G.R. No.

187495               April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to
give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat
her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to
maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong."1

REYES, J.:

Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the
realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in
Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The Case

This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

The Facts

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since
then and raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-
appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her
shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint
Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and
recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accused-appellant.

On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as
Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-
668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999,
the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in an
Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a
plea of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15 averring that the
name of the private complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also
stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true
dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the
dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18,
2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as follows:

Criminal Case No. 99-668:

That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18

Criminal Case No. 99-669:

That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19

The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both
indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.

Version of the prosecution

The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000,
which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:

KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers.
They got married after a year of courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the
accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they engaged in several other businesses
-trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally,
was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality,
however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul
goods.22

Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication.
Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would drive the trucks
sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the businesses.24

She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce
with that objective.25

In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-
appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places
regularly and sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City
most of the days of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure
supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29

Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It
was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal
degree of enthusiasm.30 However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately
remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of
lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten
her into submission.31

In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed
to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He
wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x
x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant
slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October
14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City.33

On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly
routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken.
Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the
rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then
prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to
their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.35

Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie
thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive
behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously
order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."36

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed,
lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.37

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with
her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that
she was not feeling well.38

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on
to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by
refusing to bend her legs.40

The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on
them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he
was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do
that to me because I'm not feeling well."42

With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses'
bedroom,43 KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.

Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on
me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed
upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that
Mama is crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the
door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again.47 Since she
heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door
again, and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once
more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching
and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma,
why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her
underwear is torn[?]"49

When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to
bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered herself with a
blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the
accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK
to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go
out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned
against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51

In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened.52 KKK
relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling
well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest."53

The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on
October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them
since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the
children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the
room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred
to sleep with the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are
women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after
retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.55

He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He
lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you
sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing
them to tear apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front
of you."58

The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in
front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He then
ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where
they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.59

The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's
short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still
aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand
sex."60

After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and
forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs,
stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you
deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.61

Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found
the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside
and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the
bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK
replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't
feel well. "62

Version of the defense

The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of
KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got
married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.

Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through
their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established
their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their
trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63

The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those
dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident
somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside
because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to
Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave
him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com.64

Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above
claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the
rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he
and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the truck. They
finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order
to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to
Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.

They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it
to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko.
The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October
18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck
to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because
he took over the control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-
up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for
their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance of
₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount
dwindled to a measly ₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape
allegations.67

KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected
from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-
appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin
to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same
when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives
home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and
would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out.68

Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love
letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70

KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio,
Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a
government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other priests.71 Several persons told him about
the paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted her.72

What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that
time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program,
he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the
player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An
altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's
side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant
because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who
smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73

KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and
one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the
accused-appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-
appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18,
1999.75

Ruling of the RTC

In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by
giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters'
testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a
crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.

The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's
accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the
accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting
declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on
October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of
the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify
complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay
the costs.

SO ORDERED.77

Ruling of the CA

In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original
informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was
re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the
corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the
elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using
force and intimidation.

The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the
commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.

The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with
mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or
manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained
that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for
rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.

In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces
the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of
having raped her if it were not true.

The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that
she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her
separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.

Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is
only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.79

Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties
that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and
Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed
that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through
counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the
alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a)
KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure
to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate
and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82

Our Ruling

I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection

The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture'
whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a
woman and married her.83

The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to
punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable
interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85

If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped
his wife, he was merely using his property.86

Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified
under three ideologies.

Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father
until she marries to become the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman,
he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were
synonymous.88

From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law
denied her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring
order within the family.90

This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying,
the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own
personal property or write a will.91

II. The marital exemption rule

In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable
implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated
that:

[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband,
which she cannot retract.92

The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and
England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would
be rape if committed against a woman not his wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally
defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."94

The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would
always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar
rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.96

The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with
absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal and
pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or
abets another person in raping her.98

In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition
for being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.99

In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule
in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or
in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation.100

In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New
York declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's
irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:

We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape.
The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon
archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to
withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New
York statute to be unconstitutional.

Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has
been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a
supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not
consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and
frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such
an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been
viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a
marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman
x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should
seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."

The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a
woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been
rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a
woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity
associated with recognition as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of
Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some
exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired,
unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103

III. Marital Rape in the Philippines

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears,
however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable
implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a
husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal
separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse.105

In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first
international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all
forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality
and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns.107 The country also
committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to
pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against
women and, to this end, undertook:

(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions
or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and
other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;

xxxx

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.108

In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of
gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:

Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.

xxxx

Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the
generally accepted principles of international law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:

Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)

The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No.
8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape
as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to
the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2
thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:

Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.

In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not
be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is
unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship
with his victim, thus:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th
Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on
tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the
consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general
definition of 'rape,' viz:

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point

of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital
rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender... "
Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.

MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private
practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a
lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for
rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband.
That is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being
presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we
don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can
sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this
jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second
paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction
there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for something that will
unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No.
6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.

MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your
Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph,
quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the
husband? Is that correct?

MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.

MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?

MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that.
Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I
am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate
version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee report are all now
denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty
is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?

xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the
husband who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape,
call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x x.110 (Emphasis ours)

HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.

HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.

HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly
contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But
it was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful
husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your
wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot
raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can
beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is
easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying
is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was
just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.

PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]

HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can
have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave
abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the,
yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the same
definition x x x.

xxxx

HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is
implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged
[with] rape x x x.

HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.

HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this
rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.

HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8,
the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence.
But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think
that should be made clear. x x x.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're
[the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do
you have to beat me up.

So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face
up, I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.

HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new
crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.

HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is
husband is not, does not negate.111

CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only
disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on
marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the circumstances
that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated does not
come into the picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant
circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112

PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does
not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or
not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you having
been married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to
change the concept of rape as defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually
add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife
has evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into
having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed against her by
the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It does not change
anything at all, Mr. Chairman.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x.113

The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No.
9262,114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a
man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:

Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is
not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or
her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a

sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking
the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications
and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make
films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep
together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal
violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-
married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical violence by their husbands
while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.115

IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments

The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory.
In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave
rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and
the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from
ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof
must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between
husband and wife.116

The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.

The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have
already been superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights between men and
women and respect for human dignity established in various international conventions, such as the
CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role
of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality
between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of such measures
is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a
husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of
sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.

Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the

Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly
subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that
constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual
violence, viz:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-
based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether
occurring in public or in private life.

Article 2

Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual
abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related
to exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man
who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and
the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying Declaration, defines and
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a
fellow human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate
this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the
Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.

It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual123 and not
the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.

Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes
cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way
in deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in
order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to
protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband
who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual
intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
an essential marital obligation.125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her
coercively or violently.

Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements
that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The
Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other
persons or other classes in like circumstances.127

As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as
traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law
does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage.
Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man
alike.

The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims
over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the
penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.

Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument
akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license
for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control
her own body, as does an unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual
intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she
refuses.

Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely
and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive
health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of
such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable.130
(cannot be waived because contrary to morals…

In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for
different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law
dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the
law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases
as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently
from the victims of non-marital rape.

Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules
on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum
of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the
legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.

Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal
principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no
reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.

The evidence for the prosecution was

based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies

In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the
strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the
accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts
are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified.
Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human
nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted
on the basis thereof.131

It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to
directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-
examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts
of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not
be disturbed on appeal.132

After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records
of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no
justification to disturb its findings.

Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to
the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate
between uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid
during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly
explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.

She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal
on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently
throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the
bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and
headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her
panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear
apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of
resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her,
rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he
never desisted.133

Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable.
After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the
children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into
the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to
stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to
pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he
could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the
children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He
forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still
aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand
sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread
KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying
himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you
are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135

Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be
proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.136

Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or
intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of
giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or
that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force
and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through
the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:

On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO:

Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what
happened?

A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.

Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?

A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.

Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?

A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap
which means that he wanted to have sex."

Q So, what did you do after that?

A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is
sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?

