CERTIFIED

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Divisi,of Cle1~k. of Cou 1
'] l11rd Divb: n

3R.epublic of tbe ilbilippines MAR 1 3 20111

~upreme <ll:ourt
;!Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 233063

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - PERALTA, J, Chairperson,

LEONEN,
REYES, A., JR.,
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH HERNANDO, and
DIVISION), REYNALDO 0. CARANDANG,* JJ.
PAROJINOG, SR., AND NOVA
PRINCESS E. PAROJINOG Promulgated:

ECHAVEZ,
x----------------------------
-~~~~~:~~-~'.~:------~~-·~--~----x
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari are the Resolutions, dated April
7, 201 i and June 14, 2017, 2 issued by the Sandiganbayan in SB-16-CRM-
1206.

In an anonymous letter 3 dated August 23, 2010, the Ombudsman was

requested to conduct an investigation against respondents Reynaldo 0.
Parojinog, Sr., then Mayor of Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, and Nova
Princess E. Parojinog-Echavez, Mayor Parojinog's daughter, for possible
violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, to wit:

I
Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.
Rollo, pp. 45-58. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega, and concurred
in by Associate Justices Rafael R. Lagos and Reynaldo P. Cruz.
1 /

•3 Id. at60-63.
Requesting for a conduct of investigation against the officials of Ozamiz City, Province of
Misamis Occidental.
Decision -2- G.R. No. 233063

Section 3. Corrupt practices of' public officers. In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xx xx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any

business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
takes pm1 in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

On December 22, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao

endorsed the letter to the Commission on Audit ( COA) for a conduct of a
special audit on the matter. The COA submitted a copy of the Joint Affidavit
and Special Audit Report dated September 26, 2011 which disclosed
deficiencies in the procurement for the improvement/renovation of the multi-
purpose building/ Ramirez Gymnasium in Lam-an, Ozamiz City by the local
government of Ozamiz City. The payment for the renovation project was
suspended in audit, through notice of suspension no. 13-001-101 (08), as it
was discovered, based on the audit, that the end user of the renovation
project was the local government unit of Ozamiz City, represented by
respondent Mayor Parojinog, the father of respondent Echavez who is the
managing partner of Parojinog and Sons Construction Company to which
the renovation project was awarded; that the relationship of father and
daughter falls within the third civil degree of consanguinity which
transaction is prohibited by Section 47 of the Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations of RA 9184 or the Government Procurement Refonn Act.

On December 8, 2014, a formal complaint was filed by the

Ombudsman Field Investigation Unit against respondents. On January 7,
4
2015, the Office of the Ombudsman--Mindanao issued a Joint Order
directing the respondents, among others, to submit their counter-affidavits.
On February 13, 2015, respondents filed a motion 5 for additional time to file
their counter-affidavits and which they filed 6 on March 3, 2015. On July 22,
2015, a subpoena duces tecum 7 was issued to the COA and the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for them to submit certified true
copies of documents relating to the bidding, evaluation, and acceptance of
the gymnasium project. The other respondents filed a supplemental to their
position paper on October 16, 2015, and their motion to admit annexes on
October 23, 2015. (JY
Rollo, pp. 72-76.
Id at 77-82.
Id at 90-107.
Id at 120-122.
Decision -3- G.R. No. 233063

On November 27, 2015, the graft investigation officer submitted a

Resolution 8 finding probable cause to indict herein respondents for violation
of Section 3(h) of RA 3019. The Resolution was approved9 by the
Ombudsman on April 29, 2016. Respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order 10 dated June 30, 2016.

