towards ASEAN
economies amid escalating trade conflict between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China.
However, in recent years, FDI through M&As also grew rapidly, as

multinationals were increasingly drawn to the expanding domestic markets
in the region, especially in the services sector. Data on firm level investment
activity indicate that, in 2018, the share of M&As in total FDI to the region
tripled from only 13% in 2003 (the earliest year for which data are available).
These patterns suggest that in the future, Asian economies may also be
able to leverage their expanding middle classes in addition to the historical
reliance on abundant labor in order to continue FDI driven industrial policies
and development strategies.
4.4.3 Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia: A Closer Look
Indonesia has historically been one of the most popular destinations of

inward FDI in Asia as it remained the 6th largest recipient in 2018. Based on
balance of payments, FDI inflows in 2018 amounted to almost $22 billion
(from $20.5 billion in 2017), recovering from the sharp contraction in 2016
when it had declined precipitously to $4 billion (compared to $22 billion
in 2015). Singapore, Japan, and the People’s Republic of China were the
largest investors in Indonesia, with Singapore accounting for half of all FDI
in Indonesia (Table 4.7). More than 90% of FDI inflows to Indonesia were
from within the region reflecting its strong intraregional trade and investment
linkages (Figure 4.3). The People’s Republic of China had gradually cemented
its position as a top investor over the years with more than $2 billion worth of
inward FDI in 2018, 10 times higher than the annual average in 2001–2007.
7 Asian Economic Integration Report 2016. What Drives Foreign Direct Investment in Asia and the
Pacific. ADB. Manila.
Table 4.7: Top Sources of Foreign Direct Investment (Balance of Payment)

to Indonesia, 2001–2018 ($ million)
2001–2007 2008–2016
Netherlands 1,251 Singapore 7,098
Japan 924 Japan 4,196
United States 866 United Kingdom 967
Singapore 684 Seychelles 908
Germany 321 Korea, Republic of 487
Korea, Republic of 259 Luxembourg 467
France 235 China, People’s Republic of 459
China, People’s Republic of 209 Hong Kong, China 440
Australia 207 Australia 278
Malaysia 193 United States 266
2017 2018
Netherlands 4,059 Japan 4,937
Japan 3,913 China, People’s Republic of 2,142
China, People’s Republic of 1,994 Hong Kong, China 1,160
Malaysia 976 United States 1,067
Switzerland 575 Malaysia 753
Germany 561 Germany 585
Hong Kong, China 548 Switzerland 564
United Kingdom 469 Thailand 541
Macau, China 197 Netherlands 470
Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2019. Bilateral FDI Statistics; United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2019. World Investment Report 2019
Statistical Annex Tables.
The lion’s share of inward FDI to Indonesia took the form of greenfield
investment with nominal committed investments totaling $39 billion
in 2018, compared to $3.5 billion of M&As (Figure 4.4).8 Greenfield
investments generally dominated M&As except in 2008, when there was a
surge in investment deals in the service sub-sectors in a trend which could
not be sustained.
8 Greenfield investments recovered dramatically from the sharp decline in 2017 when nominal
committed investments were only $9.6 billion.
While greenfield investments in the rest of Asia targeted GVC-linked

manufacturing sectors, the top recipient industries in Indonesia were
traditionally natural resource based, with “coal, oil, and natural gas” and
“metals” attracting the most (Table 4.8). However, in 2018, “alternative/
renewable energy” displaced “coal, oil, and natural gas” as the top recipient
due to large investments in the industry from the People’s Republic of China.
Figure 4.3: Intra-Asia versus Rest of the World Foreign Direct Investment

(Balance of Payment) to Indonesia, 2001–2018
25
20
15
10
$ billion
5
0
-5
-10
-15
2004
2006
2009
2008
2005
2003
2007
2001
2002
2012
2013
2015
2011
2018
2016
2010
2017
2014
Asia Rest of the World

Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2019. Bilateral FDI Statistics;
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2019. World Investment Report
2019 Statistical Annex Tables.
Figure 4.4: Firm Level Foreign Investment Activity in Indonesia,

by Mode of Entry, 2003–2018 ($ million)
A. Inward FDI B. Outward FDI
100 7
6
80
5
$ million
$ million
60 4
40 3
2
20
1
0 0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
M&A Greenfield
FDI = foreign direct investment, M&A = mergers and acquisitions.
Sources: Zephyr M&A Database. 2003–2018. Bureau van Dijk; fDi Markets. 2003–2018. Financial
Times; Asian Development Bank estimates.
Table 4.8: Top Recipient Industries, 2003–2018 ($ million)
Total
2003–2007 2008–2016
Coal, oil, and natural gas 6,012 Coal, oil, and natural gas 7,303
Metals 2,638 Financial services 7,285
Food and tobacco 992 Metals 5,500
Alternative/renewable energy 984 Real estate 1,823
Financial services 608 Chemicals 1,815
Automotive oem 504 Food and tobacco 1,121
Consumer products 385 Alternative/renewable energy 841
Chemicals 382 Communications 813
Hotels and tourism 359 Automotive oem 730
Communications 359 Rubber 650
2017 2018
Metals 3,232 Alternative/renewable energy 19,977
Food and tobacco 1,995 Chemicals 4,065
Alternative/renewable energy 747 Real estate 3,773
Business services 684 Metals 2,599
Hotels and tourism 578 Hotels and tourism 1,647
Chemicals 560 Software and IT services 1,596
Consumer products 350 Food and tobacco 1,118
Building and construction materials 350 Financial services 585
Automotive oem 331 Automotive oem 567
Greenfield FDI
2003–2007 2008–2016
Metals 2,626 Metals 5,465
Alternative/renewable energy 1,229 Real estate 1,758
Automotive oem 457 Chemicals 1,693
Rubber 394 Alternative/renewable energy 840
Chemicals 354 Automotive oem 723
Hotels and tourism 330 Rubber 702
Building and construction materials 311 Food and tobacco 699
Food and tobacco 275 Paper, printing and packaging 617
Semiconductors 233 Transportation 489
2017 2018
Metals 3,075 Alternative/renewable energy 19,974
Alternative/renewable energy 743 Chemicals 4,054
Chemicals 551 Real estate 3,723
Table 4.8 continued
Hotels and tourism 542 Metals 2,372

