Lacson v. Executive Secretary (1999)

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VOL.

301, JANUARY 20, 1999 297


Ituralde vs. Falcasantos

298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

*
G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999.

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE


SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO
MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-


intervenors.

Constitutional Law; Statutes; Every law has in its favor the


presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative one.—The established rule is that every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies
with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not
convincingly discharged in the present case.
Courts; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; Requisites for a Case to Fall
Within the Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.--A perusal
of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A.
3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee holding any of the posi-

_______________

* EN BANC.

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tions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed


is in relation to the office.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Republic Act 8249; Under Section 4, par.
b of Republic Act 8249, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is
the official position or rank of the offender; In enacting Republic Act 8249,
the Congress simply restored the original provisions of Presidential Decree
1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer
as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.—
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with
murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal
Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph
a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to
“other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a
of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office.” The phrase “other
offenses or felonies” is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accused’s official functions.
Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender—that is, whether
he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same
Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the
accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice
or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the
original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal
participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; Statutes; Statutory
Construction; Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable—
the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.—
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
violate their right to equal protection of the law because its enactment was
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the
Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration
of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of
the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification
made

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by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must
present proof of arbitrariness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.—It
is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class, all of which are present in this case.
Same; Same; The classification between those pending cases involving
the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose
cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction under Republic Act 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction
that makes real differences.—The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness
of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced
and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where
trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against
them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy
in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot
now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from
those similarly situated as them.

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

Same; Statutes; Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; The Congress, in its


plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to
invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.—On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices
allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same
would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law.
Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the
graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a
member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear
before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; Words and Phrases; “Ex Post Facto
Laws,” Explained.—This contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post
facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one—(a) which
makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or (b) which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or (c)
which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed; (d) which alters the legal
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant; (e) every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. This
Court added two more to the list, namely: (f) that which assumes to regulate
civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation
of a right which when done was lawful; (g) deprives a person accused of
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 8249 is not a penal law—it is a
substantive law on jurisdiction, and not being a penal law, its retroactive
application cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.—Ex post facto law,
generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal
law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural
matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being
a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; The mode of procedure provided for in the
statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post
facto laws.—Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a
two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by
the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already
been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal
is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law.
The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not
included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains
only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does
not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty
and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did
not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.
Same; Statutes; Bills; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; The expansion in
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does
not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
necessary consequence of the amendments; The requirement that every bill
must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve.—The challenged law does not violate the
one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed
on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines” the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to “expand” its jurisdiction. The
expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered
as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because
such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the
title is compre-

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hensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general


purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule is liberally interpreted
and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is
here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A.
8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the
provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in
employing the word “define” in the title of the law, acted within its powers
since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the
legislative body to “define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts.”
Courts; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and Practice; The jurisdiction of a
court is defined by the Constitution or statute, and the elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain
which court has jurisdiction over a case.—The jurisdiction of a court is
defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must
appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and
not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Right to be Informed; It is essential
that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as “he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.”—The noble object of written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: “The object of this
written accusations was—First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense; and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that
this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of
law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set
forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

necessary to constitute the crime charged.” (Emphasis supplied) It is


essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are
imputed to him, as “he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere allegation in the amended
information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in
relation to his office is not sufficient—that phrase is merely a conclusion of
law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the
offense charged and the discharge of the accused’s official duties.—The
stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as
will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to
have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We
believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense
was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not
sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment
that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the
discharge of the accused’s official duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy
between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of
the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed
in relation to public office.—In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it
is noteworthy that the phrase “committed in relation to public office” does
not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not
what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling
is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the
close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the
commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having
been committed in relation to public office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is failure to show in the
informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused Philippine National Police
officers, the offense charged is plain murder and, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.—Consequently, for failure
to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense


charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and


Mandamus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


     Fotun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner.
     Chavez, Laureta & Associates for petitioners-intervenors.
     Free Legal Assistance Group for private respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249


—an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
—is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo
Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties’
pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons
believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly
an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of
bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The
ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic
Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime
Commis-

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

sion—Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief


Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command
(CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-
intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May
18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators
headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved
from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel
allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that
1
the said incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman, except for the
withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was
among those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for
2
murder before the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-the-fact.

