EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-20700. February 27, 1969.]

FIDEL TEODORO , petitioner, vs. FELIX MACARAEG and COURT OF

AGRARIAN RELATIONS, Second Regional District, Sala II ,
respondents.

Jose A. Buendia and Agustin A. Pelmoka for petitioner.

Jesus A. Garcia for respondent Felix Macaraeg.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; AGRICULTURAL TENANCY LAW;

PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS THEREOF. — The following could be synthesized as the
principal elements of a leasehold tenancy contract or relation: 1. The object of the
contract or the relationship is an agricultural land which is leased or rented for the
purpose of agricultural production; 2. The size of the landholding must be such that it is
susceptible of personal cultivation by a single person with assistance from the
members of his immediate farm household; 3. The tenant-lessee must actually and
personally till, cultivate or operate said land, solely or with the aid of labor from his
immediate farm household; and 4. The landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owner or
the legal possessor of the land, leases the same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain
or ascertainable either in an amount of money or produce.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. — The landholding in dispute is
unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural production. More speci cally,
the parties stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural
enterprise only" (italics supplied). Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the
farmland must be used for rice production as could be inferred from the stipulation
that "the rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one agricultural year . . . must
be of the same variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE" (italics supplied). The
land is de nitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an area only four
and a half (4 1/2) hectares. This Court has held that even a bigger area may be
cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or with the help of the members of his
immediate farm household. From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same
variety as that produced by the LESSEE," it can be reasonably inferred that the intention
of the parties was that Macaraeg personally work the land, which he did as found by the
Agrarian Court. Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he
delivered the possession thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be
paid in produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold tenancy agreement. Moreover,
the provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce - 9 cavans per hectare -
is an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties did
actually enter into a leasehold tenancy relation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIXING DURATION OF LEASE CONTRACT DOES NOT NEGATE
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP. — The mere fact that the parties xed and limited the
duration of their lease contract to only one agricultural year, does not remove the
relationship which they created from the purview of leasehold tenancy, considering the
general import of their agreement which irreversibly leads to and clearly justi es
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 tenancy coverage. It is fundamental that the tenant-lessee's security of tenure subsists
notwithstanding the termination of the contract which initially established the tenancy
relation. In the language of the law, the "expiration of the period of the contract as xed
by the parties, and the tenancy relationship which is maintained and governed by law."
Furthermore, Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act does not permit the parties to
stipulate at what future time the tenant shall leave or surrender the land.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AGREEMENT TO RETURN AFTER ONE CROP YEAR,
PROHIBITED. — This Court has held that an agreement whereby the tenant was required
to return to the landlord his landholding after one crop year cannot justify the tenant's
dispossession after the said period because such agreement is expressly proscribed