Building and construction materials 350 Hotels and tourism 1,629
Automotive oem 331 Automotive oem 567
Consumer products 288 Rubber 453
Food and tobacco 189 Food and tobacco 427
Pharmaceuticals 176 Warehousing and storage 258
M&As
2003–2007 2008–2016
Food and tobacco 717 Financial services 6,797
Coal, oil, and natural gas 536 Coal, oil, and natural gas 999
Financial services 487 Communications 676
Consumer products 415 Food and tobacco 422
Communications 412 Beverages 331
Building and construction materials 96 Business services 252
Wood products 68 Consumer products 237
Rubber 52 Automotive components 221
Automotive oem 47 Chemicals 122
Paper, printing and packaging 38 Consumer electronics 91
2017 2018
Food and tobacco 1,806 Software and IT services 1,500
Business services 578 Food and tobacco 691
Metals 157 Financial services 430
Software and IT services 150 Metals 227
Real estate 110 Business services 158
Coal, oil, and natural gas 94 Communications 137
Communications 81 Rubber 111
Financial services 73 Pharmaceuticals 97
Transportation 69 Consumer products 57
Consumer products 62 Real estate 50
FDI = foreign direct investment, IT = information technology, M&A = mergers and acquisitions,
OEM = original equipment manufacturer.
Source: Zephyr M&A Database. 2003–2018. Bureau van Dijk; fDi Markets. 2003–2018. Financial
Concurrently, despite the dominance of the natural resource sector,

Indonesia had been attracting an increasing amount of greenfield investment
in the manufacturing sector (albeit resource linked manufacturing), recording
the highest greenfield committed investments to date in 2018 (Figure 4.5).
Also, in an encouraging sign of diversification, the “software and IT services”
industry was the top recipient of M&As in 2018 followed by “food and
tobacco” and “financial services,” with the size of these deals nevertheless
being only a fraction of greenfield investments.
Indonesia’s GVC participation, from an FDI perspective, remained low

compared to other economies in the ASEAN as, in 2016, only 41% of foreign-
owned firms engaged in both imports and exports—a proxy for GVC-linked
FDI. This pales in comparison to the relevant numbers for Malaysia and
Viet Nam, which were 65% and 78%, respectively (ADB 2016).
Figure 4.5: Firm-Level Foreign Investment Activity in Indonesia, by Broad

Industrial Sector, 2003–2018 ($ million)
A. Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment
35,000
30,000
25,000
$ million
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2004
2006
2009
2008
2005
2007
2003
2012
2013
2015
2011
2018
2010
2016
2017
2014
B. Mergers and Acquisitions

60,000
50,000
40,000
$ million
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2004
2006
2009
2008
2005
2007
2003
2012
2013
2015
2011
2018
2010
2016
2017
2014
Primary Manufacturing Services

Source: Zephyr M&A Database. 2003–2018. Bureau van Dijk; fDi Markets. 2003-2018. Financial
From a policy perspective, while Indonesia generally remained an attractive

destination for FDI over 2001–2018, more concerted efforts towards
improving governance and the business environment would help deepen and
broaden GVC participation, especially in labor intensive manufacturing and
services, and help the economy diversify away from its dependence on natural
resources. The next sub-section briefly discusses factors that Indonesia could
improve upon to increase inward FDI, especially GVC-linked FDI.
4.4.4 The Inextricable Link Between Foreign Direct Investment,

Uncertainty, and Policy
Investment has historically been one of the most volatile components of any
given country’s GDP (Mendoza 1991; Aguiar and Gopinath 2006; Fernandez
and Gulan 2015) and FDI, being a subset of aggregate investment, is no
exception. Figure 4.6 shows the time trend of Indonesian FDI, which exhibits
large swings at certain periods of time.
Building upon the limitations of neoclassical models of investment,

economists began to integrate the effects of expectations and uncertainty
in forming theoretical foundations that explain the unpredictable nature of
investment. One of the key ideas that emerged from such research is that
the value of investment projects follows a stochastic process (e.g., geometric
Brownian motion) and are therefore subject to uncertainty. Profit-maximizing
firms therefore take this into account, apart from the usual considerations of
adjustment and replacement costs and marginal values of additional capital,
among others, when optimizing their actions.
Figure 4.6: Levels of Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment,