___________________

1 Rollo, p. 43
2 Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, Annex “B,” Petition; Rollo,
pp. 32-34, 44.

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3
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, the
Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of
4
the Ombudsman’s action.
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman 5
filed on
March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an
accessory, together with Romeo
6
Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
others. One of the accused was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
7
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend that
the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or more of the “principal accused” are government
officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has
the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at
least SG 27. 8
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on
May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman
and de Leon concurring, and Justices Bala-
________________

3 Their motion states that they have been deprived of their right to file their
respective motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s final resolution.
4 Annex “C,” Petition—Sandiganbayan Order dated November 27, 1995; Rollo,
pp. 37-38.
5 Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 39-41.
6 Inspector Alvarez.
7 Entitled “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of
The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As
Amended.”
8 Annex “E,” Petition; Rollo, p. 42.

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

9
jadia and Garchitorena dissenting, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has
the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for
a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution,
and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing
of the
10
amended informations
11
on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299 and No. 1094 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate
12
Bill No. 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were
introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to
amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
“principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A.
13
No. 8249 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.

___________________
9 Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice De Leon were designated as special
members of the Division pursuant to SB Administrative Order No. 121-96 dated
March 26, 1996.
10 Annex “F,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 113-123.
11 Annex “F-1,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 124-134.
12 Annex “G,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 135-145.
13 Annex “A,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 28, 31. The law is entitled,
“AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.” It took effect on February 25, 1997.

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Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a


14
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special
Prosecutor, ruling that it “stands pat in its resolution dated May 8,
1996.”
15
On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM
to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which
reads:

“After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou


concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and
dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the
President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering
the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are
now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor’s
motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his
concurring and dissenting opinion.
x x x     x x x     x x x
“Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP
Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and
Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases—in
fact, no order of arrest has been issued—this court has competence to take
cognizance of these cases.
“To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3
to 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases and by the
unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained
16
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.” [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said
law “shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as of the approval hereof.” Petitioner argues that:

_________________

14 Rollo, pp. 162-171.


15 March 5, 1997.
16 Rollo, pp. 214, 216-219.

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310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

“a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors
thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which
petitioner’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction
thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the
Sandiganbayan has footdragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a
pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial
Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
petitioner’s vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
“b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was
again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner’s cases
were under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in
Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try
them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural
due process.
“c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
“innocuous” provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather
than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the
one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section
17
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.”

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add


that “while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have
merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the
character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended
to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case
18
pending before the Sandiganbayan.” They further argued that if
their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural
due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the

_________________

17 Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 10-11.


18 Petition-In-Intervention, p. 9; Rollo, p. 236.

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under


R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General
filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the
challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both
the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
19
This Court then issued a Resolution requiring the parties to file
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from
notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the
subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-
23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of
the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act
No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing
the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach20
of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of proving the
invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden,
we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present
case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
“SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known
as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction

_________________

19 Dated December 15, 1998.


20 Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in Padilla v. Court of Appeals and People, 269 SCRA 402,
citing Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30.

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those
in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office
as may be determined by law.”

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution


under the following provision in Article XI, Section 4:

“Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall


continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.”

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No.


21
1486 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on
the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
22 23 24
1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860,
25 26 27
P.D. No. 1861, R.A. No. 7975, and R.A. No. 8249. Under the
latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

_________________

21 Took effect on June 11, 1978; See Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 229 [1994].
22 Took effect on December 10, 1978; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
23 “Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. (See also Natividad vs. Felix, 229
SCRA 685-686 [1994]).
24 Took effect on January 14, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
25 Took effect on March 23, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
26 Approved on March 30, 1995 and took effect on May 16, 1995; People v.
Magallanes, 249 SCRA 224 [1995]; Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 757
[1997].
27 Approved on February 5, 1995.

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

“SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is


hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of


regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang


panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’


and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;

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314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the


Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ or
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.

“b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other


crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
“In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
“The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
“The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor,

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant
to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x     x x x     x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

“SEC. 7. Transitory provision.—This act shall apply to all cases pending in


any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section
2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

“SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as


amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang


panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads;

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316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang


panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’


and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ or
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.

“b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and


employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
“In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on


appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts
where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade ‘27,’ or not
otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
x x x     x x x     x x x
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x     x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

“SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial
has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.”

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word


“principal” before the word “accused” appearing in the above-
quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It
is due to this deletion of the word “principal” that the parties herein
are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the
Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over
the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under
28
the amended information has the rank of Superintendent or higher.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the
29
29
Supreme Court except in certain cases, contends that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.

________________

28 This is the rank stated in paragraph c (second par.), Section 2 of R.A. 7975,
while in paragraph a(1) (e) of said Section 2, the rank is “chief superintendent” or
higher.
29 Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and 8249.

