Madagascar Final Report Legislative and Second

ELECTION REPORT ✩
Legislative and Second Round of

Presidential Elections in Madagascar
Final Report
December 2013
The Carter Center strives to relieve suffering
by advancing peace and health worldwide; it seeks
to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and
democracy, and protect and promote human rights worldwide.
ELECTION REPORT ✩
Legislative and Second Round of

Presidential Elections in Madagascar
Final Report
December 2013
One Copenhill
453 Freedom Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30307
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Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns . . . . . . . . . 28

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Campaign Finance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Key Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . 7 Participation of Women, Minorities, and
Marginalized Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The Carter Center in Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Media. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Deployment of Observers for the
Civil Society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Dec. 20 Elections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Election Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Historical and Political Background . . . . . . . . . . 14
Opening and Polling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Voting Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Single-Party Dominance and a Close
Relationship With France (1960–1975). . . . . . . 14 Postelection Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Single-Party Dominance and the Transfer of Results to District Transmission
Red Admiral’s Break With France. . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Centers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Zafy, Ratsiraka Again, and the Advent of Tabulation of Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Multiparty Democracy (1992–2001) . . . . . . . . . 16 Election Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
Growth, Reform, and CEO Ravalomanana Electoral Dispute Resolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Versus President Ravalomanana (2001–2009). 16
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . 44
The Rise of Rajoelina and the Return of
Military Intervention (2009–2012). . . . . . . . . . . 17 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
The Ni . . . Ni Solution and the Appendix A: Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2013 Proxy Election. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix B: Observation Delegation and Staff . 49
Electoral Institutions and the
Appendix C: Terms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . 50
Framework for the Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Legal Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Appendix D: Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Decrees and the Principle of Neutrality . . 21 Appendix E: Deployment Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Electoral System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Appendix F: Letter of Invitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Boundary Delimitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Appendix G: Quick Facts About the
Election Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2013 Presidential and Legislative
Elections in Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Pre-election Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Voter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Voter Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Foreword
The Dec. 20, 2013, elections in Madagascar from the international community made the 2013
marked a turning point in Malagasy history, an elections possible, overcoming repeated delays and
important step toward democracy and a founda- obstacles to the electoral process.
tion for renewed growth and development. The In November 2013, The Carter Center
elections offered an opportunity for one of the deployed six long-term observers across
world’s poorest countries to emerge from five Madagascar to monitor political developments and
years of economic, social, and political stagna- logistical preparations for the upcoming elections.
tion that began with a 2009 coup d’état — when The Carter Center’s presence grew in December
Andry Rajoelina took power from President Marc when, in a joint mission with the Electoral
Ravalomanana. The international community did Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
not recognize Rajoelina’s 2009 coup or his govern- (EISA), the Center deployed 26 observers from 19
ment. Isolated and without critical international different countries to a total of 85 polling stations
support, the Malagasy people suffered as domestic in six different regions of Madagascar.
political battles derailed development. Former Mauritius President Cassam Uteem and
EISA Executive Director Denis Kadima joined
me as co-leaders of our partnered mission. The
partnership between The Carter Center and EISA
Madagascar’s independent electoral institutions, represented the only nongovernmental observa-
along with the presence of citizen and tion effort of these elections.
The Carter Center’s presence in Madagascar
international observers, were vital to successful would not have been possible without the initial
democratic elections. support of Stefan Findel and Susan Cummings-
Findel and then the U.S. State Department.
We were fortunate to work alongside observa-
Concerted efforts of multilateral diplomacy tion missions from several intergovernmental
led by the Southern African Development organizations including the Southern African
Community (SADC) and other members of the Development Community, the European Union
international community guided Madagascar (EU), the African Union (AU), the Indian
forward to this significant step toward demo- Ocean Commission (IOC), and the Organisation
cratic governance. SADC was instrumental in Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). These
Madagascar’s adoption of a new constitution in organizations deployed an estimated total of 800
2010 and applied critical pressure leading to the international observers for the Dec. 20 elections.
implementation of a roadmap back to democracy, In addition to the international observers present
signed in 2011. Constant, coordinated pressure during the elections, domestic citizen observer
4
organizations deployed more than 10,000 mobile breaking the cycle of winner-take-all elections
and stationary observers throughout Madagascar that have bred repression and economic depriva-
on election day. The strong citizen and inter- tion in Madagascar. To advance democracy, the
national observer presence during the election government should establish a comprehensive
period contributed to the overall transparency and national reconciliation process that can bridge the
success of the electoral procedures. bitter divides of previous years.
Madagascar’s independent electoral institu-
tions, along with the presence of citizen and
international observers, were vital to successful
democratic elections. The recent elections in
To advance democracy, the government should
Madagascar were successfully implemented by the establish a comprehensive national reconciliation
National Independent Electoral Commission for
the Transition (CENI-T), the first independent
process that can bridge the bitter divides of
electoral commission in Madagascar’s history. previous years.
CENI-T should be commended for its orderly
and timely execution of electoral procedures. The
Special Elections Court should also be commended For the international community, the message
for its management of the electoral dispute process is clear: These elections are only the beginning of
and the announcement of election results. what is likely to be a long and difficult transition
Although this forward progress is positive, in which sustainable engagement with ample
stability is fragile. The international community moral and material support will be essential.
should continue to press Madagascar’s govern-
ment to foster and strengthen its democratic
institutions. The elections were a necessary Dr. John Stremlau
step to putting Madagascar back on the path to Vice President for Peace Programs
democracy, but Madagascar’s political leaders The Carter Center
need to provide genuine leadership and to demon-
strate their commitment to inclusive democratic
governance. Doing so would be a crucial step in
Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 5

Executive Summary
Madagascar held the first round of presidential and the foundation to forge a solution to the
elections on Oct. 25, 2013, and the second round prolonged humanitarian crisis.
runoff presidential and legislative elections on The Carter Center met with critical stake-
Dec. 20, 2013. The Carter Center’s observations holders, including the leadership of CENI-T,
and findings summarized in this report relate only during a pre-election assessment in February 2013.
to the second round of presidential elections and During the course of that visit, CENI-T formally
legislative elections. invited The Carter Center to observe the elec-
tions. Upon accepting CENI-T’s invitation, in
mid-October the Center deployed a core team to
set up a field office in the capital, Antananarivo.
Observers from the integrated EISA/Carter Center The following month, six international long-
term observers arrived in Madagascar and were
mission reported that voting and counting processes deployed across the country. During the month
were peaceful, orderly, and in general accordance leading up to the elections, they observed electoral
preparations, met with various stakeholders, and
with Madagascar’s legal framework and obligations monitored important political developments in
for democratic elections. their respective areas of responsibility. As the
election date neared, Carter Center staff from
the Atlanta office deployed to Antananarivo to
assist the mission. With our partner, the Electoral
These elections marked a pivotal point for Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa,
Madagascar as its leadership sought a return to The Carter Center deployed 26 observers to a
genuine democratic government and normalized total of 85 polling stations in six different regions
relations with the international community. of Madagascar.
Madagascar has been in international political Observers from the integrated EISA/Carter
isolation since a 2009 coup d’état prompted its Center mission reported that voting and counting
foreign partners to sever ties and eliminate critical processes were peaceful, orderly, and in general
financial support. The coup and the subsequent accordance with Madagascar’s legal framework and
isolation it provoked created a devastating obligations for democratic elections. In polling
political crisis that lasted nearly five years. stations that Carter Center and EISA members
The road to elections was rocky, but they took observed, voter turnout was moderate at only
place after years of negotiations and international about 50 percent.
pressure. As a result, Madagascar now has an The Center commends the CENI-T for its
opportunity to rejoin the community of nations efforts to ensure that all eligible voters had an
6
Taboh Gideon
opportunity to cast their ballots freely. Although Republic of Madagascar. In this report, The Carter The integrated
Carter Center and EISA observers noted several Center recommends areas in which aspects of the EISA/Carter Center
mission deployed
shortcomings in the process — including inconsis- legal framework could be strengthened, including
26 observers from
tent use of separate voter lists for the presidential the introduction of campaign finance reforms, 19 countries on
and legislative elections, delays in delivery of modifications of the framework for electoral election day.
materials to some polling stations, and inconsis- dispute resolution, and adjustments to enhance
tent inking procedures — these shortcomings were women’s participation in politics.
not systematic and did not appear to have signifi-
cantly influenced the outcome of the elections. Election Administration
Carter Center observers also reported that the To the government of Madagascar: Continue to
polling process was good or excellent in 82 percent support the independence of the commission and
of stations observed. develop its capacity
For the first time in Madagascar’s history, elections
Key Findings and Recommendations were organized and managed by an independent
electoral authority, the National Independent
Legal Framework
Electoral Commission for the Transition.
To the government of Madagascar: Introduce International obligations for democratic elec-
campaign finance regulations, modify framework tions indicate that an independent, professional,
for dispute resolution, and improve women’s transparent, and impartial election authority is
representation fundamental to ensuring that citizens are able to
The legal framework for the 2013 Malagasy presi- participate in genuine democratic elections. The
dential and legislative elections was established by formation of CENI-T marked an important step
the constitution of Dec. 11, 2010, the roadmap of forward, and its independence should continue to
Sept. 16, 2011, and the laws and regulations of the be strengthened.

Voter Registration Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns
To the government of Madagascar: Commit to To political parties and the government of
revise the voter registration process to ensure an Madagascar: Strengthen political parties;
accurate and complete voter registry in advance improve access to candidacies by women
of future elections In a healthy democracy, political parties play a
Although the Center did not directly observe critical role in linking citizens to government.
the registration process, and while accurate Madagascar has accepted important international
demographic data is unavailable, analysis suggests obligations regarding political candidates, parties,
that the register likely underrepresented the and campaigns — including political pluralism,
voting-age population. On election day, observers freedom of assembly, the right to run for office,
noted confusion surrounding the introduction of and competitive elections. Candidate interest was
the additive voter lists, lists of additions made to high, as 33 presidential candidates were on the
the voter list between the first and second round ballot during the first round of elections, while
of elections. Observers also noted challenges 2,054 candidates contested legislative elections.
related to the inadequate distribution of voter Despite the large number of candidates, only two
cards. The Carter Center recommends revision of of the 33 presidential candidates were women.
Madagascar’s voter registration process to ensure That proportion was slightly higher in legisla-
an accurate and complete voter registry in advance tive elections but still low with just 15 percent
of future elections. being women.
Although the abundance of over 200 political
parties in Madagascar is indicative of competition,
Political parties in Madagascar should strive most parties are weak, lack internal organization
and institutions, and are inactive outside the
to develop issue-based platforms and build capital city.
membership bases across the country and beyond Political parties in Madagascar should strive
to develop issue-based platforms and build
the capital. membership bases across the country and
beyond the capital. Steps should be taken to
strengthen internal party structure, organiza-
Voter Education tion, and democracy. Steps should also be taken
To the government of Madagascar: Commit to to increase women’s participation in political
developing an extensive and nationwide voter parties, including in leadership positions and
education program in advance of future elections as candidates.
Voter education is an essential part of any legiti-
mate electoral cycle, and an informed electorate Voting
ensures that the electoral results are a genuine To the CENI-T: Reduce opening delays
expression of the will of the people. The 2013 and improve delivery of materials
elections included a number of important changes Carter Center and EISA observers visited 85
that would have benefited from corresponding polling stations and reported that election day
voter education messages, including the introduc- proceeded in an atmosphere that was primarily
tion of a single ballot paper for the first time calm and peaceful. There were no reported
and a change in voter identification procedures. incidents of election-related violence. Voter
However, Carter Center observers reported limited turnout on election day was modest at about 50
voter education activities across the country. In percent, a drop of nearly 10 percent from the
future elections, there should be a commitment turnout level reported in the first round. Most
to development of an extensive, nationwide voter observers reported delays in the opening of polling
education program. stations, but these delays did not affect the polling
8 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

process. Observers also reported that the voting enough to change the outcome of the election.
process was relatively efficient and that standard Although the CENI-T conducted the tabula-
operating procedures were usually followed. tion process and announced provisional results,
Isolated irregularities occurred in various polling Madagascar’s legal framework calls for official
stations, including the late arrival of ballots and results to be announced separately by the Special
confusion over voter identification, but they did Electoral Court. Further consideration should be
not undermine the fundamental integrity of the given to the process of tabulating and announcing
electoral process nor prevent registered voters from official results. In future elections, the authority
participating in that process. In future elections, for the counting, tabulation, and announcement
CENI-T should strive to reduce opening delays of results should rest with an independent elec-
and improve delivery of materials. toral authority. If this responsibility continues to
be divided across two institutions, the division
Closing and Counting of responsibility should be done in a way that
To the government of Madagascar: Review the preserves the efficiency and transparency of the
electoral law to strengthen counting procedures tabulation process.
Accurate and fair vote counting plays an indis-
pensable role in ensuring the electoral process Electoral Dispute Resolution
is democratic and reflects the will of the voters. To the government of Madagascar: Continue to
Although no significant irregularities were support the independence of the Special Electoral
observed during the counting process, future elec- Court; revise the legal framework to allow
tions would benefit from a review of the electoral more time to file complaints and to broaden
law to strengthen counting procedures to ensure overly restrictive criteria for filing complaints
an accurate count and provide stronger guidance A total of 650 complaints were submitted to
to polling staff. the Special Electoral Court after the elections
regarding the presidential and legislative electoral
Tabulation and Results proceedings. The court responded swiftly and in an
To the government of Madagascar: The full impartial manner in the electoral dispute process.
authority for the counting, tabulation, and While this was a positive part of the electoral
announcement of results should rest with independent process, consideration should be given to revising
bodies, and any distribution of responsibility for the legal framework for dispute resolution to
tabulation should be done in a way that preserves allow more time to file complaints. As it stands,
the efficiency and transparency of the process complaints must be filed within 10 days of
Tabulation of results is an integral phase of the polling, which means that complaints must be
electoral process that ensures the will of voters filed before results are announced and that any
is accurately and comprehensively reflected in formal complaints about the results themselves are
final results. In the days following the polls, prohibited. Legislators should modify Article 132
Carter Center observers reported that the of the Electoral Law in order to allow appeals and
tabulation process generally met Madagascar’s complaints after the release of provisional results
international obligations. The Special Electoral by CENI-T.
Court announced the results of the presidential In addition, consideration should be given
election on Jan. 17, 2014, officially declaring Hery to broadening the criteria for filing complaints.
Rajaonarimampianina the winner, and legisla- Currently, the criteria for the plaintiff to file a
tive results were announced on Feb. 7. While complaint are: 1) be a registered voter, 2) have
some results were not included in the final count participated in the election, 3) limit complaints to
primarily due to unreadable certified copies of activities in the polling station where the voter is
polling station tallies, the total number of votes registered, and 4) limit the subject of complaints
left out of the final count was not significant only to the regularity of voting operations. These

restrictions weaken the Malagasy citizens’ right for democratic elections. The Carter Center urges
to an effective remedy against improper action, a Madagascar to use these elections as a foundation
right that is recognized in international standards on which to foster both democratic develop-
for democratic elections. ment and national reconciliation. The Center
commends the Malagasy people for participating
in a peaceful and orderly process and for the
successful democratic elections of 2013. There
The Center commends the Malagasy people for is, however, room for improvement. To continue
participating in a peaceful and orderly process and its progress toward democratic governance, the
government of Madagascar should make efforts to
for the successful democratic elections of 2013. make campaign finance significantly more trans-
parent, ensure greater representation of women in
future elections, empower civil society organiza-
Conclusions tions to educate the Malagasy people on voting
In summary, the Center found the electoral procedures, and focus on national reconciliation
process to be generally orderly and transparent and cooperation.
and in accordance with international obligations

The Carter Center
in Madagascar
Since 1989, The Carter Center has observed

Thomas Cox
96 elections in 38 countries. The Center

played a central role in the development of
the Declaration of Principles for International
Election Observation and Code of Conduct for
International Election Observation adopted at
the United Nations in 2005 and is among 40
intergovernmental and international organizations
that have endorsed these documents. Endorsing
organizations pledge their commitment to assuring
integrity and transparency in election observation
missions and adhere to these documents to guide
the purpose, scope, and conduct of their missions.
The purpose of election observation is to provide
a credible and impartial assessment of the electoral
process and, when relevant, to make recommenda- Deployment of Observers Observers from
tions to improve future electoral processes. The Carter
for the Dec. 20 Elections Center and the
The Carter Center assesses the electoral
Electoral Institute
process against national laws and the country’s In February 2013, The Carter Center conducted
for Sustainable
international obligations for democratic elections. a pre-election assessment mission in Madagascar Democracy in
An assessment of the pre-electoral environment to determine whether key political and elec- Africa were trained
and preparation for the election are essential to toral stakeholders would welcome an election in Antananarivo
determining the full extent to which all aspects observation mission and if the Center could before the Dec. 20
play a useful role in supporting Madagascar’s elections.
of the electoral process — including voter registra-
tion, campaigning, and voter education — fulfill transition. Throughout the mission, key Malagasy
the obligations of the country in its ratified or actors, including representatives of CENI-T, the
endorsed international and regional treaties. Special Electoral Court, and civil society leaders,
Madagascar has ratified a series of international requested the Center’s assistance in supporting
and regional human rights treaties whose provi- the electoral process. They welcomed the Carter
sions are relevant to the electoral process. Table 1 Center’s possible role as international observers,
provides an overview of the relevant international and CENI-T extended a written invitation to the
and regional treaties that Madagascar has acceded Center to observe the entirety of the electoral
to, signed, or ratified. process. See Appendix F.
11
Table 1: Criteria for Assessing the Elections
Organization Document Status

U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Ratified/Acceded
U.N. Convention on the Political Rights of Women Ratified/Acceded
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratified/Acceded
U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Ratified/Acceded
U.N. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Ratified/Acceded
U.N. United Nations Convention Against Corruption Ratified/Acceded
AU African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Ratified/Acceded
AU African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption Ratified/Acceded
U.N. Communication No. 488/1992. Toonen vs. Australia Ratified/Acceded
U.N. Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities Signed
AU Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa Signed
U.N. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force Signed
Jan. 27, 1980
U.N. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Persuasive Upon
Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
U.N. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, Nondiscrimination Persuasive Upon
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights Persuasive Upon
U.N. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Right to Freedom of Persuasive Upon
Expression and Opinion
AU African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa Persuasive Upon
AU NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance Persuasive Upon
U.N. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25 on The Right to Participate Persuasive Upon
in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right to Equal Access to Public Service
U.N. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 10 on Freedom of Expression Persuasive Upon
(Article 19)
AU African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance Not Party To
The Carter Center did not observe the first larger electoral process and began in-country logis-
round of voting for the presidential elections tical preparations for the arrival and deployment
held on Oct. 25. Instead, the Center’s election of long-term observers. Meetings were conducted
observation was focused on the second round of with key stakeholders to explore the status of
presidential elections and legislative elections that electoral preparations, including representatives of
took place simultaneously on Dec. 20. the government, political parties, candidates, civil
The Carter Center deployed an initial core society organizations, the judiciary, media, police,
team of experts to Madagascar in October 2013 and others.
and established an office in Antananarivo. This Six long-term observers representing six
team assessed critical issues that would frame the different countries joined the core team in