A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.

Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?

A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.

xx xx

Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?

A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.

Q So after that what else did he do?

A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I
failed because he is stronger than me.

COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.

ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)

Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held
your two hands?

A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."

Q How did you say that to your husband?

A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."

Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?

xxxx

A I shouted when I uttered that words.

xxxx

Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?

xxxx

A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137

(Cross-Examination)

ATTY. AMARGA;

Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty?

A Yes, Sir.

Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he
normally do that if he have sex with you?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?

A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have sex
with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?

A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.

xxxx

Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?

A No, Sir.

Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?

A He raised my duster [sic] up.

Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?

A No, only on the breast level.138

On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO

Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?

A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.

Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?

A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what
you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."

Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?

A It was tom.

Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?

A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in
having sex with me.139

The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands,
flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his
much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.

Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His
actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted
sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and
thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.

The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she
insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as
husband all cowed KKK into submission.

The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October
16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that
ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the
conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there
were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was still
irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to
the person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is
at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case,
that point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended
to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.

Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.

We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey
that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not
impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific
kind thereof.

At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to
recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent
him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for
him to stop.

Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough
to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel the
defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.142

Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack
of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's
underwear that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable
evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do not pertain to the elements that
produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent.145

The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary

circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the
testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the
prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied based on the position
of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical
violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as
discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.

The corroborative testimonies of

MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.

The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did
not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in
relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced
sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether
they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's
narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.

MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK
shouting and crying: "Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998
shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went
upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to
aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was
prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room
downstairs.

MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom panty
lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to
escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is
an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "

KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged
inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the
accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife
even in front of the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the
staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-
appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant,
through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his
wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.

KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical
resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after
the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-
appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children after the two
bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her
will.

Failure to immediately report to the

police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.

The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report
the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or
vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if
such delay is satisfactorily explained.150

At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to
sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for
rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the
separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant.151

It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing
marital exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as
opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social
humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the
authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated
belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband
raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic
trouble.

Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public
scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even
the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the
subject rape incidents.

The victim -S testimony on the

witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.

The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the
credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries
more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-
cross examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.152

Ill motive imputed to the victim

The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with
loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that
the ₱3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the
amount of ₱3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her
wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately
₱3 Million was spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the
accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the bank.153

Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be
his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's
birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent
witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do
so, to present the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed
extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court
finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled
around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on
the witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to
infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of
this legal quandary.

At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded
suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and
that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK
is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.

Alibi

It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-
appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal
informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion
thereon will thus be irrelevant.

At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also
because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely.154

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place
at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the
geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was
committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two
places.155

Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not
easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from
Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at
any time.156 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and
times when the two rape incidents were committed.

Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony
of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the
absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.

Conclusion

All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by
KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably
corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and
short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the
accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.

Penalties

The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-
appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not
be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157

The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00. Moral damages are
granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that
the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.158

The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place.1âwphi1 Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying
circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is ₱50,000.00159 and not
₱75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.

To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an
award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.160

The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be
reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.161

A Final Note

Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and
dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can
happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside
her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be
her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws
provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.

Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A
husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself
of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give
or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to
engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can
seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological
incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.

Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion
that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it
contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.

The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing
personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that
safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital
rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable
under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar
Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further
ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997.]

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO BALOGBOG, Respondents.

Ramon V . Ceniza, for Petitioners.

Antonio T . Bacaltos & Raul D. Bacaltos for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE CELEBRATED UNDER CIVIL CODE OF 1889; EXISTENCE
DETERMINED BY PROVISIONS OF PRESENT CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE. — Art. 53
provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified
copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have
been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of
the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided
that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in
evidence. This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain
did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after
the extension of that code to this country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since
this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except
as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption
is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; MARRIAGE MAY BE PROVED BY SECONDARY EVIDENCE. — Although a

marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not a proof
that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.

3. LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE; EXCHANGE OF VOWS, PRESUMED. — Neither is there merit in the
argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence
showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they
were taking each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been
made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very
purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual
to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its
absence. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of
the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern.

