Human Relations, Civil Personality,

Citizenship and Domicile

Prepared by Judge Joy Angelica P. Santos Doctor
The abuse of rights principle is the
overarching principle behind:
 Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
 Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
 Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
 Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property
was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be
liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.
The abuse of rights principle is the
overarching principle behind:
 Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the
courts must be vigilant for his protection.
 Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want
or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable
institution.
 Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
 Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
The abuse of rights principle is the overarching principle behind:
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
The abuse of rights principle is the overarching principle behind:
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or
from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted
in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
The abuse of rights principle is the
overarching principle behind:
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police
force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace
officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city
or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor.
The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of
any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.
 Civil Action and Criminal Action
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
Civil Action and Criminal Action
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges
another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code
or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or
fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the
prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the
criminal proceedings.
Independent Civil Action as per Section
3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
 Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. -
In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action.
 Independent Civil Actions
 Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages: 1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3)
Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal
detention; (5) Freedom of suffrage;(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; (8) The right to the
equal protection of the laws; (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures; (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; (11) The privacy
of communication and correspondence; (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law; (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances; (14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
 Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
 Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to
any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,
and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized
shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support
such action.
Independent Civil Action: Quasi-delict

 Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Explanation:

 Section 3 provides that a civil action for damages in cases

provided under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, which may also constitute criminal offenses, may
proceed independently of the criminal action. In instances
where an independent civil action is permitted, the result of
the criminal action, whether of acquittal or conviction, is
entirely irrelevant to the civil action.
Pre-judicial Question

Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must

be decided before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme
Court shall promulgate and which shall not be
in conflict with the provisions of this Code
What is a prejudicial question?
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined (Librodo v. Judge
Coscolluela, Jr., No. L-56995, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA
303)
What is a prejudicial question?
It comes into play generally in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending
and there exists in the former an issue which must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. (Librodo v. Judge
Coscolluela, Jr., No. L-56995, August 30, 1982, 116
SCRA 303)
Elements of a Prejudicial Question

 1)
the civil case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based;
 2)
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and
 3)
jurisdiction to try the said question must be lodged in
another tribunal. (Heirs of Domingo v. Sps. Singson, G.R.
No. 203287, April 05, 2017)
Requisities of a Prejudicial Question
The elements of a prejudicial question are provided
in Section 7 of Rule 111, Rules of Court, to wit:

 (a)a previously instituted civil action involves an

issue similar to or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
 (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Liability Criminal Civil
Article 100 RPC Yes Yes Prejudicial
Question?
Article 29 CC No, guilt not proven beyond Yes, by preponderance of evidence -
reasonable doubt
Article 30 CC No criminal proceedings Yes, by preponderance of evidence -
Article 31 CC Does not arise from crime but from Independent civil action No.
culpa aquiliana,
culpa contractual, quasi delict,
natural obligations

Article 33 CC Defamation, fraud, physical injuries Independent civil action No

(includes death)
Article 35 CC A person, claiming to be injured by  Court should allow civil action -
a criminal offense, charges another  Defendant can ask plaintiff to
with the same, for which no post bond to cover damages on
independent civil action is granted account of malicious prosecution
in this Code or any special law, but  If criminal case filed, civil action
court acquits accused on reasonable is suspended
ground, or public prosecutor refuses
or fails to institute criminal
proceedings
Exercise
Caterpillar is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
footwear, clothing and related items, among others. Its products are known for six
core trademarks, namely, "CATERPILLAR", "CAT", "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN", "CAT AND
DESIGN", "WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN (Core Marks).
Caterpillar filed a criminal case against Samson for “unfair competition” on July 27,
2000. Additionally, on July 31, 2000, Caterpillar commenced a civil action against
Samson and his business entities, with the IPO as a nominal party – for Unfair
Competition, Damages and Cancellation of Trademark with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction – docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 of the RTC in Quezon City.

Samson sought the dismissal of the criminal case, on account of a prejudicial

question. Is Samson correct?
 Caterpillar v. Samson, G.R. No.
205972, November 09, 2016
We note, to begin with, that Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, the civil case filed by
Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City, was for unfair competition, damages and
cancellation of trademark, while Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 were the
criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair competition. A common element of all
such cases for unfair competition – civil and criminal – was fraud. Under Article 33
of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. In view of
its being an independent civil action, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 did not operate as
a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44.
 Caterpillar v. Samson, G.R. No.
205972, November 09, 2016
there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought
by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Caterpillar v. Samson, G.R. No.
205972, November 09, 2016
An action for the cancellation of trademark like Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 is a
remedy available to a person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the
registration of a mark. On the other hand, the criminal actions for unfair competition
(Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44) involved the determination of whether or not
Samson had given his goods the general appearance of the goods of Caterpillar, with
the intent to deceive the public or defraud Caterpillar as his competitor.[61] In the
suit for the cancellation of trademark, the issue of lawful registration should
necessarily be determined, but registration was not a consideration necessary in
unfair competition.[62] Indeed, unfair competition is committed if the effect of the
act is "to pass off to the public the goods of one man as the goods of another;"[63] it
is independent of registration. As fittingly put in R.F. & Alexander & Co. v. Ang,[64]
"one may be declared unfair competitor even if his competing trade-mark is
registered."
Exercise