1990–2018 ($ million)
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
$ million
5,000
0
–5,000
–10,000
–15,000
2014
2010
2016
2018
1992
2012
2002
1998
1994
1996
1990
2008
2006
2000
2004
Inward FDI Outward FDI

FDI = foreign direct investment.
Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2019. World Investment Report
2019 Statistical Annex Tables; Zephyr M&A Database. 2003–2018. Bureau van Dijk;
fDi Markets. 2003–2018. Financial Times; Asian Development Bank estimates.
Uncertainty, on the other hand, is recognized as a function of economic and

political shocks. In a model conceptualized by Bloom (2009), it was shown
that time-varying second-moment shocks (i.e., uncertainty shocks) lead to an
increase in the real option value to waiting, which in turn compels firms to scale
back on hiring and investment—a result that was empirically validated with the
use of vector autoregressions. The results, which pinpointed the relationship
between the continued occurrence of such shocks and business decisions
across time, shed some light on the volatile nature of investment and, more
importantly, strengthened the understanding of economists and policymakers
alike on the importance of governance and stability to economic growth.
Cross-country econometric evidence suggests that the quality of

governance, as measured by perceptions-based governance indicators, is the
most important driver of FDI in the region (ADB 2016). The effect is most
pronounced for M&As, particularly in the services sector, but is also significant
and positive for greenfield FDI in the manufacturing sector. Empirical
evidence also suggests that M&As are more drawn towards economies with
good governance and business environment given the domestic market
seeking nature of these investments (ADB 2016).
In the absence of good governance, which often takes a concerted effort

over a long period of time to achieve, a better business environment may
complement and compensate for poor institutions—the positive impact of
ease of doing business indicators is strongest when the quality of governance
is low. Among the indicators, the ease of “registering property” is most
important for greenfield investments and ease of “getting credit” most
important for M&As.
The importance of governance and the business environment is underlined

by Indonesia’s experience with attracting FDI. The vast proportion of inward FDI
to Indonesia was in natural resources, where the quality of governance and
ease of doing business do not have as significant an impact. While Indonesia
fared relatively poorly in governance and ease of doing business rankings
across most dimensions—particularly on dealing with construction permits,
registering property and ease of trading across borders—its rankings had been
improving over time, especially since 2015 (Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8). In terms
of governance, from 2014 to 2018 Indonesia saw the most improvement in
control of corruption and political stability.
Figure 4.7: Overall Ease of Doing Business in Indonesia, 2014–2019

70
60
50
40
68.0
Score
30 61.8 60.0 61.2 64.2 66.5

20
10
0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Source: Overall Ease of Doing Business. 2014–2019. World Bank.
Figure 4.8: Ease of Doing Business—Indonesia in a Comparative Context,

2014 versus 2018
A. 2014
Overall ease of doing business
Resolving insolvency Starting a business
Enforcing contracts Dealing with construction permits
10
Trading across borders 20 Getting electricity
30
40
50
Paying taxes 60 Registering property
70
80
Protecting minority investors Getting credit
B. 2018
Overall ease of doing business
Resolving insolvency Starting a business
Enforcing contracts Dealing with construction permits
10
Trading across borders 20 Getting electricity
30
40
50
60
Paying taxes 70 Registering property
80
90
Protecting minority investors Getting credit
Indonesia ASEAN Asia and the Pacific
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Source: World Governance Indicators. 2014 and 2018. World Bank.
95
Chapter 5
Reaping the Benefits of Global Value
Chain Participation: Conclusion and
Policy Recommendations
T
he report assesses Indonesia’s participation in GVCs from 2000 to
2017. Since 2000, domestic value-added embedded in the country’s
exports and final production exhibited a rising trend, specifically in
the primary sector. This also reflects the effects of recent policies that
support domestic industries in the country. The turn towards the domestic
market is captured by the analyses presented in the report. It is, however,
necessary to note that a sizeable share of domestic value-added generated
in Indonesia accrued from extractive, rather than technology-intensive,
industries. Further, Indonesia is seen as one of the countries least likely to
reap substantial gains from the trade conflict between the United States and
the People’s Republic of China.
Indonesia contributed to other countries’ output. The value-added it

generated accounted for a small but rising share in the production of final
goods and services in neighboring ASEAN economies. Forward GVC links
from a network perspective, meanwhile, show that a significant share of
domestic value-added embedded in the country’s goods and services
contributed to the production of exports of services-oriented economies
such as Hong Kong, China and Singapore as well as central GVC hubs such as
the Germany, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States.
The decomposition of Indonesia’s gross exports into value-added

components indicates that its involvement in GVCs was more bilateral
than global. Upstreamness indices show that, on average, production in the
country was about two steps away from final consumers. A huge portion of
the domestic value-added embodied in exported commodities underwent
only one border crossing. Traded commodities from the country were either
consumed as final products or exported as intermediates used to produce
final goods and services in a partner economy.
Trends in Indonesia’s GVC participation indicators align with gross exports

decomposition results. Overall, forward GVC participation dominated
backward GVC participation, with greater shares accounted for by simple
GVC than complex GVC-related activities. Findings show that forward
GVC participation dominated backward GVC participation in primary and
manufacturing sectors. In other words, the country was relatively more
involved in supplying value-added that ultimately became embodied in final
products consumed abroad. Hence, these sectors were more engaged in

