B. OBLIGATIONS OF THE COMMON CARRIERS Plaintiff [herein private respondent Atty.

Renato Arroyo], a public attorney,

bought a ticket [from] defendant [herein petitioner], a corporation engaged in
324 Phil. 513 x x x inter-island shipping, for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to
Cagayan de Oro City from Cebu City on November 12, 1991.
THIRD DIVISION
At around 5:30 in the evening of November 12, 1991, plaintiff boarded the
M/V Asia Thailand vessel. At that instance, plaintiff noticed that some repair
[ G.R. No. 118126, March 04, 1996 ]
works [sic] were being undertaken on the engine of the vessel. The vessel
departed at around 11:00 in the evening with only one (1) engine running.
TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AND ATTY. RENATO T. ARROYO, RESPONDENTS.  After an hour of slow voyage, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island and
dropped its anchor thereat. After half an hour of stillness, some passengers
DECISION demanded that they should be allowed to return to Cebu City for they were
no longer willing to continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro City. The
captain acceded [sic] to their request and thus the vessel headed back to Cebu
DAVIDE, JR., J.:  City.

As formulated by the petitioner, the issue in this petition for review on At Cebu City, plaintiff together with the other passengers who requested to
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is as follows: be brought back to Cebu City, were allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the
vessel proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Plaintiff, the next day, boarded the
In case of interruption of a vessel’s voyage and the consequent delay in that M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to Cagayan de Oro City, likewise a vessel of
vessel’s arrival at its port of destination, is the right of a passenger affected defendant.
thereby to be determined and governed by the vague Civil Code provision on
common carriers, or shall it be, in the absence of a specific provision On account of this failure of defendant to transport him to the place of
thereon, governed by Art. 698 of the Code of Commerce?[1] destination on November 12, 1991, plaintiff filed before the trial court a
complaint for damages against defendant.[4]

The petitioner considers it a "novel question of law."

In his complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-491, plaintiff (hereinafter
Upon a closer evaluation, however, of the challenged decision of the Court of private respondent) alleged that the engines of the M/V Asia Thailand
Appeals of 23 November 1994,[2] vis-a-vis, the decision of 29 June 1992 in conked out in the open sea, and for more than an hour it was stalled and at
Civil Case No. 91-491 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro the mercy of the waves, thus causing fear in the passengers. It sailed back to
City, Branch 24,[3] as well as the allegations and arguments adduced by the Cebu City after it regained power, but for unexplained reasons, the
parties, we find the petitioner’s formulation of the issue imprecise. As this passengers, including the private respondent, were arrogantly told to
Court sees it, what stands for resolution is a common carrier’s liability for ‘disembark without the necessary precautions against possible injury to them.
damages to a passenger who disembarked from the vessel upon its return to They were thus unceremoniously dumped, which only exacerbated the
the port of origin, after it suffered engine trouble and had to stop at sea, private respondent’s mental distress. He further alleged that by reason of the
having commenced the contracted voyage on one engine. petitioner’s wanton, reckless, and willful acts, he was unnecessarily exposed
to danger and, having been stranded in Cebu City for a day, incurred
The antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows: additional expenses and loss of income. He then prayed that he be awarded
P1,100.00, P50,000.00, and P25,000.00 as compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages, respectively.[5]
 Neither could negligence, bad faith or malice on the part of defendant be
In his pre-trial brief, the private respondent asserted that his complaint was inferred from the evidence of the parties. When the boat arrived at [the] Port
"an action for damage&arising from bad faith, breach of contract and from of Cebu after it returned from Kawit Island, there was an announcement that
tort," with the former arising from the petitioner’s "failure to carry [him] to passengers who would like to disembark were given ten (10) minutes only to
his place of destination as contracted," while the latter from the "conduct of do so. By this announcement, it could be inferred that the boat will [sic]
the [petitioner] resulting [in] the infliction of emotional distress" to the proceed to Cagayan de Oro City. If plaintiff entertained doubts, he should
private respondent.[6] have asked a member of the crew of the boat or better still, the captain of the
boat. But as admitted by him, he was of the impression only that the boat will
After due trial, the trial court rendered its decision [7] and ruled that the action not proceed to Cagayan de Oro that evening so he disembarked. He was
was only for breach of contract, with Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 of the instead, the ones [sic] negligent. Had he been prudent, with the
Civil Code as applicable law - not Article 2180 of the same Code. It was of announcement that those who will disembark were given ten minutes only,
the opinion that Article 1170 made a person liable for damages if, in the he should have lingered a little by staying in his cot and inquired whether the
performance of his obligation, he was guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, or boat will proceed to Cagayan de Oro City or not. Defendant cannot be
in any manner contravened the tenor thereof; moreover, pursuant to Article expected to be telling [sic] the reasons to each passenger. Announcement by
2201 of the same Code, to be entitled to damages, the non-performance of microphone was enough.
the obligation must have been tainted not only by fraud, negligence, or delay,
but also bad faith, malice, and wanton attitude. It then disposed of the case as The court is inclined to believe that the story of defendant that the boat
follows: returned to the Port of Cebu because of the request of the passengers in view
of the waves. That it did not return because of the defective engines as shown
WHEREFORE, it not appearing from the evidence that plaintiff was left in by the fact that fifteen (15) minutes after the boat docked [at] the Port of
the Port of Cebu because of the fault, negligence, malice or wanton attitude Cebu and those who wanted to proceed to Cagayan de Oro disembarked, it
of defendant’s employees, the complaint is DISMISSED. Defendant’s left for Cagayan de Oro City.
counterclaim is likewise dismissed it not appearing also that filing of the case
by plaintiff was motivated by malice or bad faith. [8] The defendant got nothing when the boat returned to Cebu to let those who
did not want to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City including plaintiff
disembarked. On the contrary, this would mean its loss instead because it will
The trial court made the following findings to support its disposition: have to refund their tickets or they will use it the next trip without paying
anymore. It is hard therefore, to imagine how defendant by leaving plaintiff
in Cebu could have acted in bad faith, negligently, want only and with
In the light of the evidence adduced by the parties and of the above
malice.
provisions of the New Civil Code, the issue to be resolved, in the resolution
of this case is whether or not, defendant thru its employee in [sic] the night of
If plaintiff, therefore, was not able to [m]ake the trip that night of November
November 12, 1991, committed fraud, negligence, bad faith or malice when
12, 1991, it was not because defendant maliciously did it to exclude him
it left plaintiff in the Port of Cebu when it sailed back to Cagayan de Oro
[from] the trip. If he was left, it was because of his fault or negligence. [9]
City after it has [sic] returned from Kawit Island.

Evaluation of the evidence of the parties tended to show nothing that

defendant committed fraud. As early as 3:00 p.m. of November 12, 1991, Unsatisfied, the private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-
defendant did not hide the fact that the cylinder head cracked. Plaintiff even G.R. CV No. 39901) and submitted for its determination the following
saw during its repair. If he had doubts as to the vessel’s capacity to sail, he assignment of errors: (1) the trial court erred in not finding that the
had time yet to take another boat. The ticket could be returned to defendant defendant-appellee was guilty of fraud, delay, negligence, and bad faith; and
and corresponding cash [would] be returned to him. (2) the trial court erred in not awarding moral and exemplary damages. [10]
In its decision of 23 November 1994,[11] the Court of Appeals reversed the x x x The dropping of the vessel’s
trial court’s decision by applying Article 1755 in relation to Articles 2201, anchor after running slowlyon only one engine when it departed earlier must
2208, 2217, and 2232 of the Civil Code and, accordingly, awarded have alarmed some nervous passengers x x x
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby The entries in the logbook which defendant-appellee itself offered as
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one is rendered ordering evidence categorically stated therein that the vessel stopped at Kawit Island
defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant: because of engine trouble. It reads:
1. P20,000.00 as moral damages; 2330 HRS STBD ENGINE EMERGENCY STOP
2350 HRS DROP ANCHOR DUE TO. ENGINE TROUBLE,2 ENGINE
2. P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; STOP.
3. P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

4. Cost of suit. The stoppage was not to start and synchronized [sic] the engines of the vessel
as claimed by defendant-appellee. It was because one of the engines of the
SO ORDERED.[12] vessel broke down; it was because of the disability of the vessel which from
the very beginning of the voyage was known to defendant-appellee.

