782 Phil.

292

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 221697, March 08, 2016 ]
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, PETITIONER,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO,
RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. Nos. 221698-700]

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, PETITIONER,

VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex
parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December
2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and (4) 23
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC),
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a

newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
(Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was
passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife.
Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as
a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In
her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given
the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."[1]

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a
petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City.
On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo
on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,[2] the
petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005
that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-

Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the
name of her adoptive parents.[3] Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an
affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo.
On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.[4]

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a
voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986,
she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.[5]

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
F927287[6] by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April
1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively
secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.[7]

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at

the University of the Philippines[8] but she opted to continue her studies abroad and
left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991
from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.[9]

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares

(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San
Jose Parish in San Juan City.[10] Desirous of being with her husband who was then
based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding
ceremony or on 29 July 1991.[11]

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian)
on 16 April 1992.[12] Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa
Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004,
respectively.[13]

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. [14] She

obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.[15]

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna
to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was
during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned
to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004.[16]

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to

the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition.
[17]
 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in
the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements
as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.[18]

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to
her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the
petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.[19] The couple began preparing
for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they
will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester;[20] coordination
with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and
cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;[21] and inquiry with Philippine authorities as
to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.
[22]
 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.[23]

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005[24] and without

delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Her three (3) children immediately followed[25] while her husband was forced to
stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their
family home there.[26]

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and
her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson
Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.[27] The
corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking
slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her
husband on 20 February 2006.[28] Meanwhile, her children of school age began
attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings.[29] She travelled
back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.[30]

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. [31] The
family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.[32]

Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the
country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in
July 2006.[33]

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home[34] and to this
day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.[35] A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1 June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.[36] Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau
of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together
with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10
July 2006.[37] As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted
favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have
reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens
of the Philippines.[38]
Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name
and in the names of her three (3) children.[39]

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on
31 August 2006.[40] She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport
bearing the No. XX4731999.[41] This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and
she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.[42]

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as

Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).[43] Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010,
[44]
 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.
[45]
 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to
the BI[46] and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.[47] From then
on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.[48]

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States."[49] On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the
U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing
her American citizenship.[50] In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that
she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3
September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.[51]

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of

Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.[52]

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6
years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before
May 13, 2013."[53] Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.[54]

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.

DE0004530.[55]

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections.[56] In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would
be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.[57] The
petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A.
Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14
October 2015.[58]

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the
filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these
consolidated cases.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo)
filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA
No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.[59] She is
convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition.[60] Essentially,
Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation
when she stated in her COC that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen and that she
is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up
to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.[61]

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered

as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.
[62]
 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural born status and
Filipino citizenship on foundlings.[63] Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is
not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.[64] Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to
have lost that status when she became a naturalized American citizen.
[65]
 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.
[66]

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was
bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein
she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six (6) years and six (6)
months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that
assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status
under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of
the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July
2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the
assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship,
Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines.[67]

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually
a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the
Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary
jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations
which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a
willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of
the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing
of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full
force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
 e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born
status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an
honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of
reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino
people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's
next leader.[68]
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed
submitted for resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution

finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of
the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections,
contained material representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.[69]
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by
petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015
Resolution by denying the same.[70]

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in GR. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad
(Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against
petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First
Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure,[71] docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner
lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. [72]

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,
persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-
born status.[73] Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not
included is excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly
included in the categories of citizens in the 1935 Constitution is indicative of the
framers' intent to exclude them.[74]

Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.
[75]

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to

support her claim that foundlings have a nationality.[76] According to Tatad,
international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local
legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines.[77] He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that
automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.[78]

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the
option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only
applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a
foundling.[79]

Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not
comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.[80] Tatad opined that
petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced
her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.[81]

Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S.

domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent
trips to the U.S.[82]

In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner,
docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.[83] He
advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the
said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their
original status as natural born citizens.[84]

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she
had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6)
months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected
petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his
position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency requirement
for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition,
[85]
 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He
claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the
ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said
candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a
legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9
May 2016.[86] Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing
petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date
when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.
[87]
 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July
2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since
she was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by
the Philippine immigration laws.[88]

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of
action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as
enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.[89] Instead,
Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of
petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a
candidate to an elective office.[90]

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as
they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.[91] A petition for quo
warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.[92]

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.[93] Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a
natural-born citizen of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a

nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found.
[94]
 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.[95]

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be
repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.
[96]
 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption
of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her
as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the
decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.[97] She believed that all these acts reinforced
her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.[98]

Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started
reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her
children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium
unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.[99]

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in
the Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the
three determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.[100] She reasoned
out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a
prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicilee of choice.[101]

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her
COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.[102]

In a Resolution[103] promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First

Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to
complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a
resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as
of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National
Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC
First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En
Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present
petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex
parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the
Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court
also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its
Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these
cases.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe Llamanzares
and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division,

in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in

the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares, respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc,

upholding the I December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc,

upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9
May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be
denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the
certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should
hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue
of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue
is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot
itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions
in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests

involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or

coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which
seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to
uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political

parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground
for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,

including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the
provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the
President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for
candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission

on Elections,[104] which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin
v. COMELEC[105] is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993
so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law
or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot
be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of
action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
rule-making power under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power
to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §
2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility

into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For
not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for
"disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified
in § 12 and § 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming
a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their
purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its
progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office

does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing
as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in
our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications
prescribed in § 2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of
[the] disqualifications provided in § 4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of
the respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that
"the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot
be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an
individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election
offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very
acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if
the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for;
if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some
reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or
his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his

citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make,
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquinos residence was still pending in
the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why
the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to
fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election
and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre proclamation cases in
elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be. [106]
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25
September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February 1993 version of Rule 25,
which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law
or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.[107]
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or

Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance
Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of
an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of
candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be
a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to
be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are

flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not
vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a
candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior
proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior
determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a
judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is

suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can
the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative
finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary
measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only
exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases
equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be
determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under

Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the
candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially
that since foundlings[108] are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the
1935 Constitution,[109] they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in
oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all.
This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after
saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a
Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable,"
proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her
natural filiation with a Filipino parent."

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is

DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither

unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines
has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.[110] That said, there is more than
sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-
born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to
show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have
shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the
possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is
a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters. - Evidence must have such a relation to the
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no existence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA)[111] that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in
the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country
was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in
that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented
census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In
1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62%
of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and
5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female
foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886
male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1,190
female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as
against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments,
that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in
Iloilo was Filipino.[112]

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact
that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.
She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair,
almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the

ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.[113]  All of the foregoing
evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that
a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the
norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the
Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We
do not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would
have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We
need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos?
99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly

average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents,
as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that
sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children
is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278.
For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would
be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us,
but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not
the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a
Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children
out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their
children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for
raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever
considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just
because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these
foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the
statistical certainty 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a
denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use
an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire
class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of
common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to
examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,[114] this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.[115]
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to
be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is
inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother
not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President: [We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the
amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind
of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of
unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown
parents.
Sr. Montinola: For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current
codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code
wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the
Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines
is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need...
Sr. Rafols: There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are
[required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola: But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more]
need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols: The amendment should read thus: "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign
father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of
unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones: The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of
unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols: The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not
recognize the child, is not unknown.
President: Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols: I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude
the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize
the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas
Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should
also be considered as Filipinos.
President: The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion: Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in
the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas: Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and Jar in
between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international
law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown
parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary
to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.[116]
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was
any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens
but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was
the account,[117] cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose
Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to
include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a
mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to
apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect
that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that
foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby
making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16
February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was
declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as
Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it
was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need
to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally

correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions
that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is
basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their
colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic

efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize
foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by
Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. [118]
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a
just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be
unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts
that, given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-
born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos.
The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark
side and inflict this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings.
On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special
consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11
which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to
defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict
an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee.
Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most
basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are
binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals
with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the
adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,[119] a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no
court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of
the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of
Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres
to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by
the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status
of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the
petitioners, who are foreigners.[120] (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the
Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A.
No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption
of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on
Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as
among Filipino children who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance
of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make
the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV,
Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must
be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling
status is done not by the child but by the authorities.[121] Secondly, the object of the
process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship
of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by
one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution,
which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.[122] The
Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption
by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano
and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively
affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.[123]

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that
an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as locallegislation.[124] On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include
international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.[125] International customary rules
are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
[126]
 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which
are "basic to legal systems generally,"[127] such as "general principles of equity, i.e.,
the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation."[128] These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Bill of Rights.[129]

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this

Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding
on the State.[130] Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of

the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations
on our country:
Article 7
 1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and
as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in

accordance with their national law and their obligations under the
relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where
the child would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of
every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour,

sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth,
the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status
as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have

a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which
require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines,
are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the
1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of
the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country

of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined
by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of

proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of
parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles
are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
Article 15(1) of which[131] effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. [132] In Razon
v. Tagitis,[133] this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the
"International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced
disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally
accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for
declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although
the convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into
force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states.
Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of
international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America,
and State Practice in the United States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative
is Mijares v. Ranada,[134] where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded
to"[135] the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005.
The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European
Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited
U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the
practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was pronouncement
that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that

"generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on
international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ
Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are
fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal
systems generally,"[136] support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly
considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence[137] shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and

South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the
sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness;
twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at
the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries
surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally
accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born
of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally
accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In
all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted.
Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings.
Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship
of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is
at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of
nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class
which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive
as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member
of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening
statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that
those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is
concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would
be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the international
instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them
political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.[138]
The COMELEC also ruled[139] that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act,
what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine
citizenship."

The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter

of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson III v. HRET,[140] repatriation was explained as

follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally
a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several
cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC[141] where we described it as
an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x."
Also included is Parreño v. Commission on Audit,[142] which cited Tabasa v. Court
of Appeals,[143] where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will
allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on
Audit[144] is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under
R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural
citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain
uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in
line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or
reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be
reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree
with the Congress' determination.

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be

continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET[145] where the phrase
"from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time
of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural born citizen thereof."
Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship.
In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of
citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that
there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-
born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is
not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The
reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz
was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.[146]
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court.
And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing
doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,[147] where we decreed reversed the condonation
doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in application for the reason
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also
said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be,
as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently,
the people's reliance thereupon should be respected."[148]

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner
committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application
for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this
misled the BI to presume that she was a natural born Filipino. It has been
contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which
are precisely unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One
of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents
and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adoptee."[149] Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended
birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)"
and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
issue."[150] That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to
the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and
Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption
proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."[151] The law therefore allows
petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what
would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that
she was an adoptee.

Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot

make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness
which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is
wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

On Residence

The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not
petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that
she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence
in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections
will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the
Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested
information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May
09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in
these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for
good from the U.S.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile,
which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1.
Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and
3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.[152] To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period
of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.[153]

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May
2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail
correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about
28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal
Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her
children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for
succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles
for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their
corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February
2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from
petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming
request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title
Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July
2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner
indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that
she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and
Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to
relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to
finish some work and to sell the family home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the
COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez
cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been
timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites,
namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was
no animus non-revertendi.[154] The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the
evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest date
that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006
when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard,
COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,[155] Japzon v.
COMELEC[156] and Caballero v. COMELEC.[157] During the oral arguments, the
private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.[158] Respondents contend that
these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until
he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a
visa free entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was
still an American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be
counted.

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different
from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,[159] the only evidence presented was
a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he
would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC[160] did not involve a
candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship,
the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to
establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC,[161] the candidate admitted that his
place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations.
In Reyes v. COMELEC,[162] the candidate was found to be an American citizen who
had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer.
The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is
not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases
cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could
be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is
overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children
from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S.
Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items
to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after
selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-
established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her
children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here,
returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed
here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the
years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had
entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768
as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,"
shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors
who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has
been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines."[163] The law
institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the
necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant
members of society upon their return to the country"[164] in line with the
government's "reintegration program."[165] Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary
transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute
terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is
obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself
into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal
requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she
reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while
awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly
thereafter.

No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in

domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court.
Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent
that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication
in Coquilla v. COMELEC,[166] and the other cases cited by the respondents that the
Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are
different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-
of-the case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of

petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because
she put six (6) years and six (6) months as "period of residence before May 13,
2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she
started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the
COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the
2015 COCas false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date

required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted
that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006
which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to
the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that
residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of

residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she
submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself
introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines
up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the
query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of
her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that
she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her
passport and the school records of her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a
binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence
against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all
where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was
overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,[167] the candidate
mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required
period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not
a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence
presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines
from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the
2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of
residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner
actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but
only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only
from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does
not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was
here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a
resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything.
As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the
SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the
commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No.
9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the
2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2
June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner
appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents
have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore
when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the
2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET
petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September
2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six (6)
years and six (6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have
truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of
public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on
15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her
erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned
in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an
intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement
that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for
denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a
deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.[168]
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a
good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the
Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The
veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as
inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration
in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and
therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner]
fails to meet the residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already
shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the
statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with
the constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores the
easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided
favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number,
weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.[169] It ignores, above all
else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by
the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the
declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six
(6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she
naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which
was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral
arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made,
petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and
that the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that
she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-
residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence
other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of
residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. [petitioner's] husband

however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their
family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City.
[Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning
Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One
Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit
7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her
former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
[petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and
"Jesusa L. Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the

disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. [Petitioner]
returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal
Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He
returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine
company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian
Hills, where they eventually built their family home.[170]
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let
the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no
other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the
COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave
abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in

SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in
the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in
the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA
No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9
May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE

NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED
QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections
of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., see concurring opinion.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., please see separate dissenting opinion.
Peralta, J., I join J. Caguioa's opinion.
Reyes, J., I concur with the dissenting opinion of J. Perlas-Bernabe.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
 NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on March 8, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached

herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on March 11, 2016 at 5:33 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA
Clerk of Court

[1]
 Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700, pp. 15-16; COMELEC First
Division Resolution dated 11 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No.
15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC), p. 2.
[2]
 Petition for Certiorari, id. at 16-17;
[3]
 COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 4.
[4]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 22.
[5]
 Id. at 17; Comment (on the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697) filed by
respondent COMELEC dated 11 January 2016, p. 6.
[6]
 Petition for Certiorari, id.; id. at 7.
[7]
 Id. at 18.
[8]
 Supra note 6.
[9]
 Id.
[10]
 COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 3.
[11]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 17.
[12]
 Id. at 18.
[13]
 Id.
[14]
 COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 10.
[15]
 Id.
[16]
 Supra note 1 at 17-18.
[17]
 COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 10.
[18]
 Id.
[19]
 Id.
[20]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 20.
[21]
 Id.
[22]
 Supra note 3.
[23]
 Supra note 20.
[24]
 Supra note
3.                                                                                                             
[25]
 Supra note 20.
[26]
 Supra note 3.
[27]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 4.
[28]
 Id.
[29]
 Id. at 23; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 3.
[30]
 Id.; id.
[31]
 Id.; id.
[32]
 Id.; id.
[33]
 Id. at 23-24; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 5.
[34]
 Id. at 24; id.
[35]
 Id.
[36]
 Supra note 34.
[37]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 25; COMELEC First Division
Resolution, supra note 1 at 5.
[38]
 Id. at 25-26; id.
[39]
 Id. at 26; id.
[40]
 Id.; id.
[41]
 Id.; id.
[42]
 Id. at 32; id. at 6.
[43]
 Supra note 39.
[44]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 26-27; COMELEC First Division
Resolution, supra note 1 at 5.
[45]
 Section 5, R.A. No. 9225 states:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

3. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

xxxx
[46]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 27.
[47]
 Id. at 29.
[48]
 Supra note 46; supra note 1 at 6.
[49]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 30; id.
[50]
 Id.
[51]
 Supra note 48.  
[52]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 31; COMELEC First Division
Resolution, supra note 1 at 6.
[53]
 Comment, supra note 5 at 9.
[54]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 31.
[55]
 Id. at 32; Comment, supra note 53 at 10.
[56]
 Id.; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 6.
[57]
 Id.; id. at 7.
[58]
 Id.; id.
[59]
 Comment (on the Petition in G.R. No. 221697) filed by respondent Elamparo,
dated January 6, 2016, p. 7.
[60]
 COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated December 1, 2015 in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), p. 7.
[61]
 Id. at 7-8.
[62]
 Supra note 60.
[63]
 Id.
[64]
 Id. at 8.
[65]
 Id.
[66]
 Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697, p. 7.
[67]
 Supra note 64.
[68]
 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 65 at 8; COMELEC Second Division
Resolution, supra note 60 at 8-11.
[69]
 COMELEC Second Division Resolution, supra note 60 at 34.
[70]
 Comment, supra note 59 at 10.
[71]
 Section I of Rule 25 ofthe COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, states:

Rule 25 -Disqualification of Candidates

Section 1. Grounds. -Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or

Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance
Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
[72]
 Petition to Disqualify dated 19 October 2015 filed by Tatad in SPA No. 15-002
(DC), p. 9.
[73]
 Id. at 9 and 14.
[74]
 Id. at 10.
[75]
 Id. at 12.
[76]
 Id. at 11.
[77]
 COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 8.
[78]
 Id.
[79]
 Petition to Disqualify, supra note 72 at 11.
[80]
 Id. at 21.
[81]
 Id.
[82]
 Id.
[83]
 Supra note 1 at 8.
[84]
 Id.
[85]
 Contreras' petition is a petition for cancellation of Grace Poe's COC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
[86]
 Petition for Cancellation of Grace Poe's COC dated 17 October 2015 filed by
Contreras in SPA No. 15-007 (DC), pp. 2-4.
[87]
 Id. at 3; Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 13.
[88]
 Id. at 3-4.
[89]
 Sections 12 and 68 ofthe Omnibus Election Code provide:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent

authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which

he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of,
or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed
by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and
261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
[90]
 COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 12.
[91]
 Id. at 10.
[92]
 Id.
[93]
 Id. at 9.
[94]
 Id.
[95]
 Id.
[96]
 Id.
[97]
 Id.
[98]
 Id.
[99]
 Id. at 9-10.
[100]
 Id. at 10.
[101]
 Id.
[102]
 Id.
[103]
 The 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division was
concurred in by Commissioners Louie Tito F. Guia and Ma. Rowena Amelia V.
Guanzon. Presiding Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim issued a Separate
Dissenting Opinion.
[104]
 318 Phil. 329 (1995).
[105]
 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
[106]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 104 at 396-397.
[107]
 Id. at 397-398; Fermin v. COMELEC, supra note 105 at 471-472.
[108]
 In A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Resolution Approving The Proposed Rule on
Adoption (Domestic and Inter-Country), effective 22 August 2002, "foundling" is
defined as a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian or
relatives are unknown; or a child committed to an orphanage or charitable or
similar institution with unknown facts of birth and parentage and registered in the
Civil Register as a "foundling."
[109]
 Article IV-Citizenship.

Sec. I. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution,

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided

by law.
[110]
 Article 163 to 182, Title VI of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
The Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on 4 August 1988.
[111]
 Statistics from the PSA or its predecessor agencies are admissible evidence.
See Herrera v. COMELEC, 376 Phil. 443 (1999) and Bagabuyo v. COMELEC,
593 Phil. 678 (2008). In the latter case, the Court even took judicial notice of the
figures.
[112]
 Transcipt of Stenographic Notes, 9 February 2016, p. 40.
[113]
 Section 3 (y), Rule 131.
[114]
 236 Phil. 307 (1987).
[115]
 Id. at 314-315.
[116]
 English translation of the Spanish original presented in the petitioner's
pleadings before the COMELEC and this Court. The COMELEC and private
respondents have not disputed the accuracy and correctness of the translation.
[117]
 1 Jose M. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 209 (1949).
[118]
 TSN, 16 February 2016, pp. 20-21.
[119]
 117 Phil. 976 (1963).
[120]
 Id. at 978-979.
[121]
 See Section 5 of the RA No. 8552: "Location of Unknown Parent(s). - It shall
be the duty of the Department or the child-caring agency which has custody of
the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the
subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned."
(Underlining supplied)
[122]
 See Exhibit "1" in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).
[123]
 See Exhibit "2" in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).
[124]
 Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536, 600 (2009) citing Pharmaceutical and
Health Care Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 398 (2007).
[125]
 Article 38.1, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
[126]
 Mijares v. Raiiada, 495 Phil. 372, 395 (2005).
[127]
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561
Phil. 386, 400 (2007).
[128]
 International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, 388 Phil. 661, 672-
673 (2000).
[129]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1.
[130]
 Rep. of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545 (2003).
[131]
 "Everyone has the right to a nationality."
[132]
 See Introductory Note to the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness issued by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.
[133]
 Supra note 124.
[134]
 Supra note 126.
[135]
 Id. at 392; See footnote No. 55 of said case.
[136]
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, supra
note 127.
[137]
 See Exhibits 38 and 39-series.
[138]
 Opening Statement of the Solicitor General, p. 6.
[139]
 First Division resolution dated 11 December 2015, upheld in toto by the
COMELEC En Banc.
[140]
 409 Phil. 633, 649 (2001).
[141]
 692 Phil. 407, 420 (2012).
[142]
 551 Phil. 368, 381 (2007).
[143]
 531 Phil. 407, 417 (2006).
[144]
 Supra note 142.
[145]
 Supra note 140 at 646.
[146]
 Id. at 651.
[147]
 G.R. No. 217126-27, 10 November 2015.
[148]
 Id.
[149]
 Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8552, Art. VI, Sec.
33.
 
[150]
 Republic Act No. 8552 (1998), Sec. 14.
[151]
 Republic Act No. 8552 (1998), Sec. 15.
[152]
 Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 623 Phil. 628, 660
(2009) citing Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354, 370-372 (2009) further
citing Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC, 430 Phil. 754, 768-770 (2002) further
further citing Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, 14
September 1993, 226 SCRA 408, 415.
[153]
 Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798, 819 (1999).
[154]
 TSN, 16 February 2016, p. 120.
[155]
 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
[156]
 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
[157]
 G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015.
[158]
 G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013, 699 SCRA 522.
[159]
  Supra note 155.
[160]
 Supra note 156.
[161]
 Supra note 157.
[162]
 Supra note 158.
[163]
 Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 2(a).
[164]
 Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 1.
[165]
 Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 6.
[166]
 Supra note 155.
[167]
 Supra note 104 at 326. (Emphasis supplied)
[168]
 Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, 575 Phil. 253, 265-266 (2008).
[169]
 In Mitra v. COMELEC, et al., [636 PhiL 753 (2010)], It was ruled that the
residence requirement can be complied with through an incremental process
including acquisition of business interest in the pertinent place and lease of
feedmill building as residence.
[170]
 COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), pp.
4-5.

CONCURRING OPINION

SERENO, CJ.:

It is important for every Member of this Court to be and to remain professionally

indifferent to the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. Whether it turns out to
be for a candidate who best represents one's personal aspirations for the country or
who raises one's fears, is a future event we must be blind to while we sit as
magistrates. We are not the electorate, and at this particular juncture of history, our
only role is to adjudicate as our unfettered conscience dictates. We have no master
but the law, no drumbeater but reason, and in our hearts must lie only the love for
truth and for justice. This is what the Constitution requires of us.

It is apropos at this point to recall the principles that Justice Angelina Sandoval-
Gutierrez evoked in her concurring opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC,[1] the
landmark case involving as respondent a presidential candidate for 2014, the late
Ronald Allan Kelly-Poe:

xxxx

Let it not be forgotten that the historic core of our democratic system is
political liberty, which is the right and opportunity to choose those who will
lead the governed with their consent. This right to choose cannot be subtly
interfered with through the elimination of the electoral choice. The present bid
to disqualify respondent Poe from the presidential race is a clear attempt to
eliminate him as one of the choices. This Court should resist such attempt. The
right to choose is the single factor that controls the ambitions of those who
would impose through force or stealth their will on the majority of
citizens. We should not only welcome electoral competition, we should cherish it.
Disqualifying a candidate, particularly the popular one, on the basis of doubtful
claims does not result to a genuine, free and fair election. It results to violence. x x
x. We have seen Edsa I and Edsa II, thus, we know that when democracy operates
as intended, an aroused public can replace those who govern in a manner beyond
the parameters established by public consent.[2]
 xxxx

When the people vote on May 10 and cast their ballots for President, they will be
exercising a sovereign right. They may vote for respondent Poe, or they may not.
When they vote, they will consider a myriad of issues, some relevant, others
trivial, including the eligibility of the candidates, their qualities of leadership, their
honesty and sincerity, perhaps including their legitimacy. That is their prerogative.
After the election, and only after, and that is what the Constitution mandates, the
election of whoever is proclaimed winner may be challenged in an election contest
or a petition for quo warranto. Where the challenge is because of ineligibility, he
will be ousted only if this Court exerts utmost effort to resolve the issue in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of
the majority.[3]

That is what the COMELEC rulings in these cases would have precisely
accomplished had they been affirmed: the illegitimate elimination of an
electoral choice, a choice who appears to be one of the frontrunners in all the
relevant surveys. For the reasons set forth below, I concur with Justice Jose
Portugal Perez, and am herein expounding in detail the reasons for such
concurrence.

With the majority of the Members of the Court declaring, by a vote of 9 as against
6, that petitioner Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares has no legal impediment to run for
the presidency, it is most unfortunate that one of the Dissenting Opinions opens
with a statement that tries to cast uncertainty on an already tense situation. The
dissent gives excessive weight to the fact that there are 5 Justices in the minority
who believe that petitioner does not have the qualifications for presidency, while
ignoring the reality that there at least 7 Justices who believe that petitioner
possesses these qualifications.

Note that the fallo needed only to dispose of the grant or denial of the petitions
and nothing more. Ideally, no further interpretation of the votes should have been
made. Unfortunately, there are attempts to make such an interpretation. We
therefore need to look to our internal rules for clarification on the matter to avoid
exacerbating matters.

If we were to apply the rules on voting in the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,
it is clear that the Court decided on the matter of petitioner's intrinsic
qualifications in accordance with Rule 12, Section 1 of these rules:

Section 1. Voting requirements. - (a) All decisions and actions in Court en

banc cases shall be made up upon the concurrence of the majority of the Members
of the Court who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues or issues
involved and voted on them.

Out of the 12 Members who voted on the substantive question on citizenship, a

clear majority of 7 voted in favor of petitioner. As to residency, 7 out of 13 voted
that petitioner complied with the 10-year residency requirement. These votes, as
explained in the extended opinions submitted by the members of the majority,
must be respected. Granting therefore that we need to address the question of
substantive qualifications of petitioner, she clearly possesses the qualifications for
presidency on the matter of residency and citizenship.

I.
The Proceedings Before the Court

On 28 December 2015, petitioner filed two separate Petitions for Certiorari before
this Court assailing the Resolutions dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC
En Banc, which ordered the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for
the 2016 presidential elections.[4] Both petitions included a prayer for the issuance
of Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) against the COMELEC.

In the afternoon of 28 December 2015, by my authority as Chief Justice and upon

the written recommendation of the Members-in-Charge, the Court issued two
separate orders enjoining COMELEC and its representatives from implementing
the assailed Resolutions, pursuant to Section 6(g), Rule 7 of the Supreme Court
Internal Rules.[5]

The issuance of the TROs was confirmed by the Court En Banc, voting 12-3, in
Resolutions dated 12 January 2016. In the same resolutions, the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions.

Oral arguments were then held on the following dates: January 19 and 26;
February 2, 9 and 16, 2016. During these proceedings, the parties were ordered in
open court to submit their Memoranda within five days from the conclusion of the
oral arguments, after which the consolidated petitions would be deemed submitted
for resolution.

On 29 February 2016, the draft report of the Member-in-Charge was circulated to

the Members of the Court. The Court then decided to schedule the deliberations on
the case on 8 March 2016. A reserved date - 9 March 2016 - was also agreed upon,
in the event that a decision is not reached during the 8 March 2016 session.

In keeping with the above schedule, the Members of the Court deliberated and
voted on the case on 8 March 2016.

II
COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled on petitioner's
qualifications under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The brief reasons why the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled on
petitioner's qualifications are as follows.

First, Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 118, or the Omnibus Election Code

(OEC), does not allow the COMELEC to rule on the qualifications of candidates.
Its power to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is circumscribed within the
confines of Section 78 of the OEC that provides for a summary proceeding to
determine the existence of the exclusive ground that any representation made by
the candidate regarding a Section 74 matter was false. Section 74 requires, among
others a statement by the candidate on his eligibility for office. To authorize the
COMELEC to go beyond its mandate and rule on the intrinsic qualification of
petitioner, and henceforth, of every candidate, is an outcome clearly prohibited by
the Constitution and by the OEC.

Second, even assuming that the COMELEC may go beyond the determination of
patent falsity of the CoC, its decision to cancel petitioner's CoC must still be
reversed. The factual circumstances surrounding petitioner's claims of residency
and citizenship show that there was neither intent to deceive nor false
representation on her part. Worse, the COMELEC's unmerited use of this Court's
dissenting opinions as if they were pronouncements of the Court itself[6] misleads
both the Court and the public, as it evinces a refusal to acknowledge a dissent's
proper place - not as law, but as the personal views of an individual member of
this Court. Most egregiously, the COMELEC blatantly disregarded a long line of
decisions by this Court to come up with its conclusions.

The Power of the COMELEC Prior

to Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code

Prior to the OEC, the power of the COMELEC in relation to the filing of CoCs
had been described as ministerial and administrative.[7] In 1985, the OEC was
passed, empowering the COMELEC to grant or deny due course to a petition to
cancel a CoC. The right to file a verified petition under Section 78 was given to
any person on the ground of material representation of the contents of the CoC as
provided for under Section 74. Among the statements a candidate is required to
make in the CoC, is that he or she is eligible for the office the candidate seeks.

The fundamental requirements for electoral office are found in the Constitution.
With respect to the petitions at hand, these are the natural-born Filipino citizenship
and the 10-year residency requirements for President found under Section 2,
Article VII in relation to Section 1, Article IV of the Constitution.

In the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa on what would turn out to be

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code or Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881,
the lawmakers emphasized that the fear of partisanship on the part of the
COMELEC makes it imperative that it must only be for the strongest of
reasons, i.e., material misrepresentation on the face of the CoC, that the
COMELEC can reject any such certificates. Otherwise, to allow greater
power than the quasi-ministerial duty of accepting facially compliant CoCs
would open the door for COMELEC to engage in partisanship; the
COMELEC may target any candidate at will. The fear was so real to the
lawmakers that they characterized the power to receive CoCs not only as
summary, but initially as, "ministerial." Allow me to quote:

HON. ADAZA. Why should we give the Comelec power to deny or to give due
course when the acceptance of the certificate of candidacy is ministerial?

HON. FERNAN. Iyon na nga ang sinasabi ko eh.

THE CHAIRMAN. Baka iyong residences, this must be summary. He is not a

resident of the ano, why will you wait? Automatically disqualified siya. Suppose
he is not a natural born citizen.
HON. ADAZA. No, but we can specify the grounds here. Kasi, they can use this
power to expand.

THE CHAIRMAN. Yeah, that is under this article nga.

HON. ADAZA. Iyon na nga, but let's make particular reference. Remember,

Nonoy, this is a new provision which gives authority to the Comelec. This was
never there before. Ikansel na natin yan.

HON. GONZALES. At saka the Constitution says, di ba? "The Commission on

Election is the sole judge of all the contest." This merely refers to contest e.
Petition fang to give due course e. You will only be declared disqualified.

THE CHAIRMAN. No, no, because, clearly, he is a non-resident. Oh, why can we
not file a petition? Supposing he is not a natural born citizen? Why?

HON. GONZALES. This is a very very serious question. This should be declared
only in proper election contest, properly litigated but never in a summary
proceedings.

THE CHAIRMAN. We will not use the word, the phrase "due course", "seeking
the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy". For example, si Ading, is a
resident of Cebu and he runs in Davao City.

HON. ADAZA. He is a resident of Cebu but he runs in Lapu-Lapu? lkaw, you are

already threatening him ah.

THE CHAIRMAN. These are the cases I am sure, that are ...

HON. ADAZA. I see. No, no, but let us get rid of the provision. This is dangerous.

THE CHAIRMAN. No but, if you know that your opponent is not elected or
suppose ...

HON. ADAZA. File the proper petition like before without providing this.

THE CHAIRMAN. But in the mean time, why ...

HON. SITOY. My proposal is to delete the phrase "to deny due course", go direct
to "seeking the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy."

HON. ASOK. Every Certificate of Candidacy should be presumed accepted. It

should be presumed accepted.

THE CHAIRMAN. Suppose on the basis of. ..

HON. SITOY. That's why, my proposal is, "any person seeking the cancellation of
a Certificate of Candidacy".

HON. FERNAN. But where are the grounds here?

HON. ADAZA. Noy, let's hold this. Hold muna ito. This is dangerous e.

THE CHAIRMAN. Okay, okay.

HON. GONZALES. Ginagamit lamang ng Comelec ang "before" if it is claimed

that a candidate is an official or that his Certificate of Candidacy has been filed in
bad faith, iyon lang. Pero you cannot go to the intrinsic qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates.

HON. DELOS REYES. Which are taken up in an ordinary protest.

HON. GONZALES. Dito ba, kasama iyong proceedings sa ... ? What I'm saying

is: Kagaya iyong nabanggit kay Nonoy, natural course of margin, imagine, it will
eventually reach the Supreme Court. The moment that the disqualification is
pending, lalong lalo na kung may decision ng Comelec and yet pending pa before
the Supreme Court, that already adversely affect a candidate, mabigat na iyan. So,
what I'm saying is, on this disqualification sub-judice, alisin ito except if on the
ground that he is a nuisance candidate or that his Certificate of Candidacy has
been filed in bad faith. But if his Certificate of Candidacy appears to be regular
and valid on the basis that his certificate has been filed on time, then it should be
given due couse.[8]

The same concerns were raised when the provision was taken up again:

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. No. 10, the power of the Commission to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. What is the specific ano, Tessie?

HON. ADAZA. Page 45.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Section 71.

HON. ADAZA. Kasi kay Neptali ito and it is also contained in our previous

proposal, "Any person seeking to deny due course to or cancel. . . " our proposal
here is that it should not be made to appear that the Commission on Elections has
the authority to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy. I mean
their duty should be ministerial, the acceptance, except in cases where they are
nuisance candidates.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. In case of nuisance, who will determine, hindi

ba Comelec iyan?