Carter Center mission was co-led
Thomas Cox
by Cassam Uteem, former presi-

dent of Mauritius; Denis Kadima,
executive director of EISA; and
Dr. John Stremlau, vice president
of the Carter Center’s Peace
Programs. The EISA/Carter
Center team consisted of 26
observers from 19 countries, and
they visited 85 polling stations.
Carter Center observers
continued to observe the
aggregation of results in the
transmission center and remained
in Madagascar until the end
of December to observe the
Antananarivo is the capital and largest city in Madagascar.
tabulation process and the imme-
diate postelection period. The
Center’s core team remained in
mid-November. After their arrival, observers were Antananarivo through January 2014 to continue
briefed in the capital and deployed to the field on to observe the postelection period, including the
Nov. 18. In the field, they assessed the campaign resolution of election-related disputes and the
period and electoral preparations in six regions, announcement of election results.
including Toamasina, Fenoarivo, Antsirabe, During this time, The Carter Center issued
Fianarantsoa, Toliara, and Antsiranana. Observer two press statements on aspects of the electoral
teams provided regular reports on political devel- process, summarizing observations and findings
opments in their respective regions. and offering recommendations to key stakeholders.
The Carter Center partnered with the Electoral These reports can be found in Appendix D, and
Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa to their key findings are summarized in this report.
observe the Dec. 20 polls. The integrated EISA/

Historical and
Political Background
Overview of the political process — but one that was too

frequently and easily swept aside during moments
Madagascar became independent from France
of political gridlock or crisis. Long-term political
in 1960. During the subsequent five-and-a-half
and economic stability is not a hallmark of
decades, Malagasy politics have been volatile
Madagascar’s political history, nor is good gover-
and prone to mass protests and military interven-
nance or institutionalized democracy. The 2013
tion. For the first three decades of independence,
elections provided the opportunity to break with
Madagascar was dominated by two longstanding
this overly contested and conflict-ridden past to
Rice is important regimes, one led by the pro-French President
open a new peaceful democratic chapter.
to the country, Philip Tsirananana and the other by Marxist–
both culturally Socialist turned pragmatist Vice Admiral Didier
and as a valuable
Ratsiraka. After the political system became
Single-Party Dominance
food source. This
more open to multiparty competition in the early and a Close Relationship
paddy is in the
Antananarivo area. 1990s, elections became a more meaningful aspect With France (1960–1975)
Madagascar’s First Republic began in 1960
when Madagascar became an independent state.
Thomas Cox
However, independence did not usher in a

sharp break with its former colonizer. Instead,
Madagascar’s first postindependence president,
Philip Tsiranana of the Parti Social Démocrate,
presided over a political system that continued
to allow French citizens to dominate the upper
class of society while maintaining political
and economic coordination between Paris and
Antananarivo. With the blessing of France
(Tsiranana was selected by the French govern-
ment), the new president dominated Madagascar’s
politics in the postindependence period. The
regime was an authoritarian one-party state, and it
tolerated minimal dissent.
Over time, Malagasy citizens began to grow
weary of the postindependence arrangement,
which was not drastically different from the
colonial period. In 1971, Tsiranana’s regime
14
crushed a rebellion, the first major challenge to Table 2: Country Profile
his power. The following year, farmer and student
protests broke out. Although these, too, were Population 22,599,098 (July 2013 estimated)
crushed, Tsiranana recognized that his regime was Ethnic Groups Malayo-Indonesian (Merina and related Betsileo), Cotiers
intensely unpopular. Trying to save his presidency, (mixed African, Malayo-Indonesian, and Arab ancestry–
Tsiranana dissolved his government and appointed Betsimisaraka, Tsimihety, Antaisaka, Sakalava), French,
Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa as prime minister. Indian, Creole, Comoran
This move failed to stem the tide of discontent, Languages French (official), Malagasy (official), English
and Tsiranana reluctantly handed over the reins
Religions Indigenous beliefs 52 percent, Christian 41 percent, Muslim
of presidential power to Gen. Ramanantsoa in
7 percent
October 1972.
The transfer of power to Gen. Ramanantsoa Life Expectancy 64.85 years
set a precedent of military involvement in poli- GDP Per Capita $900 (2012 estimated)
tics that would endure for decades and provoke System Republic
instability in Madagascar’s politics. Having been of Government
trained in the French army, Ramanantsoa ruled
Legal System Civil law system based on the old French civil code and
for three years, maintaining a close relationship
customary law in matters of marriage, family, and obligation
with France in Tsiranana’s mold. His attempts to
sew Madagascar’s fraying social and political fabric
back together were unsuccessful, and he, too,
was forced to resign due to protests and political toward a political alignment with Eastern Bloc
instability. His successor, another military officer, countries. This political and economic reorienta-
Col. Richard Ratsimandrava, was in power for six tion came shortly after the global oil crisis of 1973.
days before he was assassinated. Ratsimandrava’s The global economic downturn and the shock to
successor, Gen. Gilles Andriamahazo, served as domestic industry from a split with France were
president for just five months before being pushed too much for the fragile Malagasy economy to
aside by another military officer, Vice Admiral absorb. The economy collapsed, and the country
Didier Ratsiraka. was bankrupt by 1979. Ratsiraka was forced
Therefore, Madagascar’s first 15 years of to abandon his ideological commitments and
independence were marked by regime volatility, accepted bailouts from the International Monetary
single-party authoritarianism, military rule, and a Fund and World Bank, which, in turn, pushed the
continued close alliance with France, the former administration to adopt a free-market economic
colonial power. policy and combat government corruption. Despite
Ratsiraka’s pragmatic change of heart and his
attempts to reinvigorate the economy with more
Single-Party Dominance and the
liberal policies, economic growth remained stag-
Red Admiral’s Break With France nant and his popularity dwindled. Public support
Vice Admiral Didier Ratsiraka took power in for Ratsiraka plummeted after presidential guards
June 1975. Ratsiraka and his political party, the opened fire on unarmed protesters in 1991. Shortly
Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution, instituted after, Ratsiraka was removed from office, and a
a Marxist–Socialist system of government that transitional government was established under the
began Madagascar’s Second Republic. During leadership of Albert Zafy, who called for multi-
Ratsiraka’s rule, Madagascar severed its ties party democracy. By the end of Ratsiraka’s time
with France and other Western allies. Ratsiraka in office, Madagascar had experimented with new
nationalized a number of Malagasy industries ideologies and breaking ties with France but had
and proclaimed a national goal of economic largely failed — both in terms of forging sustained
self-sufficiency. While officially declaring a growth and in creating a stable and inclusive
nonalignment foreign policy, Madagascar shifted political system.

Zafy, Ratsiraka Again, and throughout his term as president. The 1990s
the Advent of Multiparty transformed Madagascar from an authoritarian
single-party state to a fragile multiparty democracy.
Democracy (1992–2001)
Shortly after initially taking control of the Growth, Reform, and CEO
post-Ratsiraka interim government, Zafy was Ravalomanana Versus President
officially elected president of Madagascar in
1992 — the country’s first genuinely competi-
Ravalomanana (2001–2009)
tive multiparty elections. After his election, The next elections, held in 2001, pitted Ratsiraka
Zafy put in place a new Malagasy Constitution, against the mayor of Antananarivo, Marc
launching Madgascar’s Third Republic. The new Ravalomanana. Ravalomanana had built an
constitution permitted multiparty competition impressive dairy company, Tiko, into a national
and instituted separation of powers between the empire and had subsequently created tangible
executive branch and the National Assembly, an progress during his time presiding over the capital
important step to constraining the authority of the city. As a result, Ravalomanana was popular and
one-party state. The constitution also included won the first round of the 2001 election, but he
a stronger emphasis on human rights, free trade, failed to clear the 50 percent plus one hurdle
and civil liberties — though these goals remained required to avoid a presidential runoff. Shortly
largely unrealized. after that result was announced, however, the
results were changed and reannounced, giving
Ravalomanana enough votes to avoid a runoff.
Ratsiraka refused to recognize Ravalomanana’s
International pressure successfully led to the Maputo victory, sparking a prolonged standoff that
approached the brink of civil war. The country
accords, signed in the Mozambique capital in
became home to two self-proclaimed governments.
August 2009, that called for Madagascar to create After months of simmering political violence,
Ravalomanana established political dominance,
an inclusive and neutral transitional government and Ratsiraka was forced to flee Madagascar
and mandated that elections be held within 15 into exile.
Ravalomanana’s political party, Tiako I
months. This deadline would come and go, as 15 Madagasikara (translated as I Love Madagascar or
months would stretch into 55 months until a vote TIM party), secured an overwhelming majority
of seats in the Malagasy National Assembly (104
finally took place. of 106 seats). During this period, Ravalomanana
presided over impressive economic growth,
consistently above 5 percent during his time in
Madagascar’s economy continued to decline. office. Ravalomanana was extremely popular due
Due to economic malaise, civil unrest, and to Madagascar’s first brush with strong economic
allegations of corruption, the National Assembly growth over a sustained period. He was re-elected
impeached Zafy in 1996. After a short interim in a landslide in 2006, though the election period
period, a presidential election was held in the was marred both by the exclusion of a prominent
same year. Running on a platform based on opponent (Pierrot Rajaonarivelo, who was in
economic reform and decentralization, Ratsiraka forced exile) and by a failed coup attempt by Gen.
returned to power after narrowly defeating Zafy Randrianafidisoa, known colloquially as Gen. Fidy.
with 51 percent of the vote in the runoff presi- With his landslide victory in place, however,
dential election. His second term in office was as Ravalomanana began running the country
equally unsuccessful as his first. Economic woes almost as an extension of his business, prompting
persisted, and public support for Ratsiraka declined observers to question his commitment to

democracy. For example, he purchased a new As a result, when a group of soldiers at Camp
presidential plane but registered it to Tiko rather Capsat mutinied in early March 2009, the military
than to the state — prompting public outcry. This leadership did little to stop them. A week later,
was further fueled by Ravalomanana’s announce- the military stormed the presidential palace and
ment that he had signed a deal with Daewoo, a forced Ravalomanana to hand over power to a
South Korean firm, providing a 99-year lease to military directorate. The directorate took power
large tracts of Madagascar, representing roughly and immediately transferred it to Rajoelina, their
half of all arable land in the country. By late 2008, handpicked president.
Ravalomanana — who had won a resounding When Rajoelina took power, the international
electoral victory just two years previously — was community’s reaction was swift and coordinated.
becoming vulnerable and unpopular. The African Union suspended Madagascar’s
membership, and all foreign aid to Madagascar
The Rise of Rajoelina and dried up as foreign governments refused to
the Return of Military recognize a government that came to power
after deposing an elected leader with a military
Intervention (2009–2012)
coup d’état. The U.S. government went one step
Ravalomanana’s successor as mayor of further, severing Madagascar’s involvement in the
Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, harnessed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a preferen-
growing opposition to Ravalomanana. Rajoelina, tial trade deal that provided an estimated 150,000
who had previously made a living as a radio disc direct and indirect jobs.
jockey, utilized the airwaves and television to The political, social, and economic costs of
stoke a nascent opposition movement. He called the 2009 coup hit Madagascar’s people hard.
upon disgruntled Malagasy citizens to take to the Nevertheless, Rajoelina formed an interim tran-
streets under the umbrella of his Tanora mala- sitional government called the High Transitional
Gasy Vonona (TGV) party. (TGV translates to Authority that was packed with TGV partisans.
“determined Malagasy youth” but is also a play on International pressure successfully led to the
words about the TGV bullet train in France and Maputo accords, signed in the Mozambique
Rajoelina’s speedy rise in Malagasy politics.) In capital in August 2009, that called for Madagascar
response to the opposition movement’s growing to create an inclusive and neutral transitional
support, Ravalomanana closed Rajoelina’s televi- government and mandated that elections be held
sion station in December 2008, which triggered within 15 months. This deadline would come and
widespread protests in the capital. These quickly go, as 15 months would stretch into 55 months
turned violent, and dozens died when a burning until a vote finally took place.
building that was being looted collapsed. In the meantime, Rajoelina proposed a new
Nonetheless, Malagasy citizens continued to constitution shortly after the accords, which
heed Rajoelina’s call to take to the streets. On included an expansion of presidential powers. The
Feb. 7, 2009, an estimated 20,000 protesters vote proceeded after minimal voter education, and
gathered in the center of the capital, and a it was widely believed that few voters understood
contingent of them crossed the “red line” of the the content of the proposed document before they
security perimeter around the presidential palace. cast their votes in support. Several major opposi-
The military fired live rounds at the protesters, tion parties called for a boycott of the referendum.
killing at least 28 (though unconfirmed esti- Nonetheless, the vote took place — after several
mates frequently cite a death toll above 50) and delays and postponements — and it passed with
injuring hundreds. The incident both cemented 74.2 percent of the votes, albeit amid moderate
popular anger toward Ravalomanana’s regime and voter turnout of 52 percent of registered voters.
prompted several key elements of the military to This constitution began Madagascar’s Fourth
question their allegiance toward the government. Republic in ominous fashion, as Madagascar

remained in international limbo, with no elections “allow all Malagasy citizens in exile for political
in sight. reasons to return to the country unconditionally,
After the new constitution was in place, the including Mr. Marc Ravalomanana.”
international community (led by the Southern Seemingly, these provisions were intended
African Development Community, or SADC) to pave the way for Ravalomanana’s return to
renewed pressure on Madagascar’s past and former Madagascar without the threat of immediate
leaders to reach agreement and set a timetable for arrest. However, because Rajoelina interpreted
elections. This pressure was successful, producing Ravalomanana’s actions during the lead-up to
a roadmap in 2011 that was intended to pave the the coup d’état as “war crimes” and “crimes
way for a vote. The roadmap was signed by both against humanity,” the roadmap did not resolve
Rajoelina and Ravalomanana and was intended the prolonged political deadlock surrounding
to usher in a swift return to elections and an end Ravalomanana’s return to Madagascar. The debate
to the crisis. However, the text of the document over this provision of the roadmap would be the
called for “blanket amnesty for all political events lynchpin of blocked dialogue, prompting repeated
that happened between 2002 and 2009, except delays to successive electoral calendars.
for crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of
genocide, and other serious violations of human The Ni . . . Ni Solution and
rights and fundamental freedoms.” Article 20 the 2013 Proxy Election
confirmed that the transitional government would
With Ravalomanana remaining in forced exile
in South Africa, the international community
Shoppers crowd made clear that they would not support, fund, or
Thomas Cox
a market in acknowledge elections that involved Rajoelina

Antananarivo, but not Ravalomanana. Stagnation continued and
Madagascar, where humanitarian conditions worsened, as develop-
the World Bank
ment remained stalled by the political impasse.
estimates that 92
percent of citizens This deadlock was finally broken as the interna-
now live on less tional community coalesced around the so-called
than $2 a day. “ni . . . ni” (neither/nor) solution, which would
allow elections to proceed without Ravalomanana
or Rajoelina’s participation. On Dec. 12, 2012,
Ravalomanana announced that he would abide
by the proposed solution and withdrew himself
from future consideration in elections. This put
pressure on Rajoelina, and he eventually followed
suit — taking himself out of the running with an
announcement on Jan. 16, 2013.
For a brief period, it appeared that the road was
clear for elections. That optimism dissipated when
Ravalomanana announced on April 15, 2013,
that his wife, Lalao, would stand as the candidate
for his political mouvance. Although this may
have adhered technically to the ni . . . ni solution,
most analysts interpreted Lalao Ravalomanana’s
candidacy as a violation of the spirit of the ni . . . ni
agreement. Rajoelina’s reaction was swift, arguing
that because Ravalomanana had reneged on his
commitment, he, too, was free to do so. On May

4, 2013, one day after the close of the candidate
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa

nomination period, Rajoelina announced that he
would stand as a candidate in elections, rescinding
his previous pledge.
This reversal of progress prompted the inter-
national community — particularly the European
Union — to rescind its offer to provide critical
financial support for the elections. As a result,
the elections, scheduled to take place on July 24,
2013, were postponed. The impasse continued as
that date came and went, and the elections were
rescheduled for Aug. 23, 2013.
As the scheduled elections approached, the
political deadlock remained in place, and it
became apparent that they would not take place
as planned. Just five days before the proposed elec-
tion day, on Aug. 18, 2013, the Special Election
Court ruled that Rajoelina, Lalao Ravalomanana, Regardless, the elections proceeded, as A delegation meets
Rajoelina and Ravalomanana both selected with the president
and former President Ratsiraka (along with five
of the transition,
other candidates) were ineligible to run. In the proxy candidates to represent their political
Andry Rajoelina.
case of Rajoelina, he was disqualified because he mouvances in their stead. Ravalomanana selected
had filed his candidate registration papers after one of his former government ministers and a
the prescribed period. The candidacies of Lalao former World Health Organization official, Dr.
Ravalomanana and former President Didier Jean-Louis Robinson. Rajoelina selected his
Ratsiraka were also rejected by the court on former minister of budget and finance, Hery
the basis that they failed to meet the residency Rajaonarimampianin. CENI-T, the independent
requirement of having lived in Madagascar for the electoral commission, finally set a date of Oct. 25
six months prior to registration — something they for the first-round presidential elections and Dec.
had not done but only as a result of their forced 20 for the legislative elections and second-round
exiles. This ruling opened the way to elections but presidential runoff.
set a dubious precedent by using exile as the legal
basis to disqualify political opposition.