Defendant-appellee from the very start of the voyage knew for a fact that the
It did not, however, allow the grant of damages for the delay in the vessel was not yet in its sailing condition because the second engine was still
performance of the petitioner’s obligation as the requirement of demand set being repaired. Inspite of this knowledge, defendant-appellee still proceeded
forth in Article 1169 of the Civil Code had not been met by the private to sail with only one engine running.
respondent. Besides, it found that the private respondent offered no evidence
to prove that his contract of carriage with the petitioner provided for liability Defendant-appellee at that instant failed to exercise the diligence which all
in case of delay in departure, nor that a designation of the time of departure common carriers should exercise in transporting or carrying passengers. The
was the controlling motive for the establishment of the contract. On the latter, law does not merely require extraordinary diligence in the performance of the
the court a quo observed that the private respondent even admitted he was obligation. The law mandates that common carrier[s] should exercise utmost
unaware of the vessel’s departure time, and it was only when he boarded the diligence in the transport of passengers.
vessel that he became aware of such. Finally, the respondent Court found no
reasonable basis for the private respondent’s belief that demand was useless Article 1755 of the New Civil Code provides:
because the petitioner had rendered it beyond its power to perform its
obligation; on the contrary, he even admitted that the petitioner had been ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
assuring the passengers that the vessel would leave on time, and that it could as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
still perform its obligation to transport them as scheduled. cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
To justify its award of damages, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated as follows:

It is an established and admitted fact that the vessel before the voyage had Utmost diligence of a VERY CAUTIOUS person dictates that defendant-
undergone some repair work on the cylinder head of the engine. It is likewise appellee should have pursued the voyage only when its vessel was already fit
admitted by defendant-appellee that it left the port of Cebu City with only to sail. Defendant-appellee should have made certain that the vessel [could]
one engine running. Defendant-appellee averred: complete the voyage before starting [to] sail. Anything less than this, the
vessel [could not] sail x x x with so many passengers on board it. responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation.
However, defendant-appellant [sic] in complete disregard of the safety of the
passengers, chose to proceed with its voyage even if only one engine was
running as the second engine was still being repaired during the voyage. Plaintiff-appellant is entitled to moral damages for the mental anguish, fright
Defendant-appellee disregarded the not very remote possibility that because and serious anxiety he suffered during the voyage when the vessel’s engine
of the disability of the vessel, other problems might occur which would broke down and when he disembarked from the vessel during the wee hours
endanger the lives of the passengers sailing with a disabled vessel. of the morning at Cebu City when it returned.[14]
As expected, x x x engine trouble occurred. Fortunate[ly] for defendant- Moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of
appellee, such trouble only necessitated the stoppage of the vessel and did contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or
not cause the vessel to capsize. No wonder why some passengers requested bad faith even if death does not result.[15]
to be brought back to Cebu City. Common carriers which are mandated to
exercise utmost diligence should not be taking these risks. Fraud and bad faith by defendant-appellee having been established, the
award of moral damages is in order.[16]
On this premise, plaintiff-appellant should not be faulted why he chose to
disembark from the vessel with the other passengers when it returned back to To serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar acts in the future,
Cebu City. Defendant-appellee may call him a very "panicky passenger" or a exemplary damages should be imposed upon defendant-appellee.
"nervous person," but this will not relieve defendant-appellee from the [17]
Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to
liability it incurred for its failure to exercise utmost diligence. [13] reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating x
x x negative incentives or deterrents against such behavior. [18]
xxx      xxx     xxx
Moral damages having been awarded, exemplary damages maybe properly
awarded. When entitlement to moral damages has been established, the
As to the second assigned error, we find that plaintiff-appellant is entitled to award of exemplary damages is proper.[19]
the award of moral and exemplary damages for the breach committed by
defendant-appellee.

As discussed, defendant-appellee in sailing to Cagayan de Oro City with only The petitioner then instituted this petition and submitted the question of law
one engine and with full knowledge of the true condition of the vessel, acted earlier adverted to.
in bad faith with malice, in complete disregard for the safety of the
passengers and only for its own personal advancement/interest. Undoubtedly, there was, between the petitioner and the private respondent, a
contract of common carriage. The laws of primary application then are the
The Civil Code provides: provisions on common carriers under Section 4, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book
IV of the Civil Code, while for all other matters not regulated thereby, the
Art 2201. Code of Commerce and special laws.[20]

xxx     xxx     xxx Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, the petitioner was bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the private respondent. That
meant that the petitioner was, pursuant to Article 1755 of the said Code,
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be bound to carry the private respondent safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances. In this case, we are in full accord anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner failed to discharge this humiliation, or similar injury. They may be recovered in the cases
obligation. enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, likewise, if they are the
proximate result of, as in this case, the petitioner’s breach of the contract of
Before commencing the contracted voyage, the petitioner undertook some carriage.[24] Anent a breach of a contract of common carriage, moral damages
repairs on the cylinder head of one of the vessel’s engines. But even before it may be awarded if the common carrier, like the petitioner, acted fraudulently
could finish these repairs, it allowed the vessel to leave the port of origin on or in bad faith.[25]
only one functioning engine, instead of two. Moreover, even the lone
functioning engine was not in perfect condition as sometime after it had run Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
its course, it conked out. This caused the vessel to stop and remain adrift at public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
sea, thus in order to prevent the ship from capsizing, it had to drop anchor. damages.[26] In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be
Plainly, the vessel was unseaworthy even before the voyage began. For a awarded if the defendant acted in a wanton fraudulent, reckless, oppressive
vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and or malevolent manner.[27] It cannot, however, be considered as a matter of
manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. [21] The right; the court having to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
[28]
failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel  Before the court may consider an award for exemplary damages, the
involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of is duty prescribed in plaintiff must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
Article 1755 of the Civil Code. compensatory damages; but it is not necessary that he prove the monetary
value thereof.[29]
As to its liability for damages to the private respondent, Article 1764 of the
Civil Code expressly provides: The Court of Appeals did not grant the private respondent actual or
compensatory damages, reasoning that no delay was incurred since there was
ART. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in no demand, as required by Article 1169 of the Civil Code. This article,
accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 however, finds no application in this case because, as found by the
shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract respondent Court, there was in fact no delay in the commencement of the
by common carrier. contracted voyage. If any delay was incurred, it was after the commencement
of such voyage, more specifically, when the voyage was subsequently
interrupted when the vessel had to stop near Kawit Island after the only
The damages comprised in Title XVIII of the Civil Code are actual or functioning engine conked out.
compensatory, moral, nominal, temperate or moderate, liquidated, and
exemplary. As to the rights and duties of the parties strictly arising out of such delay, the
Civil Code is silent. However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner,
In his complaint, the private respondent claims actual or compensatory, Article 698 of the Code of Commerce specifically provides for such a
moral, and exemplary damages. situation. It reads:

Actual or compensatory damages represent the adequate compensation for In case a voyage already begun should be interrupted, the passengers shall be
pecuniary loss suffered and for profits the obligee failed to obtain. [22] obliged to pay the fare in proportion to the distance covered, without right to
recover for losses and damages if the interruption is due to fortuitous event or
In contracts or quasi-contracts, the obligor is liable for all the damages which force majeure, but with a right to indemnity if the interruption should have
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation if he is been caused by the captain exclusively. If the interruption should be caused
guilty of fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude. [23] by the disability of the vessel and a passenger should agree to await the
repairs, he may not be required to pay any increased price of passage, but his
Moral damages include moral suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious living expenses during the stay shall be for his own account.
 petitioner’s lack of genuine concern for the safety of its passengers. It was,
perhaps, only providential that the sea happened to be calm. Even so, the
This article applies suppletorily pursuant to Article 1766 of the Civil Code. petitioner should not expect its passengers to act in the manner it desired. The
passengers were not stoics; becoming alarmed, anxious, or frightened at the
Of course, this does not suffice for a resolution of the case at bench for, as stoppage of a vessel at sea in an unfamiliar zone at nighttime is not the sole
earlier stated, the cause of the delay or interruption was the petitioner’s prerogative of the faint-hearted. More so in the light of the many tragedies at
failure to observe extraordinary diligence. Article 698 must then be read sea resulting in the loss of lives of hopeless passengers and damage to
together with Articles 2199, 2200, 2201, and 2208 in relation to Article 21 of property simply because common carriers failed in their duty to exercise
the Civil Code. So read, it means that the petitioner is liable for any extraordinary diligence in the performance of their obligations.
pecuniary loss or loss of profits which the private respondent may have
suffered by reason thereof. For the private respondent, such would be the loss We cannot, however, give our affirmance to the award of attorney’s fees.
of income if unable to report to his office on the day he was supposed to Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, these are recoverable only in the
arrive were it not for the delay. This, however, assumes that he stayed on the concept of actual damages,[32] not as moral damages[33] nor judicial costs.
[34]
vessel and was with it when it thereafter resumed its voyage; but he did not.  Hence, to merit such an award, it is settled that the amount thereof must
As he and some passengers resolved not to complete the voyage, the vessel be proven.[35] Moreover, such must be specifically prayed for - as was not
had to return to its port of origin and allow them to disembark. The private done in this case - and may not be deemed incorporated within a general
respondent then took the petitioner’s other vessel the following day, using the prayer for "such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and
ticket he had purchased for the previous day’s voyage. equitable."[36] Finally, it must be noted that aside from the following, the
body of the respondent Court’s decision was devoid of any statement
Any further delay then in the private respondent’s arrival at the port of regarding attorney’s fees:
destination was caused by his decision to disembark. Had he remained on the
first vessel, he would have reached his destination at noon of 13 November Plaintiff-appellant was forced to litigate in order that he can claim moral and
1991, thus been able to report to his office in the afternoon. He, therefore, exemplary damages for the suffering he encurred [sic]. He is entitled to
would have lost only the salary for half of a day. But actual or compensatory attorney’s fees pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code. It states:
damages must be proved,[30] which the private respondent failed to do. There
is no convincing evidence that he did not receive his salary for 13 November Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’ s fees and expenses of
1991 nor that his absence was not excused. litigation, other than judicial costs cannot be recovered except:

We likewise fully agree with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner is liable 1.  When exemplary damages are awarded;
for moral and exemplary damages. In allowing its unseaworthy M/V Asia
Thailand to leave the port of origin and undertake the contracted voyage, 2.  When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
with full awareness that it was exposed to perils of the sea, it deliberately litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.
disregarded its solemn duty to exercise extraordinary diligence and obviously
acted with bad faith and in a wanton and reckless manner. On this score,
however, the petitioner asserts that the safety of the vessel and passengers This Court holds that the above does not satisfy the benchmark of "factual,
was never at stake because the sea was "calm" in the vicinity where it legal and equitable justification" needed as basis for an award of attorney’s
stopped as faithfully recorded in the vessel’s log book (Exhibit "4"). Hence, fees.[37] In sum, for lack of factual and legal basis, the award of attorney’s
the petitioner concludes, the private respondent was merely ‘over-reacting" fees must be deleted.
to the situation obtaining then.[31]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged
We hold that the petitioner’s defense cannot exculpate it nor mitigate its decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
liability. On the contrary, such a claim demonstrates beyond cavil the 39901 is AFFIRMED subject to the modification as to
the award for attorney’s fees which is hereby SET ASIDE.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

