DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., vs.

PAWIS NG MAKABAYANG OBRERO (PAMAO-NFL)

G.R. No. 146650, January 13, 2003

DOCTRINE:

The disputed provision of the CBA is clear and unambiguous. The terms are explicit and the
language of the CBA is not susceptible to any other interpretation. Hence, the literal meaning of
free meals after three (3) hours of overtime work shall prevail, which is simply that an employee
shall be entitled to a free meal if he has rendered exactly, or no less than, three hours of
overtime work, not after more than or in excess of three hours overtime work.
The exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. It is subject to the limitations found in
law, a collective bargaining agreement or the general principles of fair play and justice. This
situation constitutes one of the limitations. The CBA is the norm of conduct between petitioner
and private respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.

FACTS:

February 22, 1996, a new five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement for the period starting
February 1996 up to February 2001, was executed by petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc., and
private respondent Pawis Ng Makabayang Obrero-NFL (PAMAO-NFL). Among the provisions of
the new CBA is the disputed section on meal allowance under Section 3 of Article XVIII on
Bonuses and Allowances. Some departments of Dole reverted to the previous practice of
granting free meals after exactly three hours of actual overtime work. However, other
departments continued the practice of granting free meals only after more than three hours of
overtime work. Thus, private respondent filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board alleging that petitioner Dole refused to comply with the provisions of the 1996-
2001 CBA because it granted free meals only to those who rendered overtime work for more
than three hours and not to those who rendered exactly three hours overtime work.
The parties agreed to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration. Thereafter, the voluntary
arbitrator, deciding in favor of the respondent, issued an order directing petitioner Dole to extend
the free meal benefit to those employees who actually did overtime work even for exactly three
hours only.
Petitioner Dole asserts that the phrase after three hours of actual overtime work should be
interpreted to mean after more than three hours of actual overtime work. On the other hand,
private respondent union and the voluntary arbitrator see it as meaning after exactly three
hours of actual overtime work.
Petitioner asserts that the phrase after three (3) hours of actual overtime work does not
mean after exactly three hours of actual overtime work; it means after more than three hours of
actual overtime work. Petitioner insists that this has been the interpretation and practice of Dole
for the past thirteen years. Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that after three (3) hours
of actual overtime work simply means after rendering exactly, or no less than, three hours of
actual overtime work.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission of the phrase more than between after and three hours in the
present CBA spells a big difference.

HELD:

No. No amount of legal semantics can convince the Court that after more than means the same
as after. The disputed provision of the CBA is clear and unambiguous. The terms are explicit
and the language of the CBA is not susceptible to any other interpretation. Hence, the literal
meaning of free meals after three (3) hours of overtime work shall prevail, which is simply that
an employee shall be entitled to a free meal if he has rendered exactly, or no less than, three
hours of overtime work, not after more than or in excess of three hours overtime work.
 GANDARA MILL SUPPLY and MILAGROS SY vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND SILVESTRE GERMANO

G.R. No. 126703. December 29, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife delivered their
first child. He did not however notify his employer, causing a disruption in the business of the
latter. When the respondent returned to work, he was surprised upon knowing that someone
has been hired to take his place.

 
ISSUE: 

Whether or not there was a case of illegal dismissal.

HELD:

Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged absence
without leave may constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems from the non-
observance of due process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where dismissal was
not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the illegality of the dismissal in
question, is under heavy clouds and therefore illegal.

IMASEN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORP., vs. RAMONCHITO T. ALCON and JOANN

S. PAPA

G.R. No. 194884, October 22, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in

the manufacture of auto seat-recliners and slide-adjusters. It hired the respondents
as manual welders in 2001.

On October 5, 2002, the respondents reported for work on the second shift – from 8:00 pm to
5:00 am of the following day. At around 12:40 am, Cyrus A. Altiche, Imasen’s security guard on
duty, went to patrol and inspect the production plant’s premises. When Altiche reached
Imasen’s Press Area, he heard the sound of a running industrial fan. Intending to turn the fan
off, he followed the sound that led him to the plant’s “Tool and Die” section.

At the “Tool and Die” section, Altiche saw the respondents having sexual intercourse on the
floor, using a piece of carton as mattress. Altiche immediately went back to the guard house and
relayed what he saw to Danilo S. Ogana, another security guard on duty.

Respondent’s defense: they claimed that they were merely sleeping in the “Tool and Die”
section at the time of the incident. They also claimed that other employees were near the area,
making the commission of the act charged impossible.

