Article 25 Individual Criminal Responsibility: Literature

Article 25
Individual criminal responsibility

1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this
Statute.
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court
shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance
with this Statute.
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that
other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which
in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime,
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted
commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall
either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or
purpose involves the commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites
others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that
commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the
crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the
person’s intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to
commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the
crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the
attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and
voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal
responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.
Literature:
Kai Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL DES VÖLKERSTRAFRECHTS. ANSÄTZE EINER DOGMATISIERUNG
(2002/2004); id., LA PARTE GENERAL DEL DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL (2005); id., INTERNATIONALES
STRAFRECHT. STRAFANWENDUNGSRECHT – VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT – EUROPÄISCHES STRAFRECHT (2006, 2nd ed.
2008); id., General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 9 CRIM. L.F. 1 (1999); id., Individual
Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in: Gabrielle K. McDonald/Olivia Swaak Goldman (eds.),
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, Vol. I: Commentary 1 (2000); id.,
"Verbrechenselemente" sowie Verfahrens- und Beweisregeln des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs, 54 NJW 405
(2001); id., Immer mehr Fragen im internationalen Strafrecht, 21 NStZ 628 (2001); id., Superior Responsibility
(Art. 28), in: A. Cassese et al. (eds.), THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 805 (2002); id., Some Preliminary Reflections on the Mens Rea Requirements of the Crimes of the
ICC-Statute and of the Elements of Crimes, in: Lal Chand Vohrah et al. (eds.), MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN –
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF A. CASSESE 11 (2003); id., Zwischenbilanz im Milosevic-Verfahren, 59 JZ 965 (2004); id.,
Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 660 (2006); id., Joint
Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 INT’L CRIM. JUST. 159 (2007); id., Command responsibility
and Organisationsherrschaft, in: A. Nollkaemper/H. van der Wilt (eds.), SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008), forthcoming; Kai Ambos/Mohamed Othman (eds.), NEW APPROACHES IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: KOSOVO, EAST TIMOR, SIERRA LEONE AND CAMBODIA (2003); Kai Ambos
and Steffen Wirth, The Current Law of Crimes Against Humanity: An Analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000,
13 CRIM. L.F 1 (2002); M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003); Boris
Kai Ambos 743
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e8ad48/
article 25 Part 3. General principles of criminal law
Burghardt, DIE VORGESETZTENVERANTWORTLICHKEIT IM VÖLKERRECHTLICHEN STRAFTATSYSTEM (2008);

Tilman Blumenstock/Wayde Pittman, Prosecutor v. Naser Orić: The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia Judgment of Srebrenica’s Muslim Wartime Commander, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1077 (2006);
Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003, 2nd ed. 2008); Robert Cryer/Hakan Friman/Darryl
Robinson/Elisabeth Wilmshurts, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (2007);
Alison Marston Danner/Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CALIFORNIA L. REV. 75 (2005); Albin
Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility (Art. 25), in: Antonio Cassese et al. (eds.), THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
ICC: A COMMENTARY 767 (2002); Christopher Greenwood, Command responsibility and the Hadzihasanovic
decision, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 598 (2004); Verena Haan, The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal
Enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 INT’L C. L. REV. (2005); Kai
Hamdorf, BETEILIGUNGSMODELLE IM STRAFRECHT. EIN VERGLEICH VON TEILNAHME- UND
EINHEITSTÄTERSYSTEMEN IN SKANDINAVIEN, ÖSTERREICH UND DEUTSCHLAND (2002); Silva Hinek, The
Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, 19
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 477 (2006); Robert Kolb, Droit international pénal, in: Robert Kolb (ed.), DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL 1 (2008); Claus Kreß, Die Kristallisation eines Allgemeinen Teils des Völkerstrafrechts:
Die Allgemeinen Prinzipien des Strafrechts im Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs, 12 HUMANITÄRES
VÖLKERRECHT – INFORMATIONSSCHRIFTEN 4 (1999); id., Claus Roxins Lehre von der Organisationsherrschaft
und das Völkerstrafrecht, 153 GOLTDAMMER’S ARCHIV FÜR STRAFRECHT 304 (2006); id., The Darfur Report and
Genocidal Intent, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 562 (2005); Cyril Laucci, DIGEST OF JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 2003-2005 (2007); Ferrando Mantovani, The General Principles of International
Criminal Law: The viewpoint of a national criminal lawyer, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 26 (2003); Klaus Marxen,
Beteiligung an schwerem systematischem Unrecht. Bemerkungen zu einer völkerstrafrechtlichen Straftatlehre, in:
Klaus Lüderssen (ed.), AUFGEKLÄRTE KRIMINALPOLITIK ODER KAMPF GEGEN DAS BÖSE? BAND III:
MAKRODELINQUENZ 220 (1998); Guénaël Mettraux, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS
(2005); Vincenzo Militello, The personal nature of individual criminal responsibility and the ICC Statute, 5 J.
INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 941 (2007); Daniel Ntanda Nsereko, Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 4 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 497 (2002); Mark Osiel, The Banality of the Good: Aligning Incentives
against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1751 (2005); Nicola Piacente, Importance of the JCE Doctrine for
the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 448 (2004); Henning Radtke, Mittelbare Täterschaft kraft
Organisationsherrschaft im nationalen und internationalen Strafrecht, 153 GOLTDAMMER’S ARCHIV FÜR
STRAFRECHT 350 (2006); Thomas Rotsch, Neues zur Organisationsherrschaft, 25 NStZ 13 (2005); Claus Roxin,
Organisationsherrschaft als eigenständige Form mittelbarer Täterschaft, 125 ZStR 3 (2006); id., STRAFRECHT.
ALLGEMEINER TEIL VOL. II: BESONDERE ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DER STRAFTAT (2003); Per Saland,
International criminal law principles, in: Roy S. Lee (ed.), THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. THE MAKING
OF THE ROME STATUTE. ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 189 (1999); Helmut Satzger, INTERNATIONALES UND
EUROPÄISCHES STRAFRECHT (2nd ed. 2008); William A. Schabas, General Principles of Criminal Law, 6 EUR. J.
CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. J. 400 (1998); Andrea Sereni, Individual criminal responsibility, in: Flavia Lattanzi
(ed.), THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATUTE 139 (1998); Otto Triffterer,
Bestandsaufnahme zum Völkerstrafrecht, in: Gerd Hankel/Gerhard Stuby (eds.), STRAFGERICHTE GEGEN
MENSCHHEITSVERBRECHEN 169 (1995); id., Acts of Violence and International Criminal Law – A New Position of
Power to Fight Abuse of Power, 4 CROATIAN ANN. CRIM. L. & PRAC. 811 (1997); id., Command responsibility,
Article 28 Rome Statute. An Extension of Individual Criminal Responsibility for Crimes within the Jurisdiction of
the Court – Compatible with Article 22, nullum crimen sine lege?, in: id. (ed.), GEDÄCHTNISSCHRIFT FÜR THEO
VOGLER 213 (2004); id., "Command Responsibility" – crimen sui generis or participation "as otherwise provided"
in Art. 28 Rome Statute, in: Jörg Arnold et al. (eds.), MENSCHENGERECHTES STRAFRECHT. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR
ALBIN ESER 91 (2005); Christine van den Wyngaert, The Structure of the Draft Code and the General Part, in: M.
Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), COMMENTARIES ON THE ILC’S 1991 DRAFT CODE 55 (1993); Elies van Sliedregt, THE
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2003);
Hans Vest, GENOZID DURCH ORGANISATORISCHE MACHTAPPARATE. AN DER GRENZE VON INDIVIDUELLER UND
KOLLEKTIVER VERANTWORTLICHKEIT (2002); Thomas Weigend, Article 3: Responsibility and Punishment, in: M.
Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), COMMENTARIES ON THE ILC’S 1991 DRAFT CODE 113 (1993); id., Bemerkungen zur
Vorgesetztenverantwortlichkeit im Völkerstrafrecht, 116 ZSTW 999 (2004); Kerstin Weltz, DIE
UNTERLASSUNGSHAFTUNG IM VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT, EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG DES
FRANZÖSISCHEN, US-AMERIKANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHTS (2004); Gerhard Werle, VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT
(2nd ed. 2007); id. Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 953 (2007);
Edward Wise, General Principles of Criminal Law, in: Leila Sadat Wexler (ed.), MODEL DRAFT STATUTE FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT BASED ON THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE’S TEXT TO THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE 61 (1998); Alexander ZaharGöran Sluiter, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (2008).
Contents: margin No.

A. Introduction/General Remarks .................. 1 α) "commits ... as an individual
B. Analysis and interpretation of elements ... jointly with another or
I. Paragraph 1 ....................................... 4 through another person".......... 7
II. Paragraph 2 ....................................... 5 β) "... regardless of whether that
III. Paragraph 3 ....................................... 6 other person is criminally
(a) Perpetration, co-perpetration responsible"............................. 12
and perpetration by means (b) "orders, solicits or induces" an
(attempted) crime ......................... 14
744 Kai Ambos
Individual criminal responsibility article 25
(c) "For the purpose of facilitating (f) attempt

aids, abets or otherwise α) "by taking action that
assists ..."...................................... 16 commences its execution by
α) "aids, abets or otherwise means of a substantial
assists ... including providing step ..."..................................... 36
the means"............................... 17 β) "a person ... shall not be
β) "For the purpose of liable ... for the attempt ... if
facilitating".............................. 23 that person completely and
(d) "In any other way contributes" voluntarily gave up the
to the (attempted) commission criminal purpose" .................... 39
... "by a group ... acting with a IV. Paragraph 4 ....................................... 42
common purpose" ........................ 24 C. Special Remarks
(i) "with the aim of 1. Issues of delimitation ........................... 43
furthering the criminal 2. Complicity after commission............... 46
activity or criminal 3. Individual criminal responsibility
purpose of the group ..." .. 29 and omission, in particular command
(ii) "in the knowledge of the responsibility........................................ 48
intention of the group"..... 30
(e) "directly and publicly incites ...
to commit genocide" .................... 31
A. Introduction/General Remarks
The provision, in particular paragraphs 1 and 2, confirms the universal acceptance of the 1
principle of individual criminal responsibility as recognized by the International Military
Tribunal1 and reaffirmed by the ICTY in the Tadic jurisdictional decision with regard to
individual criminal responsibility for violations of common article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions2. The drafting history has been described elsewhere3.
Subparagraphs (a)–(c) of paragraph 3 establish the basic concepts of individual criminal 2
attribution4. Subparagraph (a) refers to three forms of perpetration: on one’s own, as a co-
perpetrator or through another person (perpetration by means, mittelbare Täterschaft).
Subparagraph (b) contains different forms of participation: on the one hand, ordering an
(attempted) crime, on the other soliciting or inducing its (attempted) commission. Subparagraph
(c) establishes criminal responsibility for "aiding and abetting" as the subsidiary form of
participation. Thus, in contrast to the ILC Draft Codes of Crimes against the Peace and Security
of Mankind5, the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and the so-called mixed tribunals (Special
1 In THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS (Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at
Nuremberg, Germany, H.M. Attorney General by HMSO, London 1950, Part 22, 447) it was held that
individual criminal responsibility has "long been recognized" and further stated: "enough has been said to
show that individuals can be punished for violations of International Law. Crimes against International Law
are committed by men not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can the provisions of International Law be enforced".
2 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR 72, Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on
jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, paras. 128–137 (134): "All of these factors confirm that customary international law
imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common Article 3, as supplemented by other general
principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for breaching certain
fundamental principles and rules regarding means and methods of combat in civil strife". For an analysis on
the case law since Nuremberg see K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL DES VÖLKERSTRAFRECHTS. ANSÄTZE
nd
EINER DOGMATISIERUNG 78 et seq. (2 ed., 2004); id., Individual Criminal Responsibility in International
Criminal Law, in: G. K. McDonald/O. Swaak Goldman (eds.), SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, Vol. I: COMMENTARY 7 et seq. (2000) See also O. Triffterer,
Bestandsaufnahme zum Völkerstrafrecht, in: G. Hankel/G. Stuby (eds.) STRAFGERICHTE GEGEN
MENSCHHEITSVERBRECHEN 211 – 213 (1995); M. Ch. Bassiouni, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 12, 47, 59, 64 et seq. (2003). For an analysis of the ICTR’s case law see R. Boed, Individual
criminal responsibility for violations of Art. 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of Additional
Protocol II thereto in the case law of the ICTR, 13 CRIM. L.F. 293 (296 et seq.) (2002).
3 C. f. K. Ambos, INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT, § 6, margin No. 40 (2006); M. Cherif Bassiouni, THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Vol. I, 3-40 (2005); W.A. Schabas,
General Principles of Criminal Law, 6 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. (1998).
4 See also supra note 3, K. Ambos, § 7, margin No. 3.
5 1954 ILC Draft Code, article 2 para. 13; 1991 ILC Draft Code, article 3; 1996 ILC Draft Code, article 2.
Kai Ambos 745
Court for Sierra Leone and the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers)6, paragraph 3 distinguishes
between perpetration (subparagraph (a)) and other forms of participation (subparagraphs (b) and
(c)), with the latter establishing different degrees of responsibility7. This approach confirms the
general tendency in comparative criminal law to reject a pure unitarian concept of perpetration
(Einheitstätermodell) and to distinguish, at least on the sentencing level, between different forms
of participation8. The approach is also followed, albeit less elaborate, by the internationalized
panels for East Timor9; for example the act of providing the means for the commission of a
crime is not made explicitly punishable10. In fact, article 25 differentiates already at the level of
allocation of responsibility, at least terminologically, between different forms of participation
and thereby follows a unitarian concept of perpetration in a functional sense (funktionelle
Einheitstäterschaft) as known, for example, in Austrian and Swedish law11.
Subparagraphs (d), (e) and (f) provide for expansions of attribution: contributing to the
commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group, incitement to genocide, attempt.
3 Thus, in sum, article 25 para. 3 contains, on the one hand, basic rules of individual criminal
responsibility and, on the other, rules expanding attribution (which may or may not still be
characterized as specific forms of participation). A grosso modo, an individual is criminally
responsible if he or she perpetrates, takes part in or attempts to commit a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court (articles 5–8). It must not be overlooked, however, that criminal
attribution in international criminal law has to be distinguished from attribution in national
criminal law: while in the latter case normally a concrete criminal result caused by a person’s
individual act is punished, international criminal law creates liability for acts committed in a
collective context and systematic manner; consequently the individual’s own contribution to the
harmful result is not always readily apparent12.
6 See article 7 para. 1 ICTY Statute (U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), in: 14 HUM. RTS. L. J. 211 (1993)) and (the
identical) article 6 para. 1 ICTR Statute (U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)): "A person who planned, instigated,
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime …".
See also article 6 para. 1 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) Statute in C. Laucci, DIGEST OF
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 63 (2007) as well as article 29 of the Law on the
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea in K. Ambos/M. Othman (eds.), NEW APPROACHES
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: KOSOVO, EAST TIMOR, SIERRA LEONE AND CAMBODIA (2003).
7 Conc. A. Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility (Art. 25), in: A. Cassese et al. (eds.), THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE ICC: A COMMENTARY 788 with fn. 86 (2002).
8 C. f. supra note 2, O. Triffterer, Bestandsaufnahme 226; J. Pradel, DROIT PENAL COMPARE 312 et seq.
(2002); G. Fletcher, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 188 et seq. (1998). In a similar vein also F.
Mantovani, The General Principles of International Criminal Law: The viewpoint of a national criminal
lawyer, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 34 (2003).
9 Section 14 of UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 (On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction
over Serious Criminal Offences) of 6 June 2000 in K. Ambos/S. Wirth, The Current Law of Crimes Against
Humanity: An Analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000, 13 CRIM. L.F. 1-90 (2002).
10 Unlike article 25, paras. 3 (c) and (f) of the ICC Statute respectively.
11 C.f. K. Hamdorf, BETEILIGUNGSMODELLE IM STRAFRECHT. EIN VERGLEICH VON TEILNAHME- UND
EINHEITSTÄTERSYSTEMEN IN SKANDINAVIEN, ÖSTERREICH UND DEUTSCHLAND 43 et seq., 75 et seq., 104 et
seq. (2002); supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 543 et seq. with further comparative law
references. For the unitarian concept C. Kreß, Die Kristallisation eines Allgemeinen Teils des
Völkerstrafrechts: Die Allgemeinen Prinzipien des Strafrechts im Statut des Internationalen
Strafgerichtshofs, 12 HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT 9 (1999).
12 See – for a first attempt to develop a theory of attribution in international criminal law – K. Marxen,
Beteiligung an schwerem systematischem Unrecht. Bemerkungen zu einer völkerstrafrechtlichen
Straftatlehre, in: K. Lüderssen (ed.), AUFGEKLÄRTE KRIMINALPOLITIK ODER KAMPF GEGEN DAS BÖSE?
BAND III: MAKRODELINQUENZ 226 et seq. (1998). On the peculiarities on attribution in international criminal
law see also supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL, 539 et seq. and passim.; id., Remarks on the
General Part of International Criminal Law, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 663 (2006); supra note 328, id., § 7,
margin No. 10.
746 Kai Ambos
B. Analysis and interpretation of elements