Electoral Institutions
and the Framework
for the Elections
Effective electoral institutions and a sound legal International Covenant on Civil and Political
framework are essential to the administration Rights; the African Charter on Human and
of democratic elections and to ensuring that a Peoples’ Rights; the African Union Convention
country upholds its international obligations. The on Preventing and Combating Corruption;
legal framework includes constitutional provi- International Convention on the Elimination of
sions, domestic laws, and regulations regarding All Forms of Racial Discrimination; International
the electoral process. Based on its international Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural
commitments, Madagascar is obligated to take Rights; Convention on the Elimination of
measures to promote the principles of the rule of Discrimination Against Women; Convention on
law, recognizing that laws must be consistent with the Political Rights of Women; Convention on
international principles of human rights.1 the Rights of the Child; and the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption. It has also signed
the protocol to the African Charter on Human
Madagascar’s electoral law includes positive and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa.
measures for transparency and fair campaigning. Madagascar’s electoral law includes positive
measures for transparency and fair campaigning.
Its robust judicial avenues to contest and appeal
Its robust judicial avenues to contest and appeal
election results were an important contribution to election results were an important contribution
to democratic institutions.2 Also, Article 46 of
democratic institutions. Madagascar’s Constitution, which invalidates any
candidate who uses public assets to campaign,
could be a positive deterrent to corruption,
Legal Framework
if enforced.
The regulatory framework for Madagascar’s presi- The Carter Center commends CENI-T for its
dential and legislative elections is provided by work in compiling a comprehensive set of legal
the constitution of Dec. 11, 2010; the roadmap texts governing the elections and making the
of Sept. 16, 2011, incorporated into the Malagasy legal framework more accessible to stakeholders.
legal system by the law of Dec. 28, 2011; and
the laws and regulations of the Republic of
Madagascar. In addition, Madagascar has ratified
a series of international and regional human and 1 U.N., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2; AU,
political rights instruments that are relevant to ACHPR, Article 1; UDHR, Article 21(3); ICCPR, Article 25(b)
the electoral process. These treaties include the 2 Organic Law No. 2012–005, March 15, 2012, Article 23
20
However, there is room for improvement. The
Thomas Cox
legal framework sometimes lacks coherence
and should be reviewed for grammatical and
spelling errors.
The Decrees and the

Principle of Neutrality
Madagascar’s electoral law and the roadmap
require that members of the government exercise
neutrality during the time of elections.3 In its
preliminary statement released on Dec. 22, The
Carter Center noted that the enactment of two
decrees on April 16 and Aug. 6, 2013, contra-
dicted this sentiment of neutrality, removing Electoral System Toliara is
the provision of the roadmap that insisted on nicknamed “City of
the neutrality of the current heads of Malagasy The essence of any electoral system should the Sun” becauses
political institutions during the legislative and be to translate the will of the people into a of its hot climate.
presidential campaigns. The second decree was representative government.4

annulled by the Special Election Court but, Madagascar is divided into 119 constituencies,
unfortunately, this annulment came on the final with 87 single-member constituencies and 32 two-
day of the campaign period, making its enforce- member constituencies.5 The difference in these
ment irrelevant. Heads of institutions — notably two types of constituencies is related to popula-
Rajoelina — were able to campaign throughout tion, with constituencies of more than 250,000
the campaign period in support of Hery inhabitants (urban areas) being two-member
Rajaonarimampianina, who was perceived to constituencies and those with fewer than 250,000
be Rajoelina’s proxy candidate. The decree also inhabitants (the more rural areas) being the
benefited the Robinson camp, as influential single-member constituencies.
heads of Malagasy institutions, including the Legislative elections in the single-seat constitu-
president of the Congress of the Transition, Mamy encies are conducted with the first-past-the-post
Rakotoarivelo, participated in his campaign. system, while two-member constituencies use a
closed-list system of proportional representation.
Although political parties are able to nominate
two candidates in these two-member constituen-
cies, only one candidate for each party appears

on the ballots, despite it being a two-member
constituency where a party has nominated two
candidates. In two-member constituencies, this
mismatch between the electoral system and ballot
design should be rectified before future elections.
3 Organic Law No. 2012–005, March 15, 2012, Articles 45 and 115;
Roadmap For Ending the Crisis in Madagascar, Dec. 28, 2011, Article 15
4 U.N., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 25(b);
Carter Center and EISA leadership John Stremlau (left) and International IDEA Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal
President Uteem (middle) meet with presidential candidate Framework of Elections, p. 28
Hery Rajaonarimampianina. 5 Organic Law No. 2013–083

A mix of majoritarian and proportional have a greater impact on election results than the
representation systems is used jointly in 13.8 vote of a citizen in a larger district.
percent of countries worldwide.6 Although it adds Constituent representation per legislative seat
complexity, this parallel representation system in Madagascar ranges from as low as 5,219 inhabit-
used in the Malagasy legislative elections supports ants per seat in Ampanihy to as high as 143,036
a comprehensive representation of the will of the inhabitants per seat in Anjozorobe. (See Appendix
voters. In past elections, these systems ensured G.) While the use of pre-existing administrative
a satisfactory level of representation for the divisions as a basis to draw constituencies may
Malagasy population. have had some financial and logistical advantages,
The president of Madagascar is elected in a future designs of the electoral system should
two-round system in a single nationwide constitu- include a revised boundary delimitation process
ency. Candidates can be elected outright in the that creates a more equitable population distribu-
first round if they receive more than 50 percent of tion in Madagascar’s parliamentary seats.
the vote. If no candidate reaches this threshold, a
second round is organized between the two candi- Election Management
dates who garnered the highest numbers of votes
An independent and impartial election manage-
in the first round. This second round of elections
ment body that functions transparently and
must be held within 30 days of the official release
professionally is recognized as an effective means
of the first-round results.7
of ensuring that citizens are able to participate
in a genuine democratic process and that other
international obligations related to the democratic
process can be met.10 The election management
The current boundary delimitation creates body should have the responsibility of ensuring
that the electoral process is in compliance with
considerable variance between districts and, Madagascar’s obligations for democratic elections
therefore, undermines the principle of equal suffrage. and human rights. The body should also ensure
accountable, efficient, and effective public admin-
istration as it relates to elections.11
These elections were notably the first to be
Boundary Delimitation conducted in Madagascar through an indepen-
To ensure that the right of equal suffrage is dent body. Previous elections in Madagascar
respected, the delimitation of boundaries should
6 ACE electoral knowledge network database: http://aceproject.org/epic-
seek to ensure that elected representatives repre- en/CDTable?question=ES005#g
sent reasonably equal numbers of constituencies.8 7 The Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Madagascar, Nov. 22, 2010,
Boundary delimitation should be managed by an Article 47, para. 3
independent and impartial body representative 8 UNHCR General Comment No. 25, para. 21: “[...] The principle of one
of the society as a whole so electoral boundaries person, one vote, must apply, and within the framework of each state’s
electoral system, the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote
do not favor any particular social group or of another. The distribution of electoral boundaries and the method
political interest.9 of allocating votes should not distort the distribution of voters or
discriminate against any group [...].” http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/
The current boundary delimitation creates d0b7f023e8d6d9898025651e004bc0eb. The Venice Commission, Code
considerable variance between districts and, there- of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, section I.2: “Seats must be evenly
distributed among constituencies”; and p.17 of the Explanatory Report,
fore, undermines the principle of equal suffrage. http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD(2002)023-e.pdf
The current system is based on older administra- 9 EISA and Electoral Commission Forum of SADC Countries, Principles for
tive divisions and results in significant differences Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region,
p. 13
in the number of inhabitants represented for
10 UNHRC, General Comment No. 25, para. 20
different legislators, meaning that the votes of
11 Venice Commission, Code, sec. II.3.1.c
citizens in districts with fewer inhabitants per seat

were primarily conducted through the Ministry secretary-general. Twenty-one of the 24 General
of Interior. Assembly members represent a broad spectrum
The constitution of the Fourth Republic of of civil society organizations and branches of
Madagascar provides for an “independent national government. The Carter Center is pleased
structure” that is responsible for the conduct to note that the spirit of inclusiveness of the
of elections,12 and the roadmap13 established a CENI-T continued down to the lowest levels of
temporary election administration structure, the election administration.
National Independent Election Commission While the decision-making process is central-
(CENI). The election commission’s mandate was ized de facto at the national level, a large part of
later domestically established by Organic Law No. the election preparations and election-day opera-
2012–004,14 which expresses the institutional and tions is decentralized to the 22 regional election
financial independency of the collegial body, the commissions, 119 district election commissions,
National Independent Election Commission for and 1,553 municipality election commissions.
the Transition or CENI-T. The Carter Center recognizes the good faith effort
CENI-T is governed by its General Assembly, that CENI-T officials and polling staff put forth to
composed of 24 members, supported by a ensure that Madagascar could re-establish democ-
secretariat, and headed by a collegial executive racy and end its long-standing crisis.
The president of
Gaston Kalombo
a polling station
oversees operations
in Toamasina on
election day.
12 The Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Madagascar, Nov. 22, 2010, 13 The roadmap was introduced to the Malagasy legal system by the
Article 5: “The organization and administration of electoral operations fall Organic Law No. 2011–014, Dec. 28, 2011.
under the jurisdiction of an independent national structure.”
14 Organic Law No. 2012–004, Feb. 1, 2012

CENI-T and local administration bodies
Brett Lacy
recruited 140,007 polling staff in order to conduct
the election in 20,001 polling stations across the
island. At the local level, representatives of civil
administration (chefs du fokontany) played a major
role in recruiting polling staff. In its preliminary
statement released on Dec. 22, The Carter Center
also noted that its long-term observers reported
that due to limited resources, district-level election
administration often depended on municipal-level
civil administration to conduct the elections.
In future elections, CENI-T should re-evaluate
its structure, strive to continue to enhance its
Carter Center country expert Brian Klaas speaks with polling
independence, and reduce the need to rely on officials and records observations on an electronic system
government elements at the local level. that reports data in real time to Carter Center and EISA
election analysts.
process, the court has a much more limited

CENI-T conducted electoral operations with a financial and technical capacity to perform the
satisfying level of independence and collaborated same tasks. In future elections, the full authority
for the counting, tabulation, and announce-
with its national and international partners. ment of results should rest with an independent
electoral authority.
CENI-T conducted electoral operations with a
Although the CENI-T is authorized to release satisfying level of independence and collaborated
election results, these results are not binding. with its national and international partners.
Only the Special Electoral Court has the power However, at times the presence of high-level
to release final certified results. As a result, the government officials during CENI-T meetings
decision-making power of CENI-T as the only and deliberation presented a possible avenue for
authority mandated by the constitution to organize conflicts of interest. Despite this presence, there
the elections is greatly diminished compared to is no evidence that electoral operations or results
that of the court. While the CENI-T’s budget were influenced.
allows for a thorough tabulation and results

Pre-election Period
Voter Registration households across the country, filled in registration

forms, and transmitted copies to CENI-T. During
Voter registration is recognized as an important
registration, some instances of confusion in the
means to ensure the right to vote, and it should
process reportedly led to voters assuming they were
be made available to the broadest pool of citizens
registered, when in reality, their name was never
possible without obstacles to ensure universal and
recorded in the voter list.
equal suffrage.15
The rights of universal and equal suffrage are Distribution of Voter Cards
fundamental in democracies and are a critical Although The Carter Center did not directly
part of democratic elections. The constitution observe the registration process, the process
of Madagascar and other Malagasy legislative included an official display of the voter list, a
acts affirm these human rights.16 For example, complaint period for correction of irregularities,
Madagascar’s electoral law17 outlines the procedure and the distribution of voter cards to registered
for establishing the voter list and stipulates that it voters. However, in some circumstances the
must be regularly updated. While the voter list is distribution of these cards by local electoral
independent of the civil register, identity verifica- administration was delayed. While a voter card
tion (using a national identity card) is required was not required to vote in Madagascar’s 2013
when registering as a voter. elections,18 the document has traditionally been
According to the official calendar, voter regis- compulsory in previous elections. This history
tration took place between Oct. 1, 2012, and Oct. led many voters to believe that voter cards would
9, 2013, which was prior to the arrival of Carter be required in order to vote. People who did not
Center observers. Registration activities were not receive a voter card — or received one after a long
directly observed by the Center. The comments delay — may have mistakenly believed they were
included here reflect analysis of the legal frame- ineligible to vote, which may have discouraged
work for voter registration; the impact of the voter some from voting.
registration process observed on election day;
and information collected from interviews with
15 U.N., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 25(b);
political parties, civil society organizations, and AU, AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in
international organizations. Africa, Article 1; U.N., United Nations Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 25 on “the Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting
Voter registration was conducted by election Rights, and the Right to Equal Access to Public Service,” para. 11
officials deployed by CENI-T to each of the 1,553 16 The Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Madagascar, Nov. 22, 2010
municipalities of Madagascar. This process was 17 Organic Law No. 2012–005, March 15, 2012
largely coordinated with local administration, 18 The national identity card is the only identification required for polling;
or chefs du fokontany. Election officials visited not the voter card.
25
Additionally, although the voter card was in 2013 — in spite of the fact that the best
not required to vote, it is an important source of demographic estimates show that Madagascar’s
information and indicates the designated polling population has been growing relatively quickly in
location for each voter. Voters without voter cards all regions.
did not have access to information about their In its Dec. 22 statement, The Carter Center
polling location. In some areas, Carter Center noted that these concerns of underregistration
observers witnessed the distribution of voter cards were compounded by low voter turnout, particu-
as late as election day. larly in the second round, with just under 51
percent of registered voters casting ballots. If the
Representative Factor in the Voter List demographic estimates are correct that more than
Ultimately, the voter list included 7,823,305 10.5 million Malagasy citizens should be eligible to
eligible citizens. Although the Center did not vote, it is important to note that the winning pres-
directly observe the registration process, and idential candidate, Hery Rajaonarimampianina,
while accurate demographic data is unavail- won with just over 2 million votes — less than 20
able, analysis suggests that the register likely percent of the age-eligible population.
underrepresented the voting-age population. In
addition, it is extremely likely that many people The Additive Voter List
were not registered properly in the first place. Reports from international observers indicated
U.N. projections, based in part on Madagascar’s that during the first round of presidential elections
last census (conducted in 1993), indicate that at on Oct. 25 (prior to the arrival of Carter Center
least 10,500,000 citizens of Madagascar should be observers) some problems arose related to inad-
eligible to vote. If that figure is correct, only 74.5 equacies with the voter list. As a result, CENI-T
percent of eligible Malagasy citizens registered to reviewed the official voter list and discovered that
vote in the 2013 elections. Moreover, according some names of properly registered voters were
to official, national-level statistics, more than 3 omitted from the final copy used for voter identi-
million adult citizens do not have a national iden- fication at the polling station, an error that caused
tity card. Lacking this card would prevent them some voters to be disenfranchised.
from registering. This resulted in the decision to revise the
voter list between the first and second rounds by
reintegrating 143,408 voters who were initially
registered but whose names were not added to
In its Dec. 22 statement, The Carter Center noted the list in the first round of presidential elections.
This decision was reached after a robust debate
that these concerns of underregistration were that involved some parties suggesting that voter
compounded by low voter turnout, particularly in registration should be completely reopened to
new registrations. The Carter Center supports
the second round, with just under 51 percent of the CENI-T decision not to open the voter list,
registered voters casting ballots. opting instead to reinstate the names of previously
registered voters. Reopening the list for the regis-
tration of new voters between the first and second
rounds of elections would have been challenging
The increase in the size of the voter roll and would have meant that the two parts of the
between 2006 and 2013 was extremely low (a
2.7 percent increase), another indicator that
demographic growth was not being captured by
voter registration.19 In six of the country’s 22 19 “Analysis of the electronic voter list of the presidential elections of
Dec. 3, 2006, and administrative status of the Malagasy population
regions, the number of registered voters decreased was based on the rule of law, democracy, and development in
from the elections in 2006 to the recent elections Madagascar.” — Ministry of the Interior, June 2009

same presidential election were conducted with Voter Education
different electorates.
Voter education is an essential part of the electoral
Exclusions From Eligibility cycle that is recognized in international law as
Only small groups of people should be excluded an important means of ensuring that an informed
from voting under Malagasy electoral law.20 electorate is able to effectively exercise their right
Madagascar’s Constitution allows for voters to to vote.25
be excluded from participation in elections only
by court ruling.21 If these are the only groups of
people excluded under established procedures,
In future elections, voter cards should be distributed
being based on objective and reasonable criteria,
such restrictions are in line with international to all Malagasy citizens with ample time before
standards for democratic elections. Madagascar’s
laws do not provide for the disenfranchisement of
elections take place. Comprehensive efforts to
sick or incarcerated citizens. The Carter Center educate voters, not just about the voting process
regrets, however, that attempts were not made
to register and facilitate the enfranchisement of itself but also about the registration process, should
eligible voters in Madagascar’s 2,648 hospitals22 or be made across the island.
41 detention centers.23
Women and the Voter Register

Although official voter registration data disaggre- Voters’ understanding of the secrecy of the
gated by gender is not available, some civil society ballot was of fundamental importance, particularly
groups compiled statistical information related to given the highly politicized environment in which
women’s participation in the voter registration these elections took place and the country’s
process that indicated women likely participated political culture of punishing losers and their
at high levels, with an estimated 46 percent of the supporters. These elections included important
final registry being women.24 changes, such as the introduction of a single ballot
paper for the first time and the change in voter
Conclusions identification procedures. Voter education efforts
Before Madagascar’s next elections, steps should be to enhance awareness and understanding of these
taken to ensure that the problems related to voter changes were broadly recognized as being essential
registration are not repeated. In particular, future to the process but, ultimately, appear to have been
electoral processes would benefit greatly from underfunded and ineffective.
the conduct of a comprehensive national census,
followed by a new voter registration process to
generate a clean and representative voter list. 20 Organic Law No. 2012–005, March 15, 2012, Article 4
In future elections, voter cards should be 21 The Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Madagascar, Nov. 22, 2010,
Article 5
distributed to all Malagasy citizens with ample
22 2,485 Municipal Health Centers (CSB 1 and 2) have the capacity of
time before elections take place. Comprehensive accommodating 9,940 patients (source: Ministry of Health). Additionally,
efforts to educate voters, not just about the voting there are 148 other health institutions with residing patients. However,
the number of eligible adult patients currently being hospitalized in public
process itself but also about the registration health centers is not available.
process, should be made across the island. 23 The population of those awaiting trial in Madagascar’s detention centers
The electoral management body should ensure is thought to be about 10,000.
that voters are given ample opportunity to be 24 Data related to the participation of women in the elections was
compiled from a range of meetings with stakeholders, including
notified of their voting eligibility status and given CENI-T, National Women’s Council of Madagascar, Focus Development
sufficient time to appeal any decisions that would Association, and EISA.
restrict their right to participate. 25 ICCPR, Article 25; UNHRC, General Comment No. 25, para. 11

ensuring the integrity of
Thomas Cox
the democratic election
process. Madagascar
has accepted several
important international
obligations in relation to
candidates, parties, and
the campaign environ-
ment, including ensuring
that every citizen has
the right to be elected26
and the right of freedom
of assembly.27
Due to its interna-
tional obligations for
democratic elections, the
Republic of Madagascar
committed to ensure “a
real political pluralism, an
ideological variety, and
a multiparty system that
are exercised through
Children Carter Center observers noted limited voter functioning of political parties . . . .”28 In order to
entertained education activity in advance of the Dec. 20 elec- ensure this important ambition, Madagascar is also
themselves by
playing outside a
tions. Thirty-two civil society organizations under obligated to ensure that “every citizen should have
polling station the the supervision of CENI-T were given materials equal legal possibilities to propose him/herself as a
day before election to conduct voter education. However, their candidate in elections.”29
day. They enjoyed overall capacity, level of programming, and impact The Malagasy legal framework for political
the camera too. throughout the election process remain unclear. parties and campaigns contains some positive
The Project to Support the Electoral Cycle in measures in support of electoral transparency. For
Madagascar was among the more prominent orga- example, Article 45 of the electoral law prohibits
nizations that conducted voter education aimed at any official inauguration ceremony, such as of a
maximizing voter participation. building or event, during the election campaign
In spite of the new procedures and limited voter period. This is a positive measure that, in practice,
education activities, voters seemed to have under- could reinforce an equal playing field for candi-
stood the basic voting process and were given dates. However, it was not fully respected during
support by polling staff when needed. Polling staff the campaign.
members were generally willing to help voters with The Carter Center congratulates the Malagasy
casting their ballots and contributed positively to people on conducting campaigns for presidential
the success of the electoral process. and legislative elections in a largely peaceful
Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns 26 See, for example, UDHR, Article 21(1); ICCPR, Article 25(b); AfCHPR,
Article 13(1); CISCHRFF, Article 29(b)
Political pluralism and genuine choice for voters
27 ICCPR, Article 21; AfCHPR, Article 11; CISCHRFF, Article 12(1)
are critical aspects of democracy. Equitable treat-
28 CIS, Convention on the Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral
ment of candidates and parties during an election, Rights, and Freedoms in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Article
as well as the maintenance of an open and trans- 9(2)
parent campaign environment, are important to 29 Ibid., Article 3(4)