HON. ADAZA. Iyon na nga, except in those cases, eh. Ito, this covers a provision

not only in reference to nuisance candidates.

HON. CUENCO. Will you read the provision?

HON. ADAZA. "Any person seeking due course to or the cancellation ... "
because our position here is that these are matters that should be contained in an
election protest or in a quo warranto proceedings, eh. You know, you can be
given a lot of problems in the course of the campaign.

HON. ASOK. But we already have a specific provision on this.

HON. ADAZA. (MP Adaza reading the provision.) You know, we should not
have this as a provision anymore because whatever matters will be raised
respecting this certificate of candidacy, these are normal issues for protest or quo
warranto, eh.

HON. CUENCO. So you now want to remove this power from the Comelec?

HON. ADAZA. This power from the Comelec. This is the new
provision, eh. They should not have this. All of us can be bothered, eh.

HON. CUENCO. So in that case how can the Comelec cancel the certificate of
candidacy when you said. . .

HON. ADAZA. Only with respect to the nuisance candidates. There is no specific
provision.

HON. ASOK. There is already a specific provision for nuisance candidates.

HON. ADAZA. This one refers to other candidates who are not nuisance
candidates, but most particularly refers to matters that are involved in protest
and quo warranto proceedings. Why should we expand their other provisions
before. You know, you can get bothered.

HON. CUENCO. Everybody will be vulnerable?

HON. ADAZA. Yeah, everybody will be vulnerable, eh.

HON. CUENCO. Even if you are a serious candidate?

HON. ADAZA. Even if you are a serious candidate because, for instance, they
will file a petition for quo warranto, they can file a petition to the Comelec to
cancel your certificate of candidacy. These are actually grounds for protest or
for quo warranto proceedings.

xxxx

HON. CUENCO. By merely alleging, for example, that you are a subversive.

HON. ADAZA. Oo, iyon na nga, eh.

xxxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Suppose you are disqualified, you do not have the
necessary qualifications, the Comelec can motu propio cancel it.

HON. CUENCO. On what ground, Mr. Chairman?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. You are disqualified. Let's say, wala kang residence

or kuwan ...

HON. ADAZA. Ah, that's the problem.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. That's why.

HON. ADAZA. We should not allow that thing to crop up within the powers of
the Comelec because anyone can create problem for everybody. You know, that's
a proper subject for protest or quo warranto. But not to empower the Comelec to
cancel. That's a very dangerous provision. It can reach all of us.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Hindi, if you are a resident pero iyong, let's say a

new comer comes to Misamis Oriental, 3 months before and file his Certificate of
Candidacy.

HON. ADAZA. Never mind, file the necessary petition.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. These are the cases they say, that will be involved.

HON. ADAZA. I think we should kuwan that e.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Iyon talagang non-resident and then he goes there

and file his certificate, You can, how can anybody stop him, di ba?

HON. ADAZA. No, let me cite to you cases, most people running for instance in
the last Batasan, especially in the highly urbanized city, they were residence in one
particular city but actually running in the province. You see, how you can be
bothered if you empower the Comelec with this authority to cancel, there would
have been many that would have been cancelled.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. There were many who tried to beat the deadline.

HON. ADAZA. No, there are many who did not beat the deadline, I know.

HON. LOOD. The matter of point is the word Article 8, Article 8, provides full
responsibility for ...

HON. ADAZA. Which one? That's right.

HON. LOOD. That's why it includes full ... (Unintelligible).

HON. ADAZA. No, it's very dangerous. We will be all in serious trouble. Besides,
that covered already by specific provisions. So, can we agree. Anyway it is this
new provision which is dangerous.

HON CUENCO. So, you want the entire provision?

HON. LOOD. Unless we make exception.[9]

The Summary Nature of Proceedings

under Section 78 Only Allow the
COMELEC to Rule on Patent
Material Misrepresentation of Facts
on Residency and Citizenship, not of
Conclusions of Law, and especially,
not in the Absence of Established
Legal Doctrines on the Matter
The original intent of the legislature was clear: to make the denial of due course or
cancellation of certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC a summary
proceeding that would not go into the intrinsic validity of the qualifications of the
candidate, even to the point of making the power merely ministerial in the absence
of patent defects. There was concern among some other members about giving the
COMELEC the power to deny due course to or cancel outright the certificate of
candidacy. As such, the proposal was to remove Section 78 entirely or to lay down
specific parameters in order to limit the power of the COMELEC under the
provision. Thus, in interpreting the language of Section 78 as presently crafted,
those intended limitations must be kept in mind. This includes retaining the
summary nature of Section 78 proceedings.

Reyes v. Commission on Elections[10] provides an insight into the summary nature

of a Section 78 proceeding:

The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one "heard
summarily." The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC
Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the
Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the
Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17
further provides in Section 3 that when the proceedings are authorized to be
summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be
required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-
affidavits and other documentary evidence; ... and that "[t]his provision shall
likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence are delegated
by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials .... "

xxxx

In fact, in summary proceedings like the special action of filing a petition to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, oral testimony is dispensed
with and, instead, parties are required to submit their position paper together
with affidavits, counter affidavits and other pieces of documentary evidence.

The Summary nature of Section 78 proceeding implies the simplicity of subject-

matter[11] as it does away with long drawn and complicated trial-type litigation.
Considering its nature, the implication therefore, is that Section 78 cases
contemplate simple issues only. Any issue that is complex would entail the use of
discretion, the exercise of which is reserved to the appropriate election
tribunal. With greater reason then, claims of candidate on a matter of opinion
on unsettled questions of law, cannot be the basis for the denial of a CoC.

Section 78 Proceedings Cannot Take

the Place of a Quo Warranto
Proceeding or an Electoral Protest

The danger of the COMELEC effectively thwarting the voter's will was clearly
articulated by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his separate opinion in the case
involving Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos.[12] The Court voted to grant the Rule 64
Petition of Mrs. Marcos to invalidate the COMELEC's Resolution denying her
Amended CoC. Justice Mendoza wanted the Court to do so on the prior threshold
issue of jurisdiction, i.e., that the COMELEC did not have even the power to
assume jurisdiction over the petition of Cirilo Montejo because it was in effect a
petition for disqualification. Thus, the COMELEC resolution was utterly void.
Justice Mendoza explains Section 78 in relation to petitions for disqualification
under the Constitution and relevant laws. The allegations in the Montejo's petition
were characterized, thus:

The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC,
while entitled "For Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no allegation that
private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in
her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the
ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of
Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of Representative,
considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than
ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her
certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its
finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not
because of any finding that she had made false representations as to material
matters in her certificate of candidacy.

Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for
cancellation of certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to
note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under § 78 have for
their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo
warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding
public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of
the House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body. [13]

Justice Mendoza opined that the COMELEC has no power to disqualify

candidates on the ground of ineligibility, elaborating thus:

In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the
power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the
office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected,
by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate
forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the
proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were
unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their
dispute to that body.

The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for
determining a candidate's qualifications for an office before his election. There are
none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law
of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A.
No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests
but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning
candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are
not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These
provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or
conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a
candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation
of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
[14]

He then proceeded to cite the three reasons explaining the absence of an

authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate:

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an
individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election
offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very
acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if
the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for;
if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some
reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or
his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make,
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in
the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That
is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial
duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state
in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which
they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made
after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases
involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is
the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in

elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.
[15]

The legal differentiation between Section 78 vis-a-vis quo warranto proceedings

and electoral protests made by Justice Mendoza in the Romualdez Marcos case
was completely adopted, and affirmed by a unanimous Court in Fermin v.
COMELEC.[16] Fermin v. COMELEC has been affirmed in Munder v. Commission
on Elections,[17] Agustin v. Commission on Elections[18] Talaga v. Commission on
Elections,[19] Mitra v. Commission on Elections,[20] Hayundini v. Commission on
Elections,[21] Aratea v. Commission on Elections[22] Gonzalez v.Commission on
Elections[23] Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[24] Dela Cruz v. Commission
on Elections,[25] and Maruhom v. COMELEC,[26] thus the Mendoza formulation has
become settled doctrine.

It is clear that what the minority herein is attempting to accomplish is to

authorize the COMELEC to rule on the intrinsic qualifications of petitioner,
and henceforth, of every candidate - an outcome clearly prohibited by the
Constitution and by the Omnibus Election Code. That this was also the
objective of the minority justices in Tecson v. COMELEC should warn us that the
proposal of the minority herein will result in the direct reversal of the said case.

In Tecson, the COMELEC contended it did not have the jurisdiction to rule on the
qualification of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe. The COMELEC stated that it could only
rule that FPJ did not commit material misrepresentation in claiming that he was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, there being substantial basis to support his belief that
he was the son of a Filipino. The Court upheld this conclusion of the COMELEC,
and in the dispositive conclusions portion of the Decision held:

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

The Court made two important rulings on this particular point. First, that Mr.
Fornier, the petitioner in the COMELEC case to deny Mr. Poe's CoC, had the
burden to prove that Mr. Poe committed material misrepresentation. Second, even
assuming that the petitioner therein was able to make out a prima facie case of
material misrepresentation, the evidence on Mister Poe's side preponderated in
favor of the conclusion that he did not make any material misrepresentation. Thus,
the COMELEC was correct in saying that there was no basis to grant Fornier's
Section 78 petition. Mr. Poe, We said, did not have to conclusively establish his
natural-born citizenship; preponderance of evidence was sufficient to prove
his right to be a candidate for President.

It is absolutely offensive to Our concept of due process for the COMELEC to

insist on its own interpretation of an area of the Constitution that this Court has yet
to squarely rule upon, such as the citizenship of a foundling. It was also most
unfair of COMELEC to suddenly impose a previously non-existing formal
requirement on candidates-such as a permanent resident visa or citizenship itself-
to begin the tolling of the required duration of residency. Neither statutes nor
jurisprudence require those matters. COMELEC grossly acted beyond its
jurisdiction by usurping the powers of the legislature and the judiciary.

Section 78 and Material Misrepresentation

It must be emphasized that all the decisions of the COMELEC where the Court
upheld its denial of a CoC on the basis of an alleged misrepresentation pertaining
to citizenship and residency, were all denials on matters of fact that were either
uncontroverted, or factual matters that were proven to be false. None of them had
to do with any question of law.

In the following cases, we upheld the COMELEC'S denial of the CoCs: Labo, Jr.
v. COMELEC[27], (Labo's statement that he was a natural-born citizen was
disproved on the ground that he failed to submit any evidence proving his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship); Abella v . COMELEC[28] (Abella, a
candidate for governor of Leyte, and undisputedly a resident of Ormoc City, an
independent component city, failed to establish a new domicile in Kananga,
Leyte ); Domino v. Commission on Elections,[29] (the lease contract over a
residence in Sarangani Province failed to produce the kind of permanency
necessary to establish abandonment of one's original domicile); Caballero v.
Commission on Elections,[30] (petitioner, who had effectively transferred his
domicile of choice in Canada, failed to present competent evidence to prove that
he was able to re-establish his residence in Uyugan); Jalosjos v. Commission on
Elections,[31] (Svetlana Jalosjos, whose domicile of origin was San Juan, Metro
Manila, failed to acquire a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental,
prior to the May 2010 elections); Aquino v. Commission on Elections,[32] (Aquino,
whose domicile of origin was San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, failed to established a
new domicile in the Second District of Makati City on the mere basis of a lease
agreement of a condominium unit); Reyes v. Commission on Elections[33] (where
petitioner, who previously admitted that she was a holder of a U.S. passport, failed
to submit proof that she reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 or that
she maintained her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque ); Dumpit-Michelena
v. Boado[34] (candidate Dumpit-Michelena was not a resident of Agoo, La Union -
voter's registration at Naguilian, La Union and joint affidavit of
all barangay officials of San Julian West, Agoo taken as proof that she was not a
resident of the barangay); Hayudini v. Commission on Elections[35] (candidate
Hayudini was not a resident of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi - based on a final RTC
Decision ordering the deletion of Hayudini's name in Barangay Bintawlan's
permanent list of voters); Velasco v. Commission on Elections[36] (court ruling that
he was not a registered voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga); Bautista v. Commission on
Elections[37] (admission that he was not a registered voter of Lumbangan, Nasugbu,
Batangas where he was running as punong barangay); Ugdoracion, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections[38] (admission that he was at the time of the filing of the
CoC still a holder of a then valid green card); and Jalosjos v. Commission on
Elections[39] (temporary and intermittent stay in a stranger's house does not amount
to residence).

In fact, in the only case of material misrepresentation on citizenship where the

Supreme Court agreed to a Section 78 denial by the COMELEC, was in the case
of Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. of Baguio City[40] who had previously been declared by
the Supreme Court itself as not a Filipino citizen.[41] In the Labo case, there was a
prior binding conclusion of law that justified the action of the COMELEC in
denying the CoC. It is important to emphasize this considering the dangers of an
overly broad reading of the COMELEC's power under Section 78.

A candidate commences the process of being voted into office by filing a

certificate of candidacy (CoC). A candidate states in his CoC, among others, that
he is eligible to run for public office, as provided under Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Thus:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall

state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for
elective public office; that is, having all the qualifications and none of the
ineligibilities.[42] The remedy to remove from the electoral ballot, the names of
candidates who are not actually eligible, but who still state under oath in their
CoCs that they are eligible to run for public office, is for any person to file a
petition under Section 78, which provides:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied)

How Legally Significant is the Intent

to Deceive for a Section 78 OEC
Petition to Prosper?

It was proposed by Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v.

COMELEC that the intent to deceive was never contemplated as an essential
element to prove a Section 78 petition.[43] The problem with this opinion is that it
remains a proposed reversal of a doctrine that remains firmly entrenched in our
jurisprudence. In a long line of cases, starting with Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC[44] in 1995, this Court has invariably held that intent to deceive the
electorate is an essential element for a Section 78 petition to prosper.

In Romualdez-Marcos, the Court ruled that it is the fact of the qualification, not a

statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's qualification
requirements. The statement in the certificate of candidacy becomes material only
when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.[45]
This ruling was adopted by the Court in a long line of cases, in which it was ruled
that aside from the requirement of materiality, a petition under Section 78 must
also show that there was malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the
candidate's qualifications for public office.

In Salcedo II v. COMELEC,  [46] the Court affirmed the decision of the COMELEC

denying the petition to cancel the CoC filed by Ermelita Cacao Salcedo, a
candidate for mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Apart from finding that the use of the surname
"Salcedo" was not a material qualification covered by Section 78, the Court also
declared that there was no intention on the part of the candidate to mislead or
deceive the public as to her identity. We concluded that, in fact, there was no
showing that the voters of the municipality were deceived by Salcedo's use of such
surname; consequently, the COMELEC correctly refused to cancel her CoC.

On the other hand, in Velasco v. COMELEC,[47] We upheld the cancellation of the

CoC filed by Nardo Velasco because he made a material misrepresentation as to
his registration as a voter. In Our discussion, We emphasized that Velasco knew
that his registration as a voter had already been denied by the RTC, but he still
stated under oath in his CoC that he was a voter of Sasmuan. [48] This was
considered sufficient basis for the COMELEC to grant the Section 78 petition.[49]

In Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections,[50] this Court sustained the

COMELEC's dismissal of the petition of cancellation filed against Rustico B.
Balderian because there was no showing that he had the intent to deceive the
voting public as to his identity when he used his Filipino name, instead of his
Chinese name, in his CoC.

On the other hand, in Maruhom v. COMELEC,[51] We upheld the cancellation of

the CoC of Jamela Salic Maruhom because she had subsisting voter registrations
in both the municipalities of Marawi and Marantao in Lanao del Sur. We
emphasized that Maruhom deliberately attempted to conceal this fact from the
electorate as it would have rendered her ineligible to run as mayor of Marantao.

The element of intent was again required by this Court in Mitra v COMELEC.
[52]
 In that case, We reversed the ruling of the COMELEC, which cancelled the
CoC filed by Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra because the commission "failed to
critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or
hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor
of Palawan." Upon an examination of the evidence in that case, We concluded that
there was no basis for the COMELEC's conclusion that Mitra deliberately
attempted to mislead the Palawan electorate.

The presence of intent to deceive the electorate was also a controlling factor in the
decision of the Court in Panlaqui v. COMELEC.[53] We ruled that the decision of
the Regional Trial Court to exclude Nardo Velasco as a voter did not result in the
cancellation of his CoC for mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga. Said this Court:

It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter's inclusion/exclusion

proceedings to take cognizance of and determine the presence of a false
representation of a material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether
the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was an intention to
deceive the electorate in terms of one's qualifications for public office. The finding
that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does
not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.

In Gonzales v COMELEC,[54] the Court distinguished between a petition for

cancellation under Section 78 and a petition for cancellation under Section 68 of
the OEC, in order to determine whether the petition filed against Ramon Gonzales
was filed on time. We declared that a Section 78 petition must pertain to a false
representation on a material matter that is made with the deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. Upon finding these elements in the petition filed against Fernando V.
Gonzales, We ruled that the applicable period for filing the petition is that
prescribed under Section 78 i.e. within twenty-five days from the filing of the
COC. Since the petition was filed beyond this period, this Court declared that the
COMELEC erred in giving due course to the same.

The requirement of intent was likewise reiterated in Tecson v. COMELEC,

[55]
 Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[56] Fermin v. Commission on
Elections,[57] Aratea v. Commission on Elections[58] and Talaga v. Commission on
Elections.[59]

It has been claimed, however, that this Court in Tagolino v. HRET,[60] abandoned

this requisite when it stated that "deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much
less one's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is
enough that the person's declaration of a material qualification in the [certificate of
candidacy] be false." In that case, the Court, using Miranda v. Abaya[61] as basis,
stated that:

In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person
committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
determination of whether one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What
remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or
cancel the CoC on the basis of one's ineligibility and that the same be granted
without any qualification.[62]

It is important to note that the statement regarding intent to deceive was only an
obiter dictum. The primary issue in both Tagolino and Miranda is whether a
candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course or cancelled
may be validly substituted in the electoral process. In other words, the cases dealt
with the effect of the denial of due course or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy, and not on the validity or soundness of the denial or cancellation itself.

Furthermore, in Miranda, We clarified the COMELEC's use of the word

"disqualified" when granting a petition that prays for the denial of due course or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. This Court said:

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May
5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and
particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on
the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the
granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy.[63]
Clearly, the phrase "no qualification" in Miranda, which was essentially echoed
in Tagolino, referred to the ruling of the COMELEC to grant the petition to deny
due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy. It did not refer to the false
representation made by the candidate in his certificate of candidacy.

At any rate, after Tagolino, We reiterated the requirement of deceit for a Section

78 petition to prosper in four more cases.[64] Our most recent pronouncements
in Jalover v. Osmena,[65] reiterated that a petition under Section 78 cannot
prosper in a situation where the intent to deceive or defraud is patently
absent, or where no deception of the electorate results. Furthermore, the
misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, but must
pertain to a material fact.

Said Justice Arturo D. Brion in the 2014 unanimous Jalover v. Osmena decision:

Separate from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under

Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide
a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. (citing Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections) In other words, it
must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would be
candidate's qualifications for public office. In Mitra v. COMELEC, we held that
the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere
innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is
patently absent, or where no deception of the electorate results. The deliberate
character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the
consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run.

Thus, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy

according to the prevailing decisions of this Court still requires the following
essential allegations: (1) the candidate made a representation in the certificate; (2)
the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive
rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election); and (3) the candidate
made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his
qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.[66]

Romualdez- Marcos v. COMELEC is again worth recalling.[67] We ruled therein

that it is the fact of the disqualification, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual
has satisfied the constitution's qualification requirements. The statement in the
certificate of candidacy becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.[68]

In Mitra v. COMELEC,[69] We gave importance to the character of a representation

made by a candidate in the certificate of candidacy. This Court found grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it failed to take into account
whether there had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitra's certificate of
candidacy.[70] The COMELEC cannot simply assume that an error in the certificate
of candidacy was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material representation. [71]
It must be emphasized that under Section 78, it is not enough that a person lacks
the relevant qualification; he must have also made a false representation of the
lack of qualification in the certificate of candidacy.[72] The denial of due course to,
or the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy, is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation
that is false, which relates to the qualifications required of the public office the
candidate is running for.[73]

Considering that intent to deceive is a material element for a successful petition

under Section 78, a claim of good faith is a valid defense. Misrepresentation
means the act of making a false or misleading assertion about something, usually
with the intent to deceive.[74] It is not just written or spoken words, but also any
other conduct that amounts to a false assertion.[75] A material misrepresentation is a
false statement to which a reasonable person would attach importance in deciding
how to act in the transaction in question or to which the maker knows or has
reason to know that the recipient attaches some importance.[76]

In the sphere of election laws, a material misrepresentation pertains to a

candidate's act with the intention to gain an advantage by deceitfully claiming
possession of all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications when the
contrary is true.

A material misrepresentation is incompatible with a claim of good faith. Good

faith encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and
the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. [77] It
implies honesty of intention and honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a contrary claim, and absence of intention to deceive another. [78]

Burden of Proof in Section 78 Proceedings

Section 1, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence defines burden of proof as
"the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim" "by the amount of evidence required by law." When it comes to a
Section 78 proceeding, it is the petitioner who has the burden of establishing
material misrepresentation in a CoC.[79]

Since the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body, the petitioner must establish his
case of material misrepresentation by substantial evidence.[80] Substantial evidence
is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.

Burden of proof never shifts.[81] It is the burden of evidence that shifts.[82] Hence, in

a Section 78 proceeding, if the petitioner comes up with a prima facie case of
material misrepresentation, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.

In this case, respondents had the burden to establish the following: (1) falsity of
the representations made by petitioner with regard to her citizenship and residence;
and (2) intent to deceive or mislead the electorate.

On residence
As will be further discussed below, respondents mainly relied on the
representation that petitioner previously made in her 2012 CoC for the position of
Senator to establish the requirements of falsity and intent to deceive. Petitioner,
however, has shown by an abundance of substantial evidence that her residence in
the Philippines commenced on 24 May 2005 and that the statement she made in
the 2012 CoC was due to honest mistake. But respondents failed to meet head on
this evidence. Hence, they failed to discharge their burden of proving material
misrepresentation with respect to residency.

Furthermore, the COMELEC unreasonably shifted the burden of proof to

petitioner, declaring that she had the burden to show that she possessed the
qualifications to run for President. As previously discussed, respondents had the
burden to establish the key elements for a Section 78 petition to prosper.

On citizenship

With respect to the issue of citizenship, respondents leaned heavily on petitioner's

admission that she was a foundling. Nevertheless, this did not establish the falsity
of petitioner's claim that she was a natural-born citizen. Presumptions operated
profoundly in her favor to the effect that a foundling is a natural-born citizen.
Further, she had a right to rely on these legal presumptions, thus negating the
notion of deception on her part. Thus, respondents failed to discharge their burden
of proving material misrepresentation with respect to residency.

Yet, the COMELEC unfairly placed the burden of proof on petitioner when, for
reasons already discussed, the onus properly fell on respondents. This point will be
more comprehensively discussed below.

III.
The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it cancelled
petitioner's 2016 Certificate of Candidacy in the absence of any material
misrepresentation on residency or citizenship.

In my view, the fact that the COMELEC went beyond an examination of the
patent falsity of the representations in the CoC is enough to demonstrate its grave
abuse of discretion. I maintain that a Section 78 proceeding must deal solely with
"patent defects in the certificates" and not the question of eligibility or
ineligibility. The commission clearly exceeded the limited authority granted to it
under Section 78 of the OEC when it determined petitioner's intrinsic
qualifications, not on the basis of any uncontroverted fact, but on questions of law.

With this conclusion, the Court already has sufficient justification to reverse and
set aside the assailed COMELEC Resolutions. Consequently, I believe that it is no
longer necessary for us to decide questions pertaining to petitioner's qualifications.

However, given the factual milieu of this case and its significance to the upcoming
electoral exercise, I am likewise mindful of the duty of the Court to allay the
doubts created by the COMELEC ruling in the minds of the voting public.
Furthermore, the dissents have already gone to the intrinsic qualification of
petitioner as to cast doubt on her viability as a candidate. These positions must be
squarely addressed; hence this extended opinion is inevitable.
Grave Abuse of Discretion

In Mitra v. COMELEC,[83] this Court held that COMELEC's use of wrong or

irrelevant considerations in the resolution of an issue constitutes grave abuse of
discretion:

As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it

refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of
wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a
decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC,
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial
evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support
a conclusion.

In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily

review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an
error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

For reasons discussed below, I find that the COMELEC committed a grossly
unreasonable appreciation of both the evidence presented by petitioner to prove
her residency, as well the legal standards applicable to her as a foundling. For
purposes of clarity, I will discuss residency and citizenship separately.

In Sabili,[84] we noted that the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, when the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence is so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of
jurisdiction, the Court is duty-bound to intervene. In that case, petitioner was able
to show that the COMELEC relied on wrong or irrelevant considerations - like
property ownership in another municipality - in deciding the issue of whether
petitioner made a material misrepresentation regarding his residence.

IV.
A. ON RESIDENCY

The COMELEC made two findings as far as petitioner's compliance with the 10-
year residency requirement is concerned. First, petitioner committed a false
material representation regarding her residency in her 2016 CoC for President, as
shown by her declaration in her 2013 CoC for senator. Second, petitioner's alien
citizenship at the time she allegedly abandoned her domicile in the US was a legal
impediment which prevented her from re-establishing her domicile in the
Philippines, considering her failure to obtain an authorization from the Bureau of
Immigration as permanent resident in the country early enough to start the count of
the 10-year residency requirement.
These conclusions reveal the failure of the COMELEC to properly appreciate and
evaluate evidence, so much so that it overstepped the limits of its discretion to the
point of being grossly unreasonable.

There was no deliberate intent on the

part of petitioner to make a material
misrepresentation as to her residency.

In the assailed Resolutions, the COMELEC had concluded that petitioner

committed a false material representation about her residency in her 2016 CoC for
president on the basis of her declaration in her 2013 CoC for senator. According to
the Commission, this 2012 declaration showed a deliberate intent to mislead the
electorate and the public at large.

Public respondent's conclusions are unjustified. In the first place, the COMELEC
misapplied the concepts of admissions and honest mistake in weighing the
evidence presented by petitioner. As will be discussed below, declarations against
interest are not conclusive evidence and must still be evaluated to determine their
probative value. Neither does the declaration in her 2013 CoC foreclose the
presentation of evidence of petitioner's good faith and honest belief that she has
complied with the 10-year residency requirement for presidential candidates.

Admissions against Interest

Admissions against interest are governed by Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a

relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

It is well to emphasize that admissions against interest fall under the rules of
admissibility.[85] Admissions against interest pass the test of relevance and
competence. They, however, do not guarantee their own probative value and
conclusiveness. Like all evidence, they must be weighed and calibrated by the
court against all other pieces at hand. Also, a party against whom an admission
against interest is offered may properly refute such declaration by adducing
contrary evidence.[86]

To be admissible, an admission must (1) involve matters of fact, and not of law;
(2) be categorical and definite; (3) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (4) be
adverse to the admitter' s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and
inadmissible.[87] An admission against interest must consist of a categorical
statement or document pertaining to a matter of fact. If the statement or
document pertains to a conclusion of law or necessitates prior settlement of
questions of law, it cannot be regarded as an admission against interest.[88]

Even a judicial admission, which does not require proof, for judicial admissions
under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court[89] But even then, contrary
evidence may be admitted to show that the admission was made through palpable
mistake. In Bitong v. CA,[90] the Court ruled that although acts or facts admitted in
a pleading do not require proof and can no longer be contradicted,
evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made through
palpable mistake. Said the Court:

A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission against interest is entitled to

overcome by evidence the apparent inconsistency, and it is competent for the party
against whom the pleading is offered to show that the statements were
inadvertently made or were made under a mistake of fact. In addition, a party
against whom a single clause or paragraph of a pleading is offered may have the
right to introduce other paragraphs which tend to destroy the admission in the
paragraph offered by the adversary.

Every alleged admission is taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one
side with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect on the other
side. The reason for this is, where part of a statement of a party is used against him
as an admission, the court should weigh any other portion connected with the
statement, which tends to neutralize or explain the portion which is against
interest.

In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value
is to be determined from the whole statement and others intimately related or
connected therewith as an integrated unit.[91]

COMELEC Conclusions on Admission

against Interest

In the Resolution dated 1 December 2015 of the Second Division in SPA No. 15-
001 (Elamparo v. Llamanzares), the COMELEC ruled as follows:

Respondent ran for Senator in the May 13, 2013 Senatorial Elections. In her COC
for Senator, she answered "6 years and 6 months" in the space provided for the
candidate's period of residence in the Philippines. Based on her own declaration,
respondent admitted under oath that she has been a resident of the country only
since November 2006.

Undeniably, this falls short by 6 months of the required May 2006 commencement
of the residence in the Philippines in order for respondent to qualify as a candidate
for President of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 elections. If we reckon her
period of residency from November 2006, as she herself declared, she will be a
resident of the Philippines by May 9, 2016 only for a period of 9 years and 6
months.

As correctly pointed out by petitioner, this sworn statement by respondent is an

admission against her interest.

Section 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court (which is of suppletory application)

expressly states:

Section 26. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as

to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

The rationale for the rule was explained by the Supreme Court in Manila Electric
Company v. Heirs of Spouses Dionisio Deloy:
Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is
based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against
himself UNLESS SUCH DECLARATION WAS TRUE. Thus, it is fair to
presume that the declaration corresponds to the truth, and it is his fault if it does
not.

Respondent's representation in her COC for Senator that she had been a resident of
the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months by May 2013 is an admission
that is binding on her. After all, she should not have declared it under oath if such
declaration was not true.

Respondent's convenient defense that she committed an honest mistake on a

difficult question of law, when she stated in her COC for Senator that her period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013 was 6 years and 6 months, is at
best self-serving. It cannot overturn the weight given to the admission against
interest voluntarily made by respondent.

Assuming arguendo that as now belatedly claimed the same was due to an honest

mistake, no evidence has been shown that there was an attempt to rectify the so-
called honest mistake. The attempt to correct it in her present COC filed only on
October 15, 2015 cannot serve to outweigh the probative weight that has to be
accorded to the admission against interest in her 2013 COC for Senator.

Certainly, it is beyond question that her declaration in her 2013 COC for Senator,
under oath at that, that she has been a resident of the Philippines since November
2006 still stands in the record of this Commission as an official document,
which may be given in evidence against her, and the probative weight and binding
effect of which is neither obliterated by the passing of time nor by the belated
attempt to correct it in her present COC for President of the Philippines.
Respondent cannot now declare an earlier period of residence. Respondent is
already stopped from doing so. If allowed to repudiate at this late stage her prior
sworn declaration, We will be opening the floodgates for candidates to commit
material misrepresentations in their COCs and escape responsibility for the same
through the mere expedient of conveniently changing their story in a subsequent
COC. Worse, We will be allowing a candidate to run for President when the COC
for Senator earlier submitted to the Commission contains a material fact or data
barring her from running for the position she now seeks to be elected to. Surely, to
rule otherwise would be to tolerate a cavalier attitude to the requirement of putting
in the correct data in a COC. In fact, the COC filer, in that same COC, certifies
under oath that the data given are indeed "true and correct".

As shown by the above-cited Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division

regarded the declaration of petitioner in her 2013 certificate of candidacy for
senator - that she had been a resident of the Philippines only since November 2006
- as a binding and conclusive statement that she can no longer refute. It appeared
to confuse admissions against interest with judicial admissions.

However, in the Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the En Banc, COMELEC

conceded that such statement may indeed be overcome by petitioner through the
presentation of competent evidence of greater weight. According to the
COMELEC En Banc:
On the allegation that the Second Division chose to rely solely on the declarations
of respondent in her 2013 COC: we are not persuaded. Again, the Second Division
was not constrained to mention every bit of evidence it considered in arriving at
the assailed Resolution. Concededly, however, it did put ample attention on
Respondent's 2013 COC, but not without good reason.

To recall, Respondent, in her 2013 COC for Senator, indicated, under oath, that
her period of residence in the Philippines from May 13, 2013 is "6 years and 6
months." Following this, she became a resident on November 2006. This is
entirely inconsistent with her declaration in the present 2016 COC for president
that immediately before the May 9, 2016 elections, she will be a resident of the
country for "10 years and 11 months," following which she was a resident since
May, 2005. -The Second Division struck respondent's arguments mainly on the
basis of this contradiction.

Respondent cannot fault the Second Division for using her statements in the 2013
COC against her. Indeed, the Second Division correctly found that this is an
admission against her interest. Being such, it is "the best evidence which affords
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on
the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such
declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds
with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not."

Moreover, a COC, being a notarial document, has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. To contradict the facts stated therein, there must be evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. In order for a declarant to
impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to
merely execute a subsequent notarial document. After executing an affidavit
voluntarily wherein admissions and declarations against the affiant's own interest
are made under the solemnity of an oath, the affiant cannot just be allowed to
spurn them and undo what he has done.

Yes, the statement in the 2013 COC, albeit an admission against interest, may later
be impugned by respondent. However, she cannot do this by the mere expedient of
filing her 2016 COC and claiming that the declarations in the previous one were
"honest mistakes". The burden is upon her to show, by clear, convincing and more
than preponderant evidence, that, indeed, it is the latter COC that is correct and
that the statements made in the 2013 COC were done without bad faith.
Unfortunately for respondent, she failed to discharge this heavy burden.

As shown by the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc had a proper understanding

of an admission against interest - that it is one piece of evidence that should be
evaluated against all other pieces presented before it.

The COMELEC was wrong, however, in ruling that petitioner attempted to

overcome the alleged admission against interest merely by filing her 2016 CoC for
president. Petitioner submitted severed various many and varied pieces of
evidence to prove her declaration in her 2016 certificate of candidacy for president
that as of May 2005, she had definitely abandoned her residence in the US and
intended to reside permanently in the Philippines. They are the following:
 1. Petitioner's US passport showing that she returned to the Philippines on
24 May 2005 and from then would always return to the Philippines after
every trip to a foreign country.

2. Email exchanges showing that as early as March 2005, petitioner had

begun the process of relocating and reestablishing her residence in the
Philippines and had all of the family's valuable movable properties packed
and stored for shipping to the Philippines.

3. School records of petitioner's school-aged children showing that they

began attending Philippine schools starting June 2005.

4. Identification card issued by the BIR to petitioner on 22 July 2005.

5. Condominium Certificate of Title covering a unit with parking slot

acquired in the second half of 2005 which petitioner's family used as
residence pending the completion of their intended permanent family home.