530 Phil. 332 bow mooring of the vessel was intentionally cut or stolen by unknown
persons. Because there was nothing holding it, the vessel drifted westward,
SECOND DIVISION dragged and stretched the flexible rubber hose attached to the riser, broke the
elbow into pieces, severed completely the rubber hose connected to the
[ G.R. NO. 149019, August 15, 2006 ] tanker from the main delivery line at sea bed level and ultimately caused the
diesel oil to spill into the sea. To avoid further spillage, the vessel's crew
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. AMERICAN tried water flushing to clear the line of the diesel oil but to no avail. In the
HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. meantime, the shore tender, who was waiting for the completion of the water
flushing, was surprised when the tanker signaled a "red light" which meant
DECISION stop pumping. Unaware of what happened, the shore tender, thinking that the
vessel would, at any time, resume pumping, did not shut the storage tank gate
valve. As all the gate valves remained open, the diesel oil that was earlier
GARCIA, J.:  discharged from the vessel into the shore tank backflowed. Due to non-
availability of a pump boat, the vessel could not send somebody ashore to
inform the people at the depot about what happened. After almost an hour, a
By this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
gauger and an assistant surveyor from the Caltex's Bulk Depot Office
petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. (Delsan hereafter) assails and seeks to
boarded the vessel. It was only then that they found out what had happened.
set aside the Decision,[1] dated July 16, 2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
Thereafter, the duo immediately went ashore to see to it that the shore tank
CA-G.R. CV No. 40951 affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
gate valve was closed. The loss of diesel oil due to spillage was placed at
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, in two separate complaints for damages
113.788 k/l while some 435,081 k/l thereof backflowed from the shore tank.
docketed as Civil Case No. 85-29357 and Civil Case No. 85-30559.
As a result of spillage and backflow of diesel oil, Caltex sought recovery of
The facts:
the loss from Delsan, but the latter refused to pay. As insurer, AHAC paid
Caltex the sum of P479,262.57 for spillage, pursuant to Marine Risk Note
Delsan is a domestic corporation which owns and operates the vessel MT
No. 34-5093-6, and P1,939,575.37 for backflow of the diesel oil pursuant to
Larusan. On the other hand, respondent American Home Assurance
Inland Floater Policy No. AH-1F64-1011549P.
Corporation (AHAC for brevity) is a foreign insurance company duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines through its agent, the American-
On February 19, 1985, AHAC, as Caltex's subrogee, instituted Civil Case
International Underwriters, Inc. (Phils.). It is engaged, among others, in
No. 85-29357 against Delsan before the Manila RTC, Branch 9, for loss
insuring cargoes for transportation within the Philippines. 
caused by the spillage. It likewise prayed that it be indemnified for damages
suffered in the amount of P652,432.57 plus legal interest thereon.
On August 5, 1984, Delsan received on board MT Larusan a shipment
consisting of 1,986.627 k/l Automotive Diesel Oil (diesel oil) at the Bataan
Also, on May 5, 1985, in the Manila RTC, Branch 31, AHAC instituted Civil
Refinery Corporation for transportation and delivery to the bulk depot in
Case No. 85-30559 against Delsan for the loss caused by the backflow. It
Bacolod City of Caltex Phils., Inc. (Caltex), pursuant to a Contract of
likewise prayed that it be awarded the amount of P1,939,575.37 for damages
Afreightment. The shipment was insured by respondent AHAC against all
and reasonable attorney's fees. As counterclaim in both cases, AHAC prayed
risks under Inland Floater Policy No. AH-IF64-1011549P and Marine Risk
for attorney's fees in the amount of P200,000.00 and P500.00 for every court
Note No. 34-5093-6.
appearance. 
On August 7, 1984, the shipment arrived in Bacolod City. Immediately
Since the cause of action in both cases arose out of the same incident and
thereafter, unloading operations commenced. The discharging of the diesel
involved the same issues, the two were consolidated and assigned to Branch
oil started at about 1:30 PM of the same day. However, at about 10:30 PM,
9 of the court.
the discharging had to be stopped on account of the discovery that the port
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional
On August 31, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision[2] in favor of AHAC Trial Court of Manila, Branch 09 in Civil Case Nos. 85-29357 and 85-30559
holding Delsan liable for the loss of the cargo for its negligence in its duty as is hereby AFFIRMED with a modification that attorney's fees awarded in
a common carrier. Dispositively, the decision reads: Civil Case Nos. 85-29357 and 85-30559 are hereby DELETED.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
SO ORDERED.
A). In Civil Case No. 85-30559: Delsan is now before the Court raising substantially the same issues
proffered before the CA.
(1) Ordering the defendant (petitioner Delsan) to pay plaintiff (respondent
AHAC) the sum of P1,939,575.37 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Principally, Delsan insists that the CA committed reversible error in ruling
November 21, 1984 until fully paid and satisfied; and that Article 1734 of the Civil Code cannot exculpate it from liability for the
loss of the subject cargo and in not applying the rule on contributory
(2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and for negligence against Caltex, the shipper-owner of the cargo, and in not taking
attorney's fees. into consideration the fact that the loss due to backflow occurred when the
diesel oil was already completely delivered to Caltex.
For lack of merit, the counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
We are not persuaded.
B). In Civil Case No. 85-29357:
In resolving this appeal, the Court reiterates the oft-stated doctrine that
(1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P479,262.57 with interest factual findings of the CA, affirmatory of those of the trial court, are binding
thereon at the legal rate from February 6, 1985 until fully paid and satisfied; on the Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. [5]
(2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees. Delsan would have the Court absolve it from liability for the loss of its cargo
on two grounds. First, the loss through spillage was partly due to the
For lack of merit, the counterclaim is hereby dismissed. contributory negligence of Caltex; and Second, the loss through backflow
should not be borne by Delsan because it was already delivered to Caltex's
Costs against the defendant. shore tank.
SO ORDERED. Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
In time, Delsan appealed to the CA whereat its recourse was docketed as CA- vigilance over the goods transported by them. They are presumed to have
G.R. CV No. 40951. been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated.[6] To overcome the presumption of negligence in case of loss,
In the herein challenged decision,[3] the CA affirmed the findings of the trial destruction or deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that
court. In so ruling, the CA declared that Delsan failed to exercise the it exercised extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this
extraordinary diligence of a good father of a family in the handling of its rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when the
cargo. Applying Article 1736[4] of the Civil Code, the CA ruled that since the presumption of negligence does not attach:
discharging of the diesel oil into Caltex bulk depot had not been completed at Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
the time the losses occurred, there was no reason to imply that there was deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following
actual delivery of the cargo to Caltex, the consignee. We quote the fallo of causes only:
the CA decision:
1) Flood storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
 completed at the time of the spillage when the backflow occurred, there is no
2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; reason to imply that there was actual delivery of the cargo to the consignee.
Delsan is straining the issue by insisting that when the diesel oil entered into
3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; the tank of Caltex on shore, there was legally, at that moment, a complete
delivery thereof to Caltex. To be sure, the extraordinary responsibility of
4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in
the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the
5) Order or act of competent public authority. same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee,
Both the trial court and the CA uniformly ruled that Delsan failed to prove its or to a person who has the right to receive them. [8] The discharging of oil
claim that there was a contributory negligence on the part of the owner of the products to Caltex Bulk Depot has not yet been finished, Delsan still has the
goods – Caltex. We see no reason to depart therefrom. As aptly pointed out duty to guard and to preserve the cargo. The carrier still has in it the
by the CA, it had been established that the proximate cause of the spillage responsibility to guard and preserve the goods, a duty incident to its having
and backflow of the diesel oil was due to the severance of the port bow the goods transported.
mooring line of the vessel and the failure of the shore tender to close the
storage tank gate valve even as a check on the drain cock showed that there To recapitulate, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
was still a product on the pipeline. To the two courts below, the actuation of reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the gauger and the escort surveyor, both personnel from the Caltex Bulk vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
Depot, negates the allegation that Caltex was remiss in its duties. As we see them, according to all the circumstances of each case. [9] The mere proof of
it, the crew of the vessel should have promptly informed the shore tender that delivery of goods in good order to the carrier, and their arrival in the place of
the port mooring line was cut off. However, Delsan did not do so on the lame destination in bad order, make out a prima facie case against the carrier, so
excuse that there was no available banca. As it is, Delsan's personnel that if no explanation is given as to how the injury occurred, the carrier must
signaled a "red light" which was not a sufficient warning because such signal be held responsible. It is incumbent upon the carrier to prove that the loss
only meant that the pumping of diesel oil had been finished. Neither did the was due to accident or some other circumstances inconsistent with its
blowing of whistle suffice considering the distance of more than 2 kilometers liability.[10]
between the vessel and the Caltex Bulk Depot, aside from the fact that it was
not the agreed signal. Had the gauger and the escort surveyor from Caltex All told, Delsan, being a common carrier, should have exercised
Bulk Depot not gone aboard the vessel to make inquiries, the shore tender extraordinary diligence in the performance of its duties. Consequently, it is
would have not known what really happened. The crew of the vessel should obliged to prove that the damage to its cargo was caused by one of the
have exerted utmost effort to immediately inform the shore tender that the excepted causes if it were to seek exemption from responsibility. [11] Having
port bow mooring line was severed. failed to do so, Delsan must bear the consequences.