by law.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF LANDHOLDER TO FREELY CONTRACT; SAID RIGHT
HAS NOT BEEN JUDICIALLY NEGATED IN INSTANT CASE. — This Court frowns upon
and rejects any attempt to nullify the legitimate exercise of the right to contract. We
agree with Teodoro that as a landholder he has full liberty to enter into a civil lease
contract covering his property. What we want to indelibly impress, however, is that once
a landowner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to
agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by
the lessee, solely or with the help of labor coming from his immediate farm household,
then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement, and perforce
comes under the direct coverage of the tenancy laws. Otherwise, it would be easy to
subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of
protecting the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the unscrupulous
schemes and pernicious practices of the landed gentry.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT THEREOF. — A tenant's offer or intention to
surrender his leasehold on the condition that the person named by him should be
accepted as his successor, does not of itself constitute abandonment of his farmland.
The act of abandonment constitutes actual, absolute and irrevocable desertion of one's
right or property.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER NOT GUILTY THEREOF. — In the case at bar,
Macaraeg merely intended to vacate his leasehold possession on the condition that a
certain Claus be taken as his successor. Hence, his act did not constitute desertion of
his leasehold as it was a mere intended surrender of the same. It is "only through the
actual surrender of the land that tenancy relation terminates; no amount of intention to
surrender severes the relationship." Furthermore, the said act of Macaraeg was not an
absolute renunciation of his leasehold possession, as it was in fact'clearly conditional.
8. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF LANDLORD TO TENANT FOR DAMAGES; EARNINGS
OF TENANT DURING THE UNLAWFUL EJECTMENT NOT DEDUCTIBLE FROM AWARD
OF DAMAGES. — The Court hastens to modify, however, the award of damages in so far
as it deducts from the total amount recoverable by Macaraeg the sum of P30 or its
equivalent of 3 cavans of palay, representing his earnings during the period of his
unlawful ejectment. This part of the award contravenes Section 27 (1) of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act which makes the erring landlord "liable to the tenant for
damages to the extent of the landholder's participation in the harvest in addition to the
tenant's right under Section twenty two of the this Act." And Section 22(1) provides that
the "tenant shall be free to work elsewhere whenever the nature of his farm obligations
warrants his temporary absence from his holdings." Consequently, Macaraeg's measly
earning of P30 during the period of his dispossession should not be deducted from the
total amount of damages due to him.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 9. ID.; COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS; LIBERAL POLICY TOWARDS
PROCEDURE IN SAID COURT. — Attention must be centered on the liberal policy which
frees the Court of Agrarian Relations from the fetters of formalistic procedure. The
Court of Agrarian Relations is not "restricted to the speci c relief claimed or demands
made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter
or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further disputes, provided said matter for
determination has been established by competent evidence during the hearing"
(Section 11, Rep. Act 1267, as amended). The respondent court could have determined
Macaraeg's claim for damages even without his "supplemental petition," provided there
was proof to substantiate such claim (and such requisite evidence was not wanting).
Hence, if the agrarian court could have awarded damages in favor of Macaraeg even in
the absence of a speci c prayer, then there is no conceivable reason to bar the
respondent court from granting the same with the interposition of the aforesaid
"supplemental petition" which explicitly and unmistakably prays for damages resulting
from Macaraeg's dispossession.