On November 23, 2016, an Information for violation of Section 3(h)

of RA 3019 against respondents was filed with the Sandiganbayan. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:

During the period of April to May 2008, or sometime prior or

subsequent thereto, in Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and
within this Honorable Court's jurisdiction; REYNALDO OZAMIZ
PAROJINOG, SR. as Mayor (SG 27) o[f] Ozamiz City; while in the
performance of his administrative and/or official functions and in
conspiracy with his daughter NOV A PRINCESS ENGRACIA
PAROJINOG-ECHA VEZ, Managing Partner of Parojinog & Sons
Construction Company (PSCC); willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
possessed a financial or pecuniary interest in PSCC- a company owned by
his family-when it participated as a bidder and was awarded the project for
the [I]mprovement/Renovation of Multi-Purpose Building/Ramiro
Gymnasium, Lam-an, Ozamiz City and when the local government of
Ozamiz City as end user, represented by Parojinog, accepted said project
as completed. 11

12
Respondent Mayor Parojinog filed his Motion to Quash dated
February 17, 201 7 on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an
offense. Later, both respondents filed an Omnibus Motion 13 to Quash
Information and to Dismiss SB-16-CRM-1206, contending that the facts
alleged in the Information did not constitute an offense warranting the
quashal thereof and that their right to a speedy disposition of cases had been
violated.

On April 7, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed

Resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Omnibus Motion

is hereby GRANTED. The Information is ordered QUASHED and the
instant case is DISMISSED for violation of accused's constitutional right
to speedy disposition of cases[.]

Accordingly, the hold-departure issued by the Court against the

accused is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE, and the bonds they posted for

9
JO
II
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 123-133.
at 132.
at 136-145.
(71
Id. at 48-49.
12
Id. at 146-154.
13
Id. at 155-182.
Decision -4- G.R. No. 233063

their provisional liberty are ordered RELEASED, subject to the usual

accounting and auditing procedures. 14

In granting the motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan n1led that the

following elements need to be proven in order to constitute a violation of
Section 3(h) of RA 3019, to wit: (1) the accused is a public officer; (2) he
has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction; and (3) he either (a) intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity in connection with such interest, or (b) is prohibited from
having such interest by the Constitution or by any law. It found that the
allegation in the Information that the subject business is owned by the family
of respondent Mayor Parojinog was glaringly deficient as it did not state if
he had any interest in the business; hence, the second element had not been
properly alleged. As to the third element, it found that the Information did
not state how respondent Mayor Parojinog intervened or participated in
furtherance of the alleged financial interest nor did it state that he had any
financial interest prohibited by the Constitution or by any other law; that the
acceptance of the project only after it was completed cannot amount to
intervention or participation of respondent Mayor Parojinog in order that the
project could push through since it was the DPWH which bidded out and
awarded the project to the company.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case because there was a violation

of respondents' right to a speedy disposition of cases. It took into
consideration the period from the receipt by the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao of the anonymous letter-complaint up to the filing of the
Information in this case, which amounted to a total of five (5) years and
eleven ( 11) months; that the delay could not be ignored by separating the
fact-finding investigation from the conduct of preliminary investigations as
all stages to which the accused was exposed should be included; that there
was no explanation offered for such delay. The Sandiganbayan found that
respondents had raised the issue of the violation of their right to a speedy
disposition of cases in their motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
finding probable cause; and even if they did not, there was no need to follow
up their case. There was prejudice to the respondents since relevant
documents could have already been lost since the subject business was only
required to keep its business books, accounts and other documents for three
years.

Petitioner People of the Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration

which the Sandiganbayan denied in the second assailed Resolution date~/
June 14, 2017. (,,/
1

14
Id. at 58.
Decision -5- G.R. No. 233063

The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner failed to address its finding

that the fact-finding investigation period must be considered in determining
whether there was inordinate delay. It also found that petitioner violated
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court regarding hearing of motion
and notice of hearing, and resultantly, the motion was reduced to a mere
scrap of paper which did not toll the period to appeal.

Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by petitioner raising the

following issues:

I.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH

ORAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RECKONING THE CONDUCT OF
PROCEEDINGS - AND THE IMPUTATION OF DELAY - FROM THE
CONDUCT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION BY THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, WHICH CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND A DEROGATION OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION.

II.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN MERELY RESORTING TO A
MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION OF THE PERIOD
CONSTITUTING THE ALLEGED DELAY, WITHOUT REGARD TO
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE
AS WELL AS THE PRECEDENTS THAT DEFINE THE
PARA.METERS OF INORDINATE DELAY.