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318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to


fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a
violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
30
(the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A,
31
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a
32
public official or employee holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense
committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being
charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII
of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4
of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to “other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
[Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office.” The phrase “other
offenses or felonies” is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accused’s official
functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender—that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section
_________________

30 Items (a), (b), and (c) are taken from paragraph a, Section 4 of R.A. 8249.
31 Paragraph c, Section 4, R.A. 8249.
32 The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual when the
complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

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VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 319


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the


accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress
simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not
mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite
to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law33 because its
enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were
presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress
and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must
34
present proof of arbitrariness.
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty
of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;


(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
35
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class;

________________
33 “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws” (Section 1,
Article III, 1987 Constitution).
34 Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164.
35 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343; People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939); People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56; Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703; Philippine Association of
Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988).

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320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the


presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the
questioned provisions. The classification between those pending
cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval
of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
36
differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not
yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted
their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
37
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can
be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a
remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and
intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them
under a different category from those similarly situated as them.
Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to “all
cases involving” certain public officials and, under the transitory
provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary
to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly
directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory
provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan
but also in “any court.” It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng
cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases
where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory
provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy
reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the

______________

36 Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164.


37 See Fabian v. Aniano A. Desierto, as Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129742, Sept. 16,
1998.

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

38
part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan for their
participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is
stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against
those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the
hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the
Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased
against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67
million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word
“principal” in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and
39
of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. R.A. 8249, while still a
bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by
about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the
Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of
the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly
had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same
would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise
valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings
was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the
committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the
Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its
plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the
Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
40
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases
__________________

38 Senator Raul Roco and Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena


and Justice Jose Balajadia.
39 Petition, p. 17.
40 Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution provides: “The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”

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322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

41
constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right
to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-
tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post
42
facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one—

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes
such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it
was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed;
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the
43
defendant;
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
44
disadvantage.

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies


only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
which when done was lawful;
___________________

41 “No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted” (Section 22, Article
VI, 1987 Constitution).
42 Penned by Chief Justice Chase (3 Dall. 386, 390); Black, Constitutional Law,
595, cited in Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995 ed., p. 247.
43 Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1903) and U.S. v. Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766, 770,
cited in Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands, Part II, 1991 ed., p. 513.
44 This kind of ex post facto law appeared in Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1,
5 (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 520) cited in People v. Sandiganbayan, 211
SCRA 241.

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful


protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
45
proclamation of amnesty.
46
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.
R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
47
their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature,
48
and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D.
1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal
and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not
a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all
49
kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a two-
tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted
by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention
50
has already been rejected by the court several times considering
that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature
that can be regulated by law.

_________________
45 En banc cases of In Re Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970); Mejia v.
Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457; Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686; People v. Sandiganbayan,
211 SCRA 241.
46 Wright v. CA, 235 SCRA 341; Juarez v. CA, 214 SCRA 475; Pascual v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344; See also Katigbak v. Solicitor General, 180
SCRA 540 citing Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 6 SCRA 1059; Republic v. Agoncillo, 40
SCRA 579, and dela Cruz v. Better Living, Inc., 78 SCRA 274.
47 Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 367 (1937).
48 Hernandez v. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 102.
49 Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 334 Phil. 346.
50 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137
SCRA 63; Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433; De Guzman v. People,
December 15, 1982.

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324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal


51
is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A.
8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto
law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come
52
within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of
53
evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved
54
at the time of their passage.
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to
55
appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. On the
removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still
has the power of review to determine if the presumption of
56
innocence has been convincingly overcome.
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-
one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed
on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines” the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to
“expand” its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill
57
must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the
title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects
related

_________________

51 Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, supra.


52 People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186.
53 Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680.
54 Oñas v. Sandiganbayan, 178 SCRA 261.
55 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 cited in Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
56 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137
SCRA 63.
57 Section 26(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution reads “Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.”

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

58
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule
is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such
requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general
subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the
59
law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in
employing the word “define” in the title of the law, acted within its
powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself
empowers the legislative body to “define, prescribe, and apportion
60
the jurisdiction of various courts.”
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject
amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural
application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we
shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein
petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint
or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
61
61
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and
62
not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.

_______________

58 Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208.


59 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 291.
60 Sec. 2, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution provides: “The Congress shall have the power
to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.”
61 People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, 222 [1995], citing Republic vs.
Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211 [1994].
62 People vs. Magallanes, ibid., citing U.S. vs. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366 [1913]; People
vs. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 501 [1935]; People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA 218 [1978].