upstream activities. On the other hand, backward participation was higher
than forward participation in services, suggesting that services embodied more
GVC-related value-added in comparison with primary and manufacturing
sectors. This coincided with the country’s lack of comparative advantage
in services over the period considered. The country imported value-added
created in other economies to produce services for domestic consumption.
Comparative advantage remained in the primary and low-technology

manufacturing sectors, but these had weak ties with other domestic sectors.
To elaborate, the relationship between industrial specialization and strength
of domestic production links was nonsignificant in Indonesia. This implies
that specialization did not create spillovers that could generate significant
multiplier effects in other industries within the local economy. Thus, there
remains huge potential for strengthening linkages among sectors for the
benefits of specialization to trickle down to other industries.
The analysis of jobs in Indonesia from 2005 to 2015 reveals that upgrades in
technology within GVCs had a negative impact on jobs across all sectors, but
this displacement effect was counteracted by the job creation associated with
increases in income. Holding other factors constant, the negative effect of
technology on labor demand was largest in the agricultural sector. Furthermore,
changes in final consumer preferences could be displacing workers in agriculture,
while the trends were also associated with an increase in demand for jobs in
manufacturing and services. Examining results by occupation type, estimates
suggest that routine cognitive workers (such as clerical support workers) and
nonroutine manual workers (such as sales and services workers) in the country
were most vulnerable to changes in technology within GVCs.
Indonesia continued to be a popular destination of foreign direct investment

(FDI) in Asia. Greenfield investment in the country has traditionally been in
the natural resource sector, but investment in manufacturing sectors have also
been increasing in recent years. Mergers and acquisitions linked FDI, though
a small share of total FDI inflows in the economy, also began to diversify into
services. However, GVC-linked FDI remained low in in the country.
Analysis shows that Indonesia has considerable ground to cover to deepen

and broaden its participation in GVCs and realize the associated benefits.
Based on the data gathered, statistics compiled, and information analyzed,
this report offers the following recommendations:
1. To maximize gains from insertion into GVCs, a concerted effort in

bringing multiple stakeholders together to establish stronger links
among domestic industries is needed. This can be done through
Reaping the Benefits of Global Value Chain Participation 97
putting in place coordination mechanisms to ensure consistency and

coherence of industrial policies (Tijaja and Faisal 2014); addressing key
governance bottlenecks and constraints to foster a business-friendly
environment where firms can not only thrive but also innovate; and
developing, especially, technology intensive manufacturing to cascade
structural transformation.
2. Infrastructure investment is necessary in a GVC-world. Efficient

transportation of goods, fast transmission of information, and reliable
utilities services are crucial not only in attracting investment in GVC-
related firms but also in strengthening linkages of domestic firms.
Especially for an archipelago like Indonesia, connectivity among firms
from different parts of the country is a key concern. Transportation
networks must be designed to make the movement of goods and
people easier. Information and telecommunications infrastructure
are also important in lowering transactions costs between firms facing
geographic barriers. Moreover, reliable utilities services are especially
important in the manufacturing sectors, where production is capital-
intensive. Disruptions in power and water supplies for example can lead
to backlogs in production, which can affect the bottom line of firms.
Thus, policy driven efforts must be made in bridging infrastructure
gaps in the economy.
3. To the extent that jobs in agriculture are vulnerable to technology

diffused by GVCs, the need for labor policies oriented to create
incentives for or usher the movement of workers from the agricultural
sector towards other sectors cannot be overstated. Moreover, policies
that cater to fine-tuning skills, reskilling the workforce, and establishing
formal education systems that are both globally competitive and
sensitive to industry needs would help establish a steady supply of
skilled workers that are not easily at risk of automation. Creating
curriculums that are broad-based, and that sharpen competencies
in nonroutine tasks that activate multiple intelligences would help
cushion against the job-displacement effects of technological change.
4. Studies have recognized that economic policies should not only be

sensitive to domestic needs but adaptive to the changing times, the
demands of the external environment, and the existence of competing
and complementary market players (Naude 2013). In order to reap
greater benefits from GVC participation, Indonesia should consider
further developing its innovation capacity by aiming to attract FDI
investments in non-extractive and research and development-oriented
industries, especially in those that are heavily linked to other sectors
within the domestic economy. To foster an ecosystem for, and a culture
of innovation, Indonesia should look to gradually reducing its reliance

on extractive industries and facilitating greater inflow of technologies,
especially through GVCs. Since technology can be disruptive at the
onset, policy measures need to be put in place to support vulnerable
workers and enterprises.
To conclude, deepening and widening participation in GVCs is a gradual

process that involves reorienting capacities, taking risks, and transcending
traditional development paradigms. Indonesia has had a long history of
intermittent import substitution industrialization, coupled with episodes of
export-orientation. In an era of technology-driven GVCs, the country needs
to revisit its economic policies and industrial strategies to tactfully use them
to define, or redefine its position, in the landscape of global production
networks and reap the benefits of supplying its goods and services to a fast
evolving global market.
99
Appendix 1
List of Economies in the ADB
Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables
Code Economy Name

AUS Australia
AUT Austria
BAN Bangladesh
BEL Belgium
BGR Bulgaria
BHU Bhutan
BRA Brazil
BRU Brunei Darussalam
CAM Cambodia
CAN Canada
CYP Cyprus
CZE Czech Republic
DEN Denmark
EST Estonia
FIJ Fiji
FIN Finland
FRA France
GER Germany
GRC Greece
HKG Hong Kong, China
HRV Croatia
HUN Hungary
IND India
INO Indonesia
IRE Ireland
ITA Italy
JPN Japan
KAZ Kazakhstan
100 Appendix 1
Code Economy Name