manner. While the campaign period was peaceful, healthy democracy, competition among political
regrettably there was a grenade attack in the parties provides citizens a meaningful choice in
capital during Rajaonarimampianina’s inaugura- governance, outlets for participation in politics,
tion on Jan. 25, which killed one child and injured and ways to mobilize citizens around issues that
37 others. No other major violent events occurred affect their lives.
during the electoral process.30 Although the abundance of over 200 political
The peaceful campaign period is a major parties in Madagascar is indicative of competition,
improvement from previous elections and an The Carter Center regrets that most parties are
important milestone for Malagasy democracy. weak and lack internal organization and institu-
Approximately one month before the presi- tions, and most are inactive outside the capital
dential runoff elections, one-third of Madagascar’s city. Few parties in Madagascar put forward a
regional governors were replaced with military coherent slate of candidates. Some parties are
personnel, a move that was seen as unneces- empty shells, with a membership that does not
sarily inflammatory given Madagascar’s history of extend beyond a single candidate.
postelection coups. In its Dec. 22 statement, the Madagascar’s democracy would be better
Center noted regret for this decision to replace served if parties extended their outreach and
governors with military personnel, which created built membership. Moreover, parties should
unnecessary uncertainty about the role of the devote more effort to constructing platforms and
military within key government posts during policy statements beyond the personality of their
Madagascar’s first postcoup election. featured candidate.
Freedom of assembly is recognized as an
essential part of democratic elections; however,
this right may be restricted under circumstances Approximately one month before the presidential
prescribed by law.31 During the campaign period,
candidates were free to organize meetings after
runoff elections, one-third of Madagascar’s regional
fulfilling conditions dictated by electoral code, governors were replaced with military personnel, a
which required the prior notification of admin-
istrative authorities. The Carter Center believes move that was seen as unnecessarily inflammatory
that despite this requirement, no candidates given Madagascar’s history of postelection coups.
reported difficulty with enjoying their freedom
of assembly.
Similarly, The Carter Center is disappointed
Candidate Debates by the lack of an oversight body for the code
CENI-T and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of conduct of candidates and political parties.
organized three presidential debates between Electoral rules and regulations exist to ensure
the two second-round finalists, Dr. Jean-Louis fairness and that elections accurately reflect the
Robinson and Hery Rajaonarimampianina. will of the people. Without oversight and enforce-
Though at times pointed, the debates were largely ment, it is difficult to ensure that a campaign is
conducted in a respectful manner that allowed conducted appropriately. This is an important
Malagasy citizens to hear directly from the candi- flaw that should be addressed in advance of
dates on live television and radio as they discussed future elections.
important issues about Madagascar’s future. The
continuation of these debates in future elections is
encouraged for presidential and legislative races.
30 Legislative candidate Victorio Antonio Rakotobe was killed on Nov. 16
at his home in Antananarivo. His death was reportedly not politically
Political Parties motivated but rather linked to the high level of criminality that prevails in
Political parties play a critical role in democratic the island.
societies to connect citizens to government. In a 31 ICCPR, Article 21; AfCHPR, Article 11; CISCHRFF, Article 12

Campaign Finance to publicize their assets were ignored. Greater
oversight of campaign expenditure and public
Madagascar is obligated to take measures to
disclosure of candidate assets would have provided
prevent corruption, particularly in the context
greater financial transparency throughout the
of campaign financing.32 Campaign finance
process while strengthening voter confidence in
regulations should enforce a transparent process
the electoral process.
in which all political parties and candidates are
treated equally.
While Article 47 of Madagascar’s electoral law
Participation of Women, Minorities,
references regulating campaign finance, the polit- and Marginalized Groups
ical parties’ law makes no reference to campaign Gender equality is an important goal of democratic
finance regulation. Regardless of the legal founda- elections. Article 5 of the Malagasy Constitution
tion for campaign finance oversight, no scrutiny provides for gender equality in voter eligibility.
or regulation of money used in campaigns was Article 6 of the constitution mandates equality
conducted during the 2013 Malagasy elections. between men and women and forbids all forms of
The lack of campaign finance regulation and discriminations based on gender. International and
oversight was one of the largest shortcomings regional obligations also protect women’s rights
of these elections, particularly in the politically and ensure their democratic right to participa-
charged context in which these elections was tion.34 Madagascar has committed to taking
conducted and in the spirit of the roadmap that measures to ensure that:
sought to protect a neutral environment.
a. Women participate without any discrimination
in all elections.
b. Women are represented equally at all levels in
Greater oversight of campaign expenditure and all electoral processes.
public disclosure of candidate assets would have c. Women are equal partners with men at all levels
of development and implementation of state
provided greater financial transparency throughout policies and development programs.”35
the process while strengthening voter confidence in According to the latest comparative reports36
aimed at monitoring gender equality in SADC
the electoral process. countries, Madagascar is situated at the bottom of
the list in achieving the objectives of its regional
commitments.37 The current representation of
The overall absence of transparency in Malagasy women in decision-making positions
campaigns — coupled with the refusal of both is exceptionally low. While in the previous
presidential candidates to publish the details of
their campaign spending — contributed to an
opacity of the 2013 presidential and legislative 32 U.N. Convention Against Corruption, Articles 18 and 37; African Union
campaigns, undermining Madagascar’s obligations Convention on Corruption, Article 7; UNCAC, Article 7
for democratic elections.33 33 African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, Article 2,
With no campaign finance regulations in para. 10; ICCPR general comments on Article 25, para. 19
place, it was difficult for observers, parties, and 34 ICCPR, Convention on the Political Rights of Women
citizens to assess how much money was spent or 35 AU, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on
the Rights of Women in Africa, Article 9(1); SADC Protocol on Gender and
whether financial resources were improperly used Development, Article 12
to secure an electoral edge. The Center regrets 36 The SADC Gender Protocol Barometer (Baromètre du Protocole de la
that Madagascar lacks a clear legal framework to SADC sur le Genre et Développement) (Last Barometer 2012) indicates that
Madagascar falls short of achieving the protocol’s objectives.
regulate campaign finances and that attempts by
37 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development: http://www.sadc.int/
civil society organizations to compel candidates documents-publications/show/803

parliamentary mandate 11
Jules Lalancette
percent of parliamentar-
ians were women, only 4.7
percent of the country’s
mayors are female and only
2.6 percent of chefs du fokon-
tany are women.
The Carter Center regrets
that in spite of Madagascar’s
national and international
obligations regarding gender
equality, the meaningful
participation of women as
candidates in these elections
was low. Just two of the 33
candidates in the first-round
presidential election were
women, and none advanced
to the runoff elections.38
In the legislative elections, Former President of Mauritius Cassam Uteem and Carter Center Vice President
female candidates repre- for Peace Programs John Stremlau speak with the press on election day to share
sented only 15 percent of initial observations.
the total number of candi-
dates, and only 10 percent of political parties who nominate female candidates.
female candidates were ranked at the “head of the These measures could increase gender parity both
list” of candidates, making it distinctly unlikely in the number of candidates and in the number of
that they would be elected. people of each gender elected in Madagascar.
During the presidential and legislative election
campaign, civil society organizations reported The Media
isolated cases of intimidation toward female
The media play an indispensible role during demo-
candidates and their supporters. In future elec-
cratic elections by educating voters and political
tions, additional measures should be put in place
parties about major issues, thus giving them
to ensure the security of female participants of the
access to information so they can make a truly
electoral process.
informed decision.40
The Carter Center recommends implementing
The Malagasy Constitution guarantees the
legal and systematic measures that will ensure
freedoms of opinion, expression, communication,
accurate representation of women in the demo-
and press. The constitution guarantees freedom
cratic life of Madagascar and likewise recommends
of the press with the caveat that press freedom
implementation of the goal of gender equality in
may not violate the rights of others and is within
terms of representation in public life as stipulated
in Article 12 of the SADC Protocol on Gender
and Development.39
Financial incentives could be put in place to 38 In the first round of presidential elections, Saraha Georget Rabeharisoa
encourage more women to run in future legislative received 4.5 percent of votes while Brigitte Ihantanirina Rabemananantsoa
received 1.38 percent.
elections. These could include the allocation of
39 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, Article 12: “States’ parties
funding specifically for the campaigns of female shall endeavor that, by 2015, at least 50 percent of decision-making
candidates, waiving candidate fees for women positions in the public and private sectors are held by women.”
who run for office, or providing tax incentives to 40 OSCE, Election Observation Handbook (Fifth Edition), p. 48

the boundaries of preservation of public order, powerful and popular medium for educating voters,
national dignity, and state security. It also reaf- especially in remote areas where TV and newspa-
firms the right to information for all individuals pers do not reach the populations.
and forbids all forms of censorship. The ownership of media outlets and access
Madagascar’s national legislation provides for to airtime has traditionally played a significant
an equitable distribution of airtime on public radio role in the success of electoral campaigns in
and television between candidates and parties, Madagascar. Radio and printed media provide
which is monitored and regulated by CENI-T.41 a stage for the repetition of campaign messages
However, there is no similar regulation of private that ultimately reinforce a candidate’s credibility
media. This absence of regulation and inde- among the public. The dominance of privately
pendent enforcement of private airtime greatly owned media outlets by wealthy candidates in the
benefits the wealthiest candidates, providing 2013 presidential and legislative elections created
them with an overwhelming advantage over an unequal playing field in favor of the richest
their opponents. candidates. Media ownership by candidates and
The Malagasy media environment is made up airtime used in campaigns should be regulated
of a large number of newspapers, television, and in future elections to ensure a level playing
radio channels. Freedom of the press was generally field for all candidates in the legislative and
respected during the campaign, and no attempts presidential races.42
to curtail these freedoms were reported by Carter
Center observers. While there was a considerable Civil Society
amount of information available for the public via
According to public international law, all people
Malagasy news sources, the quality and accuracy of
have the right to participate in the public affairs of
the information reported are questionable. Reports
their country.43 This includes the right of citizens
of inaccurate and conflicting information were
to participate in nongovernmental organizations.44
abundant throughout the election period.
Other sources extend this to the right to take part
in citizen observer organizations and to contribute
to voter education efforts.45 Through these means,
civil society can actively play an essential role in
Civil society organizations would benefit from
upholding an electoral process that is accountable
additional technical, financial, and organizational while also building confidence in the process.
Overall, Carter Center observers noted a
capacity to strengthen their ability to be a voice in relatively weak role of civil society organizations
Madagascar’s public affairs. across the country throughout the electoral
process, particularly in the area of voter education.
Civil society organizations would benefit from
Carter Center observers found that while
media diversity is prevalent, news reports are often
biased and opinionated. A media environment rife 41 Organic Law No. 90–031, Dec. 21, 1990; Ordinance 92–039, Sept. 14,
1992; Organic Law No. 2012–005, March 15, 2012, Article 48; Organic Law
with biased and inflammatory information could No. 2012–015, Article 19; Organic Law No. 2012–016, Article 48
have negatively affected the electoral process 42 The Carter Center did not conduct comprehensive quantitative media
and incited violence during the campaign period. monitoring. For further information on the role of the press in the elections,
please refer to the work of the European Union election observation
Despite the media’s lack of partisanship, local news mission, or Osservatorio di Pavia.
reports regularly informed the public on various 43 U.N., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 25(a);
parties’ campaign spending, creating at least a low AU, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 13(1); U.N.,
level of transparency in campaign finance. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21(a)
A limited number of media outlets conducted 44 U.N., CEDAW, Article 7
voter education. Radio media remained the most 45 EISA, PEMMO, p. 19

additional technical, financial, and organizational estimated 10,000 mobile and stationary observers
capacity to strengthen their ability to be a voice in throughout Madagascar on Dec. 20, according to
Madagascar’s public affairs. accreditation numbers from CENI-T. However,
The election process was observed by a large Carter Center and EISA observers noted that
number of domestic observers. The three main domestic observers were only present at about 40
groups of civil society organizations deployed an percent of polling stations observed.

Election Day
Opening and Polling retribution.48 Madagascar largely met these impor-

tant requirements in the Dec. 20 polls.
The quality of voting operations on election day
is crucial to determining whether an election
lives up to its democratic obligations. According
Voting Process
to Madagascar’s international and regional Carter Center and EISA observers visited a
commitments, all citizens should enjoy the right total of 85 polling stations in six districts on
to universal and equal suffrage,46 and all citizens election day where they observed poll opening,
have the right to vote,47 subject only to reasonable polling, closing, and counting in an atmosphere
and objective limitations. A core obligation under that was primarily calm and peaceful. Overall,
international law is that elections shall be held observers reported modest voter turnout and
by secret ballot, which is recognized as a means of polling staff that generally performed according
ensuring that the will of the people is expressed to procedures. The presence of Carter Center and
freely and that a cast ballot cannot be connected EISA observers was welcomed across the country
with a voter to avoid intimidation and political without exception. The Center shared its findings
in a preliminary statement released on
Dec. 22, shortly after election day, to
President Cassam congratulate Madagascar on a calm and
Uteem, former transparent polling process.49

president of
Maritius (left), and
Dr. John Stremlau
of The Carter
Center speak with
polling station staff
on election day.
46 U.N., ICCPR, Article 25; ACHR, Article 23; U.N., UDHR,
Article 21
47 ICCPR, Article 25; AU, AfCHPR, Article 13; ACHR,
Article 23
48 U.N., ICCPR, Article 25; ACHR, Article 23; U.N., UDHR,
Article 23. EISA and Electoral Commission Forum of SADC
Countries, Principles for Election Management, Monitoring,
and Observation in the SADC Region, p. 24
49 The Carter Center. “Carter Center Congratulates
Madagascar on a Calm and Transparent Polling
Process; Encourages Renewed Commitment to National
Reconciliation,” Dec. 22, 2013
34
Opening of Polling Stations
Thomas Cox
Observer teams noted opening delays across the
country. The delays were minimal, often between
five and 15 minutes, and did not impact the
opportunity for citizens to vote. In some areas
observed, polling stations opened as much as an
hour late.
Observers reported that in most cases, delays
in opening were due to a late start in setting up
the polling stations and the late arrival of elec-
tion materials, including voting booths and ballot
papers. Observer teams evaluated the opening
processes as average, poor, or very poor in 63
percent of stations observed.
Voting
Voters were able to vote in a relatively efficient
manner in most polling locations, with few queues.
Carter Center and EISA observers reported that
the polling process was good or excellent in 82
percent of stations observed. Election day was
largely calm and peaceful, with no reported inci-
dents of election-related violence.
Carter Center and EISA observers reported
modest participation, with about 50 percent
turnout at polling locations visited. Official statis-
tics put overall national turnout at 50.72 percent.
This figure represents a sharp reduction of more
than 10 percent from the more than 61 percent
turnout reported in the Oct. 25 first-round presi-
dential vote and is regrettable.
The Carter Center and EISA observer teams
reported a few shortcomings in the process,
including inconsistent use of the separate voter list
and inconsistent inking procedures.50
Although voting procedures were conducted that votes be counted by an independent and As part of polling
relatively smoothly, observers reported challenges procedures, voters’
impartial electoral management body. The
thumbs were
with the voter identification process. In a number counting process must be public, transparent, and marked with ink
of cases, there was confusion about which identi- free of corruption.51 to show that they
fication documents were necessary to vote, with had voted.
officials in some cases accepting voter cards rather
than the required national identification cards. 50 Observers also reported a few isolated irregularities, including the
extremely late arrival of presidential ballots in two polling stations, and
polling staff determining to simply hold a legislative election during that
Closing and Counting time, allowing people to vote for one-half of the election but not the other.
Accurate and fair vote counting plays an indis- There was one report of roughly a dozen armed guards inside a polling
station. These shortcomings were not systematic and did not impact the
pensable role in ensuring the electoral process outcome of the elections.
is democratic and reflects the will of the voters. 51 UNHRC General Comment No. 25, para. 20; U.N. Convention Against
International and regional commitments require Corruption, Article 18

In its Dec. 22 statement, The Carter Center
Brett Lacy
noted that 80 percent of polling stations
observed did not close on time, but procedures
were followed to allow all those in line at the
time of closing to cast their ballots. Center and
EISA observers noted that the closing process
was conducted poorly in 60 percent of stations
observed. However, administrative and proce-
dural challenges in the closing process were not
significant enough to question the outcome of the
elections at these polling stations.
Counting took place at the polling-station
level immediately following the closure of polls
Polling officials locate a name on the voter list as children
on election day. The counting process took place
look on.
peacefully and without significant incident.
Future elections would benefit from a review
of the electoral law to strengthen counting proce- any discrepancies between the number of signed-in
dures to ensure an accurate count and provide voters and the number of ballots in the ballot box.
stronger guidance to polling staff. In particular, This change would allow severe discrepancies to
Article 106 of Malagasy electoral law stipulates be flagged quickly and transparently and would
avoid the unnecessary disenfranchisement of votes.
Polling Station Locations

Future elections would benefit from a review of the
Although best practice indicates that polling
electoral law to strengthen counting procedures stations should be assigned a relatively equal
number of voters, Malagasy law does not mandate
to ensure an accurate count and provide stronger that an equitable and manageable number of
guidance to polling staff. voters be assigned to each polling station. As a
result, some polling locations had large numbers of
voters, while others were allocated a much smaller
number. While CENI-T initially introduced an
that whenever the number of ballots in the ballot internal benchmark aimed at having fewer than
box is greater than the number of people who 1,000 voters per polling location, that number
signed in to vote, the polling staff must randomly later increased to 1,200, especially in the capital
withdraw a matching number of ballots from the city of Antananarivo. In spite of CENI-T’s efforts,
ballot box and declare them invalid.52 Although there were more than 2,400 voters (double the
the application of this procedure ensures reconcili- benchmark number) in some polling stations
ation of ballots, the invalidation of ballots from around the country.
the box, disenfranchising voters, is regrettable. Due to the increase of the number of voters in
The ballots that are invalidated from this some areas, polling stations were added or moved
procedure are not reported separately, as there is to new locations. These last-minute changes,
no difference in recording procedures between combined with distribution delays with voter
genuinely blank ballots and those declared blank cards that provided polling location information
as a result of this process. The Carter Center to voters, created confusion during election day.
recommends that Madagascar introduce a new
electoral procedure to ensure that the number of
blank and invalid ballots reflects only those ballots
that are genuinely blank or invalidated and reports 52 Organic Law No. 2012–005, March 15, 2012, Article 106

Lake Anosy in
Thomas Cox
the capital city of

Antananarivo was
created in the 19th
century to provide
hydraulic power to
industrial factories.
In some cases, Carter Center observers noted that delivery of voting materials, security, and efficient
prospective voters were turned away at polling processing of voters on election day to ensure that
stations due to not being on the voter list or not all voters are able to cast their ballot within an
having a national identification card. appropriate time frame.
For future elections, The Carter Center recom- The Center also recommends an appropriate
mends that Malagasy electoral law be revised to procedure for the effective distribution of voter
stipulate a maximum number of voters per polling cards and an alternative method to orient voters
station and put the appropriate framework in place to their assigned polling station. Further discussion
to implement this threshold. Doing so will make a on these points can be found in the voter registra-
number of areas of the electoral process smoother tion section of this report.
and more efficient, including procurement, the