6. Receipts dated 23 February 2006 showing that petitioner had supervised

the packing and disposal of some of the family's household belongings.

7. Confirmation of receipt of the request for change of address sent by the

US Postal Service on 28 March 2006;

8. Final settlement of the selling of the family home in the US as of 27

April 2006.

9. Transfer Certificate of Title dated 1 June 2006 showing the acquisition of

a vacant lot where the family built their family home.

10. Questionnaire issued by the US Department of State - Bureau of

Consular Affairs regarding the possible loss of US citizenship, in which
petitioner answered that she had been a resident of the Philippines since
May 2005.

11. Affidavits of petitioner's mother and husband attesting to the decision of

the family to move to the Philippines in early 2005 shortly after the death of
petitioner's father.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC En Banc found that these pieces of evidence failed
to overcome the probative weight of the alleged admission against interest.
According to the COMELEC, the discrepancy between petitioner's 2013 and 2016
certificates of candidacy only goes to show that she suits her declarations
regarding her period of residency in the Philippines when it would be to her
advantage. Hence, her deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide the fact of
her ineligibility insofar as residency is concerned.

The statement that she would be a resident of the Philippines for six years and six
months as of May 2013 (reckoned from November 2006) in her 2013 certificate of
candidacy was admittedly made under oath. However, while notarized
documents fall under the category of public documents,[92] they are not
deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.[93] Section 23, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. - Documents consisting of entries in

public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter.

Clearly, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date stated therein.[94] They require no further proof to be
admissible, because the certificate of acknowledgement serves as the prima
facie evidence of its execution.[95]

Thus while petitioner's 2013 certificate of candidacy may be presented as proof of

its regularity and due execution, it is not prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein, i.e. the declaration that she essentially became a resident of the Philippines
only in November 2006. Furthermore, while a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution and
regularity, even such presumption is not absolute as it may be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.[96]

Thus, where the document or its contents are in question, the person who executed
the same may submit contrary evidence to establish the truth of the matter. In this
case, petitioner submitted the above-cited pieces of evidence to prove that her
2016 certificate of candidacy declared the truth about her residence in the
Philippines, and that her declaration in her 2013 certificate of candidacy was the
result of an honest mistake.

Honest Mistake

The COMELEC gave scant consideration to petitioner's assertion that she made an
honest mistake in her 2013 certificate of candidacy for senator. The Commission
hypothesized that if petitioner truly believed that the period of residency would be
counted backwards from the day of filing the CoC for Senator in October 2012,
she should always reckon her residency from April 2006. The COMELEC
observed that the period of residency indicated in the 2015 CoC for President was
reckoned from May 2005. The COMELEC took the alleged unexplained
inconsistency as a badge of intent to deceive the electorate.

To a malicious mind, the assertions of petitioner are nothing but sinister.

Considering the contradicting and inconsistent dates alleged before the
COMELEC, an indiscriminate observer may be tempted to think the worst and
disbelieve a claim to the common experience of human mistake.

United States v. Ah Chong,[97] has taught generations of lawyers that the question

as to whether one honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell
into the mistake, is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to
him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
mind, in forming the intent upon which he acted.
In the petitions before us, petitioner explained her mistake in the following
manner:

5.268. [Petitioner] committed an honest mistake when she stated in her COC for
Senator that her "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE BEFORE MAY 13, 2013" is "6"
years and "6" months.

5.268.1. Only a two-year period of residence in the Philippines is

required to qualify as a member of the Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines. [Petitioner] sincerely had no doubt that she had satisfied
this residence requirement. She even accomplished her COC for
Senator without the assistance of a lawyer. x x x

5.268.2. It is no wonder that [petitioner] did not know that the use of

the phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013" in her COC for Senator, actually referred to the
period immediately preceding 13 May 2013, or to her period of
residence on the day right before the 13 May 2013
elections. [Petitioner] therefore interpreted this phrase to mean
her period of residence in the Philippines as of the submission of
COCs in October 2012 (which is technically also a period
"before May 13, 2013").

5.268.3. In terms of abandoning her domicile in the U.S.A. and

permanently relocating to the Philippines, nothing significant
happened in "November 2006." Moreover, private respondent
was not able to present any evidence which would show that
[petitioner] returned to the Philippines with the intention to reside
here permanently only in November 2006. Thus, there would have
been no logical reason for [petitioner] to reckon the start of her
residence in the Philippines from this month. Even the COMELEC
considered a date other than November 2006 as the reckoning point
of [petitioner's] residence (i.e., August 2006). This date is, of
course, not the day [petitioner] established her domicile in the
Philippines. Nonetheless, that even the COMELEC had another
date in mind bolsters the fact that [petitioner]'s representation in
her COC for Senator regarding her period of residence was
based on her honest misunderstanding of what was asked of her
in Item No. 7 of her COC for Senator, and that she indeed
counted backward from October 2012 (instead of from 13 May
2013).

xxxx

When [petitioner] accomplished her COC for Senator, she reckoned

her residence in the Philippines from March-April 2006, which is
when (to her recollection at the time she signed this COC) she and
her family had substantially wound up their affairs in the U.S.A. in
connection with their relocation to the Philippines. Specifically,
March 2006 was when [petitioner] arrived in the Philippines after
her last lengthy stay in the U.S.A., and April 2006 was when she and
her husband were finally able to sell their house in the U.S.A. The
 month of April 2006 is also when [petitioner's] husband had resigned
from his job in the U.S.A. The period between March-April 2006 to
September 2012 is around six (6) years and six (6) months.
Therefore, this is the period [petitioner] indicated (albeit,
mistakenly) in her COC for Senator as her "Period of Residence
in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."

5.268.7. This erroneous understanding of the commencement of

her residence in the Philippines, together with the confusing
question in Item No. 7 of her COC for Senator, explains why
[petitioner] mistakenly indicated in that COC that her "Period
of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" would be
"6" years and "6" months.

5.268.8. [Petitioner] was later advised (only last year, 2015) by legal

counsel that the concept of "residence," for purposes of election law,
takes into account the period when she was physically present in the
Philippines starting from 24 May 2005, (after having already
abandoned her residence in the U.S.A., coupled with the intent to
reside in the Philippines) and not just the period after her U.S.A.
residence was sold and when her family was already complete in the
country, after her husband's return. [Petitioner]'s period of residence
in her COC for Senator should, therefore, have been counted.from
24 May 2005, and extended all the way "up to the day before" the 13
May 2013 elections. [Petitioner] realized only last year, 2015, that
she should have stated "7" years and "11" months (instead of "6"
years and "6" months) as her period of residence in her COC for
Senator.[98] (Emphases supplied)

To an open mind, the foregoing explanation proffered by petitioner does not

appear to be concocted, implausible, or the product of mere afterthought. The
circumstances as they appeared to her at the time she accomplished her 2013
certificate of candidacy for senator, without the assistance of counsel, may indeed
reasonably cause her to fill up the residency item with the answer "6 years and 6
months." It does not necessarily mean, however, that she had not been residing in
the Philippines on a permanent basis for a period longer than that.

The fact that it was the first time that petitioner ran for public office; that only a
two-year period of residence in the country is required for those running as
senator; and that the item in the certificate of candidacy providing "Period of
Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" could be open to an
interpretation different from that required, should have been taken into
consideration in appreciating whether petitioner made the subject entry honestly,
in good faith, and without fault or negligence.

The surrounding circumstances in this case do not exclude the possibility that
petitioner made an honest mistake, both in reckoning her period of residence in the
Philippines as well as determining the proper end period of such residence at the
time. That petitioner is running for the highest public office in the country should
not be the only standard by which we weigh her actions and ultimately her
mistakes. Not all mistakes are made with evil motives, in much the same way that
not all good deeds are done with pure intentions. Good faith is always presumed,
and in the face of tangible evidence presented to prove the truth of the matter,
which is independent of the circumstances that caused petitioner to make that
fateful statement of "6 years and 6 months," it would be difficult to dismiss her
contention that such is the result of an honest mistake.

To reiterate, the COMELEC incorrectly applied the rule on admissions in

order to conclude that petitioner deliberately misrepresented her
qualifications-notwithstanding a reasonable explanation as to her honest
mistake, and despite the numerous pieces of evidence submitted to prove her
claims.

If petitioner honestly believed that she can reckon her residency in the Philippines
from May 2005 because she had already relocated to the country with the intent to
reside here permanently, then her statement in her 2016 certificate of candidacy
for president cannot be deemed to have been made with intent to deceive the
voting public. The COMELEC has clearly failed to prove the element of deliberate
intent to deceive, which is necessary to cancel certificates of candidacy under
Section 78.

In any case, the single declaration of petitioner in her 2013 certificate of candidacy
for senator cannot be deemed to overthrow the entirety of evidence showing that
her residence in the Philippines commenced in May 2005.

Petitioner was able to prove the fact of

the reestablishment of her domicile in
the Philippines since May 2005.

Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution requires that a candidate for president be
"a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election." The term residence, as it is used in the 1987 Constitution and previous
Constitutions, has been understood to be synonymous with domicile.[99] Domicile
means not only the intention to reside in one place, but also personal presence
therein coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.[100] It is the permanent
home and the place to which one intends to return whenever absent for business or
pleasure as shown by facts and circumstances that disclose such intent. [101]

Domicile is classified into three: (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired at birth
by every person; and (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment
of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law
attributes to a person independently of his residence of intention.[102]

Domicile by operation of law applies to infants, incompetents, and other persons

under disabilities that prevent them from acquiring a domicile of choice.[103] It also
accrues by virtue of marriage when the husband and wife fix the family domicile.
[104]

A person's domicile of origin is the domicile of his parents.[105] It is not easily lost
and continues even if one has lived and maintained residences in different places.
[106]
 Absence from the domicile to pursue a profession or business, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature, and even travels abroad,
[107]
 does not constitute loss of residence.[108]
In contrast, immigration to a foreign country with the intention to live there
permanently constitutes an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.[109] In
order to qualify to run for public office in the Philippines, an immigrant to a
foreign country must waive such status as manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.[110]

A person can have but one domicile at a time.[111] Once established, the domicile
remains until a new one is acquired.[112] In order to acquire a domicile by choice,
there must concur: (a) physical presence in the new place, (b) an intention to
remain there (animus manendi), and (c) an intention to abandon the former
domicile (animus non revertendi).[113]

Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these requirements, the
domicile of origin continues.[114] In Gallego v. Verra,[115] we emphasized what must
be shown by the person alleging a change of domicile:

The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite

period of time. The acts of the person must conform with his purpose. The change
of residence must be voluntary; the residence at the place chosen for the domicile
must be actual; and to the fact of residence there must be added the animus
manendi.[116]

The question of whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its

conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the durational residency requirement of 10
years goes into the COMELEC's appreciation of evidence. In Sabili v.
COMELEC,[117] we held that:

As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been
established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In
these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.[118]

Sabili was an instance of grossly unreasonable appreciation in evaluation of

evidence, very much like the lopsided evaluation of evidence of the COMELEC in
the present case.

Further, in Mitra v. COMELEC,[119] we held that COMELEC's use of wrong or

irrelevant considerations in the resolution of an issue constitutes grave abuse of
discretion:

As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it

refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of
wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a
decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC,
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial
evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support
a conclusion.

In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily

review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an
error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

However, before going into a discussion of the evidence submitted by petitioner, a

threshold issue must first be resolved: whether petitioner's status as a visa-
free balikbayan affected her ability to establish her residence in the country. I
believe that it did not.

The Philippines' Balikbayan Program

On 31 July 1973, President Marcos issued Letter of Instructions No. (LOI)

105[120] designating the period from 1 September 1973 to 28 February 1974 as a
"Homecoming Season" for Filipinos - and/or their families and descendants - who
are now residents or citizens of other countries (referred to as overseas Filipinos).
Due to its overwhelming success,[121] the Balikbayan Program was extended. This
was further enhanced in 197 4 under LOI 163.[122]

In 1975, professionals and scientists were targeted in the program by encouraging

their return under LOI 210, and then by PD 819. Overseas Filipino scientists and
technicians were being encouraged to come home and apply their knowledge to
the development programs of the country, and to take advantage of
the Balikbayan Program. It was also decreed that any overseas Filipino arriving in
the Philippines under the Balikbayan Program shall be authorized to remain in the
country for a period of one year from the date of arrival within the extended
period.

Pursuant to the stated purpose of LOI 210, P.D. 819[123] was issued on 24 October
1975 in recognition of the "need of attracting foreign-based scientists,
professionals, or persons with special skill or expertise who are of Filipino descent
or origin."[124] It was decreed that these persons, who are licensed to practice their
profession, special skill or expertise in their host, adopted or native countries, may
practice their profession, special skill or expertise while staying in the Philippines
either on a temporary or permanent basis, together with their families upon
approval by the Secretary of Health. They are only required to register with the
Professional Regulation Commission, regardless of whether or not their special
skill or expertise falls within any of the regulated professions and vocations in the
Philippines, and pay the required license fee. They are entitled to all incentives,
benefits and privileges granted to or being enjoyed by overseas
Filipinos (balikbayans).

As a means of attracting more "returnees,"[125] LOI 1044 provided for additional

incentives such as attendance in international scientific conferences, seminars,
meetings along the field of expertise with the travel of the returnees funded by
the program at least once per year. Also, they shall have priority to obtain
housing loans from GSIS, SSS and Development Bank of the Philippines to
assure their continued stay in the country.

By virtue of LOI 272-A[126], the Balikbayan Program was extended to another

period beginning 1 March 1976 to 28 February 1977 featuring the same incentives
and benefits provided by LOI 210. It was again extended to 28 February 1978,
[127]
 to 28 February 1979,[128] to 29 February 1980,[129] and to 28 February 1981.[130]

On 28 February 1981, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. (EO) 657
extending the Balikbayan Program for overseas Filipinos for a period of five years
beginning 1 March 1981 to 28 February 1986.

Executive Order No. (E.O.) 130[131] issued on 25 October 1993 by President

Ramos institutionalized the Balik Scientist Program under the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST) but with different features. It defined
a Balik Scientist as a science or technology expert who is a Filipino citizen or a
foreigner of Filipino descent, residing abroad and contracted by the national
government to return and work in the Philippines along his/her field of expertise
for a short term with a duration of at least one month (Short-Term Program) or
long term with a duration of at least two years (Long-Term Program).

A Balik Scientist under the Short-Term Program may be entitled to free round-trip

economy airfare originating from a foreign country to the Philippines by direct
route, and grants-in-aid for research and development projects approved by the
Secretary of Science and Technology.

A Balik Scientist under the Long-Term Program and returning new graduates from
DOST-recognized science and technology foreign institutions may be entitled to
the following incentives:

1. Free one-way economy airfare from a foreign country to the Philippines,

including airfare for the spouse and two minor dependents; and free return
trip economy airfare after completion of two years in the case
of Balik Scientists, and three years in the case of new graduates;

2. Duty-free importation of professional instruments and implements, tools

of trade, occupation or employment, wearing apparel, domestic animals,
and personal and household effects in quantities and of the class suitable to
the profession, rank or position of the persons importing them, for their
own use and not for barter or sale, in accordance with Section 105 of the
Tariff and Customs Code;

3. No-dollar importation of motor vehicles;

4. Exemption from payment of travel tax for Filipino permanent residents

abroad;

5. Reimbursement of freight expenses for the shipment of a car and

personal effects;

6. Reimbursement of the freight expenses for 2-1/2 tons volume weight for
surface shipment of a car and personal effects, as well as excess baggage
 not exceeding 20 kilograms per adult and 10 kilograms per minor
dependent when travelling by air;

7. Housing, which may be arranged through predetermined institutions;

8. Assistance in securing a certificate of registration without examination or

an exemption from the licensure requirement of the Professional Regulation
Commission to practice profession, expertise or skill in the Philippines;

9. Grants-in-aid for research and development projects approved by the

Secretary of Science and Technology; and

10.Grant of special non-immigrant visas[132] under Section 47 (a) (2) of the

Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, after compliance with the
requirements therefor.

R.A. 6768,[133] enacted on 3 November 1989, instituted a Balikbayan Program

under the administration of the Department of Tourism to attract and encourage
overseas Filipinos to come and visit their motherland. Under R.A. 6768, the
term balikbayan covers Filipino citizens who have been continuously out of the
Philippines for a period of at least one year; Filipino overseas workers; and former
Filipino citizens and their family who had been naturalized in a foreign country
and comes or returns to the Philippines.

The law provided various privileges to the balikbayan:

1. Tax-free maximum purchase in the amount of US$1,000 or its equivalent

in other acceptable foreign currencies at Philippine duty-free shops;

2. Access to a special promotional/incentive program provided by the

national flag air carrier;

3. Visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one year for foreign
passport holders, with the exception of restricted nationals;

4. Travel tax exemption;[134] and

5. Access to especially designated reception areas at the authorized ports of

entry for the expeditious processing of documents.

It is emphasized in the law that the privileges granted thereunder shall be in

addition to the benefits enjoyed by the balikbayan under existing laws, rules and
regulations.

R.A. 9174[135] dated 7 November 2002 amended R.A. 6768 by extending further

the privileges of a balikbayan to include:

1. Kabuhayan shopping privilege through an additional tax-exempt

purchase in the maximum amount of US$2,000 or its equivalent in
Philippine peso and other acceptable foreign currencies, exclusively for the
purchase of livelihood tools at all government-owned and -
controlled/operated duty-free shops;
 2. Access to necessary entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills
programs and marketing assistance, including
the balikbayan's immediate family members, under the government's
reintegration program; and

3. Access to accredited transportation facilities that will ensure their safe

and convenient trips upon arrival.

It was again emphasized that the privileges granted shall be in addition to the
benefits enjoyed by the balikbayan under existing laws, rules and regulations.

Balikbayans are not Mere Visitors

As shown by the foregoing discussion, the Balikbayan Program, as conceptualized

from the very beginning, envisioned a system not just of welcoming overseas
Filipinos (Filipinos and/or their families and descendants who have become
permanent residents or naturalized citizens of other countries) as short-term
visitors of the country, but more importantly, one that will encourage them to
come home and once again become permanent residents of the Philippines.

Notably, the program has no regard at all for the citizenship of these overseas
Filipinos. To qualify for the benefits, particularly the exemptions from the
payment of customs duties and taxes on personal effects brought home and tax
exemptions for local purchases, all they have to do is prove their desire to become
permanent residents of the Philippines. This is done through the simple expedient
of the presentation of the official approval of change of residence by the
authorities concerned in their respective foreign host countries.

As originally intended in the case of the balik scientists, they are also welcome to

practice their profession, special skill or expertise while staying in the Philippines
either on temporary or permanent bases. Again, there was no regard for their
citizenship considering that the program is open to both foreign-based Filipinos
and those of Filipino origin or descent, as long as they were licensed to practice
their profession, special skill or expertise in their host, adopted or native countries.

Therefore, as far as our immigration laws are concerned with regard

to balikbayans, they and their families may reside in the Philippines either on
temporary or permanent bases even though they remain nationals of their host,
adopted or native countries. The special treatment accorded to balikbayans finds
its roots in recognition of their status as former Filipinos and not as mere aliens.

Further militating against the notion of balikbayans as mere visitors of the

country are the privileges accorded to them under R.A. 9174, the
current balikbayan law. It specifically provides for a Kabuhayan shopping
privilege for the purchase of livelihood tools as well as access to the necessary
entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programs and marketing
assistance in accordance with the existing rules on the government's
reintegration program.

Livelihood tools have been defined as "instruments used by hand or by machine

necessary to a person in the practice of his or her trade, vocation or profession,
such as hand tools, power tools, precision tools, farm tools, tools for dressmaking,
shoe repair, beauty parlor, barber shop and the like,"[136] as well as a computer unit
and its accessories.

Access to the reintegration program is one of the social services and family
welfare assistance benefits (aside from insurance and health care benefits, loan
guarantee fund, education and training benefits and workers assistance and on-site
services) that are available, to Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA) members.[137] It incorporates community organizing, capability-building,
livelihood loans and other social preparations subject to the policies formulated by
the OWWA Board.[138]

The reintegration program aims to prepare the OFW in his/her return to Philippine
society.[139] It has two aspects. The first is reintegration preparedness (On-Site)
which includes interventions on value formation, financial literacy, entrepreneurial
development training (EDT), technological skills and capacity building.[140] The
second is reintegration proper (In-Country) which consists of job referrals for local
and overseas employment, business counselling, community organizing, financial
literacy seminar, networking with support institutions and social preparation
programs.[141]

As the Philippine government's reintegration manager,[142] the Department of

Labor and Employment National Reintegration Center for OFWs (NRCO)
provides the following services:

1. Develop and support programs and projects for livelihood,

entrepreneurship, savings, investments and financial literacy for returning
Filipino migrant workers and their families in coordination with relevant
stakeholders, service providers and international organizations;

2. Coordinate with appropriate stakeholders, service providers and relevant

international organizations for the promotion, development and the full
utilization of overseas Filipino worker returnees and their potentials;

3. Institute, in cooperation with other government agencies concerned, a

computer-based information system on returning Filipino migrant workers
which shall be accessible to all local recruitment agencies and employers,
both public and private;

4. Provide a periodic study and assessment of job opportunities for

returning Filipino migrant workers;

5. Develop and implement other appropriate programs to promote the

welfare of returning Filipino migrant workers;

6. Maintain an internet-based communication system for on-line

registration and interaction with clients, and maintain and upgrade
computer-based service capabilities of the NRCO;

7. Develop capacity-building programs for returning overseas Filipino

workers and their families, implementers, service providers, and
stakeholders; and
 8. Conduct research for policy recommendations and program
development.[143]

While the reintegration program covers only OFWs,[144] non-

OFW balikbayans can also avail of possible livelihood training in coordination
with the Department of Tourism, the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center
and other training institutions.[145]

R.A. 9174 is the government's latest thrust in its consistent efforts in

attracting balikbayans to come home to the Philippines and build a new life
here. Notwithstanding our immigration laws, balikbayans may continue to
stay in the Philippines for the long-term even under a visafree entry, which is
extendible upon request.[146]

It must be emphasized that none of the Court's previous decisions has ever looked
at the very extensive privileges granted to Balikbayan entrants.

Coquilla, Japzon, Caballero, Jalosjos and the Balikbayan Program

In ruling that petitioner can only be said to have validly re-established her
residency in the Philippines when she reacquired her Philippine citizenship, the
COMELEC invoked the ruling in Coquilla v. COMELEC.[147]

In Coquilla, petitioner was a former natural-born citizen and who reacquired

Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000. He was not able to show by any
evidence that he had been a one-year resident of Oras, Eastern Samar prior to the
May 14, 2001 local elections. His argument was that he had been a resident of the
said town for two years, but was not able to show actual residence one year from
before the said election. Evidence shows on the contrary that his last trip to the
United States, of which he was a former citizen was from July 6 to August 5,
2000. The only evidence he was able to show was a residence certificate and his
bare assertion to his townmates that he intended to have himself repatriated. He
did not make much of a claim, except to advert to the fulfillment of the required
residence by cumulating his visits and actual residence. We Court said:

Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this

country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras
by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by constantly declaring
to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May
14, 2001 elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived
either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring
Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine
citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR) and thus waive his status as a nonresident. On the other hand, he may
acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended,
or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status
as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.

In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the
country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23,
2000 is the statement Philippine Immigration Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S.
passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription
good for one year stay. Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting
a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen
who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the
Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a visa-free entry to the
Philippines for a period of one (1) year (3(c)). It would appear then that when
petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-
free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence,
petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-
resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him
for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.

Note that the record is bare of any assertion, unlike in the case before Us, that
Coquilla had bought a residence, relocated all his effects, established all the
necessities of daily living to operationalize the concept of actual residence to show
residence for the minimum period of one year. Even if in fact the period of
reckoning for Coquilla were to start from his entry into the country on 5 August
2000, it would still be only nine months; thus there was not even any necessity to
discuss the effect of his having been classified as a Balikbayan when he entered
the country in 1998, 1999 and 2000.

The COMELEC tries to assert that its interpretation of the ruling in Coquilla was
carried over in Japzon v. COMELEC[148] and Caballero v. COMELEC[149] as to bar
petitioner's claims on residency. The COMELEC is dead wrong.

In Japzon, private respondent Ty was a natural-born Filipino who left to work in

the US and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9225.[150] Immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, he
performed acts (i.e. applied for a Philippine passport, paid community tax and
secured Community Tax Certificates (CTC) and registered as a voter) wherein he
declared that his residence was at General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. On 19
March 2007, Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public.
Prior to this, however, Ty had been bodily present in General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar for a more than a year before the May 2007 elections. As such,
the Court brushed aside the contention that Ty was ineligible to run for
mayor on the ground that he did not meet the one-year residency
requirement. If anything, Japzon reinforces petitioner's position.

In Caballero, petitioner was a natural-born Filipino who was naturalized as a

Canadian citizen. On 13 September 2012, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9225. On 1 October 2012, he renounced his Canadian citizenship. He filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Uyugan, Batanes on 3 October 2012.

We ruled that it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that he made Uyugan,
Batanes his domicile of choice upon reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship.
Aside from his failure to discharge this burden, the period reckoned from 13
September 2012 to the May 2013 elections is only nine months - clearly short of
the required one-year residency requirement for mayoralty candidates. Caballero is
thus clearly not applicable. Indeed, it is to be noted that it is only Justice Brion in
his Separate Concurring Opinion who opines that a permanent resident visa is
required for reestablishment of domicile to take place, a view not shared by the
majority.

Justice Brion needed to state in his Separate Concurring Opinion that a permanent
residency visa is necessary for the start of residency for election purposes is
precisely because such view is not found in the Ponencia, hence, contraries to be
legally inapplicable.

There are categorical rulings in U.S. state courts that are squarely as all fours with
the petition before us. In Elkins v. Moreno,[151] aliens with a non-immigrant visa
were considered as having the legal capacity to change their domiciles. In
reaching this conclusion, the US Supreme Court took into account the intention of
Congress when it enacted the terms and restrictions for specific classes of non-
immigrants entering the United States:

Although nonimmigrant aliens can generally be viewed as temporary visitors to

the United States, the nonimmigrant classification is by no means homogeneous
with respect to the terms on which a nonimmigrant enters the United States. For
example, Congress expressly conditioned admission for some purposes on an
intent not to abandon a foreign residence or, by implication, on an intent not to
seek domicile in the United States. Thus, the 1952 Act defines a visitor to the
United States as "an alien . . . having a residence in a foreign country which he has
no intention of abandoning" and who is coming to the United States for business
or pleasure. Similarly, a nonimmigrant student is defined as "an alien having a
residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning. . . and
who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of
pursuing. . . a course of study. . . ." See also (aliens in "immediate and continuous
transit"); (vessel crewman "who intends to land temporarily"); (temporary worker
having residence in foreign country "which he has no intention of abandoning").

By including restrictions on intent in the definition of some nonimmigrant classes,

Congress must have meant aliens to be barred from these classes if their real
purpose in coming to the United States was to immigrate permanently. x x x.

But Congress did not restrict every nonimmigrant class. In particular, no

restrictions on a nonimmigrant's intent were placed on aliens admitted under §
101(a)(15)(G)(iv). Since the 1952 Act was intended to be a comprehensive and
complete code, the conclusion is therefore inescapable that, where as with the G-4
class Congress did not impose restrictions on intent, this was deliberate. Congress'
silence is therefore pregnant, and we read it to mean that Congress, while
anticipating that permanent immigration would normally occur through immigrant
channels, was willing to allow nonrestricted nonimmigrant aliens to adopt the
United States as their domicile.

Under present law, therefore, were a G-4 alien to develop a subjective intent to
stay indefinitely in the United States he would be able to do so without violating
either the 1952 Act, the Service's regulations, or the terms of his visa. Of course,
should a G-4 alien terminate his employment with an international treaty
organization, both he and his family would lose their G-4 status. Nonetheless, such
an alien would not necessarily be subject to deportation nor would he have to
leave and re-enter the country in order to become an immigrant.[152] (Citations
omitted) (Emphasis supplied)

In Toll v. Moreno,[153] the Supreme Court of Maryland applied the ruling

in Elkins and held that the ordinary legal standard for the establishment of
domicile may be used even for non-immigrants:

If under federal law a particular individual must leave this country at a certain
date, or cannot remain here indefinitely, then he could not become domiciled in
Maryland. Any purported intent to live here indefinitely would be inconsistent
with law. It would at most be an unrealistic subjective intent, which is insufficient
under Maryland law to establish domicile.

xxxx

In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law, it is obvious that

nothing inherent in the nature of a G-4 visa would render the holder of such
visa absolutely incapable of establishing a Maryland domicile. Assuming the
correctness of the defendant's assertion that most G-4 visa holders will leave
this country, if in a particular case one of these individuals is in a minority
and, as shown by objective factors, intends for Maryland to be his fixed place
of abode and intends to remain here indefinitely, he will have satisfied the
Maryland standard for establishing domicile in this State.

The fact that an alien holds a non-immigrant visa is thus not controlling. What is
crucial in determining whether an alien may lawfully adopt a domicile in the
country is the restriction placed by Congress on a specific type of non-immigrant
visa. So long as the intended stay of a nonimmigrant does not violate any of
the legal restriction, sufficient animus manendi may be appreciated and
domicile may be established.

In the case of balikbayans, the true intent of Congress to treat these overseas

Filipinos not as mere visitors but as prospective permanent residents is evident
from the letter of the law. While they are authorized to remain in the country for a
period of only one year from their date of arrival, the laws, rules and regulations
under the Balikbayan Program do not foreclose their options should they decide to
actually settle down in the country. In fact, the Balikbayan Program envisions a
situation where former Filipinos would have been legally staying in the
Philippines visa-free for more than 36 months.[154] In the case of petitioner Poe, she
entered the Philippines visa-free under the Balikbayan program, left for a short
while and legally re-entered under the same program. This is not a case where she
abused any Balikbayan privilege because shortly after reentering the country on
11 March 2006,[155] she applied for dual citizenship under R.A. 9225.

Based on the foregoing, it was most unfair for COMELEC to declare that
petitioner could not have acquired domicile in the Philippines in 2005 merely
because of her status as a balikbayan. Her visa (or lack thereof) should not be the
sole determinant of her intention to reacquire her domicile in the Philippines.

Congress itself welcomes the return of overseas Filipinos without requiring any
type of visa. Although visa-free entry is for a limited time, the period is extendible
and is not conditioned upon the acquisition of a permanent resident visa.
Considering that the law allows a balikbayan to stay in the Philippines for a
certain period even without a visa and to settle in .the country during that period,
there is no reason to reject petitioner's intent to re-establish a residence from the
date she entered the country. In fact, petitioner's permanent resettlement, as one
millions of Filipino who had gone abroad, is an end-goal of
the Balikbayan Program.

If we were to apply the standard for determining the effect of a visa on the ability
of petitioner to re-establish her domicile in the Philippines, the U.S. cases
of Elkins v. Moreno and Toll v. Moreno, beg the question: Does her entry as
a Balikbayan restrict her from re-establishing her domicile in the Philippines? The
answer would be a resounding NO, for precisely the legislative policy of
the Balikbayan Program is to assist in the reintegration of former Filipino citizen
back into the country. The Court must also note that the visa-free entry is good for
one year and renewable, even to the extent of authorizing the Balikbayan to stay
much longer. The Balikbayan program is fully compatible and supportive of the
re-establishment by a Balikbayan of her residence in her native land, her domicile
of origin.

And this is not a case when petitioner abused the privileges of visa-free entry
considering that, a year after her relocation, she immediately took steps to
reacquire her Philippine citizenship

Petitioner was able to prove that she

reacquired her domicile in the Philippines
beginning May 2005.

As discussed, there are only three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile
by choice: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new domicile; (2) an intention to
remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.[156] In my view, the
pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner sufficiently prove that she re-
established her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 2005.

I shall discuss the fulfillment of the requirements in the following order: (1)
intention to remain in the new domicile; (2) intention to abandon the old domicile;
and (3) bodily residence in the new domicile.

Intent to Establish a New Domicile

To prove her intent to establish a new domicile in the Philippines on 24 May 2005,
petitioner presented the following evidence: (1) school records indicating that her
children attended Philippine schools starting June 2005;[157] (2) Taxpayer's
Identification Number (TIN) Card,[158] showing that she registered with and
secured the TIN from the BIR on 22 July 2005; (3) Condominium Certificates of
Title (CCTs)[159] and Tax Declarations covering Unit 7F and a parking slot at One
Wilson Place Condominium, 194 Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila,
purchased in early 2005 and served as the family's temporary residence;
(4) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)[160] in the name of petitioner and her
husband issued on 1 June 2006, covering a residential lot in Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City in 2006; and (5) registration as a voter on 31 August 2006.
Enrollment of Children in Local Schools

Whether children are enrolled in local schools is a factor considered by courts

when it comes to establishing a new domicile. In Fernandez v. HRET,[161] we used
this indicium:

In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish
Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any
other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and
operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended
schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In Blount v. Boston,[162] the Supreme Court of Maryland identified location of the

school attended by a person's children as one of the factors in determining a
change of domicile. The discourse is reproduced here:

Where actual residence and/or place of voting are not so clear or there are special
circumstances explaining particular place of abode or place of voting, court will
look to myriad of other factors in deciding person's domicile, such as paying of
taxes and statements on tax returns, ownership of property, where person's
children attend school, address at which person receives mail, statements as to
residency in contracts, statements on licenses or governmental documents, where
personal belongings are kept, which jurisdiction's banks are utilized, and any other
facts revealing contact with one or the other jurisdiction.[163] (Emphasis supplied)

The fact that petitioner's children began their schooling in the Philippines shortly
after their arrival in the country in May 2005 is no longer in dispute. In its
Comment, the COMELEC noted this as one of the facts "duly proven" by
petitioner.[164] By "duly proven," the COMELEC explained during the oral
arguments that the term meant that documentary proof substantiated the pertinent
allegation:

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

All right. Let me turn your attention to page 56 of the COMELEC Comment. It
says, "the COMELEC noted the following facts as duly proven by the petitioner.
Petitioner's children arrived in the Philippines during the latter half of 2005.
Shortly after their arrival, petitioner's children began their schooling in the
country. Petitioner purchased a condominium unit in San Juan City during the
second half of 2005. Petitioner and husband started the construction of their house
in 2006. Petitioner and her husband informed the U.S. Postal Service in 2006 of
their abandonment of their U.S. Address." What does the commission mean when
it says that these facts are duly proven?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Your Honor please, the proceeding before the commission was summary. There
was a preliminary conference, submission of exhibits, stipulations, comparison
between the originals and the photocopies, and offer of evidence. We considered
these facts as non-controverted in the sense that they are covered by
documentary proof, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)

Acquisition of a New Residence

The COMELEC, in its Comment, found the following facts to be duly proven: that
petitioner purchased a condominium unit in San Juan City during the second half
of 2005, and that petitioner and her husband started the construction of their house
in Corinthian Hills in 2006.[165] That petitioner purchased the residential lot in
Corinthian Hills is not up for debate. Taken together, these facts establish
another indicium of petitioner's establishment of a new domicile in the
Philippines.

