NARAYANI GAUTAM VS. STATE Case

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: October 20, 2009
Pronounced on: November 05, 2009
+ (1) CRL.M.C. No. 3447/2009
# Narayani Gautam & Ors. ..... Appellant
! Through: Mr. Vijay Aggarwal and Mr.

T.S. Atwal, Advocates
Versus
$ State …..Respondent
^ Through: Mr.Amit Sharma, Addl.P.P.

for the State
+ (2) CRL.M.C. No. 3712/2009 & Crl.M.A.12619/09
Reserved on: October 30, 2009
# Guddu & Ors. ..... Appellant
! Through: Mr. Brahman Singh,

Advocate
Versus
$ State & Ors. …..Respondent
^ Through: Mr.R.N. Vats, Addl.P.P. for

the State with Insp. Sukhdev Meena
From P.S. Dwarka
Crlmc3447/09, 3712/09 & WP(Crl.) 858/09 Page 1 of 38

+ (3)W.P.(Crl.) No. 858/2009
Reserved on: November 03, 2009
# Than Singh & Anr. ..... Appellant
! Through: Mr. Sanjeev Narula, Advocate
Versus
$ State N.C.T. of Delhi & Anr. …..Respondent
^ Through: Mr.Piyush Singh for

Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Addl.
Standing Counsel for CBI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be

allowed to see the Judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the

Digest? Yes
V.K.Jain, J.
These are two petitions u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and the one under Article 226 of the Constitution
read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C., for quashing the FIR and
the proceedings arising therefrom. The petitioner in
Criminal Misc. Case No.3447/2009 has sought quashing of

FIR No.118/2009 registered at P.S. Narela u/s 376/506 of
IPC, whereas the petitioner in Criminal Misc. Case
No.3712/2009 has sought quashing of the proceedings
arising from FIR No.826/2007 which was initially registered
u/s 304-B/498-A of IPC and in which the petitioners were
discharged of the offence u/s 304-B of IPC. In WP (Crl.)
858/09, the petitioner has sought quashing of FIR registered
u/s 323/186/353/332/34 of IPC and consequential
proceedings.
2. In Crl.M.C. No.3447/2009, the prosecutrix who is a
married woman, alleged that on 25th April, 2009, she fell sick
and informed her husband on telephone who, then sent the
petitioner Rajender to her house, for taking her to hospital.
The prosecutrix was in semi-conscious state, when the
petitioner came to her house. Taking advantage of her
condition, the petitioner raped her and then fled from the
house before arrival of her maid servant. It has been stated
in the petition that since the parties belong to the same
family, they have resolved all their disputes and differences.

3. In Criminal Case No.3712/2009, one Mehrunissa, who
was married to petitioner No.1, Guddu died on 20 th August,
2007. The cause of her death was opined to be broncho
pneumonia, which resulted in respiratory failure and death.
It was alleged in the FIR lodged by the father of the
deceased that since the time of marriage, the husband,
mother and sister of the deceased used to harass her for
dowry. In between he also gave financial assistance to them
to the extent it was possible for him. He further stated that
about 8-10 days ago, the petitioner asked his daughter to
demand Rs.80,000/- from him, over telephone, for
construction of a house. The complainant was unable to pay
that amount. Thereupon at about 7.30 p.m. on 20th August,
2007, petitioner Guddu called them from a STD Booth and
threatened to marry again, in case Rs.80,000/- were not paid
to him. The learned Additional Sessions Judge vide her order
dated 4th July, 2008 held that since cause of her death was
found to be broncho-pneumonia, no case u/s 304-B of IPC
was made out. The matter was sent back for trial by a
Magistrate for the offence punishable u/s 498-A of IPC.

4. In WP(Crl.) 858/09, the allegation against the
petitioner, who is working in Delhi Police, is that when the
officials of Delhi Jal Board, disconnected his unauthorized
water connection, he came there in uniform, abused a Junior
Engineer who had disconnected the supply and gave him
beating.
5. Quashing of FIR and criminal proceedings pursuant to
a compromise have been subject matter of a judicial
pronouncement from time to time and the learned counsel
for the petitioner in Crl.M.C. No.3447/2009 also has referred
to a number of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and
this court in which criminal proceedings were quashed in
exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
6. In Mahesh Chand and Another versus State of
Rajasthan, 1990 (Supp) SCC 681, the accused was acquitted
by the trial court but convicted by the High Court for the
offence under Section 307 IPC. One of the accused was a
lawyer practising in the lower court and there was a counter
case arising out of the same transaction. That case had also
been compromised. Permission was sought to compound the