DECISION

CASTRO , J : p

Before us for review, upon a petition for certiorari, are the decision of the
respondent Court of Agrarian Relations of September 7, 1962 in CAR case 558—Gba.
68 (Nueva Ecija), ordering the herein petitioner Fidel Teodoro to reinstate the herein
private respondent Felix Macaraeg (the petitioner in the agrarian court) to his "former
landholding . . . and to keep him as the true and lawful tenant in accordance with law,"
and the resolution of the same court of November 27, 1962 condemning Teodoro to
pay or deliver to Macaraeg as damages "82 cavans of palay or its equivalent value in the
amount of P820.00 computed at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, plus interest at 10% until
fully paid."
We turn to the factual milieu. cdphil

On June 7, 1961 Macaraeg led a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations
(Second Regional District, Sala II, Guimba, Nueva Ecija), praying, inter alia, that (1) an
interlocutory order be issued to restrain Teodoro and Jose Niegos (the respondents
below) from ejecting him from his landholding pending resolution of his petition; and
(2) after due trial, he be maintained as the lawful tenant in the disputed landholding.
Macaraeg alleged that he is a leasehold tenant of Teodoro cultivating a
farmholding situated in the municipality of Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, of an area of four (4)
hectares devoted to rice culture, and that he has worked said land "as a tenant for the
last seven years"; that on March 2, 1961 he received a letter from Teodoro and his wife
advising him that the aforesaid landholding will be given to another tenant, on the
pretext that he (Macaraeg) "is contracting to be a tenant of another in said landholding";
that forthwith, Teodoro placed a new tenant, Jose Niegos, in the disputed land; that
subsequently, Niegos repeatedly forbade him from working on said riceland; that in
order to avoid trouble, he refrained from forcibly entering the landholding, but with the
advent of the planting season, it became imperative that the agrarian court order his
reinstatement and restrain Teodoro and Niegos from committing further acts of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 dispossession.
In his answer with counterclaim dated June 19, 1961, Teodoro categorically
denied that Macaraeg was his tenant, claiming that "ever since he became the owner of
around 39 hectares of riceland in Kalisitan, Talugtug, N. Ecija, he had always leased all
of it under civil lease and he had never given any portion of it under tenancy." He further
alleged that after the expiration of his lease contract with Macaraeg in January, 1961,
his wife twice noti ed Macaraeg to renew his contract for the then incoming
agricultural year 1961-62, but the latter "verbally told Mrs. Teodoro that he was no
longer interested to work on the land and he was giving it up as he had left the place
already." Teodoro also claims that it was only after Macaraeg had abandoned the
farmland that he decided to lease it to Niegos.
On his part, Niegos seasonably answered, disclaiming any knowledge that
Macaraeg is the tenant of Teodoro, and averring that he "entered the landholding in
good faith clothed with the proper authority from the other respondent (Teodoro) and
with the consent and con rmity of the petitioner (Macaraeg) who allowed him to work
on the same"; and that Macaraeg "has no more interests in the cultivation of the
landholding as could be gleaned from his actuations, like the failure to clean the land
during the months of March and April, and his failure to prepare his seedbed in the
month of May which is the period for broadcasting seedling in the community."
On February 6, 1962, when the hearing of the present controversy was nearing
completion in the respondent agrarian court but before the case was submitted for
decision, Macaraeg led "supplemental petition," claiming damages as a result of his
dispossession. Said petition was given due course by the court commissioner and the
requisite hearing was set for March 9, 1962. Both Teodoro and Niegos interposed their
respective answers, identically asserting that the same was led out of time and that
the failure of Macaraeg to claim earlier his alleged damages amounted to a fatal
neglect which could no longer be cured at that very late stage of the proceedings.
Nonetheless, hearing on the said petition was held at which it was disclosed that as "a
result of his (Macaraeg's) ejectment, he became destitute" since he had no "income
except from those derived from transplanting and reaping wherein he earned the
amount of P30.00." It was further proved that "for the agricultural year 1961-62, Jose
Niegos realized a gross harvest of 110 cavans out of which he paid his rental to Fidel
Teodoro in the amount of 42 cavans and 23 kilos."
On September 7, 1962 the decision under review was rendered, with the
following dispositive portion:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of petitioner Felix Macaraeg and against respondents Fidel
Teodoro and Jose Niegos in the tenor and disposition hereinbelow provided, to
wit:
"1. Jose Niegos is hereby ordered to vacate the landholding in question
with an approximate area of four (4) hectares, situated at Barrio Kalisitan,
Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, in favor of herein petitioner and to refrain from molesting
or in any manner disturbing his peaceful possession and cultivation thereof,
subject to the condition that said respondent shall have harvested and threshed
his crop which he planted for the current agricultural year;

"2. Conformably with the preceding paragraph, Fidel Teodoro is hereby

ordered to reinstate said petitioner to his former landholding aforestated and to
keep him as the true and lawful tenant in accordance with law;
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 "3. Declaring Exhibit A as a leasehold tenancy contract between the
parties for the agricultural year 1960-61 as the term is understood under our
tenancy law; as a consequence hereof, Exhibit 4-Teodoro and Exhibit 5-Niegos, i.e.
contract of lease between Fidel Teodoro and Jose Niegos is hereby declared void
and of no legal effect; and

"4. Dismissing petitioner's claim for damages as embodied in his

supplemental petition."