I. Paragraph 1
As far as the jurisdiction over natural persons is concerned, paragraph 1 states the obvious. 4
Already the International Military Tribunal found that international crimes are "committed by
men not by abstract entities"13. However, the decision whether to include "legal" or "juridical"
persons within the jurisdiction of the court was controversial. The French delegation argued
strongly in favour of inclusion since it considered it to be important in terms of restitution and
compensation orders for victims14. The final proposal presented to the Working Group was
limited to private corporations, excluding States and other public and non-profit organizations15.
Further, it was linked to the individual criminal responsibility of a leading member of a
corporation who was in a position of control and who committed the crime acting on behalf of
and with the explicit consent of the corporation and in the course of its activities. Despite this
rather limited liability, the proposal was rejected for several reasons which as a whole are quite
convincing. The inclusion of collective liability would detract from the Court’s jurisdictional
focus, which is on individuals. Furthermore, the Court would be confronted with serious and
ultimately overwhelming problems of evidence. In addition, there are not yet universally
recognized common standards for corporate liability; in fact, the concept is not even recognized
in some major criminal law systems16. Consequently, the absence of corporate criminal liability
in many States would render the principle of complementary (article 17)17 unworkable.
II. Paragraph 2
The provision repeats the principle of individual criminal responsibility. 5
A person may "commit" a crime by the different modes of participation and expansions of
attribution set out in the following paragraph 3. In other words, commission in this context is not
limited to perpetration within the meaning of paragraph 3 (a).
"A crime within the jurisdiction of the Court" refers to genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes according to articles 5 para. 1 (a)–(c) and 6 to 8. The crime of aggression also
falls within the jurisdiction of the Court; this jurisdiction cannot be exercised, however, until an
acceptable definition has been adopted (article 5 para. 2). It is doubtful whether this will ever be
the case given the fact that – more than eight years after the adoption of the Rome Statute – the
Working Group on Aggression18, established within the Preparatory Commission, has not
arrived at a commonly agreed upon definition19. Moreover there has not been any agreement on
what role the UN Security Council would have to play. Its permanent members (USA, France,
13 See already supra note 326.

14 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.3 (1998), article 23 paras. 5 and 6. See also E. Wise, General Principles of
Criminal Law, in: L. Sadat Wexler (ed.), MODEL DRAFT STATUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT BASED ON THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE’S TEXT TO THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 42 (1998); A.
Sereni, Individual criminal responsibility, in: F. Lattanzi (ed.), THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATUTE 145–6 (1998); supra note 3, W.A. Schabas, Principles.
15 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5 (1998) and supra note 3.
16 C.f. A. Eser/B. Huber/K. Cornils (eds.), EINZELVERANTWORTUNG UND MITVERANTWORTUNG IM
STRAFRECHT. EUROPEAN COLLOQUIUM ON INDIVIDUAL, PARTICIPATORY AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
IN CRIMINAL LAW (1998); supra note 8, J. Pradel, 351 et seq.
17 C. f. S.A. Williams/W.A. Schabas, article 17, margin Nos. 1 et seq. and 21 et seq. (in this volume).
18 C.f. D. Ntanda Nsereko, Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 4 NORDIC J.
INT'L L. 497 (2002).
19 C. f. "Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator", in: Report of the Preparatory Commission, 24 July
2002 (Addendum. Part II. Proposals for a provision on the crime of aggression, UN-Doc.
PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2) and <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html> (last visited 30 June 2008); for a
critical assessment see also R. S. Clark, Rethinking aggression as a crime and formulating Its elements: The
Final Work-Product of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 15 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 859 (2002).
Kai Ambos 747
Great Britain, China and Russia) insist on the fact that the presentation of the elements of the
crime of aggression must be subject to approval from the Security Council20.
The possible "punishment" follows from article 77: imprisonment up to a maximum of 30
years or life imprisonment, additionally a fine and forfeiture of proceeds21.
III. Paragraph 3
6 The chapeau repeats paragraph 2 and serves as an introduction to the modes of participation
and commission set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f).
(a) Perpetration, co-perpetration and perpetration

by means
α) "commits ... as an individual ... jointly with another or through another person"
7 The first part of subparagraph (a) distinguishes between three forms of perpetration: direct or
immediate perpetration ("as an individual"), co-perpetration ("jointly with another") and
perpetration by means ("through another person").
The characterization of direct perpetration as committing a crime "as an individual" is
unfortunate since it does not make clear that the direct perpetrator acts on his or her own without
relying on or using another person22. As it stands the formulation only repeats the principle of
individual responsibility. While the original French version ("à titre individual") was more
precise, the new one ("individuellement") is identical to the English one; thus, only the Spanish
version ("por sí solo") clearly refers to the concept of direct perpetration23. This view was also
taken by Appeals Chambers of the ad hoc Tribunals. Tadic held that the word "committed" as
used in article 7 para 1 ICTY Statute means "first and foremost the physical perpetration … by
the offender himself"24. Similarly, in Celebici it was stated that "commission" constitutes
primary or direct responsibility25. It must not be overlooked, however, that the term "committed"
as such is broad enough to include the other forms of perpetration contained in subparagraph (a),
especially if they are not explicitly mentioned as is the case with articles 7 para. 1 and 6 para. 1
of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively26. In fact, the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals
employs such a broad definition as will be seen below (margin No. 9).
20 For more on the crime of aggression see reports on the work of the "Assembly of State Parties Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression" <www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression> (last visited 30 June
2008).
21 See also rules 145–148 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as finally adopted by the Preparatory
Commission, PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, 2 Nov. 2000. For a recent study on sentencing in international criminal
law see J.C. Nemitz, STRAFZUMESSUNG IM VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT (2002).
22 See Model Penal Code (American Law Institute, 1985), § 2.06 (1): "committed by his own conduct",
available at <www.ali.org> (last visited 30 June 2008); good Introduction by M. D. Dubber, Criminal Law:
Model Penal Code 1 et seq. (NY:Foundation Press, 2002), Spanish Penal Code (Código Penal, Ley Orgánica
10/1995, de 23 Nov. 1995), article 28: "por sí solo"; German Penal Code (trans. by J. Darby, THE AMERICAN
SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (Vol. 28, 1987), <http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc>, last visited 1 July
2008), § 25 (1): "selbst ... begeht" ("acting himself").
23 Conc. supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 789 with fn. 89.
24 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, para. 188. Conc.
Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 Feb. 2001, para. 376:
"direct personal or physical participation"; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, Trial
Chamber, 15 Mar. 2002, para. 73; Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber,
29 Nov. 2002, para. 62; Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, Trial
Chamber, 31 Mar. 2003, para. 62. See recently Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T,
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 17 Jan. 2005, para. 694; Proseucutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T,
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 12 Sep. 2006, para. 463.
25 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 20 Feb. 2001, paras. 342 et
seq. (346).
26 See recently Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, paras. 438
et seq., esp. 439 where "committing" is defined as participating "physically or otherwise directly or
748 Kai Ambos
Co-perpetration is no longer included in the complicity concept but rather is recognized as 8

an autonomous form of perpetration27. It is characterized by a functional division of the criminal
tasks between the different (at least two) co-perpetrators, who are normally interrelated by a
common plan or agreement. Every co-perpetrator fulfils a certain task which contributes to the
commission of the crime and without which the commission would not be possible. The
common plan or agreement forms the basis of a reciprocal or mutual attribution of the different
contributions holding every co-perpetrator responsible for the whole crime28.
The ICTY has in the meantime decided a significant number of cases dealing with this form 9
of participation. First and foremost, the Tadic Appeals Chamber, inter alia referring to article 25
para. 3 Rome Statute, held that co-perpetration is contained in article 7 para. 1 ICTY Statute and
constitutes a form of participation that is particularly necessary in order to cope with
international crimes since "most of ... these crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of
single individuals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are often
carried out by groups or individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal design"29. It
further distinguished three categories of collective criminality on the basis of the case law: first,
the basic form where the participants act on the basis of a "common design" or "common
enterprise" and with a common "intention"30; second, the systemic form, i.e., the so-called
concentration camp cases where crimes are committed by members of military or administrative
units such as those running concentration or detention camps on the basis of a common plan
("common purpose")31; third, the so called "extended" joint enterprise where one of the co-
perpetrators actually engages in acts going beyond the common plan but his or her acts still
constitute a "natural and foreseeable consequence" of the realization of the plan32. On the basis
of these categories and the national law of various States, the objective requirements of the
responsibility as a co-perpetrator can be stated as follows33: There must be a plurality of persons
who act on the basis of a – explicit or implicit – common plan or purpose, and the accused must
take part in this plan, at least by supporting or aiding its realization34. Subsequent decisions have
taken up these considerations and refined this so called joint criminal enterprise (jce) liability35,
indirectly". The Appeal chamber of Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgement, 12
March 2008, recently clarified, that "committing is not limited to direct and physical perpetration"(para 161).
The correct legal standard has to ask if the actions done were as much "an integral part" of the crime as the
direct and physical actions (para 206), citing Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A,
Judgement, Appeal Chamber, 7 July 2006, para 60.
27 Conc. H. Vest, GENOZID DURCH ORGANISATORISCHE MACHTAPPARATE. AN DER GRENZE VON
INDIVIDUELLER UND KOLLEKTIVER VERANTWORTLICHKEIT 185 (2002), E. van Sliedregt, THE CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 71 et seq. (2003)
28 For a similar definition invoking Claus Roxins opus TÄTERSCHAFT UND TATHERRSCHAFT see now supra
note 26, Prosecutor v. Stakic, para. 440. See also supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 789 et seq.; G. Werle,
VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT, margin Nos. 426 et seq. (2nd ed 2007); id., Individual Criminal Responsibility in
Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 958 (2007).
29 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Tadic, para. 191. In a similar vein most recently Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case
No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 27 Sep. 2006, para. 876: "JCE is well suited to cases such as the
present one, in which numerous persons are all said to be concerned with the commission of a large number
of crimes". C. f. A. Zahar/G. Sluiter, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 255-257
(2008).
30 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 344, paras. 196–201.
31 Ibid., paras. 202–3.
32 Ibid., paras. 204–19; Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, Trial
Chamber 3 Apr. 2008, para 138; Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement Trial Chamber, 12
June 2007, para 439. Crit. supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 792 with fn. 104; conc. A. Cassese,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 199–209 (2nd ed. 2008). In Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-
30/1-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 28 Feb. 2005, para. 86, the Appeals Chamber affirmed that an accused
may be responsible for crimes committed beyond the common purpose of the systemic joint criminal
enterprise (i.e. the second category of cases), if they were a natural and foreseeable consequence thereof.
33 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Tadic, para. 227.
34 Similarly supra note 32, A. Cassese, 190 without, however, explicitly mentioning the common plan.
35 For my view on jce see K. Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM.
Kai Ambos 749
This doctrine has so far also been applied by the Special Court for Sierra Leone36 and the East
Timorese Special Panel for serious Crimes37. The Furundzija Appeals Chamber38 held that the
common plan can also be developed during the execution of the crime and need not exist in
advance. In any case, co-perpetration in the sense of the common purpose doctrine exists
"[w]here the act of one accused contributes to the purpose of the other, and both acted
simultaneously, in the same place and within full view of each other, over a prolonged period of
time ..."39. The Celibici Appeals Chamber required "the existence of a common concerted plan"
and the "shared intent" of the participants to further the planned crimes40. In Kordic & Cerkez, a
Trial Chamber referred specifically to the third category of Tadic41. The Krstic Trial Chamber
applied the "joint criminal enterprise" doctrine to the "ethnic cleansing" of Srebrenica42 and held
that the accused, a general of the Bosnian-Serb Army (VRS), played a central role in the
execution of this plan43 and the "genocidal joint criminal enterprise" to kill the Bosnian Muslim
men44. The considerable suffering of the victims was a foreseeable consequence of the plan and
as such can be attributed to the accused45. In any case, participation "of an extremely significant
nature and at the leadership level" gives rise to responsibility as a co-perpetrator and not as a
mere accomplice46. In Kvocka et al., the jce doctrine was applied to crimes committed in the
prison camp Omarska (Prijedor, Bosnia Herzegovina), i.e., – for the first time – to a
concentration camp case in the sense of Tadic’s second category47. The Krnojelac Trial
Chamber followed Tadic48 and defined the (alternative) forms of participation in a joint criminal
enterprise as follows: direct commission of the agreed crime; presence during the commission
and assisting/encouraging another person to commit the crime; acting in furtherance of a
particular criminal system by reason of a specific position or authority with knowledge of the
JUST.159-183 (2007) and supra note 3, id., § 7, margin No. 19 et seq. According to A. M. Danner/J.S.
Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CALIFORNIA L. REV. 107 (2005), 64% of the indictments submitted in the
ICTY between 25 June 2001 and 1 January 2004 relied on this doctrine. On the importance of JCE, also see
N. Piacente, Importance of the JCE Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.448
(2004) 448; M. Osiel, The Banality of the Good: Aligning Incentives against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUMBIA
L. REV. 1783 (2005). As well as V. Haan, The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 INT’L C. L. REV.167-201 (2005).See also
R. Cryer et al., INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 304 et seq. (2007).
36 C. f. Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-03-12-PT, Decision and Order on Defence Preliminary Motion
for Defects in the Form of the Indictment, 27 Nov. 2003, para. 9; Prosecutor v. Kamara, Case No. SCSL-04-
16-PT, Decision and Order on Defence Preliminary Motion for Defects in the Form of the Indictment, 1 Apr.
2004, para. 49. As to the indictments before the SLSC invoking JCE III see supra note 35, M. Danner/J.S.
Martinez, 155 et seq.
37 See Prosecutor v. Perreira, Case No. 34/2003, Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, 27 Apr. 2005,
19-20, <www.jsmp.minihub.org/Court%20Monitoring/SPSC/Documents/2003> (last visited 30 June 2008).
Concurring also ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Phillip Rapoza, pp. 4-5, paras. 17-18, 25. See also
Prosecutor v. de Deus, Case No. 2a/2004, Judgment, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, 12 Apr. 2005, p. 13,
see: <www.jsmp.minihub.org/Court%20Monitoring/SPSC/Documents/2004> (last visited 30 June 2008);
Prosecutor v. Cardoso, (known as Lolotoe Case), Case No. 04c/2001, Judgment, Special Panel, 5 Apr. 2003,
pp. 18 et seq., <www.jsmp.minihub.org/Court%20Monitoring/SPSC/Documents/2001> (last visited 30 June
2008).
38 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1 A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 21 July 2000, paras. 117 et
seq.
39 Ibid., para. 120.
40 Supra note 25, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., para. 366.
41 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, paras. 395 et seq.
42 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33/T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 Aug. 2001, para. 611.
43 Ibid., paras. 608, 610, 612, 653.
44 Ibid., paras. 621 et seq. (633), 636.
45 Ibid., para. 635. Also cf on foreseeability issue supra note 35, K. Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise 16.
46 Ibid., para. 642. See supra note 29, A. Zahar/G. Sluiter, 236 et seq., for a crit. analysis of the judgement.
47 Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 Nov. 2001, paras. 265 et
seq.; recently supra note 32, Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., para. 77 et seq.
48 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, para. 78.
750 Kai Ambos
system and intent to further it49. The same forms of participation in a joint enterprise were
adopted by the Vasiljevic Trial Chamber on the basis of the first and second category of
collective commission as developed by Tadic50. In the Ojdanic decision the Appeals Chamber
held unequivocally that jce is a form of "commission" pursuant to article 7 para. 1 ICTY Statute
insofar as a participant shares the purpose of the enterprise as opposed to merely knowing about
it (in this case he would only be an accomplice)51. The Stakic Trial Chamber adopted the three
forms of participation in a joint enterprise as developed by Krnojelac52. It further considered that
the term "commission" in article 7 para. 1 ICTY Statute includes other forms of co-perpetration
than jce53 and employs a concept of co-perpetration based on the German doctrine of
participation and similar to the definition set out above54. The Ntakirutimana Appeals Chamber
extended these principles to article 6 para. 1 ICTR Statute and only required, as to the accused’s
concrete participation, a "form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common
purpose"55. Recently, in Brdanin, an appeal by the Prosecution was successful since the Trial
Chamber erred in law and adopted a too narrow definition of jce when it required (1) that
physical perpetrators need to be jce members for jce liability to attach to high-level officials, (2)
that there should be direct agreement between each jce member regarding the commission of the
crimes, and (3) that jce is appropriate for "small" cases only56. Last but not least, the jce doctrine
also served as a form of liability to impute Slobodan Milosevic the genocide committed by Serb
forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina57. As to the mens rea, the requirements differ according to the
form of the jce: The basic form requires the shared intent of the (co-) perpetrators. The systemic
form demands personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment. The extended form requires
the intention to participate in the criminal purpose and further it and to contribute to the
commission of a crime by a group. Responsibility for a crime which was not part of the common
purpose arises if the commission of this crime was foreseeable and the accused (willingly) took
that risk58. According to the Brdjanin Appeals Chamber the extended jce may even give rise to
the responsibility of a jce participant for a genocide without having the specific intent to destroy
a protected group59.
49 Ibid., para. 81.