Our very own jurisdiction treats acquisition of residential property as a factor

indicating establishment of a new domicile. Take the 2012 case of Jalosjos v.
COMELEC,[166] in which we held that Rommel Jalosjos acquired a new domicile in
Zamboanga Sibugay:

Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door neighbors, attesting to his physical

presence at his residence in Ipil. These adjoining neighbors are no doubt more
credible since they have a better chance of noting his presence or absence than his
other neighbors, whose affidavits Erasmo presented, who just sporadically passed
by the subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a
residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro,
Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders,
including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos
is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay. (Emphasis supplied)

It has been argued that the acquisition of a temporary dwelling in Greenhills, the
purchase of a residential lot in Corinthian Hills, and the eventual construction of a
house in the latter place do not indicate an intent on the part of petitioner to stay in
the country for good. The 2013 case of Jalosjos v. COMELEC[167] has been cited
to support this conclusion, as we purportedly held in that case that ownership of a
house "does not establish domicile."

This reading of Jalosjos is not accurate. By no means did Jalosjos rule out

ownership of a house or some other property as a factor for establishing a new
domicile. To appreciate the statement in its proper context, the relevant discussion
in Jalosjos is quoted below:

Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez v.

COMELEC has established that the ownership of a house or some other property
does not establish domicile. This principle is especially true in this case as
petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in the locality and her intent
to stay there at least a year before the elections, to wit:

To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of

permanence of domicile or residence implies that the landed can establish
compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect,
imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property
requirement would be unconstitutional. (Emphasis supplied)

As can be seen from the quoted discourse, the case did not throw out ownership of
a house as a factor for determining establishment of a new domicile. Rather, it
discarded ownership of a house as a controlling factor for determining
establishment of a new domicile.
Even US courts consider acquisition of property as a badge of fixing a new
domicile.[168] In Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic EC,[169] the Supreme Court
of Mississippi used acquisition of a new residence as a factor for determining
transfer of domicile. In that case, William Stone sought the Democratic Party
nomination for Senate District 10, a district covering parts of Marshall County,
including Stone's home in Holly Springs. Hale argued that Stone was not eligible
to run for that office because he did not meet the two-year residency requirement.
Specifically, Hale argued that Stone could not be a resident of Marshall County
because Stone .had not abandoned his domicile in Benton County. He had moved
to Holly Springs in October 2013.

The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that Stone had proven that he established his
domicile in Marshall County. It relied, among others, on acquisition of a home in
the new domicile as a factor:

To prove his position that he had changed his domicile from Benton County to
Marshall County, Stone provided an abundance of evidence. In October 2013,
Stone rented a house at 305 Peel Lane in Holly Springs, the county seat of
Marshall County, and he obtained utility service for the home. In July 2014, he
bought a home at 200 Johnson Park in Holly Springs. Furthermore, he notified
the Senate comptroller about his change of address, and the comptroller sent an e-
mail to every member of the Senate informing them of the change.

xxxx

We have held that '[t]he exercise of political rights, admissions, declarations,

the acts of purchasing a home and long-continued residency are
circumstances indicative of his intention to abandon his domicile of origin
and to establish a new domicile.' Taking into consideration all of these factors,
the circuit court did not err in determining that Stone's domicile has existed in
Marshall County since October of 2013. (Emphases supplied and citations
omitted)

Securing a Taxpayer's Identification Number (TIN) Card

In his Comment-Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221698-700,

private respondent Valdez posited that securing a TIN does not conclusively
establish petitioner's animus manendi in the Philippines.[170] He reasons that any
person, even a non resident, can secure a TIN. On this matter, I must agree with
him.

Indeed, the 1997 Tax Code mandates all persons required under our tax laws to
render or file a return to secure a TIN.[171] This would include a non-resident so
long as he or she is mandated by our tax laws to file a return, statement or some
other document.[172] It is thus correct to say that a TIN Card does not conclusively
evince the notion that petitioner is a resident of the Philippines.

Nevertheless, the significance of the TIN Card lies in the fact that it lists down the
address of petitioner as No. 23 Lincoln St. West Greenhills, the very same address
of her mother, Jesusa Sonora Poe, as reflected in the latter's affidavit.
[173]
 Therefore, the TIN Card, which was issued on 22 July 2005, corroborates the
assertion that petitioner, upon her arrival in 2005, was then staying at her mother's
home.

Registration as Voter

Petitioner registered as a voter on 31 August 2006. This speaks loudly of the intent
to establish a domicile in the country. In Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic
EC,[174] the Supreme Court of Mississippi considered registering to vote as a factor
indicative of the intent to acquire a new domicile. More importantly, Oglesby v.
Williams treats voter registration as one of the two most significant indicia of
acquisition of a new domicile. The Oglesby discussion is informative:

This Court's longstanding view on determining a person's domicile was stated in

Roberts, where the Court wrote:

The words reside or resident mean domicile unless a contrary intent is shown. A
person may have several places of abode or dwelling, but he can have only one
domicile at a time. Domicile has been defined as the place with which an
individual has a settled connection for legal purposes and the place where a person
has his true, fixed, permanent home, habitation and principal establishment,
without any present intention of removing therefrom, and to which place he has,
whenever he is absent, the intention of returning. The controlling factor in
determining a person's domicile is his intent. One's domicile, generally, is that
place where he intends to be. The determination of his intent, however, is not
dependent upon what he says at a particular time, since his intent may be more
satisfactorily shown by what is done than by what is said. Once a domicile is
determined or established a person retains his domicile at such place unless the
evidence affirmatively shows an abandonment of that domicile. In deciding
whether a person has abandoned a previously established domicile and acquired a
new one, courts will examine and weigh the factors relating to each place. This
Court has never deemed any single circumstance conclusive. However, it has
viewed certain factors as more important than others, the two most important
being where a person actually lives and where he votes. Where a person lives
and votes at the same place such place probably will be determined to
constitute his domicile. Where these factors are not so clear, however, or where
there are special circumstances explaining a particular place of abode or place of
voting, the Court will look to and weigh a number of other factors in deciding a
person's domicile.

Furthermore, this Court has stated that the place of voting is the "highest
evidence of domicile." ("the two most important elements in determining
domicile are where a person actually lives and where he votes"); ("Evidence that a
person registered or voted is ordinarily persuasive when the question of domicile
is at issue," quoting Comptroller v. Lenderking). Furthermore, actual residence,
coupled with voter registration, "clearly create[s] a presumption that [the
person] was domiciled" there. ("[w]here the evidence relating to voting and the
evidence concerning where a person actually lives both clearly point to the same
jurisdiction, it is likely that such place will be deemed to constitute the individual's
domicile"). In other words, the law presumes that where a person actually lives
and votes is that person's domicile, unless special circumstances explain and rebut
the presumption. (Citations omitted) (Emphases supplied)
This Court, too, shares this reverence for the place of voting as an evidence of
domicile. In Templeton v. Babcock,  [175] we held as follows:

The finding of the trial court to the effect that the deceased had acquired a
domicile in the State of California is in our opinion based upon facts which
sufficiently support said finding. In particular, we are of the opinion that the trial
court committed no error in attaching importance to the circumstance that the
deceased had voted in California elections.

Though not of course conclusive of acquisition of domicile, voting in a place is an

important circumstance and, where the evidence is scanty, may have decisive
weight. The exercise of the franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of
citizenship, and in no other act of his life does the citizen identify his interests with
the state in which he lives more than in the act of voting. (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, the evidence of petitioner substantiates her claim of the intent to establish
a new domicile in the country. The enrollment of her children in local schools
since 2005, the family's temporary stay in her mother's home followed by the
purchase of the Greenhills condominium unit and the subsequent establishment of
the Corinthian Hills family home, the registration of petitioner as a voter and the
issuance1 of a TIN Card in her favor, collectively demonstrate the conclusion that
she has established an incremental transfer of domicile in the country.

Respondent Valdez, however, points out that petitioner currently maintains two
residential properties in the US, one purchased in 1992 and the other in 2008.
[176]
 According to him, this is inconsistent with animus manendi.

This argument disregards overwhelming evidence showing that petitioner intended

to establish a new domicile in the country. Petitioner has uprooted her family from
Virginia, US to Manila, enrolled her children soon after her arrival in the
Philippines, acquired residential properties in the new domicile - one of which
now serves as the current family home - and registered as a voter. These factors all
point to one direction: petitioner is in the country and is here to stay. We cannot
disregard these factors, all of which establish a nexus to the new domicile, because
of a solitary fact: the retention of two residential houses in the US. To be sure, it is
difficult to justify a conclusion which considers only one contact in the old
domicile and ignores many significant contacts established by the removing
person in the new domicile.

Moreover, petitioner only admitted[177] that she owns the two houses. She never
admitted that she resides in any of them. At best, what can only be established is
that petitioner owns properties classified as residential properties. Undoubtedly,
we cannot make a conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the animus
manendi requirement in the absence of proof that petitioner uses one of the
properties as a place of abode. In fact, all the evidence points to the fact that she
leaves the Philippines only for brief periods of time; obviously with no intention to
reside elsewhere.

It is important to always remember that domicile is in the main a question of

intent.[178] It requires fact-intensive analysis. Not a single factor is conclusive. It is
the totality of the evidence that must be considered.
Even the US Supreme Court admitted that domicile is a difficult question of fact
that its resolution commands a pragmatic and careful approach. In The District of
Columbia v. Murphy,[179] the US High Court remarked:

[T]he question of domicile is a difficult one of fact to be settled only by a realistic

and conscientious review of the many relevant (and frequently conflicting)
indicia of where a man's home is and according to the established modes of proof.
[180]

It is interesting to note that the US Supreme Court appended a footnote on the

term home in the above quoted statement. Footnote 10 states:

Of course, this term does not have the magic qualities of a divining rod in locating
domicile. In fact, the search for th¢ domicile of any person capable of acquiring a
domicile of choice is llut a search for his "home." See Beale, Social Justice and
Business Costs, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 593, 596; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 19.1. [181]

Now, if we are to adopt the view that petitioner failed to meet the animus
manendi requirement on the ground that she maintains two houses in the US, I
pose this question: in our search for petitioner's home, are we making a realistic
and conscientious review of all the facts?

Additionally, it is not required for purposes of establishing a new domicile that a

person must sever all contacts with the old domicile.[182] I therefore find nothing
wrong with petitioner maintaining residential properties in the old domicile.

It has been further suggested that petitioner's invocation of acquisition of

residential property as a factor showing animus manendi does not benefit her
considering that she purchased in 2008 a residential property in the US, which was
subsequent to her purchase of the condominium unit and the residential lot in the
Philippines, and that she maintained the one she acquired in 1992. But what is
considered for animus manendi purposes as a factor is acquisition of a house in
the new domicile. Acquisition of a house in the old domicile is not a factor for
determining animus manendi.

That petitioner still maintains two houses in the US does not negate her
abandonment of her US domicile. First, it has, not been shown that petitioner
actually lived in the residential house acquired in 1992. What is clear is that there
was only one family home in Virginia, US, and petitioner had already
reestablished her residence in the Philippines before it was even sold.

Second, the residential house acquired in 2008 has no bearing in the cases before
us with regard to determining the validity of petitioner's abandonment of her US
domicile, particularly because it was purchased after she had already reacquired
her Filipino citizenship. In this regard, even respondent Valdez claims that "it is
only upon her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship on 18 July 2006, that she can be
considered to have established her domicile in the Philippines."[183] This
concession already leaves no question as to petitioner's abandonment of her US
domicile and intent to reside permanently in the Philippines at the time that the
residential house in the US was purchased in 2008.

1. Intent to Abandon the Old Domicile

To prove her intent to abandon her old domicile in the US, petitioner presented the
following evidence: (1) email exchange's between petitioner or her husband and
the property movers regarding relocation of their household goods, furniture and
vehicles from the US to the Bhilippines; (2) invoice document showing delivery
from the US and to the Philippines of the personal properties of petitioner and her
family; (3) acknowledgment of change of address by the US Postal Service; (4)
sale lof the family home on 27 April 2006.

Plans to Relocate

In Oglesby v. Williams,[184] the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that plans for

removal show intent to abandon the old domicile. The Court said:

[T]here are many citizens of Maryland who intend to change their domicile upon
retirement and may make quite elaborate plans toward fulfilling that intent by
building a retirement home in the place where they intend to retire. Such plans, by
themselves, do not prove the abandonment of an existing domicile, although it
is evidence of the intention to do so. Were such planning to be sufficient, the
intent requirement would swallow the requirement of an actual removal to another
habitation with the intent to reside there indefinitely. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, petitioner submitted email exchanges showing that the family began
planning to move back to the Philippines as early as March 2005. Exhibit "6-
series" includes an email letter dated 17 March 2005 and sent to petitioner by
Karla Murphy on 18 March 2005. Based on the email, Karla worked at Victory
Van, a company engaged in moving personal belongings. Apparently, petitioner
had asked for an estimate of moving personal properties from the US to the
Philippines. The email reply reads:

From: Karla Murphy MURPHY@VictoryVan.com

To: gllamanzares gllamanzares@aol.com
Subject: Relocation to Manila Estimate
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2005
3.17.05

Hi Grace:

Sorry for the delay in getting this to you. I know you are eager to get some rates
for budgetary purposes.

I estimate that you have approximately 28,000 lbs of household goods plus your
two vehicles. This will necessitate using THREE 40' containers. You not only
have a lot of furniture but many of your pieces plus the toys are very
voluminous. We will load the containers from bottom to top not to waste any
space but I sincerely believe you will need two containers just for your household
goods.

To provide you with door to door service which would include packing, export
wrapping, custom crating for chandeliers, marble top and glass tops, loading of
containers at your residence, US customs export inspection for the vehicles,
transportation to Baltimore, ocean freight and documentation to arrival Manila,
customs clearance, delivery, with collection of vehicles from agent in Manila
unwrapping and placement of furniture, assisted unpacking, normal
assembly (beds, tables, two piece dressers and china closets), container return to
port and same day debris removal based on three 40' containers, with 28,000 lbs of
HHG and two autos will be USD 19,295.

Grace, I predict you will have some questions. I will be out of the office tomorrow
and will be in the office all day on Monday. If your questions can't wait please call
me on my cell number at 703 297 27 88.

I'll talk to you soon.

Kind regards and again, thanks for your patience.

Karla (Emphases Supplied)

The email indicates that petitioner was planning to move an estimated 28,000
pounds of household goods plus two vehicles from Virginia, US to Manila. The
email further shows that three forty-foot containers were estimated to be used in
the movement of these items.

Twenty-eight thousand pounds of personal properties, including two vehicles, is

not difficult to visualize. The exchanges during the oral arguments held by this
Court for this case shows that three forty-foot containers is about the size of a
three-storey house. The exchange is quoted below:

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

Okay. Alright. Now when you come, you see you have thrown out the fact of
relocation, continuous schooling, you have thrown that out. May I now ask you
what you did in looking at the e-mail that they submitted dated 18 March 2005.
Have you [looked] closely at that e-mail?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

Okay. Can you tell us what that e-mail said?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
These correspondences, e-mail correspondences evinced a strong desire to bring
your belongings here to seemingly on the surface, Your Honor, to transfer
residence here and to inquire about the cost of moving to the Philippines, Your
Honor. . .

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

Did you look at the, how much they were planning to move back to the
Philippines?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Well they said they sold their house there already, Your Honor. . .

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

Twenty eight thousand pounds.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

And the estimate of the forwarding company is that they need three forty foot
containers, correct?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
No question as to, no question as to that, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

Okay. Alright. Including can you look at what a forty foot container looks like.
This. (image flashed on the screen) Please look at this Commissioner Lim.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
I'm quite familiar having been a maritime lawyer in the past. . .

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

Alright. Thank you very much. You see one forty foot container already contains
an office, and an entire residence. And then if you put three on top of the other,
okay, . . . (image flashed on the screen)

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

That's already the content of an entire house. And they're talking about glass tops,
marble tops, chandeliers, in addition to that two cars and pets. Of course, it's not in
the e-mail.

In other words, even this there is no intention, Commissioner Lim?[185]

Definitely, the email shows that as early as 18 March 2005, petitioner already had
plans to relocate to Manila. It must be stressed that not only household goods
would be moved to Manila, but two vehicles as well. Petitioner was certainly not
planning for a short trip. The letter, therefore, shows the intent of petitioner to
abandon her old domicile in the US as early as March of 2005.

Change of Postal Address

Petitioner also adduced as evidence the email of the US Postal Service

acknowledging the notice of change of address made by petitioner's husband. It
has been argued that the online acknowledgment merely establishes that
petitioner's husband only requested a change of address and did not notify the US
Postal service of the abandonment of the old US address. This reasoning fails to
appreciate that a notice of change of address is already considered
an indicium sufficient to establish the intent to abandon a domicile.

The already discussed Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic EC[186] utilized

change of postal address as a factor for determining the intent to abandon a
domicile. In the case of Farnsworth v. Jones,[187] the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina noted, among others, the failure of the candidate to change his address. It
ruled out the possibility that defendant had actually abandoned his previous
residence.

To the contrary, defendant maintained the condominium at Cramer Mountain, ate

dinner weekly at the Country Club there, exercised there, and spent approximately
50% of his time there. He additionally did not change his address to Ashley
Arms for postal purposes, or for any other purposes. He executed a month-to-
month lease for a furnished apartment because he wanted to "see what would
happen" in the election. Although defendant acquired a new residence at the
Ashley Arms address and expressed his intention to remain there
permanently, there is little evidence in the record to indicate that he was
actually residing there. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

I do agree with the observation that the online acknowledgement never showed
that the change of address was from the old US address to the new Philippine
address. To my mind, however, the deficiency is not crucial considering that there
are other factors (discussed elsewhere in this opinion) showing that petitioner's
intent was to relocate to the Philippines. What matters as far as the online
acknowledgement is concerned is that it indicates an intent to abandon the old
domicile of petitioner.

Sale of Old Residence

Another factor present in this case is the sale of petitioner's family home in the US.

In Imbraguglio v. Bernadas[188] decided by the Court of Appeals of Louisiana,

Fourth Circuit, Bernard Bernadas filed a "Notice of Candidacy" for the office of
Sheriff of St. Bernard Parish. Petrina Imbraguglio filed a petition objecting to the
candidacy of Bernadas on the ground of failure to establish residence in the parish.
It was found that Bernardas sold his home on Etienne Drive on 23 February 2006.
Since 31 August 2006, Bernadas has lived with his family at a home he purchased
at 7011 General Haig Street in New Orleans. The Louisiana appellate court ruled
that Bernardas had abandoned his domicile in the parish by selling his home
therein and had not reestablished the same. The Louisiana appellate court held
that:

We also find no error in the trial court's finding that the defendant established a
new domicile for purposes of La. R.S. 18:451.3 (which took effect on June 8,
2006) by voluntarily selling his home, the only property owned in St. Bernard
Parish, and moving to New Orleans without residing anywhere in St. Bernard
Parish for two years preceding the date he filed his notice of candidacy to run for
sheriff. (Emphasis supplied)

Location of personal belongings

Another vital piece of evidence is the invoice issued by Victory Van to petitioner
indicating the actual delivery of personal property to Manila in September 2006
and the cost of shipping of the household goods. Pertinent portions of the Invoice
dated 13 September 2006 are quoted below:

Hello! As you may have heard from your agent in the Philippines, there was an
overflow. Every effort was made to make it fit in the two 40's and all went except
for about 1900 lbs, which will be sent in lift vans. An invoice is attached. Thank
you.

xxxx

CUSTOMER: Grace Llamanzares DATE: 9/13/2006

ORIGIN: Sterling, VA REFERENCE #: EXP06020
DESTINATION: Manila, Philippines
WEIGHT: 25,241 lbs
VOLUME: 2-40' S-SC
VOLUME 2 - Lift Vans
Overflow LCI,
Shipment (293 Cu
Ft.)

The invoice proves that 25,241 pounds of personal property owned by petitioner
and her family were moved from Sterling, Virginia, US to Manila, Philippines.
This proves another factor: the consummation of the previously discussed plan to
relocate to Manila. The location of the majority of the personal belongings matters
in the determination of a change in domicile. This factor was used in the already
discussed Oglesby and in Bell v. Bell.[189]

It must be noted that Bell held that unimportant belongings are not considered in

that determination. In that case, the wife sought before a Pennsylvania court the
issuance of an injunction restraining the husband from obtaining a divorce in
Nevada. She filed the suit on the ground that the husband failed to establish a
domicile in Nevada' as he once lived in Pennsylvania. Also, he was away from
Nevada most of the time since he worked in Nigeria.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in holding that the husband succeeded in

establishing a domicile in Nevada, disregarded the fact that the husband left
behind a crate of his clothing at the home in Pennsylvania.

As for the relevancy of the clothing left behind at the Pennsylvania location by Mr.
Bell after his departure, we, as did the trial court, find this element to be "of little
moment. That [Mr. Bell] has done without them for so long shows that they are
not of particular importance to him." (Emphasis supplied)

It is worthy to note that the case did not reject movement/ non-movement of
personal belongings as a factor for determining domicile. Rather, what it rejected
was unimportant personal properties. Thus, this case, combined with
the Oglesby case, provides that movement of properties that are
valuable/important indicates intent to abandon the previous domicile. Another
take-away from this case is that when only unimportant belongings remain in the
old domicile, the intent to abandon the old domicile is not diminished.

What is more, it must be emphasized that petitioner donated to the Salvation

Army, as shown by Exhibit "15" and Exhibit "15-A," which are receipts showing
donations to the Salvation Army of clothes, books and miscellaneous items. The
receipts are dated 23 February 2006. The value of the personal effects donated was
placed by petitioner's husband at USD300.00 and USD575.00,[190] certainly little
personal items that were even then, fully disposed.
What can be gleaned from the above facts is that petitioner intended to bring along
with her in the Philippines only those items she deemed important to her, and that
those that were left behind were unimportant. It should be stressed that the items
donated to charity included books and clothes, which presumably are not valuable
to petitioner; hence, the donations to the Salvation Army. Accordingly, petitioner
was able to establish another factor indicating the intent of petitioner to abandon
her old domicile and establish a new domicile in the Philippines.

In sum, there is more than sufficient evidence indicating petitioner's intent to

abandon her domicile in the US. Several factors have been established: plans to
transfer to the Philippines, sale of the residence in the old domicile, change of
postal address, and relocation of valuable personal belongings to the new domicile.

2. Actual removal from old domicile and relocation to new domicile

The third requirement for establishment of a new domicile is bodily presence in or

the actual removal to the new domicile.

In Oglesby v. Williams,[191] the Court of Appeals of Maryland faced the issue of

whether Beau H. Oglesby met the two-year residency requirement to run for
State's Attorney for Worcester County in the November 2002 general election.
Oglesby admitted that he had been domiciled in Wicomico County for a period of
time beginning in December 1995. He argued, however, that his purchase of real
property in Worcester County on 5 September 2000, more than two years before
the election, coupled with his intention to be domiciled there, effectively
established that he had changed his domicile to Worcester County.

We do not question, to be sure, that the appellant intended to make Worcester

County his residence, his fixed, permanent home and habitation and, thus, to
abandon his Wicomico County residence. We simply do not believe that the
intent was perfected before the appellant moved into the Worcester County
home; the appellant's intent was not actualized until then.

[T]here are many citizens of Maryland who intend to change their domicile upon
retirement and may make quite elaborate plans toward fulfilling that intent by
building a retirement home in the place where they intend to retire. Such plans, by
themselves, do not prove the abandonment of an existing domicile, although it is
evidence of the intention to do so. Were such planning to be sufficient, the intent
requirement would swallow the requirement of an actual removal to another
habitation with the intent to reside there indefinitely.

xxxx

The evidence shows that the appellant established a domicile in Wicomico County
in December, 1995 and remained domiciled in that county until, at the earliest,
December, 2000. He voted in the November 7, 2000 election in Wicomico
County and he did not move into a residence in Worcester County until
December, 2000. We hold that the appellant did not become a domiciliary of
Worcester County until, at the earliest, he actually moved into his new home
on December 20, 2000.
Oglesby makes the date of actual transfer as the reckoning point for the change of
domicile. Had the actual removal happened prior to the two-year period, Oglesby
would have satisfied the residency requirement in that case.

Applying the rule to this case, it appears that the intent was actualized in 24 May
2005, the date when petitioner arrived in the Philippines, as revealed by her US
passport bearing a stamp showing her entry in the Philippines. The fact that she
arrived here for the purpose of moving back to the Philippines was not denied by
COMELEC during the oral arguments, although it did not recognize the legal
implications of such fact.

We must not lose sight of the fact that petitioner registered as a voter in this
country on 31 August 2006. Thus, the implication of petitioner having registered
on 31 August 2006 is that she had already been a resident in the country for at
least one year as of the day of her registration. The reason is that the Voter's
Registration Act of 1996[192] requires among other things that the citizen must have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year.

That being said, the registration of petitioner as voter bolsters petitioner's claim
that she concretized her intent to establish a domicile in the country on 24 May
2005. Take note that if we use 24 May 2005 as the reckoning date for her
establishment of domicile in the Philippines, she would have indeed been a
resident for roughly one year and three months as of 31 August 2006, the date she
registered as a voter in the Philippines.

Besides, when we consider the other factors previously mentioned in this

discussion - the enrolment of petitioner's children shortly after their arrival in the
Philippines, the purchase of the condominium unit during the second half of 2005,
the construction of their house in Corinthian Hills in 2006, the notification of the
US Postal Service of petitioner's change of address - there can only be one
conclusion: petitioner was here to stay in the Philippines for good when she
arrived in May 2005.

Let me highlight the fact of enrolment of petitioner's children in 2005. This

happened shortly after their arrival in the Philippines, which was in May 2005.
Taking together the two facts - the arrival of the family in May and the subsequent
attendance of the children in local schools the following month - the logical
conclusion that we can derive from them is that petitioner arrived early in May so
as to prepare her children's schooling in the Philippines. Now, given that in May,
she already had in mind the attendance of her children in local schools, this
indicates that petitioner, at the time of her arrival already had the intent to be in the
country for the long haul.

Lastly, we must not overlook the proximity of her date of arrival in the Philippines
in 24 May 2005 to the death of her father in 14 December 2004. The closeness of
the dates confirms the claim of petitioner that the untimely death of her father and
the need to give her mother moral support and comfort. The return to the country,
it must be emphasized, happened within one year of the death of petitioner's
father. It reflects the motive of petitioner for her return to the Philippines: the
only child had to return to the Philippines as soon as possible so that she could, be
with her grieving mother. More important, this very same motive justifies the acts
of relocation she executed, several of which occurred within a year of the death of
her father.

As a result, petitioner's arrival in the Philippines on 24 May 2005 was definitely

coupled with both animus manendi and animus non revertendi.

True, petitioner's transfer in this case was incremental. But this Court has already
recognized the validity of incremental transfers. In Mitra v. COMELEC,[193] We
stated:

Mitra's feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from
the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically, his expressed intent to
transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run
for a provincial position; his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; his initial
transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home;
and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the
premises he leased pending the completion of his house. These incremental
moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELEC's highly
subjective non-legal standards do. (Emphasis supplied)

Even the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Bell v. Bell[194] recognized the notion

of incremental transfers in a change of domicile:

Intent, being purely subjective, must to a large extent be determined by the acts
which are manifestations of that intent. However, it does not follow from that
that the acts must all occur simultaneously with the formation of the
intent. Such a conclusion would be contrary to human nature. One does not move
to a new domicile and immediately change church membership, bank account,
operator's license, and club memberships. Nor does he immediately select a
neighborhood, purchase a home and buy furniture. All of those acts require
varying degrees of consideration and as a consequence cannot be done hastily
nor simultaneously. (Emphases supplied)

The foregoing considered, the COMELEC used a wrong consideration in reaching

the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the durational residency requirement
of 10 years. There is no falsity to speak of in the representation made by petitioner
with regard to her residence in the country. For using wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding the issue, COMELEC tainted its cancellation of
petitioner's 2016 certificate of candidacy for president with grave abuse of
discretion.

Long Residence in the Philippines

We must remember that petitioner and her children would have stayed in the
Philippines for 10 years and 11 months by 9 May 2016. For nearly 11 years, her
children have studied and spent a substantial part of their formative years here. On
this, the case of Hale is again instructive:

We have held that '[t]he exercise of political rights, admissions, declarations,

the acts of purchasing a home and long-continued residency are
circumstances indicative of his intention to abandon his domicile of origin
and to establish a new domicile.' Taking into consideration all of these factors,
the circuit court did not err in determining that Stone's domicile has existed in
Marshall County since October of 2013. (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

Petitioner's intention to abandon US

domicile was not negated

The COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc in SPA Nos. 15-002
(DC), 15-007 (DC) and 15-139 (DC) ruled that the fact that petitioner's husband
remained and retained his employment in the US in May 2005 negated her intent
to reside permanently in the Philippines. Furthermore, petitioner travelled
frequently to the US using her US passport even after she reacquired her
Philippine citizenship. According to the COMELEC, these show that she has not
abandoned her domicile in the US. Respondent Valdez also points to two houses
in the US that petitioner maintains up to the present, and alleges that this fact also
negates her alleged intent to reside permanently in the Philippines.

The fact that petitioner's husband was left in the US and retained his employment
there should be viewed based on the totality of the circumstances and the reason
for such separation. There is no question that the impetus for petitioner to move
back to the Philippines was the death of her father in December 2004 and the
desire to be back in the Philippines and comfort her grieving mother. There is also
no question that by May 2005, petitioner and her children were already living in
the Philippines and the children already enrolled in Philippine schools.

Petitioner and her family could not have been expected to uproot their lives
completely from the US and finish all arrangements in the span of six months. One
of the spouses had to remain in the US to wind up all logistical affairs. There is
also no showing that petitioner is able to readily find a job in the Philippines upon
their return. Again, one of the spouses has to continue earning a living for the
family's upkeep and to finance the heavy cost of relocation. The conjugal decision
became clear when it was the husband who kept his employment in the us and
came to join his family in the Philippines only after the sale of the house in the
US.

To my mind, that petitioner's husband remained in the US until April 2006 only
showed that the family endured a period of separation in order to rebuild their
family life together in the Philippines. The fact that the husband stayed behind
should not have been considered in isolation but contemplated in light of the
realities of the situation.

The COMELEC also faults petitioner for travelling to the US "frequently" using
her US passport. A closer examination of the factual circumstances at the time,
however, reveals that petitioner had a justifiable reason for doing so.

When petitioner came back to the Philippines in May 2005, she was admittedly
still a US citizen. She reacquired her Philippine citizenship on 7 July 2006 under
the auspices of Republic Act No. 9225 and became a dual citizen of the
Philippines and the US. It was only on 20 October 2010 that petitioner renounced
her US citizenship and became a pure Filipino citizen. Thus, petitioner was a US
citizen from May 2005 to 20 October 2010.
Section 215(b) of the US Immigration and Nationality Act provides that "it shall
be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt
to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States
passport." This provision is echoed in Section 53.1 of the US Code of Federal
Regulations, unless the US citizen falls under any of the exceptions provided
therein.[195]

Petitioner, as a US citizen, was required by law to use her US passport when

travelling to and from the US. Notwithstanding her dual citizenship and the
abandonment of her US domicile, she could not have entered or departed from the
US if she did not use her US passport.

In Maquiling v. COMELEC,[196] which I penned for the Court, while we ruled that

the use of a foreign passport negates the earlier renunciation of such foreign
citizenship, did not say, however, that the use of a foreign passport after
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and before the renunciation of the
foreign citizenship adversely affects the residency of a candidate for purposes
of running in the elections. This case cannot, therefore, be used as basis to
negate petitioner's residency. This Maquiling decision involved Rommel Arnado
who was elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 2010 elections. He
ran also for the 2013 elections for the same post and won again. The Court
affirmed the Maquiling doctrine in the case of Arnado v. COMELEC.[197] The
doctrine was not expanded in any manner as to affect petitioner's citizenship
claim. The Maquiling doctrine solely has to do with the effect of the continued use
of a US passport after the renunciation of US citizenship. In the case of petitioner,
there is absolutely no evidence, which even COMELEC admits, that she used a
US passport after she renounced her US citizenship on 20 October 2010.
Clearly, Maquiling and Arnado are not relevant to the petitioner's case until
new proof can be adduced contradicting the present state of the evidence on
record that petitioner never used her US passport after she renounced her US
citizenship.

Taking into account all these pieces of evidence, it cannot be said that petitioner
made a false material representation in her 2016 certificate of candidacy for
president as far as her residency is concerned. The totality of these circumstances
shows that indeed, she had re-established her residence in the Philippines for 10
years and 11 months until the day before the elections in May 2016, which is
sufficient to qualify her to run for president in the country. At the very least, it
negates a finding of deliberate intention on her part to mislead the electorate with
regard to her residency. Evidently, a single statement in her 2013 certificate of
candidacy for senator cannot be deemed to overthrow the entirety of the evidence
on record, which shows that her residence in the Philippines commenced in May
2005.

IV.
B. ON CITIZENSHIP

In the assailed Resolutions, the COMELEC also declared that petitioner made a
false material representation when she declared that she was a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines. According to the commission, petitioner's inability to prove her
blood relationship to a Filipino parent precluded her from ever claiming natural-
born status under the 1935 Constitution. COMELEC argues, therefore, that her
declaration as to her citizenship must necessarily be considered false.

I find no support whatsoever for these legal conclusions.

Petitioner did not make a false material

representation regarding her citizenship in
her 2016 Certificate of Candidacy for
president.

Considering that there has been no definitive ruling on the citizenship of

foundlings, it would be unreasonable and unfair for the COMELEC to declare that
petitioner deliberately misrepresented her status as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. In fact, the evidence she submitted in support of her claim of
citizenship gives us every reason to accept her assertion of good faith.

In any event, I believe that there is sufficient legal basis to sustain a presumption
of citizenship in favor of petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any physical
proof of her filiation. Her natural-born status can be founded from solid
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.

There was no deliberate attempt to

mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render her
ineligible.