The spouses Macario and Felicidad Domingo are the parents of seven siblings namely,
Engracia, Renato Consolacion, Josefina, Rafael, Ramon, and Rosario. Macario died in 1981
whereas Felicidad died in 1997. In 2006, Engracia caused the transfer via deed of sale of a
parcel of land situated in F. Sevilla Street, San Juan, Metro Manila owned by the Sps.
Domingo in her name. In the same year, the six other siblings led by Renato filed a civil
case for annulment of sale, contending that Engracia falsified the signatures of their
parents. On February 28, 2007, Renato, Consolacion, and Ramon filed a criminal case for
falsification of public document, estafa, and use of falsified documents, claiming that
Engracia falsified the signatures of their parents in the Absolute Deed of Sale.

Engracia filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case on the ground of a prejudicial
question. Renato, Consolacion, and Ramon opposed the motion, contending that Article 33
of the Civil Code is applicable where the annulment case is a civil action that can proceed
independently of the criminal action. Who is correct?
 Renato Domingo, et. al., v. Sps. Singson,
G.R. No. 203287, April 5, 2017
The Sps. Singson are correct. Indeed there exists a prejudicial question in this situation.
The elements of a prejudicial question are: 1) the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; 2) the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the quilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and 3) jurisdiction to try the said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.

All these elements are present. The main issue raised in Civil Case No. 70898, i.e., the
genuineness of the signature of the Spouses Domingo appearing in the Absolute Deed of
Sale, is intimately related to the charge of estafa through falsification of public
document in Criminal Case No. 137867. Secondly, the resolution of the main issue in
Civil Case No. 70898 would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
Spouses Singson. The civil case is with the RTC whereas the criminal case is with the
MTCC.
 Renato Domingo, et. al., v. Sps. Singson,
G.R. No. 203287, April 5, 2017
The reliance on Section 356 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Article 3357 of the Civil Code, is misplaced. Section 3
provides that a civil action for damages in cases provided under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which may also
constitute criminal offenses, may proceed independently of the
criminal action. In instances where an independent civil action is
permitted, the result of the criminal action, whether of acquittal or
conviction, is entirely irrelevant to the civil action.
 Exercise
On June 28, 2004, James Walter Capili was charged with the crime of bigamy before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla
Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or
annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Capili filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil
case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City
filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and
void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the
civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case. Is he correct? What is Capili was able to obtain a
court ruling that the first marriage was void, can he still be charged with bigamy?
Capili v. People
G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
Capili is not correct. The elements of a prejudicial question are: 1) the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; 2) the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil action, the quilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and
3) jurisdiction to try the said question must be lodged in another tribunal. All these elements need to be
present for a prejudicial question to exist.

In the instant case, the first and second elements are missing. The civil case for nullification of marriage
and the criminal case for bigamy are not intimately related. The civil case has the issue of whether or not
the second marriage is valid. The criminal case has the issue of whether or not Capili should be held liable
for bigamy since he contracted a second marriage at the time that his first marriage was subsisting. Both
cases can proceed independently of each other.

The second element is likewise missing. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of Capili’s marriage to
his first wife had no bearing upon the determination of Capili’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. In the instant case,
Capili v. People
G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
Capili is likewise not correct in his contention that if the civil case declares the second marriage null and
void, then he is exculpated of the crime of bigamy. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the
accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage
was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy
is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, viz.:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would
only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
What is the difference between juridical
capacity and capacity to act?

Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness

to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through
death.

Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with

legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
What are the restrictions on capacity to
act?
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and
do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit

capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and
trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this
Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is
not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
Natural Persons
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with
the conditions specified in the following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered
born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not
deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after
its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
In Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014:

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to
life.

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law,
is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular
law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of
men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section
1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
 When does life begin?
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of
Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no
surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently
disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
Is conception synonymous to
fertilization?

Does conception refer to the

"implantation" of the fertilized
ovum in the uterus?
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of

becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results
in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human
life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions
 Does an unborn child have legal
personality?
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, it was
written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the
State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial
interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred
to, or cited, as a baby or a child.
 Exercise
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of
respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity
Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child.
Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on
5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.
According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006,
the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.
 Exercise
Continental Steel denied his claims for bereavement leave and other
death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code,
contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the
unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned
that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus
that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead
could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support,
nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Who is correct?
 Continental Steel Mfg. Corp. v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of
the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to
act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or
incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The
rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latter’s death.
 Do you need juridical personality to die?
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do
not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.

Note: juridical personality is synonymous to civil

personality and legal personality)
Is life synonymous to civil personality?

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.
Also,
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA.
As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on
another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the
power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition, even an
unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not
have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon
its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in
the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister
of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for
the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must
have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense,
which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more

persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which
of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior
to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof,
it is presumed that they died at the same time and there
shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.
Exercise
Kulasa filed a case for damages against B&S Construction Supply. B&S
Construction Supply is a single proprietorship owned and managed by Inteng.
Will the case prosper?

