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    3.62 Domondon vs. First Division SB

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    Jasen
    The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's denial of the petitioner's motion to dismiss on grounds of violation of right to speedy trial. The Court found that the delays in arraignment were due to valid reasons such as pending motions filed by the accused and their co-accused. As the postponements were caused by numerous incidents that required judicious resolution, and not due to vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays, the petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated.

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    3.62 Domondon vs. First Division SB

    Uploaded by

    Jasen
    357 views2 pages
    The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's denial of the petitioner's motion to dismiss on grounds of violation of right to speedy trial. The Court found that the delays in arraignment were due to valid reasons such as pending motions filed by the accused and their co-accused. As the postponements were caused by numerous incidents that required judicious resolution, and not due to vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays, the petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated.

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    The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's denial of the petitioner's motion to dismiss on grounds of violation of right to speedy trial. The Court found that the delays in arraignment were due to valid reasons such as pending motions filed by the accused and their co-accused. As the postponements were caused by numerous incidents that required judicious resolution, and not due to vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays, the petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    357 views2 pages

    3.62 Domondon vs. First Division SB

    Uploaded by

    Jasen
    The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's denial of the petitioner's motion to dismiss on grounds of violation of right to speedy trial. The Court found that the delays in arraignment were due to valid reasons such as pending motions filed by the accused and their co-accused. As the postponements were caused by numerous incidents that required judicious resolution, and not due to vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays, the petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated.

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    Criminal Procedure 2E

    TOPIC Right to speedy trial DATE


    November 29, 2005
    CASE TITLE Domondon vs. First Division Sandiganbayan GR NO 166606

    DOCTRINE The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: 1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
    capricious, and oppressive delays; 2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; 3) when
    without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
    case tried.
    FACTS The case arose from the investigation initiated by a letter-complaint of then Police Sr. Superintendent
    Romeo M. Acop to the Ombudsman where it appears that payrolls of 2,000 enlisted men of the Cordillera
    Regional Command (CRECOM), who were allegedly recipients of the P20,000,000 appropriated for combat,
    clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE) allowance, were falsified.

    Subsequent investigations determined that petitioners Philippine National Police (PNP) Director for
    Comptrollership Guillermo Domondon, and Sr. Superintendent Van Luspo, together with other PNP officers
    conspired with one another in approving without budgetary basis, the release of Advice Allotment SN No.
    4363 for P5,000,000 and Advice Allotment SN No. 4400 for P15,000,000, for the procurement of CCIE for
    the use of PNP personnel of the CRECOM, causing to be issued checks with an aggregate amount of
    P20,000,000 for payment of ghost purchases of the aforesaid CCIE items

    On May 4, 1994, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners Domondon and
    Luspo, and the above-named accused, with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
    Act.

    Their arraignment was reset for several times, hence, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss claiming that
    the failure to arraign them within the period set under Republic Act (RA) No. 8493 or the Speedy Trial
    Act of 1998 have resulted in denial of their rights to speedy trial.

    The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to dismissed and dismissed petitioner’s motion for
    reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.

    ISSUE/S Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
    petitioners’ motion to dismiss
    RATIO In justifying the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss, the Sandiganbayan reasoned that although the
    scheduled arraignments were postponed several times, they were however postponed for valid reasons. The
    respondent court cited a number of justifiable causes of postponements, thus:

    [O]ne of the postponements was due to the request of one of the accused to reset the arraignment since the
    counsel of record is not available on the scheduled date. To proceed with the arraignment despite the noted
    absence of one of the counsels would result in inequity on one of the accused-movants' co-defendants. Another
    postponement, as pointed out by the accused-movants, was the time given by the Court to allow the prosecutor
    to file an opposition to Brizuela's Bill of Particulars. The comment made by accused-movants is discriminatory and
    unjust. They claim that the delay caused by the filing of a motion for bill of particulars by a co-accused should not
    be attributable to them as they did not join the same, and consequently such is a violation of their right to speedy
    trial. They have forgotten that they themselves had caused a long delay in this case by filing a motion for
    reinvestigation and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Honorable Supreme Court, which is, if such
    reasoning is to be followed, to the detriment of the other accused in this case.

    1
    Criminal Procedure 2E

    We find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the respondent court. A careful
    examination of the records would show that the postponements were caused by numerous pending motions
    or petitions. The delays caused by the filing and resolution of these motions and petitions cannot be
    categorized as vexatious, capricious or oppressive. After all, it is the judicious and deliberate determination
    of all the pending incidents of a case, with a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements
    of procedural due process, that should be the primordial consideration in the full resolution of a case, more
    than the mere convenience of the parties or of the courts, so that justice and fairness would be served
    thereby.

    There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur
    with the conclusion reached by the Sandiganbayan that petitioners' right to speedy trial had not been
    violated. Hence, the dismissal of petitioners' motion to dismiss must be upheld.
    RULING WHEREFORE , the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated September 13, 2004
    denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and its Resolution dated January 11, 2005 denying the motion for
    reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
    NOTES While the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 sets the time limit for the arraignment and trial of a case, these however
    do not preclude justifiable postponements and delay when so warranted by the situation. Section 2 of SC
    Circular 38-98 provides that the period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or
    other causes justifying suspension of arraignment, shall be excluded.

    Thus in People v. Tee, [3] we held that the right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: 1) the
    proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; 2) when unjustified
    postponements are asked for and secured; 3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of
    time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

    A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application
    of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be
    taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

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