Contrary to claims that petitioner committed deliberate misrepresentation when

she declared that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the following documents
support a finding of good faith on her part:

1. Adoption Decree

The adoption decree issued in favor of petitioner in 1974 allows her to legally
claim to be the daughter of Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. This
proposition finds support in statutes and jurisprudence.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, We held that upon entry of an adoption

decree, the law creates a relationship in which adopted children were declared
"born of' their adoptive parents.[198]

Congress confirmed this interpretation when it enacted R.A. 8552, which provides
that the "adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter for
all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided 1 by law to legitimate sons/daughter born to them without discrimination
of any kind."[199]

Apart from obtaining the status of legitimate children, adoptees are likewise
entitled to maintain the strict confidentiality of their adoption proceedings. The
provisions of P.D. 603,[200] R.A. 85152[201] and the Rule on Adoption[202] stipulate
that all records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the
court, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, or any other agency or
institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential. The records are
permanently sealed and may be opened only upon the court's determination that
the disclosure of information to third parties if "necessary" and "for the best
interest of the adoptee."[203] This grant of confidentiality would mean very little if
an adoptee is required to go beyond this decree to prove her parentage.

2. Certificate of Live Birth

Upon the issuance of an adoption decree, an amended certificate of birth is issued

by the civil registrar attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the
adopters by being registered with their surname.[204] Like all persons, petitioner has
the right to rely on this birth certificate for information about her identity, status
and filiation.

Article 410 of the Civil Code states that the books making up the civil register and
all documents relating thereto are considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained.[205] As a public document, a
registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of validity.[206]

Petitioner's birth certificate also has the imprimatur of no less than the Municipal
Court of San Juan, Rizal Province.[207] In the absence of a categorical
pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void,
the birth certificate and the facts stated therein are deemed legitimate, genuine and
real.[208]

Petitioner thus cannot be faulted for relying on the contents of a public document
which enjoys strong presumptions of validity under the law. She is actually
obliged to do so because the law does not provide her with any other reference for
information regarding her parentage. It must be noted that records evidencing her
former foundling status have been sealed after the issuance of the decree of
adoption. In Baldos v. Court of Appeals and Pillazar,[209] We held that it is not for
a person to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live birth, but for those who
are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity.

The issuance of an amended certificate without any notation that it is new or

amended or issued pursuant to an adoption decree, should not be taken against
petitioner, because it merely complies with the confidentiality provisions found in
adoption laws.[210] Under Section 16 of the Rule on Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-
SC, 31 July 2002), it shall be the responsibility of the civil registrar where the
foundling was registered to annotate the adoption decree on the foundling
certificate, and to prepare and a new birth certificate without any notation that it is
a new or amended certificate.

3. Voter's ID

The Voter's ID issued to petitioner likewise prove that she acted in good faith
when she asserted that she was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Precisely
because of the entries in these documents, Poe could not be expected to claim any
citizenship other than that of the Philippines. Hence, she could not have committed
a material misrepresentation in making this declaration.

4. Philippine Passport
In 1996, R.A. 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) was passed. The law
imposes upon the government the duty to issue passport or any travel document to
any citizen of the Philippines or individμal who complies with the requirements of
the Act.[211] "Passport" has been defined as a document issued by the Philippine
government to its citizens and requesting other governments to allow its citizens to
pass safely and freely, and in case of need to give him/her all lawful aid and
protection.[212]

Section 5 of R.A. 8239 states that no passport shall be issued to an applicant

unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the
applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the requirements.
Conversely, a Philippine passport holder like petitioner is presumed to be a
Filipino citizen, considering the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of
public officials in the course of their duties. When the claim to Philippine
citizenship is doubtful, only a "travel document" is issued.[213] A travel document,
in lieu of a passport, is issued to stateless persons who are likewise permanent
residents, or refugees granted such status or asylum in the Philippines.[214] If the
State considers foundlings to be anything else but its citizens (stateless persons,
for example), it would not have given them passports. However, since the 1950s,
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has been issuing passports to foundlings.
[215]
 A quick look at the official website[216] of the DFA would show an enumeration
of supporting documents required of foundlings for the issuance of a Philippine
passport; to wit, certificate of foundling authenticated by the Philippine Statistics
Authority, clearance from the Department of Social Work and Development
(DSWD), passport of the person who found the applicant, and letter of authority or
endorsement from DSWD for the issuance of passport. The only conclusion that
can be made is that foundlings are considered by the State, or at least by the
executive, to be Philippine citizens.

Rule 130, Section 44[217] of the Rules of Court has been cited by the Court to
support the finding that entries in the passport are presumed true.[218] On its face,
the Philippine passport issued to Poe on 16 March 2014 indicates her citizenship
to be "Filipino." Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
not even considering this as evidence in determining whether Poe intended to
deceive the electorate when she indicated that she was a natural-born Filipino.

5. Bureau of Immigration Order

While findings made by Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the citizenship of

petitioner is not conclusive on the COMELEC,[219] such negate any notion of bad
faith or malice on the part of petitioner when she made the representation in her
CoC that she was a natural-born citizen. At the time, the presumption created by
the Order was in operation. In effect, petitioner had color of authority to state that
she was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

It has been argued that petitioner had obtained the BI order only because she
misrepresented herself to have been "born ... to Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and
Jesusa Sonora Poe."[220] However, as previously discussed, the potent policy
interests[221] embedded in the confidentiality of adoption records fully justifies her
decision to write the names of her adoptive parents as indicated in her birth
certificate.
6. The Decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-05

The SET Decision is a prima facie finding of natural-born citizenship that

petitioner can rely on. The fact that the SET Decision was issued later than the
filing by petitioner of her CoC for president does not take away from its validity as
another tangible basis of petitioner to validly claim that she was a natural-born
Filipino. It should be borne in mind that the SET Decision is a determination of
petitioner's natural-born status as of the time she was elected and assumed her
duties as senator of the Philippines. While the Decision was later in issuance, the
application of this ruling by the SET significantly predates the filing of her 2016
certificate of candidacy for president.

Taken together, the enumerated documents provide petitioner with sufficient basis
for her claim of citizenship. She cannot be faulted for relying upon these pieces of
evidence, particularly considering that at the time she made her declaration that
she was a natural-born citizen, the presumption created by these documents has
not been overturned.

At any rate, it would be absurd for petitioner to answer "foundling" in every

document where her filiation and citizenship is required when her birth certificate
and other official documents provide otherwise. Not only would this defeat the
purpose of the degree of confidentiality prescribed by the law, she would even run
the risk of causing offense to her parents whom she would deprive of actual
recognition.

Petitioner's honest belief that she was a natural-born citizen is further shown by
her constant assertion of her status and is corroborated by official documents and
acts of government issued in her favor. I believe that these documents, at the very
least, negate any deliberate intent on her part to mislead the electorate as to her
citizenship qualification.

Legal Significance of Confirmation of Renunciation

It had been posited that petitioner's repatriation as a citizen of the Philippines

under R.A. 9225 had been rendered doubtful by her subsequent acts in 2011, in
particular her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
United States before a Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines;[222] her
completion of a Questionnaire on Information for Determining Possible Loss of
U.S. Citizenship;[223] and the issuance of a Confirmation of Loss of Nationality of
the United States.[224]

Suffice it to state that these documents were; executed by petitioner only for the
purpose of complying with the requirements of U.S. law. It had no relevance to
petitioner's reacquisition of citizenship under Philippine law. The fact remains that
she had already properly renounced her U.S. citizenship by executing the Affidavit
of Renunciation required in Section 5 of R.A. 9225. Any act done thereafter
served only to confirm this earlier renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Respondent validly presumed that

she is a citizen of the Philippines.
The failure of the COMELEC to properly appreciate evidence showing good faith
on the part of petitioner is compounded by its narrow-minded approach to the
question of citizenship. There is sufficient basis to support the presumption that
foundlings are citizens of the Philippines.

Although the citizenship of foundlings is not expressly addressed by the language

of Article IV of the Constitution, Philippine statutes, administrative regulations
and jurisprudence support this conclusion, even in light of the absence of physical
proof to establish foundlings filiation.

Moreover, a presumption of foundlings their natural-born status can be established

by the deliberations of the 1935 Constitution and the history of its provisions.
These legal authorities and materials serve as sufficient justification for any
foundlings good faith belief that she is a natural-born citizen.

The standard proposed by the COMELEC - physical proof of blood relation to a

parent who is a citizen of the Philippines - is an impossible, oppressive and
discriminatory condition. To allow the imposition of this unjust and unreasonable
requirement is to sanction a violation of the Constitution and our obligations under
existing international law.

In Philippine law, a foundling refers to a deserted or abandoned infant; or

a child whose parents, guardian, or relatives are unknown; or a child committed to
an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and
parentage, and registered as such in the Civil Register.[225]

The ruling of the COMELEC is premised solely on the admitted fact that
petitioner is a foundling. As explained in the assailed Resolutions, petitioner was
found abandoned in the parish church of Jaro, Iloilo, on 3 September 1968 by a
certain Edgardo Militar. She was later on legally adopted by Ronald Allan Poe and
Jesusa Sonora Poe. To date, however, her biological parents are unknown.

According to the COMELEC, these circumstances render the citizenship of

petitioner questionable. It claims that I since she is unable to establish the
identities of her parents, she is likewise incapable of proving that she is related by
blood to a Filipino parent. Accordingly, she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen. These arguments are unmeritorious.

Filiation as a matter of legal fiction

Under Philippine law, the parentage of a child is a matter of legal fiction. Its
determination relies not on physical proof, but on legal presumptions and
circumstantial evidence. For instance, a child is disputably or conclusively
presumed legitimate, i.e. born of two married individuals depending on the period
that elapsed between the birth of that child and the ce1ebration[226] or
termination[227] of the spouses' marriage. The presumption of the fact of legitimacy
is one of the strongest known to the law, and cannot be overthrown except by
stronger evidence.[228] As the Court explained in Rodolfo A. Aguilar v.
Edna G. Siasat:[229]

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and

founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption
indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that
the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents
sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of
a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. (Emphases supplied)

The Family Code also allows paternity and filiation to be established through any
of the following methods: (1) record of birth; (2) written admission of filiation; (3)
open and continuous possdssion of the status of a legitimate or
an illegitimate child; (4) or other means allowed by the Rules or special laws.
[230]
 Notably, none of these methods requires physical proof of parentage:

(a) The entries in a record of birth depend only on the statements of certain
persons identified by law: in general, administrator of the hospital, or in
absence thereof, either of the following: the
physician/nurse/midwife/hilot who attended the birth. In default of both,
either or both parents shall cause the registration of the birth; and if the
birth occurs in a vessel/vehicle/airplane while in transit, registration shall be
the joint responsibility of the driver/captain/pilot and the parents.[231]

(b) Filiation may also be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a

public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In Aguilar, the Court declared that such due recognition
in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment
of the child and requires no further court action.[232]

(c) With respect to open and continuous possession of the status of children
and other means allowed by the Rules of Court, the relevant sections of
Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. - The act or declaration

of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree
of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. - The

reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members,
may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also
 a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree.

Evidently, there is no legal basis for the standard proposed by the

COMELEC and private respondents. Physical or scientific proof of a
blood relationship to a putative parent is not required by law to
establish filiation or any status arising therefrom such as citizenship.
In fact, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that DNA evidence is
not absolutely essential so long as paternity or filiation may be
established by other proof.233 There is, therefore, no reason to impose
this undue burden on petitioner, particularly in light of her situation
as a foundling. Instead of requiring foundlings to produce evidence
of their filiation - a nearly impossible condition - administrative
agencies, the courts and even Congress have instead proceeded on
the assumption that these children are citizens of the Philippines.

Contemporaneous and subsequent

construction by the legislature, executive
and judicial branches of government

Although the details of their births cannot be established, foundlings are provided
legal protection by the state through statutes, rules, issuances and judicial
decisions allowing their adoption. As early as 1901, the Code of Civil
Procedure[234] recognized that children whose parents are unknown have a right to
be adopted. Failure to identify the parents of the child was not made an obstacle to
adoption; instead, the rules allowed a legal guardian, or the trustees/directors of an
orphan asylum, to grant the required consent on behalf of the unknown parents.
Similar provisions were included in the subsequent revisions of the Rules of Court
in 1940[235] and 1964.[236]

Early statutes also specifically allowed the adoption of foundlings. Act No. 1670
was enacted precisely to provide for the adoption of poor children who were in
the custody of asylums and other institutions. These children included orphans or
"any other child so maintained therein whose parents are unknown":[237]

SECTION 548. Adoption of child from institution for poor children. - Upon the
application of any person to the competent authorities of any asylum or
institution where the poor children are maintained at public expense to adopt
any child so maintained therein, it shall be the duty of such authorities, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to report the fact to the provincial fiscal,
or in the City of Manila to the fiscal of the city, and such official shall thereupon
prepare the necessary adoption papers and present the matter to the proper court.
The costs of such proceeding, in court shall be de oficio.

The provisions of Act No. 1670 were substantially included in the Administrative
Code of 1916[238] and in the Revised Administrative Code of 1911.[239]

In 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8043 to establish the rules governing
the "Inter-country Adoption of Filipino Children." The adoption of a foundling
was similarly recognized under Section 8 of the statute, which allowed the
submission of a foundling certificate to facilitate the inter-country adoption of
a child.[240] A few years later or in 1998, the law on "Domestic Adoption
of Filipino Children" was amended through R.A. 8552. This time, a specific
provision was included to govern the registration of foundlings for purposes of
adoption:

SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). - It shall be the duty of the

Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of
the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be
the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.

In 2009, Congress passed R.A. 9523,[241] which allowed the Department of Social

Welfare and Development (DSWD) to declare a child "legally available for
adoption" as a prerequisite for adoption proceedings. Under this statute, foundlings
were included in the definition of abandoned children[242] and expressly allowed to
be adopted, provided they were first declared by the DSWD as available for
adoption.[243] Administrative Order No. 011-09 was adopted by that department in
2009 to implement the statute.[244]

These enactments and issuances on adoption are significant, because they

effectively recognize foundlings as citizens of the Philippines. It must be
emphasized that jurisdiction over adoption cases is determined by the citizenship
of the adopter and the adoptee. As explained by this Court in Spouses
Ellis v. Republic,[245] the Philippine Civil Code adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's
nationality. This 1uling cites Article 15 of the Civil Code:

ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.

The citizenship of a person is a "status" governed by this provision is clear,

pursuant to our ruling in Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Callano.[246] In
that case, We applied the nationality rule in Article 15 to determine whether some
individuals had lost their Philippine citizenship:

"The question, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth
subsequently acquired Chinese citizenship under the Chinese Law of Nationality
by reason of recognition or a prolonged stay in China, is a fit subject for the
Chinese law and the Chinese court to determine, which cannot be resolved by a
Philippine court without encroaching on the legal system of China. For, the settled
rule of international law, affirmed by the Hague Convention on Conflict of
Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930 and by the International Court of Justice, is
that." Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular
state should be determined in accordance with the laws of that state. (quoted in
Salonga, Private International Law, 1957 Ed., p. l 12) There was no necessity of
deciding that question because so far as concern the petitioners' status, the only
question in this proceeding is: Did the petitioners lose their Philippine
citizenship upon the performance of certain acts or the happening of certain
events in China? In deciding this question no foreign law can be applied. The
petitioners are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be
governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in conformity with Article
15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as follows: "Laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." Under Article IV, Section 2, of the Philippine Constitution,
"Philippine citizenship. may be lost or reacquired m the manner provided by law,"
which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine
citizenship shall be determined by no other than the Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)

Ellis also discredits the assertion that this Court has no power to determine
the citizenship of a foundling based only on presumptions. In that case, an
infant named Baby Rose was abandoned at the Heart of Mary Villa, an institution
for unwed mothers. When an American couple, the Spouses Ellis, later sought to
adopt Baby Rose, the Supreme Court presumed the citizenship of the infant for
purposes of adoption:

"In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no
court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of
the case an4 over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of
Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres
to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is
determined by the latters' nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have
jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the
Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners. Under our political law, which is patterned after the Anglo-American
legal system, we have, likewise, adopted the latter's view to the effect that personal
status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the
domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict
of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This, perhaps, is the reason
why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by nonresident aliens, and we have
consistently refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce -
regardless of the grounds upon which the same are based - involving citizens of
the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum, even when our laws
authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines. (citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)

In the 1976 case Duncan v. CFI of Rizal,[247] the Court again presumed the

Philippine citizenship of a foundling for purposes of adoption. Notwithstanding
the refusal of the de facto guardian o reveal the identity of the child's mother, the
adoption of the abandoned child was allowed in order to prevent a "cruel sanction
on an innocent child":

Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown parent, there

appears to be no m re legal need to require the written consent of such parent o
the child to the adoption. xxx.

The trial court in its decision had sought refuse in the ancient Roman legal maxim
"Dura lexsedlex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it rendered.
While this old adage generally finds apt application in many other legal cases, in
adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with
less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is
more or the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock,
than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed
to provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children, who
otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders
and become serious social problems, should be given the widest latitude of
sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and should not be
made, an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy
As often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should
be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist - with a
modicum promise f a useful and constructive existence.

. . . If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will
be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and
worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all
other children who might be similarly situated. We consider it to be
justifiable and more humane to formalize a factual relation, that of parents
and son, existing between the herein petitioning spouses and the
minor child baptized by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, than to
sustain the hard, harsh and cruel interpretation of he law that was done by
the private respondent court and Judge. It is Our view that it is in consonance
with the rue spirit and purpose of the law, and with the policy of the State, to
uphold, encourage and give life and meaning to the existence of family
relations.

Although the citizenship of the child in Duncan was not elaborated upon, the

Court proceeded to assume jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings. From this
act, it may be inferred that the Court presumed that the child was a Philippine
citizen whose status m y be determined by a Philippine court pursuant to Article
15 of the Civil Code.

The foregoing enactments and decisions prove the contemporaneous and

subsequent interpretation of the Constitution b the three branches of government.
It is evident that Congress, certain administrative agencies and even the courts
have always proceeded on the assumption that these children are Filipino citizens
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

The assertion that citizenship cannot be made to rest upon a presumption is

contradicted by the previous pronouncements of this Court. In Board of
Commissioners et. al v. Dela Rosa,[248] the Court utilized a presumption of
citizenship in favor of respondent William Gatchalian on the basis of an
Order of the Bureau of Immigration admitting him as a Filipino citizen.

On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex
"6", counter-petition which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision
dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens;
recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest an revalidated their Identification
Certificates.

The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of
the government on the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually
exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the
presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
In 2004, a presumption was likewise made y this Court to resolve issues
involving the citizenship of presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr.
in Tecson v. COMELEC.[249] In particular, the presumption that Poe's grandfather
had been a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, from 1898 to 1902, entitled him to
benefit from the en masse Filipinization effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902.
We explained:

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September
1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed
that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was
still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippine during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there
was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management an Archives
Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any
other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume,
that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records
Management and Archives Of ice would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

xxxx

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not private respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of private respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of private respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been ho n sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence
before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan
F. Poe, father of private respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime private respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers e Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate. (Emphasis supplied)

It is reasonable to presume that petitioner is a Filipino citizen, considering that she

was found abandoned in Iloilo at a time when the number of children born to
foreigners in the country as but a small fraction of the total number of births in the
Philippines.[250] without evidence to the contrary, this presumption must stand in
accordance with the rules on evidence.

The Place of Probability in the Rule of Law

Obedience to the rule of law is the bedrock of the Philippine justice system. [251] In
order to expound and define the true meaning and operation of these laws, they
must first be ascertained by judicial determination, and in order "to produce
uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last
resort, to one supreme tribunal xxx authorized to settle and declare in the last
resort a uniform rule of civil justice."[252]

The rules of evidence, authorized by the Constitution, is a means by which

uniformity is instituted in the judicial system whether in courts of law or
administrative agencies granted quasi-adjudicatory power. These rules govern the
means of ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.[253]

It must be emphasized that ascertaining evidence does not entail absolute

certainty. Under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence must only induce belief
in the existence of a fact in issue, thus:

Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. - Evidence must have such a relation to

the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Evidence
on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in
issue. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, judges are not precluded from drawing conclusions from inferences based
on established facts. In the case of Joaquin v. Navarro,[254] the Court proceeded to
discuss this process:[255]

In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is
never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."

xxxx

"Juries must often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities,

drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts
not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital
question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts.
How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain
secondary facts exist?" The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was
justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at
an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about an hour
before at the same animal also trespassing." That In fact, the circumstances in the
illustration leave greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case
at hand.[256] (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

This is enshrined in established legal doctrines, including that of probable cause

for preliminary investigation,[257] probable cause for issuance of a warrant of arrest,
[258]
 substantial evidence,[259] preponderance of evidence,[260] and character
evidence.[261]

Jurisprudence is replete with cases decided on the basis of probability. For

example, the Court affirmed an award of work-related compensation to an
employee who contracted rectal cancer based on a probability, stating thus:
The degree of proof required to establish work connection between the disabling
ailment and the working conditions is merely substantial evidence, or "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion" Probability not certainty is the touchstone in testing evidence of
work-connection.[262] (Emphasis in the original and citations omitted).

In criminal cases, it has also been ruled that "extrajudicial confessions,

independently made without collusion, which are identical with each other in their
essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible
as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show the probability
of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime."[263]

Note that the two cases cited pertain to different quantum of evidence (substantial
for administrative and beyond reasonable doubt for criminal), but both have relied
upon probabilities to rule upon n issue. In that sense, it can be concluded that
probabilities are considered s essential elements of the judicial determination of
relevant evidence.

While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule
should not be construed as a lice se to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary
rules.[264] In the instant case COMELEC refused to consider evidence that tends to
"establish the probability of a fact in issue," which in this case pertains to
petitioner's citizenship, claiming that it "did not and could not show bloodline to a
Filipino pare t as required under jus sanguinis."[265] This, to my mind, constitutes
gross misappreciation of the facts.

First and foremost, it is admitted that petitioner has typical Filipino features, with
her brown eyes, low nasal bridge, black hair, oval-shaped face and height. This by
itself, does not evince belief that as to her definite citizenship, but coupled with
other circumstantial evidence-that she was abandoned as an infant, that the
population of Iloilo in 1968 was Filipino[266] and there were not international
airports in Iloilo a that time-establishes the probability the she was born of Filipino
parents.

Such probability is further enhanced by the statistics obtained from the Philippine
Statistics Authority, showing that 10,558,278 children (99.03%) were born to
Filipino parents while 15,98 (0.07%) were born to foreigners in the Philippines
from 1965 to 1975.[267] Considering that the e1ection cases require a mere
preponderance of evidence,[268] then it can be reasonably concluded that petitioner
has fulfilled the requirements of citizenship under the law. In the words of Justice
Tuazon in Joaquin, this conclusion is not airtight but rational; never certain but
plain enough to justify a fact.

The rationale for implementing this policy is simple - to require abandoned

children to prove their parentage or status before they are granted protection would
compound their already dire predicament. That requirement would render these
unfortunate children even more vulnerable, in contravention of the declared policy
of the State to "defend the right of children to assistance, including proper care an
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."[269]
Respondent may he considered a natural-born
citizen under the 1935 Constitution.

Having established that foundlings may be presumed citizens of the Philippines,

the question now turns to whether they may be considered natural-born. I believe
that this issue may be resolved by utilizing both an originalist and a functionalist
approach to the interpretation of the Constitution.

Originalist v. Functionalist Interpretation

In its Memorandum, the COMELEC asserted that foundlings cannot be considered

natural-born citizens in light of the principle of inclusion unius est exclusion
alterius.[270] This line of reasoning stems from an originalist reading of the
Constitution, which is anchored on the principle that constitutional issues are to be
resolved by looking only at the text of the Constitution and at the clear intent of
the framers.[271] Intentionalism is a species of originalism. Another species is
textualism, which has been described as "that [which] looks to the Constitution's
original public meaning,"[272] or "read[s] the language of the Constitution as the
man on the street would understand it."[273]

It is a fallacy, however, to assert that there is only one - originalist/textualist -

approach to interpret the Constitution. There are many approaches to constitutional
interpretation, sub-classified into a) originalism v. non-originalism, and b)
formalism v. functionalism, among others. In his commentary on the Philippine
Constitution, Bernas enumerated and described at least five modes of
constitutional interpretation, i.e. historical approach,[274] structural approach,
[275]
 doctrinal approach,[276] ethical approach,[277] and prudential approach.[278]

In legal scholarship, the functionalist approach appears to be defined most clearly

by what it is not - it is not formalism.[279] William Eskridge, a member of the Yale
Law School faculty wrote a paper entitled "Relationships between Formalism and
Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases" in which he distinguished
formalism from functionalism:

There are no fewer than three different ways that constitutional formalism and
functionalism can be contrasted. One is their apparently different approach to legal
rules and standards. Formalism might be associated with bright-line rules that seek
to place determinate, readily enforceable limits on public actors. Functionalism, at
least as an antipode, might be associated with standards or balancing tests that
seek to provide public actors with greater flexibility.

Another way of contrasting formalism and functionalism focuses on the reasoning

process by which we reach rules or standards. Formalism might be understood as
deduction from authoritative constitutional text, structure, original intent, or all
three working together. Functionalism might be understood as induction from
constitutional policy and practice, with practice typically being examined over
time. Formalist reasoning promises stability and continuity of analysis over time;
functionalist reasoning promises adaptability and evolution.

Finally and relatedly, formalism and functionalism could be contrasted as

emphasizing different goals for law. Formalism might be understood as giving
priority to rule of law values such as transparency, predictability, and continuity in
law. Functionalism, in turn, might be understood as emphasizing pragmatic values
like adaptability, efficacy, and justice in law.[280]

I emphasize that this Court has utilized different approaches to interpreting the
Constitution. It is not mandated to fake only an originalist view of the fundamental
law. On the contrary: the Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, considered the
1935 Constitution to be a "living constitution.[281] This concept is said to have
originated from Missouri v. Holland[282] penned by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:

When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a
being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the
most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much
sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. (Emphasis supplied)

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in his Notion of Living Constitution,

[283]
 ventured to say that the framers purposely couched the United States
Constitution in general terms:

The framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to
succeeding generations the task of applying that language to the unceasingly
changing environment in which they would live. Those who framed, adopted, and
ratified the Civil War amendments to the Constitution likewise used what have
been aptly described as "majestic generalities" in composing the fourteenth
amendment. Merely because a particular activity may not have existed when the
Constitution was adopted, or because the framers could not have conceived of a
particular method of transacting affairs, cannot mean that general language in the
Constitution may not be applied to such a course of conduct. Where the framers of
the Constitution have used general language, they have given latitude to those who
would later interpret the instrument to make that language applicable to cases that
the framers might not have foreseen. (Emphasis Supplied)

Theorists utilizing the functionalist approach have likened Constitutions to

animate beings that can evolve to the extent that they become hardly recognizable
by their framers. In other words, they believe that the Constitution may be
interpreted in a manner that goes beyond the original intent of the persons who
crafted the text.

In this case, the use of both the originalist and the functionalist approaches leads to
the same result - that petitioner pad sufficient reason to believe that she is a
natural-born citizen despite the admitted fact that she was a foundling.

The Originalist Approach:

Interpretation in accordance with the
intent of the framers

Respondents urge the Court to resolve the citizenship issue in this case by using
the originalist approach, i.e. to make an interpretation based primarily on an
examination of the text and the original intent of the framers of the 1935
Constitution. They posit that there was no intent on the part of the delegates to the
1934 Constitutional Convention to consider foundlings as natural-born citizens,
"for had it been so, the text of the provision would have explicitly stated it."[284] In
thy opinion, this is a simplistic reading of the Constitution that disregards the
intent of the framers.

Where the terms of the Constitution itself do not reveal the intent of the framers
and the rest of the people, extrinsic aids may be resorted to, even when using an
originalist approach. The answer may be provided by the debates or proceedings in
the Constitutional Convention, the contemporaneous legislative or executive
construction, history, and the effects resulting from the construction
contemplated[285] Here, the records of the 1934 Constitutional Convention prove
that the framers intended to accord natural-born citizenship to foundlings.

It has been argued that the non-inclusion of a provision on "natural children of a

foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father" negates the
intent to consider foundlings natural-born citizens (or even merely citizens).
However, the Court cannot infer the absence of intent to include foundlings based
on that fact alone. Indeed, the transcript of the deliberations during the 1934
Constitutional Convention shows why it was decided that foundlings were not to
be expressly mentioned in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment, I propose that after I subsection 2, the following is
inserted: 'The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not
recognized by the father.'

El Presidente: We would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the

amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind
of illegitimate children?

Sr. Rafols: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of

unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola: For clarification. The gentleman said 'of unknown parents.' Current
codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards,
because the presumption is that - child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown
parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need...

Sr. Rafols: There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are
[required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola: But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no need
for the amendment.

Sr. Rafols: The amendment should read thus: 'Natural or illegitimate of a foreign
father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown
parentage.'

Sr. Briones: The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of
unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols: The son of a Filipina to a foreigner, although this [person] does not
recognize the child, is not unknown.

El Presidente: Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols: I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude
the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their
parentage is not unknown and I think those children of overseas Filipino mother
and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as
Filipinos.

El Presidente: The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones. :

Mr. Bulson: Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in
the hands of the Legislature? :

Sr. Roxas: Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far
between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the
principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens
in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the
subject exhaustively.

The delegates appeared to have been convince4 that there was no need to include a
binding provision on the subject for the1 following reasons: the Spanish Civil
Code already recognizes foundlings were born of Spanish citizens, and were thus
Spanish (Sr. Montinola); that the citizenship of foundlings could be determined by
Congress (Sr. Buslon); that the cases were so few and far between that the
Constitution did not need to refer to them (Sr. Roxas); or international law already
recognized children or people born in a country of unknown parents as citizens of
that country (Sr. Roxas).

For these reasons, they believed that it was no long1er necessary to include
foundlings among those to be expressly enumerated in the 1935 Constitution. The
record is bereft of any proposal by any delegate to deny foundlings Filipino
citizenship. It would even appear that those delegates who spoke could not
imagine any other interpretation than that foundlings are to be considered
Filipinos.

The textual silence on foundlings in Article IV, Section 1 is consistent with the
principle that a good Constitution is brief, comprehensive, and definite.[286] The
majority[287] of the delegates, being lawyers, must have subscribed to the accepted
principle that the Constitution is unavoidably required to be couched in general
language:

It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our
liberties, to provide for minute specifications of its powers or to declare the
means by which those powers should be carried into execution. It was
foreseen that this would be a perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable,
task. The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies
of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of
which were locked up in the ins¢rutable purposes of Providence. It could
 not be foreseen what new changes and modifications of power might be
indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter, and
restrictions and specifications which at the present might seem salutary
might in the end prove the overthrow of the system itself. Hence its powers
are expressed in general terms, leaving to the legislature from time to time
to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects and to mould and
model the exercise of its powers as its own wisdom and the public interests,
should require.[288]

The understanding that the Constitution must be brief even as it is broad is evident
in Sr. Roxas' statement during the deliberations that cases of children born of
unknown parentage were so "few kind far in between, that the constitution need
not refer to them." Notably, no one raised a comment or an objection in response
to Delegate Roxas' remark. The framers might have also accepted, regardless of its
veracity, that international law regards foundlings as citizens of the country where
they were found. They may have believed, as a matter of fact, that current codes
already considered children of unknown parents as Filipinos.

What is clear from the deliberations is that the framers could not have intended to
place foundlings in limbo, as the social justice principle embodied in Section 5,
Article II of the 1935 Constitution indiscriminately covered "all of the people."
Social justice has been defined as "the humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated." [289] It means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people.[290] It is founded on the recognition of
the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life. This recognition is consistent with the state's
fundamental and paramount objective of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons and bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.[291]

The Functionalist Approach:

Interpretation consistent with natural
justice

The issue of citizenship may also be resolved using the functional approach to
constitutional interpretation. Under this method, the Court should adopt an
interpretation that would allow the Constitution to fulfill its purpose.

Taking historical considerations into account, it is beyond cavil that the

Constitution would not function as envisioned if we give judicial imprimatur to the
COMELEC's argument. It claims that the 1935 Constitution, as well as the 1973
and 1987 constitutions, excluded foundlings from being citizens merely on the
ground that they could not establish a blood relationship with a Filipino father.
This interpretation would likewise go against the fundamental principle of natural
justice.

Mixture of jus soli and jus sanguinis

The history of citizenship laws in the Philippines shows that we have never
adopted a purely jus sanguinis regime. Ours is a mixture of elements of jus soli
andjus sanguinis, which we inherited from the Americans and the Spaniards,
respectively. In fact, as will be elaborated in the succeeding section, the concept of
"natural-born citizenship" originated from a jus soli jurisdiction.

The COMELEC however, opines that only those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines are considered natural-born citizens under the 1935 Constitution.
[292]
 Citing Valles v. Comelec,[293] it argues that natural-born Philippine citizenship
is acquired at the moment of birth on the basis of blood relationship.[294] This is a
gross misreading of the case. The Court in Valles did say that the principle of jus
sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; however, the Court
never stated that jus sanguinis had ever been the exclusive regime in this
jurisdiction. On the contrary, Rosalind Lopez's father, from whom she derived her
Philippine citizenship, was considered by the Court as a Philippine citizen based
on his birth in Daet, Camarines Norte, in 1879, a jus soli application: of
citizenship rules.

Far from adhering to an exclusively jus sanguinis regime, at least four modes of

acquiring citizenship have operated in the: Philippine jurisdiction since the turn of
the century: jus soli, jus sanguinis, res judicata and naturalization. Jus soli used to
predominate but upon the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution,jus sanguinis became the predominating regime.[295]

Citizenship prior to the 1935 Constitution

The first Civil Code adopted in the Philippines was the Spanish Civil Code,
[296]
 which became effective on 18 December 1889. It enumerated who were
Spaniards:

Article 17. The following are Spaniards:

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born

outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)

On 21 January 1899, the Malolos Constitution, which was framed by the national
assembly of the first Philippine Republic, was promulgated. All persons born in
the Philippine territory were considered as Filipinos:

Article 6. The following are Filipinos:

1. All persons born in the Philippine territory. A vessel of

Philippine registry is considered, for this purpose, as part of
Philippine territory.

2. Children of a Filipino father or mother, although born outside of

the Philippines.
 3. Foreigners who have obtained certification of naturalization.

4. Those who, without such certificate, have acquired a domicile in

any town within Philippine territory.

It is understood that domicile is acquired by uninterrupted residence for two years

in any locality within Philippine territory, with an open abode and known
occupation, and contributing to all the taxes imposed by the Nation.

