Public Disclosure Authorized

8963
OF
THE ECONOMICS
TIN MINING
IN BOLIVIA
Public Disclosure Authorized

Mahmood Ali Ayub FILECOPY

Hideo Hashimoto
Public Disclosure Authorized

~~. M

WI
Public Disclosure Authorized

a.-~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ..

A World Bank Publication

I
 The Economics
of
Tin Mining in Bolivia

Mahmood Al' Ayub

Hideo Hashimoto

The World Bank

Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
 Copyright ©)1985 by the International Bank
for Reconstructionand Development/ The World Bank
1818 H Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A

All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America
First Printing May 1985

The World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressed herein, which are
those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated
organizations. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the rusults of research
supported by the Bank; they do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank. The
designations employed, the presentation of material, and any maps used in this document
are solely for the convenience of the reader and do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of the World Bank or its affiliates concerning the legal status of any
country, territory, city, area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its
boundaries or national affiliation.

EDITOR Christine Houle

FIGURES Pensri Kimpitak
BOOK DESIGN Christine Houle
COVER DESIGN George Parakamannil

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Ayub, Mahmood Ali, 1948-

The economics of tin mining in Bolivia.
Bibliography: p.
1. Tin Industry--Bolivia. 2. Tin mines and mining-
Bolivia. I. Hashimoto, Hideo, 1937- II. World
Bank. III. Title.
HD9539.T6B6166 1985 338.2'7453'0984 85-3200
ISBN 0-8213-0514-X
 Table of Contents

Preface v
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary 3
Objectives of the Study 3
Survey for Data Collection 4
Structure of the Study 4
Summary and Conclusions 5

Chapter 2 Tin Mining in Bolivia: History and Characteristics 10

The Era of the "Tin Barons" 10
The Nationalization of Large Mines, 1952 13
The Triangular Plan for the Rehabilitation of COMIBOL 15
Recent Tin-Mining and Metallurgical Developments in Bolivia 18
Main Characteristics of Tin Mining in Bolivia 19

Chapter 3 The Impact of Tin Mining on the Bolivian Economy 24

Fiscal Results of Tin Revenues 28
Macroeconomic Linkages of Tin Mining 28

Chapter 4 Factors Determining Tin Prices and Competitiveness 30

The Demand Curve 30
The Marginal Production Cost Curve 30
Policy Factors 33
Institutional Factors 39
A Review of the World Tin Economv over the Past Decade 41

Chapter 5 Problems of COMIBOL 45

Major Problems of COMIBOL 45
Organizational and Management Problems 46
Problems Related to Manpower and Remuneration Policies 47
Lack of Investment 49
Excessive Taxation 49
Heavy Debt Burden 50
Some Recommendations for Changes in COMIBOL 50

Chapter 6 Tin Smelting in Bolivia 55

Main Objectives of Tin Smelting in Bolivia 56
Performance of ENAF 57

Chapter 7 Issues and Policies Related to Bolivian Mining Taxation 63

Drawbacks of the Present System 63
Alternatives for Mineral Tax Reform 65

..
Chapter 8 Prospects for Tin Mining in Bolivia 67
International Market Prospects 67
Domestic Considerations 70

Appendixes
A. List of Bolivian Mining Companies Included in the Survey 72
B. Aggregated Sample Data for the Bolivian Tin-Mining Sector 73
C. Alternative Legal and Contractual Agreements for Mineral Development 74
D. Problems of La Palca Tin Volatilization Plant 77
E. Comparative Analysis of Terms and Conditions of Tin Concentrates Contracts 78

Statistical Appendix 79

Bibliography 105

iv
 Preface

This study is the result of the authors' work with the Bolivian economy, in general, and with the
tin mining sector of that country, in particular. While the focus of the study is on the Bolivian
experience, the issues raised are typical of the dilemmas facing economic policymakers in many
economies with heavy reliance on a single primary goods sector.

In the preparation of this study, thieauthiors have received invaluable advice and assistance from
a number of individuals. The authors are especially indebted to Enrique Lerdau for his continued
support of the study. They are grateful to Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, assistant secretary general,
Department of Technical Cooperation for Development, United Nations, whose intimate knowl-
edge of the economic history of Bolivia and whose continuing interest in that country contributed
considerably. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the comments on a prior draft of Ronald
Duncan, Andrew Freyman, Marianne Haug, Arnaldo Leon, Peter Scherer, and Roberto Zagha.
The authors are, of course, responsible for all remaining shortcomings.

An important source of background information for the present study was a detailed survey of
Bolivia's public and private tin mining sectors. This was ably carried out by a team of Bolivian
engineers and economists, including Teresa Alcazar, Gilberto Hurtado and Humberto Zannier.
The team received considerable advice on data collection and analysis from RolandoJordan, chief
economist of the Medium Mines Association of Bolivia.

Successive drafts of the study were typed by Anna Maria Galindo de Paz, Adrienne Guerrero,
Twain Revell, and Paula Earp. We are thankful to all of them.

Mahmood Ali Ayub

Hideo Hashimoto
 The Economics
of
Tin Mining in Bolivia
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Summary

A caretaker of a Bolivianfinca (estate) once praised the natural resources of his country to a foreign
diplomat. "The whole Cordillera of the Andes is a mass of gold and tin. Here where we stand, we
are treading pure gold, and you will sleep tonight on a bed of gold." In relating the anecdote, the
diplomat commented, "The man who was walking on gold had no shoes, and his bed was made of
mud. In the words of an old philosopher, 'Rich country, poor people.' "' Nothing depicts more
vividly the bittersweet saga of mining in Bolivia.
From the advent of the Spaniards to Bolivia-then called Upper Peru-in the fourth decade of
the sixteenth century, mining has been a mixed blessing for the country. Silver mining led to the
elevation of Potosi to the rank of the most populous city in all America by the middle of the
seventeenth century. But, the Imperial City was conspicuous because of its glaring contrasts of the
big fortunes of the Spanish mine owners and the dire poverty of the indigenous Indian population.
It was tin mining that acted as the engine of growth during much of the present century and led
to the development of much of the infrastructure that currently exists. And yet there is evidence
that at least some of this was achieved at the expense of greater improvements in the working
conditions of the mine workers. In short, mining led not only to economic growth but also to social
and political polarization of the society. Where tin mining interests-specifically, three major
companies (Patiiio, Hochschild, and Aramayo), collectively referred to as the "Rosca"-heavily
influenced successive governments of Bolivia during the first four decades of this century, there also
now exists a trade union movement in the mining sector, which is probably one of the most powerful
in Latin America.
In such a charged environment, it is not surprising that few studies have examined the tin mining
sector dispassionately from a strictly economic point of view. All too often, writing on the subject
has been heavily tainted by the author's ideological outlook. Frequently, data have been distorted
or stretched to justify preconceived notions. The present study is an attempt to analyze available
data in as objective a manner as possible.

Objectives of the Study

This study has a number of objectives. First, it brings together reliable and consistent data on
the sector. Despite the overwhelming importance of tin mining in Bolivia, no systematic efforts have
been made, particularly in the public sector, to maintain reliable data. Those who have attempted
to analyze Bolivian mining sector data are fully aware of the haphazard nature of the data and the
frustrations of developing a consistent time series. Second, most discussions of mining in Bolivia
have reviewed only a decade or two of developments. The present study (Chapter 2) analyzes tin
mining activities over the past eighty years, for which the authors have compiled production and
price data. This long-term view is interesting in assessing the lagged effect of major political
upheavals and economic and technical factors, and in obtaining an idea about the future of tin
mining in Bolivia. Third, on the basis of the collected information, an attempt has been made to
answer such questions as:

3
 How successful was the attempt at rehabilitating the nationalized Bolivian Mining Corporation
(Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia, COMIBOL) during the 1960s? What lessons can be drawn from that
experience? What are the main problems of COMIBOL, and what can be done about them? Has tin
smelting in Bolivia been a success? What is the macroeconomic impact of tin mining on the Bolivian
economy? How competitive in tin production is Bolivia in relation to its Southeast Asian rivals?
What are the prospects for Bolivia's tin industry?

Survey for Data Collection

An important component of this study was the estimation of the effect of a change in tin mining
revenues on Bolivia's domestic aggregate demand. To achieve this, and to analyze the cost structure
of Bolivian tin mining, a survey was carried out for thirteen private mining firms and an equal
number of enterprises in the nationalized sector that are either sole producers of tin or produce tin
along with other minerals. The sample covered no less than 90 percent of the country's total
production of tin. For firms, both private and public, that produce other minerals as well, input
costs were carefully prorated. A list of the firms surveyed is provided in Appendix A.
In the course of the survey, detailed information was collected on the use of inputs, production,
revenues, taxes, employment, and so on. The survey was completed by extensive interviews with
enterprise managers and visits to the mines and smelters. With invaluable support from a team of
Bolivian economists and engineers from both the public and private sectors, the data were
cross-checked with other sources of information and for internal consistency. The accuracy of the
data was checked by computing certain key ratios that ought to be standard across the industry.
Such key ratios included total labor costs to total costs, wage costs to total labor costs, total material
costs to total costs, and foreign material purchases to total material purchases. Several follow-up
visits took place to obtain missing data, to remove inconsistencies, and to find explanations for
odd-looking data. In short, every effort was made to ensure the reliability of the data.

Structure of the Study

Chapter 2 provides details about the rise to significance of tin mining in Bolivia, the events leading
to the nationalization of the large mines in 1952, and an assessment of the performance of tin mining
in the country; it concludes with a description of the principal characteristics of the sector in Bolivia,
using the latest available data.
In Chapter 3 an attempt is made to quantify the effect of tin mining on the Bolivian economy.
More specifically, the change in the level of domestic aggregate demand resulting from a change
in tin output and a change in the international price of tin is measured. There is also some discussion
of the fiscal impact of tin revenues and the backward and forward linkages resulting from mining
activities.
Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the main factors, economic and institutional, that determine
the price of tin. It also includes an assessment of the competitiveness of the various countries and
mining methods using data for four benchmark years from 1971 to 1981.
Since its inception in 1952, COMIBOL has been beset by a series of problems, some emanating from
its internal organizational structure, others the result of impositions and excessive control by the
government. In Chapter 5 an effort has been made to explain why, despite the undeniably high
technical caliber of COMIBOL staff since its birth, the corporation has encountered serious problems.
The chapter is useful as a case study of the problems a public enterprise can expect to encounter
as a result of unclear and even contradictory objectives, too little delegation internally, excessive
control from outside, poor signaling systems for management performance, and lack of critical
informational flows.

4
 Virtually no study exists that assesses the performance of tin smelting and refining in Bolivia. In
Chapter 6, a summary of the most important developments of tin smelting, in both the public and
private sectors, is provided. A critical examination of the main objectives for the setting up of tin
smelting in Bolivia is carried out, and, on the basis of stated objectives, the technical and financial
performance of the State Smelting Company (Empresa Nacional de Fundiciones; ENAF) is analyzed.
One of the main policy constraints on mining development in Bolivia, particularly for private
mining, has been the level and structure of mineral taxes. In Chapter 7, the main issues related to
Bolivian mining taxation are discussed and recommendations for change are suggested.
Finally, in Chapter 8, prospects for Bolivia's mining and metallurgical activities are studied. Two
broad sets of determinants are examined: international factors, over which Bolivia has little or no
control; and domestic factors, which can significantly affect the performance of the sector in terms
of production and costs.

Summary and Conclusions

The expansion of tin production in Bolivia in the last two decades of the nineteenth century
coincided with the rapid decline of silver mining, which had been the basis of the wealth of Bolivia
for several centuries. The coming to power in 1899 of the Liberal Party, which was antagonistic to
the silver-mining interests, the development of basic infrastructure (particularly railways to the
coast) in the first two decades of this century, the increase in demand for tin after the discovery of
the vacuum-packed can, and the rise of the automobile industry were some of the factors that aided
the growth of tin production in Bolivia. The country's production of tin, which had averaged only
100 tons annually during the 1860s and did not exceed 1,000 tons annually in the 1880s (less than
2 percent of world production) had reached about 24,000 tons by the First World War (amounting
to about 20 percent of world production).
The most spectacular period of growth of tin mining in Bolivia occurred in the second half of the
1920s, when production increased by more than 50 percent to a peak of about 47,000 tons in 1929-
a level never again reached. The "Rosca," or the oligarchy and the groups of lawyers and others
supporting them, were responsible for most of this impressive growth. There is little doubt that tin
mining during that era was a lucrative business, aided as it was by a relatively high metal content
of ore extracted and a low level of taxation. The fortunes of Patifio, the Bolivian who founded the
multinational firm that eventually dominated the world tin industry, are said to have been partly
the result of ores of about 50 percent tin content. While this was exceptional, a level of 12-15 percent
was not uncommon in 1900; and even in 1925 the metal content of Patifio's Catavi and Siglo XX
mines was about 7 percent. By comparison, the metal content of these same mines is currently about
0.3 percent. Mineral taxes as a proportion of total export values remained at about 4 percent during
the first two decades of this century, and at about 10 percent during most of the next two decades.
By contrast, the figure for 1980 was about 24 percent.
Despite substantial profits, the enclave nature of the mining sector inhibited its direct positive
effect on the Bolivian economy. In view of the relatively high capital intensity of the bulk of Bolivian
mining activity, factor payments to labor accounted for a small share of total mine revenue.
Backward linkages in terms of the use of domestic inputs were virtually nonexistent. Finally, very
little reinvestment occurred during the period; foreign-owned companies repatriated most of their
funds and nominally Bolivian-owned companies indulged in capital flight. Social conditions in the
mines were deplorable, which may, in part, explain the violent nature of the 1952 revolution.
Extremely low wages, inadequate housing, and perilous conditions in the mines led to frequent
disputes over wages and hours; some of them, as in 1918, 1923, 1942, and 1947, culminated in
massacres.

5
 One of the most significant objectives of the revolution of April 9, 1952 was the nationalization
of the three largest mining companies, Patinio, Hochschild, and Aramayo. COMIBOL was established
to run the nationalized industry.
Over the past thirty years COMIBOL has been considered by many as an unmitigated failure. While
the chronic problems of COMIBOL throughout its convulsive history make it difficult to deny this
charge, it would be equally difficult to accept the notion that all was well before nationalization
and disastrous thereafter. Two factors that predetermined to a large extent the fate of COMIBOL need
to be studied: the special circumstances that existed at its birth and the new role perceived for the
new corporation by the state.
In the two decades preceding the revolution, a politically unstable environment, the threat of
ultimate confiscation, and complicated and unfavorable foreign exchange regulations severely
dampened incentives for investment in the country. Private companies withdrew their profits from
the country and invested the minimum possible in exploration and development of new ore bodies.
Existing shafts were progressively exhausted and mechanization was limited. As a consequence of
the neglect of exploration and development, the metal content of tin ores gradually declined.
Other problems, both internal to COMIBOL and external, hampered its operations. The system of
controlobrero (worker control) for the administration of COMIBOL'S mines was undoubtedly one.
Under the system, union officials were designated for each level in COMIBOL with veto power over
the operations of the managers in all matters except "technical." Naturally, all questions ended up
being economic, social, or labor-related, with none being exclusively technical. The system had a
devastating effect on labor discipline at all levels, the management was subjected to severe pressures
by union officials, and absenteeism and disappearance of ore and equipment became all too
frequent.
Aggravating the situation was the decision of the government, under union pressure, to rehire
the workers discharged for political or health reasons before the revolution. Consequently, the total
number of workers employed by COMIBOL increased from 24,000 in 1951 to about 36,500 at the end
of 1955; during this period production declined by about 20 percent.
Another important disincentive to production was the administration of the exchange rate.
COMIBOL received only 1,200 bolivianos per U.S. dollar for its exports of metal when the market
rate was fluctuating between 4,000 bolivianos and 14,000 bolivianos per U.S. dollar. This was
essentially a tax on the exports of COMIBOL. At the same time, the government pursued (quite
understandably in view of the country's heavy reliance on the mining sector) a diversification policy
that siphoned off COMIBOL'S surpluses for use in the development of other sectors of the economy,
especially tropical agriculture and petroleum. Finally, the international price of tin dropped sharply
in 1953-54 because of increased Soviet tin exports and the cessation of stockpiling by the United
States of tin and other strategic metals at the end of the Korean WVar.
Concern about the problems of COMIBOL and more generally about the hyperinflationary
situation of the economy, led to the Economic Stabilization Program of 1956. The main
macroeconomic components of the program are mentioned in Chapter 2. In the case of COMIBOL,
the program also included the elimination of the subsidized company stores (pulperia barata) and
the reduction of the corporation's payroll by about 20 percent. To complement these measures, the
government undertook a comprehensive program of rationalization of the corporation in the early
1960s, referred to as the "Triangular Plan" because it included support from the United States, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and the Inter-American Development Bank. The lenders agreed to
provide about US$37 million to COMIBOL over a three-year period for exploration, metallurgical
research, repairs, and supplies and equipment. The agreement contained provisions prohibiting
strikes and limiting the role of labor representatives in the management of the corporation.
Despite the relatively large external financing made available and generous arrangements
worked out for bolstering the working capital of COMIBOL, surprisingly little was achieved by the

6
 plan. Admittedly, there were some gains-a greater exploration effort, better supplies of food and
medicine in the company stores, and the rehabilitation of some mines-but in other areas,
achievements were substantially below expectations.
An important objective of the plan-to increase production-was not achieved, and, as can be
seen in Chapter 2, the apparent halt in the decline of production reflects only a statistical aberration.
Also, despite a decrease in the number of employees, there was no concomitant decline in COMIBOL'S
current expenditures. There was some improvement in tin recovery in the concentration plants,
but this was modest (from 51 percent in 1961 to 54 percent in 1964) compared with expectations.
Nor can it be argued that the investment during 1961-64 had a lagged effect, with its impact on
production being felt after 1968. This is because the major portion of the investment-some 70
percent-was for emergencies such as immediately needed supplies and equipment, and less than
20 percent was for rehabilitation projects with long gestation periods.
Why was the plan a failure? First, the reduction of the labor force was accompanied by an
increase in total labor costs because of a change in the composition of the labor force. More
higher-paid surface staff than underground workers were recruited; the percentage of miners
working underground declined from 45 percent of the total labor force in 1952 to 33 percent in
1968. Absence of support for the plan from the government, despite its public pronouncements, was
another reason. Because of open opposition to the plan from labor, a record number of hours was
lost in strikes during the period of the plan. Moreover, the plan was viewed, not only by workers
but also by COMIBOL technicians, as having been "imposed." Foreign experts were made directly
responsible for operations, no provisions were made for strengthening the internal organization and
structure of COMIBOL, and, consequently, when the experts left, there was a complete lack of
continuity. To that extent, the Triangular Plan is a good example of how not to execute projects
in developing countries.
Performance of COMIBOL over the past decade and its main present problems are highlighted in
Chapter 5. Some of these problems may be classified as resulting from its organizational and
management structure, its manpower and remuneration policies, lack of investment, excessive
taxation, and a heavy debt burden.
Since the nationalization of the large mining companies, the mining industry in Bolivia had been
classified into three sectors: COMIBOL, the private medium-size mines, and the private small mines
and cooperatives. While there is a legal basis for the distinction between medium and small mines
(see Chapter 2), what differentiates a small mining enterprise from a medium one is the scale and
type of operation. Small mines typically employ an average of seven or eight people, the operations
are rudimentary and labor intensive, and there is a general lack of infrastructure. By contrast,
medium-size mines employ an average of about 300 workers and have relatively sophisticated
operations. The main problems of the private sector have been lack of credit, particularly over the
past five years, as well as inappropriate macroeconomic policies on the exchange rate and mining
taxation.
The level of mining taxation in Bolivia has been one of the highest among the major tin-producing
countries. In addition, the structure of mining taxation in Bolivia suffers from a number of
drawbacks in terms of incentives for efficiency and exploitation. In theory, a move to a true income
tax would be desirable. But given the present constraints resulting from a lack of administrative
machinery in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy, and the absence
of a management and accounting infrastructure in the mining sector itself, it would be advisable to
move gradually to that objective. A premature and hurried effort to install a true income tax on
the mining sector may be worse than none at all. In Chapter 7, an interim system of taxation based
on the indexation of the major inputs is discussed.
Apart from its high level of taxation, Bolivia also has other disadvantages in relation to its main
competitors in tin production. The country's mineralized area is essentially confined to rather

7
inaccessible regions of the Andes. Mines are typically located at high altitudes, rendering access to
them difficult. Mineral outcrops normally occur in narrow, deep-seated veins, which make mining
a high-cost operation. As the analysis in Chapter 4 of Bolivia's export competitiveness in tin
production indicates, its production costs (together with those of the United Kingdom) are the
highest most of the time, whereas those of Malaysia and Thailand are the lowest. But if these actual
costs are adjusted by the degree of overvaluation, Bolivia slips into the middle-cost range, whereas
Malaysia and Australia become somewhat higher-cost producers.
Prospects for Bolivia's tin mining and metallurgical activities are expected to be influenced by
both international market prospects for tin and domestic performance and policies in the tin sector
of the country. Bolivia can exercise relatively little control over the first set of factors except through
its membership in the International Tin Council (ITC) and possibly through its influence in the
newly created Association of Tin-Producing Countries. By contrast, Bolivia can exercise substantial
control over the domestic factors of production, which will be affected primarily by the
government's objectives for the sector, plans for the rehabilitation of the nationalized sector,
exchange rate and tax policies, and credit availability, particularly from external sources.
The short-term prospects for tin are expected to be influenced primarily by the accumulated
stocks, which are at unprecedentedly high levels. Current stock levels are approximately 55 percent
higher than the average during the 1970s. It is likely, therefore, that there will continue to be
persistent downward pressure on demand for tin in the short term. In the past, producing countries
have reacted to such a situation by cutting production so as to maintain their own shares. But, the
possibility cannot be ruled out that the ITC system will lose control over markets. In such an
eventuality, high-cost producers such as Bolivia will suffer most. Medium- and long-term demand
prospects will be affected to a large extent by the degree of substitution from other materials,
particularly from aluminum and plastics. As noted in Chapter 8, the relative price of tin with respect
to other major metals has increased consistently for at least a century, and if this trend continues,
it is bound to affect adversely the future demand for tin. In fact, the use of tin for tinplate
production, which constitutes the largest percentage share of tin consumption, has declined over
the past decade, partly because of substitution of aluminum and plastics for tin in can-making, and
because of technological advances in electrolytic processes, which have reduced the use of tin per
square meter of tinplate.
In this context of low growth in the demand for tin, two scenarios are conceivable for the long
term. In the first, the current major producers are assumed to continue their control, however
feeble, over the world markets. It is assumed that the intervention of the ITC will result in a level of
tin prices that would cover the production costs of present producers. In such an eventuality,
substitution will continue to proceed in all those activities, such as canning, where such possibilities
exist.
In the second scenario, the control over world tin markets of the present producers is gradually
loosened by the emergence of new producers. Brazil appears to be the most effective newcomer and
may well overtake Bolivia by the late 1980s. If Brazil's expansion stimulates present producers to
increase production and to reduce prices, the most likely result could be the ousting of high-cost
producers such as Bolivia.
From the domestic point of view, short-term prospects for increased output and improved
productivity of Bolivian tin mining are not bright. Past neglect of exploration and mine
development, the chaotic situation of COMIBOL, the unresolved status of workers' participation in
the nationalized sector, lack of credit, as well as the discouragement of all exporting activities under
the present system of exchange rates, are some factors inhibiting recovery. For the private sector,
particularly for the medium-size mines, once a proper policy mix (a realistic exchange rate, the
adoption of a system of mining taxation that provides more incentives for investment, and greater
access to foreign credit) is in place, no other major constraints exist, and capacity utilization can

8
be increased above its present level of about 75 percent. But policy changes alone cannot resolve
COMIBOL'S problems in the short term. A gradual introduction of the organizational, financial, and
administrative changes suggested in Chapter 5 would be needed to put COMIBOL on a sounder
financial footing. Many changes can be effected within the present framework of COMIBOL and in
the context of the role assigned to the corporation by the government.
Even with a successful rehabilitation program for COMIBOL under way, and with improved
international prospects for tin, the problems of public sector tin mining in Bolivia can be expected
to persist for several years. Even if some of the more attractive new projects, enumerated later, are
executed successfully, the increased production resulting from these investments will be almost
completely annulled, at least in the first few years, by declining output of those mines whose deposits
have been progressively exhausted.
To summarize, even under the most optimistic scenario, prospects for tin mining in Bolivia appear
dim, especially in the public sector. Until the tin potential of the Bolivian lowlands is better
evaluated, it may be premature to suggest that the days of tin mining in that country are over.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the most that can be done in the next few years is to maintain
production at its present level. Meanwhile, an effort should be made to diversify gradually not only
into other metals, such as gold, silver, and zinc, but also into hydrocarbons and the agricultural
and agro-industrial sectors.

Note

I. Quoted by Margaret A. Marsh in The Bankersin Bolivia:A Study in AmericanForeignInvestment(New York: AMS
Press, 1970).

9
 CHAPTER 2
Tin Mining in Bolivia: History and Characteristics

According to Spanish records, when the Spaniards arrived in Upper Peru-now Bolivia-in 1535,
they discovered that the Incas were already operating the mines. Cerro de Potosi, the silver-rich
hill that transformed Potosi into the Imperial City, was discovered in 1545. In 1557, near the town
of Oruro, then called San Felipe de Austria, the first silver mine started operations. ' By 1650 Potosi
had a population of 120,000. A few years later it reached a peak of 160,000, which made it the
most populous city in all of America at that time. The royal city, with its glaring contrasts of the
extraordinary wealth of the Spanish mine owners and the dire poverty of the local Indians, declined
gradually as the silver mines became exhausted; by 1825, when Bolivia became independent,
Potosi's population had been reduced to a mere 8,000. The exhaustion of the main silver deposits
was followed during the 1890s by the expansion of tin production, a metal which had hitherto been
mined as a by-product of silver. Three important factors aided this expansion. The victory of the
Liberal party in 1899 marked a definite shift of power away from the silver-mining interests, still
powerful in the Sucre area, to the tin-mining enterprises located mainly in the northern part of the
Altiplano. 2 Moreover, in the aftermath of the WNarof the Pacific with Chile (1879-83), in which
Bolivia lost its access to the sea, the first railway connections between Bolivia and the outside world
were built. The connection between Oruro and Antofagasta saw the first significant shipment of
tin by rail in 1895. This railroad was later extended from Oruro to La Paz and from Oruro to
Cochabamba and Potosi. A second major railway connection between La Paz and Arica was
completed in 1913. At the same time, world demand for tin started to increase with the discovery
of the vacuum-packed can as a means of preserving many types of food, the rise of the automobile
industry, and the growing variety of industrial uses of the metal.
Nonetheless, large-scale production of tin has a much shorter history in Bolivia than in the
southeast Asian countries. 3 Average annual production during the 1860s was only 100 tons; even
in the 1880s, this figure did not exceed 1,000 tons (less than 2 percent of w'orld production). By the
end of the century the Bolivian share had risen to 5 percent and was almost 20 percent just before
the First World War.

The Era of the "Tin Barons"

The second half of the 1920s witnessed the most spectacular period of growth of the tin industry
in Bolivia, with production rising by more than 50 percent-from an average of about 29,000 tons
in 1920--24 to a peak of about 47,000 tons in 1929 (see Table 1). Production was severely affected
by the ensuing depression, and remained low during the Chaco War with Paraguay (1932-35),
which severely drained skilled manpower from the mines.4 During this period Bolivia continued to
have problems meeting its tin quota; its underexport reached 10,000 tons by June 1936.5 With the
end of the Chaco War and heavy U.S. buying during the Second World War, production increased
substantially, averaging more than 40,000 tons during 1940-44. The peak level of 1929, however,
has never again been reached.
Whereas after Bolivia's independence silver mining was carried out almost exclusively by Bolivian

10
Table 1. Bolivian and World Productionof Tin Concentrates,1900-82
(tons)

Averageannualproduction

Bolivianproduction
as a percentageof
Period Bolivia World' worldproduction
1900-04 11,781 92,800 12.7
1905-09 17,969 102,489 17.5
1910-14 23,460 118,054 19.9
1915-19 25,493 119,274 21.4
1920-24 29,963 119,547 25.1
1925-29 37,764 159,926 23.6
1930-34 25,366 120,965 21.0
1935-39 26,282 174,354 15.1
1940-44 40,096 170,899 23.5
1945-49 37,557 122,434 30.7
1950-54 32,504 171,529 18.9
1955-59 25,218 148,851 16.9
1960-64 22,011 142,458 15.5
1965-69 27,335 172,360 15.9
1970-74 30,780 188,680 16.3
1975-79 31,188 189,320 16.5
1980-82 27,052 197,900 13.7
a. Excluding
communist countries'production.
Source:
SeeStatisticalAppendixTable13.

nationals, tin mining attracted a more cosmopolitan group of foreigners as well as some Bolivians;
the new companies became complex international ventures directed by professional managers. 6 On
the basis of their output and exports, the five most important tin companies in Bolivia during the
first two decades of this century were Patifio Mines and Enterprises Consolidated, the Guggenheim's
Caracoles Tin Company of Bolivia, Compafiia Minera y Agricola Oploca de Bolivia, Empresa de
Estafio Araca, and Compagnie Aramayo de Mines en Bolivie. The major dislocation of the industry
in the Depression led to a concentration of production in three major firms: Patifio, Hochschild,
and Aramayo. The largest of these, Patifio, was owned by a Bolivian of humble origin, Hochschild
was dominated by Mauricio Hochschild, an Austrian who had acquired Argentine citizenship, and
the Compagnie Aramayo de Mines en Bolivie was controlled by the Aramayo family, who usually
resided in Bolivia but were said to be of Colombian origin. 7 Together, this group of "tin barons"
was referred to as the "Rosca," a term designating the oligarchy and the groups of lawyers and
others supporting them."
The history of tin mining in Bolivia during this period is interesting not so much for the role of
foreign multinationals in that country as for the Bolivian multinational founded by Simon Patifio
that dominated the world tin industry. So fascinating is the story of this Bolivian Indian, who, by
a single stroke of good fortune, gained possession of the richest vein of tin ore in the world, that it
merits a brief description. The story goes that Patifio, then a store clerk in a silver mine in Oruro,
gave a prospector credit, accepting as security the prospector's mining claim. The failure of the
prospector to pay his debts resulted in the dismissal of Patifio from the company store, leaving him
and his wife in possession of the supposedly worthless deeds to the prospector's mines-which, of
course, were none other than the valuable tin properties of Llallagua and Uncia. Patifio and his
enterprising wife began working the claim almost without help. Later, he made an agreement with
the British commercial house Duncan, Fox and Company, whereby they advanced him capital on
condition that he sell them his output. 9 A series of acquisitions of French, British, and Chilean

11
Table 2. Cost and price comparisons,1925 and 1981
(U.S. dollars a pound)

Item 1925 1981

Production costs 0.204 2.913
Transport costs (including c.i.f.) 0.044 0.210
'I'axes 0.062 1.007
Smelting and other charges 0.063 2.258
Total costs 0.373 6.388
Average price 0.560 6.390
'I'otal costs as percentage of price 66.6 99.9

companies and his skillful use of credit facilities led to the formation of his group, Patiio Mines and
Enterprises, incorporated in Delaware, U.S.A. '° In addition to his interest in Bolivian tin, banking,
and railways, his group acquired control of Europe's largest tin smelter-Williams Harvey of
Liverpool-in 1924. The group also acquired partnership in the National Lead Company of the
United States, at that time the world's second largest consumer of tin. From then on he was one of
the world's wealthiest individuals.
Although detailed data are not available, tin mining in Bolivia during the first four decades of
this century was undoubtedly a lucrative business. Data for Patifio Mines and Enterprises for 1925
reveal a total production cost of US$0.37 a pound, at a time when tin was selling at US$0.56 a
pound. " By comparison, the corresponding tin production cost for the whole mining sector fifty-six
years later was US$6.38 a pound, with the international price at about the same level (see Table
2).
These profits were largely the result of the relatively high metal content of ore extracted and the
low level of taxation. According to Fox, the fortunes of Patifio derived partly from ores of no less
than 47 percent tin content.' 2 While this was exceptional, a level of 12-15 percent was not
uncommon in 1900. Even in 1925 the metal content of ore in Patifio's Catavi and Siglo XX mines
was 6.65 percent. 13 By comparison, the present metal content of these same mines, now
nationalized, has fallen to below 0.3 percent.
During this period mineral taxes were typically quite low in relation to both total export values
and to profits in the sector. Table 3 provides illustrative data for 1925 for the five largest companies.