KOR Republic of Korea
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic
LAO Lao People’s Democratic Republic
LTU Lithuania
LUX Luxembourg
LVA Latvia
MAL Malaysia
MEX Mexico
MLD Maldives
MLT Malta
MON Mongolia
NEP Nepal
NET Netherlands
NOR Norway
PAK Pakistan
PHI Philippines
POL Poland
POR Portugal
PRC People’s Republic of China
ROM Romania
RUS Russian Federation
SIN Singapore
SPA Spain
SRI Sri Lanka
SWE Sweden
SWI Switzerland
SVK Slovak Republic
SVN Slovenia
TAP Taipei,China
THA Thailand
TUR Turkey
UKG United Kingdom
USA United States
VIE Viet Nam
RoW Rest of the World
101
Appendix 2
List of Sectors in the ADB
Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables
Code Sector Broad Sector

c1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing Primary
c2 Mining and quarrying Primary
c3 Food, beverages, and tobacco Low-technology manufacturing
c4 Textiles and textile products Low-technology manufacturing
c5 Leather, leather products, and footwear Low-technology manufacturing
c6 Wood and products of wood and cork Low-technology manufacturing
c7 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and Low-technology manufacturing
publishing
c8 Coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel Medium- and high-technology
manufacturing
c9 Chemicals and chemical products Medium- and high-technology
manufacturing
c10 Rubber and plastics Low-technology manufacturing
c11 Other nonmetallic minerals Medium- and high-technology
manufacturing
c12 Basic metals and fabricated metal Medium- and high-technology
manufacturing
c13 Machinery, NEC Medium- and high-technology
manufacturing
c14 Electrical and optical equipment Medium- and high-technology
manufacturing
c15 Transport equipment Medium- and high-technology
manufacturing
c16 Manufacturing, NEC; recycling Low-technology manufacturing
c17 Electricity, gas, and water supply Low-technology manufacturing
c18 Construction Low-technology manufacturing
c19 Sale, maintenance, and repair of motor Business services
vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale
of fuel
c20 Wholesale trade and commission trade, Business services
except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
c21 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and Business services
motorcycles; repair of household goods
c22 Hotels and restaurants Business services
102 Appendix 2
Code Sector Broad Sector

c23 Inland transport Business services
c24 Water transport Business services
c25 Air transport Business services
c26 Other supporting and auxiliary transport Business services
activities; activities of travel agencies
c27 Post and telecommunications Business services
c28 Financial intermediation Business services
c29 Real estate activities Business services
c30 Renting of machinery and equipment and Business services
other business activities
c31 Public administration and defense; Personal and public services
compulsory social security
c32 Education Personal and public services
c33 Health and social work Personal and public services
c34 Other community, social, and personal Personal and public services
services
c35 Private households with employed Personal and public services
persons
Appendix 3
New Revealed Comparative Advantage and Agglomeration Index
Regression Results
Dependent variable: Total agglomeration (agg_t), forward agglomeration (agg_f), backward agglomeration (agg_b)
Inpendent variable: NRCA
Control: Economic block
Linear Number of obs = 65 Linear Number of obs = 65 Linear Number of obs = 65
regression regression regression
F(5, 59) = 1017.96 F(5, 59) = 648.6 F(5, 59) = 1140.97
Prob > F = 0 Prob > F = 0 Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.9868 R-squared = 0.9732 R-squared = 0.9826
Root MSE = 0.13206 Root MSE = 0.1799 Root MSE = 0.1177
Robust Robust Robust

agg_b Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] agg_f Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] agg_t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nrca –0.04 0.0706389 –0.61 0.546 0.1842351 0.0984611 nrca 0.25 0.2722382 0.91 0.367 0.2970064 0.7924883 nrca 0.10 0.1404218 0.73 0.469 0.1785564 0.3834103
econ_block econ_block econ_block

2 3.06 0.1479724 20.65 0 2.759459 3.351643 2 –0.57 0.5719408 –1 0.32 1.717583 0.5713186 2 1.24 0.2905363 4.27 0 0.6598478 1.822571
3 2.43 0.0753179 32.23 0 2.277055 2.578477 3 –0.18 0.1328004 –1.38 0.171 0.4495687 0.0818971 3 1.12 0.0786208 14.27 0 0.9646452 1.279285
4 2.82 0.0664696 42.47 0 2.689768 2.955778 4 0.86 0.0893944 9.66 0 0.6842511 1.042007 4 1.84 0.0557506 33.06 0 1.731394 1.954508
5 1.68 0.1408308 11.93 0 1.398751 1.962355 5 –2.69 0.6081508 –4.43 0 3.909559 –1.475745 5 –0.51 0.3086996 –1.64 0.106 1.123756 0.1116569
_cons –1.96 0.0662883 –29.6 0 2.094489 –1.829204 _cons 0.28 0.0723186 3.89 0 0.1364425 0.425861 _cons –0.84 0.0467109 –17.99 0 0.9338157 –0.7468791
Source: Asian Development Bank estimates.
103
104
Appendix 3
Dependent variable: NRCA
Inpendent variable: Total agglomeration (agg_t), forward agglomeration (agg_f), backward agglomeration (agg_b)
Control: Economic block
Linear Number of obs = 65 Linear Number of obs = 65 Linear Number of obs = 65
regression regression regression
F(5, 59) = 598.86 F(5, 59) = 635.54 F(5, 59) = 571.77

agg_b Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] agg_f Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] agg_t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
agg_b –0.04 0.0738236 –0.6 0.551 0.1920253 0.1034161 agg_f 0.13 0.1072237 1.25 0.218 0.0809665 0.3481419 agg_t 0.13 0.1643028 0.8 0.426 0.1971283 0.4604098