The condition of being a Filipino is lost in accordance with law. (Emphasis

supplied)

The Malolos Constitution was short-lived and was in force only in the places were
the first Philippine Republic had control On 11 April 1899, the Treaty of Paris
between Spain and America took effect. Justice Jose C. Vitug, in Tecson v.
Comelec[297] implied that between 10 December 1898 when the parties entered into
the treaty and 11 April 1899, when it took effect, Spanish civil law remained
intact.[298]

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" was introduced a few years later
through Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902:

Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh clay of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Philippine Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

Under the Philippine Bill, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines and a Spanish subject on 11 April 1899. The term
inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant; 2) an inhabitant who
was a native of Peninsular Spain; or 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers
on or before 11 April 1899.[299]

Controversy arose on the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 1 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
the time that the common law principle of jus soli governed those born in the
Philippine Archipelago within that period.[300] Jus soli was also known as the
principle of territoriality, which was operative in the United States and England.

In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law, restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill: of 1902 as amended by the Act of
Congress in 1912:[301]

Section 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish

subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born ;subsequently thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as
have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States
under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.

Under the. Jones Law, native-born inhabitants of the Philippines were deemed to
be citizens of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if they were (1) subjects of Spain
on 11 April 1899; (2) residing in the Philippines on that date; and (3) since that
date, not citizens of some other country.[302]

Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987

Constitutions

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.

2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.

3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Items 1 and 4 of the foregoing section show that the 1935 Constitution was not
based purely on the jus sanguinis principle. Taking into account the history of our
citizenship provisions, the phrase "those who were citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution" clearly included those who
did not have a single drop of Filipino blood in them. Moreover, "those born in the
Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office" were also automatically considered citizens
despite the fact that they were of foreign blood.

Significantly, the provisions of Section 1 (1) of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution

were carried over to the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[303] The only difference was
the reference to the country as Philippines instead of "Philippine Islands."

Considering the mixture of citizenship regimes currently in force, it is not correct

to say that there is an exclusive jus sanguinis principle in place, and because of
that principle, that petitioner is thereby required, regardless of the fact that she is a
foundling, to submit proof of her blood relationship to a Filipino father. To rule
otherwise would be to implement a purely jus sanguinis regime contrary to the
history of the Constitution.

Functionality in accord with natural justice

As previously explained, the Constitution is meant to advance the fundamental

values of the Filipino people, in particular, those articulated in the Preamble: the
promotion of general welfare;[304] the creation of a just and humane society;[305] and
the protection of the blessings of independence and democracy under a regime of
truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace in accordance with the rule of
law.[306] The Constitution must be interpreted to allow it to function in accordance
with these ideals. Thus, the Court should not construe the citizenship provisions of
the 1935 Constitution in a manner that would unjustly deprive foundlings of
citizenship and render them stateless.

To emphasize, from the time that the Supreme Court was vested with the power to
interpret the law, We have exercised this power in accordance with what is right
and just. Citizenship cases are no exception. In previous cases, the Court has in
fact interpreted the law on citizenship in accordance with natural justice.

In Roa v. Collector,[307] We have assumed that the principle of jus soli was

applicable. This assumption was affirmed in Torres v. Tan Chim[308] and Gallofin
v. Ordonez,[309] in which this Court held that the principle of jus soli was followed
with reference to individuals who were born of Chinese fathers and Filipino
mothers.[310]

In Talaroc v. Uy,[311] We held that in making jus sanguinis the predominating

principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, the Constitution did not
intend to exclude those who were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration
at the time of its adoption. We ruled that if, on the strength of Roa, a person was
considered al full-fledged Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of the
Constitution when jus soli was the prevailing doctrine, that person cannot be
divested of Filipino citizenship.[312] The Court also stated that "it would be neither
fair nor good policy to hold Uy an alien after he had exercised the privileges of
citizenship in the face of legal principles that have the force of law."[313]

The principles of natural justice were also utilized in other cases to avoid an unfair
outcome. In Sale de Porkan v. Yatco,[314] We upheld the validity of a contract over
a parcel of land in favor of a "non-Christian inhabitant of the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu." The contract was considered valid despite the lack of
approval by the provincial governor of the province where the contract was
executed as mandated by the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu. The
Court held:

But if the contract, Exhibit B, is avoided, the result would be just the contrary, for
the non-Christian plaintiff-appellant here would be divested of ownership over the
houses which were ceded to him by C de S and which he now possesses. This
would defeat the legislative aim and purpose, destroy substantial equities, and
thwart the postulates of natural justice.
In Van Dorn v. Romillo,[315] We also prevented injustice by freeing a Filipino
woman from her marital obligations after she had been divorced by her foreigner
husband:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Concept of "natural-born" citizenship

The requirement of natural-born citizenship should serve only to deny certain

privileges to those who have gone through the process of naturalization in order to
acquire and perfect their citizenship. The concept, originally meant to distinguish
those who are "natural-born" from those who are "foreign-born" in jus
soli jurisdictions, cannot: be used to justify the denial of citizenship status to
foundlings because of their inability to prove a certain blood relationship.

"Natural-born" citizenship and jus soli

An examination of the origin of the term "natural-born" reveals that it was lifted
by the Philippines from the United States (U.S.) Constitution, which states:

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the
time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of the
President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within
the United States.[316] (Capitalization in the original)

The U.S. Constitution itself does not define the term. However, numerous
holdings and references in federal and state cases have clearly indicated that those
born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction (i.e., not born to foreign
diplomats or to occupying military forces), even if they were born to alien parents,
are citizens "at birth" or "by birth," and are "natural born," as opposed to
"naturalized," U.S. citizens.[317]

As a matter of inclusion, it has been held that it is beyond dispute that anyone born
on American soil with an American parent is a "natural born citizen."[318] As a
matter of exclusion, anyone whose citizenship is acquired after birth as a result of
"naturalization" is not a "natural born citizen."[319] The meaning of the natural-born
citizen clause became politically salient in the U.S. when John McCain became the
Republican nominee for President in September of 2008. He was born in the
Panama Canal Zone to parents who were American citizens.[320]

The phrase "natural-born citizen" found its way to America from England. While
there had been no extensive usage of the phrase during the founding era of the US
(1774-1797), it seems clear that it was derived from "natural born subject," which
had a technical meaning in English law and constitutional theory.[321] The framers
of the US Constitution would have been familiar with Blackstone's
Commentaries - which James Madison (hailed as the "Father of the Constitution")
described as "a book which is in every man's hand" - and would have understood
that the fundamental premise of natural-born citizenship was a concept of
allegiance to the sovereign at birth.[322]

Indeed, the English lexicographer Samuel Johnson defined "natural" as "native,"

which may mean either an "inhabitant" or an "offspring."[323] The conception of
natural- born subjects under British law is tied to that of natural allegiance to a
sovereign. This conception is based primarily on being born within the territory
subject to the sovereign's rule, but with the addition of others (such as the children
of ambassadors or of the sovereigns themselves) who have a "natural allegiance"
to the sovereign.

Blackstone writes:

The first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural-born
subjects. Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the
crown of England, that is, within the ligeance, or as it is generally called, the
allegiance of the king; and aliens, such as are born out of it. Allegiance is the tie,
or ligamen, which binds the subject to the king, in return for that protection which
the king affords the subject. The thing itself, or substantial part of it, is founded in
reason and the nature of government; the name and the form are derived to us from
our Gothic ancestors.

xxxx

Allegiance, both express and implied, is however distinguished by the law into
two sorts or species, the one natural, the other local; the former being also
perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men
born within the king's dominions immediately upon their birth. For, immediately
upon their birth, they are under the king's protection; at a time too, when (during
their infancy) they are incapable of protecting themselves.

xxxx

When I say, that an alien is one who is born out of the king's dominions, or
allegiance, this also must be understood with some restrictions. The common law
indeed stood absolutely so; with only a very few exceptions: so that a particular
act of parliament became necessary after the restoration, for the naturalization of
children of his majesty's English subjects, born in foreign countries during the late
troubles. And this maxim of the law proceeded upon a general principle, that every
man owes natural allegiance where he is born, and cannot owe two such
allegiances, or serve two masters, at once. Yet the children of the king's
ambassadors born abroad were always held to be natural subjects: for as the father,
though in a foreign country, owes not even a local allegiance to the prince to
whom he is sent; so, with regard to the son also, he was held (by a kind of
postliminium) to be born under the king of England's allegiance, represented by
his father, the ambassador.[324] (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it appears that the original opposite of the term
"natural-born" is not "naturalized," but "foreign-born." The term was meant
to distinguish between those born within a certain territory and those born outside
it. Blood or descent was irrelevant. However, because of the mixture of common
law and civil law in our jurisdiction, the original concept of natural-born
citizenship seems to have been diluted.

Citizens by Birth v. Citizens by

Naturalization

Irrespective of the origin of the concept, the term "natural-born" was used by the
framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to delineate the privileges of
those who are citizens at birth, from those enjoyed by citizens who are naturalized.

The word "natural-born" appeared thrice in the 1935 Constitution as a

qualification for the presidency and vice-presidency, as well as membership in the
Senate and House of Representatives.[325] The framers of the 1935 Constitution,
however, did not define the term.

In their commentary on the 1935 Constitution, Tañada and Fernando opined that
the requirement that a person be a natural-born citizen may be interpreted to mean
that at the time of birth, the candidate was a Filipino citizen; naturalized citizens
are excluded.[326] Proceeding from this logic, citizens who did not acquire their
Philippine citizenship through naturalization have the citizenship
qualification to run for the presidency.

The statements in these commentaries are supported by the deliberations of the

framers of the 1935 Constitution. During the 1934 Constitutional Convention,
Delegate Alejandrino proposed to limit eligibility for the presidency and vice-
presidency only to Filipino citizens born in the Philippines of parents who were
not naturalized.[327] This proposal was shot down. It must be noted, though, that he
referred to parents who were "not naturalized," instead of those who were "natural-
born." It may be inferred that the framers of the 1935 Constitution only intended to
exclude those citizens who had been naturalized from occupying certain positions.
Another section of the deliberations proceeded in this manner:

Delegate Artadi. - I am going to ask a reconsideration with respect to the matter

appearing on page 22-A which treats of the interpretation of the words, 'natural-
born,' because I would like to inform the Assembly that I have had a conversation
with some members of the committee ... and they explained to me that the words,
'natural-born,' do not necessarily mean 'born in the Philippines;' that is to say,
translated into Spanish, they mean that one who possesses all the qualifications to
be President of the republic, as it is written, is not necessarily born in the
Philippines. So that for purposes of the record, I would like one of the members of
the committee to explain the true interpretation of the words, 'natural-born,' for the
information of the Assembly.

The President. - The delegate from Capiz, Mr. Roxas, may please tell what is the
exact equivalent of those words.

Delegate Roxas. - Mr. President, the phrase, 'natural-born citizen' appears in the
Constitution of the United States; but the authors say that this phrase has never
been authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in view
of the fact that there has never been raised the question of whether or not an
elected President fulfilled this condition. The authors are uniform in the fact
that the words, 'natural-born citizen,' means a citizen by birth, a person who
is a citizen by reason of his birth, and not by naturalization or by a further
declaration required by law for citizenship. In the Philippines, for example,
under the provisions of the article on citizenship which we have approved, all
those born of a father who is a Filipino citizen, be they persons born in the
Philippines or outside, would be citizens by birth or natural-born.

And with respect to one born of a Filipino mother but of a foreign father, the
article which we approved about citizenship requires that, upon reaching the age of
majority, this child needs to indicate the citizenship which he prefers, and if he
elects Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, then he shall be
considered a Filipino citizen. According to this interpretation, the child of a
Filipino mother with a foreign father would not be a citizen by birth, because the
law or the Constitution requires that he make a further declaration after his birth.
Consequently, the phrase, 'natural-born citizen,' as it is used in the English
text means a Filipino citizen by birth, regardless of where he was born.
[328]
 (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement of "natural-born" citizenship was carried over to the 1973

Constitution[329] and then to the present Constitution.[330] Confirming the original
vision of the framers of the 193 5 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution defined the
term as "one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."[331] The 1973
definition was adopted in the present Constitution, with the added proviso that
those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
[332]
 Section 1 of Article IV, shall be deemed natural-born citizens:

Art. IV, Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Since the term was defined in the negative, it is evident that the term "natural-born
citizens" refers to those who do not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. The definition excludes only those who are
naturalized. From this interpretation, it may be inferred that a Filipino citizen who
did not undergo the naturalization process is natural-born. As We explained
in Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[333]

A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-
born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof.

In Bengson, We also ruled that private respondent regained his status as a natural-
born citizen the moment he reacquired his Filipino citizenship through
repatriation. That part of the Decision will be discussed in further detail in the
succeeding sections.
Not Purity of Blood

Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they
possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become
Filipino citizens as provided by law.[334] In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa
v. Collector of Customs,[335] a natural-born citizen is a one who has become such at
the moment of birth.

It may be observed from the exchanges during the deliberations on the

qualifications of members of the Supreme Court that the concern about the
natural-born requirement was not all about the questionable allegiance of those
without Filipino blood, but of those born abroad of Filipino parents. Delegate Lim
expressed his understanding that the requirement was for the President to be
"native-born," and his reservations about installing as magistrates those who are
not familiar with the "idiosyncrasies of the people:"

How can we figure out that naturalized citizens could really interpret the purposes
of this Constitution including the idiosyncrasies of the people? We have as a
matter of policy adopted the principle that the President of the Commonwealth
should be a native born. Our Supreme Court in some instances has the power
much bigger than that of the President by declaring our laws passed by the
National Assembly as unconstitutional. That power makes the Supreme Court the
supreme interpreter of our laws of the land, and who else but native born persons,
individuals who have been born in the country, can interpret, as I said, the customs
and habits of our people?[336]

It must be emphasized that natural-born status was never intended to be a measure

of the purity of blood. This Court, on reconsideration in Tan Chong,[337] explained
why birth alone may not be sufficient basis for the acquisition of citizenship. Some
of the important elements that would make a person living in a country its citizen:
youth spent in the country; intimate and endearing association with the citizens
among whom they live; knowledge and pride of the country's past; belief in the
greatness and security of its institutions, in the loftiness of its ideas, and in the
ability of the country's government to protect them, their children and their earthy
possessions against perils from within and from without; and their readiness to
defend the country against those perils.[338]

In the same manner, blood relationship alone is not controlling.[339] The following

groups of people, who technically have no "Filipino blood," were effectively
considered citizens by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the "Revised
Naturalization Law":

Section 15. Effect of the Naturalization on Wife and Children. - Any woman who
is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the

naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a
foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless
he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall
be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of
majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American
Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of
allegiance. (Emphasis supplied)

A necessary implication of the above provision is that children born within the

Philippines after the naturalization of their parent are unqualifiedly citizens of the
country. This implication holds true even if the naturalized parent is purely of
foreign blood. Moreover, because they do not need to perform any act to acquire
Philippine citizenship, they must be considered natural-born citizens by definition.

Like foundlings, these groups are not expressly mentioned in the Constitution.
However, by implication of law, they are considered natural-born citizens despite
the absence of a single drop of Filipino blood in them. From this fact, one can
draw no other conclusion: that the natural-born classification has nothing to do
with bloodline or birthright.

Foundling not "naturalized in accordance with law"

It has been argued that a foundling may obtain only naturalized citizenship,
because an act is supposedly required to acquire this status, i.e., the registration of
the child as a foundling after an administrative proceeding. In other words, it is
contended that the process of registration effectively amounts to naturalization in
accordance with law. This contention is unacceptable for three reasons.

First, the phrase "naturalized in accordance with law" must be understood with
reference to the naturalization process provided under naturalization statutes. In
several decisions, this Court has construed the meaning of the expression "in
accordance with law" as an allusion to enabling legislation.[340] Hence,
naturalization in Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, does not refer to
just any act, but to the specific procedure for naturalization prescribed by the
legislature. The Court does not have the right to engage in judicial legislation on
naturalization when the Constitution exclusively vests said power in Congress.

Second, registration is not an act that can be attributed to a foundling. Pursuant to

Section 5 of Act No. 3752,[341] the person who finds an abandoned child shall
report the place, date and hour of finding and other attendant circumstances to the
local civil registrar for purposes of registration. This prescribed act is in sharp
contrast to the naturalization process provided under the Revised Naturalization
Law,[342] which requires the applicants to themselves personally and voluntarily
perform certain acts to avail of naturalized citizenship. In particular, applicants are
required to (a) file a declaration under oath their bona fide intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines;[343] (b) file a petition for citizenship with a competent
court;[344] (c) participate in a hearing before a competent court;[345] and (d) take an
oath of allegiance to the Philippines.[346] Needless to state, foundlings do not
perform acts equivalent to any of these when they are registered. More often than
not, they are not aware of their circumstances when they are being registered as
foundlings.

Third, it is possible to register a foundling by reporting the circumstances of the

discovery to the local civil registrar without any administrative proceeding, if the
registration is done prior to the surrender of the custody of the child to the DSWD
or an institution.[347] It is only when the child is turned over to the DSWD without
having been registered with the local civil registrar that an administrative
proceeding is required prior to the issuance of a Foundling Certificate.[348] If
a child is already registered by the finder, the administrative proceeding under the
Rules of the DSWD[349] is followed not for the purpose of allowing that
registration, but only to determine whether the child may be declared legally
available for adoption.

Petitioner did not lose her natural-born

status when she reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225.

Respondents also question the reacquisition by petitioner of her citizenship under

R.A. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. They
claim that only natural-born citizens are allowed to reacquire citizenship under the
law. Since petitioner is allegedly not a citizen of the Philippines, she is not entitled
to this privilege.

The premise of petitioner's argument has already been extensively addressed

above. For reasons previously explained, petitioner may be considered a natural-
born citizen; hence, she may validly reacquire her citizenship under R.A. 9225.
The other arguments raised by respondents are addressed below.

Adoption Decree and Amended Birth

Certificate

In my view, petitioner was entitled to rely upon the adoption decree issued in her
favor and the amended birth certificate issued pursuant thereto. These documents
named Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces, and no other, as her parents for all
intents and purposes. Her reliance on these documents justifies her belief that she
is a natural-born citizen entitled to avail herself of the provisions of R.A. 9225.

It must be emphasized that adoption severs all legal ties between the biological
parents and the adoptee and vests those rights in the adopter.[350] Section 17 of R.A.
8552, in particular, provides that the "adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to
all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughter born to
them without discrimination of any kind." Hence, upon the entry of an adoption
decree, the law creates a relationship in which adopted children are deemed "born
of" their adoptive parents:

... The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More
technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are
recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. It has
been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son or
daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of
such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of
relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which
frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the
proceeding. The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the
determination of an application for adoption. On this part, there is unanimous
agreement.

It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to
the adoptive parents the custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing
by the child, and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural
relation, in the same manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive
parents in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions
as may be by statute imposed.[351] (Emphasis supplied)

As proof of this new relationship, an adoptee's original birth certificate is

cancelled and sealed in the records of the Civil Registry. Thereafter, an amended
birth certificate is issued in its place "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is
the child of the adopter(s)"[352] This amended certificate is issued without any
notation that it is new or amended.[353] Once issued, this document has the same
legal effect as any other birth certificate, and is entitled to a presumption of
validity as a public document.[354]

Evidently, to require adoptees to go beyond the parentage established in their birth

certificates would defeat the purpose of R.A. 8552 in requiring courts and other
institutions to seal adoption records, including the child's original birth certificate,
and to maintain the confidentiality of those papers.[355]

By these provisions, the legislature clearly intended to protect the privacy of the
parties to the adoption, thereby allowing them to avoid the stigma resulting from
the proceedings. The rationale behind these confidentiality provisions was
elucidated by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in Alma Society
Incorporated v. Mellon.[356] In that decision, which was later affirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court,[357] the U.S. Court of Appeals explained:

Judged by these standards, the New York sealed record statutes do not want
constitutional validity. The statutes, we think, serve important interests. New York
Domestic Relations Law s 114 and its related statutes represent a considered
legislative judgment that the confidentiality statutes promote the social policy
underlying adoption laws. See In re Anonymous, 89 Misc.2d 132, 133, 390
N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Surr.Ct.1976). Originally, sealing adoption records was
discretionary with the court, 1924 N.Y. Laws, ch. 323, s 113, but in 1938
confidentiality of adoption records became mandatory. 1938 N.Y. Laws, ch. 606 s
114. As late as 1968, the legislature enacted various amendments to increase the
assurance of confidentiality. 1968 N.Y. Laws, ch. 1038. Moreover, the purpose
of a related statute, Section 4138 of the Public Health Laws, was to erase the
stigma of illegitimacy from the adopted child's life by sealing his original
birth certificate and issuing a new one under his new surname. And the major
purpose of adoption legislation is to encourage natural parents to use the
process when they are unwilling or unable to care for their offspring. New
York has established a careful legislative scheme governing when adoption
may occur and providing for judicial review, to encourage and facilitate the
social policy of placing children in permanent loving homes when a natural
family breaks up. As the court of appeals stated in Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin
Adoption Service, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 195, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 73, Cert. denied, 404
U.S. 805, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971), "(i)t cannot be doubted that
the public policy of our State is contrary to the disclosure of the names and
identities of the natural parents and prospective adoptive parents to each other."
(Footnote omitted.) Forty-two other states, according to the State of New York,
require that birth and adoption records be kept confidential, indicating the
importance of the matter of confidentiality. See also Uniform Adoption Act
(U.L.A.) s 16(2) (rev. 1969) (adoption records "are subject to inspection only upon
consent of the Court and all interested persons; or in exceptional cases, only upon
an order of the Court for good cause shown"). These significant legislative goals
clearly justify the State's decision to keep the natural parents' names secret from
adopted persons but not from non-adopted persons. (Emphasis supplied)

Applicability of Bengson v. HRET

As to whether petitioner also reacquired her natural-born status, the Court must
apply the ruling in Bengson III v. HRET,[358] which allowed the applicant to
reacquire not only his citizenship, but also his original natural-born status. In that
case, the Court noted that those who reacquire Philippine citizenship must be
considered natural-born or naturalized citizens, since the Constitution does not
provide a separate category for them. Between the two categories, the Court found
it more appropriate to consider them natural-born citizens, since they were not
required to go through the tedious naturalization procedure provided under the
law:

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons
for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for
the reacquisition thereof. As private respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

Although Bengson referred to R.A. 2630 or the repatriation of persons who served

in the U.S. Armed Forces,[359] a similar process is undergone by those who
reacquire citizenship under R.A. 9225. In previous cases, this Court has also
consistently characterized R.A. 9225 as a "repatriation" statute[360] that allows
former Filipino citizens to recover their natural-born status.[361]
Accordingly, the logic used by this Court in Bengson also applies to this case - the
procedure provided by R.A. 9225 does not amount to naturalization; consequently,
a citizen who reacquires citizenship under this statute cannot be deemed
naturalized.

Determination of natural-born status at birth

When R.A. 9225 provides for the loss, reacquisition and retention of citizenship, it
refers only to the fact of citizenship, not natural-born status:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I_______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and

defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines, and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions are consistent with Article IV,[362] Section 2 of the 1935

Constitution, which indicates that what may be lost or reacquired is Philippine
citizenship and not natural-born status. These terms were carried over into the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

The precise character of the citizenship reacquired under the law was no longer
made an issue in these provisions, because natural-born status is determined at the
time of birth.[363] This characteristic cannot be changed, unless an individual
undergoes naturalization in any of the instances provided by law.[364] As will be
explained below, the procedure for the reacquisition of citizenship under R.A.
9225 does not amount to naturalization.

Reacquisition is not naturalization

It has been argued that the taking of an oath under R.A. 9225, as petitioner has
done, should be considered as an "act to acquire or perfect citizenship" under
Section 2, Article IV of the present Constitution. As previously discussed,
however, there are only two classes of citizens under the Constitution - those who
are natural-born and those who are naturalized. The "act" adverted to in the
Constitution must therefore be understood as pertaining only to the act of
naturalization.

The 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions conferred on Congress the power to
determine who are naturalized citizens:

1935 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE IV
Citizenship

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE III
Citizenship

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

1987 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE IV
Citizenship

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

In compliance with this constitutional mandate, Congress enacted the required

enabling statute in 1939 when it passed Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the
Revised Naturalization Law. This piece of legislation identifies those who are to
be considered naturalized citizens of the country, and it is not the province of the
Court to encroach upon this legislative prerogative. Accordingly, we cannot
unilaterally declare those who have availed themselves of the benefits of R.A.
9225 and similar laws as naturalized citizens. To do so would violate the principle
of separation of powers.

It must be emphasized that R.A. 9225 merely discusses the retention and
reacquisition of citizenship, not naturalization. As early as 1936, Congress already
treated naturalization as a different species apart from repatriation and other modes
that may later be introduced by the national assembly:

Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. - Citizenship may be reacquired:

 (1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the
disqualification's prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine
hundred and twenty-seven,

2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided,

That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien
may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the
termination of the marital status; and

(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.[365]

The reacquisition and retention of citizenship under R.A. 9225 or R.A.

2630[366] and repatriation under R.A. 8171[367] are different from naturalization
under C.A. 473. Reacquisition, retention, and repatriation are effected by merely
taking the necessary oath of allegiance and registering in the proper civil registry
(and in the Bureau of Immigration in accordance with R.A. 8171). On the other
hand, naturalization is a tedious process that begins with the filing of a declaration
of intention one year prior to filing a petition for admission to Philippine
citizenship and ends with the issuance of a certificate of naturalization.

Here, petitioner did not have to undergo the process of naturalization in order to
reacquire her Philippine citizenship. She only had to follow the procedure
specified in R.A. 9225. In this light, to declare her a naturalized citizen would thus
be contrary to law.

To refuse to recognize foundlings as

citizens of the Philippines is to
contravene our obligations under
existing international law.

The Philippines is obligated by existing customary and conventional international

law to recognize the citizenship of foundlings.

Customary International Law

Petitioner asserts that international law in the 1930s granted a foundling the right
to acquire a nationality "from birth." In my opinion, she has not presented
sufficient evidence to prove that in 1935, the Philippines was bound by customary
international law to recognize foundlings as Philippine citizens.

It must be remembered that norms of customary international law become binding

on the Philippines as part of the law of the land by virtue of the Incorporation
Clause in the Constitution.[368] For incorporation to occur, however, two
elements[369] must be established: (a) widespread and consistent practice on the part
of states; and (b) a psychological element known as the opinio Juris sive
necessitatis or a belief on the part of states that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.[370] For evident reasons, a
statement made by one of the framers of the 1935 Constitution and the Hague
Convention cannot, by themselves, prove widespread state practice or opinio
Juris. Without more, We cannot declare the existence of a binding norm of
customary international law granting citizenship to foundlings in 1935.
I believe, however, that this customary norm exists in international law at
present. Although matters of citizenship were traditionally considered to be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of states, contemporary developments
indicate that their powers in this area are now "circumscribed by their
obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights."[371] In particular, the
right of children to acquire a nationality is enshrined in a number of
international[372] and regional[373] conventions. The presumption of citizenship
accorded to foundlings in a state's territory is specifically mentioned in three
conventions: the 1930 Hague Convention,[374] the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness[375] and the European Convention on Nationality.
[376]
 These treaties, concurred in by various state parties,[377] show that on the part of
the members of the international community, there is widespread recognition of
the right to nationality of children in general and foundlings in particular.

As important as these international instruments are the actions of states in their

own domestic spheres. The International Court of Justice itself has considered
national legislation as sufficient evidence of state practice.[378] In this case, a survey
of the citizenship laws of 189 countries all over the world reveals that 165 of these
nations consider foundlings as citizens by operation of law. Twenty-three of these
states[379] grant citizenship to foundlings in observance of the jus soli principle, or
the general grant of citizenship to all individuals born within their territory.
Meanwhile, one hundred forty-two countries[380] have enacted foundling statutes to
grant citizenship to a child found in their territories if the parents are unknown,
unless there is proof to the contrary. Depending on the rule followed by the state,
the foundling is presumed either to have been born in the territory[381] or to have
been born to citizens of the state.[382]

That states have agreed to be bound by these obligations under various

conventions and have even enacted domestic legislation to fulfill their
responsibilities under the law of nations indicates their recognition of the binding
character of this norm. These acts demonstrate the opinio Juris of those states, i.e.,
their recognition that the grant of nationality to foundlings is obligatory under
international law.[383]

In view of the concurrence of these two elements, it is evident that a rule requiring
states to accord citizenship to foundlings has crystallized into a customary norm.
The Philippines is therefore bound at present to act in compliance with these
obligations.

The ICCPR and the CRC

As a state party to the ICCPR[384] and the CRC,[385] the Philippines is also obligated

to respect the right of every child to acquire a nationality. While these treaties
ostensibly pertain only to a "right to acquire" a nationality, this right has been
interpreted as the duty of a state to "grant nationality," particularly where there is a
link only with the state on whose territory the child was born. As the United
Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee explained:

64. Regardless of the general rules which govern acquisition of nationality, States
should ensure that safeguards are in place to ensure that nationality is not denied to
persons with relevant links to that State who would otherwise be stateless. This is
of particular relevance in two situations, at birth and upon State succession. As
regards the right to acquire a nationality under article 24, paragraph 3, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights
Committee stated that "States are required to adopt every appropriate measure ...
to ensure that every child has a nationality when he is born". In this context, birth
on the territory of a State and birth to a national are the most important criteria
used to establish the legal bond of nationality. Where there is only a link with
the State on whose territory the child was born, this State must grant
nationality as the person can rely on no other State to ensure his or her right
to acquire a nationality and would otherwise be stateless. Indeed, if
nationality is not granted in such circumstances then article 24, paragraph 3,
of the International Covenant as well as article 7 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child would otherwise be meaningless. In concrete terms, the
circumstance referred to above may arise, for example, where a child is born on
the territory of a State to stateless parents or with respect to foundlings. Given the
consequences to the children concerned, denial of nationality in such instances
must be deemed arbitrary.[386] (Emphasis supplied)

In its Concluding Observations on Fiji's compliance with the CRC, the UN

Committee on the Rights of the Child likewise directed states to take all measures
to avoid statelessness in compliance with their obligations under Article 7 of the
CRC:

The Committee takes note of article 7 of the Citizens Decree, which stipulates that
any infant found abandoned in Fiji is deemed to have been born in Fiji unless there
is evidence to the contrary. However, the Committee is concerned that this
stipulation might carry a risk of statelessness for children of whom it can be
proven that they have not been born in Fiji, but whose nationality can nevertheless
not be established. [...] The Committee recommends that the State party take all
the necessary measures to avoid a child found abandoned in Fiji being stateless.[387]

Considering these international norms, it is the obligation of the Philippines not

only to grant nationality to foundlings, but also to ensure that none of them are
arbitrarily deprived of their nationality. Needless to state, the Court cannot
interpret the Constitution in a manner contrary to these obligations. We cannot
sanction a violation of international law.

A declaration that foundlings are stateless

persons would have unconscionable
consequences.

The duty of the Court to interpret the Constitution is impressed with the equally
vital obligation to ensure that the fundamental law serves the ends of justice and
promotes the common good. After all, the Constitution is meant to be the legal
embodiment of these values, and to be the people's instrument for the protection of
existing natural rights and basic human liberties. As Chief Justice Reynato Puno
explained in his Separate Opinion in Republic v. Sandiganbayan:

But while the constitution guarantees and protects the fundamental rights of the
people, it should be stressed that it does not create them. As held by many of the
American Revolution patriots, "liberties do not result from charters; charters rather
are in the nature of declarations of pre-existing rights." John Adams, one of the
patriots, claimed that natural rights are founded "in the frame of human nature,
rooted in the constitution of the intellect and moral world." Thus, it is said of
natural rights vis-a-vis the constitution:

. . . (t)hey exist before constitutions and independently of them. Constitutions

enumerate such rights and provide against their deprivation or infringement, but
do not create them. It is supposed that all power, all rights, and all authority are
vested in the people before they form or adopt a constitution. By such an
instrument, they create a government, and define and limit the powers which the
constitution is to secure and the government respect. But they do not thereby
invest the citizens of the commonwealth with any natural rights that they did not
before possess. (Italics supplied)

A constitution is described as follows:

A Constitution is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private

rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government; it is not
the cause, but consequence, of personal and political freedom; it grants no rights to
the people, but is the creature of their power, the instrument of their
convenience. Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and
powers which they possessed before the Constitution was made, it is but the
framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the preexisting
condition of laws, rights, habits and modes of thought. There is nothing primitive
in it; it is all derived from a known source. It presupposes an organized society,
law, order, propriety, personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough
of cultivated intelligence to know how to guard against the encroachments of
tyranny.[388] (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

I believe that disputes involving the Constitution must be resolved with these
precepts in mind. As the Constitution is no ordinary legal document, this Court
should strive to give meaning to its provisions not only with reference to its text or
the original intention of its framers. Behind the text are the ideals and aspirations
of the Filipino people - their intent to "promote the general welfare;"[389] to "build a
just and humane society;"[390] and to "secure the blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality, and peace."[391] Any construction that would derogate from these
fundamental values cannot be countenanced.

In this case, a declaration that foundlings are natural-born citizens are

unconscionable. First, such a declaration would effectively render all children of
unknown parentage stateless and would place them in a condition of extreme
vulnerability.[392] As citizenship is "nothing less than the right to have
rights,"[393] its deprivation would leave foundlings without any right or measure of
protection. During the proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Nationality,
the Senior Legal Adviser of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
explained the nature of the right to citizenship:

The Right to a Given Nationality in the Avoidance of Statelessness

Citizenship, or nationality, has been described as man's basic right, as, in fact, the
right to have rights. Nationality is not only a right of itself, it is a necessary
precursor to the exercise of other rights. Nationality provides the legal connection
between an individual and a State, which serves as a basis for certain rights for
both the individual and the State, including the State's entitlement to grant
diplomatic protection.[394]

In the Philippines, a stateless individual is deprived of countless rights and

opportunities under the Constitution, statutes and administrative regulations. These
include the rights to suffrage;[395] education and training;[396] candidacy and
occupation of public office and other positions in government;[397] use and
enjoyment of natural resources;[398] investment;[399] ownership and control of
certain types of businesses;[400] practice of rofessons;[401] engagement in certain
occupations;[402] and even participation in legal proceedings involving status,
condition and legal capacity.[403]

Second, a declaration that petitioner is a citizen but is not natural-born is no less

odious to foundlings considering the privileges that would be deemed unavailable
to them. These include certain state scholarships[404] and a number of government
positions requiring natural-born citizenship as a qualification, i.e. a range of
national[405] and local[406] offices, various posts in government commissions,
[407]
 corporations,[408] banks,[409] educational institutions,[410] professional regulatory
boards[411] and the military.[412]

The repercussions of such a ruling for foundlings currently holding the enumerated
positions are too compelling to ignore. A declaration that individuals of unknown
parentage are not Filipinos, or at best naturalized citizens, may lead to their
removal from government posts; a demand to return all emoluments and benefits
granted in connection with their offices; and even the end of pension benefits
presently being enjoyed by affected retirees. The proposal for Congress to remedy
the unjust situation that would result from an affirmance by this Court of unjust
COMELEC rulings is too odious a solution to even consider. It is not the function
of Congress to correct any injustice that would result from this Court's proposed
unhappy ruling on foundlings. Rather, it is this Court's first and foremost duty to
render justice to them, as the Constitutions requires

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the consolidated petitions.