No, the case will not prosper because a single proprietorship

does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law
does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole
proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court.
Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may
be parties to a civil action and every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest. (G.R.
No. 172595, April 10, 2008)
Exercise
Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may
be parties in a civil action as Per Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Thus only natural or juridical persons have the
personality to sue.

1. Are generations yet unborn equipped with personality to sue?

2. Do resident marine mammals of the protected seascape Tañon
Strait, e.g., toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other
cetacean species have the personality to sue?
Rules in Environmental Cases
1. In Oposa v. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993), the
Supreme Court allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.”

2. Any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature can bring suit to

enforce Philippine environmental laws. Corollarily, as stewards of
Resident Marine Mammals, has the personality to sue to enforce
our environmental laws (Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Strait
v. DENR Secretary Angeles, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015).
Article 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to
which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of
each shareholder, partner or member. (35a)
Article 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article
are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a)
Article 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all
kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions,
in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.
(38a)

Article 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and

other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of
article 44, their property and other assets shall be disposed of in
pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been
specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be
applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province,
city or municipality which during the existence of the institution
derived the principal benefits from the same.
 Exercise
The Association of Flood Victims "is a non-profit and non-partisan
organization in the process of formal incorporation, the primary
purpose of which is for the benefit of the common or general interest
of many flood victims who are so numerous that it is impracticable to
join all as parties,“. Hernandez, the president of the Association of
Flood Victims and in behalf of the association, filed a case against
COMELEC to compel the latter to recognize it as a party-list group
capable of vying a seat in Congress.

Does the Association of Flood Victims have capacity to sue?

 ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR
HERNANDEZ vs.COMELEC, G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014
Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated association not endowed
with a distinct personality of its own. An unincorporated association, in the absence
of an enabling law, has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of
the association. Such unincorporated association is not a legal entity distinct from
its members. If an association, like petitioner Association of Flood Victims, has no
juridical personality, then all members of the association must be made parties in
the civil action. In this case, other than his bare allegation that he is the lead
convenor of the Association of Flood Victims, petitioner Hernandez showed no proof
that he was authorized by said association. Aside from petitioner Hernandez, no
other member was made signatory to the petition. Only petitioner Hernandez signed
the Verification and Sworn Certification Against Forum Shopping,7 stating that he
caused the preparation of the petition. There was no accompanying document
showing that the other members of the Association of Flood Victims authorized
petitioner Hernandez to represent them and the association in the petition.
 ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR
HERNANDEZ vs.COMELEC, G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014
Article44 of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical persons.
Under said Article, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it
a personality separate and distinct from that of its members.

Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated association not endowed

with a distinct personality of its own. An unincorporated association, in the absence
of an enabling law, has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of
the association. Such unincorporated association is not a legal entity distinct from
its members. If an association, like petitioner Association of Flood Victims, has no
juridical personality, then all members of the association must be made parties in
the civil action. Hernandez showed no proof that he was authorized by said
association.
Citizenship and Domicile
Article 48. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who were citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of the Philippines;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
said Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines;
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship;
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law

Article 49. Naturalization and the loss and reacquisition of citizenship of the
Philippines are governed by special laws. (n)
Article IV, 1987 Constitution
Citizenship
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
Where is your domicile?

Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of
their habitual residence.

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any

other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the
same shall be understood to be the place where their legal
representation is established or where they exercise their
principal functions.
Exercise

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March
8, 1995. Her contender filed a petition to disqualify her since she is not a resident of Leyte
for at least one year. While she was born and raised in Leyte, she left Leyte and worked in
Manila. She married Ferdinand Marcos who is a resident of Ilocos Norte and San Juan, Metro
Manila. Her contender argues that n account of her marriage, she is a resident of Ilocos
Norte or San Juan. Imelda would go to Leyte to celebrate birthdays and special occasions
such as fiesta. She maintains a house there, as well as a conjugal house in San Juan, Metro
Manila.

What is the residence of Imelda as per civil law?

What is the residence of Imelda as per election law?
Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil
rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic this
court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure,
one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place" or animus manendi, AND intention of
returning there permanently or animus revertendi.
Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of
an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person
in a given area, community or country.

The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that

residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal
for an individual to have different residences in various places.
Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various
reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to

indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of
domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
RESIDENCE DOMICILE

place of abode, whether permanent or fixed permanent residence to which,

temporary when absent, one has the intention of
returning
Animus manendi Animus manendi + Animus revertendi

As many residences as one wants Only one domicile

Can never be domicile Residence coupled with intent to return

 Stark difference in the meaning of residence in
civil code, in election laws, and in the rules of
court for purposes of determining venue
 Domicile and residence under the civil code are two different
concepts (see table)

 In election laws, the word residence is equivalent to domicile. There

are three concepts of domicile under our election laws: domicile of
origin, domicile by operation of law, and domicile by choice.

 In ROC, residence=domicile=actual residence or place of abode

For purposes of civil procedure under your ROC:
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant.“(Quiazon, et. Al., v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013)
For purposes of civil procedure under your ROC:
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that
for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus
defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. (Quiazon, et. Al., v.
Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013)