offence under Section 307 of IPC. After examining the
nature of the case and the circumstances under which the
offence was committed, the Hon’ble Court directed the trial
court to permit the parties to compound the offence.
7. In Central Bureau of Investigation, Vs. Duncans Agro
Industries Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 591, the FIR was registered
by CBI Under Section 120B of IPC read with Sections 409,
420, 467 and 471 thereof, in respect of credit facilities
extended by United Bank of India to a division of the
Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. The second FIR was
registered under Section 120B, read with Section 420 of
IPC. The criminal proceedings were quashed by the High
Court on a petition filed by Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. It
was noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the advances
had already paid before civil courts in suits for recovery of
their dues and those suits had been compromised on receipt
of payments from the Companies. The Hon’ble Court
observed that even if an offence of cheating is prima facie
constituted, such offence is a compoundable offence and
compromise decrees passed in the suits instituted by the

Banks, for all intents and purposes, amounts to
compounding of the offence of cheating. It was also noted
that investigations had not been completed till 1991 though
the complaint was filed in 1987. In these circumstances, the
Hon’ble Court felt that it would not be expedient to proceed
further with the complaint and, dismissed the appeal,
thereby maintaining the order of the High Court.
8. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr.VS. Special Judicial
Magistrate and Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 549, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that power of the Court under
Section 482 of the Code had no limit and were not inflexible
though exercise of such powers would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case, the sole purpose is being to
prevent the abuse purpose of the Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.
9. In B.S. Joshi & Ors v State of Haryana and Anr (2003)
4 SCC 675, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after reviewing case
law on the subject quashed the criminal proceedings
pursuant to settlement of disputes between husband and
wife and on a joint prayer made by them. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court held that if for the purpose of securing the
ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section
320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing
it. It was noted that there would be almost no chance of
conviction when the complainant was not likely to support
the prosecution either because she had resolved disputes
with her husband and other family members and as a result
thereof, she had again started living with him or had parted
company with him or was living happily on her own or had
married someone else on earlier marriage having been
dissolved by divorce with mutual consent of the parties. The
Hon’ble Court was of the view that where in the opinion of
the court, chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by
allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may,
while taking into consideration the special facts of a case,
also quash the proceedings. It was observed that in such
matrimonial matters, it becomes the duty of the Court to
encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.

10. In Jagdish Channana and Ors v. State of Haryana, AIR
2008 SC 1968, an FIR was registered in Sonepat under
Sections 419, 420, 465, 468, 469, 471, 472 and 474 read
with Section 34 of IPC. During pendency of these
proceedings the parties entered into a compromise and one
of the terms of the compromise was that the proceedings
pending in the court would be withdrawn, compromised or
quashed, as the case may be. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
noticing that in the light of the compromise, it was unlikely
that the prosecution will succeed in the matter and also
noticing that the dispute was purely personal one and no
public policy was involved in the transactions that had been
entered into between the parties, held that continuing with
the proceedings would be a futile exercise and quashed the
FIR and all consequent proceedings.
11. In Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 4
SCC 582; an FIR was registered under Sections
379/406/409/418/34 of IPC in Police Station Kotwali of
Amritsar. The parties entered into compromise under which
the complainant party undertook to cooperate with the

accused to get the FIR cancelled / quashed. On the basis of
compromise, an application was filed in the High Court for
quashing the proceedings. The High Court having dismissed
the application, the matter came up before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. Noticing that the dispute was purely
personal one between two contesting parties and had arisen
on extensive business dealings between them and there was
absolutely no public policy involved, in the nature of the
allegations made against the accused, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court was of the opinion that no purpose would be served in
continuing with the proceedings. The Hon’ble Court
observed that it is advisable that in disputes where the
question involved is purely personal in nature, the court
should ordinarily accept the terms of compromise even in
criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive, with no
possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury,
which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot
afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding
more effective and meaningful litigation. The Hon’ble Court
held that this is public opinion and common sense approach

to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the
technicalities of the law.
12. In Nikhil Merchant V. Central Bureau of Investigation
and Anr, (2008) 9 SCC 677, CBI filed a charge sheet against
5 accused persons under Section 120-B r/w section 420, 467,
468 and 471 of IPC r/w 5(2) and 5(1) (b) of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 13(2) read with Section
13(1) (b) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This was a
case about grant of financial assistance by a bank to a
company which defaulted in repayment of the loan. The
allegations in the charge sheet included that the accused
conspired with each other for fraudulently diverting funds of
the bank. Offences alleging forgery were also included in
the charge sheet. A civil suit was also filed by the bank
against the company which resulted into compromise.
Consequent upon the compromise which provided that
neither party had any claim against the other and the parties
were withdrawing all allegations and counter allegations
made against each other, the appellant, who was a Director
of the Company, filed an application for his discharge from