Teodoro and Niegos led separate motions for reconsideration which were
denied by the respondent agrarian court in its resolution of November 27, 1962.
However, in the same resolution, the court a quo reconsidered, upon motion of
Macaraeg, its ruling denying the latter's prayer for damages, thus;
"With respect to petitioner's claim for damages as embodied in his
supplemental petition, wherein evidence was adduced in support thereof, we
believe that its admission is in accordance with Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines, same not being for the purpose of delaying the
proceedings. And, the fact that the Court of Agrarian Relations shall not be bound
strictly by the technical rules of evidence but 'shall act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case,' we believe that the evidence to support
the claim for damages received during the hearings before the court
commissioner is meritorious (Secs. 10 and 11, RA 1267, as amended). Hence,
petitioner is entitled to recover damages claimed by him from his landholder in
the amount of 85 cavans of palay which is equal to the two years rental of his
landholding less his earnings during the same period in the amount of P30.00
only or is equivalent to 3 cavans of palay. In ne, Fidel Teodoro is liable to pay to
petitioner the amount of 82 cavans of palay or its cash value of P820.00,
computed at P10.00 per cavan plus interest at 10% until fully paid."

After Teodoro's motion to reconsider the foregoing resolution was denied, he

interposed on January 5, 1963 the present petition, imputing to the court the following
errors:
1. In holding that Macaraeg became a tenant of Teodoro by virtue of
the "Contract of Lease" which they executed in April, 1960;

2. Assuming that the foregoing contract was in effect a leasehold

tenancy agreement making Macaraeg a tenant of Teodoro, in not nding the
former guilty of abandonment, an act which terminated their tenancy relation; and
3. In condemning Teodoro to pay damages to Macaraeg for the
alleged dispossession, despite the fact that the claim for damages embodied in
the abovementioned "Supplemental Petition" below were about to be terminated.

The pertinent provisions of the disputed "Contract of Lease" between Teodoro

and Macaraeg read as follows:
"That the LESSOR is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land
situated at Talugtug, Nueva Ecija containing an area of THIRTY NINE (39)
HECTARES, more or less;

"That for and in consideration of the rental of Nine (9) cavans of palay per
hectare for one agricultural year, the LESSOR hereby lets and leases and the
LESSEE hereby accepts an undivided portion of 4-1/2 Hectares of the
abovementioned property under the following terms and conditions:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 "1. That this contract of lease shall only be for the agricultural year
1960-61;
"2. That the Lessee shall give a guaranty to answer for the payment of
the lease consideration of this contract;

"3. That the rental of 38.7 cavans of palay per hectare shall be paid
unto the LESSOR not later than January, 1961;

"4. That the corresponding rental must be brought to the Poblacion of

Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, to be deposited to any bonded Warehouse at the expense of
the LESSEE and in the name of the LESSOR;
"5. That the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the
LESSEE;
"6. That the LESSOR shall pay for the real property taxes
corresponding to the property leased;
"7.That violation of any of the terms of this contract shall be su cient
ground to terminate the same with damages against the guilty party;
"8. That the property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural
enterprise only;
"9. That in case of default on the part of the LESSEE to pay the lease
consideration when the same becomes due and payable and the collection for the
same reaches the court, the LESSEE hereby binds himself to pay the cost of the
suit including reasonable attorney's fees." (Emphasis supplied).

I. Teodoro contends that the language and tenor of the aforesaid contract
clearly manifest the intention of the parties to enter into an ordinary civil lease contract,
not a leasehold tenancy agreement as alleged by Macaraeg and sustained by the
agrarian court. To start with, Teodoro stresses, the parties denominated the said
covenant as a "Contract of Lease," which assigned title discloses their mutual intention
to execute an ordinary lease contract, for, otherwise, if they had intended to create a
leasehold tenancy relation, they could have accordingly captioned their agreement "with
the word tenancy or some other word of similar import." Moreover, Teodoro points out
that "in the contract of lease in question it is signi cant to note that the words landlord
and tenant were conspicuous by their complete absence."
The foregoing stance assumed by Teodoro is patently untenable, in the face of
the principal features and stipulations of the contract in controversy and the pertinent
provisions of existing law on leasehold tenancy. It bears emphasis that the title, label or
rubric given to a contract cannot be used to camou age the real import of an
agreement as evinced by its main provisions. Moreover, it is basic that a contract is
what the law defines it to be, and not what it is called by the contracting parties. 1
As correctly expressed by the respondent court, "viewed from the four corners of
Exhibit A, we have no doubt that the lease contract entered into between petitioner
(Macaraeg) and Fidel Teodoro is a pure and simple leasehold tenancy contract as the
term is understood under our tenancy laws." This observation of the agrarian court
nds anchor in the pertinent provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act. Thus, Section 4
of Rep. Act 1199, as amended by Rep. Act 2263, provides that
"Leasehold tenancy exists when a person, who, either personally or with the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household,
undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a
single person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging
to or legally possessed by another in consideration of a xed amount in money or
in produce or in both.