4. ID.; ID.; FILIATION; PROVED BY CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF STATUS OF LEGITIMATE CHILD

AND ADMISSION OF UNCLE; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners contend that private respondents’ reliance
solely on testimonial evidence to support their claim that private respondents had been in the
continuous possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code
which provides that such status shall be proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by an
authentic document or by final judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of
titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The
marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of
Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be
found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the war. But Matias Pogoy testified that
Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina
testified that private respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That
private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.
Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the police
of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased
Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.

The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal
who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in
1935, predeceasing their parents.

In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and
accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina
Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their
grandparents.

In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother
Gavino died single and without issue in their parents’ residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the
beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother when
she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of
Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife
and Ramonito to be their first child. On cross-examination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and
Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino
Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in
1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal
councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.

The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of private respondents, who
testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the
wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he
knew this because he attended their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina
and carry her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the
wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the
presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners’ claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the
ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who
had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple’s son, Petronilo, who died when
he was six.

Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. 4 She testified that after the wedding, she
was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned
during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children,
namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On cross-
examination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man
for a year and then they separated.

Private respondents produced a certificate from the office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that the
Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate
from the office of the Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that
office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the
war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was likewise no record of birth of
Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)

On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified 5 that Gavino died single
at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated
that she did not know private respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh.
10) from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that office did not have a record of the
names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan
Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of
Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 6

Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain
Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they were legally married. He
added, however that Catalina had children by a man she had married before the war, although he did
not know the names of the children. On cross-examination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog,
who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.

Ramonito Balogbog was presented 8 to rebut Leoncia Balogbog’s testimony.

On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents
(plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its
judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio
and Genoveva, and to pay attorney’s fees and costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in
not giving weight to the certification of the office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to
the effect that no marriage of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years
1925-1935. Their motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of Asturias which did not contain the
record of the alleged marriage in that church.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the legal
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married;
that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life. 9 Hence, this petition.

We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the
time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil
Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry,
unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the
courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the
status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their
children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not
take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code to this country. 10 Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since
this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except
as they related to vested rights, 11 and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally
married. 12 This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. 13 In this case,
petitioners’ claim that the certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record
of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production of the Book
of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not
contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents’ parents.

This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, 14 the defendants, who questioned the marriage of
the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario,
Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage.
Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, 15 the
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. 16 Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and
Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein,
were recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because
there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two
witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. 17 An exchange of vows
can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding
took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment.
It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for
people not to notice its absence.

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the
family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated in Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee: 18

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. (U.S. v. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4
Phil., 476; Son Cui v. Guepangco, supra; U.S. v. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter v.
Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)

Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents’ reliance solely on testimonial evidence to
support their claim that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of
legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be
proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But
in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of
children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by
the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of
status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.

Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the possession by
private respondents of the status of legitimate children because the Book of Marriages for the years
1928-1929 is available.

What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiation of private
respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the
preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that
municipality for the year 1930 could not be found; presumably because they were lost or destroyed
during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one
of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito and
Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the children of Gavino
and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.

Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the police
of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the balance in favor of
the appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held
on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a
patrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso testified that the complainant in that administrative
case is his nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date (Exhs. "N",
"N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4") read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Atty. Kiamco — May it please this investigative body.

"Q.- Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?

"A.- Yes I know.

"Q.- Why do you know him?

"A.- I know because he is my nephew.

"Q.- Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?

"A.- Yes.

"Q.- Do you mean to say that you are close to him?

"A.- Yes. We are close.

"Q.- Why do you say you are close?

"A.- We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we were also leaving (sic) in the
same house in Butuan City, and I even barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when
I return to Balamban, Cebu.

x          x          x

"Q.- Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?

"A.- Because he is the son of my elder brother."

This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is
considered as a reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did
not try to offer any explanation to blunt the effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during
the trial. Such silence can only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former
being the son of Gavino.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.]

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, Petitioner, v. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the "vast properties" left
by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.

In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan
Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having
been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February
2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he
acceded.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery
of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He
also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license
and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and
Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same
day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave
him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by
the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her
marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding
and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this
administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she
realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall
be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.