criminal complaint in respect of which charge sheet had
been filed by CBI. The application was rejected by the Trial
Court as well as by High Court. The prayer for quashing the
criminal proceedings was opposed by learned Solicitor
General, who appeared for CBI and pointed out that the case
also involved commission of forgery. It was also submitted
by him that as pointed out by the Constitutional Bench in
Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India & Anr,
(1998) 4 SCC 409, in exercise of its plenary powers under
section 142 of Cr. P.C., the Supreme Court should not ignore
any substantive statutory provisions dealing with the
subject. While observing that technically there was force in
the statement made by Addl. Solicitor General, the Hon’ble
Court felt that facts of the case warranted interference as
dispute had overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal
facets and was a fit case where continuance of the criminal
proceedings after the compromise would be a futile exercise.
In that case clause 11 of the Consent Terms read as under:
“Clause 11. Agreed that save as

aforesaid neither party has any claim
against the other and parties do hereby
withdraw all the allegations and

counter allegations made against each
other.”
Thus, withdrawal of all accusations was the hallmark of
the compromise in that case.
13. In a recent decision Central Bureau of Investigation vs.
A Ravishankar Prasad & Ors, (2009) 6 SCC 351, CBI
challenged an order passed by the High Court of Madras
quashing criminal proceedings initiated by it under Section
120B with Section 420 of IPC and Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The
case involved respondents entering onto a conspiracy with
Chairman and Managing Director and other officials of
Indian Bank with the object to cheat bank in the matter of
obtaining credit facilities. The respondents cleared entire
dues, by paying an amount of Rs. 1.57 crore to the bank and
filed an application under section 482 of Cr. P.C. pursuant
to which proceedings against the respondents were quashed
by the High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that
charge sheet incorporated complicity of some public
servants and private servants to defraud the bank. The
Hon’ble Court also noted that the respondents and other

bank officials shared charge sheet under Section 120B read
with Section 420 of IPC and was of the view that quashing
charges against them would also have serious repercussions
on the pending cases against other bank officials. The
appeal filed by CBI was, therefore, allowed and the order
passed by the High Court was set aside. During the course
of judgment, the Hon’ble Court was of the view that exercise
of inherent power would entirely depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case, the object of incorporating such
power in the Code being abuse of process of the court or to
secure ends of justice.
14. In Smt. Rumi Dhar Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. ,
JT 2009 (5) SC 321, an FIR was registered by CBI u/s 120-
B/420/467/468/471 of IPC. The bank officers were also
prosecuted under Prevention of Corruption Act. There was a
settlement of the appellants with the banks. An application
u/s 239 of Cr.P.C. was filed for dropping the criminal
proceedings. The prayer was rejected by holding that the
offence being against the society and investigation having
been made by CBI, settlement could not have been entered

into. Rejecting the Appeal, and after considering Duncans
Agro and Nikhil Merchant, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that exercise of power of quashing would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case.
15. In Manoj Sharma vs. State & Ors., Crl.M.A. 1619/2008
decided on 16.10.2008, an FIR got registered under Sections
420/468/471/34/121 of IPC pertaining to a dispute of private
nature, was quashed pursuant to a compromise between the
parties. During the course of the judgment written by him,
the Hon’ble Mr.Justice Markandey Katju observed as under:-
“There can be no doubt that a

case under Section 302 IPC or other
serious offences like those under
Sections 395, 307 or 304B cannot be
compounded and hence proceedings
in those provisions cannot be
quashed by the High Court in
exercise of its power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. or in writ jurisdiction on
the basis of compromise. However,
in some other cases, (like those akin
to a civil nature) the proceedings can
be quashed by the High Court if the
parties have come to an amicable
settlement even though the
provisions are not compoundable.
Where a line is to be drawn will have
to be decided in some later decisions
of this Court, preferably by a larger

bench (so as to make it more
authoritative). Some guidelines will
have to be evolved in this connection
and the matter cannot be left at the
sole unguided discretion of Judges,
otherwise there may be conflicting
decisions and judicial anarchy. A
judicial discretion has to be
exercised on some objective guiding
principles and criteria, and not on
the whims and fancies of individual
Judges. Discretion, after all, cannot
be the Chancellor’s foot.
I am expressing this opinion

because Sh. B.B. Singh, learned
counsel for the respondent has
rightly expressed his concern that
the decision in B.S. Joshi’s case
(supra) should not be understood to
have meant that Judges can quash
any kind of criminal case merely
because there has been a
compromise between the parties.
After all, a crime is an offence
against society, and not merely
against a private individual.”
16. In Satnam Kaur and Ors. versus State, 135(2006) DLT
84, the complainant alleged that on 2.11.2004, her parents-
in law caught hold of her, her brother in law held her breast
and her husband started beating her and saying that she had
not brought anything in her dowry. It appears that there
was also allegation of rape in that case. During the course
of trial, a joint petition was filed by the parties stating

