#1 Magallona v.

Ermita
G.R. No. 187167 | August 16, 2011
Article I- National Territory

DOCTRINE:
(1) UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory.
(2) The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation
(3) Section 2 of R.A. No. 9522 states that “the definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around
the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.”.

FACTS:
The Philippines is a signatory to Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (UNCLOS I)
which served as basis for the passage in 1961 by Congress of Republic Act No. 3046 "demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State." In 1984, the Philippines ratified the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which among others, "prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of
baselines of baselines of archipelagic states like the Philippines." In pursuant to this, the Philippines amended R.A.
No. 3046 by enacting R.A. No. 9522 which was believed to make R.A. 3046 “compliant” with the provisions of
UNCLOS III. R.A. No. 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
Archipelago, and classified adjacent territories namely Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as
“regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. The petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of the said law as it violates Article I of the 1987 Constitution on two principal grounds: 1.) That said
law reduces Philippine maritime territory and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power; and 2.)
That said law opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts
thereby undermining the Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy,
and damaging its marine resources. Further contentions of the petitioners include: 1.) That R.A. No. 9522’s treatment
of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen; 2). R.A. No. 9522 not only uses UNCLOS III’s “regime of islands” to determine the
maritime zones of KIG and the Scarborough Shoal but also fails to give reference to the Treaty of Paris or Sabah.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9522 results in a reduction of the Philippine’s maritime territory.
2. Whether or not R.A. No. 9522 reduces the “reach of Philippine state’s sovereign power”.
3. Whether or not R.A. No. 9522’s use of the framework of regime of islands to determine the Maritime Zones of
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal is inconsistent with the Philippines’ claim of sovereignty over these areas.

RULING:
(1) No. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas. Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are
enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines
are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be
any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in
accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The
baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago”. Thus, baselines laws are nothing but
statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. It has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, diminution of territory.

(2) No. Whether referred to as Philippine 'internal waters' under Article I of the Constitution or as 'archipelagic
waters' under UNCLOS III (Article 49 (1)), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward
of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath (UNCLOS III, Article 49). The
fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically,
the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may
pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. The
contention of the petitioners that the waters of the Philippines, being subject to the right of innocent passage and sea
lanes passage, reduces our country’s reach of sovereignty is untenable. The right of innocent passage is a customary
international law, and is automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. Thus, no modern State can validly
invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

(3) No. Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III states that “the drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.” Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III states that “the
length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of
baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.” Had
Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse
legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Principal sponsor of R.A. No. 9522 former
Senator Miriam-Defensor Santiago said, “Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating
archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na
tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.”
However, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regimes of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121" of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. To further refute the contention of the petitioners that KIG now lies outside the Philippine
territory, the Supreme Court made reference to Section 2 of R.A. No. 9522 states that “the definition of the baselines
of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.”.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

#2 Henares v. LTFRB
G.R. No. 158290 | QUISUMBING, J. | October 23, 2006

ARTICLE II - Principles and State Policies; Sec. 15 - right to health

DOCTRINE:
• The Court recognizes the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of
“inter-generational responsibility” and inter-generational justice”, with the right of future Filipinos and future
generation to clean air, just as the right of the future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of rainforests is
recognized in the case of Oposa v. Factoran.
• The legislature should have a specific statutory remedy to complex environmental problems before the
petitioners can seek for the judicial recourse by mandamus.

FACTS:
The petitioners in this case, challenged the Court to issue a writ of mandamus, commanding the LTFRB and
the DOTC to require PUVs to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. According to the petitioners, the
fuel emissions from various engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure
and overall quality of life. So to counter these detrimental effects, the petitioners propose the use of CNG which is a
natural gas and can be considered the cleanest fossil fuel. The only drawback of CNG is that it produces more
methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming. The bases of the petitioner in asserting their right to clean
air is the Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the ruling of the court in the case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,
and Section 4 of the Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the “Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”
For the respondents, the Solicitor General cites that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since it
could only be issued to command a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do an act required to be done, when he
or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act. Additionally, the SolGen noted that nothing in R.A. 8749 prohibited
the use of gasoline and diesel by the owners of motor vehicles and that the same law did not even mention anything
about the existence of CNG as alternative fuel, so unless the law is amended, petitioners cannot propose the use of
CNG as alternative fuel. Also, the SolGen contends that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement R.A. 8749 and not
the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles,
and the respondents cannot alter, modify, or change the emission standards.
 In answer to the comment of the SolGen, the petitioners insist that since LTFRB and DOTC are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, then the
responsibility to see the knowledge that PUVs emit dangerous emissions falls under them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can compel the respondents, LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to use CNG
as alternative fuel.

RULING:
No. The Court held that while the right to clean air is an issue of paramount importance, the petitioners cannot
compel the respondents through a writ of mandamus to require PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel.
There is no question that the DENR is tasked to set the emission standard for fuel use and the task of
developing an action plan. Also, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that
motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement emission standards for motor vehicles. However, since there is
no law that mandates LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG, then the writ of
mandamus cannot compel the respondents.
The Court mentioned that in the same manner that they have associated the fundamental right to a balanced
and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of “inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational justice” in
Oposa, the Court also upheld the right of the petitioners and the future generation to clean air.
Therefore, the petitioners cannot compel the respondents through a writ of mandamus to require the use of
CNG. The legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems before
a mandamus can be taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

#3 Oposa vs. Factoran

G.R. No. 101083

ARTICLE II - Principles and State Policies; Sec. 16 - right to healthful ecology

DOCTRINE:

Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: “The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”

FACTS:

The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource. They assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: (1) ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLA) in the
country, and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements; (2) and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.