2 2.23 0.2250718 9.9 0 1.778714 2.679449 2 2.10 0.0593806 35.45 0 1.986012 2.223653 2 1.90 0.2505419 7.61 0 1.404681 2.407347
3 0.56 0.1780395 3.14 0.003 0.203521 0.9160335 3 0.46 0.0174857 26.46 0 0.4276517 0.4976292 3 0.30 0.1937477 1.54 0.128 0.0884167 0.6869596
4 0.40 0.2132407 1.88 0.065 0.0252348 0.8281523 4 0.15 0.105825 1.44 0.155 0.0593005 0.3642102 4 0.03 0.3111604 0.1 0.922 0.5920488 0.6532121
5 2.07 0.1181059 17.49 0 1.828952 2.301611 5 2.29 0.2441763 9.37 0 1.799713 2.776904 5 2.03 0.068989 29.49 0 1.896291 2.172384
_cons 0.15 0.1457095 1.05 0.299 0.1389389 0.4441891 _cons 0.19 0.0380842 5.11 0 0.1182924 0.2707051 _cons 0.35 0.1353363 2.57 0.013 0.0765805 0.6181953
Dependent variable: Total agglomeration (agg_t), forward agglomeration (agg_f), backward agglomeration (agg_b)
Inpendent variable: NRCA
Control: Economic block, year
Linear Number obs = 65 Linear Number obs = 65 Linear Number obs = 65
regression of regression of regression of
F(17, 47) = 243.87 F(17, 47) = 260.39 F(17, 47) = 398.59

nrca Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] nrca Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] agg_b Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
agg_t 0.17 0.1435411 1.19 0.238 0.1172554 0.4602794 agg_f 0.11 0.0963846 1.16 0.253 0.0824256 0.3053758 nrca 0.01 0.0815704 0.1 0.918 0.1556389 0.1725582
year year year

2007 0.07 0.0934333 0.76 0.453 0.1172897 0.2586373 2007 0.06 0.0970728 0.63 0.53 0.1338527 0.2567178 2007 –0.02 0.0861026 –0.24 0.809 0.1941547 0.1522775
2008 0.05 0.0758779 0.69 0.493 0.1002526 0.2050408 2008 0.04 0.0747924 0.52 0.604 0.1113832 0.1895424 2008 –0.09 0.0727237 –1.29 0.202 0.2404213 0.0521811
2009 0.05 0.1128617 0.81 0.424 0.1360005 0.3180962 2009 0.08 0.1124289 0.74 0.464 –0.143082 0.3092737 2009 –0.01 0.0402654 –0.13 0.898 0.0861881 0.0758188
2010 0.05 0.0970483 0.99 0.329 0.0996076 0.2908642 2010 0.08 0.095259 0.88 0.382 0.1075466 0.2757263 2010 –0.07 0.038554 –1.71 0.095 0.1433329 0.0117882
2011 0.05 0.0953138 0.87 0.388 0.1087526 0.2747408 2011 0.07 0.0941894 0.76 0.454 0.1183588 0.2606103 2011 –0.07 0.0380365 –1.9 0.064 0.1488071 0.0042321
2012 0.05 0.0870582 1.2 0.235 0.0704427 0.2798344 2012 0.09 0.08567 1 0.32 0.0862995 0.2583922 2012 –0.16 0.0525021 –3.14 0.003 0.2703057 –0.0590646
2013 0.05 0.0749705 0.86 0.396 0.0866232 0.2150193 2013 0.05 0.0738443 0.7 0.489 0.0970987 0.2000126 2013 –0.09 0.0429696 –2.19 0.034 0.1803574 –0.0074701
2014 0.05 0.0927654 0.48 0.634 0.1422101 0.2310299 2014 0.04 0.0899274 0.4 0.691 –0.144953 0.2168682 2014 –0.05 0.0812497 –0.56 0.581 0.2085678 0.118339
2015 0.05 0.1194717 0.27 0.788 0.2080448 0.2726473 2015 0.03 0.1131881 0.28 0.778 0.1956846 0.2597254 2015 0.07 0.0933019 0.71 0.482 0.1215699 0.2538284
2016 0.05 0.0978341 0.56 0.579 0.1421859 0.2514478 2016 0.05 0.0987625 0.47 0.637 0.1517825 0.2455865 2016 –0.02 0.0453482 –0.51 0.611 0.1144422 0.0680155
2017 0.05 0.0970681 0.76 0.449 0.1211165 0.2694351 2017 0.06 0.0972355 0.66 0.511 –0.131181 0.2600442 2017 –0.06 0.0496415 –1.24 0.222 0.1613643 0.0383671
2018 0.05 0.1032709 1.1 0.276 0.0940248 0.3214838 2018 0.09 0.0988438 0.91 0.368 0.1089885 0.2887075 2018 –0.27 0.0679098 –3.95 0 –0.404621 –0.1313872