therein that they had agreed to dissolve their marriage by
mutual consent and had amicably settled all their
matrimonial disputes. It was further stated that FIR in
question was lodged due to some misunderstanding. After
noticing the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of B.S.Joshi & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (Supra),
a learned Single Judge of this Court felt that since the
charges levelled by the complainant would tantamount to
outraging the modesty of the prosecutrix, supported by MLC
and report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, the Court
cannot give its permission in a case like this.
17. In Sushil Suri vs. CBI & Anr., Crl.M.C. 3842/2008,
decided on 4.9.2009, this court declined to quash an FIR
registered by CBI under Sections 120B/409/420/468/471 of
IPC, despite a settlement between the petitioner and
respondent No.2
18. In Crl.M.C. 1304/2004, 6389/2006 and 6600-04/2006,
all decided by a common order dated 23rd May, 2008 this
court declined to quash the FIRs alleging forgery and use of
forged documents despite compromise between private

parties noticing the report of FSL which indicated forgery of
documents.
19. In Crl.M.C. 3030/2009, decided on 10.9.2009, the FIR
was registered under Section 313/313/376/34 of IPC. The
proceedings were quashed after noticing that the
complainant was happily living with her husband and did not
want to proceed with. The mother of the complainant had
also given approval to her marriage with petitioner No.1.
Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, the FIR was quashed.
20. In Cr.M.C.3627/2009, an FIR registered under Section
420/467/468/471/120B/34 of IPC, due to some
misunderstanding between the parties, who were three real
sisters was quashed pursuant to a compromise between
them.
21. In Ajay Kumar and Others vs. State and Others,
131(2006) DLT 130, an FIR registered under Sections
420/468/471/120-B, IPC was quashed pursuant to a
settlement between the parties. The dispute involved a

private Limited Company and was found to be commercial in
nature involving no public prosecution.
22. In B.K.Sondhi vs.State, 2001(1) JCC Delhi 73, an FIR
registered under Sections 420/468/471 of IPC and was
quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties. In
that case, the Court also took the view that even prima facie
no offence had been made out. The dispute in that case
involved a private farm house situated in village Satbari.
23. In Chain Sukh & Ors. vs. State & Ors., 1999(1)JCC
Delhi 142, an FIR under Sections 452/323/506/34 of IPC was
quashed noticing the facts and circumstances of the case
which involved the complainant, his wife and his brother.
24. In Yog Raj Arora versus State & Ors., 2002(2)JCC
1103, an FIR under Sections 420/467/471 IPC pertaining to
dispute on some agricultural land, was quashed pursuant to
a compromise between the parties.
25. In Govind and Others vs. The State, 2003 II AD (Cr)
DHC 537, an FIR under Sections 498/496/34 IPC was

quashed relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of B.S.Joshi and Ors. (Supra).
26. In D.C.Singham versus State & Anr., 133(2006)DLT
372, an FIR under Section 406/420 of IPC was quashed
pursuant to an amicable settlement of dispute between the
parties.
27. In Gudayan Dravid & Anr. Vs. State & Anr.,
Crl.M.C.227/2005, decided on 30.11.2006, a learned Single
Judge of this Court quashed the FIR under Section 406/120-
B IPC pursuant to a compromise between the petitioners
and the I.C.I.C.I. Bank Ltd.
28. In Mideast India Ltd. & Ors. vs. State, Crl.M.C.
No.8661-64/2006 decided on 10.1.2007, the FIR under
Sections 420/406/409/120 of IPC was quashed pursuant to a
settlement between the petitioners and respondent No.2.
29. In Daulat Zia vs. Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi,
74(1998)DLT259, the parties who were Afghan Nationals
settled their differences and did not want to pursue the

complaint. The proceedings arising out of the FIR
registered under Section 307 IPC were therefore, quashed.
30. In Rachna Gera & Ors. vs. State & Ors., 122(2005)DLT
412, an FIR lodged under Section 406/420/468/471/34 of IPC
was quashed pursuant to compromise between the parties
noticing that there was no allegation of criminal intent at the
inception of the transaction and the dispute appeared to be
of a private nature.
31. In Anil Kumar Vs.State, Crl.M.C. 6558-60/2006, an FIR
under Sections 323/341/354/356/452 IPC and Sections 3(X)
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act was quashed pursuant to a compromise
between the parties, who were neighbours.
32. In Neelu Gupta & Ors. vs. State 2007(3)JCC 1938, an
FIR registered under Section 120B/420/467/471 of IPC was
quashed pursuant to a compromise between the parties.
The FIR was registered pursuant to a dispute between the
private parties.