To be sure, Delsan, as the owner of the vessel, was obliged to prove that the WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA
loss was caused by one of the excepted causes if it were to seek exemption is AFFIRMED in toto.
from responsibility.[7] Unfortunately, it miserably failed to discharge this
burden by the required quantum of proof. Cost against petitioner.

Delsan's argument that it should not be held liable for the loss of diesel oil SO ORDERED.
due to backflow because the same had already been actually and legally
delivered to Caltex at the time it entered the shore tank holds no water. It had Puno, (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
been settled that the subject cargo was still in the custody of Delsan because
the discharging thereof has not yet been finished when the backflow
occurred. Since the discharging of the cargo into the depot has not yet been
124 Phil. 145 not given the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was
still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally,
[ G.R. No. L-20761, July 27, 1966 ] when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about
ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
LA MALLORCA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. "Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately
jumped from the running board without getting his bayong from the
conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded
BARRERA, J.:  place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people
beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground,
La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- her skull, crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his
G. R. No. 23267-R, holding it liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier
respondents Mariano Beltran, et al. P6,000.00 for the death of his minor together with her parents.
daughter Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.
"For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit
The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are: against the defendant seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate amount
"On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, of P6,000 to cover moral damages and actual damages sustained as a result
together with their minor daughters, namely Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits the court below rendered
about 4-1/2 years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus the judgment in question."
No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of
by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, contract of carriage and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the
Pampanga.  At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of child and P400.00 as compensatory damages representing burial expenses
baggages containing their personal belongings. The conductor of the bus who and costs.
happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three
tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not
eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both be a breach of contract in the case, for the reason that when the child met her
were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus involved in the incident and,
appellant's rules and regulations. therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the Court
of Appeals sustained this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-
"After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao, whereat it stopped to allow appellant guilty of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the
the passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their negligence of its driver, in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code:
children to get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano And, the Court of Appeals did not only find the petitioner liable, but
Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get down the increased the damages awarded the plaintiffs-appellees to P6,000.00, instead
bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to a of P3,000.00 granted by the trial court.
shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters
away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to In its brief now before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals
get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter erred (1) in holding it liable for quasi-delict, considering that respondents'
Raquel followed him unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran complaint was one for breach of contract, and (2) in raising the award of
was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal
his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose from the decision of the lower court.
motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward,
evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals we have to sustain the
judgment holding petitioner liable for damages for the death of the child, transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping
Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run
Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the deceased child) the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while
had alighted from the bus at a place designated for disembarking or the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano
unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father had to return Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not
to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of
was left under one of the seats of the bus.  There can be no controversy that the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong
which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already
and the petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its
passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the Code.  Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads—
car.[1] The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was "That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel
already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the Beltran, plaintiff's daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of
liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of carriage also exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the
persisted. defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their
daughter safely as far as human and care and foresight can provide in the
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does operation of their vehicle."
not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a is clearly an allegation for quási-delict.  The inclusion of averment for quasi-
place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the delict,while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage,
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which
carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in
person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is controversy may be resolved and determined. [4]
considered still a passenger.[2] So also, where a passenger has alighted at his
destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the
premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, claim was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of
a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want
engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of
reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger the defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was
entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents. [3] established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper
signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of
which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus.  Raquel, the child proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the
that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the
was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this
him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to
to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged pecuniarily liable for
who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it the death of the child Raquel Beltran.
cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost
diligence" of a "very cautious person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the
Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to Court of Appeals, however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate
court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued
in appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the
judgment of the trial court awarding them only P3,000.00 damages for the
death of their daughter. Neither does it appear that, as appellees in the Court
of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief the inadequacy of the
award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was merely a, clerical
error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the general
rule.[5] Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals
committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently,
meritorious.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by

sentencing the petitioner to pay to the respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the
sum of P3,000.00 for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount
of P400.00 as actual damages.  No costs in this instance.

So ordered.

Concepción, C. J., Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar,

Sanchezand Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.