Postelection
Developments
In the postelection period, The Carter Center Carter Center observers generally reported a
deployed six long-term observer teams to six calm atmosphere in the days following the elec-
regions of Madagascar. During this deployment, tions, with the population patiently awaiting
the observer teams based their reporting on results of the second round of presidential elec-
meeting with 240 interlocutors in 19 constituen- tions and legislative elections. In a press release on
cies (districts) of the country. Jan. 18, 2014, The Carter Center commended the
people of Madagascar, political parties, CENI-T,
and other key stakeholders who urged for calm and
respect for the peaceful resolution of disputes.53
Carter Center observers generally reported a calm
atmosphere in the days following the elections, Transfer of Results to District
Transmission Centers
with the population patiently awaiting results of
Following the counting process at the polling-
the second round of presidential elections and station level, the presiding officer, a representative
legislative elections. of the CENI-T, representatives of civil admin-
istration, or a nominated representative of the
transmission center was required to deliver
the certified copy of the results — along with
Thomas Cox
supporting materials outlined in the electoral

code — to the corresponding transmission center
in each district by the fastest method available.54
The Carter Center observed that the delivery
of material to the transmission center was usually
conducted by the person legally assigned to do so.
In the majority of cases, Carter Center observers
found that the transfer of material was properly
conducted, in accordance with procedures.
53 The Carter Center, “Carter Center Commends Peaceful Release of

The Carter Center and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa Madagascar Final Election Results; Urges Commitment to Reconciliation,”
Jan. 18, 2014
hold a joint press conference on Dec. 22 to share their preliminary findings and
recommendations. 54 Organic Law No. 2012–005, March 15, 2012, Article 113
38
However, the transfer of results was delayed in statistics, it is not possible to identify whether the
some districts due to the lack of adequate transport real number of valid/blank was higher or lower
and miscommunication regarding the handover than the number reported.
of material. In its Jan. 18 statement, the Center noted that
A clearly outlined collection plan for electoral the tabulation process was open to observation
material was notably absent from the electoral and was generally performed in a transparent
code. In future elections, the Center recommends manner. However, access to data in CENI-T’s
that a material collection plan be developed in data collection information technology center was
advance to ensure that the transport of material not always open. Improving accessibility of the
leads to a timely publication of results. center to observers in future elections would help
Despite these challenges relating to the timely to increase the overall transparency of the process,
transfer of materials, in its Jan. 18 statement The contributing to building confidence in the results.
Carter Center reported that the conduct within
transmission centers was acceptable in 87 percent
of the transmission centers visited and that the
overall process was sufficient. In the remaining Improving accessibility of the center to observers in
13 percent of transmission centers visited,
future elections would help to increase the overall
observers noted that returning material was not
properly recorded. In general, teams reported that transparency of the process, contributing to building
increasing the number of staff in the future would
increase the efficiency of the work of these institu-
confidence in the results.
tions. Observers largely evaluated conduct of the
transmission centers’ operations as peaceful.
In accordance with Malagasy law, the Special
Tabulation of Results Electoral Court conducted its own tabulation
process parallel to that of the CENI-T through a
Tabulation of results is an integral and important
process of verification of results slips from each
phase of the electoral process that ensures the
polling station. The court’s team in charge of
will of voters is accurately and comprehensively
checking all the results slips was understaffed and
reflected in the final results.55 Overall, the
underequipped, despite the use of software specifi-
tabulation process in Madagascar was open
cally designed for the process. In comparison,
to observers and was generally performed in a
CENI-T had more than 10 times the staff assigned
transparent manner.
to the same task of results slip verification.
The centralized tabulation process for both
Considering that the court was the only institu-
elections took place between Dec. 20, 2013, and
tion allowed to release final results, it should have
Jan. 10, 2014. Similar to the first round of the
been provided with more computers and more staff
presidential elections, the initial tabulation was
to conduct its tabulation of the results.
based on the scans of certified copies of the results
transmitted from district centers and at a later
stage, returned paper copies of the results slips.
In cases of results slips in which the total valid
votes did not equal the total votes obtained by
candidates, CENI-T followed its previous meth-
odology of using invalid/blank ballot numbers as 55 U.N., ICCPR, Article 25(b); AU, Declaration on the Principles Governing
a subtraction/addition margin.56 Use of this proce- Democratic Elections in Africa, Article 1
dure raises questions about the integrity of the 56 This CENI-T central procedure follows the philosophy of Article 106,
mentioned in the Carter Center’s preliminary statement. However in this
number of invalid/blank votes reported. However, case, contrary to using it at the polling-station level, it does not influence
because CENI-T does not keep track of these the results of the candidates.

Election Results polling stations were discarded because polling
station officials failed to return the results to the
Although the CENI-T is authorized to release
appropriate transmission centers. The votes from
election results, these results are not binding.
13 other polling stations were discarded because
Only the Special Electoral Court has the power to
the polling stations never opened and voting did
release final certified results. In future elections,
not take place. Finally, the results from 40 polling
the authority for the counting, tabulation, and
stations were labeled as “inexploitable” (unread-
announcement of results should rest with an inde-
able). In total, these decisions rendered the results
pendent electoral authority. If this responsibility
from 76 polling locations invalid.
continues to be divided across two institutions, the
division of responsibility should be done in a way Presidential Runoff Election Results
that preserves the efficiency and transparency of CENI-T released the provisional results of the
the tabulation process. Dec. 20 second-round presidential elections on
According to the law,57 CENI-T was obliged Jan. 3, 2014.58 Of the 3,862,255 valid votes,
to declare the provisional results of the elections 2,066,103 went to Hery Rajaonarimampianina
within 10 days of the day on which the last certi- (53.5 percent) and 1,796,122 went to
fied copy of results arrives from a polling station. Jean Louis Robinson (46.5 percent). Hery
The last certified copy of the result was received Rajaonarimampianina was declared the provisional
by CENI-T on Dec. 31, 2013, at 4:30 p.m. Due to winner of the presidential elections.
late arrival of these materials from many regions, CENI-T reported a total of 4,044,391 votes
and the centralized character of the tabulation, for the 2013 runoff presidential elections, with
the process took a significant amount of time. 182,166, or 4.5 percent, as blanks and invalids.
However, both declarations by CENI-T were made Voter turnout was just over 50 percent, 11 percent
within the timeline provided by the legal frame- lower than in the first round of presidential elec-
work, a praiseworthy achievement. tions on Oct. 25.
The presidential results were later confirmed by
the Special Electoral Court on Jan.17, 2014, with
only minor alterations to the published figures.
Of the 3,862,255 valid votes, 2,066,103 went to
Hery Rajaonarimampianina (53.5 percent) and Legislative Election Results
CENI-T released the provisional results of the
1,796,122 went to Jean Louis Robinson (46.5 legislative elections on Jan. 10, 2014.
percent). Hery Rajaonarimampianina was declared The parliamentary election resulted in Miaraka
Amin’ny Prezidà Andry Rajoelina, the political
the provisional winner of the presidential elections. party backing former transitional President Andry
Rajoelina, attaining the most seats, winning
49 out of 151 seats available in the National
In polling stations where the number of total Assembly. Mouvance Ravalomanana, the political
votes cast significantly exceeded the number of party backing ousted former President Marc
voters registered, CENI-T was legally obliged to Ravalomanana, secured the next highest number
transmit all the electoral material to the Special of seats with 20 out of 151. The remaining 82 seats
Electoral Court for further examination without were won by minor parties and candidates running
modifying the results as they were initially as independents.
received. After these polling station discrepancies
were sent to the court, the results from six polling
57 Organic Law No. 2012–015, Article 26; Organic Law No. 2012–016,
locations were discarded. Votes at one polling Article 53
station were not included because of the absence 58 http://www.ceni-madagascar.mg/dossier/C2P_Proclamation_resultats_
of counting forms. The votes from 16 other provisoires_du_second_tour_presidentiel_03janv2014.pdf

According to the results published by CENI-T, canceled voting results due to widespread vote
out of the 147 elected members of the National falsification and the misallocation of electoral
Assembly, 30 (20.4 percent) are female.59 This is a materials. A partial election is anticipated to be
significant increase from the 2007 elections.60 held on May 30, 2014, in these four districts.
The legislative results were later confirmed by The campaign period for these elections will take
the Special Electoral Court on Feb. 7, 2014. place from May 8 to May 29. The results of these
elections will be released before the country’s 54th
Presidential Inauguration independence day on June 26.62
Hery Rajaonarimampianina was inaugurated as
president of the Republic of Madagascar on Jan.
25, 2014. The Carter Center commends the pres-
ence of Dr. Robinson at the inauguration of his
opponent. This public display of support symbol- Hery Rajaonarimampianina was inaugurated as
ized Dr. Robinson’s respect for constitutional order
and was an important departure from the previous
president of the Republic of Madagascar on Jan. 25,
winner-take-all model of postelection disputes that 2014. The Carter Center commends the presence of
has previously affected Madagascar. The Center
encourages Malagasy political actors to foster Dr. Robinson at the inauguration of his opponent.
strong institutions in order to prevent the resur- This public display of support symbolized Dr.
gence of past trends of political overthrows.
Unfortunately, the presidential inauguration Robinson’s respect for constitutional order and was
ceremonies were marked by a grenade launch that an important departure from the previous winner-
killed a child, Kevin Arnaud Rasolonirina, and
injured 37 others. This violence was a regrettable take-all model of postelection disputes that has
mark at the conclusion of an electoral process that previously affected Madagascar.
had otherwise been largely peaceful and free of
politically motivated violence, and it signaled an
important departure from Madagascar’s past and
demonstration of the commitment of the Malagasy Electoral Dispute Resolution
people to the country’s future. Effective, clear, and fair procedures for electoral
dispute resolution are an essential part of a well-
Annulment of Legislative functioning electoral process. Effective dispute
Results in Four Districts resolution mechanisms are essential to ensure that
Following the elections, four legislative seats effective remedies are available for the redress of
remain empty in districts where results from the
Dec. 20 legislative elections were annulled due
to fraud and corruption.61 In Ambaja and Belo
Tsiribihina districts, the Special Electoral Court 59 The total number of seats in the National Assembly is 151. The results
of elections in the districts of Ambanja, Belo sur Tsiribihina, Marovoay, and
declared that a large number of “erased” ballots Sainte-Marie were annulled by the High Constitutional Court.
in each district constituted evidence for the 60 Elections in 2007 resulted in 7.9 percent women parliamentarians.
falsification of records. In Sainte Marie district, 61 Decision No. 11, CES/AR of Feb. 6, 2014, concerning announcement of
an active vice president of a local political party, the final results of the parliamentary elections on Dec. 20, 2013
Mouvement pour la Démocratie à Madagascar 62 Article 36 of the Malagasy electoral law (Organic Law no. 2012–005,
(MDM), was chairman of a polling station and March 15, 2012) designates that vacant seats in the National Assembly
must be filled via partial elections held within four months of the release
a member of the district electoral commission. of electoral results (or in this case, four months from the decree made by
The court determined that this undermined the the Special Electoral Court) if a replacement for the seat in not available.
http://www.hcc.gov.mg/election/arret/arret-n11-cesar-du-06-fevrier-2014-
integrity of results in the district and canceled all portant-proclamation-des-resultats-definitifs-des-elections-legislatives-du-
results from Sainte Marie. In Marovoay, the court 20-decembre-2013-2

violations of fundamental rights related to the seems to be to support the timely and effective
electoral process.63 Voters and other electoral resolution of disputes, the current time frame for
stakeholders must be given and must perceive that submission of complaints is too short. Complaints
they possess a voice in the quality of the electoral must be submitted within 10 days of election day,
process if the process is to retain credibility. which means that the window for complaints
Malagasy citizens have the right to an effective closes even before results are made public. There
remedy before a competent national tribunal for is no recourse for appealing results.68 Malagasy
acts that violate their rights or freedoms, including lawmakers should consider modification of Article
the right to genuine elections and all associated 132 of the electoral law in order to allow voters,
rights.64 In the instance of a dispute relating candidates, and parties to submit complaints after
to elections, citizens have the right to a public provision results are announced.
hearing in front of an independent and impartial The criteria regarding who can submit a
tribunal.65 Madagascar’s political commitments complaint, as well as the scope of violations that
also suggest that the legal framework for elections are considered worthy of consideration as an
should provide effective redress for violations of official complaint, are narrow and restrictive. To
electoral rights.66 Timely and effective resolution submit a complaint, two main conditions must be
of disputes is critical in ensuring that the right met: The person submitting a complaint must be a
to an effective remedy and the right to a fair and registered voter, and they must have participated
public hearing are realized.67 in the election. Complaints are limited to the
polling station where the voter was registered,
and the subject of the complaint can only refer to
voting operations or electoral campaigns in that
The Carter Center found the legal framework constituency. These regulations are restrictive and
infringe upon voters’ rights to an effective remedy.
for electoral dispute resolution to be in line The Carter Center welcomes the adoption of
with electoral standards and good practices for law 2013–008, which led to a new composition of
judges presiding over the Special Electoral Court
democratic elections. with the addition of 10 judges. Court members
were appointed by political parties that signed the
transitional roadmap (except the Zafy Mouvance,
In its Jan. 18 statement, The Carter Center which did not appoint a member). It is regrettable
commended the Special Elections Court on the that only two of the court’s judges were women.
impartiality and objectivity that it demonstrated The inclusiveness of the court selection
during the electoral process and postelection process is a positive measure that strengthened
period. The Carter Center also commended the political actors’ confidence in the electoral
court and other stakeholders that upheld their
commitment to peace and constitutional order.
63 U.N., Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on the Legal, Technical,
The Legal Framework for and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, para. 47
Electoral Dispute Resolution 64 U.N., ICCPR, Article 2; ACHR, Article 25
An effective electoral dispute resolution system 65 U.N., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14(1);
U.N., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 10; ECOWAS, Protocol
is essential for bolstering the legitimacy and on Democracy and Good Governance
credibility of elections and serving as an official 66 AU, ACDEG, Article 17
outlet for electoral complaints. The Carter Center 67 AU, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Principles and
found the legal framework for electoral dispute Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, Article
2(i); U.N., United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment
resolution to be in line with electoral standards No. 32, para. 27
and good practices for democratic elections. 68 The ability to challenge election results should be provided for by law
Although the intent of the legal framework (SADC, Principles and Guidelines, para 2.1.10).

dispute resolution mechanism and contributed to votes and compare the voter lists from the first and
the Special Electoral Court’s ability to act with second round in nine regions, as requested by the
neutrality. However, moving forward, Madagascar Robinson camp. Also, it was commendable that
should strive to separate electoral dispute lawyers from both opposing camps were present to
resolution mechanisms from politics and avoid witness this action. This transparency was not only
political appointments. an effective means of assessing allegations of elec-
toral fraud made by the Robinson camp but also
Resolution of Complaints in building trust for the dispute resolution mecha-
In total, 70 complaints were filed in relation to the nism during judicial review of the election result.
presidential election, the majority of which were In its Jan. 18 statement, the Center noted that
submitted on the last day of the complaint period. in advance of the announcement of results, the
A total of 580 complaints were submitted related Special Electoral Court released nine key deci-
to the legislative elections. Of these complaints, sions in early January 2014. The most important
two significant submissions called for a cancel- of these was the decision that the court would
lation of the election results and disputed the not disqualify any candidate or detract votes from
preliminary results. any candidate on the basis of its annulment of the
The Carter Center applauds the Jan. 14 deci- decree of Aug. 6, 2013, authorizing heads of insti-
sion of the Special Electoral Court to recount tutions to participate in the campaign.

Conclusions and
Recommendations
The Dec. 20, 2013, elections in Madagascar governance, the government of Madagascar
marked a pivotal turning point in Malagasy should make efforts to make campaign finance
history, both as an important step toward democ- significantly more transparent, ensure greater
racy and as a foundation for renewed growth representation of women in future elections,
and development. empower civil society organizations to educate the
Malagasy people on voting procedures, and focus
on national reconciliation and cooperation.
The Carter Center urges Madagascar to use these Recommendations

elections as a foundation on which to foster both For future elections, The Carter Center makes the
following recommendations in the spirit of mutual
democratic development and national reconciliation. respect and support:
These are critical steps to creating a lasting end
To the Government of Madagascar
to the crisis and fully emerging from its ongoing National Reconciliation
political transition. • The government should emphasize messages of
national reconciliation and cooperation in order
to ease political tensions and ensure that these
Overall, the Center found the process to be elections mark a clear turning point away from
orderly, transparent, and in accordance with the country’s history of winner-take-all politics.
international obligations for democratic elections. A Permanent and Independent
The Carter Center urges Madagascar to use these Election Management Body
elections as a foundation on which to foster both • CENI-T should be transformed into a perma-
democratic development and national reconcilia- nent electoral institution with financial
tion. These are critical steps to creating a lasting independence. Doing so would reinforce the
end to the crisis and fully emerging from its progress made in the 2013 elections and allow
ongoing political transition. future elections to be conducted with indepen-
The Center commends the Malagasy people dent management and oversight. Furthermore,
for participating in a peaceful and orderly process the composition of CENI-T should be re-evalu-
and for the successful democratic elections of ated in order to enhance its independence and
2013. There is, however, room for improvement. reduce the need to rely on government elements
To continue its progress toward democratic to support it at the local level.
44
Campaign Finance system and ballot design should be rectified in
• Campaign finance regulation should be put advance of future elections.
in place before the next election. The law Advancing the Participation of Women in Politics
should include limits on campaign spending • The Carter Center recommends implementing
and a mechanism for transparent publication legal and systematic measures that will ensure
of all money spent on campaign activities. An accurate representation of women in the
enforcement mechanism should also be put in democratic life of Madagascar and that steps
place to sanction those that violate those new are taken to ensure full implementation of
campaign finance rules. Article 12 of the SADC Protocol on Gender
Legal Framework for Electoral Dispute Resolution and Development. Specific measures to increase
• Legislators should modify Article 132 of the the representation of women in the Malagasy
Electoral Law in order to allow appeals and political system should be considered, including
complaints after the release of provisional results financial support for women candidates, tax
by CENI-T. In the article’s current wording, the exemptions, or waiving of candidate fees for
deadline to file a complaint occurs before the women who run for office.
release of provisional results by CENI-T, thereby National Census
prohibiting any complaints of election results. • Madagascar should conduct a comprehensive
In the same spirit, the overly restrictive criteria national census before future elections are held.
for filing complaints should be broadened. The This will be crucial to determining who is and
criteria for the plaintiff to file a complaint are 1) is not eligible to vote and to maintaining the
to be a registered voter, 2) to have participated integrity of the voter registration process.
in the election, 3) to limit complaints to activi-
ties in the polling station where the voter is
Revision of Voter Registration Process
registered, 4) to limit the subject of complaints • The Carter Center recommends revision of
only to the regularity of voting operations. Madagascar’s voter registration process to ensure
These restrictions damage the Malagasy citizens’ an accurate and complete voter registry in
right to an effective remedy against improper advance of future elections. Voter cards should
action, a right that is recognized in international be distributed to all Malagasy citizens with
standards for democratic elections. ample time before elections take place. The
electoral management body should ensure that
Authority for Tabulation and
voters are given ample opportunity to be noti-
Announcement of Results
fied of their voting eligibility status and given
• Further consideration should be given to the sufficient time to appeal any decisions that
process of tabulating and announcing official would restrict their right to participate.
results. In future elections, the authority for the
counting, tabulation, and announcement of
Boundary Delimitation
results should rest with an independent electoral • While the use of pre-existing administrative
authority. If this responsibility continues to be divisions as a basis to draw constituencies
divided across two institutions, the division presents significant advantages, future designs
of responsibility should be done in a way that of the electoral system should include a revised
preserves the efficiency and transparency of the boundary delimitation process that creates
tabulation process. a more equitable population distribution in
Madagascar’s parliamentary seats.
Ballots for Two-Member Constituencies
• Although parties were able to nominate two
Strengthen Counting Procedures
candidates in two-member constituencies, only • Although no significant irregularities were
one candidate for each party appeared on the observed during the counting process, future
ballots. This mismatch between the electoral elections would benefit from a review of the

electoral law to strengthen counting proce- To Political Parties
dures to ensure an accurate count and provide Strengthen Organization, Membership,
stronger guidance to polling staff. The Carter and Internal Party Democracy
Center recommends that Madagascar introduce • In a healthy democracy, political parties play
a new electoral procedure in order to ensure that a critical role in linking citizens to govern-
the number of blank and invalid ballots only ment. Political parties in Madagascar should
reflects those ballots that are genuinely blank or strive to develop issue-based platforms and
invalidated. A system should also be put in place build membership bases across the country and
to allow polling stations to more accurately beyond the capital. Steps should be taken to
report any discrepancies between the number strengthen internal party structure, organization,
of signed-in voters and the number of ballots in and democracy.
the ballot box.
Number and Distribution of Polling Stations To the International Community
• For future elections, The Carter Center recom- Sustainable and Coordinated Support
mends that Malagasy electoral law be revised • These elections are a step, but only the founda-
to stipulate a maximum number of voters tion has been laid for the path toward building
per polling station and put the appropriate a sustained, inclusive, and robust democracy in
framework in place to enforce this threshold. Madagascar. Coordinated international action
The Center also recommends an appropriate was a crucial factor in laying that foundation
procedure for the effective distribution of voter and will continue to be important to ensure that
cards and an alternative method to orient voters this opportunity for democratic development in
to their assigned polling station. a new Madagascar is not squandered.