33. In Ansal Buildwel Limited vs. State, Crl.M.C.
No.3517/2007 decided on 21.1.2008, an FIR registered
under Section 420/468/471/120B of IPC which was quashed
pursuant to a compromise between the parties.
34. In Crl.M.C. 2193/2007, an FIR got registered by
respondent No.2 against the petitioner, who was her
husband ,under Sections 420/468/471 and Section 12 of
P.P.Act was quashed pursuant to compromise between the
parties.
35. In Religare Securities Ltd. & Others vs. State , 2008[2]
JCC 824, an FIR under Sections 420/406/468/471/120B IPC
was quashed pursuant to a compromise between respondent
No.2 and the petitioners.
36. In Manoj vs. NCT of Delhi and Anr., W.P.(Crl.) 97/2008,
an FIR registered under Sections 363/376/506 of IPC was
quashed pursuant to a settlement between the parties.
37. In Ramesh Vs. State (I) (2007) CCR 116, the police,
after investigation, submitted a final report treating the case
by accidental fire. On a protest petition filed by the

complainant, cognizance was taken for the offence under
Section 304-A of IPC. The parties thereafter entered into a
compromise. The criminal proceedings were thereupon
quashed.
38. In Maninder Singh vs. CBI, Crl.M.C. 2083/2006,
decided on 10.2.1009, a learned Single Judge of this Court
quashed proceedings arising out of FIR registered by CBI
under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with 120B IPC.
39. In Surender @ Rahul vs. State, Bail Appln. 883/2009,
decided on 29.5.2009, a learned Single Judge of this Court
quashed an FIR registered under Sections 363/366/376 of
IPC pursuant to an amicable settlement between the parties.
In that case, father of the prosecutrix who was heard in
Chamber stated that he wanted to arrange wedding of his
daughter and, therefore, wanted an amicable resolution
keeping the future of his daughter in mind. The matter was
then referred for mediation where settlement was effected.
The FIR was thereafter quashed.

40. In Punjesh Jindal vs. State & Ors. 2009 in W.P.(Crl.)
727/2008, a learned Single Judge of this Court quashed an
FIR registered under Section
120B/408/420/467/468/471/477A of IPC pursuant to a
compromise between the parties, relying upon decision of
Supreme Court in Nikhil Merchant (Supra).
41. In Harish Budhiraja And Others versus State, Crl.M.C.
1742/2009, decided on 27.8.2009, a learned Single Judge of
this Court quashed an FIR registered under Section
384/342/354/506/34 IPC, pursuant to a compromise between
petitioner No.1 and the complainant/petitioner No.2. A
perusal of the order would show that due to some
misunderstanding between the petitioners, the FIR was got
registered by petitioner No.2 against petitioner No.1.
Keeping in view the facts of the case including the age of the
complainant, the proceedings were quashed.
42. In WP (Crl.) No.1236/2009 decided on 18th September,
2009, a learned Single Judge of this court quashed an FIR
registered u/s 376/420/493/494/406 IPC pursuant to a
settlement between the complainant/petitioner No.2 and

petitioner No.1. A perusal of the order would show that in
that case petitioner No.1 and 2 had got married.
Subsequently, petitioner No.2/complainant learnt that
petitioner No.1 already had a family in India, which resulted
in filing of FIR by her.
43. The proposition of law which emerges from these cases
is that (i) the embargo placed by Section 320 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure against compounding of certain offences
does not come in the way of the court quashing an FIR or a
criminal complaint and the proceedings arising therefrom, in
exercise of its inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Vesting of such a power in the High
Court cannot be denied in view of use of the expression
“nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court,” the only other
requirement being that the power should be exercised to
give effect to any order made under the Code of Criminal
Procedure or to prevent abuse of the process of a court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (ii) an FIR or a
criminal complaint and the proceedings arising therefrom

can be quashed on the basis of a compromise if, taking into
consideration the nature of the offence alleged to have been
committed, the circumstances in which the offence was
committed and the overall facts of the case, the court is of
the view that quashing of the criminal proceedings would
meet the ends of justice or is otherwise necessary to prevent
an abuse of the process of the court.
44. Coming to cases of rape, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State Vs. Gurmeet Singh, AIR 1997 SC 1588, after noticing
that the crime against women in general and rape in
particular is on the increase, reminded that a rapist not only
violates the victim’s privacy and personal integrity but
inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical
harm in the process. A murderer destroys the physical body
of his victim, whereas a rapist degrades the very soul of the
helpless female thereby destroying whole of her personality.
45. In Bodhi Sattwa Gautam Vs. Subhra Chakraborty, AIR
1996 SC 922, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed, inter
alia, as under:-

