Group 5

Legal Research
SUN 8:00AM-10:00AM TBA2 (Sec.13)
Atty. Charito F. Rodriguez
Prelims

Members:
Myles John Patio Galos
Michael Ranz Luigi G. Tabar
Rohanisa Deca Fahmi
Marinelle Therese Villena Holmes
Valerie Nicole Raymundo

Group Coordinator: Valkent Jovita Darunday

Assigned Cases:
Tanada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. 63915
Tanada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. 63915
Umali vs. Estanislao G.R. No. 104037
Farinas vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 147387
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs Ramos G.R. No. 127882
Lidasan vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-28089

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Tañada vs Tuvera (No. L-63915, December 29, 1986)

Facts: In Tañada v Tuvera 1985 respondents were ordered, "WHEREFORE the Court
hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.’ The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette.

Issue: Do all laws need to be published in Official Gazette in order to have binding
force and effect or does “unless it is otherwise provided” mean that the publication
requirement therein is not always imperative?

Ruling: Article 2 of the Civil Code states that the publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after
fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended.
Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium, unless such an amendatory statute is in fact
enacted.

Rationale: The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly.

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Tañada vs. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985)

Facts: In this case, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The petitioner contends
that the people have a right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated.

However, the respondents, through the solicitor general would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing
to bring the instant petition. Respondents further contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.

Issue: Whether the presidential issuance in question need to be published in the

Official Gazette for its effectivity.

Rulings: The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Rationale: The clear object of the Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

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In addition, the court recognized that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners
herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.  If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult
to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

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Umali vs Estanislao (G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992)

Facts: Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending section 29, paragraph (L),
items (1) and (2)(A) of the National Internal Revenue Code (adjusting the basic and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the poverty
threshold level). The said Act was signed and approved by the President on 19
December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of
general circulation. On 26 December 1991, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue(CIR) promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 stating that the regulations
shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992. Petitioners filed a
petition for mandamus to compel the CIR to implement RA 7167 in regard to income
earned or received in 1991, and prohibition to enjoin the CIR from implementing the
revenue regulation.

Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. 7167 took effect upon its approval by the president on
December 19, 1991 or on January 30, 1992, 15 days after its publication?
2. Assuming that Republic Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15 days after its
publication in “Malaya”), whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.

Ruling:

1. R.A. 7167 took effect on January 30, 1992 after 15 days of its publication. (Tanada
vs Tuvera) The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen (15) day period shall be shortened or extended.

2. Yes. The Court is of the considered view that Republic Act 7167 should cover or
extend to compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991. Sec.
29, par. [L], Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:

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Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall
automatically adjust not more often than once every three years, the personal and
additional exemptions taking into account, among others, the movement in consumer
price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare subsistence levels. The exemptions
were last adjusted in 1986. The president could have adjusted it in 1989 but did not do
so. The poverty threshold level refers to the level at the time Republic Act 7167 was
enacted by Congress. The Act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the
present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers. Republic Act 7167 says that
the increased personal exemptions shall be available after the law shall have become
effective. These exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax
returns, done not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year.
Thus, under Republic Act 7167, which became effective, on 30 January 1992, the
increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 [though not
before 30 January 1992]. But these increased exemptions can be available on 15 April
1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar
year 1991. The personal exemptions as increased by Republic Act 7167 are not
available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year;
the tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid
(The law does not state retroactive application). The personal exemptions as increased
by Republic Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available as to compensation income
received during 1992 because it would in effect postpone the availability of the
increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993. The implementing regulations
collide with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect
upon its approval”. The revenue regulation should take effect on compensation
income earned or received from 1 January 1991. Since this decision is promulgated
after 15 April 1992, those taxpayers who have already paid are entitled to refunds or
credits.

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Farinas vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003)

Facts: Before the Court are two Petitions seeking to declare as unconstitutional Sec.
14 of RA 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of
BP 881 (The Omnibus Code) which provides:

Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office. –Any elective official, whether national
or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon filing of his certificate of candidacy.

RA 9006 is a consolidation of bills, House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742.
The same was signed into law by then President GMA on February 12, 2001.

Petitioners allege that Sec. 14 of RA 9006 insofar as it repeals Sec. 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, in unconstitutional for being in violation of Sec. 26(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed
in its title. The repeal is of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006. The
petitioners also assert that Sec. 14 of RA 9006 violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution because it repeals Sec. 67 only of the Omnibus Election, leaving
intact Sec. 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials. They
contend that Sec. 14 discriminates against appointive official.

By the repeal of Sec. 67, elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the
petitions at bar.

2. Whether or not Sec. 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

Ruling:

The petitions are dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

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On issue of local standi

Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. However, being merely a matter of procedure, this
Court in several cases involving issues of “overarching significance to our society”,
had adopted a liberal stance on standing.

On the issue of Sec. 14 being a rider.

It is not. It is sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include

the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every
end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. This
Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.