Appendix A
Acknowledgments
The Carter Center’s election observation mission country and in the capital. Country expert Brian
in Madagascar would not have been possible Klaas provided the mission with in-depth political
without the support of a number of individuals analysis and contributed to public statements
and organizations. released by the Center. The Center would also
The Center is primarily grateful to the like to thank the office staff in Antananarivo,
government of Madagascar and the National including Domoina Rajaonarivony, Mialy
Independent Electoral Commission for the Raveloarison, and Achille Rabesihanaka.
Transition (CENI-T) for inviting the Center to The Center greatly appreciates its partner-
observe the elections. ship with the Electoral Institute for Sustainable
The Center is further grateful for financial Democracy in Africa. In particular, the Center
support from the U.S. State Department as well as would like to thank Olufunto Akinduro, Cecile
Stefan Findel and Susan Cummings-Findel. Their Bassomo, Hama Munyikwa, and Ange Marie
generous contributions allowed the Center to Nijimbere. These individuals contributed to the
observe the Dec. 20 presidential runoff and legisla- planning of the mission, training of observers and
tive elections in Madagascar. staff, and the execution of the successful observa-
The Center is deeply appreciative of the lead- tion of the Dec. 20 elections.
ership of former President of Mauritius Cassam The Center recognizes the efforts of all the
Uteem, EISA Executive Director Denis Kadima, international observation organizations in
and Carter Center Vice President of Peace supporting Madagascar’s electoral process. The
Programs Dr. John Stremlau for their key roles. organizations include the Southern African
Their insight during the observation process was Development Community, the European
invaluable to the success of the mission. Union, the African Union, the Indian Ocean
The Center benefited greatly from the efforts of Commission, and the Organisation Internationale
the skilled and talented Antananarivo staff. Field de la Francophonie.
office operations were supervised by Field Office The Carter Center offers its sincere thanks
Director Stephane Mondon. Electoral analyst and and gratitude to the long-term observers who
observer coordinator Bartosz Lech oversaw the completed their deployment during the pre- and
coordination of international election observers postelection periods from Nov. 18 to Dec. 31.
and contributed to political reports throughout Their reporting, diligent collection of data on
the electoral process. Security Manager Jules the electoral process, logistical support, coopera-
Lalancette coordinated the arrival and departure tion with their EISA observer counterparts, and
of the Center’s delegation to Madagascar and engagement with Malagasy stakeholders across
provided important information to the mission the country were crucial to the success of the
regarding the security situation throughout the mission. These observers included Koffi Abou
47
Anzou, Monique Nobs, Charlotte Ramble, Taboh coordinators. Tynesha Green and Traci Boyd
Gideon, Gaston Kalombo, and Laura Erizi. We provided administrative and budgetary support,
would also like to thank the EISA observers who while Mercedes Sprouse-Mickevicius helped raise
worked with The Carter Center during the elec- the funds to make the mission possible. Christelle
tion period. These observers included Gisele Pana, Lorin and Travis Linger served as the project’s
Lucianne Sophola, Immaculee Murangwa, Jean interns. Ramiro Martinez provided financial over-
Jacques Cornish, Andre Kabunda, Sailifa Nzwalo, sight. Brett Lacy managed the election observation
Aichatou Fall, and Marie Clemence Nodjan. mission, with support from David Carroll.
The Center’s efforts were supported by a This final report was drafted by Stephane
team of hard-working staff in Atlanta, including Mondon, Bartosz Lech, Brian Klaas, Thomas
Chloe Bordewich, Thomas Cox, William Hassall, Cox, and Brett Lacy with assistance from
and Alden Mahler Levine, assistant program William Hassall.

Appendix B
Observation Delegation
and Staff
Delegation Leaders Carter Center Madagascar

Denis Kadima, Executive Director, Electoral International Staff
Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy Brian Klaas, Country Expert, United States
in Africa
Jules Lalancette, Security Manager, Canada
Dr. John Stremlau, Vice President, Peace
Bartosz Lech, Electoral Analyst/Observer
Programs, The Carter Center
Coordinator, Belgium
President Cassam Uteem, Former President
Stephane Mondon, Field Office Director, France
of Mauritius
Madagascar National Staff

Delegation
Achille Rabesihanaka
Short-Term Observers
Domoina Rajaonarivony
Jean Jacques Cornish, South Africa
Mialy Raveloarison
Thomas Cox, United States
Aichatou Fall, Senegal
Carter Center Atlanta Staff
Andre Kabunda, Canada
William Hassall, Assistant Program Coordinator,
Immaculee Murangwa, Rwanda
Democracy Program
Marie Clemence Nodjan, Cote d’Ivoire
Brett Lacy, Assistant Director,
Sailifa Nzwalo, Mozambique Democracy Program
Gisele Pana, Central African Republic
Lucianne Sophola, Seychelles EISA Johannesburg Staff
Olufunto Akinduro, Head of Department,
Long-Term Observers Elections and Political Processes
Koffi Abou Anzou, Cote d’Ivoire
Cecile Bassomo, Program Officer, Elections and
Laura Erizi, Italy Political Processes
Taboh Gideon, Cameroon Hamadziripi Munyikwa, Program Officer,
Gaston Kalombo, South Africa Elections and Political Processes
Monique Nobs, Switzerland Ange Marie Nijimbere, Finance and
Administration Officer
Charlotte Ramble, France
49
Appendix C
Terms and
Abbreviations
CENI National Independent Pillar and Structure Andry sy Rihana

Electoral Commission for the Salvation of Enti-Manavotra an’i
(Commission Électorale Madagascar Party Madagasikara
Nationale Indépendante)
Project of Support Projet d’appui au cycle
CENI-T National Independent to the Electoral électoral 2012–2014
Electoral Commission Cycle in Madagascar à Madagascar
for the Transition 2012–2014
(Commission Electorale
Nationale Indépendante SADC Southern African
pour la Transition) Development Community
EISA Electoral Institute for Social Democrats Parti Social Démocrate

Sustainable Democracy Party
in Africa
Special Electoral Cour Electorale Spéciale
High Transitional Haute Autorité de Court
Authority Transition
TGV Determined Malagasy
International Groupe International Youth (Tanora malaGasy
Contact Group de Contact Vonona)
MAPAR Together With President TIM I Love Madagascar party

Andry Rajoelina (Miaraka (Tiako I Madagasikara)
amin’i Prezida Andry
Rajoelina) Transmission Center Section de Recensement
Matériel des Votes
OIF Organisation Internationale
de la Francophonie
50
Appendix D
Statements
Carter Center Election Observation Mission

LEGISLATIVE AND SECOND ROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Preliminary Statement
Carter Center Congratulates Madagascar on a Calm and Transparent Polling Process;

Encourages Renewed Commitment to National Reconciliation
Dec. 22, 2013

Contact: In Antananarivo, Stéphane Mondon, +261 347 212 613; In Atlanta, Deborah
Hakes, +1 404 420 5124
On Dec. 20, Madagascar held legislative elections and the second round of presidential
elections. Following a protracted political crisis, these elections offer an opportunity that we
are hopeful will reinstate a democratically-elected government, enable Madagascar to rejoin
the community of nations, and provide a foundation through which to address the prolonged
humanitarian crisis that has continued to escalate within recent years. The culmination of the
roadmap in Friday’s elections offer an opportunity for the country to move forward and begin
to address the suffering of the Malagasy people, 90 percent of whom survive on less than
USD $2 a day.
The Carter Center congratulates the Malagasy people for a peaceful vote, an important
achievement on the road to ending the crisis and working toward the important goal of
national reconciliation.
These elections are the first in Madagascar’s history to be conducted by an independent

electoral authority. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and Carter
Center observers reported that voting and counting processes were peaceful, orderly, and in
general accordance with Madagascar’s legal framework and obligations for democratic
elections. Although voter turnout was moderate at only about 50 percent in polling stations
observed, the Center commends the CENI-T for their commitment to ensuring that all eligible
voters had an opportunity to cast their ballots freely. Carter Center and EISA observers noted
a few shortcomings in the process, including inconsistent use of the separate voters list for the
presidential and legislative materials, delays in delivery of materials in some areas, and
51
inconsistent inking procedures. However, these shortcomings were not systematic and will
not impact the outcome of the elections. Carter Center observers visited a total of 85 polling
stations, and reported that the polling process was good or excellent in 82 percent of stations
These elections are the first in Madagascar’s history to be conducted by an independent
electoral authority. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and Carter
Center observers reported that voting and counting processes were peaceful, orderly, and in
general accordance with Madagascar’s legal framework and obligations for democratic
elections. Although voter turnout was moderate at only about 50 percent in polling stations
observed, the Center commends the CENI-T for their commitment to ensuring that all eligible
voters had an opportunity to cast their ballots freely. Carter Center and EISA observers noted
a few shortcomings in the process, including inconsistent use of the separate voters list for the
presidential and legislative materials, delays in delivery of materials in some areas, and
inconsistent inking procedures. However, these shortcomings were not systematic and will
not impact the outcome of the elections. Carter Center observers visited a total of 85 polling
stations, and reported that the polling process was good or excellent in 82 percent of stations
observed.
As the tabulation process continues, The Carter Center offers the following recommendations
to Malagasy and international stakeholders:
 All All
political actors
political should
actors shouldinsist on on
insist maintaining
maintaininga peaceful environment
a peaceful environment while
while
respecting the constitution and the laws of Madagascar. We urge all political
respecting the constitution and the laws of Madagascar. We urge all political parties parties
andand
leaders to maintain
leaders to maintainthe the
current environment
current environmentof calm as the
of calm tabulation
as the process
tabulation process
continues, materials are returned, and the results are processed.
continues, materials are returned, and the results are processed.
 Candidates, leaders,
Candidates, andand
leaders, international actors
international should
actors work
should together
work to advance
together genuine
to advance genuine
messages of national reconciliation and respect for the democratic
messages of national reconciliation and respect for the democratic process. process.
Madagascar
Madagascarmust leave
must behind
leave its its
behind history of winner-take-all
history politics,
of winner-take-all isolation
politics, of of
isolation
losers, andand
losers, extra-constitutional actions
extra-constitutional thatthat
actions undermine democratic
undermine processes.
democratic processes.
 TheThe
military should
military continue
should to play
continue a neutral
to play rolerole
a neutral in providing security,
in providing andand
security, avoid
avoid
playing a role in the political process.
playing a role in the political process.
####
####
Waging Peace.
Waging Fighting
Peace. Disease.
Fighting Building
Disease. Hope."
Building A not-for-profit,
Hope." nongovernmental
A not-for-profit, nongovernmental
organization,
organization, The Carter Center has helped to improve life for peoplemore
The Carter Center has helped to improve life for people in thanthan
in more 70 70
countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic
countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic
opportunity; preventing
opportunity; diseases;
preventing andand
diseases; improving
improvingmental health
mental care.
health TheThe
care. Carter Center
Carter waswas
Center
founded in 1982
founded by former
in 1982 U.S.U.S.
by former President Jimmy
President Carter
Jimmy andand
Carter his his
wife, Rosalynn,
wife, in in
Rosalynn,
partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide.
partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide. Visit: Visit:
www.cartercenter.org to learn more
to learn about
more TheThe
about Carter Center.
Carter Center.

Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions
The Carter Center did not observe the first round of voting for the presidential elections held
on Oct. 25; the Center’s election observation is focused on the second round of presidential
elections and legislative elections that took place on Dec. 20. The Center’s election
observation mission in Madagascar is conducted in partnership with the Electoral Institute for
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). Following an invitation from the Independent
National Electoral Commission for the Transition (CENI-T), the Center’s core team of
experts arrived in Madagascar in mid-October, and six long-term observers deployed across
the country on Nov. 18, 2013.
The integrated EISA/TCC short-term observation mission around the Dec. 20 polls was co-
led by former president of Mauritius Cassam Uteem, executive director of EISA Denis
Kadima, and vice-president of the Carter Center’s peace programs, Dr. John Stremlau. The
EISA/Carter Center team consists of 26 observers from 19 countries who visited 85 polling
stations. Carter Center observers continue to observe the aggregation of results in the
transmission center (SRMV) and will stay in the country during the post-election period. The
Carter Center thanks CENI-T and all Malagasy stakeholders who welcomed the observers
from our mission and took the time to meet with them.
The Carter Center observation mission in Madagascar is carried out in accordance with the
Declaration of Principles for International Elections Observation and its Code of Conduct
which were adopted at the United Nations in 2005 and endorsed by more than 40 election
observation organizations. The Center assesses the electoral process based on the national
legal framework of Madagascar and its commitment to holding democratic elections as
presented in regional and international agreements.
This is a preliminary statement; a final report will be published in the months following
the end of the electoral process.
BACKGROUND
Madagascar held the second round of its presidential election along with legislative elections
on Dec. 20, 2013. These elections are an important step for Madagascar as the country seeks
a return to legitimate democracy and normalized relations with the international community
after a 2009 coup d’état plunged the island into a nearly five year long political crisis.
Despite the adoption of a negotiated roadmap under the auspices of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the political impasse caused by the bitter rivalry between
the former President, Marc Ravalomanana and the President of the Transition, Andry
Rajoelina, continues to cast a long shadow over the political environment in Madagascar. As
proof of this lingering dispute, both of the presidential finalists in the second round are
closely tied to the main protagonists from the 2009 crisis, with Dr. Jean-Louis Robinson
allied to exiled President Ravalomanana and Hery Rajaonarimampianina tied closely to
President of the Transition Rajoelina. This alignment raises questions about the independence
3 of 15

of the candidates and suggests that they are simply proxies for a past rivalry that has been
brewing for nearly five years - at a time when Madagascar needs to focus on its future.
Nonetheless, the recent elections are an essential step towards ending the current crisis in
Madagascar. Originally scheduled for May 8, 2013, the first round of presidential elections
were postponed to July 24 and again to Oct. 25, when the first round of the presidential
elections finally took place. The second round took place on Dec. 20, coupled with the
legislative elections.
The international community provided critical technical and financial support for the election,
but Madagascar’s government still bore 50 percent of the costs. Moreover, the employees of
CENIT should be commended for their efforts to end the crisis and return Madagascar to a
path conducive to democracy and development.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A strong legal framework is essential for the effective administration of democratic elections.
This framework must be consistent with the commitments of the government regarding
human rights and simultaneously coherent with its obligations to democratic standards
including the obligation that the will of the people shall form the basis of the authority of
government. 1 The Carter Center mission has engaged in an objective evaluation of
Madagascar’s election, determining whether Madagascar has fulfilled its international
commitments and obligations to providing genuine democratic elections.
Madagascar’s legal framework for elections calls for a single national constituency for the
presidential election. The presidential system uses an absolute majority system in the first
round, where a candidate must receive more than 50 percent of the vote to win. If no
candidate wins the first round, the two candidates with the highest number of votes proceed
to a runoff round to determine the winner.
For legislative elections, Madagascar is divided into 119 constituencies, which correspond to
the administrative division of the country (119 districts). While 87 districts are single member
constituencies, 32 are two-member member constituencies. 2 Elections in the single seat
constituencies are conducted with the first past the post (FPTP) system, while two-member
member constituencies use a closed list system of proportional representation. Although
parties were able to nominate two candidates in these two-member constituencies, only one
candidate for each party appeared on the ballots. In future elections, the ballot design should
be reconsidered to ensure that ballots better reflect the electoral system in place.
The regulatory framework for the presidential and legislative elections is based upon a series
of commitments: the Constitution of Dec. 11, 2010, the roadmap of Sept. 16, 2011,
incorporated into the Malagasy legal system by the Law of Dec.28, 2011, and the laws and
regulations of the Republic of Madagascar. In addition, Madagascar has ratified a series of
international and regional human and political rights instruments that are relevant to the
electoral process. These treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
1
UDHR, art 21(3); ICCPR, art 25 (b).
2
See decree 2013-083.
54 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT 4 of 15

(ECOSOC), Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
Convention on the Political Rights of Women (CPRW), Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCC).
This framework contains many positive measures in support of electoral transparency. For
example, Article 45 of the Election Act prohibits any official inauguration, such as of a
building or event, during the election campaign period. This is a positive measure that
reinforces an equal playing field for candidates.
However, the Center regrets the lack of a legal framework to regulate campaign finances, and
the fact that the attempts of civil society to compel candidates to publicize their assets have
been ignored. Greater oversight of campaign expenditure and public disclosure of candidate
assets would have provided greater financial transparency on the process while strengthening
the confidence of voters in their future leaders.
Additionally, The Carter Center regrets that two decrees - one from April 16 and one from
Aug. 6, 2013 - were issued in a way that conflicted with critical legal provisions of the
agreed-upon roadmap guiding the transition. In particular, the decrees removed the provision
that insisted on the neutrality of the current heads of Malagasy political institutions during the
parliamentary and presidential campaigns. In doing so, both decrees directly contradicted
Malagasy law. 3 Malagasy law could have overridden the decrees and barred heads of
institutions from active engagement in the campaign, an important component of maintaining
the neutrality of the transitional government. Ultimately, the Special Electoral Court (CES)
shared this view, as it struck down the legality of the decrees. However, this decision was
announced less than 36 hours before voting began and only 12 hours before the end of the
campaign period, essentially rendering the verdict of the court moot. The decision should
have been announced much sooner, as virtually the entire campaign period was conducted
under the assumption that the decree provided legal cover to heads of institutions that sought
to actively campaign - something that has now been demonstrated to be a violation of
Malagasy law.
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
International standards dictate that an independent, professional, transparent, and impartial
election authority is fundamental to ensuring that citizens are able to participate in genuine
democratic elections.4
The Constitution of Fourth Republic of Madagascar provides for an “independent national

structure” that is responsible for the conduct of elections. 5 The Roadmap for Ending the
Crisis in Madagascar6 established a temporary election administration structure, the National
Independent Election Commission. The election commission’s mandate was later
domestically established by Organic Law n°2012-0047 which expresses the institutional and
financial independency of the collegial body, National Independent Election Commission for
3
Law 2011-014 of 28 December 2011
4
ICCPR UNHRC General Comment No.25, para. 20.
5
Art. 5: “L'organisation et la gestion de toutes les opérations électorales relèvent de la compétence d'une
structure nationale indépendante”
6
The Roadmap was introduced to the Malagasy legal system by the Organic Law n°2011-014 of December 28,
2011.
7
Organic Law n° 2012-004 of Feb. 1, 2012.