“Unfortunately, a woman, in our
country, belongs to a class or group of
society who are in a disadvantaged
position on account of several social
barriers and impediments and have,
therefore, been the victim of tyranny at
the hands of men with whom they,
fortunately, under the Constitution
enjoy equal status. Women also have
the right to life and liberty; they also
have the right to be respected and
treated as equal citizens. Their honour
and dignity cannot be touched or
violated. They also have the right to
lead an honourable and peaceful life.
Women, in them, have many
personalities combined. They are
mother, daughter, sister and wife and
not play things for centre spreads in
various magazines, periodicals or
newspapers nor can they be exploited
for obscene purposes. They must have
the liberty, the freedom and, of course,
independence to live the roles assigned
to them by nature so that the society
may flourish as they alone have the
talents and capacity to shape the
destiny and character of men anywhere
and in every part of the world.
Rape is thus not only a crime against

the person of a woman (victim), it is a
crime against the entire society. It
destroys the entire psychology of a
woman and pushes her into deep
emotional crisis. It is only by her sheer
will-power that she rehabilitates herself
in the society which, on coming to know
of the rape, looks down upon her in
derision and contempt. Rape is,
therefore, the most hated crime. It is a

crime against basic human rights and is
also violative of the victim’s most
cherished of the Fundamental Rights,
namely, the Right to Life contained in
Article 21. To many feminists and
psychiatrists, rape is less a sexual
offence than an act of aggression aimed
at degrading and humiliating women.
The rape laws do not, unfortunately,
take care of the social aspect of the
matter and are inept in many respects.”
46. Sexual offences constitute an altogether different class
of crime which is the result of a perverse mind. By their
very nature these crimes cannot be treated at par with
economic crimes or the crimes such as causing grievous hurt
or even attempt to commit murder. Sexual violence apart
from being a dehumanizing act is an unlawful intrusion of
the right of privacy and sanctity of a female and is a serious
blow to her supreme honor offending her self-esteem and
dignity.
47. Recognizing the imperative need to deal such offences
with a severe hand, Parliament amended the law extensively
by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 so as to provide
minimum sentence of rigorous imprisonment of seven years
with enhanced minimum punishment for offences of a graver

nature such as custodial rape and gang rape. A deeming
provision was also added by way of explanation (1) to
Section 376 IPC to hold all the persons acting in furtherance
of a common intention liable for rape even if the rape is
committed only by one or more amongst them. It is the
bounden duty of the court to respect the legislative mandate
as reflected in amendment of Section 376 of Indian Penal
Code.
48. Allowing quashing of FIR and/or charge-sheet,
pursuant to a compromise, will, in such cases, only
embolden the perpetrators of such crimes, which otherwise
are on the increase, in our society. If the accused in such a
case is an affluent person and the prosecutrix comes from a
socially or economically weaker strata of the society,
quashing in such a case would only encourage commission
of such offences, as the accused, using his money power or
otherwise, may be able to induce the prosecutrix to enter in
to settlement with him and then seek quashing of criminal
proceedings, on the strength of that settlement.

49. In my view, a petitioner is not entitled to quashing
merely because in the facts and circumstances of some other
case, this court has quashed an FIR registered u/s 376 of
Indian Penal Code. Every case has to be decided on its own
facts and no hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards
the cases, which deserve quashing by the High Court in
exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
or Article 226/227 of the Constitution. This was recognized
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Shankar
Parshad (Supra). If, considering the special facts of a case,
the court decides to quash the FIR registered or the
complaint filed in a particular case, that ipso facto does not
justify quashing of the FIR/complaint in every other case
involving the commission of an offence punishable under the
same provision of law or with equal or even lesser
punishment. The nature of the offence than in fact be more
important than the punishment prescribed for it. The court
has to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of each
case that comes up before it for quashing, note the special
features, if any, justifying quashing of the prosecution and
then come to an appropriate conclusion.

50. It was contended by the learned counsel in Crl.M.C.
3447/2009 that in case this court is of the opinion that an
FIR registered u/s 376 of Indian Penal Code ought not to be
quashed, the matter may be referred to a larger Bench as
some co-ordinate Benches have already quashed FIRs
registered u/s 376 of Indian Penal Code. I am unable to
agree with the learned counsel. No doubt, if a Judge differs
with a co-ordinate Bench on a question of law, judicial
discipline requires that he should refer the cases for
consideration of that proposition, of law by a larger Bench.
I, however, do not find any particular proposition of law
having been laid down in any of the cases referred by the
learned counsel for the petitioner. There is no denial that in
appropriate cases the High Court has the power to quash an
FIR or a criminal complaint even if the offence is otherwise
not compoundable. But, this proposition of law has to be
applied taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances of each individual case. Therefore, there is
no ground for referring the matter to a larger Bench.