2 1.85 0.224026 8.25 0 1.397277 2.298641 2 2.10 0.0680512 30.91 0 1.966749 2.240552 2 2.95 0.171256 17.21 0 2.603319 3.292364
3 0.25 0.1728619 1.46 0.15 0.0950662 0.6004403 3 0.46 0.0244213 18.88 0 0.4119281 0.5101868 3 2.40 0.0696353 34.53 0 2.264414 2.54459
Appendix 3
4 –0.04 0.2758112 –0.16 0.874 0.5988905 0.5108306 4 0.17 0.1003959 1.72 0.091 0.0289125 0.3750283 4 2.81 0.0609747 46.06 0 2.685889 2.931219
5 2.05 0.059952 34.13 0 1.925761 2.166977 5 2.24 0.2165781 10.34 0 1.803995 2.675393 5 1.58 0.1693407 9.32 0 1.237467 1.918806
_cons 0.31 0.1319519 2.37 0.022 0.0467019 0.5776077 _cons 0.14 0.0779165 1.86 0.07 0.0120633 0.3014323 _cons –1.91 0.0559317 –34.13 0 2.021413 –1.796372
105
106
Appendix 3
Dependent variable: NRCA
Inpendent variable: Total agglomeration (agg_t), forward agglomeration (agg_f), backward agglomeration (agg_b)
Control: Economic block, year
Linear Number obs = 65 Linear Number obs = 65 Linear Number obs = 65
regression of regression of regression of
F(17, 47) = 588.8 F(17, 47) = 281.36 F(17, 47) = 202.85

agg_t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] agg_f Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] nrca Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nrca 0.09 0.1006893 0.89 0.38 0.1133481 0.2917733 nrca 0.17 0.2056773 0.83 0.413 0.2438036 0.5837349 agg_b 0.01 0.1322815 0.1 0.918 –0.252406 0.2798262
year year year

2007 0.13 0.1142029 1.12 0.269 0.1021291 0.357364 2007 0.28 0.2174624 1.27 0.21 0.1613045 0.7136513 2007 0.09 0.1063478 0.89 0.38 0.1196681 0.3082205
2008 0.05 0.1281759 0.39 0.696 0.2073806 0.3083328 2008 0.20 0.2293299 0.85 0.399 0.2662799 0.6564245 2008 0.06 0.0905631 0.7 0.488 0.1189062 0.2454726
2009 0.14 0.1154762 1.17 0.248 0.0971732 0.367443 2009 0.28 0.2184786 1.26 0.214 0.1640678 0.7149766 2009 0.12 0.1205951 0.96 0.341 0.1265483 0.3586636
2010 0.07 0.113486 0.65 0.518 0.1543235 0.3022852 2010 0.21 0.2158035 0.99 0.327 0.2204065 0.6478746 2010 0.11 0.1076647 1.03 0.308 0.1057043 0.3274824
2011 0.07 0.1149012 0.59 0.561 0.1638846 0.2984181 2011 0.21 0.2182211 0.95 0.348 0.2321833 0.6458252 2011 0.10 0.1062117 0.91 0.366 0.1166903 0.3106503
2012 –0.00 0.1147967 –0.02 0.987 0.2327937 0.2290887 2012 0.16 0.2134565 0.75 0.455 0.2684388 0.5903991 2012 0.11 0.100462 1.08 0.287 0.0938579 0.310349
2013 0.04 0.1147076 0.34 0.735 0.1916957 0.269828 2013 0.17 0.2133973 0.81 0.424 –0.257254 0.601346 2013 0.07 0.0901905 0.81 0.421 0.1081607 0.2547191
2014 0.06 0.1229452 0.51 0.613 0.1847539 0.3099139 2014 0.17 0.2169493 0.78 0.436 0.2661713 0.6067201 2014 0.06 0.1007775 0.56 0.577 0.1461261 0.2593501
2015 0.14 0.1157386 1.25 0.218 0.0881741 0.377498 2015 0.22 0.2174562 1.03 0.31 0.2142708 0.6606601 2015 0.06 0.1297094 0.44 0.662 0.2038551 0.3180283
2016 0.09 0.1138902 0.83 0.409 0.1342711 0.3239641 2016 0.21 0.2153497 0.99 0.328 0.2203213 0.646134 2016 0.07 0.1108686 0.65 0.517 0.1507289 0.2953486
2017 0.05 0.1134788 0.44 0.662 0.1784077 0.2781722 2017 0.16 0.2156006 0.75 0.458 0.2724694 0.5949957 2017 0.08 0.1073983 0.79 0.434 –0.131224 0.3008909
2018 –0.12 0.1247257 –0.99 0.327 0.3743346 0.127497 2018 0.02 0.2213411 0.1 0.924 0.4241144 0.4664473 2018 0.10 0.1195245 0.82 0.418 0.1427889 0.3381158