Furthermore, Section 42 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act de nes a landlord-lessor

as
"Any person, natural or juridical, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary or
legal possessor of agricultural land, who lets, leases or rents to another said
property for purposes of agricultural production and for a price certain or
ascertainable either in an amount of money or produce";

while a tenant-lessee is defined as.

"any person who, with the consent of the former (landlord- lessor), tills,
cultivates or operates said land, susceptible of cultivation by one individual,
personally or with the aid of labor available from among his own immediate farm
household."

Gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the following could be synthesized as the
principal elements of a leasehold tenancy contract or relation:
1. The object of the contract or the relationship is an agricultural land
which is leased or rented for the purpose of agricultural production;
2. The size of the landholding must be such that it is susceptible of
personal cultivation by a single person with assistance from the members of his
immediate farm household;
3. T h e tenant-lessee must actually and personally till, cultivate or
operate said land, solely or with the aid of labor from his immediate farm
household; and
4. The landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owner or the legal
possessor of the land, leases the same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain or
ascertainable either in an amount of money or produce.

Reverting to the controverted "Contract of Lease," we are of the consensus that it

indubitably contains the foregoing essential elements of a leasehold tenancy
agreement.
The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to
agricultural production. More speci cally, the parties stipulated that " the property
leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural enterprise only." (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the farmland must be used for rice
production as could be inferred from the stipulation that "the rental of nine (9) cavans
of palay per hectare for one agricultural year . . . must be of the same variety (of palay)
as that produced by the LESSEE." (emphasis supplied)
The land is de nitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an
area of only four and a half (4-1/2) hectares. This court has held 2 that even a bigger
area may be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or with the help of the members
of his immediate farm household. prLL

From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 produced by the LESSEE," it can reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties
was that Macaraeg personally work the land, which he did as found by the Agrarian
Court, thus: "In the instant case, petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding
belonging to said respondent (Teodoro) for the agricultural year 1960- 61 in
consideration of a xed annual rental." (emphasis supplied) Moreover, there is no
evidence that Macaraeg did not personally cultivate the land in dispute. Neither did
Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg availed of outside assistance in the
cultivation of the said riceland.
Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the
possession thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in
produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold tenancy agreement. Moreover, the
provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce — 9 cavans per hectare — is
an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties did
actually enter into a leasehold tenancy relation.
Teodoro further argues, however, that the aforesaid "Contract of Lease" cannot
possibly be construed as establishing a leasehold tenancy relation because the parties
themselves ignored and repudiated the very essence of tenancy—security of tenure—
when they stipulated that "this agreement shall only be for the agricultural year 1960-
61."
This argument is unacceptable. The mere fact that the parties xed and limited
the duration of their lease contract to only one agricultural year, does not remove the
relationship which they created from the purview of leasehold tenancy, considering the
general import of their agreement which irreversibly leads to and clearly justi es
tenancy coverage. It is fundamental that the tenant-lessee's security of tenure subsists
notwithstanding the termination of the contract which initially established the tenancy
relation. In the language of the law, the "expiration of the period of the contract as xed
by the parties . . . does not of itself extinguish the relationship." 3 This is a "practical
consequence of the distinction between the tenancy contract which is xed by the
parties, and the tenancy relationship which is maintained and governed by law." 4
Furthermore, Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides that
"Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the period of
future surrender of the land, in all cases where land devoted to any agricultural
purpose is held under any system of tenancy, the tenant shall not be
dispossessed of his holdings by the landholder except for any of the causes
hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been proved before, and the
dispossession is authorized by, the court." (emphasis supplied)