[1]
 468 Phil. 421 (2004).
[2]
 Id. at 490.
[3]
 Id. at 494.
[4]
 The petition docketed as G.R. No. 221697 assailed the COMELEC En Banc
Resolution dated 23 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated 1
December 2015. On the other hand, the petition docketed as G.R. No. 221698-700
assails the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 23 December 2015 in the
consolidated cases docketed as SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC) and 15-139
(DC). The COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the COMELEC First Division Resolution dated 11 December 2015.
[5]
 This provision states: "When the Court in recess and the urgency of the case
requires immediate action, the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court shall
personally transmit the rollo to the Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson for
his or her action."
[6]
 For instance, see the COMELEC's use of a dissent in Tecson v.
COMELEC, Omnibus Resolution dated 11 December 2015, pp. 24, 46.
[7]
 Sanchez v. Rosario, 111 Phil. 733 (1961 ), citing Abeede v. Imperial 103 Phil.
136-145 (1958).
[8]
 Deliberations of the Committee: Ad Hoc, Revision of Laws, 20 May 1985, pp.
65-68.
[9]
 Deliberations of the Committee: Revision of Laws, 30 May 1985.
[10]
 G.R. No. 207264, 22 October 2013.
[11]
 Black's Law Dictionary defines "summary proceeding" as "a nonjury
proceeding that settles a controversy or disposes of a case in a relatively prompt
and simple manner." (Black's Law Dictionary 1242 [8th ed. 2004]).
[12]
 318 Phil. 329 (1995).
[13]
 Id. at 460-461.
[14]
 Id. at 457-458. Justice Mendoza then quote Section 12, 68 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, Sections 6 and 7 of the Electoral Reforms Law. R.A.
6646, and Section 40 of the Local Government Code, R.A. 7160).
[15]
 Id. at 462-463.
[16]
 Fermin v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
[17]
 G.R. No. 194076, G.R. No. 194160, [October 18, 2011]).
[18]
 G.R. No. 207105, [November 10, 2015]).
[19]
 G.R. No. 196804, 197015, [October 9, 2012], 696 PHIL 786-918).
[20]
 G.R. No. 191938, [July 2, 2010], 636 PHIL 753-815).
[21]
 G.R. No. 207900, [April 22, 2014]).
[22]
 G.R. No. 195229, [October 9, 2012], 696 PHIL 700-785).
[23]
 G.R. No. 192856, [March 8, 2011]).
[24]
 G.R. No, 193237, 193536, [October 9, 2012], 696 PHIL 601-700).
[25]
 G.R. No. 192221, [November 13, 2012]).
[26]
 G.R. No. 179430, [July 27, 2009], 611 PHIL 501-517).
[27]
 G.R. No. 105111, 105384, July 3, 1992.
[28]
 G.R. No. 100710, 100739, September 3, 1991, 278 PHIL 275-302.
[29]
 G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999, 369 PHIL 793-829.
[30]
 G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
[31]
 G.R. No. 193314, February 26,2013.
[32]
 G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 318 PHIL 467-539.
[33]
 G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013.
[34]
 511 Phil. 720 (2005).
[35]
 G.R. No. 207900, 22 April 2014.
[36]
 595 Phil. 1172 (2008).
[37]
 460 Phil. 459 (2003).
[38]
 575 Phil. 253 (2008).
[39]
 G.R. No. 193314 (Resolution), 25 June 2013.
[40]
 Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 105111, 105384, 3 July 1992.
[41]
 Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections. 257 Phil. 1-23 (1989).
[42]
 Aratea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012.
[43]
 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Dante O. Tinga in Tecson v. COMELEC, 468
Phil. 421-755 (2004).
[44]
 G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995.
[45]
 Id.
[46]
 371 Phil. 377-393 (1999).
[47]
 G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008.
[48]
 Id.
[49]
 Id.
[50]
 593 Phil. 383-397 (2008).
[51]
 G.R. No. 179430, 27 July 2009.
[52]
 636 Phil. 753-815 (2010).
[53]
 G.R. No. 188671, 24 February 2010.
[54]
 G.R. No. 192856, 8 March 2011.
[55]
 468 Phil. 421-755 (2004).
[56]
 575 Phil. 253-266 (2008).
[57]
 595 Phil. 449-479 (2008).
[58]
 696 Phil. 700-785 (2012).
[59]
 696 Phil. 786-918 (2012).
[60]
 G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013.
[61]
 G.R. No. 136351, 28 July 1999.
[62]
 Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013.
[63]
 Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, 28 July 1999.
[64]
 Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206698, 25 February
2014; Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900, 22 April
2014; Agustin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207105, 10 November 2015.
[65]
 G.R. No. 209286, 23 September 2014.
[66]
 Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695 & 182369, 18 December 2008.
[67]
 G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995.
[68]
 Id.
[69]
 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010.
[70]
 Id.
[71]
 Id.
[72]
 Tagolino v. HRET, supra.
[73]
 Fermin v. COMELEC, supra.
[74]
 Almagro v. Spouses Amaya, Sr., G.R. No. 179685, 19 June 2013.
[75]
 Id.
[76]
 Id.
[77]
 Heirs of Limense v. Vda. de Ramos, G.R. No. 152319, 28 October 2009.
[78]
 Id.
[79]
 See Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, 161634, 161824, March 3, 2004,
468 PHIL 421-755; and Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. (1999).
[80]
 Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section.
[81]
 See Jison v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 124853, 24 February 1998.
[82]
 Id.
[83]
 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010.
[84]
 686 Phil. 649 (2012).
[85]
 Rule 130 ofthe Rules of Court.
[86]
 Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, supra.
[87]
 Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., supra.
[88]
 Id.
[89]
 Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
[90]
 G.R. No. 123553, 13 July 1998.
[91]
 Id.
[92]
 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 19 provides:

Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,

documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
be entered therein.

All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied)

[93]
 Philippine Trust Co. v. CA, G.R. No. 150318, 22 November 2010.
[94]
 Id.
[95]
 Chua v. CA, G.R. No. 88383, 19 February 1992.
[96]
 China Banking Corp., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 155299, 24 July 2007.
[97]
 G.R. No. 5272, 19 March 1910.
[98]
 Memorandum of petitioner, pp. 284-287.
[99]
 Cav. HRET, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 & 92202-03,30 July 1991.
[100]
 Nuval v. Ouray, G.R. No. 30241, 29 December 1928.
[101]
 Carre v. Carre, G.R. No. L-10128, 13 November 1956.
[102]
 Ugdaracian, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851, 18 April 2008.
[103]
 25 Am Jur 2d, Domicil § 13, cited in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
of J. Puno, Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2003.
[104]
 Limbona v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181097, 25 June 2008.
[105]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995.
[106]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995.
[107]
 Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009; Gayo v.
Verceles, G.R. No. 150477, 28 February 2005.
[108]
 Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012; Papandayan, Jr. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 147909, 16 April 2002; Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995; Co v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 & 92202-
03, 30 July 1991; Faypon v. Quirino, G.R. No. L-7068, 22 December 1954.
[109]
 Caasi v. CA, G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508, 8 November 1990.
[110]
 Caasi v. CA, G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508, 8 November 1990.
[111]
 Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012.
[112]
 Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012.
[113]
 Gallego v. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, 24 November 1941.
[114]
 Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado, G.R. Nos. 163619-20, 17 November 2005.
[115]
 Gallego v. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, 24 November 1941.
[116]
 Gallego v. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, 24 November 1941, p. 456.
[117]
 Id.
[118]
 Id. at 668.
[119]
 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010.
[120]
 Designating 1 September 1973 to 28 February 1974 as a Homecoming Season
for Overseas Filipinos. Pursuant to the program, the executive departments were
mobilized to welcome and extend privileges to overseas Filipinos who are coming
home to the Philippines. It called for the preparation of a hospitality program for
overseas Filipinos, as well as the offering of promotional round-trip airline fares
for foreign and domestic flights. A temporary "tax holiday" was also declared for
the Homecoming Season in which all tax clearance requirements involved in the
travel of overseas Filipinos to and from the Philippines shall be suspended and
waived. A program of rewards was initiated for local governments which are able
to invite the most number of overseas Filipinos. The presidential issuance also
constituted a National Hospitality Committee for Overseas Filipinos, which shall
organize and supervise the operations of local hospitality committees, especially in
regard to sharing with overseas Filipinos a traditional Filipino Christmas.
[121]
 The introductory statement of LOI No. 163 dated 7 February 1974 provides:

While projected arrivals by February 28 was 30,000, the

35,000th Balikbayan participant has already actually arrived as of this date.

Numerous requests and petitions for the extension of the Balikbayan program have

been received by the Office of the President and the Department of Tourism from
individual Overseas Filipinos, from associations thereof, and from officials of the
Philippine foreign service. They cite as reasons the non-coincidence of the original
Homecoming season (1 September 1973 to 28 February 1974) with the school
vacation period overseas, and the lack of time of Overseas Filipinos to arrange for
their vacations and leave of absences from their occupations due to the suddenness
of the launching of the Balikbayan program.

A common reason, moreover, is that, with the stories about the new Philippines
related by Balikbayan participants who have returned to their overseas residences,
our countrymen who were unable to participate in Balikbayan are now more eager
than ever to observe for themselves the New Society in action and to share the
pride of the new Filipino in himself and in his reborn nation.
[122]
 Six-month Extension of the Balikbayan Program.
[123]
 Declaring A Balik-Scientist Program, Allowing any Foreign-Based Scientists,
Professional, Technician, or any Person with Special Skill or Expertise who is of
Filipino Origin or Descent to Practice His/Her Profession or Expertise in the
Philippines and Aligning Incentives for Him/Her and for Other Purposes.
[124]
 5th "Whereas" clause of P.D. 819.
[125]
 "Now, therefore" clause of LOI 1044.
[126]
 Extension of the "BALIKBA YAN" Program dated 9 February 1976.
[127]
 LOI 493 entitled Extension of Effectivity of the Balikbayan Program dated 30
December 1976.
[128]
 LOI 652 entitled Extension of the Balikbayan Program dated 6 January 1978.
[129]
 LOI 811 entitled Extension of Period for Operation of the Balikbayan Program
dated 14 February 1979.
[130]
 LOI 985 entitled Extension of the Balikbayan Program dated 21 January 1980.
[131]
 Instituting the Balik Scientist Program under the Department of Science and
Technology.
[132]
 Special non-immigrant visas are issued in accordance with Section 47 of The
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. It states:

Section 47. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized

(a) When the public interest so warrants-

(1) To waive the documentary requirements for any class of nonimmigrants, under
such conditions as he may impose;

(2) To admit, as nonimmigrants, aliens not otherwise provided for by this Act,
who are coming for temporary period only, under such conditions as he may
prescribe;

(3) To waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such conditions as
he may prescribe;

(4) To reduce or to abolish the passport visa fees in the case of any class of
nonimmigrants who are nationals of countries which grant similar concessions to
Philippine citizens of a similar class visiting such countries;

(5) To suspend the entry of aliens into the Philippines from any country in which
cholera or other infectious or contagious disease is prevalent;

(b) For humanitarian reasons, and when not opposed to the public interest, to
admit aliens who are refugees for religious, political, or racial reasons, in such
classes of cases and under such conditions as he may prescribe.
[133]
 An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program.
[134]
 Presidential Decree No. 1183 (Amending and Consolidating the Provisions on
Travel Tax of Republic Act No. 1478 as Amended and Republic Act No. 6141,
Prescribing the Manner of Collection Thereof, Providing Penalties for Violations
Thereof, and for Other Purposes, dated 21 August 1977) and Executive Order No.
283 (Restructuring the Travel Tax Exemptions and Restoring the Reduced Rates
on Certain Individuals, Amending for this Purpose, Presidential Decree No. 1183,
as Amended, dated July 25, 1987) exempted only Filipino overseas contract
workers from the payment of the travel tax.
[135]
 An Act Amending Republic Act Numbered 6768, Entitled, "An Act Instituting
A "Balikbayan Program," by Providing Additional Benefits and Privileges to
Balikbayan and for Other Purposes.
[136]
 Republic Act No. 6768, as emended by Republic Act No. 9174, Section 2(c).
[137]
 OWWA Board Resolution No. 038-03 dated 19 September 2003 entitled
Guidelines on OWWA Membership, Article VIII, Section 2(4)(b).
[138]
 Id. at Section 6(b).
[139]
 <http://www.owwa.gov.ph/?q=content/programs-services>
, (last visited 9 March 2016).
[140]
 Id.
[141]
 Id.
[142]
 <http://nrco.dole.gov.ph/index.php/about-us/who-we-are>, (last visited 9
March 2016).
[143]
 Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995), as amended by Republic Act No. 10022 dated 8 March 2010, Section 17.
[144]
 An OFW is a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in
a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a citizen or on board a
vessel navigating the foreign seas other than a government ship used for military
or non-commercial purposes or on an installation located offshore or on the high
seas [Republic Act No. 8042, Section 3(a)]
[145]
 Republic Act No. 6768, as amended by Republic Act No. 9174, Section 6, par.
2.
[146]
 <http://www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa-inquiry/balikbayan-previlege> The
website of the Bureau of Immigration states:

Those who are admitted as Balikbayans are given an initial stay of one (1) year.
They may extend their stay for another one (1), two (2) or six (6) months provided
that they present their valid passport and filled out the visa extension form and
submit it to the Visa Extension Section in the BI Main Office or any BI Offices
nationwide. An additional requirement will be ask (sic) for (sic) Balikbayans who
have stayed in the Philippines after thirty six (36) months.
[147]
 G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002.
[148]
 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009.
[149]
 G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015.
[150]
 Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
[151]
 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
[152]
 Id.
[153]
 284 Md. 425 (1979).
[154]
 The website of the Bureau of Immigration states:
Those who are admitted as Balikbayans are given an initial stay of one (1) year.
They may extend their stay for another one (1), two (2) or six (6) months provided
that they present their valid passport and filled out the visa extension form and
submit it to the Visa Extension Section in the 81 Main Office or any 81 Offices
nationwide. An additional requirement will be ask (sic) for (sic) Balikbayans who
have stayed in the Philippines after thirty six (36 months).

This is available at http://www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa-inquiry/balikbayan-

privilege, (last visited 8 March 2016).
[155]
 Petition to Deny Due Course, dated 21 Oct. 2015 (Elamparo), Annex E.
[156]
 Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193314, 26 February 2013; Mitra v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010; Gayo v. Verceles, G.R. No. 150477,
28 February 2005.
[157]
 Petitioner submitted as evidence Exhibit "7," which is Brian's official
transcript of records from the Beacon School in Taguig City. It states that Brian
was enrolled in Grade 8 at the Beacon School for the academic year 2005-2006.
Exhibit 7-A, a Certification from Sandra Bernadette Firmalino, Registrar of the De
La Salle High School Department, indicates that in 2006, Brian transferred to La
Salle Greenhills, and that he studied there until he graduated from high school in
2009. Exhibits "7-B" and "7-C" are Hanna's  permanent records at the Assumption
College as an elementary and secondary student, respectively. They show that
Hanna was enrolled in Grade 2 at Assumption College in Makati City for
academic year 2005-2006.

As for Anika, petitioner alleged that Anika was just under a year old when the
former and her family relocated to the Philippines in May 2005 and therefore
Anika was not enrolled in any school in 2005. Petitioner presented Exhibit "7-D,"
which is a Certificate of Attendance dated 8 April 2015 issued by the Directress of
the Learning Connection, Ms. Julie Pascual Penaloza. It states that Anika attended
pre-school at the Learning Connection in San Juan City from January to March
2007. Petitioner likewise offered as evidence Exhibit "7-E," a Certification dated
14 April 2015 issued by the Directress of the Greenmeadows Learning Center, Ms.
Anna Villalima-Reyes, Anika studied at the Greenmeadows Learning Center in
Quezon City for academic year 2007-2008. Exhibit "7-F" is the Elementary Pupil's
Permanent Record showing that Anika spent her kindergarten and grade school
years at the Assumption College. The record covers the years 2007 to 2013. The
same Exhibit "7-F" indicates that Anika was born on 5 June 2004.
[158]
 Marked as Exhibit "8."
[159]
 Marked as Exhibits "11" and "12."
[160]
 TCT No. 290260, issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
[161]
 G.R. No. 187478 (2009).
[162]
 718 A.2d 1111 (1984).
[163]
 Id.
[164]
 COMELEC Comment dated 7 January 2016, p. 56.
[165]
 COMELEC Comment, page 56.
[166]
 G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012.
[167]
 Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193314, 26 February 2013.
[168]
 Oglesby State Election Bd. v. Bayh 521 N.E. 2d 1313 (1988); Farnsworth v.
Jones, 114 N.C. App. 182 (1994); Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic
Executive Committee (168 So. 3d 946 (2015).
[169]
 No. 2015-EC-00965--SCT( 2015).
[170]
 See p. 47, par. 157.
[171]
 Section 236 (J) of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, R.A. No. 8424, 11 December
1997 provides:

(J) Supplying of Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN). Any person required

under the authority of this Code to make, render or file a return, statement or other
document shall be supplied with or assigned a Taxpayer Identification Number
(TIN) which he shall indicate in such return, statement or document filed with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for his proper identification for tax purposes, and
which he shall indicate in certain documents, such as, but not limited to the
following:
[172]
 Id.
[173]
 Affidavit, p. 1.
[174]
 No. 2015-EC-00965-SCT( 2015).
[175]
 G.R. No. 28328, 2 October 1928, 52 PHIL 130-138)
[176]
 Comment-Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari (G.R. No. 221698 700)
dated 8 January 2015, p. 51, par. 174.
[177]
 Petitioner's Memorandum p. 279.
[178]
 372 Md. 360 (2002).
[179]
 314 U.S. 441 (1941).
[180]
 314 u. s. 456.
[181]
 Id.
[182]
 Superior Court of North Carolina. Wake County. Business Court. Steve W
Fowler and Elizabeth P.  Fowler v. North Carolina Department of Revenue. No.
13 CVS 10989. 6 August 2014, citing Hall v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 280
N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972). See also Robin Cates v. Olga Mescherskaya and
Progressive Casualty Insurance Company. Civil Action No. 14-00729. / Signed 1
July 2014. United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana, citing Cox, Cox, Filo,
Camel & Wilson, LLC v. Sasol North Am., Inc., No. 11-856,2012 WL 262613, at
*5 (W.D.La. Jan. 30, 2012).
[183]
 Memorandum for respondent Amado D. Valdez, p. 25.
[184]
 372 Md. 360 (2002).
[185]
 Transcript of Stenographic Notes taken during the Oral Arguments on 16
February 2016, pp. 85-86.
[186]
 No. 2015-EC-00965-SCT( 2015).
[187]
 114 N.C. App. 182 (1994).
[188]
 968 So. 2d 745 (2007).
[189]
 Pa. Superior Ct. 237 (1984) 473 A.2d 1069.
[190]
 Receipt Nos. 827172 and 8220421, dated 23 February 2006.
[191]
 372 Md. 360 (2002).
[192]
 Republic Act No. 8189, 11 June 1996.
[193]
 G.R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010.
[194]
 473 A.2d 1069 (1984).
[195]
 § 53.2 Exceptions.

(a) U.S. citizens, as defined in § 41.0 of this chapter, are not required to bear U.S.
passports when traveling directly between parts ofthe United States as defined in §
51.1 of this chapter.

(b) A U.S. citizen is not required to bear a valid U.S. passport to enter or depart
the United States:

(1) When traveling as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States on
active duty and when he or she is in the uniform of, or bears documents
identifying him or her as a member of, such Armed Forces, when under official
orders or permit of such Armed Forces, and when carrying a military identification
card; or

(2) When traveling entirely within the Western Hemisphere on a cruise ship, and
when the U.S. citizen boards the cruise ship at a port or place within the United
States and returns on the return voyage of the same cruise ship to the same United
States port or place from where he or she originally departed. That U.S. citizen
may present a government-issued photo identification document in combination
with either an original or a copy of his or her birth certificate, a Consular Report:
of Birth Abroad issued by the Department, or a Certificate of Naturalization issued
by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services before entering the United States; if
the U.S. citizen is under the age of 16, he or she may present either an original or a
copy of his or her birth certificate, a Consular Report: of Birth Abroad issued by
the Department, or a Certificate of Naturalization issued by U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services; or

(3) When traveling as a U.S. citizen seaman, carrying an unexpired Merchant

Marine Document (MMD) in conjunction with maritime business. The MMD is
not sufficient to establish citizenship for purposes of issuance of a United States
passport under part 51 of this chapter; or

(4) Trusted traveler programs-(i) NEXUS Program. When traveling as a

participant in the NEXUS program, he or she may present a valid NEXUS
program card when using a NEXUS Air kiosk or when entering the United States
from contiguous territory or adjacent islands at a land or sea port-of-entry. A U.S.
citizen who enters the United States by pleasure vessel from Canada under the
remote inspection system may also present a NEXUS program card;

(ii) FAST program. A U.S. citizen who is traveling as a participant in the FAST

program may present a valid FAST card when entering the United States from
contiguous territory or adjacent islands at a land or sea port-of-entry;

(iii) SENTRI program. A U.S. citizen who is traveling as a participant in the

SENTRI program may present a valid SENTRI card when entering the United
States from contiguous territory or adjacent islands at a land or sea port-of-entry;
The NEXUS, FAST, and SENTRI cards are not sufficient to establish citizenship
for purposes of issuance of a U.S. passport under part 51 of this chapter; or

(5) When arriving at land ports of entry and sea ports of entry from contiguous
territory or adjacent islands, Native American holders of American Indian Cards
(Form I-872) issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may
present those cards; or

(6) When arriving at land or sea ports of entry from contiguous territory or
adjacent islands, U.S. citizen holders of a tribal document issued by a United
States qualifying tribal entity or group of United States qualifying tribal entities as
provided in 8 CFR 235.1(e) may present that document. Tribal documents are not
sufficient to establish citizenship for purposes of issuance of a United States
passport under part 51 of this chapter; or

(7) When bearing documents or combinations of documents the Secretary of

Homeland Security has determined under Section 7209(b) of Public Law 108-458
(8 U.S.C. 115 note) are sufficient to denote identity and citizenship. Such
documents are not sufficient to establish citizenship for purposes of issuance of a
U.S. passport underpart 51 ofthis chapter; or
(8) When the U.S. citizen is employed directly or indirectly on the construction,
operation, or maintenance of work undertaken in accordance with the treaty
concloded on February 3, 1944, between the United States and Mexico regarding
the functions of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), TS
994, 9 Bevans 1166, 59 Stat. 1219, or other related agreements, provided that the
U.S. citizen bears an official identification card issued by the IBWC and is
traveling in connection with such employment; or

(9) When the Department of State waives, pursuant to EO 13323 of December 30,
2003, Section 2, the requirement with respect to the U.S. citizen because there is
an unforeseen emergency; or

(10) When the Department of State waives, pursuant to EO 13323 of December

30, 2003, Sec. 2, the requirement with respect to the U.S. citizen for humanitarian
or national interest reasons; or

(11) When the U.S. citizen is a child under the age of 19 arriving from contiguous
territory in the following circumstances:

(i) Children under age 16. A United States citizen who is under the qge of 16 is
permitted to present either an original or a copy of his or her birth certificate, a
Consular Report of Birth Abroad, or a Certificate of Naturalization issued by U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services when entering the United States from
contiguous territory at land or sea ports-of-entry; or

(ii) Groups of children under age 19. A U.S. citizen who is under age 19 and who
is traveling with a public or private school group, religious group, social or
cultural organization, or team associated with a youth sport organization may
present either an original or a copy of his or her birth certificate, a Consular Report
of Birth Abroad, or a Certificate of Naturalization issued by U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services when arriving in the United States from contiguous territory
at all land or sea ports of entry, when the group, organization or team is under the
supervision of an adult affiliated with the organization and when the child has
parental or legal guardian consent to travel. For purposes of this paragraph, an
adult is considered to be a person who is age 19 or older. The following
requirements will apply:

(A) The group, organization, or team must provide to CBP upon crossing the
border on organizational letterhead:

(1)The name ofthe group, organization or team, and the name ofithe supervising
adult;
(2) A list of the children on the trip; and
(3) For each child, the primary address, primary phone number, date of birth, place
of birth, and the name of at least one parent or legal guardian.

(B) The adult leading the group, organization, or team must demonstrate parental
or legal guardian consent by certifying in the writing submitred in paragraph (b)
(ll)(ii)(A) of this section that he or she has obtained for each child the consent of at
least one parent or legal guardian.

(C) The procedure described in this paragraph is limited to members of the group,
organization, or team who are urider age 19. Other members of the group,
organization, or team must comply with other applicable document and/or
inspection requirements found in 8 CFR parts 211, 212, or 235.
[196]
 G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013.
[197]

[198]
 Republic v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992.
[199]
 Section 17.
[200]
 Child and Youth Welfare Code (1974), Article 38.
[201]
 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, Sec. 15.
[202]
 A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Sec. 18.
[203]
 It must be noted that in the US, adoption statutes prohibit adoption files from
being inspected by birth parents, the general public, and even the adult adoptees
themselves, with most states providing that sealed adopted records could be
opened only by court order.203 In the case of In Re: Roger B 418 N.E.2d 751
(III.1981), the Court eventually held that the adoptee has no fundamental right to
view his adoption records since the status of an adoptee does not result at birth. It
is derived from legal proceedings the purpose of which is to protect the best
interests of the child.
[204]
 Republic Act No. 8552 entitled "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998," Section 14.
[205]
 CIVIL CODE, Art. 410.
[206]
 Baldos v. Court of Appeals and Pillazar, 638 Phil. 601 (2010).
[207]
 Marked as Exhibit "2."
[208]
 Reyes v. Sotero, 517 Phil. 708 (2006).
[209]
 Id.
[210]
 The original certificate of birth shall be stamped "cancelled," annotated with
the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place, and shall be sealed in the
civil registry records. With due regard to the confidential nature of the proceedings
and records of adoption, the civil registrar where the foundling was registered is
charged with the duty to seal the foundling certificate in the civil registry records,
which can be opened only upon order ofthe eourt which issued the decree of
adoption (Section 16(B)(3)(c), A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, 31 July 2002).
[211]
 Section 2, Statement of Policy.
[212]
 Section 3(d).
[213]
 Section 3(e).
[214]
 Section 13(e)
[215]
 In 1950, an application for a Philippine passport was filed for a boy, who had
been found by Sps. Hale in an air raid shelter. The boy was only three years old
when he was found. His parents, sister and grandmother were among the dead.
The DFA asked for a DOJ opinion with the regard to the status of foundlings. In
1951, the Secretary of Justice released DOJ Opinion No. 189, series of 1951 which
stated that, following international conventions, a foundling is presumed to have
assumed the citizenship of the place where he or she is found. Since then, the OFA
has been issuing passports to foundlings.
[216] 
<http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/consular-services/passport-information>
(last accessed 8 March 2016).
[217]
 Section 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance off duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. (38)
[218]
 Lejano v. People, 652 Phil. 512 (2010).
[219]
 In Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. Nos. 167569, 167570, 171946, 4 Septembr 2009,
614 PHIL 451-484, the Court explained that res judicata applies only when the
following concur: (a) a person's citizenship is raised as a material issue in a
controversy where that person is a party; (b) the Solicitor General or an authorized
representative took active part in the resolution of the issue; and (c) the finding of
citizenship is affirmed by this Court. These conditions do not obtain in this case.
[220]
 Petition for Certiorari (G.R. No. 221697) dated 28 December 2015, Annex I-
series, Exhibit 20.
[221]
 In In Re: Roger B, the Supreme Court of Illinois explained the potent policy
interests which are promoted by the sealing of adoption records. Included in those
interests are the facilitation of the adoption process by maintaining the anonymity
and the right to privacy of the natural parents, and the integrity of the new
adoptive family:
Confidentiality is needed to protect the right to privacy of the natural parent. The
natural parents, having determined it is in the best interest of themselves and
the child, have placed the child for adoption. This process is not done merely with
the expectation of anonymity, but also with the statutory assurance that his or her
identity will be shielded from public disclosure. Quite conceivably, the natural
parents have established a new family unit with the expectation of confidentiality
concerning the adoption that occurred several years earlier.

xxxx

Confidentiality also must be promoted to protect the right of the adopting parents.
The adopting parents have taken into their home a child whom they will regard as
their own and whom they will love, support, and raise as an integral part of the
family unit. They should be given the opportunity to create a stable family
relationship free from unnecessary intrusion. The Section creates a situation in
which the emotional attachments are directed toward the relationship with the new
parents. The adoptive parents need and deserve the child's loyalty as they grow
older, and particularly in their later years.

xxxx

The State's concern of promoting confidentiality to prot ct the integrity of the

adoption process is well expressed by the following excerpt from
Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptees Quest and the
Law:
"The primary interest of the public is to preserve the integrity of the adoptive
process. That is, the continued existence of adoption as a humane solution to the
serious social problem of children who are or may become unwanted, abused or
neglected. In order to maintain it, the public has an interest in assuring that
changes in ilaw, policy or practice will not be made which negatively affect the
supply of capable adoptive parents or the willingness of biological parents to make
decisions which are best for them and their children. We should not increase the
risk of neglect to any child, nor should we force parents to resort to the black
market in order to surrender children ithey can't care for.

xxxx

No one has yet shown that decades of policy protecting the anonymity of the
biological parents and the security from intrusion of the parent-child relationship
after adoption have been misguided. Quite the contrary. The overwhelming
success of adoption aan institution which has provided millions of children with
families, and vice-versa, cannot be easily attacked.

The public has a strong interest, too, in preserving the confidential non-public
nature of the process. Public attitudes toward illegitimacy and parents who neglect
or abuse children have not changed sufficiently to warrant careless disclosure of
the circumstances leading to adoption.

But the public also has an interest in the mental health of children who have been
adopted-in order that they not become burdens to society. Some provision for the
relatively small group of adoptees whose psychological needs are compelling
would appear: necessary."
xxxx

The State certainly must protect the interest of the adoptee, as well as the rights of
the natural and adopting parents. When the adoptee is a minor, there is no dispute
that the sealed-record provisions serve this end. The child, in his new family
environment, is insulated from intrusion from the natural parents. The child is
protected from any stigma resulting from illegitimacy, neglect, or abuse. The
preclusion of outside interference allows the adopted child to develop a
relationship of love and cohesiveness with the new family unit. Prior to adulthood,
the adoptee's interest is con istent with that of the adopting and natural parents.

Upon reaching majority, the adoptee often develops a countervailing interest that
is in direct conflict with the other parties, particularly the natural parents. The
adoptee wishes to determine his natural identity, while the privacy interest of the,
natural parents remain, perhaps stronger than ever. The Section recognizes that the
right of privacy is not absolute. It allows the court to evaluate the needs of the
adoptee as well as the nature of the relationships and choices made by all parties
concerned. The statute, by providing for release of adoption records only upon
issuance of a court order, does no more than allow the court to balance the
interests of all the parties and make a det rmination based on the facts and
circumstances of each individual case.221 (Citations omitted)
[222]
 Exhibit 30, Annex I-series in G.R. No. 229697; Exhibit 30 (Tatad), Exhibit 20-
22 (Contreras/Valdez), Annex M-series of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos.
229688-700.
[223]
 Exhibit 30-A, Annex I-series in G.R. No. 229697; Exhibit 30-A (Tatad),
Exhibit 23 (Contreras/Valdez), Annex M-series of Petition for Certiorari in G.R.
Nos. 229688-700.
[224] 
Exhibit 31, Annex I-series in G.R. No. 229697; Exhibit 31 (Tatad), Exhibit 34
(Contreras/Valdez), Annex M-series of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos.
229688-700.
[225]
 Section 3(h), Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoptin Act
of 1998, IRR-R.A. 8552 (1998); Also see Rule 26, Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Act No. 3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration, NSO
Administrative Order No. 1-93 (1992); Section 3(e), Rule on Adoption, A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC (2002).
[226]
 Articles 255 and 258 of the Civil Code state:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.

Article 258. A child born within one hundred eighty qays following the
celebration of the marriage is prima facie presumed to be legitimate. Such
a child is conclusively presumed to be legitimate in any of these cases:

(1) If the husband, before the marriage, knew of the pregnancy of the wife;
(2) If he consented, being present, to the putting of his surname on the record of
birth of the child;
(3) If he expressly or tacitly recognized the child as his own.
A similar provision is found in the Family Code:
Article 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another
marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage,
these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to te contrary:

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been corceived during the former
marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of
the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following te celebration of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been con eived during such marriage,
even though it be born within the three hu dred days after the termination of the
former marriage.
[227]
 Rule 131, Section 3 ofthe Rules of Court, states:

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory

if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other eividence.

xxxx

(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage
within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage these
rides shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:     

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemntzation of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former
marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of
the former marriage;

(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
subseq
546+45
56uent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
[228]
 Alejandro E. Sebastian, The Philippine Law on Legitimacy, 11 PHIL. L.J. 35
(1931), p. 42.
[229]
 G.R. No. 200169, 28 January 2015.
[230]
 CIVIL CODE, Art. 172.
[231]
 Section 5, Act No. 3753 states:
SECTION 5. Registration and Certification of Births. - The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
the documentary stamp tax land shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the
birth or by either parent of the newly born child.

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to fhe following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mothr
alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f) and such
other data may be required in the regulation to be issued.