51. Now, I come to prayer in Crl.Misc. Case 3712/09 for
quashing prosecution u/s 498-A IPC. The object behind
addition of Section 498-A to Indian Penal Code by Criminal
Law (2nd Amendment) Act, 1983 was to prevent the torture
of a woman by her husband or relatives of the husband. The
increase in cases of harassment and deaths of young
married women, as a result of unlawful demands of dowy by
their husbands or parents-in-law, had led to enactment of
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Since the provisions of Dowry
Prohibition Act were not found to be adequate to curb the
evil, the Parliament in its anxiety to extend protection to the
weaker spouse, added Chapter XX-A, which includes Section
498-A, to Indian Penal Code. Traditionally, the women in
our society has, at least in the past, been subjudicated to the
whims and caprices of the husband and sometimes also her
in-laws. Sometimes, on account of the harassment caused
and the cruelties inflicted on her, her life becomes so
miserable and intolerable that she decides to put an end to
such a life by committing suicide. The statement of objects
and reasons behind enactment of Act 46 of 1983, inter alia,
stated as under:-

“The increasing number of dowry
deaths is a matter of serious concern.
The extent of the evil has been
commented upon by the Joint
Committee of the Houses to examine
the working of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961. Cases of cruelty by the
husband and relatives of the husband
which culminate in suicide by, or
murder of, the hapless woman
concerned, constitute only a small
fraction of the cases involving such
cruelty. It is, therefore, proposed to
amend the Indian Evidence Act suitably
to deal effectively not only with cases of
dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty
to married women by their in-laws.”
52. If the wife, who has been subjected to cruelty or
harassment enters into a settlement with her husband
and/or in laws either by deciding to give the marriage
another try and consequently continue living with the
husband or by obtaining divorce by mutual consent and
decides to embark upon a new Chapter in her life, bereft of
her past relationship, the courts do recognize the need for
bringing an end to the criminal proceedings initiated in such
a case by quashing the same in terms of the settlement
between the parties. The purpose is to enable the parties to
live peacefully, in future, without retaining any feeling of
rancouror or ill-will towards each other.

But, when the wife has died, these considerations do
not exist any more and in such a situation, no useful purpose
is served by quashing the criminal proceedings that were
initiated against the husband and/or in-laws of the deceased.
In fact, the parents or other family members of a deceased
spouse are nobody to enter into a compromise in respect of
the offence which was committed against the deceased and
not against them. It is the deceased and not her family
members, who had to undergo the torture, cruelty and
harassment at the hands of her husband and/or in-laws. It
would, therefore, neither be in consonance with public
policy nor in the benefit of the society at large to allow the
family members of a deceased woman to enter into a
compromise with her husband and/or in-laws and then come
to the court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings
pursuant to such a compromise. In fact, quashing criminal
proceedings in such cases, after death of victim of the crime
may in some cases, encourage the accused persons to win
over the family members of the deceased for considerations
which may not necessarily be brought on record. To put it
rather bluntly, this may encourage the accused of such

offences to offer lucrative amounts in the form of
compensation or otherwise to the family members of the
deceased, particularly if they happen to come from rather
poor strata of the society. Having already lost their
daughter/sister, they may not always find any incentive to
continue the criminal proceedings, if they are compensated
in monetary terms or are otherwise persuaded to enter in to
a settlement. Therefore, in my view, it would be contrary to
public interest if the criminal proceedings are quashed
pursuant to a compromise between the accused persons on
one hand and family members of the deceased on the other
hand.
53. As regards offences u/s 186/332/353 of Indian Penal
Code, it would be noticed that Section 186 is comprised in
Chapter X of the Penal Code which deals with Contempts of
Lawful Authority of Public Servants and the offences u/s 332
and 353 of the Penal Code are also the offences committed
against public servants with intent to prevent them from
discharging their official duties or on account of something
done or attempt to be done by them in lawful discharge of

their duties as a public servant. The main purpose behind
these sections is to give adequate protection to the public
servants in discharge of their official duties and to maintain
the lawful authority of the public office held by them. It has
to be kept in mind that these offences are not committed on
account of some private act done by the victim public
servants. These public servants become victim of the crime
only on account of their discharging the duties of the public
office held by them. They are not engaged in any personal
work and have done nothing with a personal purpose so as
to invite the wrath of accused persons. Therefore, such
offences cannot be treated at par with other offences
against human body, such as offences u/s 325, 326, 308 or
even 307 of Indian Penal Code. If those who commit such
offences are allowed to go scot free by entering into a
compromise with the public officials assaulted or obstructed
by them, that would discourage other public servants from
discharging their official duties without any fear or pressure.
In fact the very sanctity behind an orderly governance and
maintenance of rule of law will be seriously compromised, if
such offenders are allowed to go scot free without having to