50 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, paras. 63 et seq. (67).
51 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR 72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s motion
challenging jurisdiction – joint criminal enterprise, 21 May 2003, para. 20.
52 Supra note 26, Prosecutor v. Stakic, para. 435.
53 Ibid., para. 438.
54 See already supra margin No. 8 with fn. 348. Crit. supra note 29, A. Zahar/G. Sluiter, 236 et seq., explaining
the result with the presiding German judge.
55 See Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment,
Appeals Chamber, 13 Dec. 2004, paras. 462 et seq. summarizing and relying on the ICTY case law, and
supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, paras. 695 et seq. See also supra note 32, Prosecutor v.
Kvocka et al., para. 97, where the Appeals Chamber stressed (contrary to the holding of the Trial Chamber),
that, "in general, there is no specific legal requirement that the accused make a substantial contribution to the
joint criminal enterprise".
56 Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment Appeals Chamber, 3 Apr. 2007, para. 414 with
regard to ground 1 ("principal perpetrator as a member of jce"); para. 419 with regard to ground 2, second
part ("requirement of an additional understanding or agreement"), para. 425 with regard to ground 2, first part
("jce applicable to small cases only"); see further the declaration of Judge van den Wyngaert, 164, para. 1 et
seq.; partly dissenting Judge Shahabudden, 170 et seq., who states that "link" between the accused member
and the crime can only be provided by showing that the physical perpetrator was himself a member of the jce
and therefore within the intention of the accused member to take responsibility for certain crimes when
committed by fellow members (para. 18).
57 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 16 June 2004,
paras. 144 et seq. See K. Ambos, Zwischenbilanz im Milosevic-Verfahren, 59 JZ 966 (2004).
58 See supra note 55, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, para. 467 with further references; also
Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Radic & Sljivancanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment Trial Chamber, 27 Sep. 2007,
para 542. Crit. as to the negligence standard, supra note 35, R. Cryer et al., 307.
59 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on interlocutory appeal, 19 Mar. 2004, para. 6: "…
to establish that it was reasonable foreseeable to the accused that an act specified in Art. 4 (2) [ICTYS] would
Kai Ambos 751
9a The ICC adopted recently the liability mode of co-perpetration in its narrow sense explicitly
in the Lubanga case60 and approved especially the German doctrine of "functional control over
the act" ("funktionelle Tatherrschaft")61:
"The concept of co-perpetration based on joint control over the crime is rooted in the principle of the
division of essential tasks for the purpose of committing a crime between two or more persons acting in a
concerted manner. Hence, although none of the participants has overall control over the offence because
they all depend on one another for its commission, they all share control because each of them could
frustrate the commission of the crime by not carrying out his or her task"62.
On an objective level the PTC established two requirements, namely the existence of an
agreement or common plan between two or more persons63 and a co-ordinated essential
contribution by each co-perpetrator resulting in the realisation of the objective elements of the
crime64. As to the subjective side, the PTC generally states the obvious, i.e., that the suspect
must fulfil the subjective elements of the crime in question65. More concretely, the suspects must
all be mutually aware and mutually accept that implementing their common plan may result in
the realisation of the objective elements of the crime66; they must be aware of the factual
circumstances enabling him or her to jointly control the crime67.
10 The perpetration by means presupposes that the person who commits the crime
(intermediary, intermédiaire, Tatmittler) can be used as an instrument or tool (Werkzeug) by the
indirect perpetrator (auteur médiat) as the master-mind or "man in the background"
(Hintermann68)69. He or she is normally an innocent agent, not responsible for the criminal act.
A typical example is the case where the individual agent or instrument acts erroneously or is not
culpable because he or she is a minor or because of a mental defect. The perpetrator by means is
also considered a principal at common law70. However, especially in the field of
"macrocriminality", i.e., systematic or mass criminality organized, supported or tolerated by the
be committed and that it would be committed with genocidal intent". Crit., but not clear the separate opinion
of Judge Shahabuddeen, who, on the one hand, takes the view that "specific intent always has to be shown"
(para. 4), but, on the other hand, states "that intent is shown by the particular circumstances of the third
category of joint criminal enterprise" (para. 5 a. E.). Supra note 57, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, para. 219 adopts
without more the majority opinion of Brdjanin. Crit. G. Mettraux, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC
TRIBUNALS 215, 264-5, 289 (2005).
60 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the confirmation of charges, PTC I,
29 Jan. 2007, paras. 326 et seq.
61 Ibid., para 341 "joint control". See also C. Roxin, STRAFRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL VOL. II: BESONDERE
ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DER STRAFTAT, § 25 .margin Nos. 188 et seq., H. Satzger, INTERNATIONALES UND
EUROPÄISCHES STRAFRECHT, § 14 margin Nos. 42 (2nd 2008); Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, supra
note 26, Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, para 17.
62 Supra note 60, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, para 342 quoting supra note 26, Prosecutor v. Stakic, para 440.
63 Supra note 60, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, para 343- 345.
64 Ibid., paras 346-348.
65 Ibid., paras 349-360.
66 Ibid., paras 361-365.
67 Ibid., paras 366-367.
68 The translation of the German "Hintermann" as "master-mind" (by E. Silverman, in: C. Roxin, The Dogmatic
Structure of Criminal Liability in the General Part of the Draft Israeli Penal Code, 30 ISRAEL L. REV. 71
(1996)) may omit cases in which the dominance of the "Hintermann" is physical (e.g., by coercion) rather
than intellectual. Michael Bohlander employs in his recent translation of the German Criminal Code (THE
GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE – A MODERN ENGLISH TRANSLATION, Hart, Oxford/Portland, 2008, § 84) the
term "hinterman" referring to other words borrowed from German into English terminology, such as
"hinterland", which suggest that English native-speakers will be familiar with the connotations of the
prefix "hinter–" and be able to adapt it to new combinations.
69 See generally for perpetration by means supra note 8, G. Fletcher, 197–200; H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend,
STRAFRECHT. ALLGEMEINER TEIL § 62, 662 et seq. (5th ed. 1996). In French criminal law the "auteur
médiat" is not codified, but exceptionally recognized if the direct perpetrator is used as a "simple instrument"
(c. f. A.-K. Czepluch, TÄTERSCHAFT UND TEILNAHME IM FRANZÖSISCHEN STRAFRECHT 30–33 (1994)). With
regard to article 25 see also (conc.) supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 793 et seq., supra note 27, E. van
Sliedregt, 71.
70 See comment to supra note 22, Model Penal Code, § 2.06.
752 Kai Ambos
State71, the direct perpetrator or executor normally performs the act with the necessary mens rea
and is fully aware of its illegality. Thus, the question arises if perpetration by means always
presupposes that the direct perpetrator has a "defect", or if it is also possible with a fully
responsible or culpable direct perpetrator, i.e., in the case of a "(indirect) perpetrator behind the
(direct) perpetrator" (Täter hinter dem Täter). This has been affirmed for cases in which the
"Hintermann" dominates the direct perpetrators by way of a hierarchical organizational
structure, i.e., where he or she has "Organisationsherrschaft"72. Although there are no
precedents in international case law that refer explicitly to this doctrine, it may be argued that the
judgment in the Justice Trial was implicitly based on it since the accused were held responsible
because of their "conscious participation in a nationwide government-organized system of
cruelty and injustice"73, i.e., because of their commission of crimes by way of a hierarchical
organizational structure74. Further, the doctrine has been recognized by national tribunals. In
Eichmann, the Jerusalem District Court invoked – for the specific macro-crimes in question – a
type of organizational responsibility or domination of the act by the man at the desk and thereby
developed the concept used in the Justice trial75. In the Argentinean trial against the former
commanders of the military junta the Appeals Court argued with a form of perpetration based on
Organisationsherrschaft: "The accused dominated the acts since they controlled the
organization which carried them out ... who dominates the system dominates the anonymous will
of all the men who constitute it"76. In the German trials for shootings at the East German border,
the Supreme Court employed the doctrine to hold members of the National Defence Council
("NDC") and generals of the National People’s Army responsible as indirect perpetrators for the
killings directly committed by border guards77. With regard to the current investigation of the
disappearance of the German citizen Elisabeth Käsemann during the Argentinean military
dictatorship it has been argued that the members of the then Junta, the Generals Jorge Videla
and Emilio Massera, are responsible as indirect perpetrators on the basis of this doctrine78. Most
71 See H. Jäger, MAKROKRIMINALITÄT. STUDIEN ZUR KRIMINOLOGIE KOLLEKTIVER GEWALT (1989).