On the issue of the repeal of Sec. 67 being unconstitutional and violative of Equal
Protection Clause

Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.

The equal protection clause is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.
It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

A substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Sec. 55 of
Administrative Code of 1987, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the
civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or
take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials,
or officers, or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to
take part in political and electoral activities. By repealing Sec. 67 but retaining Sec.

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66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of
the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by
them. It is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of
this classification.

On the issue of Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Under this Doctrine, the signing of bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Court is not the proper forum for
the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House of Senate. And it
has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and within their
observance the Courts have no concern.

On the issue of effective clause

The effectivity clause which provides, “shall take effect immediately upon its
approval” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid.

Ruling: Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for
an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of the contested
law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda, doesn’t violate the “one subject- one title rule”. The Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated in its title, may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and they may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject.
The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal
protection is not absolute especially if the classification is reasonable. There is
reasonable classification between an elective official and an appointive one. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected
to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent

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conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction is that by
law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or
take part in any election except to vote.

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La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association vs Ramos (G.R. No. 127882, December 1,
2004)

Facts: On January 27, 2004, the court en banc decided certain provisions of RA 7942,
DAO 96-40 (The Philipping Mining Act of 1995) is unconstitutional mainly because
of the FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, a foreign owned
company. The court found that FTAAs are similar to service contracts. Though
permitted by the 1973 Constitution, service contracts are prohibited by Article 12,
section 2 of the 1987 Constitution because they allow foreign control over the
exploitation of our country's natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino Nation.
The respondent’s rebuttal was that in January 2001, WMC, a publicly listed
Australian mining and exploration company, sold its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius
Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil
Resources, an Australian company. Thus, the government’s FTAA with WMCP was
transferred to Sagittarius, a Filipino owned company, satisfying the requirement of
Article 12, section 2.
Petitioner argues that the FTAA is still unconstitutional because the government
entered into a service contract with a foreign owned company for the exploitation of
our country’s resources. The court ruled in favor of petitioner.
Respondents filed a Motion of Reconsideration arguing that the phrase, “Agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance” does not bind the agreement to
technical or financial assistance because it is a comprehensive agreement for
integrated Exploration, Development, and Utilization (EDU) of mineral, petroleum or
other minerals. Therefore, it is authorized to perform a whole range of integrated and
comprehensive services, ranging from the discovery to the development, utilization
and production of minerals or petroleum products.
Petitioner stated that the phrase, “Agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance” simply means technical assistance or financial assistance agreements.
There is no ambiguity to the phrase such that when a foreign owned company enters
into an agreement with the government, they are limited either financial or technical
assistance only, for EDU of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. This does not
include foreign management and operation of a mining enterprise.

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Issue: What is the proper intention of the phrase, “Agreement involving either
technical or financial assistance” contained in Article 12, section 2 of the
Constitution?

Ruling: Motion for Reconsideration is granted RA 7942 and government-WMCP

FTAA is valid and constitutional.
Rationale: In this petition, the court could not see how applying a strictly literal or
verbal legis to the phrase, “Agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance” concludes that the FTAA is a service contract prohibited by the
Constitution. The word, “involving” does not mean the exclusion of other modes of
assistance.
On the other hand, it could also mean the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of
assistance or activities related to financial or technical assistance. Another
interpretation would be that, if taken in the context of “including”, involving means
technical or financial assistance are included but there are other forms of assistance
mentioned explicitly in the agreement. None of these interpretations imply exclusivity
in the agreement.
If the drafter’s intent was to confine assistance to technical or financial and nothing
more, their language would have been more restrictive and clear that it would leave
no doubt as to its true intent. With these terms, the court sided with respondents and
reversed its Decision. The Philippine mining act is deemed valid and constitutional.
Since congress has already made its decision and considering that it is a political
question, we should not disturb the decision of the sovereign people because congress
is considered always as the representative of the sovereign people. So the court cannot
assume jurisdiction.

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Lidasan v Comelec (G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967)

Facts: RA No. 4790, “ An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the

province of Lanao del Sur ” was signed into law but later came to light that twelve
barrios are within the two municipalities of Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del
Sur. With the upcoming elections, Comelec adopted a resolution for establishment of
precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes. Informed of this
development, the Office of the President recommended to Comelec that the operation
of the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation. Comelec stood by
its own interpretation, the statute be implemented unless declared unconstitutional.
This triggered the action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and
taxpayer of Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the elections praying that RA No. 4790
be declared unconstitutional and that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same
for electoral purposes be nullified. Lidasan relied on the constitutional requirement
that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

Issue: Whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional
requirement

Ruling: No. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province
of Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new town.
The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur" makes the title deceptive. The title did
not inform the members of Congress of the full impact of the law and the people in
those two municipalities and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away and added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur. It
kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another is as
important as the creation of a municipality -- the title did not reflect this fact. RA No.
4790 is null and void. Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political
subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise
declared unconstitutional.

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