Table 3. Selected Data for the Major Bolivian Mining Companies, 1925
(U.S. dollars)

Taxes paid
as Taxes paid
Profits percentage as
Export and of export percentage
Mining company Taxes paid value loss (-) value of profits
Patino Mines and
Enterprises 904,604 9,957,756 6,611,219 9.1 13.7
Caracoles 271,303 2,951,888 -391,583 9.2 n.a.
Oploca 198,081 2,160,150 1,460,088 9.2 13.6
Araca 185,066 2,027,985 885,293 9.1 20.9
Aramayo 159,829 1,740,958 1,139,037 9.2 14.0
'rotal/average 1,718,883 18,838,737 9,704,054 9.1 17.7
,Vote:Exchange rates used: US$1 = 2.70 Bolivianos, CI = US$4.83.
n.a. Not applicable.
Source:Adapted from the table facing page 42 of"Comisi6n Fiscal Permanente, Tercera Memoria" (La Paz, 1926).

12
More generally, total taxes as a percentage of total export values remained approximately 4 percent
during the first two decades of this century, and about 10 percent during most of the next two
decades.' 4 By comparison, the figure for 1980 was 24 percent.
Although the mining sector was very profitable, its enclave nature precluded any significant
benefits to the rest of the Bolivian economy.' 5 Writing in 1927, Marsh referred to this situation:
"The mining industry lies, on the whole, outside the general current of Bolivian life, and is largely
a foreign enterprise, enriching foreign, or at least nonresident, stockholders-in the heart of Bolivia
and yet not in any sense essentially Bolivian."' 6 Throughout most of this period, national retained
value (defined as the sum of returns accruing to the country from taxes, factor payments, purchase
of domestic inputs, and the like) from the sector was minimal. As has already been mentioned,
mining taxes as a percentage of export values and of profits were low, except for the period 1936-47
when they averaged about 17 percent. Moreover, in view of the relatively high capital intensity in
the bulk of Bolivian mining activity, factor payments to labor accounted for a small share of total
mine revenue. Backward linkages in the use of domestic inputs were virtually nonexistent. Finally,
very little reinvestment occurred during this period, with foreign-owned firms repatriating their
funds on a large scale and nominally Bolivian-owned companies indulging in capital flight.
Deplorable social conditions in the mines may, in part, explain the violent nature of the 1952
revolution. The workers-recruited originally from the Indian peasant population-received
extremely low wages, both in relation to wages in other occupations and in relation to prices."
Housing was inadequate, and extremely perilous conditions in the mines caused frequent accidents
and equally frequent silicosis. In Aramayo's Atocha mill, the Indian workers, men and women,
worked twelve hours a day, although more frequently the work day varied between nine and eleven
hours.' 8 The record for inhuman hours was in a mine near Potosi, where the miners worked on a
thirty-six hour shift, taking a little time off at intervals to eat dried corn and chew coca. Marsh
refers to some "questionable methods" employed to secure labor. At the time of local feasts,
advantage was taken of the "prevailing state of intoxication to bind the Indian to a mine by signing
him up and advancing him some pay, which being promptly drunk up, the Indian was forced into
the company's debt and had to work in the mine to pay it off."' 9
It was not surprising, therefore, that frequent disputes occurred on wages and hours, some of
them (as in 1918, 1923, 1942, and 1947) culminating in massacres.

The Nationalization of the Large Mines, 1952

One of the most significant objectives of the revolution of April 9, 1952, was the nationalization
of the three largest mining companies, Patiiio, Aramayo, and Hochschild. 20 A commission, in which
the Bolivian Mine Workers Federation (Federaci6n Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia,
FSTMB) participated, drew up the new law nationalizing the mines. After extensive debate and some
unwarranted delays, the law was enacted on October 31, 1952. To run the new nationalized
industry, the Bolivian Mining Corporation (Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia, COMIBOL) was
established.
Many writers, Bolivian and foreign, have referred to the history of COMIBOL over the past thirty
years of its existence as one of unmitigated failure.2' Although the chronic problems of COMIBOL
throughout its convulsive history make it difficult to deny this charge, it would be equally difficult
to accept the notion that all was well before nationalization and disastrous thereafter. 22 Moreover,
the special circumstances that existed at its birth and the new role perceived for the new corporation
by the state sealed COMIBOL'S fate from the moment of the sunrise ceremony at Siglo XX and Catavi
commemorating nationalization in 1952.
In the decades immediately preceding the revolution, the politically unstable conditions, foreign
exchange regulations, and the threat of ultimate confiscation afforded little incentive for investment

13
in Bolivia. The private mining companies, therefore, withdrew their profits from the country and
invested the minimum possible in exploration and development of new sources of ore. No major
investment had been undertaken since 1929. According to Gall, the industry "had been sustained
23
for more than twenty years by the efforts of the first three decades of the century." The existing
shafts were nearly exhausted and mechanization was limited.
Because exploration and development of new ores had been neglected, the metal content of the
ores had progressively declined. Reference has already been made to the high metal content of the
ore in the first two decades of this century. According to the Keenleyside study completed just before
the revolution, the metal content in Patifno mines was already as low as 1.5 percent by 1950,
compared with more than 6.5 percent in the mid-1920s.2 4 According to the same report, Bolivian
mining was already in a precarious position in 1950.
In addition, other factors hampered the operations of COMIBOL from its inception. These may be
broadly classified into those related to, and the outcome of, the general economic and political
situation during the 1950s, and those external factors over which Bolivia, let alone COMIBOL, had
no control.
The problems of COMIBOL must be set against a background of wider dislocation of national
economic activity during the early 1950s and of certain policy decisions adopted by the new regime.
Among these policies, the setting up of the system of control obrero (worker control) for the
administration of COMIBOL'S mines was undoubtedly one of the most significant. According to this
system, union officials were designated at each management level in COMIBOL with veto power over
the operations of the managers in all matters except "technical" ones. Needless to say, all questions
turned out to be economic, social, and labor-related, with no problem being exclusively technical.
FSTMB was represented at the highest level of COMIBOL. The system of control obrero, together with
the euphoria that followed the revolution, had a devastating effect on labor discipline in the mines.
The management was subjected to unbearable pressures by the union officials and, in many cases,
managers were dismissed by the control obrero. This "lack of discipline" took many other forms:
high absenteeism, constant disappearance of ore and equipment, powerlessness of foremen and
managers to enforce disciplinary measures, and so on.2 5
Aggravating the situation was the decision of the government, under union pressure, to rehire
the workers who had been discharged for political reasons prior to the revolution, as well as those
who had been retired for health reasons. As a result, the total number of workers employed by
COMIBOL increased from 24,000 in 1951 to about 36,500 at the end of 1955 over a period when
production of the corporation declined by about 20 percent. EvenJuan Lechin Oquendo, then vice
president of the Republic and leader of the mine workers, admitted the adverse effect of this policy
on the efficiency of COMIBOL in September 1955.26
The administration of the exchange rate proved another disincentive to increased production:
when the market rate fluctuated between 4,000 bolivianos and 14,000 bolivianos per U.S. dollar,
27
COMIBOL received only 1,200 bolivianos per U.S. dollar for its export of metals. In effect, this
discriminatory exchange rate imposed an implicit tax on the exports of COMIBOL.

The government's policy of economic diversification also affected the performance of COMIBOL.
Understandably concerned about excessive reliance on a single primary goods sector, the
government siphoned off the surpluses of the corporation for investment in other sectors, especially
petroleum and tropical agriculture. This was done either covertly through the discriminatory
2 8
exchange rate or overtly through lack of investment in COMIBOL.
Apart from these factors which, in one way or another, resulted from government policies, there
were others which were the result of external circumstances. To begin with, the price of tin dropped
sharply from US$1.20 a pound in 1952 to US$0.91 a pound in 1953, mainly because of increased
Soviet tin exports and the cessation of stockpiling by the United States at the end of the Korean
War. Moreover, the management problems of the corporation were aggravated by the loss of skilled
technicians, both foreign and Bolivian, who left the country to take up jobs abroad with their

14
mining companies. Alexander suggests that the companies even used coercion, threatening their
employees with loss of retirement and pension rights if they stayed behind.2 9 In addition, although
the announcement to nationalize was made on May 31, 1952, nationalization did not take place
until October 31, 1952. This five-month delay gave sufficient time to the former owners to repatriate
capital, to cut off further exploration, to exploit existing shafts to the maximum, to retain goods in
transit in ports in the United States, and Europe or in Antofagasta and Arica, and to remove
valuable geological maps from the country. Finally, because of the complex nature of the Bolivian
ores and their low metal content, few smelters in the world were equipped to handle the concentrates
economically. For several years Bolivian tin had been refined mainly by Williams, Harvey &
Company of Liverpool, who reduced smelting costs by combining the Bolivian concentrates with
high-content concentrates from East Asia. Patinio owned a substantial interest in Consolidated Tin
Smelters, Ltd., which, in turn, owned Williams, Harvey & Company. It is alleged that this
monopsonistic position enabled Patifno to hurt the interests of COMIBOL and to collect excessive
indemnization for seizure of the mines.
Consequently, production of tin and other metals by COMIBOL declined precipitously during the
1950s. Table 4 provides production indexes for COMIBOL for the major minerals during 1952-60.
Tin production declined from about 24,000 tons in 1951 to less than 15,000 tons by 1961.
In view of the problems of COMIBOL and, more generally, the hyperinflationary situation, the
Economic Stabilization Program of 1956 was initiated under the presidency of Dr. Hernan Siles
Zuazo. 3 0 The main points of the program, supported by the U.S. government and the International
Monetary Fund, were the reduction of the fiscal deficit through a 40 percent reduction of public
expenditures and increases in taxes and tariffs; the unification of the exchange rate at 7,500
bolivianos to one U.S. dollar, 3 ' and the elimination of all exchange, import, and price controls;
and the raising of the legal reserve requirement on commercial bank deposits. Measures bearing
directly on the problems of COMIBOL were also adopted. These included the reduction of COMIBOL'S
payroll by more than 7,000 supernumerary workers retrenched with severance pay, the elimination
of widespread subsidies on many items,3 2 and the replacement of the income and other mineral
taxes by a graduated ad valorem export tax (beginning at 10 percent when the price of tin was 90
U.S. cents and rising with any increase in price). This latter measure was meant primarily to
increase revenues to the Treasury.
To complement these macroeconomic measures and to rehabilitate COMIBOL, the government
undertook a comprehensive program of rationalization of the corporation in the early 1960s; this
program was referred to as the Triangular Plan.

The Triangular Plan for the Rehabilitation of COMIBOL

The preoccupation of the government with the deteriorating situation of COMIBOL, together with

Table 4. ProductionTrendsfor Major Minerals of COMIBOL, 1952-60

(1952 = 100)

Minerals 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960

Tin 100.0 94.5 84.1 63.6 55.7
Zinc 100.0 70.5 83.8 33.1 13.7
Wolfram 100.0 162.7 152.7 54.4 50.0
Lead 100.0 74.6 108.7 76.1 74.0
Copper 100.0 81.9 98.0 56.4 36.1
Silver 100.0 72.9 0.1 0.1 0.1
Gold 100.0 69.1 60.1 42.7 19.1
Source:COMIBOL.

15
Table 5. Basic Indicators of COMIBOL Operations,1959-68
Indicator 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Production (finemetric tons) a 15,806 15,230 14,830 15,261 15,393 17,713 16,550 18,420 18,622 18,364
Production (percentage change) - 9.1 - 3.6 - 2.6 1.0 0.8 15.1 - 6.4 11.3 - 1.1 - 1.4
Labor force 28,622 28,927 28,219 26,843 25,524 25,225 23,072 23,468 22,501 20,917
Underground 9,171 9,477 8,522 8,584 9,358 9,348 8,108 8,167 7,645 6,980
Other 19,451 19,450 19,697 18,259 16,166 15,877 14,964 15,301 14,856 13,937
Directlaborcostsb 21.6 15.5 17.7 15.7 17.0 19.5 16.4 13.0 13.3 13.3
Indirectlaborcostsc 8.5 8.6 9.9 10.1 10.2 11.0 12.3 13.6 13.6 14.0
Current revenue 42.7 41.8 47.0 45.3 46.1 69.0 78.6 82.3 79.2 79.7
Current expcnditured 48.2 40.4 40.4 43.9 42.0 51.0 74.6 77.5 79.3 75.8
Current surplus or deficit (-) - 5.5 1.4 6.6 1.4 4.1 18.0 4.0 4.8 - 0.1 3.9
Averageprice oftin 1.00 1.02 1.13 1.14 1.16 1.58 1.80 1.65 1.48 1.58
(U.S. dollars a pound) c

a. Includespurchasesfrom "other sources."

b. Includesovertime, compensationfor night work,specialcontract remunerations,as well as altitude, safety,and attendance bonuses.
c. Includes bonusesother than under direct labor costs,socialsecuritypayments,lossesto COMIBOL on subsidizedcommissaries(perdidapulperia)and other socialbenefits.
d. Including taxes.
e. London Metal Exchange cash.
Source: COMIBOL.
 a promise of an offer of US$150 million in aid "without strings" from the U.S.S.R. 3 3 led to a major
Western-supported program for this corporation. In August 1961 a formal contract was signed by
the government of the United States, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the
Inter-American Development Bank (hence "triangular") as lenders and by COMIBOL as the
borrower, with the Central Bank as guarantor. Under this contract, the lenders agreed to advance
US$37.75 million to COMIBOL, over a three-year period. The agreement contained several provisions
prohibiting strikes and limiting the role of the labor representatives under control obrero. The plan
also provided that COMIBOL be exempt from all import duties and export royalties, and that all
export taxes paid by the private mines be turned over to COMIBOL to replenish its working capital.
It also suspended all indemnity payments to the Patifio, Aramayo, and Hochschild interests until
the exact amount of this indemnity could be determined.
Despite the large external financing made available and the generous arrangements worked out
for bolstering the working capital of COMIBOL, very little was accomplished by the plan. Admittedly,
there were some achievements-a greater exploration effort, a better supply of staples and
medicine, and the rehabilitation of some mines, especially the Quechisla and Caracoles group. In
other areas, however, achievements were either nonexistent or substantially below expectations.
One of the main objectives of the plan, to increase COMIBOL'S production, was not attained. The
apparent reversal of the decline in production, which had been evident since 1952 (see Table 5),
indicated only that COMIBOL was buying more tin concentrates than usual from "other sources"
during this period. These purchased concentrates were counted in COMIBOL'S production.34
Another important objective not achieved, despite the reduction of staff, was the reduction of
COMIBOL's current expenditures (Table 5). Consequently, even with increases in tin prices over the
period and despite the relief from tax payments, COMIBOL'S current account did not change
significantly, except in 1964.
According to World Bank data, tin recovery in the concentration plants was improved from about
51 percent in 1961 to about 54 percent in 1964.35 This was, however, a modest improvement,
especially in relation to expectations.
It has been argued that investment during 1961-64 had a lagged effect on production felt only
after 1968. But this hypothesis does not hold true, since the major portion of the investment-some
70 percent-was for immediately needed supplies and equipment. No more than 17 percent of the
US$37.75 million invested over this period was for medium- and long-term rehabilitation projects.
Several factors explain the failure of the Triangular Plan. To begin with, although the size of the
labor force was reduced from more than 36,500 in 1956 to about 28,000 in 1961 and to about 25,000
in 1964, total labor costs actually increased. The increase was due to a change in the composition
of the labor force, with higher-paid above-ground staff increasing in proportion to underground
workers: the percentage of miners working underground declined from 45 percent of the total labor
force of COMIBOL in 1952 to 33 percent in 1968.
Absence of support for the plan was another critical factor. Despite its public pronouncements,
the government was lukewarm to some of the clauses of the agreement, especially those dealing
with labor discipline. Only after 1964, under the presidency of General Barrientos, was an
unequivocal decision made to limit severely the role of control obrero. Labor openly opposed the
plan; because of numerous illegal strikes, particularly during 1961-63, an average of more than
355,000 man-hours was lost each year over the period. The showdown came in June 1965 in the
so-called Massacre of San Juan, in which very heavy casualties were sustained.
Equally important, the Plan was viewed, not only by workers but also by COMIBOL technicians,
as having been "imposed." Many foreign experts were made directly responsible for operations by
being incorporated into the management of COMIBOL. No provisions were made for strengthening
the internal organization and structure of COMIBOLor for providing technical assistance and training
to local staff. Consequently, foreign technicians were resettled, and when they left there was a
complete lack of continuity. From this point of view, the Triangular Plan was a good example of

17
how not to execute projects in developing countries.
Finally, much had been made of improving the metallurgical recovery in the plants. Nevertheless,
except for some breakthroughs in flotation, which were applied in Siglo XX, time and money were
wasted in a series of dispersed and incoherent investigations abroad that led to no definitive
conclusions.

Recent Tin Mining and Metallurgical Developments in Bolivia

The 1970s witnessed a significant recovery in tin mining in Bolivia despite the continuous decline
in tin grade over the period and sharp increases in the prices of imported inputs during the first
half of the decade. Average production of tin concentrates for the country as a whole exceeded
31,000 tons a year for the period 1970-79, compared with about 25,000 tons during 1960-69 and
about 28,000 tons during 1952-59. A number of factors contributed to this situation. The
adjustment of the exchange rate in October 1972 from US$1 = 11.88 Bolivian pesos to US$1 =
20 Bolivian pesos clearly had a positive effect on a sector sensitive to changes in the exchange rate.
Even the export tax that was levied at the same time to capture some of the windfall profits was
not a sufficient deterrent. The improvement of tin prices during most of the decade, but especially
during 1973-74 and 1979-80, also increased the incentive for mining those ores hitherto considered
uneconomic. At the same time, the country experienced an unprecedented period of stability during
1972-77, marked by a low level of labor strife in the mines. Partly as a result of this stability and
partly as a consequence of a euphoria regarding Bolivia's potential as an exporter of petroleum
products, the country had ample access to foreign suppliers' credits and commercial loans so that,
at least until the end of 1978, credit availability was not a binding constraint on mining
development. The value of exports of tin (concentrates and metal) increased almost threefold
between 1970 and 1979. Table 6 provides the detailed information and also demonstrates how the
country gradually increased its share of exports of metal (rather than of concentrates) after the
setting up of the National Smelting Corporation (Empresa Nacional de Fundiciones, ENAF).3"
Problems in Bolivia's mining sector intensified in 1978. Over the period 1971-77, Bolivia had
increased its share in total world tin production from 16.1 to 17.8 percent, 1977 being the year of
peak productionwith more than 33,000tons of concentrates.Thereafter,however,Bolivia'sshare
declined,fallingto only 14.2percentby 1982.Concomitantly,Boliviadroppedfrom secondlargest
producerof tin to fourth largest,behind Malaysia,Indonesia,and Thailand.
The pertinent questionabout the present crisisin Bolivianmining is not why it occurred but
what preventedit fromhappeningearlier.The commoditypriceboom of 1979-80,the devaluation
of the Boliviancurrencyby 25 percent in November1979,and the eliminationof the export tax in
early 1980were someeventsthat postponedthe day of reckoning;but thesewere not sufficientto
maintain the momentumof growth in the sector.The severepoliticalinstabilitycommencingin
1978,the frequentdisruptionof productionafter that year, the deterioratingbalanceof payments
situationof the country,which hamperedimportsof neededinputs, the precipitousdeclinein the
price of metals after early 1981,and the drying up of foreigncreditshad a devastatingeffecton
miningoperations,both public and private. After 1980COMIBOLstarted to registerfinanciallosses
evenon before-taxincome.
The exchangerate policyalso has had a debilitatingeffecton miningoperationssinceearly 1982.
In March 1982the governmentinstituteda form of dual exchangerates, with 40 percent of all
export proceedsbeing purchasedby the Central Bank at the officialrate of US$1 = 44 Bolivian
pesos,with the possibilityof sellingthe remaining60 percent on the parallel (free)market. As the
divergencebetween the officialand the parallel rates increased,the implicit tax on all export
activitiesincreased accordingly.Thus by Novemberof that year, the parallel rate had reached
US$1 = 250 Bolivianpesos,whereasthe officialrate remained fixed at the March 1982level,

18
Table 6. Bolivian Export of Tin Concentratesand AMetal,1970-82
(US$ millions)

Tin concentrates
Medium Smallmines Metallic tin
rear COMIBOL mines and coops Total ENAF Other Total Total
1970 64.4 23.3 14.3 102.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 102.0
1971 51.5 17.4 13.1 82.0 23.9 0.0 23.9 105.9
1972 59.2 16.5 13.2 88.9 23.5 1.1 24.6 113.5
1973 67.3 19.3 12.1 98.7 32.3 0.0 32.3 131.0
1974 121.2 28.0 25.3 174.5 55.4 0.2 55.6 230.1
1975 98.2 20.3 11.3 129.8 49.5 0.7 50.2 180.0
1976 113.0 20.3 20.5 153.8 69.3 5.0 74.3 228.1
1977 134.6 21.4 36.9 192.9 131.8 4.1 135.9 328.8
1978 117.0 23.1 32.6 172.7 200.9 0.1 201.0 373.7
1979 95.6 26.8 43.5 167.6 228.0 0.0 228.0 395.6
1980 83.7 15.2 40.4 139.3 238.8 0.0 238.8 378.1
1981 32.8 11.8 32.6 77.2 265.9 0.0 265.9 343.1
1982 20.2 8.9 11.9 41.0 237.3 0.0 237.3 278.3
Sources: Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy; Central Bank of Bolivia.

resulting in an implicit tax of 33 percent. 37 In November 1982 the government unified the exchange
rate at US$1 = 200 Bolivian pesos and made it mandatory for all export proceeds to be surrendered
to the Central Bank at this rate. Although the parallel market was declared illegal, in the absence
of enforcement measures an active market continued to exist, and, moreover, changes in that market
rate became the main determinant of domestic (including input) prices.
The exchange rate adjustment considerably enhanced the incentive for exporting. But this
improvement was short-lived, lasting only two or three months. A very tight foreign exchange
situation and absence of a strong fiscal policy continued to put pressure on the parallel market.
Thus by the end of 1983 the parallel rate had reached US$1 = 1400 Bolivian pesos, whereas the
official rate (at which all export proceeds had to be surrendered) was moved at the end of the year
to US$1 = 500 Bolivian pesos. Needless to say, once again a strong bias was created against export
activities, including mining.

Main Characteristics of Tin Mining in Bolivia

Bolivia's mineralized area is essentially confined to rather inaccessible regions of the Andes. Mines
are generally located at high altitudes-in some instances above 5,500 meters-and access at times
poses formidable infrastructural and logistical problems. Mineral outcrops normally occur in
narrow, deep-seated veins, embodied in hard rock, which makes mining in Bolivia a high-cost
operation. 3 " Furthermore, deposits normally are low grade and frequently consist of complex ores,
such as lead-antimony-tin, which can be treated but incur relatively high smelting and refining
costs.
Since the nationalization of the large private companies in 1952, the mining industry in Bolivia
has been classified into three sectors: the nationalized mining sector (COMIBOL), the private
medium-size mines, and the private small mines and cooperatives.
COMIBOL, comprising fifteen large nationalized mines, is the second largest tin enterprise in the
world (ranking behind the Indonesian state-owned tin company, P. T. Timah) with average gross

19
sales during 1980-82 of about US$340 million. Of these fifteen mines, only Corocoro and Matilde
do not produce any tin (Corocoro produces copper and Matilde produces lead and zinc). Of the
remaining thirteen, three (Catavi, Huanuni, and Santa Fe) produce only tin; the others produce
tin as well as other minerals.
The medium-size mining sector has consisted in recent years of between twenty-four and
twenty-nine private firms, of which two are foreign controlled and five others have varying degrees
of minority participation by foreign interests. Of the fifteen medium-size mining companies that
mine tin, ten mine only tin. Table 7 presents a summary of the prinicipal characteristics of the
sector. The averages in this table conceal a number of features of the firms in this subsector. For
example, in 1980 one-third of the firms had gross sales of less than US$1.5 million, whereas three
firms had sales in excess of US$12 million. Similarly, while most firms have fewer than 300
employees, at least three firms in 1980 had more than 900 employees.
The rest of the mining sector consists of "small mining" and cooperatives. What differentiates a
small mining enterprise from a medium-size one is the scale and type of operation. Small mines
typically employ on average seven or eight people, the operations are rudimentary and labor
intensive, and infrastructure is generally lacking. Nevertheless, there are at least half a dozen
small-scale tin-mining companies in the Oruro and Potosi areas that are larger than some
medium-size mining enterprises. The legal basis for the classification is laid down in Supreme
Decree 05674 of December 30, 1960. According to this, the main requisites for a private mining
company to be classified as a medium-size mining operation are: (1) a minimum level of production,
which in the case of tin is 5,500 fine kilos of concentrates a month; (2) a paid-up capital of at least
US$100,000, excluding the value of the ores; (3) a minimum of one mining engineer and a financial
auditor on a full-time basis; and (4) the company should be registered with the Association of
Medium Miners. But in the absence of strict enforcement, classification as a medium-size miner
(should the legal requisites be met) depends on the individual mine owner. While there are
perceived advantages in being classified as a medium-size miner-better access to credit and the
possibility of being able to export directly, instead of being forced by law to sell to the publicly
owned Mining Bank (Banco Minero,)-in practice, tax advantages and less exacting accounting
requirements encourage the marginal cases to continue as small miners.3 9 With one exception, small
mines are all locally owned.
In terms of output, the cooperatives make a small contribution, but they account for at least 20
percent of the total mining labor force. There is also a much larger variation in the size of
membership, ranging from two or three to more than a thousand. Major tin and silver cooperatives
are located in and around the city of Potosi, and several gold mining cooperatives arc situated along
the Tipuani River.
Table 8 compares the productivity of COMIBOL, the medium-size mines, and the small mines and
cooperatives for the period 1973-81. As expected, productivity is highest for the medium-size mines,
although, interestingly enough, during the period 1976-78, COMIBOL'S productivity equaled that of
the medium-size mines, partly because of the tranquil working conditions at that time in COMIBOL'S
mines compared with much of its history.

Table 7. Key AverageIndicatorsof the AMediumMining Sector,1974-80

(US$ thousands)

Item 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Fixed assets 1,325 1,830 2,190 2,410 3,590 4,308 4,816
Sales value 2,625 3,305 3,160 3,895 5,000 7,798 6,692
Profits (after tax) 531 80 535 285 165 163 452
Numberofemployees 311 298 292 294 336 322 326
Source:Ministryof Mining and Metallurgy.

20
 The working conditions in the mines can be referred to as deplorable, even in comparison with
conditions in underground mines of other countries. Health and safety standards in the mines are
appallingly low. The pervasive dust from the drilling operations and the absence of adequate
ventilation cause a high incidence of silicosis. The average life of a mine worker is thirty-five years.
Housing is inadequate, with frequent shortages of water and poor sanitary facilities. It is extremely
cold in most mining areas throughout the year, (the tin-producing mine of Caracoles is located just
below the snow line). By contrast, inside badly ventilated mines such as Colquiri and Unificada,
the temperatures are so unbearably high that the miners have to be hosed down with cold water
as they work. Miners take frequent breaks to chew coca leaves, which allegedly dull their pain and
appetite but are also considered to be protein rich. In fact, coca leaf is one item that the
commissaries dare not run out of.40
In this atmosphere of intense physical suffering and isolation, the altiplano Indians have
developed over centuries a unique dualistic system of rituals in which Christian ceremonies coexist
with those practiced before the Spanish Conquest. Even today, llamas are sometimes sacrificed to
Supay or Tio, the Devil Spirit that is supposed to control the wealth of the mines. Miners worship
in the chapels and cross themselves before entering the mines, but once inside, names of Christian

Table 8. Productiivy Comparisonfor Various Tin Subsectorsof Bolivia

(tons of concentrates an employee a year)

Mledium-size Small mzines

and
Year COMIBOL mines cooperatives
1973 0.86 1.17 0.08
1974 0.82 0.93 0.08
197.5 0.84 0.93 0.12
1976 0.84 0.79 0.08
1977 0.95 0.80 0.09
1978 0.86 0.87 0.06
1979 0.72 0.77 0.06
1980 0.70 0.79 0.05
1981 0.60 0.84 0.06
Source:Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy.

saints are not mentioned for fear of offending the awesome Tio. The famous and colorful Oruro
festival perfectly epitomizes this dichotomy. The event is in honor of the Virgin of Socavon (Virgin
of the mine mouth). Most of the week is taken up with events depicting ancient traditions and
myths, culminating in the grand procession on Saturday of dancers dressed as devils, condors,
temptresses, and the like. On Sunday, the masqueraders reveal themselves in front of the Church
of the Virgin de Socavon.
Despite some improvements in medical services in the mines,yatiris or herbal curers, have a large
clientele. As in many Asian and African countries, some individuals are supposed to have bankanowi
or evil eye, and they are avoided as much as possible.