Decision modified.
257 Phil. 797 highway.  Virgilio Llamosoadmitted that there was another motor vehicle
ahead of him.
THIRD DIVISION The general rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has the right-of-
way as against a feeder road.  Another general rule is that the vehicle coming
[ G.R. No. 85331, August 25, 1989 ] from the right has the right-of-way over the vehicle coming from the
left.  The general rules on right-of-way may be invoked only if both vehicles
KAPALARAN BUS LINE, PETITIONER, VS. ANGEL CORONADO, approach the intersection at almost the same time.  In the case at bar, both
LOPE GRAJERA, DIONISIO SHINYO, AND THE COURT OF roads are national roads.  Also, the KBL bus was still far from the
APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.  intersection when the jeepney reached the same.  As testified to by
Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming from the
DECISION direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he
stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven
by Grajera.  Behind Manicad were two vehicles, a car of his client and
FELICIANO, J.:  another car.  A Laguna Transit bus had just entered the town of Pila ahead of
Atty. Manicad.
The sketch marked Exhibit 'E' indicates very clearly that the jeepney had
Petitioner Kapalaran Bus Line ("Kapalaran") seeks the reversal or already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on.  It is
modification of the Court of Appeals’ decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12476 also obvious that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway
and the absolution of petitioner from all liability arising from the collision which is the lane properly belonging to the jeepney.  As testified to by
between one of petitioner's buses and a jeepney owned by respondent Lope Grajera, the KBL bus ignored the stopped vehicles of
Coronado, driven by respondent Grajeraand in Atty. Manicadand the other vehicles behind Atty. Manicad and overtook both
which jeepney respondent Shinyo was a passenger. vehicles at the intersection, therefore, causing the accident.
Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch
The facts of this case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
(Exhibit 'E'), the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at
Appeals, are summarized in the trial court's decision and quoted in the Court
the intersection was the jeepney.  Seeing that the road was clear,
of Appeals’ own judgment in the following terms:
the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move forward,
and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way
"The accident happened on the National Highway at 10:30 A.M. on August to the jeepney.  At about this time, the KBL bus was approaching the
2, 1982.  The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, intersection and its driver was engaged in determining from his conductor if
Laguna on its way towards the direction of Sta. Cruz, traversing the old they would still pass through the town proper of Pila.  Upon learning that
highway.  As it reached the intersection where there is a traffic sign 'yield', it they were already full, he turned his attention to the road and found the
stopped and cautiously treated the intersection as a 'Thru Stop' street, which it stopped vehicles at the intersection with the jeepney trying to cross the
is not.  The KBL bus was on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its intersection.  The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without
regular driver Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards Manila.  The regular slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad.  The
itinerary of the KBL bus is through the town proper of Pila, Laguna, but at KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately,
times it avoids this if a bus is already fully loaded with passengers and can no the jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to
longer accommodate additional passengers.  As the KBL bus neared the cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL
intersection, Virgilio Llamosoinquired from his conductor if they could still bus.  The gamble made by Llamoso did not pay off.  The impact indicates
accommodate passengers and learning that they were already full, he decided that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the
to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the national collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only
when it hit an electric post (pp. 3-4, Decision; pp. 166-167, Record)."[1]
On 14 September 1982, Kapalaran, apparently believing that the best defense weigh evidence presented by the parties all over again and that our
was offense, filed a complaint for damage to property and physical injuries jurisdiction is in principle limited to reviewing errors of law that might have
through reckless imprudence against respondents Angel Coronado and been committed by the Court of Appeals.  Kapalaran has made no
Lope Grajera in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. compelling showing of any misapprehension of facts on the part of the Court
Cruz, Laguna.  Respondents answered with their own claims (counter- of Appeals that would require us to review and overturn the factual findings
claims) for damages.  A third-party complaint and/or a complaint for of that court.  On the contrary, examination of the record shows that not only
intervention was also filed in the same case are the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals and the trial court on who
against Kapalaran by jeepney passenger Dionisio Shinyo. -- the bus driver or the jeepney driver -- had acted negligently and was at
fault in the collision of their vehicles, amply supported by the evidence of
On 15 October 1986, after trial, the trial court rendered a judgment in favor record, but also that Kapalaran's bus driver was grossly negligent and had
of private respondents and ordering Kapalaran acted wantonly and in obvious disregard of the applicable rules on safety on
the highway.
"(a)    to pay Angel Coronado the sum of P40,000.00 as compensation for the
totally wrecked jeepney, plus the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and Kapalaran's driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus
litigation expenses, and and travelling in the same direction had already stopped at the intersection
obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to
(b)     to Dionisio Shinyo the sum of P35,000.00 representing the expenses
enter the intersection.  The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too high to
incurred by said intervenor for his treatment including his car–hire, the
be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and in any case
further sum of P30,000.00 representing the expenses said defendant will
too high to be able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had
incur for his second operation to remove the intramedularynail from his
preceded it and which had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the
femur, the additional sum of P50,000.00 to serve as moral damages for the
left lane and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection and
pain and suffering inflicted on said defendant, plus the sum of P10,000.00 in
directly smashed into the jeepney within the intersection.  Immediately
the concept of exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent to others who, like
before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic
the plaintiff, may be minded to induce accident victims to perjure themselves
rules and regulations, among others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic
in a sworn statement, and the sum of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and
Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended:
litigation expenses."
"Sec. 35.  Restriction as to speed.  -- (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle
From the above judgment, Kapalaran appealed to the Court of Appeals
on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater
assailing the trial court's findings on the issue of fault and the award of
nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the
damages.  The Court of Appeals, on 28 June 1988, affirmed the decision of
width of the highway, and or any other condition then and there existing;
the trial court but modified the award of damages by setting aside the grant of
and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed
exemplary damages as well as the award of attorney's fee and litigation
as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed
expenses made to Dionisio Shinyo.[2]
greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured
clear distance ahead.
This decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us on a Petition for
Review, a motion for reconsideration by Kapalaran having been denied by x x x              x x x                 x x x
that court on 13 October 1988. Sec. 41.  Restrictions on overtaking and passing. -- (a) The driver of a vehicle
shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or
Kapalaran assails the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court and of the passing another vehicle, proceeding in the same direction, unless such left
Court of Appeals, and insists before this Court that respondent Grajera, side is clearly visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance
driver of the jeepney, was at fault and not the driver of Kapalaran's bus.  It ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.
must be remembered that it is not the function of this Court to analyze and
x x x              x x x                 x x x
(c) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other vehicle there was no justification for holding it, the employer, liable for damages,
proceeding in the same direction, at any railway grade crossing, or at any considering that such liability was premised upon the bus driver's negligence,
intersection of highways, unless such intersection or crossing is controlled by and that petitioner "as mere employer" was not guilty of such negligence or
traffic signal, or unless permitted to do so by a watchman or a peace officer, imprudence.[6] This contention is thoroughly unpersuasive.  The patent and
except on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one gross negligence on the part of petitioner Kapalaran'sdriver raised the legal
direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in
on the right.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a driver the selection or in the supervision of its bus drivers. [7] Where the employer is
overtaking or passing, upon the right, another vehicle which is making or held liable for damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own
about to make a left turn. negligent employee.  If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its
x x x              x x x                 x x x." right of recourse against or reimbursement from its own driver, [8] it should
have appealed from that portion of the trial court's decision which had failed
(Underscoring supplied) to hold the bus driver responsible for any damage.  Contrary
to Kapalaran's pretense, its liability for the acts and negligence of its bus
Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent, [3] a driver is not "merely subsidiary", and is not limited to cases where the
presumption Kapalaran was unable to overthrow. employee "cannot pay his liability", nor are private respondents compelled
first to proceed against the bus driver.  The liability of the employer under
Petitioner's contention that the jeepney should have stopped before entering Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate:  it is not conditioned
the "Y-intersection" because of the possibility that another vehicle upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
behind the cars which had stopped might not similarly stop and might swerve the insolvency of such employee.[9] So far as the record shows,
to the left to proceed to the highway en route to Manila, is more ingenious petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its
than substantial.  It also offers illustration of the familiar litigation tactic of own part.  The award of moral damages against petitioner Kapalaran is not
shifting blame from one's own shoulders to those of the other party.  But only entirely in order:  it is also quite modest
the jeepney driver, seeing the cars closest to the intersection on considering Dionisio Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a
the opposite side of the highway come to a stop to give way to him, had the death hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by
right to assume that other vehicles further away and behind the stopped cars him in the violent collision.
would similarly come to a stop and not seek illegally to overtake the stopped
vehicles and come careening into the intersection at an unsafe speed. The Court of Appeals deleted the award of exemplary damages which the
[4]
 Petitioner's bus was still relatively far away from the intersection when trial court had granted in order "to serve as a deterrent to others who, like the
the jeepney entered the same; the bus collided head-on into plaintiff [Kapalaran], may be minded to induce accident victims to perjure
the jeepney because the bus had been going at an excessively high velocity themselves in a sworn statement." The Court of Appeals held that there was
immediately before and at the time of overtaking the stopped cars, and so no basis for this award of exemplary damages, stating that it was not "such a
caught the jeepney within the intersection.  It was also the responsibility of reprehensible act to try to gather witnesses for one's cause" and that there was
the bus driver to see to it, when it overtook the two (2) cars ahead which had no evidence of use of "pressure or influence" to induce the accident victims
stopped at the intersection, that the left lane of the road within the to perjure themselves.  While that might have been so, both the trial court and
intersection and beyond was clear.  The point of impact was on the left side the Court of Appeals overlooked another and far more compelling basis for
of the intersection (the right lane so far as concerns the jeepney coming from the award of exemplary damages against petitioner Kapalaran in this
the opposite side), which was precisely the lane or side on which case.  There is no question that petitioner's bus driver was grossly and very
the jeepney had a right to be. probably criminally negligent in his reckless disregard of the rights of other
vehicles and their passengers and of pedestrians as well.  The Court is
Petitioner Kapalaran also assails the award of moral damages against itself, entitled to take judicial notice of the gross negligence and the appalling
upon the ground that its own bus driver, third-party defendant, was disregard of the physical safety and property of others so commonly
apparently not held liable by the trial court.[5] Hence, Kapalaran argues that exhibited today by the drivers of passenger buses and similar vehicles on our
highways.  The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise restored and increased from P10,000.00 to P25,000.00, and (2) that the grant
extraordinary diligence in carrying and transporting their passengers of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P15,000.00
safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost to Dionisio Shinyo shall similarly be restored.  Costs against petitioner.
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances."[10] In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from SO ORDERED.
common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them, the
law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. [11] While the Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of
course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a common carrier, they
are not the only persons that the law seeks to benefit.  For if common carriers
carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect
of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit
pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally
entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways.
[12]
 The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people
(whether passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether freight
or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem
often to inflame the minds of their drivers.  Article 2231 of the Civil Code
explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of quasi-
delicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence".  Thus we believe that
the award of exemplary damages by the trial court was quite proper, although
granted for the wrong reason, and should not only be restored but augmented
in the present case.  The Court is aware that respondent Shinyo did not file a
separate petition for review to set aside that portion of the Court of Appeals’
decision which deleted the grant by the trial court of exemplary damages.  It
is settled, however, that issues which must be resolved if substantial justice is
to be rendered to the parties, may and should be considered and decided by
this Court even if those issues had not been explicitly raised by the party
affected.[13] In the instant case, it is not only the demands of substantial
justice but also the compelling considerations of public policy noted above,
which impel us to the conclusion that the trial court's award of exemplary
damages was erroneously deleted and must be restored and brought more
nearly to the level which public policy and substantial justice require.

In much the same vein, we believe that the award by the trial court of
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, deleted by the Court of
Appeals, should similarly be restored, being both authorized by law [14] and
demanded by substantial justice in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for lack

of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED,
except (1) that the award of exemplary damages to Dionisio Shinyo shall be
104 Phil. 65 other means of transportation, to which defendant agreed, and in that same
morning the pick-up left Parang bound for Davao taking along six
[ G. R. No. L-9907, June 30, 1958 ] passengers, including Lara. 