72 See the fundamental work of C. Roxin, TÄTERSCHAFT UND TATHERRSCHAFT 242-252, 704-717 (8th ed.
2006); see also supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 590 et seq. with further references; with
regard to genocide C. Kreß, MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR STGB, Vol. III, § 220a/§ 6 VStGB, margin Nos. 100
et seq. (2003); supra note 28, G. Werle, VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT, margin No. 433 with fn. 232 also considers
that the concept of the "Täter hinter dem Täter" is recognized by article 25 para. 3 (a) but expresses doubts as
to the application of the German doctrine in international criminal law. The doctrine is not uncontroversial,
for a recent critique see T. Rotsch, Neues zur Organisationsherrschaft, 25 NStZ 13 et seq. (2005). With
references on this discussion c. f. C. Kreß, Claus Roxins Lehre von der Organisationsherrschaft und das
Völkerstrafrecht, 153 GOLTDAMMER’S ARCHIV 304 et seq. (2006); also H. Radtke, Mittelbare Täterschaft
kraft Organisationsherrschaft im nationalen und Internationalen Strafrecht, 153 GOLTDAMMER’S ARCHIV
350 et seq. (2006). For a recent reply C. Roxin, Organisationsherrschaft als eigenständige Form mittelbarer
Täterschaft, 125 Schweizerische ZStR 3 et seq. (2006). See for a good explanation in English, supra note 35,
M. Osiel, 1829 et seq. See further supra note 27, E. van Sliedregt, 70; most recently with a detailed
explanation K. Ambos, in: A. Nollkaemper/H. van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International Law,
Vol. IV (forthcoming).
73 Judgment, U.S. v. Altstötter et al., (Justice Trial), US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, 4 December
1947, in: TRWC (US-GPO, 1947), para. 985: "conscious participation in a nationwide government-organized
system of cruelty and injustice" (emphasis added).
74 C. f. supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 93–4; supra note 2, id., Individual Criminal
Responsibility 9.
75 Judgment 12 Dec. 1961, 36 I.L.R. 5 & 18, at 236–37, para. 197: "... the degree of responsibility generally
increases as we draw further away from the man who uses the fatal instrument with his own hands and reach
the higher levels of command ..."; for a more detailed analysis see supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER
ALLGEMEINE TEIL 184 et seq.; supra note 2, id., Individual Criminal Responsibility 17–8.
76 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones etc., Sentencia 9 Dec. 1985, in: Fallos CSJ Vol. 309-I/II 33, at 1597–98,
1601–02 (emphasis added; own translation from Spanish). For a more detailed analysis see supra note 2, K.
Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 234 et seq.; supra note 2, id., Individual Criminal Responsibility 18–9.
77 40 Bundesgerichtshof-Entscheidungen in Strafsachen, 218, 237–38 (1994). For a more detailed analysis see
supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 243 et seq.; supra note 2, id., Individual Criminal
Responsibility 20–1.
78 C. f. K. Ambos/Ch. Grammer, Tatherrschaft qua Organisation. Die Verantwortlichkeit der argentinischen
Kai Ambos 753
importantly, the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC recognized that those who have "control
over the commission of the offence" are perpetrators ("auteur") since, i.a., they "control the will
of those who carry out the objective elements of the offence (commission of the crime through
another person, or indirect perpetration)". Further, the PTC affirms that the most typical
manifestation of the "control over the act theory" is "the commission of a crime through another
person", as explicitly provided for in article 25 para. 3 (a) ICC Statute79.
11 It must not be overlooked, however, that attribution in these cases may go too far if the
indirect perpetrator cannot dominate the direct perpetrator sufficiently, i.e. exercise effective
control so as to justify attributing to him the latter’s conduct as though it were his own.
Generally speaking, perpetration by means requires a sufficiently tight control by the
"Hintermann" over the direct perpetrator, similar to the relationship between superior and
subordinate in the case of command responsibility (article 28)80. Although it cannot be denied
that the "man in the background" exercises only limited control over a fully responsible direct
perpetrator – he or she may, at any time, decide to abandon the criminal plan –, this lack of
control is compensated by the control of the criminal organization, which produces an unlimited
number of potential willing executors. In other (more "dogmatic") words, although direct
perpetrators acting with full criminal responsibility cannot be considered mere "fungible
mediators of the act" (fungible Tatmittler), the system provides for a practically unlimited
number of replacements and thereby for a high degree of flexibility as far as the personnel
necessary to commit the crimes is concerned81. Still, it is clear that only very few persons
command the control necessary to immediately replace one (failing) executor by another,
namely only those who belong to the leadership of the criminal organization or who at least
control a part of the organization; only they can dominate the unfolding of the criminal plan
undisturbed by other members of the organization82. Although these persons are generally far
away from the actual execution of the criminal acts and are therefore normally considered
indirect perpetrators or even accessories before the fact, they are in fact, from a normative
perspective, the main perpetrators while the executors (the direct perpetrators) are merely
accessories or accomplices in the implementation of the criminal enterprise83. Thus, it becomes
clear that the system of individual attribution of responsibility, as used for ordinary criminality,
must be modified in international criminal law aiming at the development of a mixed system of
individual-collective responsibility in which the criminal enterprise or organisation as a whole
serves as the entity upon which attribution of criminal responsibility is based (so-called
Zurechnungsprinzip Gesamttat)84. In this sense, the individual criminal contributions of the
participants must be assessed in the light of their effect on the criminal plan or purpose pursued
by the criminal apparatus or organization. One can speak of a system of "organizational
domination in stages" (stufenweise Organisationsherrschaft), where domination requires,
Militärführung für den Tod von Elisabeth Käsemann, in: JAHRBUCH FÜR JURISTISCHE ZEITGESCHICHTE 531
(2003); in Spanish: Dominio del hecho por organización. La responsabildad de la conducción militar
argentina por la muerte de Elisabeth Käsemann. 16 Cuadernos DE DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA PENAL
(Argentina) 163 (2003) = 12 REVISTA PENAL (Spain) 27 (July 2003).
79 See supra note 60, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, para. 332.
80 Conc. supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 795 with fn. 111; supra note 28, G. Werle, Individual Criminal
Responsibility 964. On the proximity between command responsibility and Organisationsherrschaft see also
supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID 300.
81 C. f. supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 594 et seq. (597–8), 614 with further references.
82 Ibid., 602 et seq., 614.
83 C. f. supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID 220, 249.
84 On this new concept of attribution for collective criminality see the fundamental work of F. Dencker,
KAUSALITÄT UND GESAMTTAT 125 et seq., 152 et seq., 229, 253 et seq. and passim (1996); id., Beteiligung
ohne Täter, in: C. Prittwitz et al. (eds.), FESTSCHRIFT LÜDERSSEN 525, at 534 et seq. (2002). The concept
was further elaborated by supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID 214 et seq., 236 et seq., 303, 304 et seq., 359 et
seq. referring in particular to the crime of genocide.
754 Kai Ambos
however, at least some form of control over part of the organization85. Thus, taking up the
distinction between main perpetrators and accomplices made above, there are in fact three levels
of participation: the first and highest level is composed of those (main) perpetrators who plan
and organize the criminal events as a whole and as such belong to the leadership level
(Führungstäter); at the second level we find those (still main) perpetrators of at least the mid-
level of the hierarchy who exercise some form of control over a part of the organization
(Organisationstäter); the third and last level consists of the accomplices who merely execute the
crimes (Ausführungstäter)86.
β) "... regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible"

It is not clear from the English original wording if "that other person" refers to both co- 12
perpetration and perpetration by means or only to the latter. The travaux do not offer an
explanation, since the problem was simply not addressed in Rome. The French ("celle-ci") and
Spanish ("éste") versions indicate, however, that the reference applies only to the intermediary.
This is confirmed by a teleological interpretation.
As explained above (margin No. 8), in the case of co-perpetration all persons involved fulfil 13
a certain function and are, therefore, criminally responsible. Thus, the reference cannot apply to
co-perpetration. On the other hand, in the case of perpetration by means, it is typical that the
person used ("the instrument") is not criminally responsible. The express recognition of this fact
is superfluous. Yet it makes sense in the exceptional case that the instrument is criminally
responsible, e.g., in the above mentioned "Organisationsherrschaft" by the indirect perpetrator.
For in this case the reference confirms that a perpetration by means is even possible if the direct
perpetrator is criminally responsible87.
(b) "orders, solicits or induces" an (attempted) crime

A number of very different forms of participation are established in this subparagraph. A 14
person who orders a crime is not a mere accomplice but rather a perpetrator by means, using a
subordinate to commit the crime. Indeed, the identical article 2 para. 1 (b) of the 1996 Draft
Code was intended to provide for the criminal responsibility of mid-level officials who order
their subordinates to commit crimes88. The ICTR, in the Akayesu judgment, held that "ordering
implies a superior-subordinate relationship" whereby "the person in a position of authority uses
it to convince (or coerce) another to commit an offence"89. Such a – at least de facto – "superior-
subordinate relationship" is also the first and basic requirement of command or superior
responsibility as first confirmed in the "Celebici" case90 and adopted by the subsequent case law
of the ad hoc Tribunals91. Consequently, the first alternative in subparagraph (b) ("[o]rders")
85 See already K. Ambos, Tatherrschaft durch Willensherrschaft kraft organisatorischer Machtapparate, 145
GOLTDAMMER’S ARCHIV FÜR STRAFRECHT 226, at 237–8 (1998); also available in Spanish: DOMINIO DEL
HECHO POR DOMINIO DE VOLUNTAD EN VIRTUD DE APARATOS OGANIZADOS DE PODER 37–38 (Bogotá 1998,
Universidad Externado) = 3 REVISTA DE DERECHO PENAL Y CRIMINOLOGIA (Universidad Nacional de
Educación a Distancia, Facultad de Derecho, Spain) 133 (Jan. 1999, 2nda Epoca) = 9 CUADERNOS DE
DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA PENAL (Argentina) 367 (1999). Conc. supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID, 239.
86 C. f. supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID 29–30, 240 et seq., 302.
87 Conc. supra note 27, E. van Sliedregt, 71.
88 1996 ILC Draft Code, p. 25 (para. 14).
89 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 Sep. 1998, para. 483. In the
same vein supra note 42, Prosecutor v. Krstic, para. 601; supra note 26, Prosecutor v. Stakic, para. 445; also
the ICTY supra note 58, Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Radic & Sljivancanin, para 550; supra note 32, Prosecutor v.
Martic, para 441.
90 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 16 Nov. 1998, paras. 348 et seq.
C.f. supra note 29, A. Zahar/G. Sluiter, 261 et seq.
91 C. f. supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, paras. 64 et seq.; supra note 26, Prosecutor v.
Stakic, paras. 447 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 7
Kai Ambos 755
complements the command responsibility provision (article 28): in the latter case the superior is
liable for an omission, in the case of an order to commit a crime the superior is liable for
commission for having "ordered". In conclusion, the first alternative in subparagraph (b)
actually belongs to the forms of perpetration provided for in subparagraph (a), being a form of
commission "through another person"92.
15 Soliciting a crime means, inter alia, "urging, advising, commanding, or otherwise inciting
another to commit a crime"93. Similarly, inducing entails the "enticement or urging of another
person to commit a crime"94. Thus, both terms basically refer to a situation where a person is
influenced by another to commit a crime. In fact, the French version of the Statute speaks of
"sollicite ou encourage", thereby using a form of solicitation to express the English term induce.
In substance, in both cases a person is caused to commit a crime95. Such "causal" influence is
normally of a psychological nature (persuasion) but may also take the form of physical pressure
(coercion) within the meaning of vis compulsiva96. It may also occur in a chain, i.e., a person
induces another to induce a third person to commit a crime97. In contrast to cases of "ordering",
a superior-subordinate relationship is not necessary.
(c) "For the purpose of facilitating aids, abets

or otherwise assists ..."
16 Subparagraph (c) codifies any other assistance not covered by subparagraph (b). Generally
speaking, participation as defined by subparagraph (b) implies a higher degree of responsibility
than in the case of subparagraph (c).
α) "aids, abets or otherwise assists ... including providing the means"

17 "Aiding and abetting" as the weakest form of complicity covers any act which contributes to
the commission or attempted commission of a crime. The difficult task is to determine the
minimum requirements of this mode of complicity. Article 2 para. 3 (d) of the 1996 Draft Code
requires that the aiding and abetting be "direct and substantial"; i.e., the contribution should
facilitate the commission of a crime in "some significant way"98. The ICTY referred to these
criteria in the Tadic case and held that the act in question must constitute a direct and substantial
contribution to the commission of the crime99. "Substantial" means that the contribution has an
effect on the commission; in other words, it must – in one way or another – have a causal
June 2001, paras. 37 et seq. and recently Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, Trial
Chamber, 31 Jan. 2005, paras. 357 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-01-65-T, Judgment,
Trial Chamber, 11 Sept. 2006, para. 19; supra note 24, Proseucutor v. Muvunyi, para. 467; Prosecutor v.
Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, Judgement Trial Chamber, 7. Dec. 2007, para 537; supra note 26,
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, para 143; Prosecutor v. D. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Judgement Trial
Chamber, 12 Dec. 2007, para 957; supra note 32, Prosecutor v. Martic, para 441. For a summary of the case
law see K. Ambos, Superior Responsibility (Art. 28), in: A. Cassese et al. (eds.), THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 815 et seq. (2002) and supra note 35, R. Cryer et al.,
313.
92 In the same vein supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 797 who, however, correctly clarifies (in fn. 123) that
the Akayesu Trial Chamber considers ‘ordering’ as a form of complicity.
93 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398 (7th ed. 1999); supra note 22, Model Penal Code, § 5.02 (1).
94 Supra note 93, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 779.
95 C. f. supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 481 et seq. I do not longer take the view, as in the First
Edition, that a meaningful terminological distinction between both terms can be made. For an "umbrella"
function of soliciting also supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 797 with fn. 117. Different V. Militello, The
personal nature of individual criminal responsibility and the ICC Statute, 5 J. INT’L.CRIM.JUST 947 (2007).
96 Unlike vis absoluta vis compulsiva leaves the person still a certain freedom to act and decide (c. f. supra note
69, H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, 224).
97 C. f. supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID 203 et seq., 238.
99 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, paras. 674, 688–692.
756 Kai Ambos
relationship with the result100. However, this does not necessarily require physical presence at
the scene of the crime. In Tadic, Trial Chamber II followed a broad concept of complicity based
on the English "concerned in the killing" theory101. In fact, the Chamber did not take the “direct
and substantial” criterion very seriously since it included within the concept of aiding and
abetting "all acts of assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement or support"102. This
position was confirmed by a Trial Chamber in "Celebici"103 and, more recently, in Naletilic &
Martinovic104. The Appeals Chamber stressed that the aiding and abetting must have a
substantial effect on the main act105.
In Furundzija the ICTY took a more sophisticated view106. The Trial Chamber distinguished 18
between the nature of assistance and its effect on the act of the principal (main perpetrator).
Regarding the former it stated that the assistance need not be "tangible" but that "moral support
and encouragement" is sufficient. Mere presence at the scene of the crime suffices if it has "a
significant legitimizing or encouraging effect on the principals". The term "direct" – used by the
ILC – in qualifying the proximity of the assistance is "misleading" since it implies that the
assistance needs to be "tangible"107. Regarding the effect of the assistance the Chamber does not
consider a causal relationship in the sense of the conditio sine qua non formula necessary but
holds that the acts of assistance must "make a significant difference to the commission of the
criminal act by the principal". Thus, it is, for example, sufficient that a person continues to
interrogate the victim while it is being raped by another person108. The "significant"-
requirement, however, implies that it would not be sufficient if the accomplice has only "a role
in a system without influence"109. With regard to the Rome Statute, the Chamber explicitly states
that it is "less restrictive" than the ILC Draft Code 1996 since it does not limit aiding and
abetting – as article 2 para. 3 (d) Draft Code does – to assistance which "facilitate[s] in some
significant way", or "directly and substantially" assists the perpetrator. Rather, subparagraph (c)
contemplates "assistance either in physical form or in the form of moral support. ... ‘abet’
includes mere exhortation or encouragement"110. In sum, aiding and abetting requires "practical
assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of
the crime"111. The Appeals Chamber endorsed this view112.
The subsequent case law of the ICTY has confirmed the broad concept of aiding and 19
abetting developed in Tadic, Celibici and Furundzija113. The Aleksovski Trial Chamber required
100 Ibid., para. 688.