Both LA and NLRC held that the dismissal was valid. CA however nullified NLRC’s decision and
held that sexual intercourse inside company premises is not serious misconduct.
ISSUE:

Whether the respondents’ infraction – engaging in sexual intercourse inside company premises
during work hours – amounts to serious misconduct justifying their dismissal.

HELD:

Yes. Sexual acts and intimacies between two consenting adults belong, as a principled ideal, to
the realm of purely private relations. Whether aroused by lust or inflamed by sincere affection,
sexual acts should be carried out at such place, time and circumstance that, by
the generally accepted norms of conduct, will not offend public decency
nor disturb the generally held or accepted social morals. Under these parameters, sexual acts
between two consenting adults do not have a place in the work environment.

Indisputably, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse inside company premises and
during work hours. These circumstances, by themselves, are already punishable misconduct.
Added to these considerations, however, is the implication that the respondents did not only
disregard company rules but flaunted their disregard in a manner that could reflect adversely on
the status of ethics and morality in the company.

Additionally, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse in an area where co-employees or

other company personnel have ready and available access. The respondents likewise
committed their act at a time when the employees were expected to be and had, in fact, been at
their respective posts, and when they themselves were supposed to be, as all other employees
had in fact been, working.

The Court also considered the respondents’ misconduct to be of grave and

aggravated character so that the company was justified in imposing the highest penalty
available ― dismissal.

                Their infraction transgressed the bounds of socially and morally

accepted human public behavior, and at the same time showed brazen disregard for the respect
that their employer expected of them as employees. By their misconduct, the respondents,
in effect, issued an open invitation for others to commit the same infraction, with like disregard
for their employer’s rules, for the respect owed to their employer, and for their co-employees’
sensitivities.

FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G. DORIA vs. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO

G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively, in
PT&T’s Shipping Section, Materials Management Group. Acting on an alleged unsigned letter
regarding anomalous transactions at the Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit
team to investigate the matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value
of the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents
allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition.

Petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in
the anomaly. Their suspension was extended for 15 days twice. Then in a Memorandum,
petitioners were dismissed from the service for having falsified company documents. Petitioners
filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal alleging that they were dismissed on
November 8, 1993, the date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.

LA favored petitioners. NLRC reversed the decision of LA. Petitioners appealed to CA.  CA
affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners’ illegal suspension for 15 days and dismissal
for just cause were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissed without due
process. Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision before the SC. They contend that
there was no just cause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process and that
they were illegally suspended for 30 days.
 

ISSUE:

Whether respondents were dismissed for just cause and with the observance of due process.
 

RULING:

Respondents’ evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which
the loss of confidence resulted.  Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such
documents came into petitioners’ hands at some point, respondents should have provided
evidence of petitioners’ functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and
approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were
involved. The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to
petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to these
documents.

Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative is a just cause for termination. However, loss of confidence should not be
simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith.

The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause in view of
the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor Code. The
employer’s evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which the loss of
confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest. It must be adequately proven by
substantial evidence. Respondents failed to discharge this burden.

Respondents’ illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due
process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an
employer must furnish the worker with 2 written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the
grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side
and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee.

Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend
themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served notices of
termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. Respondents
failed to comply with the two-notice requirement for terminating employees.

We note a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the
Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code provides that an employer must
provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance
of his representative if he so desires.

The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and
conference during which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. 
In case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. The
authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself.  To be valid, a rule or
regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute. As
such, it cannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.

Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an
employee must be given “ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.” Thus, the
opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word “ample” which
ordinarily means “considerably more than adequate or sufficient.” In this regard, the phrase
“ample opportunity to be heard” can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover
actual hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of
Book VI of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article 277(b).

Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code
should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine
qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The
test for the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a
formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The “ample
opportunity to be heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing.

The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language
revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to meet the
peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal
hearing will defeat its spirit.

Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that
the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be observed “substantially,” not
strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an
absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.

A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his
side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the
controversy. “To be heard” does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may
be heard just as effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore,
while the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not
limited to a formal hearing only. The existence of an actual, formal “trial-type” hearing, although
preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard.

Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. In
fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was
given a chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the
opportunity to be heard. Twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is deemed sufficient for the employer
to follow the natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment.

In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in
dismissal cases:

(a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given
to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his
defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee
in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or
when similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing or
conference” requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.

On the other hand, an employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause
provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which the
employee shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.
Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article
279 of the Labor Code mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up
to the time of actual reinstatement. In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible
because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. 14
years have transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order
reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose. So
petitioners will just be paid their separation pay. Petition is hereby GRANTED.