2 1.27 0.2137108 5.94 0 0.8389985 1.69886 2 –0.41 0.4432624 –0.92 0.36 1.301713 0.4817452 2 2.06 0.4075422 5.05 0 1.237165 2.876903
3 1.13 0.0580004 19.45 0 1.01127 1.244634 3 –0.15 0.1056257 –1.41 0.166 0.3610891 0.0638939 3 0.42 0.3171099 1.32 0.192 0.2178843 1.058001
4 1.85 0.0426991 43.25 0 1.760711 1.93251 4 0.88 0.0802402 11.03 0 0.7232443 1.046089 4 0.24 0.3731063 0.64 0.526 0.5122075 0.9889785
5 –0.48 0.2314757 –2.07 0.044 –0.945361 –0.0140231 5 –2.54 0.470846 –5.39 0 –3.48474 –1.5903 5 1.97 0.2267801 8.7 0 1.516525 2.42897
_cons –0.89 0.1158598 –7.7 0 1.125659 –0.6594992 _cons 0.12 0.2224622 0.56 0.581 0.3238019 0.5712704 _cons 0.19 0.2614253 0.72 0.476 –0.338229 0.7136106
107
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experts-warn-they
Indonesia is the largest economy in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,

and its exports and evolving role in global value chains (GVCs) contribute notably
to its economic performance. However, in a highly globalized environment,
the fragmentation of production processes across geographical borders calls
for a reevaluation of countries’ contributions to global production. This report
analyzes Indonesia’s participation in—and contribution to—GVCs during
2000–2017 using recent empirical and theoretical frameworks in GVC analysis and
multi-regional input–output tables compiled by the Asian Development Bank.
About the Asian Development Bank
ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable

Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty.
Established in 1966, it is owned by 68 members—49 from the region. Its main
instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans,
equity investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.
About the Islamic Development Bank
The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) is a multilateral development bank that

has been working for over 40 years to improve the lives of the communities it
serves by delivering impact at scale. We bring together 57 member countries
across four continents, touching the lives of 1 in 5 of the world’s population.
The IsDB is headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with major hubs in Morocco,
Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Senegal, Turkey, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Nigeria.
Our mission is to equip people to drive their own economic and social progress at
scale, putting the infrastructure in place to enable them to fulfil their potential.

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THE EVOLUTION OF

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Some rights reserved.

Published in 2019 by the Asian Development Bank

ISBN 978-92-9261-822-3 (print), 978-92-9261-823-0 (electronic)

Please contact pubsmarketing@adb.org if you have questions or comments with respect to

Corrigenda to ADB publications may be found at http://www.adb.org/publications/corrigenda.

Printed on recycled paper

Tables, Figures, and Boxes v

Foreword by the Vice-President for Knowledge viii

Foreword by the Vice-President, Country Programs, xi

2. Indonesia’s Production and Value-Added Exports 9

2.1 Domestic Production and Consumption of Intermediate Goods 10

3. Indonesia’s Participation, Position, and 29

3.1 Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains 29

4. Examining Other Aspects of Global Value Chains: 63

4.1 Agglomeration in Indonesia 63

5. Reaping the Benefits of Global Value Chain 95

1 List of Economies in the ADB Multi-Regional Input–Output Tables 99

Tables, Figures, and Boxes

2.1 Use of Intermediate Imports and Production of Intermediate Exports, 12

Box 8 Table: Classification of Occupations 72

2.1 Structure of Production and Use of Intermediates, Indonesia, 2000–2017 10

2.8 Changes in Value-Added Components of Exports, 2000 versus 2007 22

Box 1 Figure: A Stylized Representation of a Multi-Regional Input–Output 3

1 The Structure of a Multi-Regional Input–Output Table 3

Foreword by the Vice-President

The vast global interconnection of economies in production and trade helps

However, quantitative analysis on GVCs shows that developing economies

There is a growing body of literature on reconfiguring trade data to reveal the

down the composition of value-added in final products, imports, and exports

The Indonesian economy saw a steady slowdown of growth since peaking in

Statistical analysis shows that Indonesia’s declining participation in GVCs

Much of recent economic literature is coming to the conclusion that

Overall, this report is an excellent resource, which will open more

Foreword by the Vice-President,

The proliferation of cross-border production arrangements enables especially

There is also strong evidence that globalization of production results in

that globalization has increased the awareness on environmental issues and

The ongoing collaboration among the Asian Development Bank (ADB),

This report, The Evolution of Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains,

We gratefully acknowledge Vice-President for Knowledge Management

Mahinthan Joseph Mariasingham of ADB led the team of consultants

ADB Asian Development Bank

Indonesia’s Production and Value-Added Exports

•• Indonesia’s production and use of intermediates generally increased

•• The use of foreign intermediates declined across the economic

•• Domestic value-added in the final products of all sectors increased

•• Domestic value-added constituted over 90% of Indonesia’s gross

foreign value-added in Indonesia’s gross exports was generally low.

•• Domestic value-added embedded in the primary sector’s intermediate

•• In 2000, only the United States imported a significant amount of

Indonesia’s Participation, Position, and Specialization in

•• Trade-related value-added generated in Indonesia as a share of its

•• Indonesia’s participation in GVCs through both forward and backward

•• Indonesia’s international trade was more bilateral than global. From

•• Country-sector specific upstreamness indices from 2000 to 2017

•• Indonesia’s comparative advantage was concentrated in the industries

2.1 Domestic Production and Consumption of Intermediate Goods 10

3. Indonesia’s Participation, Position, and 29

4. Examining Other Aspects of Global Value Chains: 63

5. Reaping the Benefits of Global Value Chain 95

2.1 Domestic Production and Consumption of