LOURDES J. LARA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. The pick-up has a front seat where the driver and two passengers can be
BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. accommodated and the back has a steel flooring enclosed with a steel walling
of 16 to 17 inches tall on the sides and with a 19 inches tall walling at the
DECISION back. Before leaving Parang, the sitting arrangement was as follows:
defendant was at the wheel and seated with him in the front seat were Mrs.
Valencia and Nicanor Quinain; on the back of the pick-up were two
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:  improvised benches placed on each side, and seated on the right bench were
Ricardo Alojipan and Antonio Lagahit, and on the left one Bernardo and
This is an action for damages brought by plaintiffs against defendant in the Pastor Geronimo. A person by the name of Leoning was seated on a box
Court of First Instance of Davao for the death of one Demetrio Lara, Sr. located on the left side while in the middle Lara sat on a bag. Before leaving
allegedly caused by the negligent act of defendant. Defendant denied the Parang, defendant invited Lara to sit with him on the front seat but Lara
charge of negligence and set up certain affirmative defenses and a declined. It was their understanding that upon reaching barrio Samoay,
counterclaim.  Cotabato, the passengers were to alight and take a bus bound for Davao, but
when they arrived at that place, only Bernardo alighted and the other
The court after hearing rendered judgment ordering defendant to pay the passengers requested defendant to allow them to ride with him up to Davao
plaintiffs the following amount: (a) P10,000 as moral damages; (b) P3,000 as because there was then no available bus that they could take in going to that
exemplary damages; and (c) P1,000 as attorney's fees, in addition to the costs place. Defendant again accommodated the passengers. 
of action. Both parties appealed to this Court because the damages claimed in
the complaint exceed the sum of P50,000.  When they continued their trip, the sitting arrangement of the passengers
remained the same, Lara being seated on a bag in the middle with his arms on
In their appeal, plaintiffs claim that the court a quo erred in disregarding their a suitcase and his head covered by a jacket. Upon reaching Km. 96, barrio
claim of P41,400 as actual or compensatory damages and in awarding as Catidtuan, Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a result he suffered
attorneys' fees only the sum of P1,000 instead of P3,000 as agreed upon serious injuries. Valencia stopped the pick-up to see what happened to Lara.
between plaintiffs and their counsel. Defendant, on the other hand, disputes He sought the help of the residents of that place and applied water to Lara but
the finding of the court a quo that the death of Demetrio Lara, Sr. was due to to no avail. They brought Lara to the nearest place where they could find a
the negligence of defendant and the portion of the judgment which orders doctor and not having found any they took him to St. Joseph's Clinic of
defendant to pay to plaintiffs moral and exemplary damages as well as Kidapawan. But when Lara arrived he was already dead. From there they
attorneys' fees, said defendant contending that the court should have declared proceeded to Davao City and immediately notified the local authorities. An
that the death of Lara was due to unavoidable accident.  investigation was made regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of
Lara but no criminal action was taken against defendant. 
The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao
with an annual salary of P1,800. The defendant is engaged in the business of It should be noted that the deceased went to the lumber concession of
exporting logs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said defendant in Parang, Cotabato upon instructions of his chief in order to
concession upon instructions of his chief to classify the logs of defendant classify the logs of defendant which were then ready to be exported and to be
which were about to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. The loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. It took Lara six days to do
work of Lara lasted for six days during which he contracted malaria fever. In his work during which he contracted malaria fever and for that reason he
the morning of January 9, 1954, Lara who then in a hurry to return to Davao evinced a desire to return immediately to Davao. At that time, there was no
asked defendant if he could take him in his pick-up as there was then no available bus that could take him back to Davao and so he requested the
defendant if he could take him in his own pick-up. Defendant agreed and, sufria dolores de cabeza con erupciones en la cara y cuerpo; que en la
together with Lara, other passengers tagged along, most of them were mañana del dia 2 de enero de 1954, fecha en que Lara salio de Davao para
employees of the Government. Defendant merely accommodated them and Parang, en aeroplano para clasificar los trozos del demandado, el automobil
did not charge them any fee for the service. It was also their understanding de este condujo a aquel al aerodromo de Davao. 
that upon reaching barrio Samoay, the passengers would alight and transfer
to a bus that regularly makes the trip to Davao but unfortunately there was ******* 
none available at the time and so the same passengers, including Lara, again
requested the defendant to drive them to Davao. Defendant again "El viaje de Cotabato a Davao no es menos de 8 horas, su carretera esta en
accommodated them and upon reaching Km. 96, Lara accidentally fell malas condiciones, desnivelada, con piedras salientes y baches, que hacen del
suffering fatal injuries.  vehiculo no estable en su marcha. Lara estaba enfermo de cierta gravedad,
tenia el cuerpo y cara inflamados, atacado de malaria, con dolores de cabeza
It therefore appears that the deceased, as well as his companions who rode in y con erupciones en la cara y cuerpo.
the pick-up of defendant, were merely accommodation passengers who paid
nothing for the service and so they can be considered as invited guests within "A la vista de estos hechos, el demandado debia de saber que era sumamente
the meaning of the law. As accommodation passengers or invited guests, peligroso llevar 5 pasajeros en la parte trasera del pick-up; particularmente,
defendant as owner and driver of the pick-up owes to them merely the duty to para la salud de Lara; el permitirlo, el demandado no ha tornado las debidas
exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their precausiones, para evitar un posible accidente fatal. La negativa de Lara de
destination. Thus, "The rule is established by the weight of authority that the ocupar el asiento delantero del pickup no constitute a juicio del Juzgado una
owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to aninvited guest to defensa, pues el demandado conociendo el estado delicado de salud de Lara,
exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him no debio de haber permitido que aquel regrese a Davao en su pickup; si
to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. This rule, as querria prestar a aquel un favor, debio de haber provisto a Lara de un
frequently stated by the courts, is that an owner of an automobile owes a automobil para su regrese a Davao, ya que el demandado es un millionario; si
guest the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. no podia prestar a aquel este favor, debio de haber dejado a Lara en Samuay
Since one riding in an automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the para coger aquel un camion de pasajero de Cotabato a Davao."
privilege of doing so, the same obligation of care is imposed upon the driver Even if we admit as true the facts found by the trial court, still we find that
as in the case of one expressly invited to ride" (5 Am. Jur., 626-627). the same are not sufficient to show that defendant has failed to take the
Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in precaution necessary to conduct his passengers safely to their place of
duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common destination for there is nothing there to indicate that defendant has acted with
carrier by our law (Articles 1755 and 1756, new Civil Code).  negligence or without taking the precaution that an ordinary prudent man
would have taken under similar circumstances. It should be noted that Lara
The question that now arises is: Is there enough evidence to show that went to the lumber concession of defendant in answer to a call of duty which
defendant failed to observe ordinary care or diligence in transporting the he was bound to perform because of the requirement of his office and he
deceased from Parang to Davao on the date in question?  contracted the malaria fever in the course of the performance of that duty. It
should also be noted that defendant was not in duty bound to take the
The trial court answered the question in the affirmative but in so doing it took deceased in his own pick-up to Davao because from Parang to Cotabato there
into account only the following facts: was a line of transportation that regularly makes trips for the public, and if
"No debe perderse de vista el hecho, que los negocios de ex-portacion de defendant agreed to take the deceased in his own car, it was only to
trozos del demandado tiene un volumen de P1,200. Lara era empleado de la accommodate him considering his feverish condition and his request that he
Oficina de Montes, asalariado por el gobierno, no pagado por el demandado be so accommodated. It should also be noted that the passengers who rode in
para classificar los trozos exportados; debido a los trabajos de classificacion the pick-up of defendant took their respective seats therein at their own
que duro 6 dias, en su ultimo dia Lara no durmio toda la noche, al dia choice and not upon indication of defendant with the particularity that
siguiente, Lara fue atacado de malaria, tenia inflamada la cara y cuerpo, defendant invited the deceased to sit with him in the front seat but which
invitation the deceased declined. The reason for this can only be attributed to
his desire to be at the back so that he could sit on a bag and travel in a,
reclining position because such was more convenient for him due to his
feverish condition. All the circumstances therefor clearly indicate that
defendant had done what a reasonable prudent man would have done under
the circumstances. 

There is every reason to believe that the unfortunate happening was only due
to an unforeseen accident caused by the fact that at the time the deceased was
half asleep and must have fallen from the pick-up when it ran into some
stones causing it to jerk considering that the road was then bumpy, rough and
full of stones. 

The finding of the trial court that the pick-up was running at more than 40
kilometers per hour is not supported by the evidence. This is a mere surmise
made by the trial court considering the time the pick-up left barrio Samoay
and the time the accident occured in relation to the distance covered by the
pick-up. And even if this is correct, still we say that such speed is not
unreasonable considering that they were traveling on a national road and the
traffic then was not heavy. We may rather attribute the incident to lack of
care on the part of the deceased considering that the pick-up was open and he
was then in a crouching position. Indeed, the law provides that "A passenger
must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to
himself" (Article 1761, new Civil Code), which means that if the injury to the
passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier
cannot be held liable. 

All things considered, we are persuaded to conclude that the accident

occurred not due to the negligence of defendant but to circumstances beyond
his control and so he should be exempt from liability. 

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement

as to costs. 

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,

Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur. 
211 Phil. 37 coach of the said train, as a result of which, they were over run, causing their
instantaneous death."
FIRST DIVISION
The facts established by the prosecution and accepted by the respondent
[ G.R. No. L-30309, November 25, 1983 ] court as basis for the decision are summarized as follows:

CLEMENTE BRIÑAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE "The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that in the afternoon of
PHILIPPINES AND HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, January 6, 1957, Juanita Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad
RESPONDENTS.  station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and
his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio
DECISION Lusacan, Tiaong, same province. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left
Tagkawayan with the old woman and her granddaughter among the
passengers. At Hondagua the train's complement were relieved, with Victor
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:  Millan taking over as engineman, Clemente Brinas as conductor, and
Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon approaching Barrio
Lagalag in Tiaong at about 8:00 p.m. of that same night, the train slowed
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, now down and the conductor shouted 'Lusacan', Lusacan'. Thereupon, the old
Intermediate Appellate Court, affirming the decision of the Court of First woman walked towards the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong,
Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, Branch I, which found the carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with the other.
accused Clemente Briñas guilty of the crime of DOUBLE HOMICIDE When Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked up
THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE for the deaths of Martina Bool and speed. As a result the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen
Emelita Gesmundo. no more. It took three minutes more before the train stopped at the
next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not among the passengers who
disembarked thereat.
The information charged the accused-appellant and others as follows:
"Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses were
"That on or about the 6th day of January, 1957, in the Municipality of found along the railroad tracks at Barrio Lagalag. Repairing to the scene to
Tiaong, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this investigate, they found the lifeless body of a female child, about 2 feet from
Hon. Court, the said accused Victor Milan, Clemente Briñas and the railroad tracks, sprawled to the ground with her belly down, the hand
Hemogenes Buencamino, being then persons in charge of passenger Train resting on the forehead, and with the back portion of the head crushed. The
No. 522-6 of the Manila Railroad Company, then running from Tagkawayan investigators also found the corpse of an old woman about 2 feet away from
to San Pablo City, as engine driver, conductor and assistant conductor, the railroad tracks with the head and both legs severed and the left hand
respectively, wilfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same missing. The head was located farther west between the rails. An arm was
in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to existing found midway from the body of the child to the body of the old woman.
laws, regulations and ordinances, that although there were Blood, pieces of scattered brain and pieces of clothes were at the scene.
passengers on board the passenger coach, they failed to provide lamps or Later, the bodies were identified as those of Martina Bool and Emelita
lights therein, and failed to take the necessary precautions for the safety of Gesmundo. Among the personal effects found on Martina was a train ticket
passengers and to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, (Exhibit "B").
causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence, that when said
passenger Train No. 522-6 was passing the railroad tracks in the Municipality On January 7, 1957, the bodies of the deceased were autopsied by Dr. Pastor
of Tiaong, Quezon, two of its passengers, Martina Bool, an old woman, and Huertas, the Municipal Health Officer of Tiaong. Dr. Huertas testified on the
Emelita Gesmundo, a child about three years of age, fell from the passenger cause of death of the victims as follows:
"FISCAL YNGENTE: "For lack of sufficient evidence against the defendant Hermogenes
"Q   What could have caused the death of those women? Buencamino and on the ground of reasonable doubt in the case of defendant
Victor Millan, the court hereby acquits them of the crime charged in
"A    Shock. the information and their bail bonds declared cancelled.
"Q   What could have caused that shock? "As to the responsibility of the Manila Railroad Company in this case, this
"A    Traumatic injury. will be the subject of court determination in another proceeding."
"Q   What could have caused traumatic injury?
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
"A    The running over by the wheel of the train. lower court.
"Q   With those injuries, has a person a chance to survive?
During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First
"A    No chance to survive.
Instance of Quezon, the heirs of the deceased victims filed with the same
"Q   What would you say death would come? court a separate civil action for damages against the Manila
"A    Instantaneous. Railroad Company entitled "Civil Case No. 5978, Manaleyo Gesmundo, et
al., v. Manila Railroad Company". The separate civil action was filed for the
"Q   How about the girl, the young girl about four years old, what could have recovery of P30,350.00 from the Manila Railroad Company as damages
caused the death? resulting from the accident.
"A    Shock too.
"Q   What could have caused the shock? The accused-appellant alleges that the Court of Appeals made the following
errors in its decision:
"A    Compound fracture of the skull and going out of the brain.
"Q   What could have caused the fracture of the skull and the going out of the I
brain?
"A    That is the impact against a steel object." THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING
PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNDER THE FACTS AS FOUND BY SAID
(TSN., pp. 81-82, July 1, 1959) COURT; and