III.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT VIOLATIONS OF
SECTIONS 4 & 5 OF RULE 15 OF THE RULES OF COURT ARE
FATAL TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION. 15

We first address the third issue raised by petitioner regarding the

Sandiganbayan's finding that it violated Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court in the filing of its motion for reconsideration, which did not
toll the running of the period to appeal.

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide that~

15
Id. at 14-15.
Decision - 6 .. G.R. No. 233063

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may act
upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written
motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the
other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the
court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. -- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all

parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which
must not be later than ten ( 10) days after the filing of the motion.

In Cabrera v. Ng, 16 we held:

The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions

under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral
component of procedural due process. "The purpose of the three-day
notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the
movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the
latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to
meet the arguments interposed therein."

"A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper
which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no
authority to act upon." "Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to
reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by
their filing or pendency."

Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and

fast rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be
heard. and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition
to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is
deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process
are substantially complied with. 17 (Citations omitted.)

The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner failed to furnish the

respondents a copy of the motion for reconsideration at least three days
before the date of hearing as prescribed in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner claims that it sent the motion for reconsideration and notice
of hearing to respondents' counsel 15 days before the scheduled hearing;
thus, there was enough time to reach them. However, as respondents stated
in their Comment, the unit number in the address of the respondents' counsel
was wrongly written, i.e., Unit 1002 which should be Unit 1102; thus, the
motion was only received by respondents' counsel one day before the date
of hearing. Notwithstanding, we find that respondents were given the
opportunity to be heard as they were able to file their opposition;;;,;

16

17
729 Phil. 544 (2014). (/!
Id. at 550.
Decision -7- G.R. No. 233063

petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and controvert the arguments raised

therein. Thus, the requirement of procedural process was met.

The Sandiganbayan also found that petitioner failed to comply with

Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on the rule of setting the hearing of
the motion for reconsideration not later than 10 days after the filing of the
motion. Here, the motion for reconsideration was filed on April 27, 2017 and
was set for hearing on May 12, 2017, however, considering that an
examination of the petition shows its merit, we decide to relax the strict
application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of our equity
jurisdiction.

In Atty. Gonzales v. Serrano, 18 we held:

Rules of procedure exist to ensure the orderly, just and speedy

dispensation of cases; to this end, inflexibility or liberality must be
weighed. Thus, the relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or
exemption of a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling
reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. 19 (Citation omitted.)

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint for
violating respondents' right to a speedy disposition of cases.

The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III

of the Constitution, which declares:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

"The constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal

proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative
in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial." 20 "In
this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all
officials who are tasked with the administration of justice."21 "This right,
however, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays." 22

18
755 Phil. 513 (2015).
19
Id. at 527.
20
People v. Sandiganbayan, 51" Div., et ul., 791 Phil. 37, 52, citing Cada/in v. Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration's Administrator, 308 Phil. 728, 772 (1994).
21
Id. at 52-53, citing Capt. Roquero v. The Chancellor of UP-Manila, et al., 628 Phil. 628#639
(20 I 0).
22
Id. at 53, citing Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 929 (200 I).
Decision -8- G.R. No. 233063

"The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere

mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular
23
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. "
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right
has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as
follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay. 24

In dismissing the complaint for violation of respondents' right to a

speedy disposition of cases, the Sandiganbayan found that from the time the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao officially took cognizance of the case
by referring the letter to the COA for audit up to the filing of the
Information, a total of five (5) years and eleven (11) months had elapsed;
and that there was no explanation for the delay. It cited the case of People v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 25 where we declared:

The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article Ill

of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or
rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted.
Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
should not matter for purposes of determining if the respondents' right to
the speedy disposition of their cases had been violated. 26

Our ruling in the cited case of People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 27

where we held that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for
determination of inordinate delay has already been abandoned. In Cagang v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 28 we made the following disquisition, thus:

People v. Sandiganhayan. Fifth Division must be re-examined.

When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the

Ombudsman conducts a motu proprio fact-finding investigation, the
proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to attend
these investigations, this period cannot be counted since these are merely
preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the Office of
the Ombudsman will not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge
the accused.