101 Ibid., para. 687: "... not only does one not have to be present but the connection between the act contributing
to the commission and the act of commission itself can be geographically and temporally distanced". For the
"concerned in the killing" doctrine, see: 15 L.R.T.W.C. 49–51; also: supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Tadic, para.
691.
102 Ibid., para. 689.
103 Supra note 90, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., paras. 325–9.
104 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, para. 63, see also supra note 24, Prosecutor v.
Blagojevic & Jokic, para. 726.
105 Supra note 25, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., para. 352. As to the concrete case the Chamber held that the
position as a camp guard is not per se sufficient (para. 364).
106 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 10 Dec. 1998, paras. 190–249.
107 Ibid., paras. 199, 232.
108 Ibid., para. 273–4; confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in supra note 38, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para. 126
and supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, supra note 344, para. 63.
109 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, paras. 217, 233–4.
110 Ibid., para. 231.
111 Ibid., paras. 235, 249.
112 Supra note 38, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, paras. 117 et seq.
113 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 25 June 1999, paras. 60 et seq.;
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 Mar. 2000, para. 245; Prosecutor v.
Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 22 Feb. 2001, paras.
391–3; supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, paras. 395 et seq.; supra note 24, Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, paras. 88 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Limja, Bala & Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, Trial
Kai Ambos 757
an "effet important" on the main act114 and allowed the act of support to be given at any time115.
In Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar116 the Trial Chamber declined to enter convictions against Pavle
Strugar for aiding and abetting on the grounds that there was no settled jurisprudence on
whether, and in what circumstances, an omission may constitute the actus reus of aiding and
abetting. Further, it found that Strugar’s failure to carry out an investigation into the offences
committed and punish the perpetrators thereof occurred well after the commission of the
offences and thus could not have had a requisite direct and substantial effect on them117. As to
the issue of a causal relationship between the aiding and the final criminal result, the Trial
Chambers in Aleksovski, Blaskic, Krnojelac, Vasiljevic, and Naletilic & Martinovic followed
Furundzija renouncing this requirement118. Presence at the scene of the crime would (only) be
sufficient if the accused had an "autorité incontestée" that encourages the direct perpetrator to
commit the crime119. At a minimum, the presence of a superior constitutes a "probative
indication" in this respect120.
20 The ICTR defined aiding in Akayesu as "giving assistance to someone" and abetting as
involving "facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto"121. The separate
definitions of aiding and abetting do not mean, however, that individual responsibility within the
meaning of article 6 para. 1 ICTR Statute is only incurred if both forms of participation – aiding
and abetting – have been realized; aiding or abetting is sufficient122. Subsequent case law,
however, does not distinguish between aiding and abetting but requires for both, taking the same
approach as the ICTY, any form of physical or moral support which contributes substantially to
the commission of a crime123. Thus, the contribution need neither "always" be "tangible"124 nor
Chamber, 30 Nov. 2005, para. 516; confirmed by Appeals Chamber Judgment 27 Sep. 2007, para. 90 et seq.,
supra note 58, Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Radic & Sljivancanin, para. 551 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza, Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, 28 Nov. 2007, para 482; supra
note 32, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj & Brahimaj, para. 145.
114 Supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, paras. 60–1.
115 Ibid., para. 62. See also supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, para. 284.
116 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 31 January 2005.
117 C.f. S. Hinek, The Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor
v. Pavle Strugar, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.477 (2006).
118 Supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, para. 61; supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, para. 284; supra
note 24, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, supra note 344, para. 88; supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Naletilic &
Martinovic, para. 63; supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, para. 70; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-
95-14-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004, para. 48; supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic &
Jokic, para. 726.
119 Supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, paras. 63 et seq. (65); similarly supra note 24, Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, para. 89: "significant legitimising or encouraging effect"; also supra note 24, Prosecutor v.
Vasiljevic, para. 70; supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, para. 726, fn. 2177: "'Mere presence' at
the scene of the crime is not conclusive of aiding and abetting unless it is demonstrated to have a significant
encouraging effect on the principal offender".
120 Supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, para. 284; conc. supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic,
para. 63. In supra note 118, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, the Appeals Chamber explicitly left open the possibility
that "in the circumstances of a given case, an omission may constitute the actus reus of aiding and abetting
(para. 47)".
121 Supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 484. For an analysis of the ICTR’s complicity concept with
regard to genocide see A. Obote-Odora, Complicity in genocide as understood trough the ICTR experience, 2
INT’L. CRIM. L. REV. 375 (2002), in particular on the distinction between aiding and abetting pp. 391–2, 400.
122 Similarly already supra note 2, O. Triffterer, Bestandsaufnahme 229.
123 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 6 Dec. 1999, para. 43;
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 27 Jan. 2000, paras. 125–6;
supra note 91, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, para. 33; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T,
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 15 May 2003, para. 385; Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T,
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 22 Jan. 2004, para. 597; Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR-00-60-T,
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 13 Apr. 2006, paras. 32 et seq.; supra note 91, Prosecutor v. Karera, para 548;
supra note 91, Prosecutor v. Mpambara, para. 16; supra note 24, Proseucutor v. Muvunyi, para.471; supra
note 26, Prosecutor v. Seromba, para 530.
124 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 21 May 1995,
para. 200.
758 Kai Ambos
need it be indispensable (in the sense of a conditio sine qua non)125. Although it is not necessary
that the aider or abettor be present during the commission126, presence may indicate moral
support, especially if the accused possesses a degree of authority entails "a clear signal of
official tolerance"127. Aiding and abetting may also consist in an omission128; in such cases it
may be interpreted as moral support by encouraging129.
Summing up this case law, aiding and abetting encompasses any assistance, physical or 21
psychological, that has a substantial effect on the commission of the crime. Thus, the only
limiting element is the "substantial effect" requirement. Obviously, this requirement is far from
precise, and the case law has not contributed to its clarification, instead leaving the decision to
each individual case. If one takes the principle of legality seriously, i.e., the requirements of
legal certainty and foreseeability (nullum crimen sine lege)130, a general theory of imputation in
international criminal law must be developed in order, inter alia, to determine, on an abstract
level, when an effect is "substantial" and, thus, when aiding and abetting should entail criminal
responsibility. From a theoretical perspective, this is ultimately a normative question which can
best be answered by taking into account the modern theories of attribution131. Accordingly, to
incur criminal responsibility the aider and abettor must, with her contribution, create and
increase the risk that the crime be committed and thereby fundamental legal interests violated
(Risikoerhöhung). The risk must be realized through the commission of the (main) crime
(Risikorealisierung) or, in other words, the risk-creation or increase must be causal for the
commission of this crime (kausale Risikosteigerung). Finally, the risk created or increased must
be disapproved by the legal order, i.e., it must be a forbidden risk (Risikomißbilligung)132. – On
the delimitation between co-perpetration and aiding and abetting see margin No. 44.
It must not be overlooked, however, that an abstract determination of aiding and abetting 22
may be a mere academic exercise if one considers that the subsidiary mode of complicity of
"assist otherwise" introduces an even lower threshold for accomplice liability than aiding and
abetting. Although this concept is already included in the aiding and abetting formula as
interpreted by the case law, it makes quite clear that there should be virtually no objective
threshold for accomplice liability. Still, if one follows the case law and considers the substantial
effect of the assistance on the main crime as an independent constituting element of accomplice
liability, complicity as an "otherwise assist" would also require a substantial effect on the
commission, and the risk-criteria developed above (margin No. 21) would apply.
125 Supra note 124, Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, para. 201; supra note 91, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema,
para. 33; supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, para. 34.
126 Supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 484; supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Musema, para. 125; supra
note 91, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, para. 33; supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Semanza, para. 385; supra note
35, R. Cryer et al., 311.
127 Supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 484; supra note 91, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, paras. 34–5;
supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Semanza, para. 386; supra note 56, Prosecutor v. Brdanin, para 273;
128 Supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 548: "... may consist in failing to act or refraining from action"
(unlike complicity in genocide); see also supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-
T, para. 597: "The act of assistance may consist of an act or an omission"; supra note 123, Prosecutor v.
Bisengimana, para 34; supra note 91, Prosecutor v. Mpambara, para. 22; supra note 24, Proseucutor v.
Muvunyi, para. 470.
129 Supra note 124, Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, para. 200 referring to Furundzija (supra note 106);
supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, para 34.
130 See for the interpretation of article 7 ECHR in this respect Sunday Times v. UK, Series A 30 Judgment of 26
Apr. 1979, para. 49; S.W. v. UK, Series A 335-b, 27 Oct. 1995, para. 36; C.R. v. UK, Series A 335-c, 27 Oct.
1995, para. 34 and most recently Streletz, Kessler, Krenz v. Germany, Judgment of 22 Mar. 2001, paras. 77 et
seq. (105).
131 See, generally, C. Roxin, STRAFRECHT. ALLGEMEINER TEIL Vol. I, 287 et seq. (3rd ed. 1997); G. Jakobs,
STRAFRECHT. ALLGEMEINER TEIL. DIE GRUNDLAGEN UND DIE ZURECHNUNGSLEHRE 185 et seq. (2nd ed.
1993). Conc. supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 801 with fn. 141.
132 For a detailed discussion see supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 619 et seq., 663–4.
Kai Ambos 759
β) "For the purpose of facilitating"

23 This concept introduces a subjective threshold which goes beyond the ordinary mens rea
requirement within the meaning of article 30133. The expression "for the purpose of facilitating"
is borrowed from the Model Penal Code. While the necessity of this requirement was
controversial within the American Law Institute, it is clear that purpose generally implies a
specific subjective requirement stricter than mere knowledge134. The formula, therefore, ignores
the – above quoted – jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, since this jurisprudence holds that
the aider and abetter must only know that his or her acts will assist the principal in the
commission of an offence135. Additionally, knowledge may be inferred from all relevant
circumstances136, i.e., it may be proven by circumstantial evidence137.
On the other hand, the word "facilitating" confirms that a direct and substantial assistance is
not necessary and that the act of assistance need not be a conditio sine qua non of the crime138.
In conclusion, the formulation confirms the general assessment that subparagraph (c)
provides for a relatively low objective but relatively high subjective threshold (in any case
higher than the ordinary mens rea requirement according to article 30)139.
(d) "In any other way contributes" to the (attempted) commission ...
"by a group ... acting with a common purpose"
24 The whole subparagraph (d) is an almost literal copy of a 1998 Anti-terrorism convention140
and presents a compromise with earlier "conspiracy" provisions141, which since Nuremberg have
been controversial142. The 1991 ILC Draft Code held punishable an individual who "conspires
133 See D.K. Piragoff/D. Robinson, article 30, margin Nos. 9 et seq. and 17 et seq. (in this volume); generally
about the mental element in international criminal law, c. f. A. Eser, Mental Elements – Mistake of Fact and
Law, in: A. Cassese et al. (eds.), THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC: A COMMENTARY 889 (2002); K. Ambos,
Some Preliminary Reflections on the Mens Rea Requirements of the Crimes of the ICC-Statute and of the
Elements of Crimes, in: L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN – ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF A.
CASSESE 12 et seq. (2003); supra note 2, id., DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 757 et seq.; supra note 2, O. Triffterer,
Bestandsaufnahme 221–4.
134 Supra note 22, Model Penal Code, § 2.06. Conc. supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 801.
135 Supra note 99, Prosecutor v. Tadic, para. 692; supra note 90, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., paras. 326, 328;
supra note 106, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, paras. 236–249 (236, 245–6, 249); supra note 24, Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, para. 90; Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 25 Feb.
2004, para. 102; Supra note 118, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, para. 49; supra note 89Prosecutor v. Akayesu, paras.
476–9; supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Semanza, para. 388; supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, para.
599.
136 Supra note 99, Prosecutor v. Tadic, para. 676; supra note 90, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., para. 328; supra
note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 478; supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, para. 600.
137 C. f. supra note 99, Prosecutor v. Tadic, para. 689: "if the presence can be shown or inferred, by
circumstantial or other evidence, to be knowing ..."; supra note 90, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., para. 386
with regard to command responsibility: "... such knowledge cannot be presumed but must be established by
way of circumstantial evidence".
138 Supra note 106, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para. 231.
140 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1998),
Annex (37 I.L.M. 249 (1998)), article 2 para. 3 (c).
141 For example: Preparatory Committee Draft, article 23 para. 7 (e) (ii).
142 See, for example, V. Pella, Mémorandum, 2 Y.B.I.L.C. 278–362, 357 (1950); J. Graven, Les Crimes contre
l’Humanité, RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 433–605, 502–503 (1950); H.-
H. Jescheck, Die internationale Genocidium-Konvention vom 9. Dezember 1948 und die Lehre vom
Völkerstrafrecht, 66 ZSTW 193–217, 213 (1954); R. Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace
and Security of Mankind: Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission, 8 CRIM. L.F 52 (1997);
supra note 32, A. Cassese, 196 et seq. (2003), but now less critical in the 2nd ed supra note 352, 228. See also
the statement of the German delegate O. Katholnigg at the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the
1988 Drug Convention (United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 1988, Official Records, Vol. II, para. 52: "common
law concept unknown in civil law systems"). The concept was, however, in principle recognized by the ILC
Special Rapporteur D. Thiam (2 Y.B.I.L.C., Part 1, 16, para. 66 (1990)) and also exists today in civil law
jurisdictions in a similar form (see, e.g., § 30 para. 2 alt. 3 of the German Strafgesetzbuch).
760 Kai Ambos
in" the commission of a crime, thereby converting conspiracy into a form of "participation in a
common plan for the commission of a crime against the peace and security of mankind"143. The
1996 Draft Code extends to a person who "directly participates in planning or conspiring to
commit such a crime which in fact occurs"144. Thus, it restricts liability compared to the
traditional conspiracy provisions in that it requires a direct participation – already discussed
above – and an effective commission of the crime. Subparagraph (d) takes this more restrictive
approach even further, eliminating the term conspiracy altogether and requiring at least a
contribution to a collective attempt of a crime.
Subparagraph (d) establishes, on the one hand, the lowest objective threshold for 25
participation according to article 25 since it criminalizes "any other way" that contributes to a
crime. This seems to imply a kind of subsidiary liability if subparagraph (c) is not applicable. On
the other hand, however, subparagraph (d) only refers to "a crime by a group of persons acting
with a common purpose", i.e., provides for objective – group crime – and subjective – common
purpose – limitations of attribution which – at first glance – seem to delimitate subparagraph (d)
from (c). Indeed, in Furundzija, the ICTY held that these provisions confirm that international
(criminal) law recognizes a distinction between aiding and abetting a crime and participation in
a common criminal plan as "two separate categories of liability for criminal participation ... –
co-perpetrators who participate in a jce, on the one hand, and aiders and abetters, on the
other"145. – On the issue of delimitation, see also margin No. 45.
The distinction gains particular importance on the subjective level. While aiding and abetting 26
generally only requires the knowledge that the assistance contributes to the main crime146 and
subparagraph (c) adds to this the "purpose of facilitating" (margin No. 23), participation in a
group crime within the meaning of subparagraph (d) requires, on the one hand, a "common
purpose" of the group and, on the other, an "intentional" contribution of the participant,
complemented by alternative additional requirements ((i) and (ii)) to be discussed below (margin
Nos. 29 and 30).
Furthermore, it is not absolutely clear what is meant by "intentional". Does it refer to the 27
traditional use of "intent"147 – as dolus (Vorsatz)148 – including knowledge (Wissen) and
intention or purpose (Wollen) or is it limited to the latter, i.e., the first degree dolus directus149?
This view seems to be supported by the Spanish version ("intencional") since Spanish doctrine,
based on German thinking, starts from the general concept of dolus (see article 10 of the 1995
Codigo Penal: "dolosas") and reserves the notion of "intención" or "intencional" for the "delitos
de intención" or the first degree dolus directus150. The French version ("intentionelle"), however,
does not support this restrictive interpretation since in French thinking151 "l’intention" consists
of two elements: the foreseeability (element of knowledge) and the wish (element of will) of the
criminal act. Thus, although the "faute intentionelle" is characterised by the "volonté orientée
vers l’accomplissement d’un acte interdit", i.e., rather by will than knowledge, the latter is also
contained in the concept of "intention"; thus, "intentionelle" in this general context is to be
143 2 Y.B.I.L.C., Part 2, p. 99 (commentary to article 3) (1991).