The abovecited provision does not permit the parties to stipulate at what future time
the tenant shall leave or surrender the land. Thus, this court has held 5 that an
agreement whereby the tenant was required to return to the landlord his landholding
after one crop year cannot justify the tenant's dispossession after the said period
because such agreement is expressly proscribed by law.
Still vehemently contending that he never intended to enter into any tenancy
relation with Macaraeg, Teodoro nally argues that construing the abovementioned
"Contract of Lease" as a leasehold tenancy agreement would amount to a judicial
negation of his freedom to contract. cdtai

Needless to stress, this Court frowns upon and rejects any attempt to nullify the
legitimate exercise of the right to contract. We agree with Teodoro that as a landholder
he has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his property. What we want
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 to indelibly impress, however, is that once a landowner enters into a contract of lease
whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is
susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with the help of labor coming
from his immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very essence of a
leasehold agreement, and perforce comes under the direct coverage of the tenancy
laws. Otherwise, it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract,
the intendment of the law of protecting the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous
farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed gentry.
II. We now come to the second assignment of error. Teodoro posits that
granting the establishment of a leasehold tenancy relation between him and Macaraeg
by virtue of the aforesaid "Contract of Lease," the agrarian court nevertheless erred in
not nding Macaraeg guilty of abandonment, an act which terminates the tenancy
relation and justi es the ejectment of the tenant. In support of his thesis, Teodoro
points out that Macaraeg committed a positive act of abandonment when he offered to
vacate his leasehold in favor of a certain Luciano Claus, and only after "he could not
have his own way of placing Luciano Claus as his successor" did he try to "recover the
landholding." Assuming the veracity of the foregoing allegation, a tenant's offer or
intention to surrender his leasehold on the condition that the person named by him
should be accepted as his successor, does not of itself constitute abandonment of his
farmland.
"The word 'abandon,' in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely, to forsake
or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of 'putting under a
ban.' The emphasis is on the nality and the publicity with which some thing or body is
thus put in the control of another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with
intent never again to resume or claim one's rights or interests." 6 In other words, the act
of abandonment constitutes actual, absolute and irrevocable desertion of one's right or
property. In the case at bar, Macaraeg merely intended to vacate his leasehold
possession on the condition that a certain Claus be taken as his successor. Hence, his
act did not constitute desertion of his leasehold as it was a mere intended surrender of
the same. And as correctly espoused by the counsel for the respondent court, it is "only
through the actual surrender of the land that tenancy relation terminates; no amount of
intention to surrender severs the relationship." Furthermore, the said act of Macaraeg
was not an absolute renunciation of his leasehold possession, as it was in fact clearly
conditional.
However, Teodoro also claims, with characteristic certitude, that Macaraeg did
actually abandon work on the land in dispute and that even the decision under review
contains a nding to this effect. We nd no statement in the agrarian court's decision
sustaining Teodoro's view. On the contrary, we perceive truth in the respondent court's
counsel's manifestation that
"The only times that the tenant herein did not work the land were (1) during
the time it was undergoing its regular dry season fallow, and , . . . (2) after he was
prohibited from plowing the land by a certain Niegos, an agent of petitioner.
Failure to cultivate during the dry season fallow de nitely does not amount to
abandonment (Cf. De la Cruz vs. Asociacion Zangera Casilan, et al., 83 Phil. 214).
Likewise, failure to cultivate the land by reason of the forcible prohibition to do so
by a third party cannot also amount to abandonment, for abandonment
presupposes free will."