It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record
of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue
a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.

On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage
license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9
May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot
issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000,
found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license
and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be
imposed on respondent judge.

We agree.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court.

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro v. Domagtoy, 1 respondent judge held office and
had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However,
he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not
fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held
that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to
do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability." 2 (Emphasis supplied.)

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles
like the ones involved in the instant case. . . . While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons." 3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. In People v. Lara, 4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an
iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives
the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in
gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This
Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined. 5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters.
They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a
matter which involves the Court’s constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may
be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity
of this Court as a disciplining authority. 6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 182438               July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging
the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each
other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together
with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians,
also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a
ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no
marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony.
Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne
testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding
rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the principal
sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took
pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony
that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal
local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given
a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed
on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of
giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage
ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of
the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not
specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of
the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter
law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the
petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It
further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than
the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be
Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must
appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the
CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage
certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350
of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the
Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such
as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming
that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and
Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take each
other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is
duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner
likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared
that they take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church
and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony.
Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of
giving moral guidance to the couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not
covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor
a regulation promulgated thereafter.22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the
prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of
the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case,
the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an
"illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and
what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these
matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was
copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 625 of the Family
Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code
and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that
no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as
correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony:
first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer;
and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other
as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact
was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s
allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to
persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely
register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding
the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the
declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey
disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of
evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne,
had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes
the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that
no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement
gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject
only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end,
it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which
penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may
view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article
3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony
was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a
valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple
had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential
and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was
illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good
faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted,
a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code,
as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The
penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly
provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the
Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without
being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage,
refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents,
grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any
church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to
the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister
solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one
month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two
thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized,
or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that
the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the
Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As
correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law
but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the
provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which
was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the
Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008
in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of
the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and
since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as
Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262
for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his
counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for
the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to
deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support
legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also
filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the
RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime
charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby
cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation
to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable
under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support
their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is
a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty
and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262
for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies
to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our
domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court
that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law;
and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the
fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic
v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial
court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In
Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit:
(1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a
civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review
under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
"The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions
of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a
foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not
he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning
the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special
criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu
of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as
a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to
the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the
observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not
fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the
legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support
his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation
to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to
support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added
that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil
Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their
national law with respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject
to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child,
as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their
personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country
(cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic
or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not
been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as
well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show
that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed
on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s
obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law,
said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v.
American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down
in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e)
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women
and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom
of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her
or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered
anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here
in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our
courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise
irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a
legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which
provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of
facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-9005             June 20, 1958

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners,

vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.

Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.

Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.

BENGZON, J.:

Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the validity of the
marriage in articulo mortis  between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.

It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as wife
and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In the early
part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her
critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen
Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father
Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been
living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union
according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the
bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction
and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and
Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.

After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in
January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.

On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to an
accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la
Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix
resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of
first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal question-which
they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief — whether the events which took place in
January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.

According to the Court of Appeals:

There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the marriage
in articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945, under
the circumstances set forth in the reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest
of Pasay City then, had no reason to side one or the other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive evidence
on the celebration or performance of the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the
same was not in articulo mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr.
Bautista clearly testified, however, that her condition at the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and
according to his observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he about
her condition that he decided in administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing
her confession. . . . .The greatest objection of the Appellees and the trial court against the validity of
the marriage under consideration, is the admitted fact that it was not registered.

The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.

There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no
question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr.
Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."

The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:

(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the priest, as
required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and

(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil registry.

The factual basis of the first proposition — no signing — may seriously be doubted. The Court of
Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such marriage
contract to have been executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the only
question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of the certificate of marriage
in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in the Record of Marriages of
the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid." And such was the only issue
tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)

However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or
contract" constitute a cause for nullity?

Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which
provides:

Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties
with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife. This
declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the
contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . .
(Emphasis ours).

In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for
annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.

In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity
of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration
of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal
age that they take each other as husband and wife" — which in this case actually occurred.3 We think
the signing of the marriage contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose
of evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it
an essential requisite — not the formal  requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The
fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.

Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage usually provide for the
issuance of a certificate of marriage and for the registration or recording of marriage . . . Generally
speaking, the registration or recording of a marriage is not essential to its validity, the statute being
addressed to the officials issuing the license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper return
and registration or recording. (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.)
Formal Requisites. — . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct that a license must
be issued and procured, that only certain persons shall perform the ceremony, that a certain number
of witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be signed, returned, and
recorded, and that persons violating the conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed
to persons in authority to secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage
contract. Such statutes do not void  common-law marriages unless they do so expressly, even where
such marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is the purpose of
these statutes  to discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit intercourse under the guise of
matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties who live together as man and wife, by
providing competent evidence of the marriage. . . . (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp.
188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)

And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several
formal requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)

In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such
marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation
to see  that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the
wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had
been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its environs.

Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by sections 20 and
21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no serious consequences to the
married pair, specially where as in this case, it was caused by the emergency.

The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the
latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all
requisites for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not
being one of the requisites. (Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55
Phil. 1.

The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to
make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of a
marriage license. The first  practically substitutes  the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated
without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613),5 this marriage should not also be voidable for
lack of such affidavit.

In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who have lived
publicly in a state of concubinage6, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to be valid.

The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the plaintiffs who
are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews,
children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)

Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the
Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 72322 convicting her of
bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded “not guilty,” while her putative
husband escaped the criminal suit.5redarclaw

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos
on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to
remarry, she should choose someone who was “without responsibility.”7redarclaw

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married.
She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be
proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the
lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation
and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his
marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced
herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative
defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible
for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.8redarclaw
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage.”9 Thus, the
trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for
having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case,
petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior
to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their
marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:11redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court
to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court can not do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of
the previous marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses’ narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.12redarclaw

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because
she was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of
a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages
exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married
Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her
husband’s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner’s denial of any knowledge of Santos’s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the
courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

In Montañez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as

follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony
is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime,  People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing
prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice.

The Ruling of the Court

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner’s

knowledge of Santos’s first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained
in Nepomuceno:18redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis
supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her
in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the
RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the
trial.20redarclaw

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts’ imposition of the principal
penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the
range of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted
in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an
eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly
consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an
accomplice in the crime of bigamy.”22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice
to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree,23prision correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to
six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed
in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months
of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,24 petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner

resulting from her marriage to
Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.25 If the accused wants to raise
the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned
below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the
essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.28redarclaw

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass
judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her
union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts,29 and given
that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review,30 this Court now resolves to
correct the error of the courts a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage license
had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years before their
marriage.31redarclaw

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 199632 and
that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior
to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-
laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination, respondent
did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who
sold her piglets.36redarclaw

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five
years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the solemnizing officer
stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized
under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case

of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of
(1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals “to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment.”

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in
the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of
the sanctity of marriage.40redarclaw

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded.”41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a result, litigants shall
be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.43redarclaw

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well
that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use
her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that
when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a
second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and
petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our
treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the
crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.”45 It must be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160172             February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs.

ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2)
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the
child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist
and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner
and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife
and Reinna Tricia as his child."4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since
the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent
to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution
due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he
got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has
never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion
when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when
the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation,
as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7
April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of
the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial
court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case.
There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that
there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but
it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of
petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily
entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the
appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant
and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.9 Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without
a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as
husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the
absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and
not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner
argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same
evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be
time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s
paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.13

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the
finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court,
she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the
filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial
court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support.
Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in
an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid
marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that
their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the
findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to
support.18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second,
whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to
pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.24 However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:
Q     But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the
last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A     Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not
exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore
entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
child, thus stating: 1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on
November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein
he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit
petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of
their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though
invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage
ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1"
and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and
"H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting
the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent
is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch
70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed
in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the
standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to
the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages.
In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution
of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases,
the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of
the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest
to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will
be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves
as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status,
i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married
or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces
and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it
cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry.
A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the
Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties
to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case,
we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order.
We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.