Notes

1. Alberto Crespo Rodas, "Fundaci6n de la Villa de San Felipede Austria", RevistaHistorica,vol. 29 (La Paz,
1967).
2. Robert J. Alexander,Bolivia:Past,PresentandFutureof Its Politics(New York:Praeger, 1982).
3. WilliamRobertson, Tin:Its ProductionandMarketing(Westport,Conn.:GreenwoodPress, 1982).
4. The bitter fighting on the southeasternfrontier left 100,000Bolivian men dead, wounded, deserted, or
captured. During this period, some4,000womenwere employedin the mines.SeeJune Nash, 11'eEat theMinesand

21
the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
5. William Fox, Tin: The Working of a Commodity Agreement (London: Mining Journal Books Limited, 1974).
6. Jerry Ladman, ed., Modern-Day Bolivia: Legacy of the Revolution and Prospectsfor the Future ( Tempe, Ariz.: Arizona
State University, 1982).
7. Alexander, Bolivia: Past, Present and Future of its Politics.
8. For a description of the life and times of these mine owners see: H. S. Klein, "The Creation of the Patifino Tin
Empire," Inter-American Economic Affairs, autumn, 1965; C. F. Geddes, Patino, the Tin King (London: Robert Hale,
1972); Sergio Almaraz Paz, El Podery La Caida (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1980); Alfonso Crespo,
Los Aramayo de Chichas: Tres Generaciones de Mineros Bolivianos (Barcelona: Editorial Blume, 1981); and Roberto
Querejasu Calvo, Llallagua: Historia de Una Montafa (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1977).
9. New York Times (December 22, 1926).
10. C. F. Geddes, Patino, the Tin King ( London: Robert Hale, 1972).
11. Patinio Mines and Enterprises Consolidated, Annual Report, December 31, 1925 (La Paz, Bolivia).
12. David J. Fox, "The Bolivian Tin Mining Industry: Some Geographical and Economic Problems," in ITC,
Proceedings of a Technical Conferenceon Tin (London, 1967'.
13. Walter Gomez D'Angelo, "Mining in the Economic Development of Bolivia," Ph.D. dissertation (Nashville:
Vanderbilt University, 1973).
14. Gillis and others provide a figure of 1.5 percent for 1921, but this is not borne out by data. See Malcolm
Gillis, Taxation and Mining: Non-fuel Minerals in Bolivia and Other Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1978).
15. For a detailed analysis of the effect of tin mining on the present Bolivian economy, see Chapter 3.
16. Margaret Marsh, The Bankers in Bolivia: A Study in American Foreign Investment (New York: AMS Press, 1970).
17. For evidence, see Manuel Eduardo Contreras, "Tin Mining in Bolivia, 1900-1925." Unpublished M.A.
dissertation, University of London, September 1980.
18. W. L. Schurz, Bolivia: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook.
19. Margaret Marsh, The Bankers in Bolivia: A Study in American ForeignInvestment (New York: AMS Press, 1970).
20. The other objectives were land reform, universal voting rights, labor participation in management of the
nationalized mines, and dissolution of the army.
2 1. See, for example, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, A PeopleCrucified: The Tragedy of Bolivia (New York: Prestige Book,
1958) and Cornelius H. Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65: The Revolution and Its Aftermath (New York: Praeger,
1966).
22. For a detailed discussion of the present problems of COMIBOL, see Chapter 5.
23. Norman Gall, "Bolivia: The Price of Tin. Part II: The Crisis of Nationalization." Thc American Universities
Field Staff Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 21, no. 2, 1974.
24. Hugh Keenleyside, Report of the United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia (New York: United
Nations, 1951).
25. Hillman, by contrast, argues that technical and economic factors were much more important than lack of
discipline and other social problems during the first few years of the existence of COMIBOL. See John Hillman, "TIhe
Nationalized Mining Industry of Bolivia, 1952-1956" (processed, 1982). In the opinion of the present authors,
Hillman's interpretation errs on the other extreme, that is, that COMIBOL had no responsibility at all for the
deteriorating situation.
26. Quoted in Amado Canelas Orellana: iQuiebra de la Mineria Estatal Boliviana? (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro,
1981).
27. There was in fact a complicated maze of multiple exchange rates including the official rate of 190, the rate
for COMIBOL of 1,200, the rate to the State Petroleum Company (YPFB) of 1,500, and the rate paid for meat imports
of 560 bolivianos to one U.S. dollar.
28. Total investment in COMIBOL throughout the 1950s was only US$3 million, for a company whose annual gross
exports over the period exceeded US$60 million.
29. Alexander, Bolivia: Past, Present and Future of its Politics.
30. For an interesting and intimate account by one who headed the formulation of the program, see George
Jackson Eder, Inflation and Development in Latin America: A CaseHistory of Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan, 1968).
31. The exchange rate later moved to 11,880 bolivianos; the currency was renamed peso, with the rate US$1
11.88 pesos. This rate was maintained until October 1972.
32. With the elimination of the subsidies, the government froze the prices of four basic items meat, bread, sugar,
and rice--in December 1956. The prices of these items remain unchanged to this day. Needless to say, many of the
pulperia goods are sold to black marketeers who "swarm around the company stores like flies around a stable." For
a detailed discussion of COMIBOL'S pulperias, see Chapter 5.
33. See Eder, Inflation and Development in Latin America.

22
 34. Every large mine has hundreds of marginal workersnot included in COMIBOL'S labor force, who sort and resort
rock to remove carefully every bit of mineral. There are also jucos (a Quechua word for nocturnal birds of prey) or
mineral thieves who sell back to enterprises the mineral ore stolen from them. juqueo (or mineral robbery) has long
been practiced in the Bolivian mining industry but especially during the early 1960s. Ore purchased by COMIBOL
from these "other sources" increased from 45 tons of tin concentrates in 1957 to 538 tons in 1962 and 1,366 tons in
1964. For details, see Norman Gall, "Bolivia: The Price ofTin. Part II: The Crisisof Nationalization," The American
Universities Field Staff Report, vol. 21, no. 2, 1974.
35. See Armando de Urioste, "Asistencia a la Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia: Un Analisis Critico de Esfuerzos
Pasados y Presentes," report prepared for the World Bank, March 1981.
36. Details on tin smelting in Bolivia are provided in Chapter 6.
37. The implicit tax rate is calculated as T = 40 (F- R)/F, where F is the free market rate and R the official
rate.
38. For an analysis of the international competitiveness of Bolivian tin mining in relation to other producers, see
Chapter 4.
39. Small mining companies pay less taxes since their "presumed costs" are higher.
40. For a sociological study of the Bolivian mines, see June Nash, We Eat theMines and the MinesEat Us: Dependency
and Exploitationin Bolivian Tin Mines (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

23
 CHAPTER 3

The Effect of Tin Mining on the Bolivian Economy

Writing in 1928, Marsh noted, "that humble but inidispensable metal (tin) is the hub around which
Bolivia's economic life revolves." ' Fifty-five years later, despite some diversification of the Bolivian
economy into hydrocarbons and agriculture, the statement is almost as true. Though the percentage
has gone down considerably since the commencement of natural gas exports to Argentina in 1972,
tin exports account for more than 35 percent of total merchandise exports (see Table 9). Revenues
from tin mining account for 14-15 percent of the total central government tax revenues. In terms
of value added, the tin subsector accounts for about 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). It
has a relatively small share of the total employed labor force (less than 3 percent) but traditionally
the mining sector has been in the forefront of the labor movement, in terms of both wage
negotiations and sociopolitical concerns.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and to quantify the contribution of tin mining to the
Bolivian economy. More specifically, an attempt is made to examine the influence on Bolivia's
domestic aggregate demand of changes in the output and prices of tin, to study the effect of tin
revenues on the Treasury's revenues, and to discuss the sector's influence on the rate of inflation
and the level of wages in the overall economy. Some discussion of backward and fbrward linkages
is also included. Some of these topics were examined by Gillis and others in their study that used
1973-74 data. 2 Structural and informational developments have occurred since then, however,
which warrant an updating of some of their conclusions. In particular, the level and composition
of energy costs have changed, there is a somewhat greater use of domestic inputs, and more detailed
information has become available on the structure of mining labor's expenditures.

Table 9. Share of Tin in the Bolivian Economy

Sector 1970 1975 1980
Tin sector
Value added as percentageofGDP 5.1 3.8 4.4
Exports as percentageof merchandiseexports 44.6 33.6 40.1
Tax revenuesas percentageof central government
tax revenues 41.2a 14.0 15.4
Employmentas percentageof total employment 2.8 2.9 2.8

Total miningsectorb
Value added as percentageof GDP 9.4 6.7 7.2
Exports as percentageof merchandiseexports 89.6 58.6 61.9
Tax revenuesas percentageof central government
tax revenues 68.1a 21.5 24.4
Employment as percentageof total employment 5.2 4.9 4.9
a. Statistical problem relating to payments due from 1969.
b. Including metallurgy.
Sources: Central Bank of Bolivia; Ministry of Finance.

24
 A change in the level of domestic aggregate demand as a result of a change in tin-mining revenues
can result from either a change in output or a change in the international price of tin. In the former,
a change in the quantity of tin produced will normally result in corresponding changes in the
quantity of labor employed and in purchases of energy and material inputs, which, in turn, will
lead to further changes in income flows to mine owners (government or private) and tax revenues
to the government. By contrast, a change in the price of tin will first affect the income accruing to
the mine owners and the government's tax revenues. Should this change in price persist for a
reasonably long period, it might also stimulate other changes in the same direction-changes in
output as well as in the real wages received by miners and in new investment expenditures.
To estimate the influence on Bolivia's domestic aggregate demand of these two distinct effects,
and to analyze the cost structure of the Bolivian economy, a survey was carried out for thirteen
medium-size mining firms and thirteen enterprises of COMIBOL that are either sole producers of tin
or produce tin along with other minerals. Thus the sample covered at least 90 percent of the total
production of tin in Bolivia. For firms that produce other minerals besides tin, input costs
attributable to tin production were carefully prorated. A list of the firms included from both the
medium-size mining sector and from COMIBOL is provided in Appendix A, and important aggregated
results of the survey for the medium-size mines and COMIBOL are presented in Appendix B. Efforts
to ensure the reliability of the survey data have already been mentioned in Chapter 1.
The two years chosen for the survey, 1980 and 1981, are the latest for which complete and reliable
information could be obtained. The data for 1982 are unreliable because of unresolved accounting
problems related to the floating exchange rate, and the subsequent devaluation of the Bolivian peso
from US$1 = 25 pesos in early 1982 to US$1 = 200, the rate at which it was fixed in November
of that year.
From the available survey data, the weight of each of the costs was obtained, and the import
content of each of them estimated. Those cost items for which import intensity was not available
from the survey data, were calculated separately on the basis of other available data, and, wherever
necessary, further information was gathered from interviews with enterprise managers.
When Gillis and others did their study, no reliable data existed on consumption patterns of
Bolivian mine workers. Since then significant work has been done in this area in the context of
calculation of the minimum wage. In Table 10, information on the import content of miners'
income is provided. The data refer to a family of five. On this basis, the import content of mining
labor is 26.1 percent. 3
The import content of material costs was available from the survey data. Although most of
Bolivia's mining inputs are imported, in recent years there has been some increase in the use of
domestic inputs, although mine managers frequently complain of the poor quality and relatively
high price of domestic inputs compared with imported ones. Some of the main inputs being
produced in significant quantity domestically are explosive fuses, steel grinding balls, some foundry
goods, electric cables, compressors and drilling equipment, rubber boots, work clothes, and gloves.

Table 10. Import Contentof Bolivian Mine Workers' Consumption

(Bolivian pesos)

Import content
Total Import of expenditure
Item expenditure component (percent)
Food 7,635.04 2,240.14 29.3
Clothing 3,748.67 1,237.06 33.0
Education costs 3,370.00 337.00 10.0
Other costs 75.00 50.00 67.0
Total 14,828.71 3,864.20 26.1
Source:Derived from 'Estudio Sobrc el Salario Minimo V'ital v Escala Movil Para Trabajadores de la CONIBOL," prepared by
CONALSA (Bolivia: La Paz, July 1982.

25
 Encrgy costs in Bolivian mining comprise electricity (self-generated as well as purchased) and
petroleum costs. In the former, hydroelectric power is the primary source of generation. On the
basis of information provided by the National Electricity Company (ENDE), about 80 percent of
total annual costs in a hydro-powered electrical system are capital related. Of this, about 90 percent
are import costs. The import content of electric energy is, therefore, set at 72 percent.
Bolivia is self-sufficient in petroleum products and has had a small surplus for export, although
this surplus has declined gradually since 1974 as production has declined and consumption has
increased steadily. In addition, domestic prices of petroleum products are heavily subsidized in
Bolivia. For example, the domestic price per barrel of crude oil in 1980 and 1981 was about US$ 18
and US$26, respectively, at a time when the corresponding export price (f.o.b. Bolivia) in those
two years was, respectively, US$29 and US$34 a barrel. Examination of the effect of an
increase in purchases of petroleum products on domestic aggregate demand, therefore, requires
consideration of (1) the gross increase in aggregate demand because of the use of local petroleum
products and (2) the loss to the Bolivian economy because of the subsidized price the tin mining
sector pays for petroleum compared with what the country could earn by exporting this product.
The change in domestic consumption of petroleum products (dEp) in the tin mining sector because
of a change in gross tin revenues (dS) is therefore provided by

dEp = ApdS -Ap (a- dS

= A, [l (P; Pd) l dS
where APis the ratio of petroleum costs to gross tin revenues and Pa and Pd are, respectively, the
domestic and export price of petroleum. Gillis and others misspecified this part of their model, which
may have affected their results.
About 60 percent of smelting costs pertain to energy, divided almost equally among fuel
oil, charcoal, and electricity. Other inputs include sodium carbonate, sodium hydroxide, and
electrodes, most of which are imported. For smelting and transport costs together, an import
intensity of 0.65 was calculated.
"Other costs" is a catchall for several input costs, the more important ones being foreign travel,
legal fees, information services, infrastructure, and administration costs. On the basis of separate
estimates, the import content of these costs is approximately 44 percent for COMIBOL and 50 percent
for medium-size mines. The import content of the other components (profits, interest, and rentals
and depreciation expenses) have been similarly derived from interviews with managers, or separate
studies, or both.
Finally, to derive the propensity for government to import using tax revenues, a comparison of
the foreign exchange purchases (inclusive of foreign debt service payments) was made, which is
summarized in Table 11. As the table shows, the import content of central government expenditure
has increased steadily, reflecting the proportionally larger payments for external interest and
amortization.
Table 12 gives estimates for the various parameters for the two survey years--for COMIBOL and
the medium-size mines as well as for the whole sector.
On the basis of this data, it is possible to calculate the initial effect of a change in tin production
and sales on the domestic demand for goods and services in Bolivia, using the equation

dC = ( - mi)A, (I - A,) dS,

26
Table 11. Import Contentof Central GovernmentExpenditure
(USS millions)
Expenditure 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Central governmentexpenditures 400.0 472.0 609.0 765.0 828.0
Central governmentforeignexchangepurchases 45.0 63.0 80.4 115.2 194.3
Import content of central governmentexpenditures
(percent) 11.2 13.3 13.2 15.0 23.5
CentralBankof Bolivia;Ministryof Finance.
Sources:

where dC1represents the change in the use of input i as a result of a change in gross tin sales, dS; m,
represents the import intensity of cost i, A, its proportion in total sales, and A. the proportion of
foreign smelting, transport, and insurance costs in total tin sales. The calculation for petroleum
costs is slightly different, and the relevant equation has already been provided. If these equations
and data are used, it is estimated that approximately 53 percent of gross tin revenues from increased
tin production were spent on domestic goods and services in 1980 and 1981. Put differently, the
initial foreign exchange leakages from a change in tin sales because of a change in tin production
were approximately 47 percent.

Table 12. Valuesof Parametersfor Estimating the Effect of Changein Tin Productionand Sales
on DomesticAggregate Expenditures,1980-81
1980 1981
Medium-size Total Medium-size Total
Parameterdescription mines COMIBOL sector mines COMIBOL sector
As proportion of gross tin sales
Total labor costs 0.172 0.244 0.228 0.210 0.351 0.319
Material purchases 0.068 0.086 0.082 0.094 0.118 0.112
Total energy costsof which 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.055 0.059 0.058
Electricitya (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.035) (0.044) (0.042)
Petroleumproducts (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016)
Domesticsmeltingand transport costs 0.170 0.166 0.168 0.200 0.228 0.223
Other costs 0.121 0.032 0.057 0.110 0.057 0.069
Profits,financialand rental payments 0.107 0.150 0.134 0.035 -0.012 -0.001
Depreciationexpenses 0.050 0.020 0.027 0.047 0.026 0.031
Total tax payments 0.254 0.243 0.245 0.215 0.156 0.169
Foreignsmelting,transport
and insurance costs 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.034 0.017 0.020
Gross tin sales 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Import content of
Total labor costs 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261
Material purchases 0.770 0.793 0.788 0.763 0.798 0.792
Electricity 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720
Domesticsmelting and transport costs 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650
Other costs 0.500 0.450 0.460 0.500 0.450 0.460
Profits,financialand rental payments 0.750 0.700 0.710 0.750 0.700 0.710
Depreciationexpenses 0.650 0.400 0.462 0.650 0.400 0.462
Central governmentexpenditures 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.235 0.235 0.235
Price parameters
Domesticprice of crude oil
(U.S. dollars a barrel) 18.00 18.00 18.00 26.00 26.00 26.00
World price of crude oil
(fo.b. Bolivia,U.S. dollars a barrel) 29.00 29.00 29.00 34.00 34.00 34.00
a. Purchasedaswellas self-generated.

27
 The same data can be used to estimate the effect on Bolivian aggregate demand of a change in
tin sales arising from a change in international tin prices. Normally, an increase in tin prices will
result in an increase in the revenues to the owner of the mines and to the government in the form
of additional tax revenues. Under the Bolivian system of compensation, mining labor also shares in
any increase in income arising from higher prices. Other costs of mining operations are not normally
affected by changes in tin prices.
Under Bolivian mining taxation, approximately 50 percent of any increase in income from a
price increase accrues as government revenue. The remaining 50 percent is allocated between wage
increases and profits. Mining labor in Bolivia obtains the same share of any increase in income on
account of price increases as they do for increases in income arising from increased output. As shown
in Table 12, this share for the total sector was 22.8 percent in 1980 and 31.9 percent in 1981.
Therefore, the residual of the additional income accruing to the owners of the mines in the form of
profits generated by a price increase was 27.2 percent and 18.1 percent in 1980 and 1981,
respectively. All other values, except that for the share of foreign smelting, transport, and insurance
costs (which is left as in Table 12), are set equal to zero. Substituting these values, the change in
domestic expenditures is equal to 65 percent of the change in tin sales in 1980 and 70 percent in
1981, which implies smaller foreign exchange leakages of 35 percent and 30 percent during 1980
and 1981, respectively, compared with the change in domestic expenditures resulting from a change
in output. The main reason revenues increase by a greater amount than the proportional increase
in prices is the slight progressivity with respect to price of the major mineral tax when prices are
not exceptionally high or low.
The analysis of foreign expenditure leakages is concerned only with initial effects. A full general
equilibrium analysis of the effect on aggregate demand would require the estimation of a
multisectoral econometric model for which data are not available.

Fiscal Result of Tin Revenues

As already mentioned, tax revenues from tin production and export are an important part of the
revenues of the Bolivian central government. In addition to the regalias and export taxes, a
significant portion of the import duties can be attributed to tin mining. Thus a decline in tin
production or price (or both) can have a profound effect on the size of the government deficit. As
noted by Gillis and others, this observation-that a decline in an important export product may
generate inflationary pressures-is contrary to the prediction of most traditional macroeconomic
models.
The inflationary effect of a decline in tin revenues through its impact on the fiscal deficit is clearly
moderated by the availability of external financial resources. During 1974-78 international tin
prices were rather low, but Bolivia had ready access to foreign commercial loans, so that annual
inflation over the period averaged less than 10 percent. By contrast, tin prices rose significantly
during 1979-80, but foreign lending declined considerably in view of the country's rapid loss of
creditworthiness. Inflation in these two years averaged more than 30 percent a year. As illustrated,
when low mineral prices coincide with severe foreign borrowing constraints, a time of crisis ensues,
such as the hyperinflationary periods of 1953-57 and 1981-83, when three-digit inflation rates were
registered.

Macroeconomic Linkages of Tin Mining

There is little doubt that tin mining in Bolivia has some backward linkages. The development of
railways in the first decade of this century and the development of electric energy are the most
important examples. But as already noted, about 80 percent of materials needed in tin mining in
Bolivia are imported.

28
 In terms of forward linkages, the experience of Bolivia has been mixed. Since the setting up of
the National Smelting Company (ENAF), there has been some saving on transport costs and some
increase in domestic value added. From the beginning, however, ENAF has been confronted with
severe financial and technical problems (see Chapter 6 for details). There has, therefore, been a
tradeoff between increasing domestic value added and the inefficiency of domestic smelting.
Mineral producers in both the private and public sectors are unanimous in their preference to sell
their concentrates directly abroad rather than to ENAF as they are obliged to do by law.
Normally, a mineral-based economy exhibits a marked form of wage dualism, in which the
enclave employees in the mineral-exporting sector earn substantially higher wages than those in
other sectors of the economy. 4 Nankani has noted that Bolivia has been spared this wage dualism.
This is true, however, only if one looks at nominal wages (that is, exclusive of social and other
benefits). But, in the nationalized sector of Bolivian mining (which accounts for three-quarters of
all mining), a widespread system of subsidized commissaries (pulperias) and other social benefits
exists (which are discussed in Chapter 5). The prices of four basic food items sold in the mines-
bread, rice, meat and sugar-have been frozen since 1956. As an example, in mid-1983 the
subsidized price of meat on the rations sold to the miners was three pesos a kilo while the market
price of the same item was more than 300 pesos a kilo. It is safe to say that nonwage benefits in
1983 in the nationalized mining sector were at least twice as much as direct wage payments. If these
nonwage benefits, which are not available to workers in other sectors of the economy, are added
to miners' wages, a significant differential exists between the total earnings of miners and their
counterparts in other sectors.

Notes

1. Margaret A. Marsh, The Bankersin Bolivia:A Studyin AmericanForeignInvestment(New York:AMS Press,

1970).
2. See Malcolm Gillis and others: Taxationand Mining: Non-fuelMineralsin Boliviaand Other Countries
(Cambridge,Mass.: BallingerPublishingCompany, 1978).
3. Allowancehas been made for subsidieson basic food items. It is assumed (realistically)that the savingsof
mine workersare negligible,at least for the two sampleyears.
4. For a discussionof this topic and other characteristicsof mineral-exportingcountries,seeGobind Nankani,
Development
Problems of Mineral-Exporting Countries,
World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 354, (Washington,D.C.,
1979).

29
 CHAPTER 4

Factors Determining Tin Prices

and Competitiveness

In this chapter the principal determinants of international tin prices and the competitiveness of
various mining processes and producers are analyzed. A basic framework for determining the price
of tin is used-price-cost movements and their relation to the demand for tin. The analysis employs
data for the period since the early 1970s.
As with prices of other commodities, the price of tin is determined by a set of factors such as
demand functions, production costs, investment policies, and market structure. In the simplest case
of price determination in perfectly competitive markets, price is determined at the intersection (A)
of the demand curve, DD, and the marginal production cost curves, MM (see Figure 1). This case
is presented first. But in the "real world," tin prices are also affected by policy and institutional
factors, also discussed in this chapter.

The Demand Curve

Demand for tin is generally a derived one, based on price and income elasticities for its final
products. In the production of tinplate, the use of tin can be reduced by material-conserving
substitution or can be replaced at the canning stage by competitive materials such as aluminum,
tin-free steel (TFS), and plastics.
A recent World Bank study estimated the own-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticity for
tinplate at the canning stage as -0.3 and 0.07, respectively. ' The same study estimated price elasticity
at the tinplate production stage (that is, the price elasticity of unit consumption of tin metal for
tinplate production) at -0.5. Substitution at the latter stage requires about five years of completion
in view of the replacement of old tinning facilities. With both elasticities combined, the long-term
price elasticity of tin with respect to its demand for tinplate production is estimated at about - 0.9.
The elasticity of tin price with respect to its demand in production of solder is much lower than in
production of tinplate, because substitution of other materials for tin is more limited in solder
production. The overall short-term price elasticity of demand for tin is considered to be in the range
of -0.1 to -0.3, and the long-term price elasticity in the range of -0.7 to -1.2, depending upon
the ease of substitution and practices of tin uses in tin-consuming industries in various regions. The
income elasticity of demand for tin is estimated to be in the range of 0.3 to 0.5.
The important point emerging from these estimates, and which has implications for long-term
market prospects for tin, is that, while tin has a low short-termprice elasticity, it has a relatively high
long-term price elasticity. I-n other words, a continually high price for tin in relation to its main
substitutes can result in substantial substitution.

The Marginal Production Cost Curve

Before the factors affecting tin production costs are examined, two remarks deserve mention.
First, because of difficulties in collecting marginal cost data, average production costs by mining

30
 Figure 1. Determination of the Price of Tin

Demand function D

Marginal production
cost curve (+ R)
oP - ---------- M'
U Go T…---
~~~~~~r-
- - - - -___ -
M
A
. F

Marginal production
E
| cost curve (-R) I
E M \

II | D

o~~~~~~

Production and production capacity

Mining Mining Mining Mining

method A method B method C method D
in country I in country 2 in country 3 in country 4

methods are generally employed as a proxy. In this section, average production costs of five mining
methods and seven tin-producing countries are used.2 Second, the established convention in the
International Tin Council (ITC) statistics is to express production costs in two forms: production
costs, excluding royalties and export duties (- R) and production costs, including royalties, export
duties, and tributes ( +R). The same convention is used here.
Production costs (-R) are influenced mainly by mining methods, which are determined by
mining conditions (metal content of ore, thickness of overburden, and so on) and location. The four
principal mining methods are underground mining, dredging, gravel-pump mining, and open-cast
mining. Underground mining to extract tin from deep lodes is the most common method of tin
mining in Bolivia, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Dredging, the method of mining alluvial
deposits, uses floating excavators with a chain of buckets or suction pumps. Dredging can be both
onshore and offshore. Gravel-pump mining is a form of open-cast mining, although it is considered
different from other types of open-cast mining. In the typical open-cast mine, the ore is mined and
the overburden is removed by earth-moving equipment. By contrast, the gravel-pump method,

31
Table 13. ProductionShare and AverageProductionCosts by Mining Method, 1971-81
1971 1974 1978 1981

Production Productioncost Production Productioncost Production Productioncost Production Productioncost

share (US$/kg) share (US$/kg) share (US$/kg) share (US$/kg)
Miningmethod (percent) +R - R (percent) +R - R (percent) +R - R (percent) +R - R
Underground 28.0 3.47 3.21 31.1 6.32 5.00 29.3 11.27 8.94 30.4 14.86 13.26
Gravel pump 38.3 2.43 2.40 36.9 5.35 4.82 39.2 9.37 7.84 42.3 12.01 11.81
Open-cast 15.7 2.91 2.22 2.1 4.79 3.02 2.0 7.97 4.38 2.0 10.21 8.33
Dredges onshore 6.5 2.84 2.33 20.9 4.98 3.41 19.9 8.06 4.89 14.0 9.91 7.56
Dredges offshore 11.6 2.14 1.55 9.1 4.13 3.24 9.6 6.42 4.50 11.3 8.39 6.31
Weighted average n.a. 3.01 2.48 n.a. 5.86 4.35 n.a. 9.99 7.14 n.a. 13.10 10.89

n.a. Not applicable.

International Tin Counicil;and the industry.
Sources:
 commonly used in mining alluvial deposits of Southeast Asia, Nigeria, and Zaire, is relatively
labor-intensive and its initial capital requirement is small compared with other open-cast methods.
Apart from these four main methods, the traditional method of dulang washing is still employed in
parts of Southeast Asia and suction boats have recently been developed in southern Thailand.
Dulang washing is a traditional method of washing gravel in a bowl (or dulang) for recovering tin.
Suction boats are fitted with pipes through which loose sand and gravel are sucked in from the
seabed. After tin has been recovered, the waste is discharged over the deck of the boats.
Among the four main methods, gravel pumping accounts for about 40 percent of total tin
production; most of the remainder is equally divided between underground mining and dredging. 3
Open-cast mining, once important, has become insignificant recently.
Table 13 provides the average production costs by mining methods for the four benchmark years,
1971, 1974, 1978, and 1981. For the average production costs, which exclude royalties and export
duties (- R), underground mining has been the highest-cost operation, and offshore dredging the
least-cost method. 4 These, however, are averagefigures, and substantial variations can exist within
each method.
Among the various countries, average production costs in Bolivia and the United Kingdom have
usually been the highest, while those in Thailand and Malaysia have been the lowest (see Table 14).
On the basis of the information available for the four benchmark years, it is possible to construct
quasi-marginal production cost curves for each of the four years by plotting the production quantity
of each method in each country on the horizontal axis and the average production cost on the
vertical axis. These curves are shown in Figures 2 through 5.
To summarize, the highest-cost tin producer is Bolivia, which employs mostly underground
mining (the highest-cost method). The lowest-cost producers are Malaysia and Thailand. In
Malaysia the majority of tin is produced from on-shore alluvial deposits, for which mining costs are
typically lower. Even though off-shore mining is much more significant in Thailand, the mining
operations are carried out with large-scale, modern dredges. Moreover, the use of suction boats also
reduces average costs.

Policy Factors
In a dynamic framework, a country's cost competitiveness is clearly affected by investments for
capacity expansion and modernization. In the present study only the static dimension is considered
in which a country can affect its cost-competitiveness only by adjusting taxes and exchange rates.
Competitiveness in international markets depends not just on production costs (-R) but on
production costs including taxes in a broader sense, that is, royalties, export duties, and tributes ( + R).
Countries can and do affect their competitiveness by adjustments in taxes and duties, as shown in
Figure 1. In this figure, M'M' denotes the production cost, including taxes and duties ( + R) for each
country and mining method. With taxes, the price is determined at the level P, that is, at the
intersection of the production cost (+ R) of the marginal producer and the given demand curve. In
such a case, the economic rent accruing to Country I by Method A, for example, is shown as the
distance between E and P. This rent can be further itemized into (1) GP, which corresponds to
long-term scarcity of tin resources (scarcity rent) and to collusive action by producers (monopoly
rent); and (2) EG, which corresponds to the so-called differential rent accruing to efficient producers.
The more efficient the producer, the greater is the differential rent. Also, in the case of Country I
and Method A, a tax EP can be levied without jeopardizing its cost-competitiveness by that method.
On the basis of historical data used to construct Figures 2 through 5, two observations can be
made. First, no economic rent accrued to the marginal producers in 1971 and 1981, whereas
significant rents accrued to them in 1974 and 1978. Second, export duties in those countries which
have such duties (all except the United Kingdom, Australia, and Zaire) remained fixed in absolute
terms, regardless of increases in production costs. Consequently, the percentage of export duties in

33
Table 14. ProductionShare and AverageProductionCosts by Country, 1971--81
1971 1974 1978 1981

Production Productioncost Production Productioncost Production Productioncost Production Productioncost

share (USs/kg) share ( US$/kg) share (US$/kg) share ( US$/kg)
Country (percent) +R - R (percent) + R - R (percent) + R - R (percent) +R - R

Bolivia 19.4 3.80 3.47 22.7 6.71 5.03 22.8 12.53 9.54 20.2 16.69 14.44
United Kingdom 1.2 3.84 3.75 2.3 5.57 5.50 2.0 8.75 8.39 3.0 13.24 12.70
Indonesia 8.7 3.17 2.87 13.3 5.82 5.03 18.3 9.33 8.11 20.8 12.67 10.43
TIhailand 18.3 2.38 1.67 11.3 5.09 3.44 10.5 8.82 5.09 10.8 12.39 9.08
Malaysia 46.0 2.94 2.26 45.5 5.74 3.91 41.1 9.71 5.96 37.1 12.09 9.69
Australia 6.5 2.56 2.56 4.9 5.13 5.11 5.5 6.44 6.24 7.9 10.81 10.51
Zaire .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.3 9.51 9.51
Weighted average n.a. 3.01 2.48 n.a. 5.86 4.35 n.a. 9.99 7.14 n.a. 13.10 10.89

n.a. Not applicable.

Not available.
Sources:International Tin Council; and the industry.
Figure 2. Average Production Costs (+ R) and (-R) by Mining Method, by Country,
and by Price of Tin, 1971

4.0

--------------------
ze=
~~~--------f-

I
.,,

2.0 I…

Average production costs R)

I - ------
- Average production costs (+ R)
- Price of tin

111 1 II1II I I I Il 11
0 50 100
Percentage share of production

C- C-. _ z
C- z

c c < S n ~~~~m t c V- bC c
QC C aC O O :
C bO > C > >

iVote: The width of each category in the horizontal axis is in proportion to its share in total producton by all the
categories listed here. Country names are abbreviated: AU is Australia; BO, Bolivia-, IN, Indonesia; MA, Malaysia-,
TH, Thailand; UK, United Kingdom.
Source:World Bank data.