Anent the charge of abandonment, it is also pertinent to note that four days after
Macaraeg received a letter from Teodoro and his wife advising him that the landholding
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 in question will be given to another tenant, he lost no time in inquiring from the Tenancy
Mediation Commission at Cabanatuan City about his rights as a leasehold tenant. It
would appear therefore that Macaraeg's immediate reaction to his landlord's design to
dispossess him negates the act of abandonment imputed to him.
Moreover, Teodoro's pretension that Macaraeg had abandoned the disputed
landholding was squarely rejected by the agrarian court, thus:
"In the instant case, while petitioner had intentions to surrender his
landholding to respondent after the harvest for the agricultural (year) 1960-61
which led the latter to advise the former not to give his landholding to Luciano
Cla u s, yet that surrender did not materialize because said petitioner had
apparently changed his mind. For as early as March 6, 1961, petitioner went to the
O ce of the Tenancy Mediation Commission, Cabanatuan City for consultation.
As a matter of fact, said Commission wrote a letter to Fidel Teodoro and his wife
advising them to enjoin their overseer, Benito Ismael, from ejecting petitioner.
"During the intervening period, Fidel Teodoro and his wife entered into
another lease contract of tenancy with Jose Niegos. For this reason, Mariano
Niegos, son of Jose Niegos, prevented petitioner from plowing his landholding
when he found him in the premises on June 1, 1961. However, notwithstanding
this incident, Fidel Teodoro opened the door for negotiations. In fact, as late as
June 23, 1961, when petitioner went to the house of Fidel Teodoro in Manila, a
conference was set for that purpose at the house of Benito Ismael in Muñoz,
Nueva Ecija which did not take place because of the absence of petitioner. Under
these circumstances, it appears to our mind that while negotiations for settlement
were still pending, yet petitioner has not, in truth and in fact, surrendered his
landholding." (emphasis supplied)
We are not at liberty to reverse the foregoing nding of fact in the absence of any
proof that it is unfounded or was arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court had failed to
consider important evidence to the contrary. 7 This Court has consistently ruled that the
ndings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations will not be distributed on appeal
where there is substantial evidence to support them. 8 In the case at bar, the ndings of
fact by the respondent court anent the issue of abandonment rests on substantial
evidence. cdasia

III.Toward the end of the proceedings in the respondent court, Macaraeg

interposed a pleading which he denominated "supplemental petition," wherein he asked
for damages as a result of his dispossession. The said "supplemental petition" was
given due course by the hearing commissioner and Macaraeg was allowed to present
evidence in support thereof. On the basis of the evidence thus adduced, the respondent
court awarded damages to Macaraeg as decreed in its abovementioned resolution of
November 27, 1962.
Teodoro maintains that the respondent court erred in admitting the said
"supplemental pleading" on the basis of Section 2, Rule 17 (now Section 3 of Rule 10 of
the Revised Rules of Court) which exclusively pertains to amendments of pleadings, and
has nothing to do with the interposition of supplemental pleadings which is separately
governed by Section 5 of Rule 17 (now Section 5 of Rule 10). Teodoro avers, moreover,
that since Macaraeg led his claim for damages only when the hearing below was
about to end, his inaction must be considered as a waiver of such claim or that he
should be considered guilty of fatal negligence.
In resolving this last assignment of error, attention must be centered on the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 liberal policy which frees the Court of Agrarian Relations from the fetters of formalistic
procedure. As aptly observed in one case, 9
"Social justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation like the
present, an element of rigidity would be a xed to procedural precepts and made
to cover the matter. Flexibility should not be ruled out. Precisely, what is sought to
be accomplished by such a fundamental principle expressly so declared by the
Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 5) is the effectiveness of the community's effort to assist
the economically underprivileged. For under existing conditions, without such
succor and support, they might not, unaided, be able to secure justice for
themselves. . .
"Moreover, there is equally the obligation on the part of the State to afford
protection to labor. The responsibility is incumbent then, not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary, to translate this
pledge into a living reality. The present case is an appropriate occasion for the
discharge of such a trust. To preclude relief under the circumstances herein
disclosed would be to fail to submit to the dictates of a plain constitutional duty.
That we should not allow to happen."