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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and


intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249.
Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by
the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan
63
to have jurisdiction over it. This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution
which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over
criminal cases committed by public officers and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, “in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.” This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution
when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan “shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.”
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the
offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of
the accused PNP officers.
64
In People vs. Montejo, we held that an offense is said to have
been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
“intimately connected” with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
65
functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and
the discharge66
of official duties “must be alleged in the
information.”
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information,
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

“SEC. 9. Cause of accusation—The acts or omissions complained of as


constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and

_________________

63 Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, pp. 232-233; People vs. Magallanes, supra, p. 220.
64 108 Phil. 613 [1960].
65 See also Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 233 [1994] and People vs. Magallanes, 249
SCRA 221 [1995].
66 See Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, and People vs. Magallanes, supra.

327

VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 327


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the


statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.” (Emphasis
supplied)

As early as 1954, we pronounced that “the factor that characterizes


67
the charge is the actual recital of the facts.” “The real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
68
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.”
The noble object of written accusations cannot be
69
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:

“The object of this written accusations was—First. To furnish the accused


with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make
his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In order that
this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of
law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set
forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged.” (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts


that are imputed to him, as “he is presumed to have

_________________

67 People vs. Cosare, 95 Phil. 657, 660 [1954].


68 People vs. Mendoza, 175 SCRA 743.
69 3 Phil. 223, 226 [1904]. See also Matilde v. Jobson, 68 SCRA 456, [December
29, 1975]; People v. Labado, 98 SCRA 730, 747 [July 24, 1980], cited in Bernas, The
Constitution of the Philippines—A Commentary, Vol. 1, 1987 Edition, p. 386.

328

328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

70
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case,
we find the amended informations for murder against herein
petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to
show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged
and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
71
informations for murder reads:

“AMENDED INFORMATION

“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman


hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP.
ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL,
INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4
ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT.
JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR.,
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II,
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO,
SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN,
SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO
LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
“That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO

________________

70 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Criminal Procedure, p. 77, cited in Balitaan vs.
Court of First Instance of Batangas, 115 SCRA 739 [1982].
71 The eleven (11) amended informations were couched uniformly except for the names of
the victims.

329

VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 329


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P.


ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG and SPO1 OSMUNDO B.
CARINO all taking advantage of their public and official positions as
officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the
acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to
kill and using firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
“That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT.
ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR
SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO,
CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES,
SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the
acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National
Police, are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the
crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there
were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila on or about the early
dawn of May 18, 1995.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named


principal accused committed the crime of murder “in relation to their
public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was
intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police
officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that
the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed
the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of
herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-
fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is

330

330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

alleged therein that the said accessories concealed “the crime herein-
above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were
no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, on or about the
early dawn of May 18, 1995.” The sudden mention of the arrests
made during the raid conducted by the accused” surprises the reader.
There is no indication in the amended information that the victim
was one of those arrested by the accused during the “raid.” Worse,
the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted “at Superville
Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila” but, as alleged in the
immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the
shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City.” How the raid, arrests and shooting
happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again,
while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said
accessories committed the offense “in relation to office as officers
and members of the (PNP),” we, however, do not see the intimate
connection between the offense charged and the accused’s official
functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was,
sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the
amended information that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is
merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show
the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of
the accused’s official duties.
72
In People vs. Magallanes, where the jurisdiction between the
Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

_________________

72 249 SCRA 212, 222-223 [1995].

331

VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 331


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

“It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in


the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
“In People vs. Montejo (108 Phil. 613 [1960]), where the amended
information alleged

Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and x x x special
policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then
established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x x supervision
and control where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints
and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to
arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to
the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of
Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office
of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and
would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the
accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there was an
intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
“Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and
15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the
purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted,
kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not
the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.”

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the


phrase “committed in relation to public office” does not appear in
the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the

332

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 332


Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual


allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy
between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the
commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations
that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
73
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos.
23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said
cases.
SO ORDERED.

          Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,


Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Constitutionality sustained.

Notes.—Continued incarceration after the twelve year period


when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
_______________

73 Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides: “Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.” See also People v. Magallanes, 249
SCRA 223 [1995].

333

VOL. 301, JANUARY 21, 1999 333


Mallorca vs. Panopio

accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly


convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with
equal protection. (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
37 SCRA 420 [1971])
The non-prosecution of another suspect provides no ground for
the accused to fault the decision of the trial court convict-ing him.
(People vs. Goce, 247 SCRA 780 [1995])

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