This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office
of the Ombudsman as unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its

23
Id., citing Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 374 Phil. 413, 447 ( 1999).
24
Id., citing Alvizo v. Sandiganhayan, 292-A Phil. 144, 155 (1993); Dansal v. Judge Fernandez,
Sr. 3 83 Phil. 897, 906 (2000); and Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, 399 Phil. 674, 682 (2000).
25
26
27
2R
723 Phil. 444(2013).
Id. at 493.
Supra note 25.
{f
G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458, and 210141-42, .July 31, 2018.
Decision -9- G.R. No. 233063

investigation takes too long, it can result in the extinction of criminal

liability through the prescription of the offense.

Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial

proceedings against the accused, the period of investigation will not be
counted in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of
cases was violated. Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of
detennining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have
commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent
conduct of the preliminary investigation. In People v. Sandiganbayan,
Fifth Division, the ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in
the period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned. (Citations
omitted.)

Clearly, the period devoted for fact-finding investigations before the

filing of the formal complaint is not included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay. Hence, in this case, the period from
the receipt of the anonymous complaint by the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao, on August 23, 2010, until December 7, 2014 should not be
considered in the determination of the presence of inordinate delay. This is
so because during this period, respondents were not yet exposed to
adversarial proceedings, but only for the purpose of determining whether a
formal complaint against them should be filed based on the result of the fact-
finding investigation.

Therefore, the reckoning point to determine if there had been

inordinate delay should start to run from the filing of the formal complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, on December 8, 2014, up to
the filing of the Information on November 23, 2016. Here, it appears that
after the filing of the formal complaint on December 8, 2014, the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint Order dated January 7, 2015
directing respondents, among others, to submit their counter-affidavits,
which they did on March 3, 2015 after some extensions of time. Thereafter,
a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the COA and the DPWH. The other
respondents filed a Supplement to Position Paper on October 16, 2015 and
followed by a Motion to Admit Annexes of the Supplemental Counter-
Affidavits on October 23, 2015. On November 27, 2015, the Graft
Investigation Officer submitted to the Ombudsman a Resolution finding
probable cause. The Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman on April
29, 2016 and the Information was filed on November 23, 2016.

We find that the period from the filing of the formal complaint to the
subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation was not attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays as would constitute a violation
of respondents' right to a speedy disposition of cases. We find the period of
less than two years not to be unreasonable or arbitrary. In fact, respondents
did not raise any issue as to the violation of their right to a speedy

tJI
Decision - 10 - G.R. No. 233063

disposition of cases until the issuance of the Ombudsman's Resolution

finding probable cause.

Finally, we note that the Sandiganbayan granted respondents' motion

to quash the Information on the ground that the facts did not constitute an
offense, and since it dismissed the case due to the violation of respondents'
right to a speedy disposition of cases, it did not order the amendment of the
information as provided under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:

Section 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the

motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that
an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute

an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

Petitioner did not assail the finding of the Sandiganbayan regarding

the insufficiency of the allegations in the Information. Considering our
finding that there was no violation of respondents' right to a speedy
disposition of cases, hence, the case should not be dismissed and, therefore,
petitioner should be given an opportunity to amend the Information and
correct its defect pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
9
Notably, respondent Mayor Parojinog had already died on July 30, 201 i
as shown by his death certificate; thus, the Information should only be filed
against respondent Echavez.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated

April 7, 2017 and June 14, 2017, issued by the Sandiganbayan in SB-16-
CRM-1206, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Prosecution is
hereby given the chance to AMEND the Information against respondent
Nova Princess E. Parojinog-Echavez for violation of Section 3(h) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

SO ORDERED.

~9
Rollo, p. 389.
 Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 233063

WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice

ANDR~iEYES, JR. RAMO

¥:2 I
PAULL. HERNANDO
.
As~~cTkte Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

Assoc\iate Justice
Chairpersor\J, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

CERTI Fl ED fRUE.COP\'

,~:o·v~
DivisiJ{n Clerk of Court
Third Division

MAR l J 2019