35
 Figure 3. Average ProductionCosts (-R) and (+ R) by Mining Method, by Country,
and by Price of Tin, 1974

9.0-

8.0 -

7.0 - r--
…_____ JI - _____

06.0 _ r
I IL
ri ~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~I i

5.0

.;,4.0 _

30
A produc.…

20--
- -- Average production costs (-R)
2.0 _----Average production costs (-t+ R)
Price of tin

1.0

I II I I I I I I 111 1
0 50 100
Percentage share of production

bF bP bp bcz z i
c;~~~ ~~
X -, C c c
eb
S r , z =S~~c bf
)b

_> > b >

Note: See note to Figure 2.

Source: World Bank data.

36
 Figure 4. Average ProductionCosts ( R) and (+ R) by Mining Method, by Country,
and by Price of Tin, 1978

14.0 -

r ------- I
…-I
12.0 I
I !

f-I~~~~~~~I

10.0 II

I I I~~I

?.1
6.0

4.0
._--__ Average production costs (+R)
- …--- Average production costs (+ R)
-_ - -Price of tin

2.0

I~~~~~~I 11 I 11I 1i 1 11
0 50 100
Percentage share of production

S. 5 - 5,
-¢
C 0 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ o
=~~~~~~~~r
Z
a, < : c-.~ cC
C<C obC~~~~~~~~~~~~~
o z C c .f c C= o~ a
C
-
5 -
a, CS a, a, 5- a, a, , 5- 5
bO X 'ME t t '- be C 5 - O-' be 'c -
X~~~~~ > >

Note: See note to Figure 2.

Source: World Bank data.

37
Figure 5. Average ProductionCosts (-R) and ( R) by Mining Method, by Country,
and by Price of Tin, 1981

18.0

16.0 -

14.0…=_ _ _ _ _ L__+ .___. __ ___ __ __

12.0 - - - -

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
10.0
12.

t46

7- Average production costs (- R)

0 8
ow - - - - - - Average production costs (-R)
Price of tin
4.0

2.0

I I 1 1111 1 1 1 1ii 11 1
0 50 100
Percentage share of production

_ _ 04 *t o~

a< 0 - 0;., oa C
:
0 C x Q ,4-~0 _ C r.

5
S: Si S: On SC S a: s U

Nfote:See note to Figure 2. ZA means Zaire.

Source:World Bank data.

38
total production costs ( + R) was generally higher for low-cost producers (between 20 percent and
30 percent) than for high-cost producers (about 10 percent).
Exchange rate policy is the second policy variable that affects export competitiveness. The degree
of over- and undervaluation of a country's currency can significantly affect its competitiveness.'
For example, between 1978 and 1981 the exchange rate adjustments of the Bolivian currency lagged
behind the inflation rate, while the exchange rates of the other tin-producing countries were revised
more significantly than their inflation rates. Table 15 summarizes the adjusted costs that represent
the "true" competitiveness, after the different degrees of over- or undervaluation of the various
countries are taken into account. As can be seen from the table, with this adjustment, Bolivia-the
highest-cost producer-slips into the middle-cost range, whereas Malaysia and Australia become
somewhat higher-cost producers.

Institutional Factors
Two institutional factors have an important effect on the international price of tin: the operations
of the ITC and the General Services Administration (GSA) sales of the U.S. strategic stockpile of tin.
Tin is unique among metals in the sense that its producers and consumers have an international
commodity agreement. The ITC has so far employed two means to stabilize the price of tin. In the
first, the price band with buffer stock operations, the irc attempts to restrict movement of the price
of tin within the ranges specified by the ITc. The second method is that of export controls, under
which each producing country's export quota is generally determined by multiplying the export
tonnage of the country in the preceding periods by a predetermined ratio. Although the buffer
stock operations and export controls are intended to stabilize prices and they are decided by both
producing and consuming countries, there is no a priori guarantee that the intended price would
be an equilibrium price, that is, that it would coincide with the intersection of the demand curve

Table 15. Actual and Adjusted Tin ProductionCost (-R), 1981

(US$/Kg)
Actual Adjusted
production Adjustment production
Countryand miningmethod, cost(- R) factor' cost (- R)
(BO) Underground 14.5 0.73 10.6
(AU) Dredges 14.4 1.05 15.2
(IN) Gravel pump 13.1 1.22 16.1
(MA) Underground 13.0 1.14 14.9
(BO) Dredges 13.0 0.73 9.5
(UK) Underground 12.7 0.88 11.2
(MA) Gravel pump 11.2 1.14 12.8
(TH) Gravel pump 10.5 1.01 10.6
(AU) Lode underground 10.3 1.05 10.8
(ZA) Open cast 10.2 1.82 18.5
(IN) Dredgesoffshore 9.6 1.22 11.8
(ZA) Gravel pump 8.9 1.82 16.2
(TH) Dredgesonshore 8.7 1.01 8.7
(MA) Open cast 8.2 1.14 9.4
(MA) Dredge 6.8 1.14 7.8
(IN) Dredgesonshore 6.4 1.22 7.8
(TH) Dredges offshore 6.2 1.82 11.3
a. Seenoteto Figure2 formeaningofcountryabbreviations.
b. The inverse of the degree of "overvaluation" between 1978 and 1981.
Computed
Sources: onthebasisofdatafromtheInternational
TinCouncil;unpublished
datafromthetinindustry;andthe
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various issuesi.

39
and the marginal production cost curve. Controversy over whether the ITC'S price stabilization
efforts have, in fact, supported the price of tin has arisen from time to time.
The effect of buffer stock operations and export controls varies from country to country. Figure
6 illustrates the consequences of buffer stock operations. If the preoperation price, P, is lower than
the floor price, P , the price is forced to rise to the floor price level, the quantity Q.Q being
withdrawn from the market. With increased stocks, marginal producers will face strong pressures
to cut their production. By contrast, export controls stipulate proportionate decreases in exports
(equivalent to production in most cases) of all producers.
Recent buffer stock operations and export controls of the ITC are shown in Table 16. The
percentage of net purchases or sales to total production varies between 1 percent and 5 percent in
most years. But in 1975 and 1982, two years of depressed markets, the ratio of purchases was about
10 percent and 24 percent, respectively, whereas in 1976, a year of higher prices, the ratio of sales
amounted to about 9 percent.
Sales from the U.S. strategic stockpile of tin conducted by the GSA iS the other important factor
affecting prices. Except for 1965, 1966, 1973, and 1974, when GSA sold large amounts of tin, the

Figure 6. Tin Price Determinationwith Buffer Stock Operations

Demand function D

\l~~~~~~~(

P X

m ----------- --- r ------ Ml

o ,____---------- M
~
Ml~ ~~ ~~~

M ~~~ I ~ ~~~I
t I D

II Ii
l I.
_ ~~~~~~~~I
I
IX I

Production

40
percentage of GSA sales to total supply has ranged between I percent and 3 percent (Table 16).
Nonetheless, the threat of potential GSA sales depresses prices, and producing countries have
frequently complained about GSA sales.

A Review of the World Tin Economy over the Past Decade

Within the preceding framework, it is interesting to analyze the behavior of the world tin
economy over the past decade. In the early 1970s both consumption and production of tin were
still increasing. By the mid-1970s a moderately declining trend set in. At the same time, production
costs, both (+R) and (-R), increased in real terms almost across the board between 1971 and
1978. Significantly, the costs of the high-cost producers increased much faster than those of other
producers (see Table 17). But even the high-cost producers were able to pass a larger proportion
of the cost increases to consumers. Between 1978 and 1981 production costs continued to increase
across the board but the price did not increase in proportion. For the first time in the period under
review, the price in 1981 could not cover all the production costs (+ R) of the high-cost producers.
To analyze the cost increase over the period 1971-81, we calculated the percentage shares of the
contribution of the cost increase due to internal factors (increases in production costs in real and
local currency terms and increases in taxes) and those due to external factors (overvaluation of the
local currency and world inflation) for the two highest-cost operations: Bolivian lode underground
and Indonesian gravel pump, (see Table 18). In the Bolivian case, the cost increase was equally
the result of internal and external factors, whereas in the Indonesian case, only a quarter of the
cost increase was due to internal factors.
The relative price of tin with respect to aluminum rose significantly in the latter half of the 1970s,
as distinct from the smoothly increasing historical trend. Substitution at the canning stage by
aluminum and material-conserving substitution at the tinplate production stage accelerated. As a

Table 16. ITC Buffer Stock Operations,Export Controls,and GSA Sales, 1965-82
Bufferstock
operations(tons) Numberof months
Net Net of effective GSA sales
rear purchases sales exportcontrols (tons)
1965 0 0 0 21,733
1966 36 0 0 16,276
1967 4,795 0 0 6,146
1968 6,640 0 4 3,495
1969 0 6,807 12 2,048
1970 0 3,432 0 3,038
1971 5,405 0 0 1,736
1972 5,842 0 0 361
1973 0 11,478 9 19,949
1974 0 859 0 23,137
1975 19,929 0 9 575
1976 0 19,265 6 3,586
1977 0 806 0 2,635
1978 0 0 0 326
1979 0 0 0 0
1980 0 0 0 25
1981 3,865 2,875 0 5,920
1982 53,330 1,663 9 4,172
Source:The International Tin Council, Tin Statistics(various issues).

41
Table 17. ProductionCosts ( + R) and (- R) and Prices, 1971-81
(1980 constant US$/kg)

Productioncostandprices 1971 1974 1978 1981

High-cost producers'
+R 11.0 12.0 15.3 17.3
-R 10.0 9.5 12.3 14.9
Average-cost producers'
+R 8.8 10.5 12.1 13.8
- R 7.3 7.8 8.6 11.4
Low-cost producers'
+R 7.2 8.1 8.5 9.3
-R 5.5 5.3 5.3 7.0
Actual price, 10.3 14.6 15.6 14.9
uTc floor price 11.8 11.4 13.7 12.6
rTc ceiling price 9.6 9.3 10.9 16.4

a. The weighted average production costs of the 25th percentile measured in (- R).
b. The weighted average of all producers.
c. LME settlement price, standard grade.
Sources:International Tin Council; and unpublished data from the tin industry.

Table 18. Classificationof Cost Increasesin the Tin-Mining Industy in Bolivia and Indonesia,1971-81
(percent)

1971-78 1978-81
Bolivia (lode underground)
Internal factors
Real cost increases in the tin industry 31.1 -127.2
Increases in taxes 24.4 - 31.2
Subtotal 55.5 - 158.4
External factors
Overvaluation of the local currency 10.4 125.3
World inflation 34.1 133.1
Subtotal 44.5 258.4
Total 100.0 100.0
Indonesia (gravel pump)
Internal factors
Real cost increases in the tin industry 18.5 7.3
Increases in taxes 7.8 29.3
Subtotal 26.3 36.6
External factors
Overvaluation of the local currency 36.9 - 20.2
World inflation 36.8 83.6
Subtotal 73.7 63.4
Total 100.0 100.0
Sources:Computed on the basis of data from the International Tin Council; unpublished data from the tin industry; and the
International Monetary Fund, InternationalFinancialStatistics (Washington, D.C., various issues).

42
Table 19. Trade Flows of Tin, 1970 and 1981
ttonsl

Importingcountry
Southea.stAsia,5
UTnited
States Yapan and China,
and Canada WesternEurope East Asiaa and Australia Latin America CPEs' Others Total
Exportingcountry 1970 1981 1970 1981 1970 1981 1970 1981 1971 1981 1971 1981 1971 1981 1971 1981
Bolivia 3.561 10,930 23,675 8,611 0 0 0 0 76 399 827 1,638 1,542 1,894 29,681 23,472
Other Latin
American countries 396 1,556 0 2,389 0 0 0 0 0 1,521 0 480 0 0 396 5,946
Southeast Asia, China,
and AUstralia 52,283 30,673 36,937 58,777 27,811 33,897 15,776 21,980 1,155 652 5,330 7,722 4,266 8,975 143,558 162,676
Africa 930 520 16,990 4,380 0 0 0 40 0 0 111 0 1,980 809 20,011 5,749
United States
and Canada 582 2,626 80 2,761 0 0 0 156 482 676 0 0 3,648 909 4,792 7,134
Western Europe 698 491 12,555 6,471 0 0 0 0 27 261 8,454 5,191 850 817 22,584 13,231
Fotal 58,450 46,796 90,237 83,389 27,811 33,903 15,776 22,176 1,740 3,509 14,722 15,031 12,286 13,404 221,022 218,208
Note:Tin is tin conicentrates anid tin metal combined.
a. IIIcludes tsheRepublic of Korea, Hong Konig, and China.
b. Includes NMalaysia,Indonesia, Ilhailand, Singapore, Burma, the Philippinies, and Laos.
c. Centrally plannied economies.
Soute: International Iin Council, Tin Slatistics1970-0flanid Tin Statistic.s1971-81.
result of both substitution and thc start of the economic recession in 1980, consumption began to
decline significantly during 1978-81.
Under these circumstances, a squeeze on high-cost producers became visible. Changes were
brought about by eliminating the export tax in Bolivia and by adjusting the real exchange rate in
Indonesia.
Relative changes in production costs, exchange rates, and other factors among exporting
countries and varying rates of growth rates in importing countries can alter the pattern of trade in
tin. To analyze the main aspects of these changes in trade patterns during the past decade, trade
flow matrices (for tin metal and tin concentrates combined) were constructed for 1970 and 1981
for six exporting and seven importing countries and regions (see Table 19).6
Among the major exporting countries and regions, a significant decrease of quantity exported
was registered in Bolivia and Africa, whereas Southeast Asian countries, China, and Australia,
and other Latin American countries (namely, Brazil) increased their exports considerably. For
importing countries and regions, there was a decrease in Western Europe and North America,
whereas imports by East Asia (principally Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China) and the
centrally planned economies increased.
Despite changes in the quantities of tin traded, however, the overall pattern of tin trade has
remained unchanged. Exports from southeast Asia, China and Australia were exported to all
regions, whereas Africa exported, almost exclusively, to Western European countries. Bolivia
exported to Western Europe and North America, but not to the two fastest growing regions: East
Asia and the centrally planned economies. Since average transport costs account for only a small
portion of tin prices, the trade-flow pattern is probably the result of historical marketing practices
rather than purely economic factors.

Notes
1. Hideo Hashimoto, ModelingMaterialSubstitutionin the Tlin-Tinplate-TFSComplex(Washington, D.G., World Bank
Commodity Division, 1983).
2. The seven countries included are Australia, Bolivia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and
Zaire.
3. These data refer only to ITC member countries.
4. Excluding the less important open-cast mining in 1974and 1978.
5. The degree of overvaluation of the currency of Country A in a given period is computed as the change in consumer
prices in Country A in relation to the change in U.S. consumer prices, divided by the change in the exchange rate of
Country A in relation to the U.S. dollar.
6. The trade flow matrices for tin concentrates and tin metal for 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1981 are presented in the
Statistical Appendix.

44
 CHAPTER 5

Problems of COMIBOL

Since its inception in 1952, COMIBOL has been beset by a series of problems, some emanating from
its own internal organization and administrative and financial problems, others the result of
impositions on it by the government. Particularly in recent years, COMIBOL's production of various
minerals has declined considerably, and, as can be seen from Table 20, it has suffered financial
losses even before taxes. In this chapter, an effort is made to find out why, despite the reasonably
high technical caliber of COMIBOL staff since its beginnings, the corporation has encountered such
serious problems. Some recommendations are also provided for improving performance.'

Major Problems of COMIBOL

Unlike some of its foreign counterparts that specialize by mineral, COMIBOL is a multimineral
corporation. Its management, therefore, faces highly complex and diverse technical issues, difficult
to resolve even for experienced multinational corporations. To deal with these technical issues, while
administering a comprehensive social program for its employees and assuming responsibilities for
marketing and investment, requires a high level of managerial and commercial efficiency as well

Table 20. COMIBOL, OverallDeficit of 1978-82

(US$ millions)

Revenue, costs, and expenditure 1978 1979 1980 1981

Total sales revenue 329.6 420.8 355.4 384.9
Marketing costs 97.1 101.3 83.1 102.0
Transport 14.5 13.1 9.9 16.5
Smelting 53.6 51.0 38.6 57.8
Penalties 29.0 37.2 34.6 27.7
Net sales 232.5 319.5 272.3 282.9
Operating costs 159.0 186.3 233.8 293.5
Labor costs 67.3 81.6 84.2 113.3
Materials 27.5 30.2 31.1 45.8
Utilities 6.2 6.9 7.2 14.6
Depreciation 6.2 7.3 7.9 10.0
Mineral purchases 29.5 35.7 23.4 42.6
Interest payments 14.1 16.0 19.1 27.4
Others 8.2 8.6 60.9 39.8
Current surplus before taxes 73.5 133.2 38.5 - 10.6
Taxes 83.7 105.0 72.5 47.5
Current account deficit - 10.2 28.2 -34.0 -58.1
Capital expenditures 45.6 32.8 5.6 8.0
Overall deficit -55.8 -61.0 -39.6 -66.1
Source:COMIBOL.

45
as an advanced system of cost control. COMIBOL does not possess many of these attributes. The main
problems of COMIBOL may be classified as those arising from its organizational and management
structure, its manpower and remuneration policies, a suboptimal level of investment, excessive
taxation, and a heavy debt burden. 2

Organizational and Management Problems

Many of COMIBOL'S financial problems stem from a heavy reliance on social objectives. Because
of political and trade union pressures and the very circumstances of the corporation's birth,
COMIBOL'S objective of providing employment and services to its labor force has been historically
paramount, and many financially unprofitable mines have been kept open (subsidized by the
more profitable ones) for purely social reasons. Conditions in the mines make this emphasis
understandable. Nor would it necessarily be a problem if COMIBOL could provide the social services
at lower social costs than could the responsible government agencies, and if the provision of the
services would not interfere unduly with COMIBOL'S productive activities. But as shown later,
COMIBOL'S social objectives and activities considerably affect what should be its principal objective
of increasing production. The corporation is essentially responsible for fourteen mining enterprises,
some industrial plants for the manufacture of spare parts, a volatilization plant, electricity
generating plants, a railroad company (Ferrocorp), and agencies abroad responsible for
procurement and negotiations with metal traders. In the management of these diverse activities,
COMIBOL suffers simultaneously from excessive centralization in some activities and too little central
control in others. For example, the centralization of all activities related to maintenance and
procurement, as well as financial and auditing control, implies excessive reliance on the La Paz and
Oruro offices and, consequently, an excessive amount of time to complete these activities. As a rule,
the technical manager is involved in too many routine decisions, which leave him little time for
planning, coordination, and control functions. Under the present system, the manager of an
enterprise exercises little control over factors of production, and with authority removed, so is the
responsibility and much of the interest of the manager. By contrast, the manufacture of spare parts
is excessively dispersed among small industrial units, which lowers efficiency and quality and raises
costs. Also, it would make sense to have all sales conducted by a centralized body because of the
complexity of this activity and the economies of scale achieved by centralization.
Past decentralization efforts have been geographical, such as the transfer of the Operations
Division (Gerencia de Operaciones) and the Auxiliary Engineering Services Unit (Ingenieria
Auxiliar) to Oruro. 3 This transfer was not accompanied by actual delegation of responsibility.
Thus, although a spare part may be manufactured at Oruro, clearance for orders for these by
enterprises must come from La Paz. This creates unnecessary bureaucractic steps and costly delays.
Another related factor is the excessive government interference in the activities of COMIBOL. Every
change in government is invariably accompanied by a change of the general manager and his senior
staff. Over the period 1978-80, COMIBOL had eight general managers. In each mining enterprise,
there are interventores of the Auditor General's Office, who exercise excessive control, with dubious
results, on many operations, and affect the morale of enterprise managers. Similarly, bidding and
procurement procedures are excessively complicated and time-consuming. Each invitation to
tender must have responses from at least three suppliers, and since on many occasions there may
not be the required three suppliers, the process of retendering repeatedly can be time-consuming.
Moreover, the procurement of even relatively small items involves at least sixty stages before being
processed at La Paz. It takes more than a year from the date of acquisition for the materials to
reach the enterprise. Consequently, there is a tendency to overorder materials. The total inventory
in COMIBOL (in the central warehouse as well as the enterprises) is estimated at more than US$80
million, and many of the items are obsolete.

46
 Other related problems are absence of clear delegation of authority, excessive loss of time in
resolving unforeseen problems because of improper planning, little exchange of information because
of scarce horizontal contacts and interchange among managers, too many organizational levels,
and an excessive number of advisers and assistants.
In mid-1983 the government and the Miners' Federation reached an agreement under which
there would be workers' participation in the board of directors of COMIBOL. Under the system, four
of the seven directors of the corporation would be named by the federation, giving it the majority
of votes (cogesti6n mayoritaria). Although the participation of representatives of the mine workers can
be beneficial to production and worker discipline, it can also lead to increased politicization of
COMIBOL. It is too early to assess the effect of the change on COMIBOL'S performance.

Problems Related to Manpower and Remuneration Policies

For social reasons, some of COMIBOL'S mines, especially Catavi, Unificada, and Colquiri, have to
support a considerably larger labor force than they actually require. Staff has been increased even
in years of falling production. At the same time, the share of the work force employed underground
is about 40 percent (see Table 21), compared with about 60 percent in private mining companies.
Labor relations traditionally have been strained, and strikes and unannounced work stoppages are
frequent. Absenteeism is a problem, though not a serious one when compared with mining
companies in other countries. Written rules and procedures do not exist for overtime, and practice
varies from mine to mine (although, in general, the practice is to pay double rate for overtime).
Apparently there are strong pressures on supervisory staff to grant overtime.
Until recently, COMIBOL had no less than sixteen salary regimes. Apart from this, COMIBOL also has
a two-tier profit-sharing plan, one at the mining enterprise level and another at the COMIBOL level.
The first bonus is paid monthly to enterprise employees as 25 percent of the enterprise profits and
has no limit; the second bonus is paid annually to all COMIBOL employees from the corporation's annual
profits and is limited to 100 percent of annual salary. This system is faulty because it may bear no
relation to productivity or effort but, rather, reflect price fluctuations. Moreover, payment may be
very high in a month prior to which, or after which, profits have been, or will be, low or negative.

Table 21. Employmentin COMIBOL Mines, 1982

Employees lU7nderground
Education as a
and percentage
Mine Underground Concentrator Surface health Total of total
Catavi 1352 894 1442 779 4467 30.3
Quechisla 1872 612 1398 671 4553 41.1
Colquiri 1000 393 718 346 2457 40.7
Huanuni 982 361 458 316 2117 46.4
Unificada 837 315 564 189 1905 43.9
San Jose 626 306 464 320 1716 36.5
Caracoles 589 123 277 138 1127 52.3
Santa Fe 353 167 251 130 901 39.1
Coroco 465 68 312 108 953 48.8
Viloco 298 101 222 105 726 41.0
Bolivar 258 75 139 58 530 48.7
Colquechaca 167 60 101 32 360 46.4
Matilde 312 47 189 68 616 50.6
Colavi 215 0 118 32 365 58.9
Total 9,326 3,522 6,653 3,292 22,793 40.92
.Ao/e:Totals do not include about 3,000 COMIBOL employees who do not work in the mines.
.Source: COMIBOL.

47
 In addition, COMIBOL runs a widespread program of social services. For example, there are
currently more than 60,000 students in various COMIBOL schools, with a student-teacher ratio of
25:1. The corporation provides school supplies such as pencils, books, blackboards, and maps, as
well as free breakfast, subsidized uniforms, and some scholarships. In view of the physical isolation
of many of the mines, the provision of education by COMIBOL is not only justifiable but also necessary.
But much of the emphasis of the education is on humanities and little on technical and industrial
topics, which are more relevant to the students' lives in the mines. This may partly explain the high
dropout rate in the schools. Also, there is a general lack of control over educational costs.
COMIBOL also provides housing for its employees, and when there is a shortage, subsidized rentals.
With the increase in the cost of construction, the corporation opted for imported prefabricated
houses. But when the exchange rate was adjusted, these became unaffordable. Besides, they entail
a great deal of effort and money in land preparation and infrastructure and are not generally liked
by the miners.
COMIBOL provides the infrastructure both in La Paz and in the mines for specialized medical and
dental services. Health and related services currently employ 1,400 persons, of whom about
250 are doctors. Again, the cost control systems are inadequate: the employer and employee
contributions cover only one-third of the total medical costs.
An important employee benefit is the provision of subsidized basic needs items through company
stores. In 1952 COMIBOL sold thirty-five different commodities at highly subsidized prices. In 1956,
however, the prices of four of these items were frozen in nominal (peso) terms. To this day, the
prices of these four items-meat, sugar, bread and rice are frozen at the 1956 levels, with COMIBOL
absorbing the commissary loss (perdidapulperia). In view of the large increases in their market prices,
COMIBOL has to bear an ever increasing deficit. Tables 22 and 23 show the differences between the
two sets of prices for 1982 and mid- 1983. The system of pulperias varies from mine to mine; in some
the quota or ration is fixed on a per capita basis and in others on the basis of household numbers.
Prices of the items also vary among the mines because of transport and inventory cost differences.
For other essential goods, prices are set at slightly above wholesale prices. Clearly the longer the
1956 prices are maintained and the higher the market prices for these items, the larger are the
commissary losses borne by COMIBOL, which amounted to about US$20 million in 1981.

Table 22. SubsidizedUnit Costsof Four Basic FoodItems

(Bolivian pesos)

Sugar Rice Meat Bread

Mining enterprise (kilo) (kilo) (kilo) (about120grams)
Catavi 1.17 1.30 2.82 0.11
Quechisla 0.99 1.10 2.43 0.13
Huanuni 0.99 1.10 2.70 0.11
Colquiri 0.99 1.10 3.00 0.13
Unificada 1.58 1.08 2.72 0.20
SanJose 0.99 1.10 2.50 0,14
Caracoles 0.99 1.20 2.70 0.15
Santa Fe 0.99 1.36 3.00 0.15
Viloco 0.90 1.00 2.80 0.11
Corocoro 1.26 1.19 2.49 0.12
Rio Yura 0.99 1.10 2.80 0.13
Adm. Oruro 1.13 1.41 2.50 0.14
Bolivar 0.99 1.36 3.00 0.15
Pulacayo 0.99 1.10 2.80 0.13
Bolsa Negra 1.22 0.99 2.70 0.15

Note: 'These unit costs have been frozen since December 1956. The difference between these prices and the market price at any
point is the per unit commissary loss to COMIBOL.
Source:COMIBOL.