144 1996 ILC Draft Code, article 2 para. 3 (e).
145 Supra note 106, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para. 216; see also para. 249.
146 Ibid., para. 246.
147 W.R. LaFave/A.W. Scott, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 1, § 3.5., 302–3 (1986).
148 C. f. supra note 8, G. Fletcher, CONCEPTS, supra note 332, 112.
149 To avoid confusion this author uses "intent" in the sense of dolus in general and "intention" in the sense of
first degree dolus.
150 Most explicitly J.M. Rodriguez Devesa/A. Serrano Gomez, DERECHO PENAL ESPAÑOL. PARTE GENERAL 459
et seq., 466 (18th ed. 1995): "El dolo directo comprende aquellos casos en que el resultado ha sido
perseguido intencionalmente ... Se habla entonces de un dolo directo de primer grado ...". See also M. Cobo
de Rosal/T.S. Vives Anton, DERECHO PENAL. PARTE GENERAL 371, 621 et seq., 625 (5th ed. 1999).
151 See J. Larguier, DROIT PENAL GENERAL 49, 51 (18th ed. 2001); J.-C. Soyer, MANUEL DROIT PENAL ET
PROCEDURE PENAL 99 (15th ed. 2000).
Kai Ambos 761
understood broadly in the sense of dolus. Also the official German translation of this
subparagraph reads "vorsätzlich", i.e., refers to dolus in its general sense152. Further, the ICTY
considers that the mens rea of participation in a jce is "intent to participate", i.e., apparently
understands intent in the traditional sense153.
28 The correct understanding of "intentional" depends in the final analysis on the context in
which the notion is used. If it is used as an expression of the general mental element it has to be
understood also in a general sense as dolus; if it is used in a specific context to express a specific
intention, aim or purpose of the perpetrator it has to be understood as first degree dolus directus.
Thus, article 6 of the Statute, referring to genocide, speaks of "intent to destroy" and means first
degree dolus directus, at least if one follows the still prevailing view that genocide requires a
dolus specialis (specific intention)154. Consequently, the French version speaks of "l’intention de
détruire", the Spanish one of "intención de destruir" and the official German translation of
"absichtlich"155. On the other hand, the general mens rea provision (article 30) is based on the
distinction between "intent" and "knowledge" defining the former – in relation to a consequence
– as "means to cause that consequence" or as being "aware" that it will occur; thus, it
understands intent in the traditional sense including knowledge. The word "intentional" in the
subparagraph under examination is used in the same general sense. This also follows from the
fact that subparagraphs (i) and (ii) contain additional specific subjective requirements which put
the general notion of "intentional" in more concrete terms.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that a provision drafted without regard to basic
dogmatic categories will create difficult problems of interpretation for the future ICC.
(i) "with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group ..."
29 A contribution to a (attempted) group crime has – first possibility – to be made "with the aim
of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group" provided that this "activity
or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court". The last
part of the phrase does not require further examination since it only states the obvious; namely,
that contribution to group crimes may only give rise to individual responsibility if these crimes
belong to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court (articles 5–8).
According to the first part of the phrase the participant must pursue the "aim" to further the
criminal “activity” or "purpose" of the group. Thus, he or she must act with a specific dolus, i.e.,
with the specific intention to promote the practical acts and ideological objectives of the
group156.
(ii) "in the knowledge of the intention of the group"

30 Alternatively ("or"), the participant must know the intention of the group to commit the
crime, i.e., he or she must know that the group plans and wants to commit the crime. The
152 Bundestag-Drucksache 14/2682 (14 Feb. 2000) = Bundesgesetzblatt p. 1394 (Vol. II 2000).
153 See supra note 106, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para. 249.
154 This view, however, has been challenged recently by different authors, see A. Gil Gil, DERECHO PENAL
INTERNACIONAL 231 et seq. (1999); A. Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-
based Interpretation, 99 COLUMBIA L. REV. 2259, at 2265 et seq. (1999); O. Triffterer, Kriminalpolitische
und dogmatische Überlegungen zum Entwurf gleichlautender "Elements of Crimes" für alle Tatbestände des
Völkermords, in: B. Schünemann et al. (eds.), FESTSCHRIFT FÜR CLAUS ROXIN 1438 et seq. (2001); id.,
Genocide, its particular intent to destroy in whole or in part the group as such, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 399,
403 et seq. (2001); supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID 101 et seq.; id., Humanitätsverbrechen –
Herausforderung für das Individualstrafrecht? 113 ZSTW 480 et seq. (2001); for a discussion of these views
see supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 790 et seq.; supra note 133, id., Preliminary Reflections
19 et seq. More recently also for a broader understanding of the specific intent (Absicht) C. Kreß, The Darfur
Report and Genocidal Intent, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 562 et seq. (2005).
155 Supra note 152.
762 Kai Ambos
question is whether positive knowledge with regard to the specific crime is required or whether
it is sufficient that the participant is aware that a crime will probably be committed. The latter
requirement was considered sufficient with regard to aiding and abetting by a Trial Chamber of
the ICTY157 but this precedent is only applicable to subparagraph (c) not to (d) (ii). The
subparagraph under examination clearly requires "knowledge of the intention ... to commit the
crime", i.e., the participant must be aware of the specific crime intended by the group.
(e) "directly and publicly incites ... to commit genocide"

The provision criminalizes direct and public incitement but only with regard to genocide. 31
Identical to article III (c) of the 1948 Genocide Convention158 the provision provokes the same
criticism. Some delegations felt that incitement as a specific form of complicity in genocide
should not be included in the "General Part" of the Statute but only in the specific provision on
the crime of genocide (article 6) in order to make it clear that incitement is not recognized for
other crimes159. This argument is questionable since incitement is covered by other forms of
complicity, in particular – in the case of the Rome Statute – by soliciting and inducing as defined
above160. Normally, the difference between an ordinary form of complicity, e.g., instigation, and
incitement lies in the fact that the former is more specifically directed towards a certain person
or group of persons in private while the latter is directed to the public in general161. The ILC
rightly referred to the use of the mass media to promote the commission of genocide in Rwanda
to justify the inclusion of direct and public incitement as subparagraph (f) of article 2 para. 3 of
the 1996 Draft Code162. The ICTR first confirmed the importance of incitement in relation to
genocide in Kambanda163 and Akayesu164; subsequent judgments have basically followed
Akayesu165. The Akayesu Appeals Chamber, however, distinguished between incitement as a
general form of participation within the meaning of article 6 para. 1 ICTR Statute and the
specific form of incitement to genocide within the meaning of article 2 para. 3 (c) ICTR
Statute166. Only the latter must be committed publicly and directly while the former does not
necessarily require these additional elements167.
To incite "publicly" means that the call for criminal action is communicated to a number of 32
persons in a public place or to members of the general public at large, in particular by using
157 Supra note 106, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para. 246.

158 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951). See, e.g., R. Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under International Law, 41 AM. J.
INT’L L. 145 (1947); J.L. Kunz, The United Nations Convention on Genocide, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 732, 738
(1949); supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID 189 et seq.; supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 415 et
seq.
159 Similarly supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 804.
160 See margin No. 15.
161 C. f. supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 651, 653–4. The ICTR, however, considers that
instigation under article 6 para. 1 ICTR Statute includes the direct and public elements of incitement under
article 2 para. 3 (c) ICTR Statute (supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 481).
162 1996 ILC Draft Code, pp. 26–7 (para. 16).
163 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 4 Sep. 1998, para. 40 (count
3).
164 Supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, paras. 672–5.
165 Supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, para. 38; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I,
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 1 June 2000, paras. 13 et seq.; supra note 91, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, paras. 51
et seq. (55).
166 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, paras. 474 et seq.
also supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, para 678.
167 Supra note 166, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, paras. 478, 482; supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza, Ngeze, para 679.
Kai Ambos 763
technical means of mass communication such as radio and television168. The ICTR considers the
place where the incitement occurred and the scope of the assistance as particularly important169.
33 To incite "directly" means that another person is concretely urged or specifically provoked to
take immediate criminal action; a vague suggestion is not sufficient170. There must be a specific
causal link between the act of incitement and the main offence171. The fulfilment of these
requirements may also depend on the "cultural and linguistic" context172. What, for example, a
Rwandan national understands as a "direct" call to commit a crime might not be understood as
such by a German and vice versa. The qualifier "direct" brings the concept of incitement even
closer to ordinary forms of complicity, such as instigation, solicitation or inducement. Thereby,
the concept loses its original purpose173, which is the prevention of an uncontrollable and
irreversible danger of the commission of certain mass crimes174. For if an individual urges
another individual known to him to take criminal action he or she has the same control over the
actual perpetrator as an instigator or any other accomplice causing a crime.
34 One important difference still remains between subparagraph (e) and the forms of complicity
found in subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d): incitement with regard to genocide does not require the
commission or even attempted commission of the actual crime, i.e., genocide. It only requires
the incitement "to commit genocide" without the additional requirement that it "in fact occurs or
is attempted" (as, for example, is required in a general manner by subparagraph (b)). Thus,
subparagraph (e) breaks with the dependence of the act of complicity on the actual crime,
abandoning the accessory principle (Akzessorietätsgrundsatz) which governs – at least in the
sense of factual dependence of the complicity on the main act175 – subparagraphs (b) to (d). A
person who directly and publicly incites the commission of genocide is punishable for the
incitement even if the crime of genocide per se is never actually committed176. This has been
confirmed by the ICTR in Akayesu, where it was stated that incitement to commit genocide
"must be punished as such, even where such incitement failed to produce the result expected by
the perpetrator"177. This view is convincing since the act of incitement is as such sufficiently
dangerous and blameworthy to be punished178.
35 On the subjective level, the incitement must be accompanied by the intention (purpose) "to
directly prompt or provoke another to commit genocide. It implies a desire on the part of the
perpetrator to create by his actions a particular state of mind necessary to commit such a crime
in the minds of the person(s) he is so engaging"179. In other words, the person who incites must
168 C. f. 1996 ILC Draft Code, p. 26; supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 556.
169 Supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 556.
170 C. f. 1996 ILC Draft Code, p. 26; supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 557; supra note 113,
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, para 692.
171 Supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 557.
172 Ibid., paras. 557–8. supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, para 700.
174 The specific danger or risk implicit in the act of incitement lies in the possibility to trigger a certain course of
events. It has been most convincingly described by E. Dreher who compares the inciter to a person who
throws a torch and does not know if it will catch fire or not (Der Paragraph mit dem Januskopf, in: K.
Lackner et al. (eds.), FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WILHELM GALLAS ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 307, 312 (1973)).
175 See on the accessory principle in a factual, quantitative and qualitative sense supra note 11, K. Hamdorf,
BETEILIGUNGSMODELLE 17 et seq.; supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 617–8.
176 C. f. T. Weigend, Article 3: Responsibility and Punishment, in: M. Ch. Bassiouni (ed.), COMMENTARIES ON
THE ILC’S 1991 DRAFT CODE 115–116 (1993) (regarding the 1991 ILC Draft Code, article 2 para. 3)
distinguishing between soliciting and aiding on the one hand, and inciting and conspiring on the other.
177 Supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, paras. 561–2 (562). In the same vein supra note 113, Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, para 678, explicitly emphasizing that "the Statute of the International
Criminal Court also appears to provide that an accused incurs criminal responsibility for direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, even if this is not followed by acts of genocide".
178 Conc. supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID 195. See supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza,
Ngeze, paras. 771 et seq. for examples of articles which constitute direct and public incitement to genocide.
179 Ibid., para. 560.
764 Kai Ambos
have the specific intention (dolus specialis) to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group
him- or herself, i.e., he or she must posses the same state of mind as the main perpetrator180.
According to the ICTR, this requirement also applies to other forms of participation in genocide
but not to complicity under article 2 para. 3 (e) ICTR Statute181. This differentiation is not
convincing182. Indeed, it was not followed by the Musema Trial Chamber, which held that
complicity in genocide – independent of its legal basis and form – requires only knowledge of
the genocidal intent183; for aiding and abetting, even possible knowledge, i.e., culpable
ignorance ("had reason to know"), shall be sufficient184. This is correct in that it limits the
accomplices’ mens rea to positive knowledge; yet it goes too far in admitting the "had reason to
know"- standard for the aider and abettor since this standard introduces a negligence threshold
and thereby violates the principle of culpability. Thus, in general, positive knowledge of the
accomplice with regard to the genocidal intent of the (main) perpetrator(s) must be considered
necessary but it is also sufficient. A higher threshold, i.e., specific genocidal intent, should only
be required for those forms of commission which are similar to direct perpetration, i.e., the other
forms of perpetration (co-perpetration, perpetration by means) and the specific forms of
complicity (incitement and conspiracy), since they create a specific and autonomous risk for the
protected groups185.
(f) attempt
α) "by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step ..."
Although attempt liability was not explicitly and autonomously recognized in Nuremberg or 36
Tokyo or in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR it was always implicit in the criminalization of
the "preparation" and "planning" of a crime, especially a war of aggression. With this form of
criminalization even conduct still in the attempt stage was made punishable as a complete
offence186. Thus, it is not surprising that all ILC Draft Codes contain an attempt provision187.
The Rome Statute correctly follows this view; yet, it does not limit attempt to certain crimes – as
proposed by the ILC188 – but refers to "such a crime", i.e., to any crime within the jurisdiction of
180 Explicitly supra note 165, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, para. 14: "... must himself have the specific intent to commit
genocide ...".
181 Supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, paras. 485, 540, 546–7.
182 For a critical view see also supra note 154, A. Greenawalt, 2282 et seq.; W.A. Schabas, The Crime of
Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, in: H. Fischer/C. Kreß/S.R. Lüder (eds.),
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 469–70 (2001).
183 Supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Musema, para. 183.
184 Ibid., para. 182. See also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No: IT-98-33-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 19 Apr.
2004, paras. 140 et seq.
185 See for a detailed discussion supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 793 et seq.; supra note 133,
id., Preliminary Reflections 21 et seq. (23–4); id., Immer mehr Fragen im internationalen Strafrecht, 21
NStZ 628, 632–2 (2001). This view is also shared by supra note 27, H. Vest, GENOZID 243 (with fn. 33),
248, 265 and 385; supra note 28, G. Werle, VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT, margin Nos. 438 et 441; supra note 28, id.,
Individual Criminal Responsibility 970 and R. Kolb, Droit international pénal, in: id. (ed.), DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL 1, 180 (2008) (both with regard to the aider and abettor); J. Jones, Whose intent is it
anyway?, in: L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN – ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF A. CASSESE
467, 479 (2003) arguing for an analogy with the mens rea requirement of crimes against humanity. Supra
note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 806 only requires that the inciter "must merely know and want the incited
persons to commit the crime", but need not herself posses the genocidal intent. It is difficult to see, however,
how this position may be reconciled with his – convincing – conclusion that the link between incitement and
genocide is "a subjective 'volitional' one in terms of being directed at the genocidal aim of the inciting act".
(ibid., 805).
186 C. f. supra note 2, O. Triffterer, Bestandsaufnahme 232–4. According to supra note 28, G. Werle,
VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT, margin No. 586 attempt is part of customary law.
187 1954 ILC Draft Code, article 2 para. 13 (iv); 1991 ILC Draft Code, article 3 para. 3; 1996 ILC Draft Code,
article 2 para. 3 (g).
188 The ILC could not reach consensus on a list of crimes which can be attempted yet many members and some
governments considered an attempt only possible in case of war crimes or crimes against humanity (2
Kai Ambos 765
the Court (articles 5–8). This is convincing since the Statute only includes the core crimes which
are all equally serious189 so that it would not be justified to admit attempt liability only for some,
but not for others.
37 Attempt is defined as the commencement of execution (of "such a crime") by means of a
substantial step190. This definition is a combination of French and American Law191 and was
already used in the 1991 Draft Code (article 3 para. 3) and the 1996 Draft Code (article 2 para. 3
(g)). The crucial question was and still is when, according to this definition, an attempt actually
begins. It is clear that preparatory acts are not included since they do no represent a
"commencement of execution". In fact, this was the only issue which was not controversial
within the ILC when discussing attempt192. It is not clear, however, whether the German concept
of the commencement of attempt by "immediately proceeding to the accomplishment of the
elements of the offence" (unmittelbares Ansetzen zur Tatbestandsverwirklichung)193 falls within
the terms of this subparagraph. At first glance, the German concept seems to differ from the
"commencement of execution" since in the case of an "immediately proceeding" the perpetrator
must only be very close to the actual execution of a crime but not have partly executed it as
apparently required in the case of the "commencement of execution". However, this is only an
apparent difference, not a real one. The ILC commentary explained that "commencement of
execution" indicates that "the individual has performed an act which constitutes a significant
step towards the completion of the crime"194. Consequently, there is no requirement that the
crime in question be partly executed, i.e., the person need not have realized one or more
elements of the crime. The French version of the Statute also speaks of "un commencement
d’exécution", employing the wording of article 121–5 of the Code Pénal. French legal
scholarship has always understood the concept in a broad sense, covering "tout acte qui tend
directement au délit"195. The Spanish version does not even speak of "commencement of
execution" but requires "actos que supongan un paso importante para su ejecución". Thus, in
practical terms, there is no difference between "commencement of execution" and "immediately
proceeding to the accomplishment of the elements of the offence"196. Still, the latter definition is
more precise and gives attempt liability by its wording much more weight since it is – at least
theoretically – clearly distinguishable from liability for a complete crime197.
Y.B.I.L.C., Part 2, 49, para. 128 (1986); 1 Y.B.I.L.C. 6, 21, 70 (1990); 2 Y.B.I.L.C., Part 2, 16 (para. 71)
(1990); 1 Y.B.I.L.C. 188 (1991); 2 Y.B.I.L.C., Part 2, 99 (1991); 2 Y.B.I.L.C., Part 2, 77, 85 (para. 196)
(1994); 1 Y.B.I.L.C. 110, 121, 145 (para. 10) (1994)).
189 See also supra note 89, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 470 considering that the ICTR Statute does not establish
a hierarchy of norms, but rather puts all offences (genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions and of the Add. Prot. II) "on an equal footing". Conc. Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 26 Jan. 2000, para. 69. For a higher gravity of
crimes against humanity Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997,
joint separate opinion G. Mc Donald/L.C. Vohrah, paras. 20 et seq.; conc. opinion N. Stephens para. 5; supra
note 163, Prosecutor v. Kambanda, para. 14; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case Nos. IT-94-1-S/Tbis-R 117,
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 11 Nov. 1999, para. 28. C. f. supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 748
with fn. 298 with further references.
190 More detailed on the essential elements of attempt (incompleteness of the crime, subjective intention and
objective commencement of execution) see supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 809 et seq.
191 See, on the one hand, the classical French formulation ("commencement d’exécution") already in § 2 of the
Code Pénal of 1810 and now in article 121–5 Code Pénal; on the other hand, supra note 22, Model Penal
Code, § 5.01 (1) (c): "substantial step". C. f. supra note 14, E. Wise, Principles 44; supra note 8, G. Fletcher,
CONCEPTS, 171–2; crit. supra note 28, G. Werle, VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT, margin Nos. 591 et seq.
192 2 Y.B.I.L.C., p. 49 (para. 129) (1986).
193 See § 22 German Penal Code; more precisely expressed in § 15 section 2 of the Austrian Penal Code by the
formula "eine der Ausführung unmittelbar vorangehende Handlung" (an act that immediately precedes the
execution of the crime). For the Austrian solution see O. Triffterer, ÖSTERREICHISCHES STRAFRECHT.
ALLGEMEINER TEIL, chapter 15, margin Nos. 7 et seq. (2nd ed. 1994).
195 C. f. H. Pelletier/J. Perfetti, CODE PÉNAL 1997–1998, 20 (10th ed. 1997).
196 Conc. supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 812–3 with fn. 204.
197 See also article 3 para. 6 of the Alternative General Part, prepared by A. Eser/O. Lagodny/O. Triffterer,
766 Kai Ambos
At first glance it is difficult to understand the meaning of the last part of the first sentence of 38
article 25 para. 3 (f)198. That "the crime does not occur" seems already to follow from the
concept of attempt as a non-completed (inchoate) offence. Further, the non-completion seems to
be logically "independent of the person’s intentions" since he or she intends (wants, desires) to
commit the offence. In other words, the perpetrator has the normal mens rea (as in the case of a
completed offence), what is lacking in the case of attempt is a complete actus reus, since "the
harm is absent"199. In fact, however, the complicated wording goes back to the French law which
conceives of abandonment as a negative element of the attempt definition200. Accordingly,
attempt implies the non-occurrence of the crime independent of circumstances intended by the
perpetrator; e contrario this means that the perpetrator is not punishable if the crime does not
occur because of circumstances intended by him or her. Thus, what this formulation does is to
recognise the possibility of voluntary abandonment using a negative-implicit approach201.
β) "a person ... shall not be liable ... for the attempt ... if that person completely and
voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose"
The possibility of abandonment was not provided for in the ILC Draft Codes of Crimes but 39
was considered in the Preparatory Committee202. It is recognized in all modern legal systems and
can, therefore, be truly considered a general principle of international law203. In theory, it creates
an incentive for the perpetrator to withdraw from the commission204. In light of the first clause
(margin No. 38), however, it is doubtful whether this second clause is indeed necessary. While
the first clause provides for an implicit formulation, the second one opts for a positive and
explicit approach. It was included in the Rome Statute in the last minute, based upon a Japanese
proposal and supported by Germany, Argentina and other like-minded States after informal
consultations. In the heat of the negotiations, the drafters, including this author, overlooked the
fact that the first clause already contained a rule on abandonment, albeit only an implicit one.
The formulation is based on the General Part of the updated Siracusa Draft205 and the US- 40
Model Penal Code206. It is, however, less stringent than these provisions. In essence, omitting
the redundant, the provision rewards the person if he or she – in objective terms – abandons the
effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents its commission and – in subjective terms –
completely and voluntarily gives up the criminal purpose. The reference to the criminal purpose
is not indispensable since the raison d’être of an exemption from punishment in case of
abandonment is that the perpetrator completely and voluntarily abandons the further execution
or prevents the completion of the act. This presupposes that he or she has given up the criminal
purpose.
<http://lehrstuhl.jura.uni-goettingen.de/kambos/Forschung/doc/GENPART3.pdf> (last visited 30 June 2008))