As their cause of action, four of the plaintiffs’ allegations are: (1) The continued allowance by defendant of
TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors and their successors, who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique
natural resource treasure; (2) Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae; (3) Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy; and
(4) Defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of
the State.

The original defendant, DENR Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on 2
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their Opposition to
the Motion, the petitioners maintain that: (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
 Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs
thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined
the latter in this case.

ISSUE:

Procedural Issue:

1. Whether or not the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) have locus standi.– YES

Substantive Issues:

2. Whether or not the plaintiffs successfully alleged, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right involved or
a specific legal wrong committed.– YES

3. Whether or not logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.– NO

4. Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint on the ground of non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution.– NO

HELD:

1. The said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous,
it becomes impracticable to bring all of them before the court. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the
instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. They can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.

2. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right, the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: “Sec. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.” This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
“Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.”

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners,
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 192, Section
4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." This policy declaration substantially
re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty, under
its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987, to
protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of
 the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

3. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
"grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition
of the judiciary.

4. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss
the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a
law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,
the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been
passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

#4 Carino vs. Insular Govt.

212 US 449
Feb. 23, 1909

ARTICLE II - Principles and State Policies; Sec. 22 - right of indigenous people

DOCTRINE: Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against
the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequent enacted
registration act.

FACTS: Petitioner Cariño is an Igorot of the province of Benguet, submitted an application to the Philippine Court of
Land Registration for the registration of certain land. The application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. Such
grant was appealed on behalf of the government of the Philippines contending that such lands were public lands but
such was dismissed and such judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Now, the case is brought here by writ of
error.
 Cariño claims that fifty years before the treaty of Paris the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as
owners. His grandfather and he had lived upon it, maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, cultivated parts
and used it for pasture. He inherited the land from his father in accordance to Igorot custom. However, no Document
of Title had issued from Spanish Crown, though in 1893-1894 and again in 1897 he made application for such title
under royal decrees but nothing came out of it. In 1901, he filed a petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law
and the lands registered to him, that process, however, establishing only a possessory title.

The government contends that such lands were public lands since when Spain assumed, asserted and had
title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; and that there was
no prescription against the crown and that if there was, which was a decree of June 25, 1880, such decree required
the registration within a limited time to make the title. Since Cariño’s land was not registered it therefore became
public land and that since the US succeeded to the title of Spain, Cariño has no right to these lands.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff, Cariño, is entitled to the registration and therefore owns the land.

RULING: Yes. Cariño owns the land.

If we supposed that the government’s contention is correct, then the plaintiff’s case is at an end since Spain in
its earlier decrees embodied a universal feudal theory that all lands were held by the crown. It is also true that in legal
theory, sovereignty is absolute and that against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted in
the Philippines, absolute power. BUT it does not follow that as against inhabitants of the Philippines that the US
asserts that Spain had such power.

The province of Benguet was inhabited by a savage tribe that was never brought under the civil or military
government of the Spanish Crown. Spanish officials would not have granted to such tribe registration which the
plaintiff is entitled by Spanish Laws. It does not follow that, in view of the US, he had lost all rights and was mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land. The reason for the US taking over the Philippines was
different, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is TO DO JUSTICE to the natives, not to exploit
their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 12 32 Stat. at L. 691, all the property and
rights acquired thereby the US are to be administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof”. The same statute
made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to
all. It provides that “No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.

Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held
by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity
in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.

The older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the
natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume
to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will.

Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Philippine, 546: 'Where
such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription.'

On the decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in
the Philippine Islands. The usual theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a grant by
competent authority; for all legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed
owners. For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art 5. So that, when this
decree went into effect, the applicant’s father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. But, it is said the
object, of this law was to require the adjustment or registration proceedings that it described, and in that way to
require every one to get a document of title or lose his land. But it does not apply to all, the regulation purport to have
been made “for the adjustment royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals”. It does not appear that this land
ever was royal or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6 it is provided that 'interested parties not included within the two
preceding [212 U.S. 449, 462] articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years] may legalize
their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be
conducted in the following manner.' This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to be owners
by lapse of time.

The applicant’s possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his
father ever was made. Finally, it should be noted that the natural construction of the decree is confirmed by the report
of the council of state. That report puts forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view of the condition of almost
all property in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by general rules, on the principle that the lapse of a fixed
period legalizes completely all possession; recommends in two articles twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the
decree; and then suggests that interested parties not included in those articles may legalize their possession and
acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.

It is true that the language of arts. 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the
necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. The
words 'may prove', as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do
so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.

The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment under the
decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought, should NOT be construed as a confiscation, but as the
withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed.

Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and justice require that the applicant
should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among
whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.

Judgment reversed.