48
Table 23. Actual Unit Costs (Market Prices) of FourBasic Items
(Bolivian pesos)

Bread
Sugarper kilo Riceper kilo Meat per kilo (about120grams)
Mining Average MIay Average May Average May Average May
enterprise 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983
Catavi 49.90 69.67 66.95 63.20 139.50 342.94 1.60 6.20
Quechisla 49.99 75.90 65.70 130.00 140.00 310.62 1.66 6.00
Huanuni 41.71 73.59 27.61 74.76 121.36 330.28 1.80 4.35
Colquiri 25.80 76.38 21.19 76.69 120.00 341.01 1.45 7.06
Unificada 26.52 69.53 34.66 97.15 146.76 314.05 1.88 7.12
SanJose 27.00 71.85 34.00 80.00 146.00 323.52 1.80 6.50
Caracoles 50.75 73.45 22.10 75.48 179.23 322.61 1.60 6.50
Santa Fe 54.80 76.50 72.20 76.87 207.75 264.89 1.60 7.09
Viloco 54.79 73.74 72.42 75.87 234.70 320.40 1.60 5.20
Corocoro 35.67 74.65 72.07 88.16 207.74 331.11 1.82 6.00
Rio Yura 52.00 76.25 79.64 103.23 211.11 289.29 3.63 9.67
Adm. Oruro 47.92 77.59 66.35 74.36 117.31 340.00 1.93 8.00
Bolivar 47.80 76.48 70.80 73.87 118.00 341.60 1.90 5.95
Pulacayo 70.96 76.00 92.18 82.23 241.49 319.58 2.50 8.70
Bolsa Negra 44.96 70.83 82.65 86.82 190.00 305.00 2.80 6.00
Source:COMIBOL.

Lack of Investment
Because of COMIBOL'S financial problems, the level of investment has been abysmally low,
particularly during the past several years: investment averaged about US$5 million a year for the
period 1980-82, although gross annual sales averaged about US$330 million over the same period.
When the mining industry was nationalized in 1952, much of COMIBOL'sequipment was already
depreciated and technically obsolete. One cannot but marvel at the genius of COMIBOL'S
maintenance crews who manage to make "museum pieces" work.
Systematic exploration and mine development has also been neglected. Most deposits being
mined today were known at the turn of the century. Except for a short period during the mid- 1960s,
there has been no significant exploratory activity-partly because of political instability (which
particularly affects this high-risk, high-cost activity requiring a relatively long gestation period)
and partly because of an unresponsive tax system that provides no incentives for exploration.
Compared with mining companies in other countries, COMIBOL's expenditures on exploration
(which rarely reached 0.5 percent of gross sales in any particular year) are very low.4
As a result, known reserves of most mines have fallen to very low levels. Only in a few mines have
reserves been developed for more than three or four years of production. Furthermore, recovery
rates of metallic values have declined as lower-grade, more complex ores are being mined. Table
24 summarizes COMIBOL'S tin reserves.From the economic point of view, only the reservesclassified
as "accessible" (proved and probable) can be considered available; the remaining reserves require
varying degrees of additional investment for their development.

Excessive Taxation
Excessive taxation is examined in detail in Chapter 7. Suffice it to note here that, until recently,
COMIBOLhas had profits before taxes in most years, and that in most years the combined burden of
the various taxes paid by COMIBOLhas exceeded 100 percent of pretax profits.

49
Table 24. Summary of COMIBOL's Tin Reserves, End 1982
Mineral ore Percentage AMetal
Classification (dry tons) tin (fine tons)
Accessible (proved) 4,304,823 1.23 50,797
Accessible (probable) 6,168,566 1.37 84,509
Inaccessiblea 3,565,676 1.38 49,206
Subtotal underground 14,039,065 1.31 184,512
Mine tailings (Desmontes) 30,799,238 0.30 92,397
Mill washings (Relaves) 61,950,251 0.43 266,386
Placer deposits (Veneros) 327,574,784 0.01 32,757
Subtotal surface 420,324,273 0.09 391,540
Total reserves 434,363,338 0.13 576,052
a. Includes proved and probable.
Source: COMIBOL.

Heavy Debt Burden

COMIBOL'S total debt outstanding and disbursed at the end of 1982 was about US$278 million,
including about US$150 million of external debt. This does not include cumulated arrears at the
end of 1982 of about US$80 million consisting of nonpayment to the National Power Company
(ENDE) for electricity supply, to the National Railways Corporation (ENFE) for transport charges,
to the Treasury for nonpayment of taxes, and to others. If these arrears are added to the total, the
total debt increases to about US$360 million. Table 25 provides details on this debt. Debt servicing
is a heavy financial burden on the corporation: in 1982, for example, COMIBOL paid about US$80
million in interest, commissions, and amortization on its total debt, which amounted to over a
quarter of its gross sales in that year.
To summarize, because of various factors, some beyond COMIBOL'S control, the corporation has
experienced severe financial problems that have affected its long-term development and exploration
plans. Unless a concerted effort is made by the corporation and the government to rehabilitate
COMIBOL financially and administratively, there is a strong likelihood that the entity will continue
to experience declining production and increasing losses, which, in one form or another, will have
to be borne by the Bolivian Treasury.

Some Recommendations for Changes in COMIBOL

From its inception, COMIBOL has been saddled with social objectives and functions that are not
part of the duties of a commercially run enterprise. This is peculiar neither to COMIBOLnor to Bolivia.
Many public and quasi-public enterprises in other countries have at some time shared the problems
of COMIBOL: a lack of clearly defined objectives, excessive government interference in day-to-day
operations, and being treated as "milch cows" to benefit other sectors. Those familiar with the
political framework within which COMIBOL operates, and with its self-perception as a provider of
social benefits, would agree that it is unrealistic to assume that COMIBOL can do away with its social
objectives and functions in the foreseeable future. Thus it is futile to recommend changes involving
the conversion of COMIBOL into a purely commercial enterprise whereby it is divested of all its social
activities. Instead, ways must be found of making the performance of the corporation more efficient
within its given framework. In this context, many improvements can be made in the performance
of COMIBOL without radical changes of direction. In the following paragraphs, some such changes
are discussed; these should not be seen as a comprehensive catalog of recommendations but as
illustrative suggestions.

50
Table 25. COMIBOL's Total Debt Outstandingand Disbursed, End 1982
(US$ million)

External debt
Bilateral 6.617
U.S. PL 480 1.823
United Kingdom 0.380
Austria 0.691
South Africa (Independent Development Corporation) 3.723
Multilateral 0.107
Andean Development Corporation (CAF) 0.107
Commercial
banks 61.363
Comp. Luxemburgoise 0.800
First National City Bank 6.171
Manufacturers Hanover Trust 21.389
Skandinaviska Enskilda Bank 9.244
Marine Midland Bank 1.836
Libra Bank 3.600
S.F.E. Banking Corp. 16.000
Mercator, Panama 2.323
Suppliers 15.084
Vielle Montagne 0.434
Assoc. Casas Prefab. Puttalo (Finland) 0.353
Soviet Union 14.297
Other 67.646
Casas Prefab. Camea 0.445
Credito Gobierno Argentino 42.500
Credito Fomento (Ex-Indef.) 24.701
Subtotalexternaldebt 150.817

Domesticdebt
Credito Consolidado 8-80 21.357
Casas Prefab. (Pizarreno y Dalmati) 0.136
Credito Soporte Financiero 4-81 106.000
Subtotaldomestic
debt 127.493

Total debt (external and domestic) 278.310

Source:
Central Bank of Bolivia.

Some studies have predicted that, if COMIBOL continues to operate as at present, by the end of
the five-year period terminating in 1986, it will have incurred an accumulated operating deficit of
more than US$700 million. 5 While these projections may be excessively pessimistic, there is no
doubt that the present financial position of COMIBOLis very grave, and in the absence of corrective
measures it could become unmanageable. Improvements in the financial situation can be made
both by reducing costs and increasing revenues.
Cost reductions can be effected through stricter control of overtime pay (reducing it gradually
from about 25 percent of basic pay to about 10 percent); better controls to reduce theft of machinery
and minerals; and minor cost reductions in the La Paz and Oruro offices. In view of the experience
of La Palca, plans for the Machacamarca volatilization plant should be postponed until its economic
feasibility has been established. 6 The infrastructure at Machacamarca should be used to convert it
into the central warehouse. The present location of the warehouse in the center of Oruro results in
excessive losses and transport costs. Machacamarca is much more convenient to most mines and is
on the main railroad. With regard to transport, an effort should be made to reduce the number of

51
makes of wagons, so that there are fewer spare parts shops. COMIBOL should also investigate the
feasibility of transporting concentrates in large reusable plastic bags instead of in open wagons or
bags of 40 kilograms, which would eliminate losses en route. But as yet no sound case exists for
closing the railroad company, Ferrocorp; the social costs would be high, and the corporation would
need to invest in a fleet of new wagons at a time of severe financial constraints.
The Unificada and Kami mines purchase substantial amounts of tin ores from cooperatives. The
prices paid to the cooperatives leave COMIBOL with considerable losses on these purchases after taxes
and selling costs. COMIBOL should negotiate a price that at least enables it to break even. COMIBOL
can also reduce penalty and noncompliance of quality deductions on its concentrates by setting up
central warehouses to receive all concentrates where these can be mixed in the proportions desired
by ENAF or foreign smelters.
COMIBOL should undertake a detailed study of how to reduce operating costs in the provision of
social services in those mines (Catavi, Unificada, Kami, Corocoro, Morococala, and Santa Fe)
which can be expected to remain a financial drain on COMIBOL. Workers who are eligible for
retirement, or who opt for retirement under some voluntary scheme, should be retired and not
replaced. Some personnel should be reallocated to other mines. The government might designate
certain mines as social necessities and pay COMIBOL an explicit subsidy to keep them operating.
COMIBOL should continue to administer its educational, housing, and health programs since there
is little guarantee that other public agencies would perform these services better. These activities,
however, should be "costed out" and the cost of the programs should be kept separately and
presented to the policymakers. This will ensure that the social costs and public interest arguments
do not become an excuse for bad management and inefficiency. The prices of the four basic
subsidized items, frozen since 1956, should be revised to more realistic levels to reduce the
commissary losses of COMIBOL.
The government should examine the possibility of passing on to COMIBOL the benefits from
refinancing COMIBOL's external debt. 7 If this is not possible, the domestic debt with the Central Bank
should be refinanced. In practice, this is already happening. COMIBOL should continue to pay taxes
to the Treasury (after adjustment for the social services provided) but the presumed costs should
be indexed to actual changes in Bolivian mining costs. This will ensure more realistic levels of tax
payments and a more rational tax structure (for details, see Chapter 7).
A relatively effortless way of obtaining revenue inflows in the short run would be to sell the
obsolete and unnecessary machinery, materials, and spare parts stored in the central warehouses
of Oruro. COMIBOL should obtain the legal clearance for selling these at prices as close as possible
to current market prices. This could bring in about US$7 million in revenues.
COMIBOL can also obtain better prices on its commercial contracts, especially on "spot" sales, if
the lengthy procedures for making these sales are simplified and if more authority, within certain
financial limits, is given to the sales manager.
The above measures, together with new external financing, would probably enable COMIBOL to
undertake a program of badly needed investment. The required investment over the next four to
five years can be divided into (1) a short-term program for urgently needed investment to maintain
present production and to undertake projects with low capital requirements and short gestation
periods and (2) a long-term program for the completion of projects initiated in the first phase.
The main components of the short-term investment program would include: (1) initiating
regional and on-property exploration, without which COMIBOL'S future could be jeopardized. The
areas of high probability for regional exploration are Japo-Maracocola and alluvial deposits of
Carmen, Centenario, and Rio Beni; on-property exploration could begin in Bolivar, Huanuni, and
Los Lipez; (2) undertaking projects with short gestation periods and requiring relatively low capital
investment, such as the tailings projects, especially at Catavi, Huanuni, and Colquiri; (3) initiating
the first phase of the development of the Bolivar mine to include exploration, development, and
construction of a new mill; (4) increasing gradually the hoisting capacity at Colquiri, Huanuni,

52
Bolivar, San Jose, and Unificada mines; (5) starting a program of maintenance and equipment
replacement, which would begin with in-depth studies of the needs of the various mines and priority
replacement or acquisition of the necessary items; (6) initiating improvements in the safety
program; and (7) improving the manufacture of spare parts by COMIBOL.
The long-term investment program would basically be a continuation of the work initiated, with
the addition of exploration and development at Viloco and Caracoles. Some of COMIBOL's larger
projects, such as the Bolivar project, can easily attract foreign loans or equity financing. Because
of the present scarcity of foreign funds to Bolivia, the government may wish to study the various
available alternatives for private, and for foreign, participation. Some such available alternatives
are mentioned in Appendix C.
It is estimated that, if the first phase of the investment program is initiated by the end of 1985,
by 1987 annual incremental tin production would amount to about 3,000 metric tons. A price for
tin of US$7 a pound in 1987 would imply new foreign exchange earnings of about US$50 million
in that year.
Some organizational and administrative changes can also be made without a major overhaul of
the system. In Bolivia, as in many other developing countries, it is believed that intervention in the
daily operations of public enterprises increases their accountability. Experience in COMIBOL has
shown, however, that the reverse is true: excessive interference by the interventores of the Auditor
General's Office in the operations of the mining enterprises and the overcentralization of functions
in the La Paz and Oruro offices have left the mine managers with little enthusiasm and given them
ample room to blame poor performance on others. It has also made them excessively conservative
in an environment in which the rewards for success are small and the penalties for failure are high.
There is urgent need, therefore, for delegating more power to the mine managers and for working
out a simple system of key indicators by which their financial performance is examined periodically
by the La Paz office. The complicated bidding and procurement procedures should also be
simplified. At the same time, the present bonus system should be changed to make it more
productivity oriented.
Available evidence suggests that the more government authorities confine their activities to
explicit goal-setting and the less they interfere in the detailed operations of management, the higher
the level of efficiency likely to be achieved. 8 Partly as a response to the desire to achieve the
flexibility and initiative of the private sector, while still enjoying the powers of the state, the idea
of converting COMIBOL into a true "holding company" of the Italian type has been suggested on
occasion. But legal framework is one thing and actual operations quite another. In the Italian case,
there was a genuine devolution of power from the government to the holding company. It is difficult
to believe that this will occur in the case of COMIBOL in the foreseeable future. Without genuine
devolution, efforts to establish the legal framework of a holding company in COMIBOL would only
create a confused authority structure and aggravate the present problems.
Finally, the big unknown in the future of COMIBOL is the role of majority worker participation
(cogestion mayoritaria) in the board of directors of COMIBOL. As alrcady mentioned, the direct
involvement of the representatives of mine workers in policy decisions can have a positive effect on
labor productivity and discipline. But it can also work in the other direction, by politicizing COMIBOL
to such a degree that its decisionmaking powers are paralyzed. Only time will tell the results of this
interesting experiment.

Notes
1. For additional details on the problems of CoMIBot, see Price Waterhouse Associates, "COMIBOL: Diagnostico y Plan
de Rehabilitaci6n," a study done for the World Banik/United Nations Development Programme, 1982.
2. Another important factor affecting not only cOMIBOL but also the rest of the mining sector is the exchange rate.
This issue has already been discussed in Chapter 2.

53
 3. The Operations Division is responsible for production from all the mining enterprises. It is also responsible for all
centralized support services pertaining to metallurgy, geology, miners' cooperatives, and industrial safety and hygiene.
'I'he Auxiliary Engineering unit consists mainly of repair and maintenance and manufacture of some spare parts.
4. Of course, exploration expenditures in Bolivia can be expected to be somewhat lower than, say, in the United
States and Canada, which have been more thoroughly explored, and new mines are becoming more difficult to find. But
even compared with mining companies in other developing countries, COMIBOL's exploration expenditures are relatively
low in relation to gross mineral sales. See Rex Bosson and Bension Varon, The Mining Industry and the DevelopingCountries
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
5. See, for example, Price Waterhouse Associates, "COMIBOL, Diagnostico y Plan de Rehabilitaci6n," a study done for
the World Bank/UNDP, 1982.
6. For a discussion of the problems of the La Palca volatilization plant, see Appendix D.
7. Currently all public entities whose external debt was renegotiated by the government with externial lenders continue
to pay the Central Bank on the original schedules.
8. For an interesting discussion of related issues, see Armeane M. Choksi, State Interventionin the IndustrialiZationof
DevelopingCountries:SelectedIssues, World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 341 (Washington, D.C., 1979).

54
 CHAPTER 6

Tin Smelting in Bolivia

For decades Bolivia has cherished the ambition of smelting its ores domestically. Scattered attempts
to start smelting operations in the country go as far back as the First World War. In 1916 the South
American Electric Smelting Company was set up, but electric smelting in Bolivia did not prove
successful. During the war, when it became impossible to secure jute sacks for exporting tin
concentrate, a certain Luis Soux smelted his own concentrates in Potosi, usingyareta (a local plant)
and taquia (llama dung) as fuel; he had some success in selling his tin on the Argentine market.
This, however, was a small-scale operation, involving about a thousand tons of metallic tin a year.
Writing in 1928, Marsh opinioned: "Smelting in Bolivia is out of the question at present," and she
presented as reasons the lack of coal, the virtual nonexistence of hydroelectric power, and the high
transport costs, which made it impossible to operate smelters profitably at some central point where
the output of the scattered mines could be sent for reduction. ' Other reasons propounded by various
commentators have been the lack of oxygen needed for the smelter furnaces at the high altitudes
of the Bolivian altiplano and the resultant "deration" of all machinery-roughly 30 percent of
power loss is encountered.
Smelting and refining activities are at present almost entirely carried out by the state-owned
National Smelting Company (Empresa Nacional de Fundiciones, ENAF), which was formed in
1966.2 There are, however, a few privately owned tin smelters, and COMIBOL operates some tin
volatilization plants.
In the 1940s and 1950s various pioneers started small smelting plants. The most noteworthy was
the high-grade tin smelter at Oruro owned by Mariano Pero. Using local raw materials, his smelter
had an initial capacity of 5,000 metric tons a year. Some of its concentrate feed came from Pero's
Chojnacota mines. When supplies from other mines increased, Pero raised the capacity of the
smelter to 10,000 tons a year. Undoubtedly, much of his success was due to the high grade of the
concentrates, which had an average tin content of about 48 percent.
Another pioneer, the Ukranian-born Jorge Zalesky, carried out a series of metallurgical
experiments in the laboratories of Banco Minero de Bolivia with the intent of proving that smelting
in Bolivia was a technically feasible proposition. He set up a low-grade tin smelter, Hormet, in
Achachicala near La Paz. Zalesky was killed by a stray bullet during a civil disturbance (though
how stray the bullet was has been a matter of great conjecture in Bolivia--many Bolivians were
convinced that Zalesky knew too much about smelting to be acceptable to the international
smelting interests). Despite severe financial problems and the death of Zalesky, the tin smelters of
both Pero and Zalesky continue in operation to this day, although on a much reduced scale.
COMIBOL also operates a few small tin volatization plants (pyrometallurgical plants that convert
low-grade or colloidal concentrates into more commercially suitable grades). In 1982, with
assistance from the Soviet Union, COMIBOL completed the large volatilization plant of La Palca,
near Potosi. The original investment was estimated at about US$8 million and the planned
completion date was 1977. The actual cost, after a series of natural disasters and poor planning,
was US$80 million.' Despite the unfortunate experience of La Palca, the government is planning
to set up a similar but much larger plant at Machacamarca, near Oruro. The country may need

55
to assess in detail the performance of the first plant before authorizing the construction of any further
such plants.
In 1953 the government contracted the services of Krupp-Lurgi to prepare a feasibility study for
a smelting plant. The study's conclusion was against such a plant on technical grounds. As a result
of a pervasive feeling in Bolivia of a conspiracy by foreign owners of smelting plants to oppose
domestic smelting in the country, and despite lingering doubts about the financial and technical
feasibility of the project, the government of Bolivia signed an agreement on October 5, 1969, with
Klockner for the first phase of the tin smelter. The smelter was to have a capacity of 7,500 metric
tons a year for high-grade ores. The smelter, located at Vinto, seven kilometers from Oruro, was
built in 1970 and became operational in early 1971. The process is conventional and consists of
roasting concentrates to remove arsenic and antimony, followed by smelting with charcoal and
suitable flux in two reverberatory furnaces. The crude tin metal so produced is thermally refined
in cast iron kettles to a purity of 99.5 percent. The thermally refined tin is then cast into anodes
and electrolytically refined to a purity of better than 99.9 percent.
In 1975 Klockner completed the expansion of this high grade smelter to 11,500 metric tons a
year. The next expansion to 20,000 metric tons a year was carried out by Klockner in association
with Paul Bergsoe and Sons of Denmark and was completed in 1977. This high-grade smelter
receives all the concentrates that formerly went to Williams Harvey.
Finally, a new smelting plant for treating low-grade and complex tin concentrates with a capacity
of 10,000 metric tons a year was completed in 1980. This raised the total smelting capacity to 30,000
tons a year, which constituted all of Bolivia's tin production. The low-grade smelter receives the
concentrates that formerly went to Capper Pass and Metalgesellschaft.

Main Objectives of Tin Smelting in Bolivia

A number of arguments have been put forward by successive Bolivian governments in support
of its forward-integration strategy in the mining sector. First, it has been argued that the net value
added from the combined mining and metallurgical sector would be enhanced; transport, smelting,
and insurance costs incurred abroad reduced; and net export receipts and fiscal revenues increased.
Second, exporting metals instead of concentrates would broaden markets and Bolivia's sales would
no longer be restricted to a small number of refineries and metal traders. Third, some minor
employment would be created. Finally, a basis would be laid for establishing industries to process
tion-ferrous metals into plate, wire, and rods.
These objectives need to be analyzed in some detail. While there is no doubt that a shift to
exporting refined metals instead of concentrates would increase net export earnings by reducing
transport costs and eliminating most foreign refining fees, smelting operations normally generate
low value added. As can be seen from Table 26, value added from the metallurgical sector
accounted for only about 0.6 percent of total GDP by 1980, despite sizable investments in the sector
during the 1970s.

Table 26. ValueAdded in Mining and Metallurgy, 1970-80

(US$ millions)

Valueadded- 1970 1975 1978 1980

Mining valuc added 97.2 159.3 303.6 393.8
Metallurgy value added 0.2 6.0 23.0 34.2
Total GDP 1,041.6 2,473.1 4,030.0 5,980.2
Metallurgy value added as
percentage of total GDP 0.02 0.24 0.57 0.57
Source:Central Bankof Bolivia.

56
 These minor gains from expanded smelting have to be weighed against the forgone benefits from
a correspondingly higher investment in mining or some other productive sectors of the economy.
As regards market conditions, metal markets are indeed broader than those for unrefined minerals
but they are also more complicated. Evidence of this is Bolivia's continued dependence on metal
trading firms.4 Moreover, most developed countries levy higher import duties on metals than on
concentrates, and thus mineral-producing countries can expect lower net gains from a shift to metal
exports. In terms of investment, since smelting projects typically have to be large scale to be
economic, they require substantial (mostly foreign) capital, long gestation periods, and a level of
coordination of various activities that is rare in most developing countries. Finally, while capital
outlays for forward integration into semimanufactures and other metal products are not large, the
domestic and even the Andean market is probably too small to allow economically feasible
operations without heavy protection. The experience of Thailand with tinplate would seem to weigh
against Bolivia's entering this activity.
In summary, while forward integration into smelting has its advantages, it is by no means an
unmixed blessing. Any future investments must, therefore, be undertaken in the overall context of
the Bolivian economy.

Performance of ENAF

With regard to the actual performance of ENAF'S tin smelters, it is difficult to say that the
objectives of the government have been achieved. 5 As can be seen from Table 27, capacity
utilization has averaged less than two-thirds since the installation of the low-grade plant in 1980.
The reasons for this low utilization rate are provided in subsequent paragraphs.
Table 28 provides the financial accounts of ENAF for the period 1973-82. As can be seen, the
enterprise has experienced a deficit even on the current account for every year except 1979. The
unfinanced part of the deficits has been normally covered by Central Bank financing.
On all accounts, the performance of ENAF has been one of unmitigated failure and a good example
of how the achievement of a set of reasonable and realistic objectives can be frustrated by
mismanagement, poor planning, lack of coordination, and technical and industrial relations
problems. It is useful to recount some of the factors behind this performance.

Table 27. Productionof Metallic Tin by ENAF, 1971-82

(fine metric tons)

Capacityutilization
rear Production Installedcapacity (percent)
1971 6,969 7,500 92.9
1972 6,227 7,500 83.0
1973 6,954 7,500 92.7
1974 7,092 7,500 94.6
1975a 7,430 7,500 99.1
1976 9,185 11,500 79.9
12,786 20,000 63.9
1978 16,184 20,000 80.9
1979 15,696 20,000 78.5
1980C 17,863 30,000 59.5
1981 19,860 30,000 66.2
1982 19,463 30,000 64.9
a. Operation of new capacity started at the end of 1975.
b. Operation of new capacity started inJune 1977.
c. Operation of low-grade concentrate began in April 1980.
Source:ENAF.

57
-,,
co

Table 28. Revenuesand Expendituresof ENAF, 1973-82

(US$ millions)

Revenuesand expenditures 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Currentrevenues 32.3 59.3 51.3 73.8 138.6 211.7 245.6 211.1 274.7 274.6
Sale of goods and services 32.2 58.9 51.3 73.8 138.6 211.7 245.6 211.1 274.0 273.8
Other 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.8
Currentexpenditures 38.2 61.1 54.1 76.9 139.5 216.1 242.4 314.6 269.5 316.3
Labor costs 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.9 2.8 2.9 3.1 9.0 9.7 9.1
Purchase of goods and services 36.0 58.3 51.3 66.7 126.2 200.7 226.3 288.2 244.9 237.7
Interest paymcnts 0.5 0.8 0.9 5.2 4.3 8.0 6.1 11.5 13.1 44.5
Internal debt 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.5 1.1 3.6 4.0 5.9 7.5 14.6
External debt (0.4 0.7 0.3 3.7 3.2 4.4 2.1 5.6 5.6 29.9
Other 1.2 1.0 1.2 3.1 6.2 4.5 6.9 5.9 1.8 25.0
Currentaccountsurplusor deficit(-) -5.9 -1.8 -2.8 -3.2 -0.9 -4.4 3.2 -103.5 5.2 -41.7
Capital expenditures 0.3 32.5 15.4 20.5 62.7 3.9 32.3 20.4 2.0 2.2
Overallsurplusor deficit (-) -6.2 -34.3 - 18.2 -23.7 -63.6 -8.3 -29.1 - 123.9 - 7.2 -43.9
Financing 6.2 34.3 18.2 23.7 63.6 8.3 29.1 - 123.9 7.2 43.9
External borrowing (net) 4.2 17.4 7.2 8.2 -2.2 -2.8 -9.9 17.3 -19.5 -10.2
Disbursements 4.2 17.4 8.3 9.8 - 3.1 0.3 23.5 2.9 ().0
Amortization 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -1.6 -2.2 -5.9 -10.2 -6.2 -22.4 -10.2
Domestic borrowing (net) 2.9 3.0 4.4 5.8 13.3 -2.5 -3.3 14.6 5.8 -15.8
Disbursements 4.1 4.2 5.4 6.6 15.5 1.7 4.1 17.4 7.8 -
Amortization -1.2 -1.2 -1 .0 -0.8 -2.2 -4.2 -7.4 -2.8 -2.0 -15.8
Short-term financing
and cash balances -0.9 13.9 6.6 9.7 52.5 13.6 42.3 92.0 20.9 69.9

ENAF; Central Bank of Bolivia.

Sources:
 ENAF'S high-grade smelter was designed for an ultimate annual capacity of 20,000 fine metric
tons of tin. Although production began in 1971 with initial capacity of 7,500 fine metric tons, the
electric power, buildings, and other infrastructure for 20,000 fine metric tons had already been
built. Also, there are no significant accessible coal deposits in Bolivia.6 Instead, ENAF must use
charcoal, which comes from domestic timber. From the very beginning, therefore, ENAF'S smelting
operations were costly.
Technically, the high-grade smelter has not encountered too many problems, although the
machinery has been run down prematurely because of improper maintenance and large variations
in the composition of fuel oil and other inputs. Also, an explosion in the volatilization furnace of
the smelter closed it down for more than two months in 1980-81, and caused a loss of about US$5.5
million. Finally, production of metal in the high-grade smelter had to be reduced in 1981 and 1982
because some of its units had to produce pellets. These units were required to begin operations of
the low-grade plant, because of delay in the start-up of operations of COMIBOL's La Palca
volatilization plant. The major technical problems exist in the low-grade smelter, whose capacity
utilization rate has never exceeded 30 percent. The main technical problem is in the exhaust system
of the electric furnace, where an inadequate cooling system has done severe damage. The problem
could have been avoided if tests had been carried out before the commencement of operations of
the smelter. Moreover, according to the original plans, of the total feed received by the low-grade
plant, only 29 percent would be in the form of tin oxide pellets from the volatilization plant at La
Palca. But, since COMIBOL has been using a sizable portion of its own low-grade concentrates to
convert them into pellets at La Palca (instead of supplying them to the low-grade smelter of ENAF),
the latter has had to contend with a mixture of feed which is about 50 percent pellets. This mix
has caused some problems in the reduction and refining section of the smelter, especially because
of the presence of antimony in the pellets.

Table 29. Price (c.iJf Oruro) of Major Inputs of ENAF, 1977 82

(U.S. dollars)

Inputs 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982"

Domestic
Cloth for filtration pipes (meter) 10.25 10.38 12.89 12.31 12.80 8.25
Pyrite (ton) 3.62 2.99 5.15 5.17 4.40 2.13
Sulphuric acid (ton) 94.44 99.41 99.63 243.19 368.00 1,013.50
Hydrocloric acid (ton) 618.00 642.99 678.02 742.14 905.00 812.50
Joiner's glue (ton) 0 1,200.00 1,205.95 2,159.77 2,404.80 2,966.25
Sulphur (ton) 135.50 111.37 107.84 170.65 161.60 147.38
Slack lime (ton) 74.29 93.93 110.35 128.48 145.20 103.94
Charcoal (ton) 90.60 95.75 96.96 128.50 165.60 117.75
Fuel oil (liter) 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.16
Imported
Cresilic acid (ton) 1,423.02 925.52 907.38 1,467.82 2,106.40 2,422.36
Phenol sulphonic acid (ton) 545.46 576.40 564.24 1,070.84 1,346.40 1,481.04
Sodium carbonate (ton) 229.51 229.51 375.16 410.41 471.97 519.20
Caustic soda (ton) 0 358.30 302.25 652.95 685.60 767.86
Metallic magnesium (ton) 5,315.94 5,315.94 6,722.79 4,716.49 4,848.40 4,160.00
Metallic zinc (ton) 1,233.55 1,233.55 1,456.99 1,188.90 1,124.80 1,158.50
Amorphous carbon electrodes (piece) 0 0 0 2,134.14 0 0
Graphite electrodes (piece) 82.14 116.72 124.40 125.49 128.00 142.50
Bars (AKC) (piece) 514.30 514.30 426.57 446.29 397.02 405.80
Firebrick (ton) 1,296.90 1,296.69 1,221.60 1,271.26 3,836.50 1,198.91

a. The decline in per unit costs ofdomestic inputs (in U.S. dollars) in 1982reflects the devaluation ofthe currency from US$1
= 25 pesos at the beginning of the year, to USSI = 196 pesos at the end of the year. The average exchange rate for the year was
US$1 = 80 pesos.
Source:ENAF.