face trial for the offences alleged to have been committed by
them.
54. In Kulvinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., 2007 (4)
CTC 769, a Five Judges Bench of Punjab & Haryana High
Court examined the scope of the power of the High Court u/s
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the
proceedings in non-compoundable offences. Sh. R.S.
Cheema, Sr. Advocate, who assisted the Bench as Amicus
Curiae, placed certain guidelines before the High Court for
consideration. These guidelines, inter alia, recommended as
under:-
“The offences against human body

other than murder and culpable
homicide where the victim dies in the
course of transaction would fall in the
category where compounding may not
be permitted. Heinous offences like
highway robbery, dacoity or a case
involving clear-cut allegations of rape
should also fall in the prohibited
category. Offences committed by
Public Servants purporting to act in
that capacity as also offences against
public servant while the victims are
acting in the discharge of their duty
must remain non-compoundable.
Offences against the State enshrined in
Chapter-VII (relating to army, navy and

air force) must remain non-
compoundable.”
In view of the discussion made in preceding
paragraphs, I am of considered view that in none of these
three cases, the FIR or the criminal proceedings arising
therefrom ought to be quashed. All the three petitions are,
therefore, dismissed.
(V.K. JAIN)
JUDGE
November 05, 2009/aks/sn/sk

NARAYANI GAUTAM VS. STATE Case

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: October 20, 2009

Pronounced on: November 05, 2009

+ (1) CRL.M.C. No. 3447/2009

# Narayani Gautam & Ors. ..... Appellant

! Through: Mr. Vijay Aggarwal and Mr.

^ Through: Mr.Amit Sharma, Addl.P.P.

+ (2) CRL.M.C. No. 3712/2009 & Crl.M.A.12619/09

Reserved on: October 30, 2009

Pronounced on: November 05, 2009

# Guddu & Ors. ..... Appellant

! Through: Mr. Brahman Singh,

$ State & Ors. …..Respondent

^ Through: Mr.R.N. Vats, Addl.P.P. for

Crlmc3447/09, 3712/09 & WP(Crl.) 858/09 Page 1 of 38

Reserved on: November 03, 2009

Pronounced on: November 05, 2009

# Than Singh & Anr. ..... Appellant

! Through: Mr. Sanjeev Narula, Advocate

$ State N.C.T. of Delhi & Anr. …..Respondent

^ Through: Mr.Piyush Singh for

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes

3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the

These are two petitions u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure and the one under Article 226 of the Constitution

the proceedings arising therefrom. The petitioner in

Criminal Misc. Case No.3447/2009 has sought quashing of

Crlmc3447/09, 3712/09 & WP(Crl.) 858/09 Page 2 of 38

IPC, whereas the petitioner in Criminal Misc. Case

No.3712/2009 has sought quashing of the proceedings

arising from FIR No.826/2007 which was initially registered

u/s 304-B/498-A of IPC and in which the petitioners were

discharged of the offence u/s 304-B of IPC. In WP (Crl.)

858/09, the petitioner has sought quashing of FIR registered

u/s 323/186/353/332/34 of IPC and consequential

2. In Crl.M.C. No.3447/2009, the prosecutrix who is a

and informed her husband on telephone who, then sent the

petitioner Rajender to her house, for taking her to hospital.

The prosecutrix was in semi-conscious state, when the

petitioner came to her house. Taking advantage of her

house before arrival of her maid servant. It has been stated

in the petition that since the parties belong to the same

family, they have resolved all their disputes and differences.

Crlmc3447/09, 3712/09 & WP(Crl.) 858/09 Page 3 of 38

was married to petitioner No.1, Guddu died on 20 th August,

2007. The cause of her death was opined to be broncho

pneumonia, which resulted in respiratory failure and death.

It was alleged in the FIR lodged by the father of the

deceased that since the time of marriage, the husband,

mother and sister of the deceased used to harass her for

dowry. In between he also gave financial assistance to them

to the extent it was possible for him. He further stated that

about 8-10 days ago, the petitioner asked his daughter to

demand Rs.80,000/- from him, over telephone, for

construction of a house. The complainant was unable to pay

that amount. Thereupon at about 7.30 p.m. on 20th August,

2007, petitioner Guddu called them from a STD Booth and