which uses the notion "substantial step" instead of "commencement of execution" since the former is more
precise.
198 Crit. also supra note 28, G. Werle, VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT, margin No. 594.
199 Supra note 8, G. Fletcher, CONCEPTS, 171.
200 Article 121–5 of the French Code Pénal reads: "La tentative ... n’a été suspendue ou n’a manqué son effet
qu’en raison de circonstances indépendantes de la volonté de son auteur". The French wording of the Statute
is almost identical: "… en raison de circonstances indépendantes de sa volonté". See also supra note 8, J.
Pradel, 286. For the Spanish law see article 16 para. 1 Código Penal and Mir Puig, DERECHO PENAL 349-50
(20026).
201 For a more profound discussion see supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 709 et seq.
202 Preparatory Committee Decisions Feb. 1997, p. 22, fn. 12.
203 C. f. G. Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 185 (1978); id., CONCEPTS, supra note 332, 181; supra note 8,
J. Pradel, 280. On its basic elements see supra note 7, A. Eser, Responsibility 815 et seq.
204 See for the different theoretical justifications of abandonment: supra note 203, G. Fletcher, RETHINKING, 186
et seq.; supra note 69, H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, 538 et seq.
205 Siracusa Draft, articles 33–8. See also supra note 197, article 3 para. 6 of the Alternative General Part. Both
rules are based on German law, c. f. sect. 24 Strafgesetzbuch.
206 Supra note 22, Model Penal Code, § 5.01 (4).
Kai Ambos 767
41 The provision does not address the difficult problems related to abandonment, e.g., at what
stage of the commission abandonment is still possible, what counter-activity the perpetrator
must engage in so as to deserve an exemption from punishment or what the circumstances must
be for the abandonment to be deemed engaged in "voluntarily". Further, the provision does not
distinguish between abandonment in case of one or more than one participants; in the latter case,
difficult questions of attribution regarding the act of abandonment of one participant vis à vis the
other(s) arise207. These and other problems are left to the Court. Given the short time at the
Rome Conference and the difficulty in reaching consensus about less complicated issues this
was certainly a wise or, at least, practical solution.
IV. Paragraph 4
42 This paragraph repeats a formulation as old as the codification history of international
criminal law208. It affirms the parallel validity of the rules of State responsibility, i.e., in
particular the rules as embodied in the ILC Draft articles on State Responsibility209.
C. Special Remarks
1. Issues of delimitation
43 The analysis of paragraph 3, subparagraphs (b) and (c), shows that it is hardly possible to
delimitate the different forms of complicity mentioned in these subparagraphs. Thus, it may be
sufficient and more reasonable to draft a rule limiting complicity to inducement/instigation and
aiding and abetting. It is submitted that these forms of complicity cover any conduct which
should entail criminal responsibility. "Ordering" a crime should be dealt with under
subparagraph (a), i.e., acting through another.
44 As to the delimitation of co-perpetration and aiding and abetting, the case law has developed
some criteria. With regard to participation in torture, the Furundzija Trial Chamber held that it
constitutes co-perpetration if the accused takes part in an "integral part of the torture and
partake(s) of the purpose"; if he or she "only" assists "in some way" in the torture and knows of
its existence, the accused is liable as an aider and abettor210. According to the Tadic Appeals
Chamber, the main difference between co-perpetration and aiding and abetting lies in the
existence of a common plan in case of the former and the absence of such a plan in the latter. If
such a plan exists, any contribution to its realisation constitutes co-perpetration211. In Krstic,
Trial Chamber I held that co-perpetration requires participation "of an extremely significant
nature and at the leadership level"212. In Kvocka, the same Chamber made the delimitation using
subjective criteria: while co-perpetrator shares the intent of the jce, the aider and abettor merely
has knowledge of the principal offender’s intent213. However, in Krnojelac, Trial Chamber II
explicitly rejected this view and instead followed the more simplistic Tadic approach, which
considers any participant in a criminal enterprise who is not a principal offender an accomplice
207 Thereto supra note 35, R. Cryer et al., 317, emphasizing that liability for aiding and abetting or participating
in a joint criminal enterprise might arise.
208 See the 1954 ILC Draft Code, article 1; 1991 ILC Draft Code, article 3 para. 1; 1996 ILC Draft Code, article
2 paras. 1 and 4. See also T. Weigend, supra note 481, Article 3, 113; supra note 98, V. Militello, personal
nature, 951.
209 2 Y.B.I.L.C., Part 2, 30–34 (1980); also in: M. Spinedi/B. Simma, UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 325 (1987).
210 Supra note 106, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para. 257; see also supra note 108 and corresponding text.
211 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Tadic, para. 229.
212 See already margin No. 9 with supra note 42.
213 Supra note 47, Prosecutor v. Kvocka, paras. 249, 284.
768 Kai Ambos
but refers to him or her, oddly enough, as a co-perpetrator (sic!)214. In substance, however, this
Chamber pursued the same subjective approach as Trial Chamber I in Kvocka215. In the
Vasiljevic Appeal Judgment, the Appeals Chamber draws the following distinction between co-
perpetration by means of a jce and aiding and abetting:
"i) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to
the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of
civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. By
contrast, it is sufficient for a participant in a joint criminal enterprise to perform acts that in some way are
directed to the furtherance of the common design.
(ii) In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed
by the aider and abettor assist the commission of the specific crime of the principal. By contrast, in the
case of participation in a joint criminal enterprise, i.e. as a co-perpetrator, the requisite mens rea is intent
to pursue a common purpose"216.
This latter approach was recently confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in the Kvocka Appeal
Judgment217. In sum, however, the case law is still developing and far from uniform.
It is also questionable if – in practical terms – subparagraph (d) is really indispensable given 45
the wide scope of liability for an aider and abetter according to subparagraph (c)218. On the
objective level, subparagraphs (c) and (d) are quite similar, the only difference being that (c) is
concerned with individual responsibility and (d) with group responsibility. A person who
contributes to a group crime or its attempt will always be liable as an aider and abetter to an
individual crime in the sense of subparagraph (c). In other words, the group requirement of
subparagraph (d) excludes liability for participation in individual crimes according to
subparagraphs (a) to (c) but not vice versa. Thus, the significant difference between
subparagraphs (c) and (d) lies, if at all, on the subjective level. As pointed out above (margin
Nos. 29–30), a participant in a group crime must either aim at furthering the criminal activity or
purpose of the group (subparagraph (d) (i)) or must know of its criminal intention (subparagraph
(d) (ii))219. Thus, a person acting without the specific intent of facilitating the commission within
the meaning of subparagraph (c) may still be liable under subparagraph (d) (ii). In fact, the
Rome Statute provides, on the one hand, for a subjective limitation of aiding and abetting by the
requirement of facilitating – in contrast, the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals only requires
knowledge that the assistance contributes to the commission of crimes220; but, on the other hand,
it takes this limitation away by the low knowledge threshold in subparagraph (d) (ii)221.
2. Complicity after commission

Article 25 does not refer to acts of complicity after the commission of the crime. The ILC 46
only wanted to include such acts within the concept of complicity if they were based on a
commonly agreed plan; in the absence of such a plan the person would only be liable pursuant to
214 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, para. 77.

215 Ibid., para. 87 requiring that the accused – as a co-perpetrator – shares the state of mind necessary for the
crimes committed as part of the criminal enterprise.
216 Supra note 135, Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, para. 102. See already supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Tadic, para.
229.
217 Supra note 32, Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., para. 89. See further para. 92, where the Appeals Chamber notes
that “the distinction between these two forms of participation is important, both to accurately describe the
crime and to fix an appropriate sentence. Aiding and abetting generally involves a lesser degree of individual
criminal responsibility than co-perpetration in a joint criminal enterprise <www.un.org/icty/kvocka/appeal
/judgement/foot.htm - 204>.
218 According to supra note 8, F. Mantovani, Principles 35 it is "superfluous".
219 I thereby modify the view presented in the first edition (margin No. 39).
220 See supra margin No. 23 with supra note135.
221 For a more detailed discussion see supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 641 et seq. drawing an
analogy to Tadic.
Kai Ambos 769
a distinct offence ("harbouring a criminal")222. This is the correct view since a prerequisite of
accomplice liability is an "attributory" nexus (Zurechnungszusammenhang) between the main
offence and the act of assistance. Thus, assistance that occurs after the commission of the main
offence may only entail criminal responsibility if there is a link to the accomplice’s conduct
before commission of the main offence, or more exactly, before its completion. In most cases
such a link will consist in a prior common agreement which extends beyond the completion of
the main offence.
47 This reasoning also follows from the guilt principle. Accordingly, a participant in a crime
can only be liable for his or her own contribution to the crime, regardless of the liability of other
participants. This implies that the responsibility of each participant has to be determined
individually on the basis of his or her factual contribution to the crime in question. A form of
vicarious liability of the accomplice for the principal is excluded223. If the accomplice, on the
contrary, is liable only for his or her own contribution, this contribution determines the scope of
attribution and guilt224.
3. Individual criminal responsibility and omission,