59
 In various reports of ENAF, frequent reference is made to a lack of spare parts and raw materials
as a factor external to the enterprise. ENAF has frequently experienced shortages of fuel oil, charcoal,
iron and cement for construction, and sulphuric acid, for example. But, more often than not, the
lack of inputs has been a reflection of poor forward planning and administrative problems of ENAF
rather than of the physical absence in the country of those parts and materials. The problem
has been aggravated by excessively stringent and time-consuming procedures for bidding and
procurement to which ENAF and other public agencies are subjected.
Another complaint generally heard in ENAF is the large increase in the prices of raw materials,
both domestic and imported. Nevertheless, Table 29 demonstrates that only some of the materials
have encountered significant increases (in U.S. dollar terms) in per unit costs of, say, more than 50
percent over the five-year period 1977-82. These include sulphuric acid, joiner's glue for woodwork,
fuel oil (all domestic inputs), cresilic acid, phenol sulphonic acid, sodium carbonate, caustic soda
and graphite electrodes (all imported). Increases in prices of inputs have not been a significant
factor in the deterioration of ENAF'S performance.
Labor costs, by constrast, rose much more rapidly. In 1978 ENAF had a wage bill of approximately
US$3.9 million for a labor force of about 1,400 employees in tin smelting. By 1981, after the
initiation of operations of the low-grade smelter, the wage bill had increased to more than US$8.6
million for 1,804 employees.7 This implies that the average wage had increased by more than 70
percent in a period of three years.
From the very beginning ENAF has had to contend with a heavy debt burden. At the end of 1982
its external debt still outstanding amounted to about US$25.5 million, and domestic debt
outstanding amounted to US$118 million (see Tables 30 and 31). Payments on these loans are a

Table 30. External Debt of ENAF

(US$ millions)

Original Amount outstanding Payments due in 1983

Lender amount end 1980 end 1982 Interest Amortization Total

High-gradetin smelter
Government of Denmark 1.136 0.915 0.757 0 0.063 0.063
Andean Development Corporation 2.208 1.528 1.052 0.081 0.271 0.352
Kreditanstalt Fur Wiederaufbau 15.275 15.274 0 0.763 0 0.763
Deutsche Sudamerikanische 4.200 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 22.819 17.717 1.809 0.844 0.334 1.178
Low-grade tin smelter
Andean Development Corporation 4.500 4.158 3.377 0.296 0.446 0.742
Paul Bergsoe & Sons 4.160 3.813 2.080 1.135 0.693 0.828
Kreditanstalt Fur Wiederaufbau 10.452 9.837 7.378 0.548 1.230 1.778
Bank of America 4.000 4.000 3.273 0.553 0.800 1.353
Compagnie Luxembourgoise 22.239 16.220 5.167 0.579 2.067 2.646
Energomachexport 1.104 1.104 0.782 0.032 0.313 0.345
Machinexport 0.538 0.538 0.213 0.007 0.105 0.112
Licanzitorg 0.130 0.130 0.011 0.002 0.011 0.013
Subtotal 47.123 39.800 22.281 2.152 5.665 7.817
Antimony smelter
Skodaexport 9.253 3.048 1.360 0.076 0.871 0.947
Subtotal 9.253 3.048 1.360 0.076 0.871 0.947
Total 79.195 60.565 25.450 3.072 6.870 9.942
a. Not included is a US$0.250 million loan from Davy Powergas for a fertilizer study, ofwhich the amount outstanding at the
end of 1982 was USS0.007 millioti.
Sources: Central Bank of Bolivia; ENAF.

60
Table 3 1. DomesticDebt of ENAF
(USS millions)

Original Amountoutstanding Paymentsdue in 1983

Lender amount end 1980 end 1982 Interest Amortization Total
Central Bank 128.815 55.443 118.070 10.628 1.195 11.823
Low-grade tin smelter 6.576 3.587 2.391 0.127 1.195 1.322
High-grade tin smelter 5.456 1.559 0.679 0.151 0 0.151
Antimony smelter 1.783 0.297 0 0 0 0
Revolving fund 115.000 50.000 115.000 10.350 0 10.350
INALPRE 0.280 0.280 0.170 0.011 0.089 0.100
Total 129.095 55.723 118.240 10.639 1.284 11.923

Sources: Central Bank of Bolivia: ENAF.

significant factor in ENAF'S problems: in 1983, for example, the company had to pay about US$22
million in interest and amortization (foreign and domestic) payments.
Other factors have also aggravated the financial performance of ENAF. Strikes and work stoppages
have been all too frequent, in some cases resulting in heavy losses in production. There is also an
excess of labor, and managers in the company interviewed felt that ENAF could possibly produce
more with half the present labor force. At the managerial level, ENAF suffers from the same syndrome
that affects most public institutions in Bolivia, lack of continuity of senior staff. In the four-year
period 1979-83, ENAF has had nine general managers. With such a short tenure, managers clearly
cannot plan and schedule crucial activities seriously and are reluctant to make important decisions.
ENAF also has encountered problems in the delivery of concentrates because of the production
problems of COMIBOL. Other problems include the robbery of tin ingots, long delays in the shipment
of the metal from the ports, and the failure of ENAF to obtain the best possible prices for the final
product. 8
Legally, COMIBOL and the private sector are constrained to sell all their concentrates to ENAF, and
can export directly abroad only if the latter cannot smelt the concentrates. Smelting and other
handling charges of ENAF are theoretically geared to fees charged by foreign smelters (Capper Pass
in Britain for low-grade concentrates and Texas City in the United States for high-grade
concentrates). When a producer sells to ENAF, therefore, the smelting and other charges are
equivalent to charges abroad, plus nearly all of the transport cost savings from exporting metals
instead of concentrates. But, as a result of the monopsonistic position of ENAF, with its concomitant
inefficiencies, the smelting and other charges of ENAF have been, in practice, somewhat higher than
those of foreign smelters, particularly since 1979. For illustrative purposes, two actual contracts for
exactly the same concentrates for 1979 and 1983 are provided in Appendix E.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Bolivian producers of concentrates, both in the public and
private sectors, are unanimous in their preference to export concentrates rather than to sell to ENAF.
The treatment charges and penalties for impurities of ENAF are generally higher. The payment terms
given by ENAF are unfavorable: COMIsoL and private companies are paid 80 percent of the value of
the concentrates fifteen days after delivery and are charged interest on this amount until full
payment about four months later. Moreover, since producers of concentrates began to sell to ENAF,
they have lost access to invaluable foreign lines of credit from metal buyers.
One idea that has been discussed for some time in Bolivia, and which merits attention, is that of
converting ENAF'S operations into a "toll" system, whereby ENAF would charge the producers a fee
for smelting and refining, but the ownership of the mineral would remain with the producers. This
would ensure that, by concentrating solely on smelting and refining activities, ENAF'S working
capital requirements would be reduced. Its specialization in more limited activities would raise
efficiency, and the producers would regain access to foreign credits.

61
Notes
1. Margaret A. Marsh, The Bankers in Bolivia: A Study in American ForeignInvestment (New York: AMS Press, 1970).
2. The decrees which set up ENAF forbade the construction of new private smelters, but allowed the operations of
those already established.
3. For a discussion of some of these problems, see Appendix D.
4. The main metal traders involved in Bolivian tin sales are Berisford Metals (Bolivia) Ltd., Marc Rich (Alpe), Philip
Brothers, and Metall-Chemie. About a dozen others are involved in other metals and minerals.
5. Since 1976 ENAF also has in operation an antimony smelter, but this is not discussed here.
6. An anthracite type of coal deposit exists near Copacabana on Lake Titicaca, and less known indications of coal
exist in the department of Cochabamba. These deposits, however, do not appear industrially exploitable at present.
7. Data for the antimony smelter are not included.
8. Under the present system, ENAF receives the lowest London Metal Exchange price quotation during a period of
fifteen days before arrival of the metal at the port of destination and fifteen days after arrival. Also, ENAF'S marketing
outlets are inadequate, and the company ends up paying unnecessary agency fees.

62
 CHAPTER 7

Issues and Policies Related

to Bolivian Mining Taxation

There are no fewer than twenty main types of taxes and more than thirty low-yield "earmarked"
levies that affect the mining sector in Bolivia. For all practical purposes, the major mining taxes
are assessed on gross value of exports and are considered equivalent to output taxes by the mining
enterprises. Until March 1980 the two principal mineral taxes, accounting for 90 percent of mining
tax revenues, were the regalia and the export tax. '
The regalia is a tax on "presumed income," which is the difference between world mineral prices
in a specified market (namely the London Metal Exchange) and a presumed cost set by the
government. The regalia is expressed in terms of taxes due for each "commercial unit" of the
mineral in question. For such minerals as tin, copper, lead, and zinc, the commercial unit is the
"fine pound" (librafina). This is intended to represent the actual metallic content for each unit of
the concentrate of metal exported. For other metals, such as antimony and wolfram, the commercial
unit is the "long unit" (unidad larga) or 22.4 pounds of metallic content. The levels of presumed
costs have been changed very infrequently in the past.
The export tax was imposed in October 1972 as a temporary levy to capture some of the windfall
gains resulting from the devaluation in that year. Like many "emergency" fiscal measures elsewhere
in the world, it remained an important fixture in the revenue structure until it was abolished in
March 1980. Initially, the tax was 20 percent of net export values, but in October 1973 it was
converted (primarily for administrative reasons) to a levy on gross values, and the nominal general
rate was reduced to 7.5 percent or less on most mineral exports.

Drawbacks of the Present System

Overall, the level of mineral taxation in Bolivia has been one of the highest among the major
tin-exporting countries. As can be seen from Table 32, the average joint burden of the regalia and
the export tax has been equivalent to about 37 percent of gross tin revenues over the period 1970-81.
In addition, the structure of mining taxation in Bolivia has suffered from a number of serious
drawbacks. First, the tax structure has adversely affected incentives for efficiency, exploration, and
concentration, since the system has made the processing of low-grade ore unprofitable. It has led
to inefficient use of concentrators because the taxes are based on the concentrates actually produced,
not on the ore taken from the mine. Second, the tax regime has served to dampen incentives for
both exploration and development because it does not take into account interenterprise cost
variances of any kind, including exploration costs. Under the existing system, a mine that spends
large sums on exploration and development pays the same taxes as a mine that spends none. The
exploration incentive is further dampened by the low rates of land taxes (patentes) since it is
profitable for individuals to hold large tracts of potentially rich land as unexploited reserves.
In March 1980 the government adopted several changes in mining taxation. The main features
of the reform were (1) the elimination of the ad valorem export tax; (2) the updating of the
presumed cost; and (3) the adoption of an adjustment mechanism that would allow for a more

63
Table 32. EffectiveRates of Regalia and Export Taxesfor Tin, 1970- 81
Tax 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Regalia payments (US$ millions) 50.3 23.1 30.6 42.2 85.8 61.2 71.5 103.0 118.9 139.5 117.5 93.3
Export tax paymcnts (US$ millions) 0.0 0.0 7.7 15.8 24.0 16.4 16.3 18.8 26.6 22.3 1.3 0.0
Gross tin revenues (US$ millions) 102.0 105.9 113.5 131.0 230.1 180.0 228.1 328.8 373.7 395.6 378.1 343.1
Effective regalia rate (percent) 49.3 21.8 27.0 32.2 37.3 34.0 31.3 31.3 31.8 35.3 31.1 27.2
Effective export tax rate (percent) 0.0 0.0 6.8 12.1 10.4 9.1 7.1 5.7 7.1 5.6 0.3 0.0
Combined effect of both (percent) 49.3 21.8 33.8 44.4 47.7 40.1 38.4 37.0 38.9 40.9 31.4 27.2
Memorandumilems
Presumcdcost(US$/lb)a 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.5() 1.50 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 3.63 3.93
Average price of tin (US$/lb) 1.68 1.58 1.69 2.11 3.60 3.11 3.40 4.78 5.72 6.77 7.61 6.39
a. Changes in the presumed cost occurred in February 1974, January 1976, April 1980, andJanuary 1981.
Sources:Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy; Ministry of Finarice.
realistic (and more frequently adjusted) deduction of presumed costs from the taxable base. Under
this system, the presumed costs would be updated in line with the floor price of the International
Tin Council (ITC).
While the mining tax reform reduced the tax burden on the sector (the sector paid about US$30
million less in taxes than it would have paid without these measures) and while the principle of
frequent adjustments of presumed costs was accepted, the major structural defects of the system
remain. Moreover, the use of changes in the floor price of the ITC is less than satisfactory because
that index is heavily influenced by changes in mining costs in Malaysia, the least-cost producer,
and, as such, it would only be a matter of time before movements of actual mining costs in Bolivia
would diverge from the movements of the ITC floor price.

Alternatives for Mineral Tax Reform

The present mining tax system in Bolivia is in need of reform to encourage more efficient and
rational use of the existing capacity in the mining sector. A change in the tax structure would also
encourage investment in the sector. Three major constraints, however, limit the range of feasible
alternatives:
* The administrative machinery in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Mining and
Metallurgy is not adequate to implement immediately a highly ambitious once-and-for-all
reform of mining taxes.
* The management and accounting infrastructure in the mining sector itself is not at present
adequate to allow full compliance with the provisions of sophisticated mining tax legislation.
* Related to the administrative-compliance constraints above, and arising from the heavy
governmental dependence on mineral taxes as a source of revenue, is the fear of significant
loss of revenues in switching to a proportional income tax. Furthermore, the magnitude of
such a loss under a pure income tax is virtually impossible to predict with any degree of
precision.
Because of these constraints, there appear to be two basic alternatives for reform of mining taxation.
The first is a true income or profits tax, which would clearly be superior in terms of improving
efficiency and encouraging investment (domestic as well as foreign). The second alternative is an
indexed regalia tax under which changes in presumed costs would be made in line with actual
change in input costs. Such a tax would be superior on revenue grounds, at least in the short to
medium term, and could be implemented quickly. It would also contribute to efficient use of existing
capacity and would facilitate the expansion of investment in the sector (although to a much lesser
extent than a true income tax).
A true income tax in the mining sector, therefore, represents the ideal toward which mining
taxation in Bolivia should evolve. But, successful implementation of income taxation would require
a more advanced tax administration and compliance infrastructure than is now present in Bolivia.
A premature and hurried effort to install a true income tax on the mining sector might be worse
than none at all. The country has already had one brief and unsatisfactory experience (1952-57)
because of hasty implementation of net income taxes on mining. A carefully designed technical
assistance program can succeed in creating, in rapid order, the kind of tax administration machinery
capable of meeting the heavy demands inherent in the operation of income taxation of mining
activities. But the caliber of the tax administration is only one side of the coin of effective taxation
of mining profits. The compliance capacities of the principal mining enterprises must be considered
as well. A comprehensive report on mining accounting was prepared in 1981 by the Canadian firm
Woods Gordon(for the Canadian International Development Agency). It is generally agreed that
about six private medium-size mining companies are in a position to implement the Woods Gordon
system.

65
 For these reasons it would be more appropriate to adopt indexation of presumed costs first and
then shift to income taxation once the administration and compliance infrastructure is in place.
The principal features of the mining cost indexation system are:
* Standard mining costs for each mineral in the base period are calculated for each type of
mine: COMIBOL, medium mines, small mines, and cooperatives.
* The standard mining cost is adjusted every six months, say, January and July, according to
a Bolivian mining cost index.
* One national index is applied to adjust all standard mining costs through time.
* The cost index is a simple calculation dependent upon the Bolivian mining cost structure for
its weights and inflation rates of main cost elements in Bolivian mining.
* The weights of the index are calculated every three years.
* The tax is determined as a percentage of the difference between the official price minus the
actual nonmining costs, and the adjusted standard mining costs.
The automatic indexation system represents an improvement over the present mining taxation
policies in five main ways. First, the semiannual revision of the standard mining cost by a Bolivian
adjustment factor is bound to keep the presumptive cost in line with real mining costs. Second, the
system will be sensitive to inflation rates and price increases and, therefore, will automatically adjust
the tax burden accordingly, and reduce the burden of inflation on the mining sector. Third, it will
reduce the disincentives on low-grade ore production by eliminating the nonmining costs from the
tax calculation. Fourth, it will create a more stable environment for the mining enterprise with less
risk of paying taxes of more than 100 percent of income. And fifth, immediately following a
devaluation, while export taxes need to supplement the regalia under the present system, the
proposed system will automatically increase the tax burden without the need for an extra tax on
windfall profits.
The indexation system still leaves much to be desired. It does little to differentiate between
variations in mining costs among enterprises, as would a pure income tax. It gives little incentive
to investment in maintenance and repair, capacity expansion, or exploration and development. It
does not fully exploit rents during periods of high mineral prices as would a graduated progressive
tax system. It still presents disincentives for the mining of certain minerals because it does not change
the arbitrariness of the tax rates on the different minerals. It should, therefore, be considered an
interim measure.

Note
1. For a comprehensive discussion of mining taxation in Bolivia, see Malcolm Gillis and others, Taxation and Mining:
Nonfuel Minerals in Bolivia and Other Countries(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978). This chapter draws
on information from that publication.

66
 CHAPTER 8
Prospects for Tin Mining
in Bolivia

The future of tin mining and metallurgical activities in Bolivia depends on two separate but related
sets of factors: international market prospects for tin and domestic performance and policies in the
tin sector of Bolivia. The first set of factors-medium- and long-term international prospects for
tin-is one over which Bolivia can exercise little control, except through its indirect influence in
the International Tin Council (ITC) and possibly through its role in the fledgling Association of
Tin-Producing Countries. ' By contrast, Bolivia has substantial control over domestic factors,
namely the government's objectives for the sector, plans for the rehabilitation of the nationalized
sector (especially for improved operational efficiency and more productive investments), exchange
rate and tax policies, and credit availability.

International Market Prospects

The short-run prospects for tin are expected to be influenced primarily by the accumulated stocks
which are at unprecedentedly high levels. The gap between global production and consumption of
tin began to increase after 1978 (see Table 33 and Figure 7). In mid-1983, the London Metal

Table 33. Tin Stocks

(metric tons)

rear Tin metal Tin concentrates Total

1965 44,700 10,000 55,494
1966 41,600 15,600 58,532
1967 45,500 12,430 66,435
1968 55,400 13,770 91,177
1969 42,100 11,210 62,379
1970 36,200 13,882 53,444
1971 39,200 10,600 63,496
1972 41,700 9,100 70,129
1973 38,200 12,200 53,981
1974 40,000 10,300 52,632
1975 43,500 15,700 86,496
1976 38,700 7,800 52,656
1977 35,900 8,400 48,385
1978 33,700 3,900 45,185
1979 28,000 11,200 40,940
1980 33,800 10,200 47,920
1981 42,100 9,300 70,135
1982 65,400 19,358 84,758
1983, 69,815 18,293 88,100
a. Preliminary.
Source:International 'Iin Council, Tin Statistics,various issucs.

67
Figure 7. World Productionand Consumptionof Tin, 1965-82

220

200

-4 180
60 /'
_- -/% \s

160 00
1965 90 %9017
18
-Production

…Consumption

140 I1 I I I t i iI I I I I I I
1965 1970 1975 1980 1982

Note:Primary tin only. As for China and U.S.S.R., only exports and imports, instead of production
and consumption, are included.
Source:International Tin Council, Tin Statistics,various issues.

Exchange had approximately 43,000 tons of tin metal in its warehouses. Moreover, because of the
export controls exercised by the ITC since mid-1982, tin-exporting countries and traders have
accumulated about 27,000 tons of tin metal and 18,000 tons of tin concentrates. As a result, the
current stock level of about 88,000 tons is roughly 55 percent higher than the average during the
1970s.2
Under these circumstances, there will probably be persistent pressure on tin prices in the short
term. The producing countries can be expected to react to this situation by cutting production,
and, as in the past, this production cut will be effected through maintenance of the present shares
of producing countries, rather than through outright ouster of the marginal producers. But the
possibility cannot be ruled out that the ITC system will lose control over markets. In such an
eventuality, the high-cost producers, such as Bolivia, will suffer most.
The demand for tin in the medium and long term will be affected to a large extent by the degree
of substitution from other materials, especially from aluminum and plastics. Because of its favorable
physical and chemical properties, such as extraordinary malleability, resistance to corrosion,
lightness, nontoxity, easy conductivity, and antifriction qualities, tin has had a wide variety of uses
over centuries. But the rate of growth of world tin consumption between 1930 and 1980 averaged
only about 0.5 percent a year lower than both its historical growth rate (tin consumption
increased between 1.5 percent and 3.2 percent a year between 1800 and 1930) and the growth rate

68
Table 34. Growth Rates of World Metal Consumption,1961-80
(annual percent)

Metal 1961-70 1970-80 1961-80

Tin 0.8 -0.3 0.3
Aluminum 9.8 4.6 7.1
Copper 4.0 2.9 3.4
Lead 4.0 2.5 3.4
Zinc 6.0 1.9 3.5
Steel 5.9 2.0 3.9

NVote: Growth rates indicate least-squares trend.

Source: The World Bank.

of consumption for other metals (see Table 34). Interestingly enough, however, the price of tin
increased almost consistently in relation to the price of other important metals (see Table 35). Over
the past two decades tin has been the only major metal whose price has increased in real terms.
This increase in the relative price of tin, particularly with respect to aluminum, is bound to have
a far-reaching effect on demand for tin in the future. In fact, the use of tin for tinplate production,
which constitutes the largest percentage share of tin consumption (see Table 36), has declined over
the past decade; this has been partly due to substitution of aluminum and plastics for tin in can
production, and partly due to technological advances in electrolytic processes, which have reduced
the use of tin per square meter of tinplate. Tin for soldering is its second largest use, particularly
in automobile radiators, in plumbing, and, most important, in electronic and domestic electrical

Table 35. Price of Tin in Relation to Other Metals, 1800-1982

Period Aluminum Copper Lead Zinc
1800a n.a. 0.7 5.2 n.a.
1850a n.a. 1.0 4.9 5.2
9gooa 0.8 1.0 8.7 6.2
1930a 1.7 2.4 8.6 8.7
1950-54 6.2 3.7 7.2 7.2
1955-59 4.2 3.0 8.2 9.1
1960-64 5.1 3.7 13.2 11.0
1965-69 6.3 2.6 12.9 12.2
1970-74 6.8 3.2 12.8 7.8
1975-79 10.4 7.3 16.0 15.9
1980-82 10.6 8.2 20.7 17.4

NVote: The price of the metal with which tin is compared is set at 1.0.
n.a. Not available.
a. Based on three-year averages.
Sources: For the period 1800-1930, C.J. Schmitz, World Von-Ferrous
Metal Production and Prices, 1700-1976; for other years, the
WVorldBank.

Table 36. PercentageShare and Annual Growth Rate of Consumptionof Tin Products,1963-81
Percentageshare Annualgrowth rate (percent)
Product 1963 1981 1963-69 1970-81 1963-81
Tinplate 40.2 35.4 -0.6 -2.6 -1.6
Tinning 4.5 4.6 -3.6 -1 .4 - 1.1
Solder 19.6 26.8 -1.2 -0.9 0.5
White metal, babbitt, and
antifriction metal 7.7 8.7 -0.4 -1 .0 0.6
Bronze and brass 14.3 7.5 - 13.5 -2.4 -4.1
Other 13.7 17.0 - 10.0 2.1 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 -3.4 -1.3 -0.7

NVote: Includes United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland,
Austria, Japan, Australia, India, and Brazil.

69
goods. Although demand for tin for soldering has registered a gradual increase, and the electronics
industry has shown a rapid growth rate, the tendency toward miniaturization of electronic products
has reduced the use of tin for soldering. Perhaps the brightest prospects for tin are in its "other"
uses, mainly new uses such as the production of chemical cans.
Within this context of low growth in the demand for tin, two scenarios are conceivable for the
long term. In the first scenario, the current large tin producers are assumed to continue their
control, however feeble, over the world markets. It is assumed that the intervention of the ITC, and
probably of the Association of Tin-Producing Countries, will raise the level of tin prices to cover
the production costs of present producers. There is evidence that by the late 1980s a number of
on-shore, low-cost mines in Southeast Asia will have been depleted, and future operations may have
to move to deeper seabeds. There is likely, therefore, to be strong pressure to retain the historical
trend of real price increases, once the current problem of pending stock has been resolved. In such
an eventuality, substitution will continue in all those activities, such as canning, where such
possibilities exist.
The second scenario is one in which the control over world tin markets of the present producers
is loosened gradually by the emergence of new producers. Brazil appears to be the most effective
newcomer. In the early 1970s Brazil produced only 2,000 tons of tin a year; by 1981 its production
had increased to 8,000 tons. At the present rate of increase, Brazil may well overtake Bolivia by
the late 19 80s. If Brazil's expansion stimulates present producers to increase production and to
reduce prices, the most likely result could be the ousting of high-cost producers.

Domestic Considerations

Short-term prospects for increased output and improved productivity in Bolivian tin mining are
not bright. Past neglect of exploration and mine development, the chaotic state of COMIBOL, the
unresolved situation of workers' participation in the nationalized sector, lack of credit, as well as
the present system of exchange rates, which discourages all exporting activities including mining,
are some of the factors which could prevent a recovery of tin production from its estimated 1983
60
level of about 22,000 tons-the lowest level since the late 1950s and early 19 s.
A move to a more realistic exchange rate (and its maintenance thereafter), the adoption of a
system of mining taxation that provides more incentives for investment, and greater access to foreign
credits would ensure the recovery of the more dynamic medium-size mining sector from its present
problems. Once a proper policy mix is in place, no other major constraints exist for the medium-size
mining sector to increase capacity utilization from its present level of about 75 percent. Prospects
for increased production are reasonably bright for the private mines of Milluni and Chojlla.
The problems of COMIBOL, however, are somewhat more intractable, and policy changes alone
would not be sufficient to increase its productivity in the short run. The immediate years ahead
should, therefore, be used to introduce the organizational, financial, and administrative changes
mentioned in Chapter 5 to put COMIBOL on a sounder financial footing.
Even with a successful rehabilitation program for COMIBOL and with improved international
prospects for tin, the problems of public sector tin mining in Bolivia can be expected to persist for
a number of years. There are, however, some reasonably attractive projects in tailings treatment,
especially at Catavi, Colquiri, Huanuni, and San Miguel. There are also possibilities in the
Cordillera de Tres Cruces, La Meseta de Morococala, and the region of Tasna-Chorolque,
provided exploration and mine development efforts are intensified. Another important project is
the development of the Bolivar mine. But, at least in the first few years, increased production as a
result of these new investments will almost completely be annulled by declining output of those
mines where deposits have been progressively exhausted.
In short, even under the most optimistic scenario, prospects for tin mining in Bolivia appear dim,
particularly in the public sector. Until the tin potential of the Bolivian lowlands is better assessed,

70
it may be premature to suggest that the days of tin mining in that country are over. But there is
little doubt that the most that can be done during the next several years is to maintain Bolivia's tin
production at the present level. Meanwhile, an effort should be made to diversify gradually into
other metals such as gold, silver, and zinc. On a macroeconomic basis, the share of overall mining
activities in GDP can also be expected to decline as the hydrocarbons, agriculture, and agroindustrial
sectors benefit from the trend toward diversification.

Notes
1. Bolivia has not signed the current (sixth; International Tin Agreement, which came into effect in June 1982.
Nevetheless, it is a member of the Association of Tin-Producing Countries. The other members of this association are
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Zaire, and Nigeria.
2. In addition, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) has approval for sales of 34,000 tons fronm its buffer
stock. The recent agreement between the U.S. and Asian tin producers, however, limits annual sales to 3,000 tons.

71
 APPENDIX A

List of Bolivian Mining Companies

Included in the Survey

Medium-Size Mining Sector

Of the fifteen medium-size mining companies that produce tin, twelve were included in the
survey. Two of them were not included because of difficulties of disaggregating their data for tin
operations alone, and one of them had incomplete information. Of the twelve, the following ten
produce only tin: Estalsa, Avicaya, Barrosquira, Cerro Grande, Suka, Soteca, Pabon, Orlandini,
Atoroma, Somar, and Leque Chico. The remaining two produce other minerals in addition to tin.
These are International Mining and Yana Mallcu.

COMIBOL
Of the fifteen main mining enterprises of COMIBOL, thirteen were included in the survey. The two
excluded, Corocoro and Matilde, do not produce any tin. Of the thirteen, three (Catavi, Huanuni,
and Santa Fe) produce only tin. The remaining ten produce tin in conjunction with other minerals.
These are Quechisla, Colquiri, Unificada, San Jose, Caracoles, Viloco, Bolivar,Kami, BolsaNegra,
and Colquechaca. The proportion of tin in total mineral production varies considerably among
these enterprises, ranging from about 95 percent for Colquiri and Caracoles to only about 5 percent
for Kami and Bolivar.