5 of 15
the Transition (CENI-T). This is an important step, as it is the first time in Malagasy history
that an independent institution was established to administer and regulate the conduct of
elections.
CENI-T, a collegial body, is governed by its General Assembly, composed of 24 members.

The General Assembly is supported by a secretariat, headed by the executive secretary
general. Twenty-one of the 24 General Assembly members represent a broad spectrum of
civil society organizations and branches of government. The Carter Center was pleased to
note that this spirit of inclusiveness continued down to the lowest levels of election
administration.
While the decision-making process is centralized de facto at the national level, a large part of
the election preparations and election day operations was decentralized by establishing 22
Regional Election Commissions (CER), 119 District Election Commissions (CED) and 1,553
Municipality Election Commissions (CEC).
The Carter Center recognizes the effort that CENI-T officials and polling staff put forth a
good faith effort to ensure that Madagascar could re-establish democracy and end its long-
standing crisis.
CENI-T and local administration bodies recruited 140,007 polling staff in order to conduct
the election in 20,001 polling stations across the island. At the local level, representatives of
civil administration (Chefs du Fokontany) played a major role in recruiting polling staff.
Carter Center long-term observers also reported that due to limited resources, district-level
election administration often depended on municipal-level civil administration to conduct the
elections. In future elections, CENI-T should re-evaluate its structure and strive to continue to
enhance its independence and reduce the need to rely on government elements at the local
level.
VOTER EDUCATION
Voter education is an essential part of the electoral cycle that is recognized in international
law as an important means of ensuring that an informed electorate is able to effectively
exercise their right to vote.8 Furthermore, given the highly politicized environment in which
these elections are taking place, the secrecy of the ballot is of pivotal importance. Fulfillment
of secrecy of the ballot is partially dependent on the extent to which voters understand this
right. 9 These elections also included a number of elements that were not present in past
elections, including the introduction of the single ballot paper and new regulation that the
voters card was not required to vote, as other forms of identification were accepted.
According to CENI-T, in advance of these elections 32 civil society organizations received

materials from the election administration in order to conduct voter education. However, their
overall capacity and level of programming and impact is largely unknown. The Project to
Support the Electoral Cycle in Madagascar (PACEM), sponsored by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), is among the more prominent CSOs that conducted voter
8
ICCPR, art. 25; UNHRC, General Comment 25, para. 11.
9
UN, Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of
Elections, para. 6.

6 of 15
education aimed at maximizing voter participation. Carter Center observers observed limited
voter education activities in advance of the Dec. 20 elections.
VOTER REGISTRATION
The Right to Universal Suffrage is at the core of democratic elections, a principle that is
affirmed in a number of universal and regional documents.10 The Constitution of Madagascar
and other Malagasy legislative acts confirm this right.11
According to the official calendar, voter registration took place between Oct.1, 2012 and Oct.
9, 2013, prior to the arrival of Carter Center observers. The registration was conducted by
election officials, deployed by CENI-T to each of the 1,553 municipalities of Madagascar.
This process was largely coordinated with local administration, or Chefs du Fokontany.
These officials visited households across the country.
Madagascar’s electoral law 12 stipulates the procedure for establishing the voters list and
ensuring that it is regularly revised. While the voters list is independent of the civil register,
identity verification (using a national identity card) is required when registering as a voter.
The registration process concluded with the registration of 7,823,305 eligible citizens on the
voters list.
Although The Carter Center did not directly observe the voter registration process, and while
accurate demographic data is unavailable in Madagascar, some analysis suggests that the
register may not be fully representative of the population of voting age. Madagascar’s last
census, which was conducted two decades ago—in 1993—indicates that there are roughly
10,500,000 citizens of Madagascar that should be eligible to vote. However, according to
official, national-level statistics, more than 3 million adult citizens do not have a national
identity card. Furthermore the increase in number of registered voters between presidential
elections in 2006 and current process was just 2.7 percent, a modest increase from an already
inadequate number in relation to the voting-age population. 13 In six of the country’s 22
regions, the number of registered voters decreased between the elections in 2006 and 2013.
Based on these estimates, a significant number of voters could have been left out of the
register. This combined with moderate voter turnout on election day impacts the extent to
which the right of universal suffrage was upheld in the Dec. 20 elections. In advance of future
elections, a census should be conducted.
10
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights Article 13, ICCPR Article 25, UNHRC ICCPR General
Comment No. 25 paragraphs 4, 10, 11, 13.
11
Constitution of Fourth Republic of Madagascar of Dec. 22, 2010.
12
Organic Law n° 2012-005 of March 22, 2012.
13
“Analyse de la liste électoral informatisée de l’Election Présidentielle du 03 Décembre 2006 et Situation
administrative de population Malagasy, base de l’état de droit, de la démocratie et du développement à
Madagascar”, Ministere de L’interieur, June 2009.

7 of 15
For the population that was successfully registered, the official process was not considered
complete until correct data was entered and the voter possessed their voter card. However, the
distribution of these cards by local electoral administration was partially delayed. While voter
cards were not required to vote in Madagascar’s 2013 elections, 14 the document has
traditionally been compulsory in previous elections. Additionally, the voter card is an
important source of information for voters, as it indicates in which polling location the voter
is registered. In some areas, Carter Center observers observed voter cards being distributed
on election day.
The Carter Center therefore regrets that problems surrounding distribution of voters cards—
both in terms of delays and lack of distribution to some voters. At best, this caused confusion
among voters as to where they should vote, and at worst the delays combined with a lack of
voter education around the regulations for acceptable voter identification at polling stations
could have given the impression that they were not registered at all, and were therefore
ineligible to participate, negatively impacting turnout.
Reports from international observers indicated that during the first round of presidential
elections on Oct. 25, prior to the arrival of Carter Center observers, some problems arose
related to inadequacies of the voters list. As a result, CENI-T reviewed the official voters list
and discovered that some of the names of registered voters had been omitted from the final
copy of the voters list used for voter identification at the polling station. This resulted in the
decision to revise the voters list by adding 143,408 citizens, in order to allow all registered
voters to participate in the elections. This decision was reached after a robust debate that
involved some parties suggesting that voter registration should be completely re-opened to
new registrations.
The Carter Center commends CENI-T on the decision to correct flaws in the voter list, but
not to reopen voter registration, between the two rounds of elections. However, in general,
changing the list of eligible voters between two rounds of the same election is not a good
practice.
Madagascar’s constitution only allows for voters to be excluded from participation in

elections by the exceptional ruling of a court.15 The Electoral Code further elaborates on this
rule by explicitly listing groups of citizens with no right to be included on the voters list.16 It
is regrettable, therefore, that attempts were not made to register and facilitate the
enfranchisement of eligible voters in Madagascar’s 2,648 hospitals 17 or 41 detention
centers.18
CANDIDATES, PARTIES, AND THE CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT
14
The national identity card is the only identification required for polling, not the voter card.
15
Constitution of Fourth Republic of Madagascar of Dec. 22, 2010.
16
Organic Law n° 2012-005 of March 22, 2012: Art. 4.
17
Only the 2 485 Municipal Health Centers (CSB 1 and 2) have the capacity of accommodating 9940 patients
(Ministry of Health). Additionally there other 148 health institutions with residing patients. However, the
number of eligible adult patients currently being hospitalized in the public health centers is not available.
18
The population of those awaiting trial in Madagascar’s detention centers is thought to be about 10,000.
58 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT 8 of 15

Madagascar is committed to several important international obligations in relation to
candidates, parties, and the campaign environment including ensuring that every citizen has
the right to be elected19 and freedom of assembly.20
Political pluralism and genuine choice for voters are critical to democracy. Madagascar is
obligated due to its international commitments to ensure “a real political pluralism, an
ideological variety and a multi-party system that are exercised through functioning of
political parties…”21 In order to ensure this important ambition, Madagascar has also made a
commitment to ensure that “every citizen should have equal legal possibilities to propose
him/herself as a candidate in elections.”22
The Carter Center firmly believes that gender equality is also an important goal for
democratic elections. Madagascar has committed to taking “measures to ensure that: a)
women participate without any discrimination in all elections; b) women are represented
equally at all levels with men in all electoral processes; c) women are equal partners with
men at all levels of development and implementation of State policies and development
programmes.”23
Carter Center observers were deployed across the country for the entirety of the campaign
period for the second round of presidential elections and legislative elections, which took
place from Nov. 28 to Dec. 19.
The Carter Center congratulates the Malagasy people on conducting the campaign period in a
peaceful manner. There have been no major violent events, an important achievement.
Additionally, there was an impressive level of candidate registration, as 33 presidential
candidates were on the ballot during the first round of elections and 2,054 candidates
contested the legislative elections for 151 seats.
Freedom of assembly is recognized as an essential part of democratic elections; however, this

right may be restricted under circumstances prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic
society. 24 During the campaign period, candidates were free to organize meetings after
fulfilling electoral code conditions requiring notification of administrative authorities. The
Center believes that despite this requirement, no candidates reported difficulty with enjoying
their freedom of assembly.
The Carter Center applauds CENI-T and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation for organizing three
presidential debates between the two second round finalists, Dr. Jean-Louis Robinson and
Hery Rajaonarimampianina. The tone of the debates was at times pointed, but were largely
conducted in a respectful manner that allowed Malagasy citizens to hear directly from the
candidates on live television and radio, as they discussed important issues about
Madagascar’s future.
19
See for example, UDHR, art. 21(1); ICCPR, art. 25(b); AfCHPR, art 13(1); CISCHRFF, art. 29(b).
20
ICCPR, art. 21; AfCHPR, art. 11; CISCHRFF, art. 12(1).
21
CIS, Convention on the Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms in
the Commonwealth of Independent States, art. 9 (2).
22
CIS, Convention on the Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms in
the Commonwealth of Independent States, art. 3(4).
23
AU, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, art.
9(1); SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, art. 12.
24
ICCPR, art. 21; AfCHPR, art 11; CISCHRFF, art. 12.

9 of 15
In spite of such positive aspects, The Carter Center is concerned about several aspects of the
electoral process related to candidates, parties, and the campaign environment. The main
findings include that:
 Although the abundance of over 200 political parties is indicative of competition, The
Carter Center regrets that most parties have not created robust internal institutions.
Political parties play a critical role in democratic societies to connect citizens to
government. Few parties in Madagascar have put forward a coherent slate of
candidates. Some parties are empty shells, with a membership that does not extend
beyond a single candidate. Madagascar’s democracy would be better served if parties
continue to build their membership. Moreover, parties should devote more effort to
constructing platforms and policy statements beyond the personality of their featured
candidate.
 The Center strongly believes that more needs to be done in terms of monitoring
campaign finance, and being transparent about the source of election finance and
campaign spending. This opaqueness and lack of national oversight makes it difficult
to assess campaign fairness, as those allied to major national-level parties may enjoy
an unfair advantage relative to independent candidates - particularly given the
importance of private media in the Madagascar campaign environment.
 Similarly, The Carter Center also is disappointed by the lack of oversight over the
code of conduct of candidates and political parties. Electoral rules and regulations
exist to ensure fairness and that elections accurately reflect the will of the people.
Without oversight and enforcement, there is no way to determine whether the
campaign was conducted appropriately.
 The low proportion of female candidates is among the most significant weaknesses of
the elections. Even though 46 percent of registered voters are women, only two of the
33 presidential candidates in the first round were women. In the legislative elections,
15 percent of the candidates were women, but only ten percent were ranked at the
“head of the list,” making it less likely that they will be elected. This does not reflect
Madagascar’s international commitment to ensure that “women are represented
equally at all levels with men in all electoral processes.”25
 The Center recommends implementing legal and systematic measures that will ensure
accurate representation of women in the democratic life of Madagascar and likewise
recommends implementation of the goal of gender equality in terms of representation
in public life as stipulated in Article 12 of the SADC Protocol on Gender and
Development.26
 Finally, The Carter Center regrets the decision by President of the Transition
Rajoelina to replace one-third of Madagascar’s regional governors with military
personnel between the first and second round of the presidential elections. This act on
Nov. 21 created uncertainty about the role of the military within key government
posts during Madagascar’s first post-coup election.
25
AU, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, art.
9(1).
26
SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, Art. 12: “States Parties shall endeavor that, by 2015, at least
fifty percent of decision-making positions in the public and private sectors are held by women”.
10 of 15
Despite these failings, the peacefulness and prevailing calm during the campaign period,
along with the high level of candidate registration and competition are laudable.
MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
Carter Center observers assessed that while media diversity is prevalent, the press is far too
often tainted by biases and overly opinionated delivery of news. Despite this failing, it is
worth noting that local media remained open about pricing for political advertising, creating
at least some level of transparency in a critical realm of campaign finance. A limited number
of media outlets also conducted voter education.
The ownership of the significant number of media outlets by politicians and their use in the
campaign should be regulated to ensure a level playing field for all candidates in the
legislative and presidential race.27
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DOMESTIC OBSERVATION

According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which Madagascar
is a signatory to, all persons have the right to participate in the public affairs of their
country. 28 This includes the right of citizens to participate in non-governmental
organizations29 as well as the right of citizens to participate in citizen observer organizations,
and contribute to voter education efforts.30 Through these means, civil society can actively play
an essential role in upholding an electoral process that is accountable and in which all participants
can have confidence.
The election process was observed by a large number of domestic observers. The three main
groups of civil society organizations deployed an estimated 10,000 mobile and stationary
observers throughout Madagascar on Dec. 20, according to accreditation numbers from
CENI-T. Carter Center and EISA observers noted that domestic observers were only present
at about 40 percent of polling stations observed.
There were also an estimated 800 international observers deployed on Dec. 20, representing
various intergovernmental and regional organizations including the African Union (AU),
Southern African Development Community (SADC), European Union (EU), and the Indian
Ocean Commission (IOC).
ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Effective, clear, and fair procedures for electoral dispute resolution are an essential part of a
well-functioning electoral process. Effective dispute resolution mechanisms are essential to
ensure that effective remedies are available for the redress of violations of fundamental rights
related to the electoral process. 31 According to Madagascar’s international commitments,
everyone has the right to an effective remedy before a competent national tribunal for acts
that violate their rights or freedoms, including the right to genuine elections and all associated
27
The Carter Center did not conduct comprehensive quantitative media monitoring. For further information on
the role of the press in the elections, please refer to the work of the European Union election observation
mission, or Osservatorio di Pavia.
28
ICCPR, art. 25; AU, AfCHPR, art.13.
29
UN, CEDAW, art. 7.
30
EISA, PEMMO, p.19.
31
UN, Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of
Elections, para. 47.

11 of 15
rights.32 In the instance of a dispute relating to elections, everyone has the right to a public
hearing in front of an independent and impartial tribunal. 33 Madagascar’s political
commitments also suggest that the legal framework for elections should provide effective
redress for violations of electoral rights.34
The Carter Center welcomes the adoption of Law 2013-008, which added 10 judges,
appointed by the groups that signed the roadmap, to the Special Electoral Court. The
inclusiveness of the reconstituted court, which is responsible for adjudicating electoral
disputes, is a positive measure that strengthened the confidence of political actors in the
mechanism of electoral dispute resolution.
Despite this fact, the Carter Center regrets the disjointedness of the electoral complaints
process. The convoluted procedure provided for by Art. 132 of the electoral law allows
candidates and parties 10 calendar days after the polls close (in this case on Dec. 20) to file a
complaint. This is problematic because the law provides that provisional results are released
within 10 days following receipt of the last certified copy of polling station results,, which
can occur well after the complaint deadline has passed, so political actors will be forced to
file complaints before provisional results are announced.35
Moreover, the necessary criteria for voters to lodge complaints of the electoral process are
overly restrictive. Voters must be registered and have voted in order to have the right to file a
complaint about the process. Even then, their right to file a complaint is limited to the
conduct of the electoral campaign in their constituency or in terms of the immediate
jurisdiction of the polling station where they are officially registered. This does not provide
for adequate exercise of the right to an effective remedy in accordance with international
standards.36
The 15-day window provided to the electoral court to process electoral disputes is sufficient.
Nonetheless, the ongoing aggregation of election results could benefit from more resources in
order to provide more robust verification of results.
VOTING
The quality of voting operations on election day is crucial to determining how closely an
election falls in line with its democratic obligations. According to Madagascar’s international
and regional commitments, all citizens should enjoy the right to universal and equal
suffrage,37 and all citizens have the right to vote,38 subject only to reasonable and objective
limitations. A core obligation under international law is that elections shall be held by secret
ballot,39 which is recognized as a means of ensuring that the will of the people is expressed
freely, and that a cast ballot cannot be connected with a voter to avoid intimidation and
32
UN, ICCPR, art. 2; ACHR, art. 25.
33
UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(1); UN, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 10; ECOWAS, Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.
34
AU, ACDEG, art. 17.
35
In these elections, it is anticipated that CENI-T may release final results by Jan. 7, 2014.
36
See for example, UDHR, art. 8; ICCPR, art. 2(3); AfCHPR, art 7(1).
37
UN, ICCPR, art. 25; ACHR, art. 23; UNm UDHR, art. 21.
38
ICCPR, art. 25; AU, AfCHPR, art. 13; ACHR, art. 23.
39
UN, ICCPR, art. 25; ACHR, art. 23, UN, UDHR, art. 23.

