Mellon Bank Vs Magsino
Mellon Bank Vs Magsino
Mellon Bank Vs Magsino
Facts: Dolores Ventosa requested the transfer of $1K from the First National Bank in
USA to private respondent Victoria Javier in Manila through the Prudential Bank.
Accordingly,the First National Bank requested the petitioner Mellon Bank to effect
the transfer. Unfortunately the wire sent by Mellon Bank to Manufacturers Hanover
Bank, a correspondent of Prudential Bank, indicated the amount transferred as
US$1M instead of US$1K. Hence, Manufacturers Hanover Bank transferred 1 million
to the Prudential Bank for the account of Javier. Javier then appropriated the amount
with the help of the other respondents. Javier opened new dollar accounts in the
Prudential Bank and deposited $999,943.70. Immediately, Victoria Javier and her
husband, Melchor Javier, Jr., made withdrawals from the account, deposited them in
several banks only to withdraw them later in an apparent plan to conceal, "launder"
and dissipate the erroneously sent amount.
Further, it appears that Melchor Javier, Jr. had requested Jose Marquez, a realtor, to
look for properties for sale in the United States. Marquez offered a 160-acre lot in the
Mojave desert in California City which was owned by Honorio Poblador, Jr. Javier,
without having seen the property, agreed to buy it for US$437,405 although it was
actually appraised at around $38,500. Consequently, as Poblador's agent, Marquez
executed in Makati a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Javiers and had the
document notarized in Manila before an associate of Poblador. Marquez executed
another deed of sale indicating receipt of the purchase price and sent the deed to the
Kern County Registrar in California for registration.
Mellon Bank filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California against Melchor
Javier et.al. Mellon Bank also filed in the CFI complaint against the Javier spouses,
Honorio Poblador, Jr., Domingo L. Jhocson, Jr., Jose Marquez, Roberto Garino, Elnor
Investment Co., Inc. F.C. Hagedom & Co, Inc. and Paramount Finance Corporation.
One of the aversions pf Mellon Bank is that because of defendants' knowledge of
Mellon Bank's mistake and inadvertence and their use of the funds to purchase the
property, they and "each of them are involuntary or constructive trustees of the real
property and of any profits therefrom, with a duty to convey the same to plaintiff
forthwith." It prayed that the defendants and each of them be declared as holders of
the property in trust for the plaintiff; that defendants be compelled to transfer legal
title and possession of the property to the plaintiff;
One of the defendants, Paramount Finance Corporation, which is not a party to the
California case, thereafter filed its memorandum raising the matter of "election of
remedies". It averred that inasmuch as the Mellon Bank had filed in California an action to
impose constructive trust on the California property and to recover the same, Mellon Bank
can no longer try to regain the purchase price of the same property through Civil Case No.
26899. The other defendants adopted Paramount's stand.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. Subsequently Mellon's 2
Motions for Reconsideration were denied by the RTC. The Court is of the view that
in cases where money held in trust was diverted by the trustee, under the "rule of
trust pursuit" the beneficiary "may elect whether to accept the trust estate in its new
form or hold the trustee responsible for it in its original condition," and that "an
election to pursue one remedy waives and bars pursuit of any inconsistent remedy."
The instant complaint among others is for the recovery of the purchase price of the
Kern property as held in trust for the plaintiff while in the California case the
plaintiff maintains that the Kern property is held in trust for the plaintiff, which
positions are inconsistent with each other. Neither can the plaintiff now abandon his
complaint for the recovery of the Kern property and pursue his complaint for the
recovery of the purchase price of said property for "if he has first sought to follow the
res, the plaintiff cannot thereafter hold the trustee personally responsible" and "when
once there has been an election to do one of two things, you cannot retract it and do
the other thing. The election once made is finally made."
Hence, Mellon Bank filed the instant petition for certiorari claiming that the RTC
resolution dismissing the case are void for being unlawful and oppressive exercises
of legal authority, subversive of the fair administration of justice,and in excess of
jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the principle of election of remedies bars recovery of Mellon Bank?
Ruling: No. Respondents, with the exception of the Javiers, failed to raise "election
of remedies" as a defense in their answers and therefore, by virtue of Section 2, Rule
9 of the Rules of Court,such defense is deemed waived.Having been waived as a
defense, it cannot be treated as if it has been raised in a motion to dismiss based on
the nonexistence of a cause of action.
Moreover,granting that the defense was properly raised,it is inapplicable in this case.
Election of remedies refers to the choice by a party to an action of one of two or more
coexisting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the same facts,but
the term has been generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent
remedial rights,the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to,or a repudiation
of the other. In its technical and more restricted sense,election of remedies is the
adoption of one of two or more coexisting remedies, with the effect of precluding a
resort to the others.
Further, it should be noted that the remedies pursued in the California case and in
Civil Case No. 26899 are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other. If
ever, they are merely alternative in view of the inclusion of parties in the latter case
who are not named defendants in the former. The causes of action, although they all
stem from the erroneous transmittal of dollars, are distinct as shown by the
complaints lengthily set out above. The bar of an election of remedies does not apply
to the assertion of distinct causes of action against different persons arising out of
independent transactions.