72
 APPENDIX B

AggregatedSample Datafor The Bolivian Tin-Mining Sector,1980-81

(US$)

Medium mining COMIBOL Total sector

Costs 1980 1981 1980 1981 1980 1981
Total labor costs 12,279,657 13,142,713 57,855,351 75,715,348 70,135,008 88,858,061
Direct labor costs 9,432,036 8,031,337 26,708,311 28,533,561 36,140,347 36,564,898
Indirect labor costs 2,847,621 5,111,376 31,147,040 47,181,787 33,994,661 52,293,163
Family subsidies 233,456 10,854 1,202,025 2,183,857 1,435,481 2,194,711
Social expenses 1,429,486 3,389,026 14,259,601 18,644,632 15,689,087 22,033,658
Indemnifications 1,184,679 1,293,652 4,128,853 6,783,237 5,313,532 8,076,889
Perdidapulperias 0 417,844 11,556,561 19,570,061 11,556,561 19,987,905
Total material costs 4,866,013 5,886,045 20,346,032 25,391,746 25,212,045 31,277,791
Domestic material
costs 1,229,305 1,391,901 4,218,144 5,119,274 5,337,449 6,511,175
Foreign material costs 3,746,708 4,494,144 16,127,888 20,272,472 19,874,596 24,766,616
Total energy costs 2,032,497 3,431,386 6,755,279 12,813,844 8,787,776 16,245,230
Electricity costs 1,492,523 2,211,417 4,605,279 9,533,883 6,097,802 11,745,300
Petroleum product
costs 539,974 1,219,969 2,150,000 3,279,961 2,689,974 4,499,930
Transport costs 1,748,571 1,165,185 5,669,402 8,861,250 7,417,973 10,026,435
Smelting costs 12,699,015 13,477,447 40,749,273 44,142,837 53,448,288 57,620,284
Other costs 8,633,501 6,861,058 9,048,159 12,249,011 17,681,660 19,110,069
Depreciation expenses 3,539,940 2,917,588 4,779,084 5,629,541 8,391,024 8,547,129
Financial costs 4,087,899 4,214,994 12,294,523 16,021,891 16,382,422 20,236,885
Total costs before taxes 49,887,093 51,096,416 157,497,103 200,825,468 207,384,196 251,921,884
Taxes 18,085,068 13,461,464 57,483,176 33,699,030 75,568,244 47,160,494
Regalias 16,819,409 12,811,431 55,348,612 33,699,030 72,168,021 46,510,461
Export and other taxes 1,265,659 650,033 2,134,564 0 3,400,223 650,033
Total costs 67,972,161 64,557,880 214,980,279 234,524,498 282,952,440 299,082,378
Gross tin sales 71,239,917 62,526,532 236,876,704 215,931,230 308,116,621 278,457,762
Sales to ENAF 59,860,166 53,359,259 202,518,632 202,044,959 262,378,798 255,404,218
Sales abroad 11,379,751 9,167,273 34,358,072 13,886,271 45,737,823 23,053,544

73
 APPENDIX C

Alternative Legal and Contractual Agreements

for Mineral Development

An important consideration for a developing country and its mineral agencies is the legal and
contractual arrangement selected for the development of specificmining projects. In principle, there
is a wide spectrum of choices, with varying degrees of foreign participation. The purpose of this
appendix is to describe the various alternatives available and to outline their advantages and
disadvantages. Clearly, the ultimate choice will depend on factors such as political acceptability,
the quality of domestic technical expertise, the profitability of the project, the stage of development
of the mining deposit and the interest of foreign companies in participating in the project.
The main alternatives available, with increasing degree of foreign participation, are:
1. Unpackaged input from foreign sources, financed externally
2. Packaged input from foreign sources, financed externally-the turnkey approach
3. Cooperation with foreigncompanies on the basis of nonequity forms of risk-sharing and benefit
sharing-the "association contract"
4. Cooperation with foreign companies on the basis of formal, equity-based corporate joint
ventures
5. Divestiture by sales or competitive bidding to private (foreign or domestic) companies as
holders of mining rights.

Unpackaged Purchase of Equipment and Services

The underlying assumption of this arrangement is that the domestic company will be responsible
for the execution of the project. It will have to be purchaser and general contractor and coordinate
individual purchase contracts. Foreign companies would only supply individual components of the
project.
The advantage of this type of contract is that it places the onus of execution on the domestic
company and provides, at least in principle, the opportunity for self-reliance. It also reduces the
negative aspects of multinational corporations such as the misuse of transfer pricing, overpricing,
and captive mine projects. The disadvantage of this type of agreement, however, is that it requires
substantial coordination from the domestic company, without whichithe project may encounter
long delays.

Packaged Purchase: the Turnkey Approach

Under this arrangement, packages of technology and equipment are purchased in the form
of a turnkey contract (often complemented by postoperational technical assistance and even
management obligations). A general contractor assumes the obligation to execute the project until
production commences. The amount paid to the contractor generally includes the price of the
separate components plus special fees as compensation for the general coordination and risk
associated with completion and performance guarantees. Since the successful completion of a
Note:'I'his appendix is based on Thomas Walde, "Mission Rcport on Bolivia," prepared for the U.N. Department
of Technical Cooperation for Development (New York: March 1982), processed.

74
project under this arrangement depends largely on the quality of the selected contractor, serious
attention should be given to choosing an appropriate contractor.
Several advantages exist in the use of turnkey arrangements. There is generally a greater
assurance that the project will be completed on schedule. Experienced contractors can economize
on costs from their knowledge of markets and their well-developed procurement systems. External
financing will usually be more forthcoming than under the first alternative, because of the
completion guarantees provided by, as well as the confidence in the technical capabilities of, the
contractor. The main disadvantage is the higher price, which can be cut if the domestic company
can undertake more coordination, as under the first alternative.

Association Contract: Project Cooperation with Shared Risks, Benefits,

and Management on a Nonequity Basis
This arrangement provides for sharing of risks, benefits, and management without an explicit
equity joint venture. The contract of association (also referred to as the "contract of mineral
development cooperation" and "service-risk contract") has heen employed effectively by Colombia
in its dealings with large multinational companies. In Colombia, as in many other developing
countries, constitutional and political exigencies made it more convenient to organize cooperation
on a purely contractual basis, without giving the foreign partner any share in the mineral rights.
Under this arrangement, both parties contribute services in developing the mine and in managing
the project. The national partner generally retains the supervisory and policymaking powers,
whereas the foreign partner acts as a technical manager or adviser. Organizationally, there is
typically a joint executive committee in which the state company has the majority but, important
decisions require unanimity. Day-to-day management is left to the foreign partner, subject to the
overall supervision of the domestic partner. Financially, a joint account is set up to which both
parties contribute: the national company contributes generally through its mining rights and
previous studies done, and the foreign partner contributes in cash or in kind. Should the project
need greater capital contributions than available in the account, the foreign partner is obligated
to advance funds (mostly as loans) on appropriate terms.
Once the project starts earning revenues, net proceeds are used first to repay loans and then to
repay advances by the foreign partner. The remainder is split according to a contractually
agreed percentage (say, 51:49 percent). Such revenue-sharing can be arranged on the basis of
production-sharing. Provision can also be made to phase-out the foreign partner as national
technical capabilities grow. For example, after a several years, the roles of technical manager or
financial controller may revert to locals.
The association contract has several appealing features. Because mining rights are retained by
the national company and no formalized corporate joint venture structure is established, there
is less cause for political outcry. For the foreign partner, the system of revenue-sharing or
production-sharing can be considerably attractive, particularly if it is linked to long-term supply
contracts and rights of first refusal. National control is maintained through majority on the joint
committees, while the foreign partner's concern for sound business management is taken into
account through autonomy in day-to-day operations. Also, the phase-out provisions allow the
national company to assume gradually full control over management. Foreign commercial banks
will be more eager to provide finiancing to the extent that they trust the foreign partner's
management capabilities. More important, these provisions force the foreign company to get more
involved in the project. Under arrangements one and two (unpackaged purchase of equipment and
services, and turnkey operations), the interest of the foreign supplier terminates with the completion
of the project contract. In the case of association contracts (and the equity investment types
discussed later), the foreign company's remuneration is based on profits. The ultimate success of
the project (in terms of completion and production on schedule, economic and high-quality

75
procurement, and effective training and management) is at the core of the foreign partner's
interests. But because the involvement of the foreign partner is more intense than under the two
previous schemes, it is more prone to political opposition.

Joint Equity Ventures

Joint equity ventures are used frequently in many developing countries where access to foreign
capital, technology, managerial ability, and markets is an important consideration. It is also
employed in some socialistcountries such as China, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.Under this
arrangement,a jointly ownedcompanyis set up. Sharesof ownershipor equitycan change.The
ownershipratio (50:50,49:51,75:25)is by no meansindicativeof the real divisionofbenefitsand
control; ownershipdistribution can be circumventedby management contracts, management
prerogatives,and ruleson the compositionof the board of directors.It is similarto the contractof
association,but, whereas the contract of associationuses contractual provisionsto set up a
cooperativerelationship,the formaljoint venturefunctionsunder corporatelaw.
The equityof the joint ventureis contributedin cash or kind by the shareholders.Frequently,
provisionis made for governmentto contributein the form of miningrights or profitableprojects
at the feasibilitystage.The strategyshouldbe to strikethe right balancebetweenthe government's
desireto maximizeits participationand the foreigninvestors'desirefor a reasonablerate of return
on equity.
The organizational structure consistsbasically of the board of directors and the chief executive
officers.The compositionof the board normallyreflectsthe distributionof equity capital. There
have been instances,however,in which foreignpartners have acceptedgovernmentmajorityon
the board even with government equity of only 25 percent.
A joint venture can be made more attractiveif the foreigninvestoris able to obtain tax credit
in his homecountryfor taxespaid in the developingcountry.Often his rate of return calculations
are greatlyinfluenced-at no costto the developingcountry -if someof hisfinancialcontributions
are so formulatedthat foreigntax authoritiesconsiderthem as taxesand allowtax credit.
Joint ventureshaveall the advantagesofthe associationcontract.In addition,externalfinancing
is generallyeven easier to arrange. Nevertheless,it may well be less acceptablepoliticallyin a
numberof countries.
Private Direct Investment
Fully privately owned investment to develop mines is an important option available to
governments.It consistsessentiallyof saleof depositsto private owners,whodevelopthe projects.
The governmentobtainsrevenuesfrom the saleof mining rights and from taxesor other levies
agreed upon.
A well-chosenprivate investorwill generallybe highly interestedin the project'ssuccess,and
noninterferencefrom the state in the internal organizationof the operating companymay add
another benefit.For the country,the arrangementimpliessavingon scarceskilledtechnicaland
managerialpersonnel.
The correspondingdisadvantagesare the lack of public control and accountability,possible
misuseby investorsoftransferpricing,and the useof inefficientand short-sightedminingpractices
("creamingoff").But governmentscan controlthe activitiesof privateenterprisesin variousways.
Reporting obligationsto the government, obligationsfavoring national processing,rules on
purchase of domestic inputs, use of national transport carriers, additional profit taxes, and
compliancewith state-issueddirectiveson marketingand pricingare someexamples.

76
 APPENDIX D

Problems of La Palca Tin Volatilization Plant

During the early 1970s,the governments of Bolivia and the U.S.S.R. signed an agreement for the
construction of a volatilization plant near Potosi. The initial cost was US$8.2 million. The plant
was designed to produce 400 metric tons a day of 3 percent tin concentrates. This would produce
about 3,500 metric tons a year of 50 percent tin concentrates at a scheduled on-stream time of
eleven months out of twelve. The main source of concentrates was to be the Unificada mine at
Potosi, where a new gravity preconcentration plant would be used to produce a 3 percent
concentrate with 70 percent recovery. Although the tin concentrate to be obtained from the
volatilization plant could be considered high grade by Bolivian standards, it would be too "dirty"
to be processed in conventional smelters. The product would, therefore, be processed in the
low-grade smelter of ENAF.
Civil works were initiated about a kilometer away from Potosi, and when these works were
reasonably advanced, it was decided to change the site because of water shortages. La Palca, 15
kilometers from Potosi, was chosen, and civil works were again initiated, despite geological studies
that cast doubts on the geologicalstructure of the location. Because of landslides, the cost of civil
works (initially estimated at about US$2 million) mounted to US$30 million.
The plant was completed ten years after initiation of construction, but before operations could
begin, a portion of the plant caught fire, apparently because of faulty diesel burners.
A few days after start-up, the population of the region complained of heavy pollution from the
plant. It was emitting an estimated 120 tons of sulphur a day, occasionallyin the form of sulphuric
acid, which did severe damage to plant and animal life in the region. Damages were paid and an
area in the radius of one kilometer was bought. To overcome the problem, the sulphur content in
the concentrates fed to the plant was reduced, and cool air was injected to disperse the fumes. When
this did not work, a very tall chimney was built.
When normal operations resumed, titanium corrosion was detected in the chimney because of
the presence of flourine and chlorine in some of the preconcentrates. The chimney had to be
refurbished with a plastic material. Because of shortages of raw materials, the plant is now
experiencing excesscapacity.
As a result of all the aforementioned problerns, the final costof the investment was US$80 million,
ten times the original estimated cost. The cost of production per ton treated is US$180 in 1982
prices.

77
 APPENDIX E

ComparativeAnalysisof TermsandConditions of Tin Concentrates

Contracts,
1979
Specification:
Sn 430,%; 2%; Sb. 0.06; S2.0%; Fe9.5%; Cu 0.02%; Pb 0.05%; Bi 0.3%; Zn
As 0.11
0.02%.
PriceQuotation:
Lowest price on LME: US$6,465 a fine metric ton.
ExchangeRate:[1 = US$1.9976.
Date: November 4, 1979.
(U.S.dollarsa metricton)
Valueanddeductions GulfChemicalCapper
Pass MarcRich ENAF
Valuation
Tin 5,904.25 5,986.20 5,914.94 5,894.99
Bonus 0.0 14.98 50.00 8.00
Total 5,904.25 6,001.18 5,964.94 5,902.99
Deductions
Treatment charges 427.67 507.59 453.85 592.00
Contamination 0.0 33.74 0.0 0.0
Energy 0.0 68.32 0.0 80.23
Penalties 9.05 5.05 10.37 14.30
Realization costs 73.07 94.44 50.53 85.14
Finaricing 22.36 21.87 22.71 91.79
Weightloss 27.30 26.86 0.0 0.0
Total 559.45 757.87 537.46 863.46
Net payable to producer (a metric ton) 5,344.80 5,243.31 5,427.48 5,039.53

ComparativeAnalysisof Termsand Conditionsof Tin Concentrates

Contracts,
1983
Specification:
Sn 39.870/o%;
As 0.953%; Sb. 0.02%; S 6.235%; Fe 11.21%.
PriceQuotation:Lowest price on LME: US$13,470a fine metric ton.
ExchangeRate:[1 = US$1.4835.
Date:March 21, 1983.
(U.S.dollarsa metric ton)
Valueand deductions CapperPass ENAF
Valuation
'Tin 5,235.90 5,235.90
Bonus 0.0 8.00
Total 5,235.90 5,235.90
Deductions
Treatment charges 381.72 805.58
Contamination 38.81 0.0
Encrgy 183.18 0.0
Penalties 40.59 22.59
Realizationcosts 193.55 110.56
Financing 21.83 35.88
Weightloss 22.96 0.0
1wotal 882.64 974.61
Net payable to producer (a metric ton) 4,353.26 4,269.29

78
 Statistical Appendix

CONTRIBUTION OF MINING TO THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY

SA.1. Share of Mining in Total GDP, 1970-80 81

SA.2. Share of Mining in Total Labor Force, 1970-81 81
SA.3. Contribution of Mining to Fiscal Revenues, 1970-81 82
SA.4. Share of Mining in Total Merchandise Exports, 1970-82 82

DATA ON BOLIVIA'S LABOR FORCE

SA.5. Share of Subsectors in Mining Labor Force, 1970-81 83

SA.6. Employment in COMIBOL Mines, 1982 83

DATA ON BOLIVIA'S MINING FISCAL REVENUES

SA.7. Composition of Mining Sector Revenues, 1970-81 84

SA.8. Source of Regalia Payments, 1970-80 84
SA.9. Source of Tin Regalia Payments, 1970-81 85
SA.10. Source of Export Tax Payments, 1970-80 85

DATA ON BOLIVIA'S TIN PRODUCTION

SA.I 1. Production of Tin Concentrates, 1973-82 86

SA.12. Production of Metallic Tin, 1970-82 86
SA.13. Bolivian and World Production of Tin Concentrates, 1900-82 87

DATA ON BOLIVIA'S EXPORTS OF TIN

SA.14. Export Values of Tin Concentrates, 1970-82 89

SA.15. Export Values of Metallic Tin, 1970-82 89

OTHER DATA ON BOLIVIAN MINING

SA.16. Sales of Tin Concentrates to ENAF, 1973-81 90

SA. 17. Distribution of Medium-Size Mines by Fixed Assets, 1973-80 90
SA.18. Distribution of Medium-Size Mines by Total Sales, 1973-80 90
SA.19. Distribution of Medium-Size Mines by Profits, 1973-80 91
SA.20. Distribution of Medium-Size Mines by Employment, 1974-80 91

DATA ON WORLD TIN MINING

SA.21. World Production of Tin Concentrates, 1900-81 92

SA.22. Rank of Major Producing Countries with Respect to Production of
Tin Concentrates, 1960 82 92

79
SA.23. Production of Tin Metal 93
SA.24. Percentage Shares of Production by Economic Group, 1980 94
SA.25. Consumption of Tin Metal, 1950-81 94
SA.26. Annual Growth Rate of Tin Consumption by Product and Country, 1963-81 95
SA.27. Trade Flows of Tin Concentrates, 1965 96
SA.28. Trade Flows of Tin Metal, 1965 97
SA.29. Trade Flows of Tin Concentrates, 1970 98
SA.30. Trade Flows of Tin Metal, 1970 99
SA.31. Trade Flows of Tin Concentrates, 1975 100
SA.32. Trade Flows of Tin Metal, 1975 101
SA.33. Trade Flows of Tin Concentrates, 1981 102
SA.34. Trade Flows of Tin Metal, 1981 103
SA.35. Relative Prices of Tin with Respect to Other Major Metals, 1800-1982 104
SA.36. Price Indices of Tin, Aluminum, and Copper, 1950-82 104

80
Table SA. 1. Share of Mining in Total GDP, 1970-80
(millions of Bolivian pesos, current prices)

Mining Mining as a percentage

rear Total GDP valueaddeda of total GDP
1970 12,374 1,157 9.4
1971 13,534 952 7.0
1972 17,218 1,687 9.8
1973 26,150 3,066 11.7
1974 43,829 4,384 10.0
1975 49,468 3,306 6.7
1976 57,787 4,010 6.9
1977 66,743 5,480 8.2
1978 80,594 6,532 8.1
1979 102,279 7,608 7.4
1980 149,506 10,701 7.2
a. Includes metallurgy.
Source:Central Bank.

Table SA.2. Share of Mining in Total Labor Force,1970-81

(thousands)

Total Mining Mining laborforce

rear laborforce laborforcea as a percentageof total
1970 1,330 69 5.2
1971 1,359 70 5.2
1972 1,388 72 5.2
1973 1,418 74 5.2
1974 1,448 76 5.2
1975 1,479 73 4.9
1976 1,547 74 4.8
1977 1,589 74 4.7
1978 1,629 78 4.8
1979 1,677 83 4.9
1980 1,720 84 4.9
1981 1,754 80 4.6
a. Excludesmetallurgy.
Sources:
National Institute of Statistics(INE); Ministry of Labor.

81
Table SA.3. Contributionof Mining to Fiscal Revenues,1970 81
(millions of U.S. dollars)

Direct contrlbution Current revenuesof Share oj miningin

Year of mining sector central government current revenues
197( 50.3 73.9 68.1
1971 23.1 64.1 36.0
1972 30.6 77.6 39.4
1973 42.2 123.5 34.2
1974 85.8 253.5 33.8
1975 61.2 284.4 21.5
1976 71.5 342.0 20.9
1977 103.0 382.1 27.0
1978 118.9 427.0 27.8
1979 139.5 412.8 33.8
1980 117.5 481.1 24.4
1981 93.4 566.5 16.5

Sources: Miniistrv of Finance: Miniistry of Mininlg and Metallurgy; Central Bank.

Table SA.4. Share of Mining in Total Mlerchandise E.xports.,1970--82

'millions of U.S. dollars)

Mining exports Total merchandise Mining exports as a

Year c.if) exports (c.if.) percentageojfotal
1970 204.9 228.8 89.6
1971 173.3 216.0 80.2
1972 174.1 240.4 72.4
1973 225.9 338.3 66.8
1974 387.3 650.5 59.5
1975 314.2 536.1 58.6
1976 393.5 649.6 60.6
1977 491.4 719.3 68.3
1978 515.0 723.7 71.2
1979 591.7 859.4 68.8
1980 641.2 1,035.9 61.9
1981 556.0 995.3 55.9
1982 419.3 898.2 46.7

Source: Central Bank.

82
Table SA.5. Shareof Subsectorsin Alining Labor Force,1970 81
(thousands)

Small mines
Year COMIBOL AMIedium
mines and corporations Total
1970 21.9 6.3 40.5 68.7
1971 23.0 6.2 40.8 70.0
1972 23.8 5.4 42.7 71.9
1973 24.1 6.0 43.6 73.7
1974 24.6 7.5 43.5 75.6
1975 25.6 7.4 40.4 73.4
1976 24.6 8.5 41.0 74.1
1977 24.6 8.5 41.1 74.2
1978 25.1 7.6 45.6 78.3
1979 26.4 7.7 49.4 83.5
1980 26.5 7.4 49.8 83.7
1981 25.7 7.5 47.2 80.4
Source:Ministry of Miniing and Metallurgy.

Table SA.6. Employment in COMIBOL M'!ines,1982

Education lUndergroundas a
Name lUndergroundConcentrator Surface and health Total percentageof total
Catavi 1,352 894 1,442 779 4,467 30.3
Qucchisla 1,872 612 1,398 671 4,553 41.1
Colqt]iri 1,000 393 718 346 2,457 40.7
Huanuni 982 361 458 316 2,117 46.4
Unificada 837 315 564 189 1,905 43.9
San,Jose 626 306 464 320 1,716 36.5
Caacoles 589 123 277 138 1,127 52.3
Santa Fe 353 167 251 130 901 39.1
Coroco 465 68 312 108 953 48.8
Viloco 298 101 222 105 726 41.0
Bolivar 258 75 139 58 530 48.7
Colquechaca 167 60 101 32 360 46.4
Matilde 312 47 189 68 616 50.6
Colavi 215 0 118 32 365 58.9
'lotal 9,326 3,522 6,653 3,292 22,793' 40.92
a. Does not include about 3,000 employees working away from mines.
Source:GOMIBOL.

83
Table SA.7. Compositionof Mining SectorRevenues,1970-81
(millions of U.S. dollars)

Year Regalia Expor, tax Others' Total

1970 38.6 0.0 11.7 50.3
1971 15.3 0.0 7.8 23.1
1972 14.9 7.7 8.0 30.6
1973 19.6 15.8 6.8 42.2
1974 44.1 24.0 17.7 85.8
1975 40.5 16.4 4.3 61.2
1976 49.9 16.3 5.3 71.5
1977 74.9 18.8 9.3 103.0
1978 91.5 26.6 0.8 118.9
1979 115.6 22.3 1.6 139.5
1980 115.0 1.3 1.2 117.5
1981 92.7 0.0 0.6 93.3

a. Includes import dutics and internal revenue.

Sources: Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy.

Table SA.8. Source of Regalia Payments, 1970-80

(millions of U.S. dollars)

rear COMIBOL Medium mine.s Small mines Totaln

1970 9.4 10.0 7.2 26.6
1971 6.3 3.2 2.4 11.9
1972 7.6 2.8 2.2 12.6
1973 13.2 7.9 2.5 24.6
1974 32.7 13.2 9.8 55.7
1975 25.3 11.7 3.4 40.4
1976 28.6 14.7 5.4 48.7
1977 62.9 20.6 8.0 91.5
1978 70.7 23.2 9.8 103.7
1979 78.2 31.2 11.8 121.2
1980 81.4 24.9 12.6 118.9
1981 72.3 11.7 7.1 91.1
Note:Starting in 1975, includes regalias paid by ENAF to the 'I'reasury.
a. This table differs from ''ables SA. 4 and SA. 7 because totals in this table are gross, that is, they include carmarked regalias
and reductions ofregalia payments on excess production.
Sources: Ministry of 'inance; Central Bank; Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy.

84
Table SA.9. Sourceof Tin Regalia Payments,1970-81
(millions of U.S. dollars)

Medium-size
Year COMIBOL mines Small mines Total
1970 6.3 2.3 1.4 10.0
1971 4.6 1.5 1.5 7.6
1972 6.5 1.4 1.4 9.3
1973 10.3 4.1 1.8 16.2
1974 25.6 6.0 5.5 37.1
1975 19.5 7.2 1.8 28.7
1976 21.5 7.9 2.4 31.8
1977 54.9 13.6 4.6 73.1
1978 64.8 16.6 8.0 89.4
1979 69.0 17.9 9.1 96.0
1980 70.2 19.6 7.1 96.9
1981 68.4 8.0 4.7 81.1
Sources:Ministry of Finance; Cenitral Bank.

Table SA. I0. Sourceof Export Tax Payments,1970 80

(millions of U.S. dollars)

Medium-size
Year COMIBOL mines Small mines ENAF Total
1970 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1971 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1972 5.7 0.0 2.0 0.0 7.7
1973 8.9 2.8 2.8 1.3 15.8
1974 14.1 4.8 2.2 2.9 24.0
1975 8.7 3.2 1.2 3.3 16.4
1976 8.3 3.7 2.0 2.3 16.3
1977 9.8 3.8 1.2 4.0 18.8
1978 9.5 3.2 0.1 13.8 26.6
1979 0.3 3.9 0.3 17.8 22.3
1980 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.7 1.3
Note: l'he export tax was imposed in 1972 and eliminated in mid-1980.

85
Table SA. 11. Productionof Tin Concentrates,1973-82
(fine metric tons)

Medium-size Small mines

Year COAIBOL mi'nes and corporations Total
1973 20,846 7,000 3,582 31.428
1974 20,061 6,940 3,396 30,397
1975 21,438 6,899 4,781 33,118
1976 20,592 6,675 3,100 30,367
1977 23,298 6,833 3,656 33,787
1978 21,471 6,625 2,813 30,909
1979 19,009 5,937 2,812 27,758
1980 18,621 5,880 2,270 26,771
1981 18,639 6,335 2,638 27,612
1982 17,910 6,026 2,836 26,772
Sources: Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy; National Institute of Statistics.

Table SA.12. Productionof Metallic Tin, 1970-82

(fine metric tons)

rear ENAF Funestanio Total

1970 0.0 0.0 0.0
1971 6,969 0.0 6,969
1972 6,227 0.0 6,227
1973 6,954 0.0 6,954
1974 7,092 36 7,128
1975 7,430 156 7,586
1976 9,185 915 10,100
1977 12,786 439 13,225
1978 16,184 8 16,192
1979 15,696 0.0 15,696
1980 17,863 0.0 17,863
1981 19,860 0.0 19,860
1982 19,463 0.0 19,463
Source: Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy.

86
Table SA.13. Bolivian and World Productionof Tin Concentrates,1900-82
(fine metric tons)

Bolivianproduction
Bolivian World as a percentage
rear production production of worldproduction
1900 9,738 86,800 11.2
1901 13,124 90,571 14.5
1902 10,604 85,431 12.4
1903 12,533 91,948 13.6
1904 12,902 93,264 13.8
1905 16,582 95,950 17.3
1906 17,624 98,354 17.9
1907 16,607 99,597 16.7
1908 17,696 105,689 16.7
1909 21,340 112,857 18.9
1910 23,129 111,829 20.7
1911 22,434 113,126 19.8
1912 23,027 118,374 19.5
1913 26,355 127,807 20.6
1914 22,355 119,132 18.8
1915 21,794 122,027 17.9
1916 21,145 120,776 17.5
1917 27,858 120,774 23.1
1918 29,280 117,826 24.9
1919 27,389 114,968 23.8
1920 29,542 113,876 25.9
1921 28,957 111,491 26.0
1922 28,129 115,663 24.3
1923 31,128 119,755 26.0
1924 32,059 136,952 23.4
1925 32,741 139,644 23.4
1926 30,543 139,086 22.0
1927 36,384 155,231 23.4
1928 42,068 173,485 24.2
1929 47,082 192,182 24.5
1930 38,758 176,026 22.0
1931 31,235 140,200 22.2
1932 20,913 93,500 22.4
1933 14,961 81,300 18.4
1934 20,965 113,800 18.4
1935 27,604 140,214 19.7
1936 24,460 183,905 13.3
1937 25,531 209,814 12.2
1938 25,896 167,648 15.4
1939 27,917 170,188 16.4
1940 38,531 238,771 16.1
1941 42,740 249,948 17.1
1942 38,908 122,942 31.6
1943 40,960 141,231 29.0
1944 39,341 101,605 38.7
1945 43,168 89,412 48.3
1946 38,222 90,428 42.3
1947 33,800 114,305 29.6
1948 37,935 153,931 24.6
1949 34,662 164,092 21.1

(Table continues
onthefollowingpage.)

87
Table SA. 13 (continued).
Bolivianproduction
Bolivian World as a percentage
Year production production of worldproduction
1950 31,714 169,172 18.7
1951 22,664 170,188 19.8
1952 32,472 173,744 18.7
1953 35,384 172,830 20.5
1954 29,287 171,712 17.0
1955 28,369 170,696 16.6
1956 27,273 169,070 16.1
1957 28,242 165,717 17.0
1958 18,014 117,658 15.3
1959 24,193 121,113 20.0
1960 19,718 138,690 14.2
1961 20,996 138,800 15.1
1962 22,150 141,900 15.6
1963 22,603 143,600 15.7
1964 24,587 149,300 16.5
1965 23,407 155,100 15.1
1966 25,932 169,800 15.3
1967 27,721 174,800 15.9
1968 29,568 183,200 16.1
1969 30,047 178,900 16.8
1970 29,379 186,300 15.8
1971 30,290 188,100 16.1
1972 32,405 196,300 16.5
1973 31,428 189,100 16.6
1974 30,397 183,600 16.6
1975 33,118 181,200 18.3
1976 30,367 180,000 16.9
1977 33,787 188,400 17.9
1978 30,909 196,600 15.7
1979 27,758 200,400 13.9
1980 26,771 200,100 13.4
1981 27,612 204,700 13.5
1982 26,772 188,900 14.2
Ministryof Miningand Metallurgy,InternationalTin Council.
Sources:

88
Table SA. 14. Export Valuesof Tin Concentrates,1970-82
(millions of U.S. dollars)

Medium-size Small mines

rear COMIBOL mines and corporations Total
1970 64.4 23.3 14.3 102.0
1971 51.5 17.4 13.1 82.0
1972 59.2 16.5 13.2 88.9
1973 67.3 19.3 12.1 98.7
1974 121.2 28.0 25.3 174.5
1975 98.2 20.3 11.3 129.8
1976 113.0 20.3 20.5 153.8
1977 134.6 21.4 36.9 192.9
1978 117.0 23.1 32.6 172.7
1979 95.6 26.8 43.5 167.6
1980 83.7 15.2 40.4 139.3
1981 32.8 11.8 32.6 77.2
1982 20.2 8.9 11.9 41.0
Source:Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy.

