Lacson v. Executive Secretary (1999)
Lacson v. Executive Secretary (1999)
Lacson v. Executive Secretary (1999)
*
G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999.
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* EN BANC.
299
300
by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must
present proof of arbitrariness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.—It
is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class, all of which are present in this case.
Same; Same; The classification between those pending cases involving
the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose
cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction under Republic Act 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction
that makes real differences.—The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness
of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced
and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where
trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against
them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy
in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot
now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from
those similarly situated as them.
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302
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural
matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being
a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; The mode of procedure provided for in the
statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post
facto laws.—Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a
two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by
the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already
been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal
is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law.
The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not
included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains
only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does
not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty
and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did
not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.
Same; Statutes; Bills; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; The expansion in
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does
not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
necessary consequence of the amendments; The requirement that every bill
must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve.—The challenged law does not violate the
one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed
on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines” the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to “expand” its jurisdiction. The
expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered
as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because
such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the
title is compre-
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MARTINEZ, J.:
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1 Rollo, p. 43
2 Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, Annex “B,” Petition; Rollo,
pp. 32-34, 44.
307
3
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, the
Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of
4
the Ombudsman’s action.
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman 5
filed on
March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an
accessory, together with Romeo
6
Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
others. One of the accused was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
7
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend that
the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or more of the “principal accused” are government
officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has
the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at
least SG 27. 8
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on
May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman
and de Leon concurring, and Justices Bala-
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3 Their motion states that they have been deprived of their right to file their
respective motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s final resolution.
4 Annex “C,” Petition—Sandiganbayan Order dated November 27, 1995; Rollo,
pp. 37-38.
5 Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 39-41.
6 Inspector Alvarez.
7 Entitled “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of
The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As
Amended.”
8 Annex “E,” Petition; Rollo, p. 42.
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9
jadia and Garchitorena dissenting, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has
the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for
a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution,
and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing
of the
10
amended informations
11
on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299 and No. 1094 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate
12
Bill No. 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were
introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to
amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
“principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A.
13
No. 8249 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
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9 Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice De Leon were designated as special
members of the Division pursuant to SB Administrative Order No. 121-96 dated
March 26, 1996.
10 Annex “F,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 113-123.
11 Annex “F-1,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 124-134.
12 Annex “G,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 135-145.
13 Annex “A,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 28, 31. The law is entitled,
“AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.” It took effect on February 25, 1997.
309
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“a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors
thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which
petitioner’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction
thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the
Sandiganbayan has footdragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a
pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial
Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
petitioner’s vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
“b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was
again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner’s cases
were under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in
Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try
them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural
due process.
“c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
“innocuous” provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather
than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the
one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section
17
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.”
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over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those
in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office
as may be determined by law.”
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21 Took effect on June 11, 1978; See Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 229 [1994].
22 Took effect on December 10, 1978; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
23 “Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. (See also Natividad vs. Felix, 229
SCRA 685-686 [1994]).
24 Took effect on January 14, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
25 Took effect on March 23, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
26 Approved on March 30, 1995 and took effect on May 16, 1995; People v.
Magallanes, 249 SCRA 224 [1995]; Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 757
[1997].
27 Approved on February 5, 1995.
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315
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant
to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section
2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
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317
“SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial
has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.”
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28 This is the rank stated in paragraph c (second par.), Section 2 of R.A. 7975,
while in paragraph a(1) (e) of said Section 2, the rank is “chief superintendent” or
higher.
29 Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and 8249.
318
30 Items (a), (b), and (c) are taken from paragraph a, Section 4 of R.A. 8249.
31 Paragraph c, Section 4, R.A. 8249.
32 The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual when the
complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
319
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33 “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws” (Section 1,
Article III, 1987 Constitution).
34 Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164.
35 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343; People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939); People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56; Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703; Philippine Association of
Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988).
320
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part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan for their
participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is
stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against
those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the
hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the
Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased
against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67
million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word
“principal” in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and
39
of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. R.A. 8249, while still a
bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by
about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the
Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of
the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly
had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same
would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise
valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings
was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the
committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the
Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its
plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the
Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
40
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases
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41
constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right
to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-
tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post
42
facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one—
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes
such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it
was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed;
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the
43
defendant;
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
44
disadvantage.
41 “No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted” (Section 22, Article
VI, 1987 Constitution).
42 Penned by Chief Justice Chase (3 Dall. 386, 390); Black, Constitutional Law,
595, cited in Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995 ed., p. 247.
43 Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1903) and U.S. v. Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766, 770,
cited in Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands, Part II, 1991 ed., p. 513.
44 This kind of ex post facto law appeared in Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1,
5 (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 520) cited in People v. Sandiganbayan, 211
SCRA 241.
323
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45 En banc cases of In Re Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970); Mejia v.
Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457; Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686; People v. Sandiganbayan,
211 SCRA 241.
46 Wright v. CA, 235 SCRA 341; Juarez v. CA, 214 SCRA 475; Pascual v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344; See also Katigbak v. Solicitor General, 180
SCRA 540 citing Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 6 SCRA 1059; Republic v. Agoncillo, 40
SCRA 579, and dela Cruz v. Better Living, Inc., 78 SCRA 274.
47 Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 367 (1937).
48 Hernandez v. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 102.
49 Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 334 Phil. 346.
50 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137
SCRA 63; Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433; De Guzman v. People,
December 15, 1982.
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to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule
is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such
requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general
subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the
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law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in
employing the word “define” in the title of the law, acted within its
powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself
empowers the legislative body to “define, prescribe, and apportion
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the jurisdiction of various courts.”
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject
amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural
application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we
shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein
petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint
or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
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determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and
62
not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
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63 Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, pp. 232-233; People vs. Magallanes, supra, p. 220.
64 108 Phil. 613 [1960].
65 See also Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 233 [1994] and People vs. Magallanes, 249
SCRA 221 [1995].
66 See Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, and People vs. Magallanes, supra.
327
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no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case,
we find the amended informations for murder against herein
petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to
show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged
and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
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informations for murder reads:
“AMENDED INFORMATION
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70 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Criminal Procedure, p. 77, cited in Balitaan vs.
Court of First Instance of Batangas, 115 SCRA 739 [1982].
71 The eleven (11) amended informations were couched uniformly except for the names of
the victims.
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alleged therein that the said accessories concealed “the crime herein-
above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were
no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, on or about the
early dawn of May 18, 1995.” The sudden mention of the arrests
made during the raid conducted by the accused” surprises the reader.
There is no indication in the amended information that the victim
was one of those arrested by the accused during the “raid.” Worse,
the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted “at Superville
Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila” but, as alleged in the
immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the
shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City.” How the raid, arrests and shooting
happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again,
while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said
accessories committed the offense “in relation to office as officers
and members of the (PNP),” we, however, do not see the intimate
connection between the offense charged and the accused’s official
functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was,
sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the
amended information that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is
merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show
the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of
the accused’s official duties.
72
In People vs. Magallanes, where the jurisdiction between the
Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
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Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and x x x special
policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then
established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x x supervision
and control where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints
and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to
arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to
the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of
Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office
of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and
would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the
accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there was an
intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
“Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and
15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the
purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted,
kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not
the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.”
332
Constitutionality sustained.
73 Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides: “Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.” See also People v. Magallanes, 249
SCRA 223 [1995].
333
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