The Court of First Instance of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant

II
Clemente Briñas for double homicide thru reckless imprudence but acquitted
Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor Millan. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INCLUDING THE
PAYMENT OF DEATH INDEMNITY BY THE PETITIONER?
APPELLANT, WITH SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the defendant Clemente Briñas guilty
INSOLVENCY, AFTER THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED HAVE
beyond doubt of the crime of double homicide thru reckless imprudence,
ALREADY COMMENCED A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR
defined and punished under Article 305 in connection with Article 249 of the
DAMAGES AGAINST THE RAILROAD COMPANY ARISING FROM
Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to suffer six (6) months and one (1)
THE SAME MISHAP.
day of prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Martina
Bool and Emelita Gesmundo in the amounts of P6,000 and P3,000,
respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to We see no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs. conclusion drawn from those findings.
It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some
the petitioner-appellant was assigned as conductor and that when the train passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark
slackened its speed and the conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan", they as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train
stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able
unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and to disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.
the child stumbled and they were seen no more."
It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when
In finding petitioner-appellant negligent, respondent Court of Appeals ruled said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of
that: Appeals correctly observed, "the appellant's announcement was premature
and erroneous."
xxx                            xxx                               xxx
"The appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact
full three minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. In that immediately after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to
making the erroneous and premature announcement, appellant was negligent. full speed. Petitioner-appellant failed to show any reason why the train
He ought to have known that train passengers invariably prepare to alight suddenly resumed its regular speed. The announcement was made while the
upon notice from the conductor that the destination was reached and that the train was still at Barrio Lagalag.
train was about to stop. Upon the facts, it was the appellant's negligent act
which led the victims to the door. Said acts virtually exposed the victims to The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and
peril, for had not the appellant mistakenly made the announcement, the erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant Briñas. This announcement
victims would be safely ensconced in their seats when the train jerked while prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without
picking up speed. Although it might be argued that the negligent act of the said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their
appellant was not the immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection
injury, for the train jerked before the victims stumbled, yet in legal between the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant
contemplation appellant's negligent act was the proximate cause of the and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any
injury. As this Court held in Tucker v. Milan, CA-G.R. No. 7059-R, June 3, intervening efficient causes.
1953: 'The proximate cause of the injury is not necessarily the immediate
cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury. It is only when the causes Petitioner-appellant also argues that it was negligence per se for Martina
are independent of each other that the nearest is to be charged with the Bool to go to the door of the coach while the train was still in motion and that
disaster. So long as there is a natural, direct and continuous sequence it was this negligence that was the proximate cause of their deaths.
between the negligent act the injury (sic) that it can reasonably be said that
but for the act the injury could not have occurred, such negligent act is the We have carefully examined the records and we agree with the respondent
proximate cause of the injury, and whoever is responsible therefore is liable court that the negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erron-
for damages resulting therefrom. One who negligently creates a dangerous eously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths
condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was
thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal
not responsible intervenes to precipitate the loss." liability.
xxx                            xxx                               xxx
With respect to the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that
after the heirs of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo had actually
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers
commenced the separate civil action for damages in the same trial court
like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow
during the pendency of the criminal action, the said court had no more power
down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter
to include any civil liability in its judgment of conviction.
The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978 is instead of P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for the death of Emelita Gesmundo
culpa contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law. We also note instead of P3,000.00, but deleting the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
from the appellant's arguments and from the title of the civil case that the insolvency imposed by the lower court. The judgment is AFFIRMED in all
party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not petitioner-appellant other respects.
Briñas. Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two
distinct sources of obligation. SO ORDERED.

The petitioner-appellant argues that since the information did not allege Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Relova, JJ., concur.
the existence of any kind of damages whatsoever coupled by the fact that no
private prosecutors appeared and the prosecution witnesses were not
interrogated on the issue of damages, the trial court erred in awarding death
indemnity in its judgment of conviction.

A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal

action for double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve
their right to file an independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil
action against the Manila Railroad Company.

The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of
the separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still
awarded death indemnity in the judgment of conviction against the
petitioner-appellant.

It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission

of a crime, the following items of damages may be recovered:
(1) an indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an indemnity for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in
proper cases.

The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary

damages, attorney's fees, and interests are recoverable separately from and in
addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for
the sole fact of death. This indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a
crime is fixed whereas the others are still subject to the determination of the
court based on the evidence presented. The fact that the witnesses were not
interrogated on the issue of damages is of no moment because the death
indemnity fixed for death is separate and distinct from the other forms of
indemnity for damages.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award

for death indemnity is increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina Bool
682 Phil. 343 poorly maintained. The “Stop” signage was already faded while the “Listen”
signage was partly blocked by another signboard. [5]
SECOND DIVISION
On September 15, 2004, the survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador,
[ G.R. No. 190022, February 15, 2012 ] together with the heirs of the deceased victims, namely, Purificacion Vizcara,
Marivic Vizcara, Cresencia Natividad and Hector Vizcara, filed an action for
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION, JAPHET damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the alternate driver of the
ESTRANAS AND BEN SAGA, PETITIONERS, VS. PURIFICACION train, before the RTC of Palayan City. The case was raffled to Branch 40 and
VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA, CRESENCIA A. NATIVIDAD, was docketed as Civil Case No. 0365-P. In their complaint, the respondents
HECTOR VIZCARA, JOEL VIZCARA AND DOMINADOR alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and serious physical injuries
ANTONIO, RESPONDENTS. sustained by the victims of the accident was the petitioners’ gross negligence
in not providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to persons and
DECISION properties. They pointed out that in the railroad track of Tiaong, Quezon
where the accident happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting
equipment or bell installed to warn motorists of the existence of the track and
REYES, J.:  of the approaching train.  They concluded their complaint with a prayer for
actual, moral and compensatory damages, as well as attorney’s fees. [6]
Nature of the Petition
For their part, the petitioners claimed that they exercised due diligence in
operating the train and monitoring its roadworthiness. They asseverate that
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
right before the collision, Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the
Four hundred (400) meters away from the railroad crossing, he started
Decision[1] dated July 21, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
blowing his horn to warn motorists of the approaching train. When the train
No. 90021, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated March 20,
was only fifty (50) meters away from the intersection, respondent Estranas
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Palayan City, and
noticed that all vehicles on both sides of the track were already at a full stop. 
Resolution[3] dated October 26, 2009, which denied the petitioners’ motion
Thus, he carefully proceeded at a speed of twenty-five (25) kilometers per
for reconsideration.
hour, still blowing the train’s horn. However, when the train was already ten
(10) meters away from the intersection, the passenger jeepney being driven
The Antecedent Facts
by Reynaldo suddenly crossed the tracks. Estranas immediately stepped on
the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney but due to the sheer weight of the
On May 14, 2004, at about three o’clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara
train, it did not instantly come to a complete stop until the jeepney was
(Reynaldo) was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver
dragged 20 to 30 meters away from the point of collision. [7]
onion crops, with his companions, namely, Cresencio Vizcara (Cresencio),
Crispin Natividad (Crispin), Samuel Natividad (Samuel), Dominador
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara (Joel). While crossing the railroad
track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train, then
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision [8] dated March 20,
being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up
2007, ruling in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which
and rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the
reads:
instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the
other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical injuries. [4]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendants Philippine National Railways Corporation (PNR), Japhet Estranas
At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the
and Ben Saga to, jointly and severally pay the following amounts to:
railroad crossing. Additionally, the “Stop, Look and Listen” signage was
 1) P63,427.00 as reimbursement for his actual expenses;
1.  a)  PURIFICACION VIZCARA: 2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Reynaldo Vizcara; 4) P10,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
2) P35,000.00, for funeral expenses;
3) P5,000.00 for re-embalming expenses; and
4) P40,000.00 for wake/interment expenses;
5) P300,000.00 as reimbursement for the value of the jeepney with license 2.  Costs of suit.
plate no. DTW-387;
6) P200,000.00 as moral damages; SO ORDERED.[9]
7) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
8) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees. The Ruling of the CA
b)  MARIVIC VIZCARA: Unyielding, the petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. 
Subsequently, on July 21, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision,
1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Cresencio Vizcara; affirming the RTC decision with modification with respect to the amount of
2) P200,000.00 as moral damages; damages awarded to the respondents. The CA disposed, thus:
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4)  P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees. WHEREFORE, instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, as follows:
c)  HECTOR VIZCARA:
(1) The award of P5,000.00 for re-embalming expenses and P40,000.00 for
1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Samuel Vizcara; wake/interment expenses to PURIFICACION VIZCARA is deleted. In lieu
2) P200,000.00 as moral damages; thereof, P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded;
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees. (2) The award of moral damages to PURIFICACION VIZCARA,
MARIVIC VIZCARA, HECTOR VIZCARA and CRESENCIA
d)  CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD: NATIVIDAD is hereby reduced from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 each
while moral damages awarded to JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR
1) P50,000.00 as indemnity  for the death of Crispin Natividad; ANTONIO are likewise reduced from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00;
2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (3) The award of exemplary damages to PURIFICACION VIZCARA,
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees. MARIVIC VIZCARA, HECTOR VIZCARA and CRESENCIA
NATIVIDAD is hereby reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 each while
e)      JOEL VIZCARA exemplary damages awarded to JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR
ANTONIO are likewise reduced from P25,000.00 to P12,500.00; and
1)  P9,870.00 as reimbursement for his actual expenses;
2)  P50,000.00 as moral damages; (4) The award for attorney’s fees in favor of the Appellees as well as the
3)  P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and award of P300,000.00 to Appellee PURIFICACION as  reimbursement  for
4)  P10,000.00 for Attorney’s fees. the value of the jeepney is DELETED.
f)  DOMINADOR ANTONIO SO ORDERED.[10]
 maintain a safe distance between the jeepney he was driving and the truck
In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding of negligence on ahead of the same prevented him from seeing the PNR signage displayed
the part of the petitioners. It concurred with the trial court's conclusion that along the crossing.[14]
petitioner PNR's failure to install sufficient safety devices in the area, such as
flagbars or safety railroad bars and signage, was the proximate cause of the In their Comment,[15] the respondents reiterate the findings of the RTC and
accident. Nonetheless, in order to conform with established jurisprudence, it the CA that the petitioners' negligence in maintaining adequate and necessary
modified the monetary awards to the victims and the heirs of those who public safety devices in the area of the accident was the proximate cause of
perished due to the collision. the mishap. They asseverate that if there was only a level crossing bar,
warning light or sound, or flagman in the intersection, the accident would not
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the decision of the have happened. Thus, there is no other party to blame but the petitioners for
CA. However, in a Resolution[12] dated October 26, 2009, the CA denied the their failure to ensure that adequate warning devices are installed along the
same. railroad crossing.[16]