in particular command responsibility
48 The wide range of liability established in article 25 para. 3 is complemented by a specific
rule on command and superior responsibility (article 28)225. This provision constitutes the
classical rule expanding attribution – apart from conspiracy (only included in a modified version
in subparagraph (d), see supra) and attempt (subparagraph (f)). Article 28 establishes a – in
international criminal law unique – responsibility for omission226: the superior is punished for
failing to prevent his or her subordinates from committing crimes or for failing to punish them
for these crimes227. Thus, this provision establishes a very broad liability of the superior as a
direct perpetrator (principal) for the acts of third persons (the subordinates), thereby creating a
kind of vicarious liability (responsabilité du fait d’autrui) that comes very close to strict liability
if one lowers the subjective threshold to a standard of mere negligence (‘should have known’)
and infers the potential knowledge not from objective facts but mere presumptions
(‘constructive knowledge’ in its worst form). It further puts liability for the failure to intervene
222 2 Y.B.I.L.C., Part 2, 98 (1991); 1 Y.B.I.L.C., 188, para. 21 (1991) (Mr. Pawlak, chairman of the Drafting
Committee). See also: 1 Y.B.I.L.C. 17, 23, 28, 48 (1990); 2 Y.B.I.L.C., Part 1, 28 et seq. (paras. 28 et seq.)
(1990); Vol. II, Part 2, 12 et seq. (para. 50). C. f. also: supra note 22, Model Penal Code, § 2.06; Ch. van den
Wyngaert, The Structure of the Draft Code and the General Part, in: M. Ch. Bassiouni (ed.),
COMMENTARIES ON THE ILC’ 1991 DRAFT CODE 55–56 (1993); supra note 176, T. Weigend, Article 3, 116–
7; supra note 2, O. Triffterer, Bestandsaufnahme 228.
223 In American law, however, the doctrine of vicarious liability serves as the basis for the formal equivalence of
perpetrators and accomplices (c. f. supra note 8, G. Fletcher, CONCEPTS, 190 et seq.).
224 C. f. supra note 14, E. Wise, Principles 42–3; supra note 14, A. Sereni, Responsibility 139. See also:
Preparatory Committee Draft, supra note 446, article 23 para. 3: "Criminal responsibility is individual and
cannot go beyond the person and the person’s possessions".
225 C f. supra note 35, K. Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise 163 et seq.
226 For a more detailed analysis with regard to liability for omission in international criminal law K. Weltz, DIE
UNTERLASSUNGSHAFTUNG IM VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT AUS DEM BLICKWINKEL DES FRANZÖSISCHEN, US-
AMERIKANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT passim (2003).
227 See for a more detailed analysis O. Triffterer, Command Responsibility, Article 28 Rome Statute, an
Extension of Individual Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court – Compatible
with Article 22, nullum crimen sine lege?, in: id., GEDÄCHNISSCHRIFT FÜR THEO VOGLER 215 et seq.(2004);
id., "Command responsibility" – crimen sui generic or participation as “otherwise provided” in Article 28
Rome Statute?, in: J. Arnold et al. (eds.), MENSCHENGERECHTES STRAFRECHT, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ALBIN
ESER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 902 et seq. (2005); supra note 91, K. Ambos, Superior Responsibility; supra
note 327, id., DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 666 et seq. See also O. Triffterer/R. Arnold, Article 28; supra note 28,
G. Werle, VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT, margin No. 472; B. Burghardt, VORGESETZTENVERANTWORTLICHKEIT 185
et seq. (2008) Crit. T. Weigend, Bemerkungen zur Vorgesetzenverantwortlichkeit, 116 ZSTW 999 et seq.
(2004). On the ICTR case law J. Williamson, Command Responsibility in the Case law of the International
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, 13 CRIM. L.F 365 (2002).
770 Kai Ambos
in the commission of crimes on an equal footing with (accomplice) liability for not adequately
supervising the subordinates and not reporting their crimes. Finally, the provision fails to
distinguish between preventive (supervision, timely intervention) and repressive (reporting the
crimes) countermeasures on the superior’s part. In fact, liability is so broad that some kind of
limitation must be imposed in order to avoid violating the principle of culpability. In the case of
Prosecutor v. Oric228 the Trial Chamber’s application of the ‘reason to know’ standard of
superior responsibility for the crimes of the subordinates pushed the boundaries of culpability to
its farthest limits in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal229. To adress the culpability problem, the
German International Criminal Law Code (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch) distinguishes between
liability as a perpetrator (principal) for the failure to prevent subordinates from committing
crimes (Sect. 4), on the one hand, and accomplice liability for the (intentional or negligent)
failure to properly supervise the subordinates (Sect. 13) and the failure to report crimes (Sect.
14), on the other230.
Moreover, although it is conceptually possible to make a clear distinction between liability 49
for ordering (an affirmative or direct act) and for superior responsibility (an omission), these
forms of responsibility are not clearly delimitated in the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals. In
fact, there is a tendency to use the superior responsibility doctrine (Articles 7 para. 3 and 6 para.
3 ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively) as a kind of default liability for cases in which an
affirmative or direct act (Articles 7 para. 1 and 6 para. 1) cannot be proven231. The issue was
implicitly addressed for the first time in Kayishema & Ruzindana, where a Trial Chamber held
that article 7 para. 3 only becomes relevant if the accused did not order the alleged crimes232. It
was also addressed in Blaskic, which held that "l’omission de punir des crimes passés … peut …
engager la responsibilité du commandant au titre de l’article 7 (1) …"233. Only recently,
however, was the issue addressed explicitly. In Kordic & Cerkez, responsibility under article 7
para. 1 was characterized as "direct" as compared to the rather "indirect" responsibility under
article 7 para. 3234. As a consequence, article 7 para. 1 constitutes a lex specialis that excludes
simultaneous conviction on the basis of article 7 para. 3235. Similarly, the Krstic Trial Chamber
held that "any responsibility under article 7 (3) is subsumed under article 7 (1)", i.e., superior
responsibility is only of subsidiary nature236. Last but not least, the Krnojelac Trial Chamber
considers that, if responsibility under article 7 para. 1 can be established, conviction should only
be entered under this provision and the accused’s position as a superior taken into account as an
aggravating factor237. The Trial Chambers in Naletilic & Martinovic238 and in Stakic239 follow
this approach, the latter obiter adding that it would be a waste of judicial resources to discuss
article 7 para. 3 if the accused can be convicted on the basis of article 7 para. 1240. In the
meantime this position has been confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in various judgments241.
228 Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment Trial Chamber, 30 June 2006
229 C.f. T. Blumenstock/W. Pittman, Prosecutor v. Naser Orić: The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia Judgment of Srebrenica’s Muslim Wartime Commander, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.1077
(2006).
230 Bundesgesetzblatt 2002 I 2254; for translations of the text and motives, see <http://lehrstuhl.jura.uni-
goettingen.de/kambos/Forschung/abgeschlossene_Projekte_Translation.html> (last visited 30 June 2008).
231 C. f. supra note 2, K. Ambos, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL 670 et seq. (esp. 672); supra note 91, id., Superior
Responsibility, 835 et seq.
232 Supra note 124, Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, para. 223.
233 Supra note 113, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, para. 337.
234 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, paras. 366 et seq. (367, 369).
235 C. f. ibid., paras. 370–1.
236 Supra note 42, Prosecutor v. Krstic, para. 605.
237 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, para. 173, 496.
238 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, para. 81.
239 Supra note 26, Prosecutor v. Stakic, para. 463 et seq.
240 Ibid., para. 466.
241 Supra note 25, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., para. 745; Supra note 118, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, para. 90-2;
Kai Ambos 770a
50 The applicability of the command responsibility doctrine in non-international armed

conflicts raises another unresolved problem. While a commander’s responsibility in
international conflicts may be based on customary law, starting with the post World War II case
law242, there is no conventional (written) or customary norm that can be invoked for such
"indirect" responsibility in non-international conflicts. Thus, the question arises of whether
prosecution and conviction in such cases would be barred by the principle of legality (margin
No. 21). Although the Tadic Appeals Chamber extended individual criminal responsibility to
non-international conflicts, mainly invoking common article 3 of the Four Geneva
Conventions243, it is difficult to apply this precedent to command responsibility since command
responsibility is a special form of "indirect" responsibility for omission which is mentioned
neither in common article 3 nor in any other norm of international humanitarian law; indeed,
articles 86, 87 First Additional Protocol only apply to international conflicts. Notwithstanding,
in Hadzihasanovic et al., the ICTY Appeals Chamber244, confirming the Trial Chamber’s
view245, held that command responsibility for crimes committed in non-international conflicts is
a logical consequence of the individual responsibility attached to these crimes by Tadic246. In
addition, it refers in agreement to the analysis of the sources presented by the Trial Chamber247.
Still, if one assumes that this is the correct view, the principle of legality would bar a
commander’s prosecution for crimes committed before the day of the Tadic judgment, i.e., 2
October 1995. The Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber seems to overlook this problem. There is
another critical point: While stretching the principle of command responsibility quite far with
regard to the commander’s responsibility in non-international conflicts, the Appeals Chamber
opts for a more restrictive interpretation with regard to the second ground of appeal, i.e., the
question whether command responsibility extends to crimes committed before the superior
assumed the command. As to this point, the Chamber allows the appeal for the lack of state
practice and opinio juris and on the basis of a strict interpretation of the relevant provisions248.
Yet, while it is certainly true that "criminal liability must rest on a positive and solid foundation
of a customary law principle"249, this applies to both grounds of appeal and does not justify the
use of apparently different concepts of command responsibility with respect to the two issues. In
fact, the right answer to the second issue lies in the correct understanding of the structure of the
"concept" of superior responsibility: It establishes, as was analyzed in detail elsewhere250 and
correctly recognized by Judge Hunt’s dissenting opinion251, a separate and own responsibility of
the superior for his or her omission to intervene. This obligation arises, so to speak, in its own
Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 17 Dec. 2004, para.
33-35; with regard to jce liability and superior responsibility supra note 32, Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., para.
104.
242 C. f. supra note 91, K. Ambos, Superior Responsibility 807 et seq.; supra note 227, B. Burghardt, 83 et seq.
243 See supra note 2.
244 Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al., Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, paras. 10 et seq. (31).
245 Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 12
Nov. 2002.
246 Supra note 244, Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al., para. 18: "Customary international law recognizes that
some war crimes can be committed ... in the course of an internal armed conflict; it therefore also recognizes
that there can be command responsibility in respect of such crimes".
247 Supra note 245, Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al., paras. 67 et seq.; supra note 244, Prosecutor v.
Hadzihasanovic et al., para. 27.
248 Supra note 244, Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al., paras. 37 et seq. (45, 51); Dissenting opinion Judges
Hunt and Shahabuddeen. For the majority Ch. Greenwood, Command Responsibility and the Hadzihasanovic
decision, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 603 et seq. (2004); supra note 27, E. van Sliedregt, 168, 170; crit. supra note
59, G. Mettraux, 301
249 Supra note 244, Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al., para. 52.
250 Supra note 91, K. Ambos, Superior Responsibility 850 et seq.
251 Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al., Separate and partially dissenting opinion of Judge David Hunt, 16 July
2003, para. 9.
770b Kai Ambos
right as soon as the commander assumes command with regard to all crimes which still may be
prevented or punished. In other words and with regard to the latter obligation, the commander is
under an obligation to punish all crimes which are or should be known to him or her,
independently of the time of their commission by the subordinates252. Were it otherwise, it
would be all too easy to strip the commander of his or her obligation to repress international
crimes by changing regularly and quickly the command. Consequently, the deterrent effect of
the command responsibility doctrine with a view to future crimes would be severely
undermined. In any case, there is a temporal limitation – apart from the day of the Tadic
judgment - to the argument of the Appeals Chamber with regard to the Rome Statute: if its
prohibition on non-retroactivity (article 22 para. 1, article 24) is to be taken seriously acts
committed in non-international conflicts can only trigger prosecution for superior responsibility
if they were committed on or after 1 July 2002 (for the first 67 States Parties).
The Rome Conference missed the opportunity to propose a general rule on omission, 51
although the final Draft Statute contained a general actus reus article253. This article was
deleted254, basically, because it was not possible to reach a consensus on the definition of an
omission255. Further, it was argued that liability for omission based on article 28 and on the
crimes themselves may be sufficient256. However, if the Court takes the nullum crimen principle
seriously it may have difficulties in basing liability for omission on provisions which do not
clearly and explicitly provide for such liability257. The case law of the ad hoc Tribunals has
generally accepted that liability under article 7 para. 1 ICTY Statute also encompasses
commission by omission258; the Celibici Appeals Chamber, however, held that the non-release
of a prisoner is not a punishable omission in terms of article 7 para. 1 ICTY Statute259. Further,
omission may imply moral support and therefore qualify as aiding and abetting260.
252 In this sense also supra note 227, T. Weigend, Vorgesetztenverantwortlichkeit.

253 Preparatory Committee Draft, article 28.
254 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.4/Add.1 (1998).
255 But see, for example, articles 33–5 Siracusa Draft, article 2 para. 2. Supra note 197, Alternative General
Part. For a general rule also supra note 14, E. Wise, Principles 48–50; see also supra note 8, F. Mantovani,
Principles 32.
256 See supra note 3, W.A. Schabas, Principles.
258 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Tadic, para. 188; conc. supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, paras.
375–6; supra note 123, Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al.,Prosecutor v. Musema, para. 123.
259 Supra note 25. Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., paras. 342–3, 376. For further positive obligations derived from
International Humanitarian Law see supra note 32, A. Cassese, 234–5; for a general liability for omission in
international criminal law supra note 28, G. Werle, VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT, margin Nos. 599 et seq.; supra
note 28, id., Individual Criminal Responsibility 964 et seq.; supra note 185, Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et
al.,R. Kolb, Droit international pénal 1, 182,
260 See supra margin No. 20 with supra note 128.
Kai Ambos 770c

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Article 25

Individual criminal responsibility

Kai Ambos 743

Burghardt, DIE VORGESETZTENVERANTWORTLICHKEIT IM VÖLKERRECHTLICHEN STRAFTATSYSTEM (2008);

Contents: margin No.

744 Kai Ambos

(c) "For the purpose of facilitating (f) attempt

Kai Ambos 745

746 Kai Ambos

B. Analysis and interpretation of elements

13 See already supra note 326.

Kai Ambos 747

(a) Perpetration, co-perpetration and perpetration

748 Kai Ambos

Co-perpetration is no longer included in the complicity concept but rather is recognized as 8

Kai Ambos 749

750 Kai Ambos

49 Ibid., para. 81.

Kai Ambos 751

752 Kai Ambos

71 See H. Jäger, MAKROKRIMINALITÄT. STUDIEN ZUR KRIMINOLOGIE KOLLEKTIVER GEWALT (1989).

Kai Ambos 753

754 Kai Ambos

β) "... regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible"

(b) "orders, solicits or induces" an (attempted) crime

Kai Ambos 755

(c) "For the purpose of facilitating aids, abets

α) "aids, abets or otherwise assists ... including providing the means"

756 Kai Ambos

100 Ibid., para. 688.

Kai Ambos 757

758 Kai Ambos

Kai Ambos 759

β) "For the purpose of facilitating"

760 Kai Ambos

143 2 Y.B.I.L.C., Part 2, p. 99 (commentary to article 3) (1991).

Kai Ambos 761

(ii) "in the knowledge of the intention of the group"

762 Kai Ambos

(e) "directly and publicly incites ... to commit genocide"

157 Supra note 106, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para. 246.

Kai Ambos 763

764 Kai Ambos

Kai Ambos 765

766 Kai Ambos

<http://lehrstuhl.jura.uni-goettingen.de/kambos/Forschung/doc/GENPART3.pdf> (last visited 30 June 2008))

Kai Ambos 767

768 Kai Ambos

2. Complicity after commission

214 Supra note 24, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, para. 77.

Kai Ambos 769

3. Individual criminal responsibility and omission,

770 Kai Ambos

Kai Ambos 770a

50 The applicability of the command responsibility doctrine in non-international armed

770b Kai Ambos

252 In this sense also supra note 227, T. Weigend, Vorgesetztenverantwortlichkeit.

Kai Ambos 770c

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