12 of 15
political retribution.40 Except in cases where a voter, such as an illiterate or disabled voter, is
being lawfully assisted, a voter cannot waive their right to secrecy of the ballot.41
Malagasy law does not ensure that only a manageable and equitable number of voters are
assigned to each polling station. While the CENI-T initially introduced an internal benchmark
aim of having fewer than 1,000 voters per polling location, that number later increased to
1,200. However, in spite of their efforts, in some cases more than double this number of
voters were assigned to a single polling location. For future elections, The Carter Center
recommends that Malagasy electoral law be revised to stipulate a maximum number of voters
per polling station.
Due to the increase of the number of voters in some areas, polling stations were added or
moved to new locations. The delays of distribution of voter cards that serve as an important
element of voter information on the location of their polling station seemed to have caused
some confusion of the voters during the election day. In some cases Carter Center observers
noted that prospective voters were turned away at polling stations observed due to either not
being on the voters list or not having a national identification card.
There were many praiseworthy aspects of the Dec. 20 election. Carter Center and EISA
observers visited 85 polling stations and reported that election day proceeded in an
atmosphere that was primarily calm and peaceful. There were no reported incidents of
election-related violence. The observer teams reported that in most stations observed they had
good access to adequately observe polling procedures.
Additionally, though most observer teams noted delays to opening times at polling locations,
the delays were minimal, often between five and fifteen minutes, and did not impact the
opportunity for citizens to vote. In some areas observed, delays in opening reached one hour.
Observers reported that in most cases delays in opening were due to a late start in setting up
the polling stations and late arrival of election materials including voting booths and in some
areas ballot papers. Opening procedures were generally followed, but observer teams
evaluated the opening processes as average, poor, or very poor in 63 percent of stations
observed.
Once voting began, voters were able to vote in a relatively efficient manner in most polling
locations, with few queues. Observers reported that the polling process was good or excellent
in 82 percent of stations observed.
Carter Center and EISA observers reported modest participation, with about 50 percent
turnout at polling locations visited. If such figures reflect national turnout, that would be a
sharp reduction from the more than 61 percent turnout reported in the Oct. 25 first round
presidential vote.
The Carter Center and EISA observer teams also indicated that isolated irregularities cropped
up in various polling locations across the country. Some problems were serious, such as the
extremely late arrival of presidential ballots in two polling stations, forcing poll staff to
40
EISA and Electoral Commission Forum of SADC Countries, Principles for Election Management,
Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region, p. 24.
41
EU, Handbook (2nd Ed.), p. 79.

13 of 15
simply hold a legislative election during that time, allowing people to vote for one half of the
election but not the other. Others were worrying, including one report of roughly a dozen
armed guards inside the polling station. Furthermore, there was considerable confusion about
which identification documents were necessary to vote, with officials in some cases accepting
voter cards rather than the required national identification cards.
Eighty percent of polling stations observed did not close on time where they followed the
procedure to allow all those in line at the time of closing to cast their ballots. Carter Center
and EISA observers noted that the closing process was conducted poorly in 60 percent of
stations observed.
Generally speaking, however, Carter Center and EISA observers did not report any
widespread evidence of intimidation, active campaigning around polling stations, or outright
attempts at electoral fraud.
COUNTING
The accurate and fair counting of votes plays an indispensable role in ensuring the electoral
process is democratic and reflects the will of the voters. International and regional
commitments indicate that votes be counted by an independent and impartial electoral
management body whose counting process is public, transparent, and free of corruption.42
Article 106 of Malagasy electoral law stipulates that whenever the number of ballots in the
ballot box is greater than the number of people who signed in to vote, the polling staff must
randomly withdraw a matching number of ballots from the ballot box and declare them blank
and invalid.43 These invalidated ballots are not reported separately, as there is no difference in
recording procedures between genuinely blank ballots and those declared blank as a result of
this process.
The Carter Center recommends that Madagascar introduce a new electoral procedure to
ensure that should this situation arise in the future, that the number of blank and invalid
ballots only reflects those ballots that are genuinely blank or invalidated, and reports any
discrepancies between the number of signed-in voters and the number of ballots in the ballot
box.
In a positive step, CENI-T for the second round of presidential elections and legislative
elections introduced a new procedure to record the number of unused ballots as a part of the
reconciliation of ballots process.
The Center also urges continued dedication of the return of results forms (PV) by polling
staff, and calls for CENI-T to publish provisional results as quickly as possible. Timely
announcement of election results is an important aspect of maintaining a peaceful, calm post-
electoral climate. Results should be publically available disaggregated to the level of polling
station.
42
African Charter, art. 17(1); UNHRC General Comment 25, para. 20; UN Convention against Corruption, Art.
18.
43
Le Guide a l’Usage Des Memberes du Bureau De Vote, page. 24.

14 of 15
The Carter Center also calls on all candidates and their supporters to abstain from disrupting
the ongoing tabulation and respect the process.
The Carter Center has observed 96 elections in 38 countries. The Center conducts election observation in
accordance with the Declaration of Principles of International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for
International Election Observation adopted at the United Nations in 2005 and revised in 2012. The Center
assesses electoral processes based on states’ obligations for democratic elections contained in their regional
and international commitments and in their domestic legal framework.
"Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope." A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization, The
Carter Center has helped to improve life for people in more than 70 countries by resolving conflicts;
advancing democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing diseases; and improving mental
health care. The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife,
Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide. Visit:
www.cartercenter.org to learn more about The Carter Center.

15 of 15
Jan. 18, 2014
Contact: In Atlanta, Deborah Hakes +1 404 420 5124; In Antananarivo, Stéphane
Mondon, +261 347 212 613
Carter Center Commends Peaceful Release of Madagascar Final Election Results; Urges
Commitment to Reconciliation
Following today’s announcement of final presidential election results, The Carter Center
congratulates the people of Madagascar on reaching this key milestone and urges continued
commitment to peace and reconciliation. While the country awaits final results of the legislative
elections and resolution of any pending election-related complaints, the Center urges all
stakeholders to commit to rising above the country’s history of winner-take-all politics. The
Center again congratulates the National Independent Electoral Commission of the Transition
(CENI-T) on its administration of the elections, and commends the Special Electoral Court
(CES) for performing its role with impartiality and a demonstrated commitment to advancing
Madagascar’s future. The Carter Center appeals to stakeholders to uphold their commitment to
peace, constitutional order, and an inclusive democratic government.
The Carter Center observed Madagascar’s Dec. 20, 2013, presidential runoff and legislative
elections in partnership with the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). The Carter Center
did not observe the first round of voting in the presidential elections that took place on Oct. 25,
2013, and the Center’s observations are limited to the immediate period of the Dec. 20 polls.
The Center released a preliminary public statement on Dec. 22 summarizing the mission’s
observations of polling, which noted that voting and counting processes were peaceful, orderly,
and in general accordance with Madagascar’s legal framework and obligations for democratic
elections. The Center commended the CENI-T for its commitment to ensuring that all eligible
voters had an opportunity to cast their ballots freely. Carter Center observers noted a few
shortcomings in the process, including inconsistent use of the separate voters list, delays in
delivery of materials in some areas, and inconsistent inking procedures. However, these
shortcomings were not systematic and did not impact the outcome of the elections. Carter Center

observers remained deployed to observe the counting and tabulation pcoress in Analanjirofo,
Atsimo-Andrefana, Atsinanana, Boeny, Haute Matsiatra, and Vakinankaratra.
Post-election Period
The Carter Center deployed six long-term observer teams to six regions1 of Madagascar. During
deployment time, these observers based their reporting on meetings with 240 interlocutors in 19
constituencies (districts) of the country.
Carter Center observers generally reported a calm atmosphere in the days following the
elections, with the population patiently awaiting results of the second round of presidential
elections. The tabulation process was open to observation and was generally performed in a
transparent manner; however, access to data in CENI-T’s data collection IT center was not
always fluid and the setup could be improved to allow for more comprehensive observation in
the future. The Carter Center commends the people of Madagascar, political parties, CENI-T, and
others key stakeholders who have urged for calm and respect for the peaceful resolution of
disputes.
Counting and Tabulation
In accordance with the Malagasy electoral code, counting took place at polling-station level
immediately following the closure of polls on election day.2 Following counting, the presiding
officer, representative of CENI-T, Fokontany Chief, or nominated representative of the SRMV
was required to deliver the certified copy of the results (PV) along with supporting materials
outlined in the electoral code to the corresponding transmission center (SRMV) in each district
by the fastest method available.3 The Carter Center observed that delivery of material to the
SRMV was usually conducted by the person legally assigned to do so. In the majority of cases,
Carter Center observers found that the transfer of material was properly conducted, in
accordance with electoral procedures. However, the transfer of results was delayed in some
districts due to the lack of adequate transport and miscommunication regarding the handover of
material. A clearly outlined collection plan for electoral material was notably absent of the
electoral code. In future elections, the Center recommends that a material collection plan be
1 Atsinanana, Analanjirofo, Vakinankaratra, Amoron’I Mania, Haute Matsiara,

Atsimo Andrefana
2 Organic Law n° 2012-005 of Mar. 22, 2012, Art. 98.
3 Organic Law n° 2012-005 of Mar. 22, 2012, Art. 113.

developed in advance to ensure that the transport of material ensures a timely publication of
results.4
Despite these challenges relating to the timely transfer of materials, The Carter Center assessed
that the conduct within SRMV’s was acceptable in 87 percent of the transmission centers visited
and that the overall process was sufficient. In the remaining 13 percent of SRMVs visited,
observers noted that returning material was not properly recorded. In general, teams reported that
increasing the number of staff in SRMVs in the future would increase the efficiency of the work
of these institutions. Observers largely evaluated conduct of the SRMV operations as peaceful.
Following the count and transfer of preliminary results, the centralized tabulation process for the
legislative elections and the second round of presidential elections took place between Dec. 20,
2013, and Jan. 10, 2014. The Carter Center has found the counting and tabulation processes to be
peaceful, with all observers reporting free access to the counting and tabulation processes.
As stated in the Center’s preliminary statement on Dec. 22, Malagasy electoral law dictates that
in a circumstance where the number of ballots in the ballot box is greater than the number of
people who signed the voter’s list, polling staff must randomly withdraw a matching number of
ballots from the ballot box and declare them blank and invalid. 5 This procedure does not provide
for a possibility to register separately invalidated ballots and genuinely blank ballots. The Carter
Center notes that the absence of such information from the CENI-T resulting from the use of this
procedure makes it impossible to distinguish between the total of invalid and blank votes.
Providing such information in future elections will help ensure greater integrity and transparency
of the process.
Declaration of Provisional Results
According to the law,6 CENI-T has 10 days after the reception of the certified copy of results to
declare provisional national electoral results. These certified results were received by CENI-T on
Dec. 31, 2013, giving the body until Jan. 10, 2014, to announce national provisional results. In
compliance with its legal obligation, CENI-T announced preliminary results for the second round
of presidential elections on Jan. 3 and preliminary results for the legislative elections on Jan. 10.
Although CENI-T has complied with this legal calendar, The Carter Center notes that further
4 Commonwealth Secretariat, Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections: Frameworks, Integrity, Transparency,
Attributes, Monitoring, 47, “The timely announcement of election results enhances the transparency of the electoral
process. The promptness or otherwise with which the results of an election are made known may depend on the
electoral system that is in place. The first-past-the-post system has the ability to produce early results, particularly
when the counting of the ballots is done at the polling stations.”
5 Guide a l’usage des membres du Bureau de Vote, page. 24.
6 Organic Law n°2012-015, Art. 26 (for presidential elections); Organic Law n°2012-016, Art. 53 (for legislative
elections).

improvements should be made regarding the collection of materials to expedite the process in the
future.
The CES conducted a parallel process of tabulation that has been the basis for the final
declaration of result, which is the only one that is legally binding. On Jan. 17, the CES released
the final results of the presidential elections, officially declaring Hery Rajaonarimampianina
Rakotoarimanana winner of the second round with 2.060.124 votes (53.49 percent) against Jean
Louis Robinson with 1.791.336 votes (46.51 percent). These results are very similar to those
released by the CENI-T. While it is unfortunate that voter turnout was lower than in the first
round of elections at about 50 percent, an important decrease in the number of invalid ballots
between the first and second rounds was positive.
For the legislative elections, CENI-T declared that results from 13 polling stations were
considered cancelled due to the failure to complete electoral operations on the election day. Most
of cases concerned non-delivery of electoral material to SRMVs, in two cases due to insecurity
in the area concerned. In three cases voting operations did not take place due to attack on polling
staff. In one case, a polling staff was arrested during election day and not replaced, which
stopped the vote in this polling station. For an additional 40 polling stations, the certified copies
of the result were unreadable.
For presidential elections, there were a small number of polling stations in which presidential
results were not included in the final CENI-T count. Presidential results from 16 polling stations
were not returned to SRMVs, and therefore not included in the final count. In a small number of
cases where the number of total votes cast significantly exceeded the number of voters
registered, CENI-T was obligated to transfer all corresponding electoral material to the CES for
further examination. In one case this process was not completed due to the lack of counting
forms. It is important to note that the total number of votes at these polling stations is not
significant and would not affect the outcome of the election.
Electoral Dispute Resolution
By Dec. 31, 2013, the deadline for the submission of complaints to the CES, 70 electoral
complaints were filed in relation to the presidential election, 63 of which were submitted on the
very last day of the complaint period. A total of 580 complaints were submitted related to the
legislative elections. Of these complaints, two significant submissions called for a cancellation of
the election results and disputed the preliminary results.
In advance of the announcement of results, the CES released nine key decisions in the first
weeks of January. The most important of these was the decision that the CES would not
disqualify any candidate or detract votes from any candidate on the basis of the CES’s annulment
of the decree of Aug. 6 2013 authorizing heads of institution to participate in the campaign.

The Carter Center commends the CES on the impartiality and objectivity that it has demonstrated
during the electoral process, and calls for the respect of the will of the Malagasy people. The
Carter Center appeals to stakeholders to uphold their commitment to peace and constitutional
order, and calls on political stakeholders to advance this opportunity to overcome the country’s
history of winner-takes-all politics and commit to an inclusive democratic government.
####
“Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope.”
A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization, The Carter Center has helped to improve life for
people in more than 70 countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights,
and economic opportunity; preventing diseases; and improving mental health care. The Carter
Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former First Lady
Rosalynn Carter, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide.

Appendix E
Deployment Plan
Short-Term Observer Teams Names Location

1 Marie Clemence Nodjan Antananarivo
(Rotating Members)
Cecile Bassomo
Hama Munyikwa
2 Gaston Kalombo Toamasina/Tamatave
Gisele Pana
3 Monique Nobs Fenoarivo
Lucianne Sophola
4 Charlotte Ramble Antsirabe
Immaculee Murangwa
5 Gideon Taboh Fianarantsoa
Jean Jacques Cornish
6 Laura Erizi Toliara
Andre Kabunda
7 Koffi Abou Anzou Toliara
Thomas Cox
8 Sailifa Nzwalo Antsiranana/Diego
Aichatou Fall
9 Denis Kadima Antananarivo
(Rotating Members)
William Hassall
Jules Lalancette
Brian Klaas
10 H.E. Cassam Uteem Antananarivo
John Stremlau
71
Appendix F
Letter of Invitation
72
Appendix G
Quick Facts About the 2013
Presidential and Legislative
Elections in Madagascar
Dates of Election
Type Date
First Round Presidential Oct. 25, 2013
Second Round Presidential (Runoff) Dec. 20, 2013
Legislative Dec. 20, 2013
Quick Statistics
Population of Madagascar 22,599,0981
Number of Regions 222
Number of Districts 119
Number of Registered Voters (First Round Presidential) 7,823,305
Turnout for First Round Elections 4,831,666 (61.76%)3
Number of Invalid/Blank Votes (First Round) 303,277 (3.88%)
Number of Registered Voters (Second Round Presidential) 7,971,7904
Turnout for Second Round Elections 4,043,246 (50.72%)
Number of Invalid/Blank Votes (Second Round) 191,786 (2.41%)
Number of Polling Stations 20,001
Average Number of Voters per Polling Station 202.15
Total Number of Presidential Candidates (First Round) 33
Total Number of Legislative Candidates 2,054
Total Number of Seats Contested in National Assembly 151
Number of Polling Stations with Invalidated Results 76
1 http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ma.html 3 http://www.cenit-madagascar.mg/res/recap/Recap_National.pdf
2 http://www.ceni-madagascar.mg/dossier/recap_nbelec_arretprov.pdf 4 http://www.hcc.gov.mg/elections/president2013-2/mada
73
First Round Presidential Election Results (Top Five Candidates)5
Candidate Name Number of Votes
Jean Louis Robinson (AVANA) 955,534 (21.10%)
Hery Rajaonarimampianina (Hery Vavao ho an’I Madagasikara) 721,206 (15.93%)
Hajo Herivelona Andrianainarivelo (MMM) 476,153 (10.51%)
Roland Ratsiraka (MTS) 407,732 (9.00%)
Albert Camille Vital (Hiaraka Isika) 310,253 (6.85%)
Second Round Presidential Election Results6

Candidate Name Number of Votes
Hery Rajaonarimampianina (Hery Vavao ho an’I Madagasikara) 2,060,124 (53.49%)
Jean Louis Robinson (AVANA) 1,791,336 (46.51%)
5 AU, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Principles and

Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, Article
2(i); U.N., United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment
No. 32, para. 27
6 The ability to challenge election results should be provided for by law
(SADC, Principles and Guidelines, para 2.1.10).

The Carter Center at a Glance
The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by 80 countries by resolving conflicts; advancing
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, democracy, human rights, and economic opportu-
Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, nity; preventing diseases; and improving mental
to advance peace and health worldwide. A not- health care. Please visit www.cartercenter.org to
for-profit, nongovernmental organization, the learn more about The Carter Center.
Center has helped to improve life for people in
Martin Frank
75
One Copenhill
453 Freedom Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30307
(404) 420-5100

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ELECTION REPORT ✩

Legislative and Second Round of

Legislative and Second Round of

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns . . . . . . . . . 28

The Decrees and the Principle of Neutrality . . 21 Appendix E: Deployment Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 5

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 7

8 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 9

10 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Since 1989, The Carter Center has observed

96 elections in 38 countries. The Center

Organization Document Status

12 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

by Cassam Uteem, former presi-

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 13

Overview of the political process — but one that was too

However, independence did not usher in a

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 15

16 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 17

a market in acknowledge elections that involved Rajoelina

18 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 19

The Decrees and the

presidential campaigns. The second decree was representative government.4

cies, only one candidate for each party appears

Hery Rajaonarimampianina. 5 Organic Law No. 2013–083

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 21

22 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 23

process, the court has a much more limited

24 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Voter Registration households across the country, filled in registration

26 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Women and the Voter Register

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 27

28 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 29

30 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 31

A limited number of media outlets conducted 44 U.N., CEDAW, Article 7

voter education. Radio media remained the most 45 EISA, PEMMO, p. 19

32 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 33

Opening and Polling retribution.48 Madagascar largely met these impor-

Uteem, former transparent polling process.49

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 35

Polling Station Locations

36 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

the capital city of

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 37

supporting materials outlined in the electoral

53 The Carter Center, “Carter Center Commends Peaceful Release of

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 39

40 The Carter Center ✩ ELECTION REPORT

Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar 41

CENI National Independent Pillar and Structure Andry sy Rihana

EISA Electoral Institute for Social Democrats Parti Social Démocrate

MAPAR Together With President TIM I Love Madagascar party