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari, This Court’s Ruling
raising the following grounds:
The petition lacks merit.
I
The petitioners’ negligence was the 
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF proximate cause of the accident.  
THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PETITIONERS;
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages
II caused by a person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence. It states:

THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF LAST Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
CLEAR CHANCE FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.  Such fault
CASE; or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
III chapter.

THE CA ERRED IN FINDING NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF In Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[17] negligence was defined as the
THE PETITIONERS OR ERRED IN NOT FINDING AT THE LEAST, omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by considerations
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
RESPONDENTS.[13] doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is
the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that
The petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
negligence and recklessness of the driver of the jeepney. They argue that as a demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. [18] To determine the
professional driver, Reynaldo is presumed to be familiar with traffic rules existence of negligence, the time-honored test was: Did the defendant in
and regulations, including the right of way accorded to trains at railroad doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
crossing and the precautionary measures to observe in traversing the same. ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
However, in utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed by PNR trains, he he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
failed to bring his jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad track and supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
thoughtlessly followed the ten-wheeler truck ahead of them.  His failure to discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the indication of negligence.[25] Having established the fact of negligence on the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, part of the petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for damages.
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.[19] There was no contributory negligence
on the part of the respondents.  
In the instant petition, this Court is called upon to determine whose
negligence occasioned the ill-fated incident. The records however reveal that As to whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the
this issue had been rigorously discussed by both the RTC and the CA. To respondents, this court rule in the negative. Contributory negligence is
emphasize, the RTC ruled that it was the petitioners’ failure to install conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
adequate safety devices at the railroad crossing which proximately caused the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to
collision. This finding was affirmed by the CA in its July 21, 2009 Decision. conform for his own protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of
It is a well-established rule that factual findings by the CA are conclusive on ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the
the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. They are entitled to great defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. [26] Here, we
weight and respect, even finality, especially when, as in this case, the CA cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury when
affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the trial court. [20] they were not even aware of the forthcoming danger. It was established
during the trial that the jeepney carrying the respondents was following a ten-
Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may wheeler truck which was only about three to five meters ahead. When the
be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. [21] To distinguish truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo, the driver of the
one from the other, a question of law exists when the doubt or difference jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the impression that it was
centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on safe to proceed. It bears noting that the prevailing circumstances immediately
the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged before the collision did not manifest even the slightest indication of an
facts.[22] Certainly, the finding of negligence by the RTC, which was affirmed imminent harm. To begin with, the truck they were trailing was able to safely
by the CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon as this cross the track. Likewise, there was no crossing bar to prevent them from
would entail going into the factual matters on which the negligence was proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or signage to forewarn them of the
based.[23] Moreover, it was not shown that the present case falls under any of approaching peril. Thus, relying on his faculties of sight and hearing,
the recognized exceptions[24] to the oft repeated principle according great Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate the impending danger. [27] He proceeded
weight and respect to the factual findings of the trial court and the CA. to cross the track and, all of a sudden, his jeepney was rammed by the train
being operated by the petitioners. Even then, the circumstances before the
At any rate, the records bear out that the factual circumstances of the case collision negate the imputation of contributory negligence on the part of the
were meticulously scrutinized by both the RTC and the CA before arriving at respondents. What clearly appears is that the accident would not have
the same finding of negligence on the part of the petitioners, and we found no happened had the petitioners installed reliable and adequate safety devices
compelling reason to disturb the same. Both courts ruled that the petitioners along the crossing to ensure the safety of all those who may utilize the same.
fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into consideration the nature
of its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the At this age of modern transportation, it behooves the PNR to exert serious
petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from efforts to catch up with the trend, including the contemporary standards in
crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train. Aside from railroad safety. As an institution established to alleviate public transportation,
the absence of a crossing bar, the “Stop, Look and Listen” signage installed it is the duty of the PNR to promote the safety and security of the general
in the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the public of the riding public and provide for their convenience, which to a considerable
impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a degree may be accomplished by the installation of precautionary warning
dilapidated “Stop, Look and Listen” signage, is needed to give notice to the devices. Every railroad crossing must be installed with barriers on each side
public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care of the track to block the full width of the road until after the train runs past
to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an the crossing. To even draw closer attention, the railroad crossing may be
equipped with a device which rings a bell or turns on a signal light to signify approach of a train, the failure of the device to operate is generally held to be
the danger or risk of crossing. It is similarly beneficial to mount advance evidence of negligence, which maybe considered with all the circumstances
warning signs at the railroad crossing, such as a reflectorized crossbuck sign of the case in determining whether the railroad company was negligent as a
to inform motorists of the existence of the track, and a stop, look and listen matter of fact. [31]
signage to prompt the public to take caution. These warning signs must be
erected in a place where they will have ample lighting and unobstructed The maintenance of safety equipment and warning signals at railroad
visibility both day and night. If only these safety devices were installed at the crossings is equally important as their installation since poorly maintained
Tiaong railroad crossing and the accident nevertheless occurred, we could safety warning devices court as much danger as when none was installed at
have reached a different disposition in the extent of the petitioner’s liability. all. The presence of safety warning signals at railroad crossing carries with it
the presumption that they are in good working condition and that the public
The exacting nature of the responsibility of railroad companies to secure may depend on them for assistance. If they happen to be neglected and
public safety by the installation of warning devices was emphasized inoperative, the public may be misled into relying on the impression of safety
in Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals,[28] thus: they normally convey and eventually bring injury to themselves in doing so.
[I]t may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of The doctrine of last clear 
exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property chance is not applicable.
at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and
to the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation Finally, the CA correctly ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance is not
constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points applicable in the instant case. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that
where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably
crossings, and erect at such points, at sufficient elevation from such road as later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains. The failure of the harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising
PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphore therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a
is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening
there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
said device or equipment be installed.[29] impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. [32] To reiterate, the
proximate cause of the collision was the petitioners’ negligence in ensuring
The responsibility of the PNR to secure public safety does not end with the that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The
installation of safety equipment and signages but, with equal measure of unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any
accountability, with the upkeep and repair of the same. Thus, in Cusi v. participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them.
Philippine National Railways,[30] we held: Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their
own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the respondents,
Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in railroad the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied.
crossings, the travelling public has the right to rely on such warning devices
to put them on their guard and take the necessary precautions before crossing WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
the tracks. A need, therefore, exists for the railroad company to use Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No.
reasonable care to keep such devices in good condition and in working order, 90021 is hereby AFFIRMED.
or to give notice that they are not operating, since if such a signal is
misunderstood it is a menace. Thus, it has been held that if a railroad SO ORDERED.
company maintains a signalling device at a crossing to give warning of the
Carpio, (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr.,* Perez, and Sereno, JJ., concur.