Since the abovementioned "supplemental pleading" was led without intent to

delay the proceedings, the agrarian court exercised sound discretion in giving it due
course in order that "the real matter in dispute and all matters in the action in dispute
between the parties may, as far as possible, be completely determined in a single
proceeding." Moreover, Teodoro has no reason to complain, for he was accorded every
opportunity to controvert Macaraeg's claim for damages, but apparently he did not, as
in fact he does not here traverse the substantiality of the award.
Signi cantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not "restricted to the speci c
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the
order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary and
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further disputes,
provided said matter for determination has been established by competent evidence
during the hearing." 1 0 In other words, the respondent court could have determined
Macaraeg's claim for damages even without his "supplemental petition," provided there
was proof to substantiate such claim (and such requisite evidence was not wanting).
Hence, if the agrarian court could have awarded damages in favor of Macaraeg even in
the absence of a speci c prayer, then there is no conceivable reason to bar the
respondent court from granting the same with the interposition of the aforesaid
"supplemental petition" which explicitly and unmistakably prays for damages resulting
from Macaraeg's dispossession.
We hasten to modify, however, the award of damages in so far as it deducts from
the total amount recoverable by Macaraeg the sum of P30 or its equivalent of 3 cavans
of palay, representing his earnings during the period of his unlawful ejectment. This part
of the award contravenes Section 27(1) of the Agricultural Tenancy Act which makes
the erring landlord "liable to the tenant for damages to the extent of the landholder's
participation in the harvest in addition to the tenant's right under Section twenty-two of
this Act." And Section 22(1) provides that the "tenant shall be free to work elsewhere
whenever the nature of his farm obligations warrants his temporary absence from his
holdings." Consequently, Macaraeg's measly earning of P30 during the period of his
dispossession should not be deducted from the total amount of damages due to him.
Interpreting the abovecited Section 27(1) in relation to Section 22(1), this Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 "The earnings of the tenants during the period of unlawful ejectment are
not now deductible from the award of damages. In the case of Potenciano vs.
Estefani, L-7690, promulgated on 27 July 1955, this Court, on grounds of equity,
ruled to deduct such income, but said case was decided under the prior law, Act
4054. The above-quoted Section 27(1) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,
which is the one applicable to the present case, not only provides for a quantum
of damages to the tenant, based on the landlord's share in the harvest, but adds
thereto his right under Section 22, which states:

'(1) the tenant shall be free to work elsewhere whenever the nature of
his farm obligations warrants his temporary absence from his holdings.'
This right, although already granted under Section 20 of Act 4054, was not
then a right additional to the recovery of damages consequent to unlawful
dismissal, but under Republic Act 1199, as amended, it is to be added to the
damages recoverable." 1 1 (emphasis supplied)

ACCORDINGLY, the decision and resolution under review are hereby a rmed,
with the sole modi cation that the earnings of the herein respondent during the period
of his dispossession shall not be deducted from the award of damages. Costs against
the petitioner.
Concepcion, C .J ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando,
Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Quiroga vs. Parsons Hardware Co., 38 Phil. 501.

2.Agustin vs. De Guzman, etc. and Guerrero, 104 Phil. 250; Buencamino vs. Reyes, etc., and
Pallasiqui, 104 Phil. 906; Somera, et al. vs. Galman and the Court of Agrarian Relations,
105 Phil. 431.

3.Section 9, Rep. Act 1199, as amended by Rep. Act 2263.

4.Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation, vol. 3 (1967 edition), p. 43.

5.Datu vs. Cabangon, L-14590, May 25, 1960.

6.See De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz, L-19565, January 30, 1968.

7.Del Rosario vs. De los Santos, L-20589-90, March 21, 1968, citing Lapina vs. Court of Agrarian
Relations, L-20706, September 25, 1967.

8.Picardal vs. Lladas, L-21309, December 29, 1967, and the cases cited therein.
9.Carillo vs. Allied Workers' Association of the Philippines, L- 23689, July 31, 1968.

10.Section 11, Rep. Act 1267, as amended.

11.Illustre, et al. vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., L- 19654, March 31, 1964; see also
Villaviza, et al. vs. Panganiban, L- 19760, April 30, 1964.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com