Table SA. 15. Export Valuesof Metallic Tin, 1970-82

(millions of U.S. dollars)

Year ENAF Funestan7o Total

1970 0.0 0.0 0.0
1971 23.9 0.0 23.9
1972 23.5 1.1 24.6
1973 32.3 0.0 32.3
1974 55.4 0.2 55.6
1975 49.5 0.7 50.2
1976 69.3 5.0 74.3
1977 131.8 4.1 135.9
1978 200.9 0.1 201.0
1979 228.0 0.0 228.0
1980 238.8 0.0 238.8
1981 265.9 0.0 265.9
1982 237.3 0.0 237.3
n.a. Not applicable.
Source:Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy.

89
Table SA. 16. Sales of Tin Concentratesto ENAF, 1973-81
Fine metrictons As a percentageof total productionof each
Medium-slze Small mines Medium-size Small mines
Year COMIBOL mines and corporations COMIBOL mines and corporations
1973 5,561 2,210 316 26.7 31.6 8.8
1974 4,923 2,692 81 24.5 38.8 2.4
1975 4,607 3,112 211 21.5 45.1 5.5
1976 5,984 4,107 43 29.1 61.5 1.4
1977 10,021 4,051 422 43.0 59.3 11.5
1978 11,760 3,771 21 54.8 56.9 0.7
1979 11,922 3,614 1 62.7 61.2 0.0
1980 13,326 4,092 412 7 r6 69.6 18.1
1981 14,915 4,266 1,625 80.0 67.3 61.6

Source:Ministry of Mining and Mctallurgy.

Table SA. 17. Distribution of Medium-Size Mines by Fixed Assets, 1973-80

Total assets Numberoffirms
(in millionsof pesos) 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
0- 0.9 1 2 1 0 3 0 0 0
1- 4.9 6 5 4 6 3 2 1 1
5- 19.9 8 9 9 11 11 8 7 3
20- 39.9 2 5 5 5 5 7 4 6
40- 99.9 0 0 1 2 2 4 7 6
100- 149.9 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2
150 -199.9 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 1
200 and above 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 5
rotal number of firms 20 24 24 29 29 26 24 24
Total assets, all firms
(millions of pesos) 708.2 634.7 879.1 1,270.8 1,398.9 1,866.1 2,150.7 2,888.7
Average per firm
(millions of pesos) 35.4 26.5 36.6 43.8 48.2 71.8 89.6 120.4

Source:Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy.

Table SA. 18. Distributionof Medium-Size Mines by Total Sales, 1973-80

Total sales Number offirms
(in millions of pesos) 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Less than 10 5 6 6 6 6 2 2 2
10- 39.9 9 9 8 13 11 10 8 6
40- 79.9 2 5 4 3 6 6 3 3
80- 119.9 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 4
120- 199.9 1 0 1 2 1 1 3 2
200 -299.9 1 1 2 2 0 2 2 4
300 and above 0 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
Total sales 20 24 23 28 29 26 24 24

Total sales
(millions of pesos) 1,006.2 1,259.2 1,520.5 1,770.7 2,259.1 2,600.4 3,892.7 4,015.6
Average sales
(millions of pesos) 50.3 52.5 66.1 63.2 77,9 100.0 162.2 167.3

Source:Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy.

90
Table SA. 19. Distribution of Medium-Size Mines by Profits,1973-80
Firms' reportedprofits N,umberoffirms
(in millionsof pesos) 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Lessthan 0 2 1 4 9 10 8 13 11
0- 0.49 2 2 5 1 5 4 2 3
0.5- 0.99 4 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
1.0 - 4.99 8 11 9 11 6 4 1 1
5.0- 9.99 1 2 2 0 2 2 4 2
10.0- 19.99 1 2 2 0 2 2 4 2
20.0- 39.99 1 2 0 1 3 2 1 3
40.0- 79.99 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 1
80 and above 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1
Totalnumber of firms 20 23 22 29 29 26 24 24
Total profits
(millionsof pesos) 120.7 244.5 35.3 310.3 165.9 86.7 81.6 270.9
Averageprofits
(millionsof pesos) 6.04 10.63 1.60 10.70 5.70 3.30 3.40 11.3
Note:Profitsare aftertaxes.
Ministryof Miningand Metallurgy.
Source:

Table SA.20. Distributionof Medium-Size Mines by Employment,1974-80

Number offirms
Number of employees 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
0- 99 2 3 7 7 2 5 3
100- 199 9 10 8 8 6 4 6
200 - 299 7 6 7 8 9 7 8
300 - 499 1 1 2 3 4 5 4
500 - 699 1 3 3 0 0 0 0
700 - 899 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
900 and above 0 2 2 3 3 3 3
Total number of firms 24 25 29 29 24 24 24
Total employment 7,476 7,456 8,480 8,516 7,640 7,740 7,400
Averageemploymentper firm 311 298 292 294 336 322 326
Source:MinistryofMiningand Metallurgy.

91
Table SA.21. World Productionof Tin Concentrates,1900-81
(thousands of tons of tin)

Regionand country 1900 1930 1950 1960 1970 1975 1981

Latin America
Bolivia 9.7 38.8 31.7 19.7 29.4 33.1 27.6
Brazil 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 3.7 5.0 8.3
Others 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.6 2.8 0.9 1.7
Subtotal 9.7 39.1 32.4 21.9 35.9 39.0 37.6
Southeast Asia and Australia
Malaysia 43.8 68.0 58.7 52.8 75.0 64.4 60.0
Thailand 3.9 11.2 10.5 12.3 22.1 16.4 31.5
Indonesia 17.9 35.5 32.6 23.0 19.4 25.3 35.3
Australia 4.4 1.5 1.9 2.2 9.0 9.3 12.9
Others 0.1 5.0 1.8 1.4 0.9 1.3 2.0
Subtotal 70.1 121.2 105.5 91.7 126.4 116.7 141.7
Africa
Nigeria 0.0 8.8 8.4 7.8 8.1 4.7 2.5
Zaire 0.0 0.7 11.9 9.4 6.6 4.6 2.4
South Africa 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.5 2.8 2.4
Others 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.7 3.1 4.1 3.6
Subtotal 0.0 10.4 22.7 20.6 19.3 16.2 10.9
Others
United Kingdom 4.3 2.5 0.9 1.2 1.8 3.3 3.9
Others 0.1 0.8 2.1 2.2 5.9 2.6 2.1
Subtotal 4.4 3.3 3.0 3.4 7.7 5.9 6.0
WVorld' 84.2 174.0 163.6 137.6 189.3 177.8 196.2

a. Excluding Albania, China, the German Democratic Republic, the Peoples' Republic of Korea, U.S.S.R., and Vietnam.
Sources:For 1900, 1938, and 1950,C.J. Schmitz, WorldJNon-Ferrous Metal ProductionandPrices,1760-1976(NJ.: Totowa, Biblio
Dist., 1979); International Tin Council, Tin Statistics(various issues) for 1960 on.

Table SA.22. Rank of Major ProducingCountrieswith Respectto Productionof Tin Concentrates,1960-82

Country 1960 1961-62 1963 1964 1965-72 1973-76 1978 1979-80 1981-82
Malaysia I I I I I I I I I
Indonesia 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 2
Thailand 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 2 3
Bolivia 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4
Source: International Tin Council.

92
Table SA.23. Productionof Tin Metal
(thousands of tons)

Country 1900 1930 1950 1960 1970 1975 1981

Ore-producing countries
Latin America
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 7.6 19.9
Brazil 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.3 3.1 5.4 7.6
Othersa 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.9
Subtotal 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.6 4.5 14.1 28.4
Southeast Asia and Australia
Malaysia 0.0 98.3 69.9 77.6 91.5 64.4 60.0
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 22.0 16.4 31.5
Indonesia 0.0 14.9 0.4 2.0 5.2 25.3 35.3
Australia 0.0 1.6 2.0 2.3 5.2 9.3 12.9
Othersi' 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 2.0
Subtotal 0.0 114.8 72.3 82.1 123.9 116.7 141.7
Africa
Nigeria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 4.7 2.5
Zaire 0.0 0.0 3.3 2.5 1.4 4.6 2.4
South Africa 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 1.5 2.8 2.4
Others' 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 4.1 3.6
Subtotal 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.8 11.6 16.2 10.9
Subtotal 0.0 114.8 76.7 89.5 140.0 145.0 178.2
Nonorc-producing countries
United Kingdomd 7.9 51.4 29.0 28.8 22.0 11.6 6.9
Others' 71.4 14.8 81.3 31.7 21.7 19.2 11.7
Subtotal 79.3 66.2 110.3 60.5 43.7 30.8 18.6
1
WVorld 79.3 181.0 187.0 150.0 183.7 176.3 196.9
,Vote:Tin metal refers to primary tin only.
a. Peru and Mexico.
b. Includes Singapore, whose metal production relies on ore produced in its vicinity.
c. Zimbabwe.
d. Although the United Kingdom is one ofthe major ore producers, it is classified as a nonore-producing country because its
metal production relies heavily on imported ores.
c. Including countries that produce less than 1,000 tons ofores a year, such as Spain, Portugal,Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Canada, and the United States.
f. Excludes Albania, China, the German Democratic Republic, the Peoples' Republic of Korea, the U.S.S.R., and Vietnam.
Sources: For 1900,1938, and 1950; C.J. Schmitz, IVorld Non-Ferrous Metal Production and Price, 1700-1976; International ''in Council,
Tin Statislics (various issues) for 1960 on.

93
Table SA.24. PercentageShares of Productionby EconomicGroup, 1980
(percent)

Industrial Developing Centrallyplanned

Production economies economies economies
Ore production
'I'in 6.9 84.8 8.3
Bauxite 33.1 56.0 10.9
Copper 30.0 49.9 20.1
Lead 45.2 33.3 21.5
Zinc 50.5 27.5 22.0
Iron ore 33.8 37.5 28.7
Metal production
'I'in 9.7 82.2 8.1
Aluminum 65.6 16.3 18.1
Copper 49.8 28.5 21.7
Lead 60.2 19.3 20.5
Zinc 56.8 19.4 23.8
Steel 54.7 15.6 29.3

Source:'I'he World Baoik.

Table SA.25. Consumptionof Tin Metal, 1950-81

thousands of tons)

Region or country 1950 1960 1970 1975 1981

Ore-producing region
LatinAmericaa 3.1 5.0 6.6 8.9 7.7
1 6.0
Asia and Oceania ) 3.1 5.5 6.1 5.8
Africa' 1.9 3.1 2.8 3.3 2.4
Subtotal 8.1 13.6 15.5 18.0 16.1
Nonore-producing countries
United States and Canada 76.9 56.3 58.4 47.9 44.3
European Community-9 48.7 69.8 58.4 49.8 41.7
Other western European countries 5.7 6.4 8.5 10.3 8.2
Japan and East Asia 4.7 13.4 25.9 29.9 34.9
Others 5.0 4.8 5.5 3.9 3.6
CPEsd 3.9 4.3 11.3 13.0 10.8
Subtotal 144.9 154.6 168.0 154.8 143.5

World 153.0 168.2 183.5 172.8 159.6

a. Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico.

b. Malaysia, 'I'hailand, lIidonesia, Australia, and Singaporc.
c. Nigeria, Zaire, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
d. Excluding Albania, China, the German Democratic Republic, the People's Republic ofKorea, Mongolia. U.S.S.R., and
Vietnam.
Source:International 'I'in Council, Tin Slatistics (various issues).

94
Table SA.26. Annual Growth Rate of Iin Consumptionby Productand Country, 1963 81
Federal All
United United Republic reporting
Product States Kingdom of Germany France E61 Japan countries'
'I'in plate -4.3 -4.8 1.4 -0.8 - 0.2 2.9 -1.6
'I'inning 0.2 -3.2 -7.7 -5.5 -5.2 4.8 -1.1
Solder - 1.0 - 4.3 4.6 0.2 0.4 4.6 0.5
White metal, babbitt
and anti-friction metal -0.9 -2.6 11.6 1.9 - 1.2 -2.8 0.6
Bronze and brass -4.4 -4.2 1.6 -2.8 - 3.3 -0.8 -4.1
Others 4.5 -1.2 1.8 -0.1 1.0 10.7 0.2
'I'otal - 1.8 -3.8 1.9 -0.7 - 1.0 0.4 -0.7
a. 'I'hic United Kirngdoiri, the Federal Rcpubliu of Ceriiany, anid France.
h. Includes the countries listed, plus Belgium, Italy, the Nctherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and Australia.
Source:'Ihc World Bank.

95
Table SA.27. Trade Flows of Tin Concentrates, 1965
(tons ol tin)

Importingcountry
SoutheastAsia,
Exporting United Slates Western Japan and China, Latin
country and Canada Europe East Asia and Australia America CPEs" Others Total
Bolivia 7,552 16,643 0 0 0 0 15 24,210
Other Latin
American countries 00 0 0 0 0
Southcast Asia, China,
andi Australia 0 664 0 22 0 0 0 686
Africa 0 4,988 0 0 0 0 28 5,016
ULnitedStates
and Canada 49 65 0 0 106 0 0 220
Western Europe 0 0 0 0 0
lotal 7,601 22,360 0 22 106 0 43 30,132
a. Centrally plaiiiiccl economies.
Source:lilternational Till Couincil, Tin Stauislics, 1.965-75.
 Table SA.28. Trade Flows of Tin Metal, 1965
tons)

Importingcountry
SoutheastA.sia,
Exporting UnitedStates Western Japan and China, Latin
country and Canada Europe East Asia and Australia America CPE.s Others Total
Bolivia 425 0 0 0 0 0 3,045 3,470
Other Latin
American countrics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SoutheastAsia, China,
and Australia 38,619 18,222 15,258 2,123 1,481 3,287 8,089 87,079
Africa 1,682 10,230 0 0 0 127 152 12,191
United States
and Canada 337 112 61 0 672 0 1,695 2,877
WesterniEurope 1,532 20,040 0 0 () 3,374 2,773 27,719
lotal 42,595 48,604 15,319 2,123 2,153 6,788 15,754 133,336

a. Centrally planned economies.

Sourre: Ilternationial Tini Couoncil, Tin .Siatistic, 1965-75.

(0
co

Tablc SA.29. Trade Flows of Tin Concentrates,1970

(tols of till)

counlty
[Importing
SoutheastAsia,
Exporling UniledStates Western Japan and China, LIatin
country andC,anada Europe East Asia and Australia America CPEs' Others Total
Bolivia 3,561 23,675 0 0 76 525 1,542 29,379
Other Latin
Americancountries 00 0 0 0)0 0
SoutheastAsia,Chinia,
and Australia 0 2,965 0 14,803 27 0 812 18,607
Africa 0 7,385 0 0 0 0 228 7,613
United States
and Canada 79 0 0 0 184 0 5 268
WesternEurope 0 590 0 0 0 0 0 590
Total 3,640 34,615 0 14,803 287 525 2,587 56,457
economics.
a. Craitrallyplanined
Source:International 'Tin Counicil, Tin Statistics,1970-80.
Table SA.30. 'Tradte Flows (j Tin Metal. 1970
(tons,

ImportingcountF)
Souteta.rl.1sia.
Exporting United States I1'e.stern ,apan and China. Latin
counhlct an(dCanada Eur ,tope Ea.stAsia and Australia America CPEs0 Others Total
Bolivia 0 ( 0 0 0 302 t 302
Other Latin
Anmerican countrics 396 0 0 0 0 0 0 396
Southeast Asia, China,
and Auistralia 52.283 33.972 27,811 973 1,128 5,330 3,454 124,951
Africa 930 9,605 0 0 0 111 1,752 12,398
Ulnited States
ani(i Canada 503 80 0 0 298 0 3,643 4.524
Wcstern Europe 698 11,965 0 0 27 8,454 850 21.994
'Fotal 54,810 55,622 27,811 973 1,453 14,197 9.699 164.565
a. Centalat planned I cOeIuounncs.
Sour,c: Internationial 'I'iti Cnounci, Tin .St!tasts, 1970-f0.
0

Table SA.31. 7raadeFlows of Iin Concentrates,197.5

(to)lls)

Importingcountry
SoutheastAsia,
Fxporting UnitedStates Western 7apanand China, Latin
country and Canada Europe East Asia and Australia America CPEs'' Others Total
Bolivia 6,841 10,222 0 0 1,242 616 23 18,944
Other Latin
Amcrican countrics 0 00 0 0 0 0 0
SoutheastAsia, China,
and Australia 0 1,867 83 15,527 450 592 198 18,717
Afiica 0 7,20(6 0 111 0 0 0 7,317
lUnitedStates
and Canada 801 165 6 0 52 0 34 1,0)52
WcstcrnEurope 0 315 0 0 0 0 128 443
'I'otal 7,642 19,775 83 15,638 1,744 1,208 383 46,473

a. Centrally planned cconomies.

Source:InitcrniationalTlin CoU1il, lin Statistics,1970-80.
Table SA.32. Trade Flows qf Tin Metal, 1975
tons)

Importingcountry
SoutheastAsia,
Exporting UnitedStates Western Japan and China, Latin
countrv and Canada Europe East Asia and Australia America CPEs' Others Total
Bolivia 611 2,248 0 0 914 3,365 360 7.498
Other Latin
American countries 1,230 1,230 0 ( 1,029 0 29 3,491
Southeast Asia, Chiira,
and Australia 41,135 43,087 22,414 644 5 9,453 4,305 121,093
Africa 0 5,577 0 0 0 0 105 5,682
United States
and Canada 998 1,452 0 0 983 0 163 3.596
Western Europe 516 7,752 0 0 45 652 1,152 10,117
I'otal 44,490 61,319 22,414 644 2.976 13,470 6,114 151,427

a. Centrally planniiedeconomics.
Sonw: Intcrinationial 'I'in Council, Tin Slaisthi(3, 1970-80.
 1981
Table SA.33. 7rade Flows of Tin Concentrate.s,
(tons of tin)

Importingcountry
SoutheastAsi'a,
Fxporting UJnitedStates Western Japan and China, Latin
country and Canada Europe East Asia and Australia America C>PEs` Others Total
Bolivia 20 3,910 0 0 0 730 860 5,520
Other Latin
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
American countries

Southeast Asia, China,

0 1,520 16 8,572 607 293 330 11,338
and Australia
0 2,204 0 40 0 0 794 3,038
Africa
Unrited States
0 830 0 156 0 0 68 1,054
and Canada
383 63 0 ( 67 0 0 513
Westcrn Eur-ope
403 8,527 16 8,768 674 1,023 2,052 21,463
Total

a. Centrally planrnl economies.

Source: Intcrniational Iin Council, Fin Statistics, 1971-81.
Table SA.34. Trade Flows of Tin Metal, 1981
(toIls)

Importingcountry
SoutheastAsia,
Exporting UnitedStates Western Japan and China, Latin
country and Canada Europe East Asia and Australia America CPEs' Others Total
Bolivia 10,910 4,701 0 0 399 908 1,034 17,952
Other Latin
American countries 1,156 2,389 0 0 1,521 480 0 5,946
Southeast Asia.China,
and Australia 30,673 57,257 33,881 13,408 48 7,429 8,645 151,338
Africa 520 2,176 0 0 0 0 15 2,711
tJnited States
and Canada 2,626 1,931 6 0 676 0 841 6,080
WesternEurope 108 6,408 0 0 194 5,191 817 12,718
'rotal 46,393 74,862 33,887 13,408 2,835 14,008 11,352 196,745
a. Centrallyplannedeconomies.
Source:International
Tin Council,Tin Statistics,1971-81.
Table SA.35. Relative Prices of Tin with Respectto Other MvajorMetals, 1800-1982
Period Aluminum Copper Lead Zinc
1800a 0.0 0.7 5.2 0.0
1850' 0.0 1.0 4.9 5.2
1900a 0.8 1.0 8.7 6.2
1930' 1.7 2.4 8.6 8.7
1950-54 6.1 3.7 7.2 7.1
1955-59 4.2 3.0 8.2 9.1
1960-64 5.1 3.7 13.2 11.0
1965-69 6.3 2.6 12.9 12.2
1970-74 6.8 3.2 12.8 7.8
1975-79 10.4 7.3 16.0 15.9
1980-82 10.6 8.2 20.7 17.4
Note:TIhe price of the metal with which the tin price is compared is set at 1.00.
a. Based on the three-vear-average price.
Sources:Schmitz, WorldNon-FerrousMetal Productionand Prices,for 1800-1930; and World Bank data for the others.

Table SA.36. Price Indices of Tin, Aluminum, and Copper. 1950-82

Period Tin' Aluminumb Coppeo'
1950-54 1.01 0.86 1.00
1955-59 0.84 1.04 1.09
1960-64 1.00 1.00 1.00
1965-69 1.27 1.03 1.78
1970-74 1.22 0.92 1.40
1975-79 1.48 0.73 0.75
1980-82 1.60 0.78 0.72
Nole:Based on prices in 1980 constant U.S. dollars, the deflator being the World Bank's unit value index of manufactured exports
from developed to developing countries on a c.i.f basis; the five-year average shown in each period group is based on having
1960-64 = 1.00.
a. London Metal Exchange, standard minimum 99.75 percent, settlement price.
b. London Market, 99.0-99.5 percent ingot, spot price.
c. London Metal Market Exchange, electrolytic wirebar, settlement price.
Source:The World Bank.

104
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, Robert J. Bolivia: Past, Present and Future of Its Politics. New York Praeger, 1968.
Almaraz Paz, Sergio. Requiem Para Una Republica. La Paz: Universidad Mayor de San Andres, 1969.
Almaraz Paz, Sergio. El Podery La Caida. La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1980.
Anstee, Margaret J. Gate of the Sun: A Prospect of Bolivia. London: Longman, 1970.
Baptista Gumucio, Fernando. Estrategia Nacional Para El Hierroy El Acero. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1982.
Bedregal G., Guillermo. La jVacionalizacion Mineray La Responsabilidad del Sindicalismo. La Paz, 1959.
Boharn, Merwin L. Report of the U.S. Economic AMission to Bolivia. La Paz: U.S. Ecoinomiiic Mission, 1942.
Bosson, Rex, and Bension Varon. The Minin~gIndustry and the Developing Countries. New York: Oxford University Press,
1977.
Canelas Orellana, Amado. Nacionalizacion de las Minas de Bolivia: Historia de Una Frustracidn. La Paz: Libreria
Altiplano, 1963.
Mitoy Realidad de la CorporacionMinera de Bolivia. La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1969.
Quiebra de la lVineria Estatal Boliviana? La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1981.
Choksi, Armeane M. State Intervention in the Industrialization of Developing Countries: Selected Issues. WVashington, D.C.:
World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 341, 1979.
Contreras, Manuel. "Tin Mining in Bolivia, 1900-1925." Unpublished M.A. thesis, London University, 1979.
Corporacion Minera de Bolivia. Operacion Triangular. La Paz: Corporacion Minera de Bolivia, March 1964.
Crespo, Alfonso. Los Aramayo de Chicas: Tres Generacionesde Mineros Bolivianos. Barcelona: Editorial Blume, 1981.
Crespo Rodas, Alberto: "Fundacidn de la Villa de San Felipe de Austria." Revista Historica, vol. 29, 1967.
Eder, George Jackson. Inflation and Development in Latin A.merica: A Case History of Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968.
Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. The Mining Industry of Bolivia. La Paz: Ford, Bacon & Davis, 1956.
Fox, David J. "'I'he Bolivian Tin Mining Industry: Some Geographical and Economic Problems." In ITC,
Proceedingsof a Technical Conferenceon Tin. London, 1967.
Fox, William. Tin: The Working of a Commodity Agreement. London: Mining Journal Books Limited, 1974.
Gall, Norman. "Bolivia: The Price of'Fin. Part II: 'I'he Crisis of Nationalization." The American Universities Field Staff
Report, vol. 21, no. 2, 1974.
Geddes, C. F. Patino, the Tin King. London: Robert Hale, 1972.
Gillis, Malcolm, and others. Taxation and Mining: Non-fuel Minerals in Bolivia and Other Countries. Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger, 1978.
Gomez D'Angelo, Walter. "Mining in the Economic Development of Bolivia," Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt
University, 1973.
Hanke, Lewis. The Imperial City of Potosi. 'I'he Hague: Nijhoff, 1956.
Hashimoto, Hideo. "Modelling Material Substitution in the 'I'in-Tinplate TFS Complex." WVorldBank Commodity
Division NVorking Paper. NVashington, D.C., 1983.
Hillman, John. "'I'he Nationalized Mining Industry of Bolivia, 1952-1956." 1982.
Ibanez C., Donaciano. Historia Alineral de Bolivia. Antofagasta: MacFarlane, 1943.
Jordan Pando. Roberto. Plan Decenal. La Paz: Editorial E. Burillo, 1962.
Keenleyside, Hugh. Report of the United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia. New York: United Nations,
1951.
Klein, Herbert S. The C'reationof the Patino Tin Empire, Inter-American Economic Affairs, Autumn, 1965.
. Parties and Political Change in Bolivia 1880-1952. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Ladman, Jerry (ed.). "Modern-Day Bolivia: Legacy of the Revolution and Prospects for the Future." Arizona:
Arizona State University, 1982.
Lora, Guillermo. La Revolucion Boliviana. La Paz: Difusi6n SRL, 1963.
Malloy, James. Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh University Press, 1970.
Malloy, James and Richard 'lThorn (eds.). Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1971.

105
Marsh, Margaret A. The Bankers in Bolivia: A Study in American Foreign Investment. New York: AMS Press, 1970.
Mitchell, Christopher. The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the AIVR to Military Rule. New York: Praeger, 1977.
Muller-Ohisen, Lotte. ,Von-Ferrous Metals: Their Role in Industrial Development. Cambridge, England:
Woodhead-Faulkner in association with Metallgesellschaft AG, 1981.
MuZ1oz Reues, Jorge. Geografiade Bolivia. La Paz: Academia Nacional de Ciencias dc Bolivia, 1977.
Musgrave, Richard. "Fiscal Reform in Bolivia." Cambridge, Mass.: Musgrave Mission, 1977.
Nankani, Gobind: Development Problems of Mineral Exporting Countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 354,
Washington, D.C., 1979.
Nash, Junc. Wf7eEat the Mines and the Mines Eat IJs: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines. Ncw- York:
Columbia University Press, 1979.
Ostria Gutierrrez, Alberto: A People Crueified: The Tragedy of Bolivia. New York: Prestige Books, 1958.
Patino Mines and Enterprises Consolidated. Annual Report. December 31, 1925.
Penaloza, Luis. Historia del Movimiento VacionalistaRevolucionario. 1941-1952. La Paz: Editorial Libreria, 1963.
Pinell-Siles, Armando. "Alternative Strategies for the Economic Development of Bolivia." In Fiscal ReJorm in Bolivia.
Cambridge, Mass.: Musgrave Mission, 1977.
Price Waterhouse Associates: "COMIBOL: Diagnostica v Plaii de Rehabilitaci6n." A study done for the World
Bank/uNDP. 1982.
Querejasu Calvo, Roberto. Llallagua: Historia de lna Montana. La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1977.
Reves, Simon. La Masacre de San Juan. Oruro, 1967.
Robertson, William. Tin: Its Production and Marketing. W\estport, Conn.:Greenwood Press, 1982.
Ruiz Gonzalez, Rent. La A1dministracioiEmpirica de laJ Minas Vacionalizadas. L.a Paz, 1965.
Shurz, W. L. Bolivia: A Commercial and industrial Handbook.
I'hoburn,John. Multinationals, Mining and Development. WVestmead, Farnborough: Gower Publishing Company, 1981.
Urioste, Armando de. "Asistencia a la Corporacion Minera de Bolivia: Un Analisis Critico de Esfuerzos Pasados y
Presentes." Unpublished report for the W;orld Bank. Washington, D.C., March, 1981.
Velasco, S. Jost Miguel. Mitoy Realidad de las Fiundicionesen Bolivia. La Paz, 1964.
Wilkie, James W. The Bolivian Revolution and U..S. Aid Since 1952. Los Angeles: Latin American Center, University of
California at Los Angeles, 1969.
Zondag, Cornelius, H. The Bolivian Economny,1952 65: ITheRevolution and Its Aftermnath.Ncw York: Pracger, 1966.

The most recent World Bank publications are described in the annual
spring and fall lists; the continuing research program is described in the
annual II 'orld Bank Research Program: Abstracts of Current Studies. The latest
edition of each is available free of charge from the Publications Sales
Unit, Department B, The WVorldBank, Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.

Mahmood Ali Ayub, a Pakistani national, was formerly a country

economist in the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office of the
World Bank and later served as the Bank's resident representative to
Bolivia during 1981-83. He is currently a senior industrial economist in
the Indtistry Department of the Bank.
Hideo Hashimoto, ajapanese national, served as an economist in the
Commodity Studies and Projections Division of the Bank. Currently on
leave of absence from the Bank, he is serving as the mining advisor to
the Ministry of Finance in Ghana.

106
9 THE WORLDBANK

A single commodity may in many developing countries exercise an enormous effect on the
national economy and the welfare of the population. Falling world prices can obviously
dislocate an economy dependent on one or a few raw materials, but such internal factors as
degrees of political stability and of technical advancement can also influence the economics
of production.

The Economics of Tin Mining in Bolivia brings together reliable and consistent data on just
such a commodity-dependent economy and analyzes them without the ideological coloration
apparent in some other studies. Rather than taking a short-term view-a decade or two
backwards-the book looks at the past century of tin mining, being able thereby to assess the
lagged effect of political upheavals in the country and of other economic and technical factors.

]Based on the collected information, an attempt is made to answer several basic questions:
how successful have attempts been to rehabilitate Bolivia's national mining company? has
Bolivian tin mining been a success, and what has been its macroeconomic effect on the nation's
economy? how competitive is the industry, and what are its prospects?

OF RELATED INTEREST FROM THE WORLD BANK

Commodity Trade and Price Trends (annual)

This annually updated publication provides historical information on the trade of developing
countries and eighty market price quotations for fifty-one commodities that are important in
international trade. Actual current and constant dollar prices are shown in tabular and graphic
form to indicate commodity price movements relative to the international price level.

ISBN 0-8213-0514-X