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed nd sworn to

jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name
othe father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.
[232]
 Supra note 229.
[233]
 In Lucas v. Lucas (G.R. No. 190710, 665 Phil. 795-815 [2011]), the Court
explained:
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing
order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider
whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would
only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
This pronouncement was reiterated in Tecson v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 161434,
161634, 161824, 468 Phil. 421-75 [2004]), in which the Court stated: In case
proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residuof the long dead parent
could be resorted to."
[234]
 Section 765 of Act 190 states:

SECTION 765. How a Child May be Adopted. — An inhabitant of the

Philippine Islands, not married, or a husband and wife jointly, may petition the
Court of First Instance of the province in which they reside for leave to adopt a
minor child but a written consent must be given for such adoption by the child, if
of the age of fourteen years, and by each of his or her living parents who is not
hopelessly insane or intemperate, or has not abandoned such child, or if there
are no such parents, or if the parents are unknown, or have abandoned
such child, or if they are hopelessly insane or intemperate, then by the legal
guardian, or if there is no such guardian, then by a discreet and suitable person
appointed by the court to act in the proceedings as the next friend of such child;
but when such child is an inmate of an orphan asylum or children's home,
organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, and has been previously
abandoned by its parents or guardians, or voluntarily surrendered by its parents
or guardians to the trustees or directors of an asylum or children's home, then the
written consent of the president of the board of trustees or directors of such asylum
must be given: Provided, nevertheless, That nothing herein contained shall
authorize a guardian to adopt his ward before the termination of the guardianship
and the final settlement and approval of his accounts as guardian by the court.
(Emphases supplied)
[235]
 Sections 3 and 7, Rule 100 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) of the 1940
Rules of Court, state: 
SECTION 3. Consent to Adoption. - There shall be filed with the petition
a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if over fourteen years of
age and not incompetent, and by each of its known living parents who is not
insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there
are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child,
or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not
been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.
SECTION 7. Proceedings as to Vagrant or Abused Child. When the parents of
any minor child are dead, or by reason of long absence or legal for physical
disability have abandoned it, or cannot support it through vagrancy, negligence,
or misconduct, or neglect or refuse to support it, or unlawfully beat or otherwise
habitually maltreat it, or cause or allow it to engage in common begging, or to
commit o fenses against the law, the proper Court of First Instance, upon petition
filed by some reputable resident of the province setting forth the facts, may
issue an order requiring such parents to show cause, or, if the parents are
dead or cannot be found, requiring the fiscal of the province to show cause, at
a time and place fixed in the order, why the child should not be taken from its
parents, if living; and if upon hearing it appear that the allegations of the petition
are true, and that it is for the best interest of the child, the court may make an
order taking it from its parents, if living, and committing it to any suitable
orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, to be
ultimately placed, by adoption or otherwise, in a home found for it by such
asylum, children's home, society, or person.
[236]
 Sections 3 and 7, Rule 99 ofthe 1964 Rules of Court, provide:

SECTION 3. Consent to Adoption. - There shall be filed witli the petition a

written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over
and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of it known
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned
such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian
ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum,
children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers
of such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if
the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the
adoption shall not be required.

If the person to be adopted is of age, only his or her consent and that of the spouse,
if any, shall be required.

SECTION 7. Proceedings as to Vagrant or Abused Child. - When the parents of

any minor child are dead, or by reason of long absence or legal or physical
disability have abandoned it, or cannot support it through vagrancy, negligence,
or misconduct, or neglect or refuse to support it, or treat it with excessive harshnes
or give it corrupting orders, counsels, or examples, or cause or allow it to engage
in egging, or to commit offenses against the law, the proper Court of First
Instance, upon petition filed by some reputable resident of the province setting
forth the facts, may issue an order requiring such parents to show cause, or, if the
parents are dead or cannot be found, requiring the fiscal of the province to
show cause, at a time and place fixed in the order, why the child should not be
taken from its parents, if living; and if upon the hearing it appears that the
allegations of the petition are true, and that it is for the est interest of the child, the
court may make an order taking it from its parents, if living; and committing it to
any suitable orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person to be
ultimately placed, by adoption or otherwise, in a home found for it by such sylum,
children's home, society or person.
[237]
 Sections 1 and 5 of Act No. 1670 provide:
SECTION 1. The board of trustees or directors of any asylum or institution in
which poor children are cared for and maintained at public expense are hereby
authorized, with the consent of the Director of Health, to place any orpran or
other child so maintained therein whose parents are unknown, or being known
are unable or unwilling to support such child, in charge of any suitable
person who may desire to take such child and shall furnish satisfactory evidence
of his ability suitably to maintain, care for, and educate such child.

SECTION 5. Upon the application of any person to the trustees or directors of

any asylum or institution where poor children are maintained at public expense to
adopt any child so maintained therein, it shall be the duty of such trustes or
directors, with the approval of the Director of Health, to report the fact to the
provincial fiscal, or in the city of Manila to the city attorney, and such official
shall hereupon prepare the necessary adoption papers and present the matter to
the proper court. The costs of such proceedings in court shall be de oficio.
[238]
 Administrative Code, Act No. 2657, 31 December 1916.
[239]
 Sections 545 and 548 of Act No. 2711 provide:
SECTION 545. Transfer of child from institution for poor children. - The
competent authorities of any asylum or institution in which poor children are
cared for and maintained at public expense are authorized, subject to regul tions
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, to place any orphan or other child so
maintained therein whose parents are unknown, or being known are unable or
unwilling to support such child, in charge of any suitable person who may desire
to take such child and shall furnish satisfactory evidence of his ability suitably to
maintain, care for, and educate such child.
The intrusting of a child to any person as herein provided shall not constitute a
legal adoption and shall not affect the civil status of such child or pr judice the
right of any person entitled to its legal custody or guardianship.
SECTION 548. Adoption of child from institution for poor children. - Upon the
application of any person to the competent authorities of anasylum or
institution where the poor children are maintained at public expense
tadopt any child so maintained therein, it shall be the duty of such authorities,
with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to report the fact to the
provincial fiscal, in the City of Manila to the fiscal of the city, and such official
shall thereupon prepare the necessary adoption papers and present the matter to the
proper court. The costs of such proceeding in court shall be de oficio.
[240]
 The law provides:
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. - Only a legally free child may be the subject
of inter-country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for
placement, the following documents must be submitted to the Board:

a) Child study;
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonm nt/death certificate of
parents;
d) Medical evaluation/history;
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
f) Recent photo of the child
[241]
 An Act Requiring the Certification of the Department of Social Welfae and
Development (DSWD) to Declare a "Child Legally Available for Adoption" as a
Prerequisite for Adoption Proceedings (2009).
[242]
 Pursuant to Section 2(3) of R.A. 9523, an "Abandoned Child" refer to
a child who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or whose parent(s) have
deserted him/her for a period of at least three (3) continuous months, and the term
includes a founding.
[243]
 Sections 4 and 5 ofR.A. 9523 state:
Section 4. Procedure for the Filing of the Petition. - The petition shall be filed in
the regional office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandred.

The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if
sufficient in form and substance and shall authorize the postipg of the notice of the
petition conspicuous place for five (5) consecutive days in the locality where
the child was found.

The Regional Director shall act on the same and shall render a rdcommendation
not later than five (5) working days after the completion of its posting. He/she
shall transmit a copy of his/her recommendation and records to the Office of the
Secretary within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of the recommendation.

Section 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. - Upon finding merit in the

petition, the Secretary shall issue a certification declaring the child legallavailable
for adoption within seven (7) working days from receipt of the recommendation.

Said certification, by itself shall be the sole basis for the immedi te issuance by the
local civil registrar of a foundling certificate. Within seven (7) working days, the
local civil registrar shall transmit the founding certificate to the National Statistic
Office (NSO).
[244]
 Guidelines on the Issuance of DSWD Certification Declaring a Child Legally
Available for Adoption, DSWD Administrative Order No. 012-11 (2011).
[245]
 G.R. No. L-16922, 30 April 1963.
[246]
 134 Phil. 901-912 (1968).
[247]
 G.R. No. L-30576, 10 February 1976.
[248]
 274 Phil. 1157-1249 (1991).
[249]
 G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634, 161824, 468 Phil. 421-75 (2004).
[251]
 People v. Veneracion, 319 Phil. 364 (1995).
[252]
 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 22; emphasis supplied.
[253]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Sec. 1.
[254]
 93 Phil. 257 (1953).
[255]
 Id. The passage cited In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, which also
cited Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River
Bridge Co., 8 N.Y. 622.
[256]
 Id. The passage cited l Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.
[257]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 112

Section 1. Preliminary Investigation Defined;When Required. - Prelim nary

investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to enge der a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
[258]
 Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7
of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint of information.
[259]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133

Section 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-

judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify conclusion.
[260]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party

having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence
on the issues involved, lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testlfying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same
may legitimate appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
[261]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130

Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. - (a) In

Criminal Cases:

(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged.

(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of
the offense charged.
[262]
 Mercado, Jr. v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 223 Phil. 483-493
(1985).
[263]
 People vs. Condemena, L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910, 919.
[264]
 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumapis, G.R. No. 163110, 13
August 2008, 562 SCRA 103, 113-114.
[265]
 Memorandum for public respondent COMELEC, p. 21
[266]
 Petition for Certiorari (G.R. 221697), p. 107.
[267]
 Oral Arguments, TSN, 16 August 2016.
[268]
 Tecson v. COMELEC, 468 Phil. 421 (2004).
[269]
 1987 Constitution, Article XV, Section 3(2).
[270]
 See p. 55
[271]
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 17-19 (3rd ed.
2006).
[272]
 William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U.L . Rev. 983-1006
(2009). :
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub, Last Accessed: 8 March 2016.
[273]
 Joaquin Bernas, SJ, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines;
A Commentary, p. 997 (2009).
[274]
 In this approach, the justice analyzes the intention of the frames of the
Constitution and the circumstances of its ratification.
[275]
 The justice draws inferences from the "three-cornered power relation hips"
found in the Constitution.

He gives as example "separation of powers." In other words, a justic relies, not on

the text of the Constitution, but on structure.
[276]
 This relies on established precedents. For Bernas, the Supreme Court
Decisions are, to a certain extent, a "second set of constitutional texts."
[277]
 This form of interpretation "seeks to interpret the Filipino moral commitments
that are embedded in the constitutional document. The Constitution, are all, as the
Preamble says, is meant to be an embodiment of 'our ideals and aspirations.'
Among these may be our innate religiosity, respect for human dignity, and the
celebration of cultural and ethnic diversity."
[278]
 The justice weighs and compares the costs to benefits that might be found in
conflicting rules.
[279]
 Madisonian Tectonics: How Form Follows Function in Constitutional and
Architectural Interpretation, Jonathan Turley, The George Washington Law
Review, Vol. 83: 308.
[280]
 Eskridge, William N. Jr., "Relationships between Formalism and
Functionalism in Separation of Powers  Cases" (1998).  Faculty  Scholarship 
Series Available  online  at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3807.
Last Accessed on: 8 March 2016.
[281]
 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
[282]
 252 u.s. 416 (1920).
[283]
 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 29, pp. 401-415.
[284]
 Petition, p. 12.
[285]
 Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, VoL I, 4th Ed., pp. 23-24
(1952).
[286]
 Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th Ed. p. 13.
(1952).
[287]
 A majority of the delegates elected - 142 out of 202 were lawyers. Of these
lawyers, 10 were law professors. Likewise there were 6 other educators who were
elected as delegates, 2 of them political scientists. There were also a respectable
number of farmers and businessmen. Fifty-five of them can be classified under this
category. Almost a majority of the total number of delegates had previously served
as public officials mostly in an elective capacity. Thus there were many former
senators, and representatives and assemblymen in the ranks of the delegates (Id. at
6).
[288]
 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
[289]
 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940).
[290]
 Id.
[291]
 Id.
[292]
 Memorandum for public respondent COMELEC, p. 56.
[293]
 392 Phil. 327 (2000).
[294]
 COMELEC Comment, p. 28.
[295]
 The following excerpts show that the Court characterized jus sanguinis the
predominating regime of citizenship:
a) Roa v. Insular Collector of Customs (1912)

"A reading of article 17 of the Civil Code, above copied, is sufficient to show that
the first paragraph affirms and recognizes the principle of nationality by place of
birth, jus soli. The second, that of jus sanguinis; and the last two that of free
selection, with the first predominating."

b) Torres v. Tan Chim (1940)

"In abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case and making jus sanguinis
the predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, the
Constitution did not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the Philippines
by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption. If on the strength of the Roa
decision a person was considered a full-pledged Philippine citizen (Art. IV, sec. 1,
No. 1) on the date of the adoption of the Constitution when jus soli had been the pr
vailing doctrine, he cannot be divested of his Filipino citizenship."

c) Villahermosa v. Commissioner of Immigration (1948)

"After the Constitution, mere birth in the Philippines of a Chinese' father and
Filipino mother does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship, and jus sanguinis
instead of jus soli is the predominating factoron questions of citizenship, thereby
rendering obsolete the decision in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., and U.S.
vs. Lim Bin, 36 Phil., and similar cases on which petitioner's counsel relies."

d) Talaroc v. Uy (1952)

"In abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case and making jus sanguinis
the predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, the
Constitution did not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the Philippines
by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption. If on the strength of the Roa
decision a person was considered a full-pledged Philippine citizen (Art. IV, sec. 1,
No. 1) on the date of the adoption of the Constitution when jus soli had been the
prevailing doctrine, he cannot be divested of his Filipino citizenship."
[296]
 Translated by Licenciados Cliffor S. Walton and Nestor Ponce de Leon.
Published under authority of Major-General Willam Ludlow Military Governor of
Havana. Edited by Major Clifford S. Walton. Available online
at https://archive.org/stream/spanishcivilcode00spairich/spanishcivilcode00spairic
h

_djvu.txt. (last visited at 9 March 2016).

[297]
 Supra note 1.
[298]
 Justice Vitug wrote: "The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so
cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States.
An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty,
while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no
effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact."
[299]
 Tecson v. Comelec citing Leon T. Garcia, The Problems of Citizenship in the
Philippines, Rex Bookstore, 1949, at pp. 31-32, supra note 1.
[300]
 Id at. 23-26, cited in Tecson v. Comelec, supra note 1.
[301]
 Teeson v. Comelec, supra note 1.
[302]
 Tecson v. Comelec, supra note ___.
[303]
 Article III, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution states:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.

xxxx

Article IV, Section 1 ofthe 1987 Constitution, states:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time the adoption of this
Constitution;

xxxx
[304]
 1987 Constitution, Preamble.
[305]
 Id.
[306]
 Id.
[307]
 23 Phil. 315 (1912).
[308]
 69 Phil. 518 (1940).
[309]
 70 Phil. 287 (1940).
[310]
 Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. II, 4th Ed. (1952),
p. 649.
[311]
 Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 (1952).

Facts: This is an action to contest the election of Uy to the office of Municipal

Mayor on the ground that he is Chinese, therefore, ineligible. He was born in the
Philippines in 1912 of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father. His parents did not
get married until 1914. His father died in 1917, while his mother died in 1949. Uy
had voted in previous elections and held various positions in the government. He
never went to China.    

Held: On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Uy can be considered a Filipino citizen
on the date of the adoption of the Constitution when jus soli has been the
prevailing doctrine. The status of those persons who were considered Filipino
citizens under the prevailing doctrine of jus soli would not be affected by the
change of doctrine upon the effectivity of the Philippine Constitution.
[312]
 Id.
[313]
 92 Phil. 61 (1952).
[314]
 70 Phil. 161-166 (1940).
[315]
 223 Phil. 357-363 (1985).
[316]
 U.S. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. I.
[317]
 Jack Maskell, "Qualifications for President and the 'Natural Born' Citizenship
Eligibility Requirement", Congressional Research Service, 14 November 2011
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42097.pdf> (last visited 8 March 2016).
[318]
 Lawrence B. Solum, Commentary, "Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen
Clause," 107 Mich. L. Rev First Impressions 22, 22 (2010).
[319]
 Id.
[320]
 Id.
[321]
 Id. at 26.
[322]
 See id; F.E. Edwards, Natural Born British Subjects at Common Law, 14
Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation 314, 315 (1914)
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/752349> (last visited 8 March 2016).
[323]
 A Dictionary Of The English Language: In Which The Words are Deduced
from Their Originals, And Illustrated in Their Different Significations By
Examples from the Best Writers, To Which Are Prefixed, A History of the
Language, And An English Grammar (2nd ed. 1756).
[324]
 The Founders' Constitution, Volume 2, Article I, Section 8, Clause 4
(Citizenship), Document I, The University of Chicago Press http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_4_citizenships1.html (last visited 8
March 2016).
[325]
 Sections 4 and 7, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution state:
Section 4. No person shall be a Senator unless he be a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and, at the time of his election, is at least thirty-five years of age, a
qualified elector, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately prior to his election.

Section 7. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he

be a natural born citizen of the Philippines, and, at the time of his election, is at
least twenty five years of age, a qualified elector, and a resident of the province in
which he is chosen for not less than one year immediately prior to his election.
Section 3, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, states:
Section 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-President,
unless he be a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years
of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding the election.
[326]
 Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. II, 4th Ed. (1952),
pp. 974-975.
[327]
 Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. II, 4th Ed. (1952),
p. 975.
[328]
 Id. at 404-405.
[329]
 Sections 4 and 2, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, state:
Section 4. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election. (as amended in the January 27, 1984
Plebiscite)

Section 2. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications
and term of office as the President and may be removed from office in the same
manner as the President as provided in Article XIII, Section 2 of this Constitution.
[330]
 Sections 2 and 3, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, read:

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen

of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election.

Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications
and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He
may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.
[331]
 Section 4, Article III.
[332]
 This section states:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

xxxx
[333]
 409 Phil. 633 (2001).
[334]
 Chief Justice (then Associate Justice) Panganiban's Concurring Opinion
in Bengson III, id.
[335]
 23 Phil. 315, 338 (1912).
[336]
 Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. V, p.
1032.
[337]
 79 Phil. 249, 256 (1947).
[338]
 Id.
[339]
 Tañada and Fernando, supra.
[340]
 See: Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil. 308-374
(2001).
[341]
 The provision states:

SECTION 5. Registration and Certification of Births.— xxxx

In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the same shall report to the
local civil registrar the place, date and hour of finding and other attendant
circumstances.
[342]
 Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939).
[343]
 Section 5 of C.A. 473 states:
SECTION 5. Declaration of Intention. One year prior to the filing of his petition
for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship
shall file with the Bureau of Justice a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth the
name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence
and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in
which he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at
the time of making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry
for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date,
place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that
he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part ofthe
school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine
citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of himself.
[344]
 Section 7 of C.A. 473 states:
SECTION 7. Petition for Citizenship. - Any person desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied
by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his
present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his
birth; whether single or married and if the father of children, the name, age,
birthplace and residence of the wife and of the children; the approximate date of
his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he
remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the
qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not
disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has
complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the
time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the
applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two
credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally
know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and
that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of
this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and post-office addresses of
such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case.
The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the
petition.
[345]
 Section 10 of C.A. 473 provides:
SECTION 10. Hearing of the Petition. No petition shall be heard within the thirty
days preceding any election. The hearing shall be public, and the Solicitor-
General, either himself or through his delegate or the provincial fiscal concerned,
shall appear on behalf of the Commonwealth of the Philippines at all the
proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing, the court believes, in view of
the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and
none of the disqualifications specified in, this Act and has complied with all
requisites herein established, it shall order the proper naturalization certificate to
be issued and the registration of the said naturalization certificate in the proper
civil registry as required in section ten of Act Numbered Three thousand seven
hundred and fifty-three.
[346]
 Pursuant to Section 12 of C.A. 473, the petitioner shall, in open court, take the
following oath before the naturalization certificate is issued:
"I, _________________, solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state of sovereignty, and
particularly to the _________ of which at this time I am a subject or citizen; that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the
laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the United States of America in the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.

"So help me God."

[347]
 Rule 28 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No. 3753 and
Other Laws on Civil Registration (NSO Administrative Order No. 1-93 [1992])
provides:
Immediately after finding a foundling, the finder shall report the case to the
barangay captain of the place where the foundling was found, or to the police
headquarters, whichever is nearer or convenient to the finder. When the report is
duly noted either by the barangay captain or by the police authority, the finder
shall commit the child to the care of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or to a duly licensed orphanage or charitable or similar
institution. Upon commitment, the finder shall give to the charitable
institution his copy of the Certificate of Foundling, if he had registered the
foundling. (emphasis supplied)
[348]
 Pursuant to R.A. 9523 (2009), the DSWD may declare a child legally available
for adoption in accordance with the following procedure:
SECTION 4. Procedure for the Filing of the Petition. - The petition shall be filed
in the regional office ofthe DSWD where the child was found or abandoned.

The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if
sufficient in form and substance and shall authorize the posting of the notice of the
petition in conspicuous places for five (5) consecutive days in the locality where
the child was found.

The Regional Director shall act on the same and shall render a recommendation
not later than five (5) working days after the completion of its posting. He/she
shall transmit a copy of his/her recommendation and records to the Office ofthe
Secretary within fortyeight (48) hours from the date of the recommendation.

SECTION 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. - Upon finding merit in the

petition, the Secretary shall issue a certification declaring the child legally
available for adoption within seven (7) working days from receipt of the
recommendation.

Said certification, by itself, shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by
the local civil registrar of a foundling certificate. Within seven (7) working days,
the local civil registrar shall transmit the foundling certificate to the National
Statistics Office (NSO).
[349]
 Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, IRR-
R.A. 8552, Section 5 (1998).
[350]
 Section 16, R.A. 8552.
[351]
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992.
[352]
 Section 14, R.A. 8552.
[353]
 Id.
[354]
 See Baldos v. Court of Appeals and Pillazar, 638 Phil. 601 (2010); Heirs of
Cabais v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 681-691 (1999).
[355]
 Sections 14 and 15 of R.A. 8552 state:
Section 14. Civil Registry Record. - An amended certificate of birth shall be
issued by the Civil Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact
that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her
surname. The original certificate of birth shall be stamped "cancelled" with the
annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place and shall be
sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the
adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.

Section 15. Confidential Natltre of Proceedings and Records. - All hearings in

adoption cases shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All
records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court,
the Department, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption
proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is
necessary for purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be
for the best interest of the adoptee, the court may merit the necessary information
to be released, restricting the purposes for which it may be used.
[356]
 601 F.2d 1225, 1235 (2d Cir. 1979).
[357]
 444 U.S. 995, 100 S. Ct. 531,62 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1979).
[358]
 409 Phil. 633-672 (2001).
[359]
 Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Served in US Armed
Forces (1960).
[360]
 See Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, 692 Phil. 407-431
(2012).
[361]
 See Parrefio v. COA, G.R. No. 162224, 551 Phil. 368-381 (2007).
[362]
 Article IV, Section 2, states:

Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or re-acquired in the manner

provided by law.
[363]
 In Bengson v. HRET (409 PHIL 633-672 [2001]), the Court declared: "A
person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is
a natural-born citizen thereof." (Emphasis supplied)
[364]
 Sections 2 and 3 of Commonwealth Act 63 provides:
SECTION 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. - Citizenship may be
reacquired:

(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the

disqualifications prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred
and twenty-seven;

(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corps Provided, That a
woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be
repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of
the marital status; and (3) By direct act of the National Assembly.

SECTION 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. - The

procedure prescribed for naturalization under Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred
and twenty-seven, as amended; shall apply to the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next preceding section: Provided,
That the qualitications and special qualifications prescribed in section three and
four of said Act shall not be required: And provided, further,

(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in
the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization;

(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living; and

(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and
perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of
which he was a citizen or subject.
[365]
 Commonwealth Act No. 63, Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May be
Lost or Reacquired (1936).
[366]
 An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the
Armed Forces of the United States (1960).
[367]
 Repatriation of Filipino Women and of Natural-Born Filipinos Who Lost Their
Philippine Citizenship (1995).
[368]
 Article II, Section 2 ofthe 1987 Constitution, provides:

The Philippines xxx adopts the generally accepted principles of international

law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
[369]
 Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

xxx

a. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

[370]
 Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536-635 (2009)
[371]
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Proposed Amendments to the
Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion OC-
4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, para. 35.
[372]
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 24; United
Nations Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, Article 7.
[373]
 See the 1997 European Convention on Nationality, Article 6; 1969 American
Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica), Article 20; 1999
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 6; 2008 Revised
Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 29.
[374]
 Article 14 of the Convention states:
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country
of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined
by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found.
[375]
 Article 2 of the Convention provides:
Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of

proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within that territory of
parents possessing the nationality of that State.
[376]
 Article 6(1)(b) of the Convention states:
Article 6 - Acquisition of nationality

l. Each State Party shall provide in its internal law for its nationality to be acquired
ex lege by the following persons:

xxx

(b) foundlings found in its territory who would otherwise be stateless.

[377]
 Based on the databases of the United Nations Treaty Collection
(https://treaties.un.org), the number of state parties in the conventions mentioned
are as follows: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 168;
Convention on the Rights of the Child 196; Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws - 13; Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness - 65; European Convention on Nationality 20.
[378]
 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2012, p. 99; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Belgium), I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 3.
[379]
 Argentina (See Database of European Union Democracy Observatory on
Citizenship); Bolivia (Article 141, New Constitution of Bolivia); Brazil (Article
12[1], Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil); Chile (Article 10,
Constitution); Cuba (Article 29, The Constitution of the Republic of Cuba as
amended); Dominica (Article 98, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Dominica,
1978); Dominican Republic (Article 18, Constitution), Ecuador (Article 7,
Ecuador Constitution); El Salvador (Article 90, Constitution of the Republic of El
Salvador as amended), Equatorial Guinea (Article 10, Fundamental Law of
Equatorial Guinea, 1982); Grenada (Item 96, 97, Grenada Constitution, 7 February
1974); Guatemala (Article 144, Guatemalan Constitution), Jamaica (Item 3B,
Jamaican Constitution August 1962); Kiribati (Kiribati Independence Order dated
July 12, 1979); Niger (Directory of Citizenship Laws compiled by the United
States Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service); Pakistan
(Sections 4 and 5, Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951, as amended); Palau (The
Citizenship Act, 13 PNCA, 1 January 1995); Panama (Article 9, Constitution of
Panama); Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Items 90-91, Constitution of 1979);
Tanzania (Sections 5 and 6, Tanzania Citizenship Act No. 6 of 1995, 10 October
1995); Thailand (Section 7, Nationality Act B.E.2508); Venezuela (Article 32,
Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and Zimbabwe (Section 5,
Constitution of Zimbabwe).
[380]
 Afghanistan (Article 3, Law of Citizenship in Afghanistan, 6 November 1936);
Albania (Article 8[1], Law on Albanian Citizenship, Law No. 8389, 6 September
1998); Algeria (Article 7, Ordonnance No. 70-86 du 15 decembre 1970 portant
code de Ia nationalite algerienne, 18 December 1970); Andorra (Nationality Act, 5
October 1997); Angola (Article 9, Constituicao da Republica de Angola aos, 21
Janeiro de 2010); Antigua and Barbuda (Article 3[1], Constitution of Antigua and
Barbuda) Armenia (Article 12, Law of the Republic of Armenia on the Citizenship
of the Republic of Armenia as amended, 27 November 2005); Australia (Section
14, Australian Citizenship Act 2007); Austria (Article 8(1), Federal Law
Concerning the Austrian Nationality [Nationality Act of 1985]); Azerbaijan
(Article 13, Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Citizenship of the Azerbaijan
Republic, 15 March 1994); Bahrain (Item No. 5[B], Bahraini Citizenship Act for
1963, 16 September 1963); Barbados (Cap. 186, Section 4[1], Barbados
Citizenship Act); Belgium (Code of Belgian Nationality, 28 June 1984), Belize
(Part III, 7, Belizean Nationality Act, Cap. 161); Benin (Article 10, Code de Ia
nationalitedahomeenn, Loi No. 65-17, 23 June 1 965); Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Section 7, Bosnia and Herzegovina Nationality Law, 7 October 1992); Bulgaria
(Article 11, Law on Bulgarian Citizenship, November 1998); Burkina Fasp (Zatu
No. An VIA 0013/FP/PRES du 16 Novembre 1989); Burundi (Article 3, Loi No
1/013 du 18 juillet 2000 portantreforme du code de la nationalite, 18 July 2000),
Cambodia (Article 4 [2] [b], Law on Nationality, 9 October 1996); Cameroon
(Section 9, Law No. 1968-LF-3 of the 11th June 1968 to set up the Cameroon
Nationality Code); Canada (Section 4[1], Canadian Citizenship Act); Cape Verde
(Nationality law, Law No. 80/III/90, from 29th of June); Central African Republic
(Article I 0, RepubliqueCentrafricaine: Loi No. 1961.212 du 1961 portant code de
la nationalitecentrafricaine, 21 April 1961); Chad (Ordonnance 33/PG.-INT. du 14
aoftt 1962 code de la nationalitetchadienne as cited in the Directory of Citizenship
Laws compiled by the United States Office of Personnel Management
Investigations Service); China (Article 6, Nationality Law of the People's Republic
of China, 10 September 1980); Comoros (Article 13, Code of Nationality, Law
No. 79-12); Costa Rica (Article 13[4), Political Constitution of the Republic of
Costa Rica), Croatia (Law of Croatian Citizenship, June 1991); Czech Republic,
Denmark, Djibouti (Article 6, Code de la NationaliteDjiboutienne [Djibouti], Loi
n°79/AN/04/5eme L, 24 October 2004); Democratic Republic of Congo (Article
2[3], LOI No. 87.010 Du ler AOUT 1987, Portant Code de la Famille); Egypt
(Article 2[4], Law No. 26 of 1975 Concerning Egyptian Nationality, Official
Journal No. 22, 29 May 1975), Eritrea (Item 2[3], Eritrean Nationality
Proclamation No. 2111992, 6 April 1992); Estonia (Section 5[2], Citizenship Act
of Estonia); Ethiopia (Article 3[2], Proclamation No. 378/2003, A Proclamation
on Ethiopian Nationality, 23 December 2003); Fiji (Section 7, Citizenship of Fiji
Decree 2009); Finland (Section 12, Finnish Nationality Act 359/2003 as
amended); France (Article 19, Title 1, French Civil Code), G. Bissau, Gabon
(Article 11[2], Code de la Nationalite Loi No. 37-1998); Georgia (Article 15,
Organic Law of Georgia on Georgian Citizenship); Germany (Section 4[2],
Nationality Act of 22 July 1913 as amended); Ghana (Citizenship Act, Act 591, 5
January 2001); Greece (Article 1[2][b], Greek Citizenship Code); Guinea
(Directory of Citizenship Laws compiled by the United States Office of Personnel
Management Investigations Service); Guinea Bissau (Article 5[2], Lei da
Cidadania Lei n.o 2/92 De 6 de Abril); Guyana (Item 8[2], Guyana Citizenship
Act, Cap. 14:01); Haiti (Article 4, Haiti Citizenship Act); Honduras (Article 23,
Constitution of the Republic of Honduras); Hungary (Section 3[3][b], Act LV of
1993 as amended); Iceland (Article 1[1], Icelandic Nationality Act No. 100/1952,
1 January 1953); Indonesia (Article 4[9], 4[10], 4[11], Law of the Republic of
Indonesia No. 12 on Citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia, 1 August 2006);
Iran (Article 976[3], Iran Nationality Law); Iraq (Article 4[6], Law No. 46 of
1963); Ireland (Item 10, Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 as amended),
Israel (Article 4[A], Nationality Law 5712-1952, 14 July 1953); Italy (Article 1[2],
Law no. 91/1992); Jamaica, Japan (Article 2[3], Nationality Law - Law No.147 of
1950, as amended); Jordan (Article 3[4], Jordanian Nationality Law 1954, Law
No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality, 1 January 1954); Kazakhstan (Article 13, Law on
Citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1 March 1992); Kenya (Article 9,
Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act No. 12 of 2011, 30 August 2011); Korea
(Article 2[1][3], 2[2] Law No. 16 of 1948, Nationality Act as amended, 20
December 1948); Kosovo (Article 7, Law Nr. 03/L-034 on Citizenship of
Kosovo); Kuwait (Article 3, Nationality Law of 1959); Kyrgyz Republic (Article
2[5], The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic as
amended, 21 March 2007); Lao PDR (Law on Lao Nationality, 29 November
1990); Latvia (Section 2(1)(3) and 2(1)(5), Law of Citizenship 1994 [as
amended]); Lebanon (Article 1[3], Decree No.15 on Lebanese Nationality
including Amendments, 19 January 1925); Lesotho (Item 38, Lesotho Constitution
of 1993, 2 April 1993); Liberia (Constitution of the Republic of Liberia); Libya
(Section 3, Item 3, Law Number (24) for 2010/1378 On Libyan Nationality, 24
May 2010); Liechtenstein (Section 4[a], Act of 4 January 1934 on the Acquisition
and Loss of Citizenship); Lithuania (Article 16, Republic of Lithuania Law on
Citizenship No. XI-1196, 2 December 2010); Luxembourg (Article 1[2],
Luxembourg Nationality Law of 23 October 2008); Macedonia (Article 6, Law on
Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia); Madagascar (Directory of Citizenship
Laws compiled by the United States Office of Personnel Management
Investigations Service); Malawi (Item 2[5), Malawi Citizenship Act 1966);
Malaysia (Second Schedule [Article 39], Part 1: Citizenship by Operation of Law
of Persons Born before Malaysia Day [Article 14[l][a] Section 1, Federal
Constitution of Malaysia, 31 August 1957); Mali (Article 11, Loi No. 6218 AN-
RM du 3 fevrier 1962 portant Code de la nationalitemalienne); Malta (Item 17[3],
Maltese Citizenship Act); Marshall Islands (Directory of Citizenship Laws
compiled by the United States Office of Personnel Management Investigations
Service); Mauritania (Article 11, Loi N° 1961-112, Loiportant code de la
nationalitemauritanienne); Mexico (Article 7, Law of Nationality as cited in the
database of European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship); Moldova
(Article 11[2], Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Moldova); Mongolia
(Article 7[4], Law of Mongolia on Citizenship, 5 June 1995); Montenegro (Article
7, Montenegrin Citizenship Act); Morocco (Article 11, Code de la
nationalitemarocaine (2011), Dahir n. 1-58-250 du 21 safar 1378, 6 September
1958); Mozambique (Article 10[b], Nationality Act, 25 June 1975); Nepal (Item
3[3], Nepal Citizenship Act 2063, 2006), Netherlands (Article 3 (2), Netherlands
Nationality Act as in force on 8 February 2015); New Zealand (Section 6,
Citizenship Act 1977 061); Nicaragua (Article 16[4), Constitution of Nicaragua);
Norway (Section 4, Act on Norwegian Nationality); Oman (Article 1 [3], Royal
Decree No. 3/83 - Law on the Organization of the Omani Nationality); Papua New
Guinea (Section 77, Constitution); Paraguay (Article 146[1], Constitution of
Paraguay); Peru (Article 2[2], Constitution); Poland (Article 15, Law of 2 April
2009 on Polish Citizenship); Portugal (Article 1[2] Portuguese Nationality Act,
Law 37/81 of 3 October as amended); Qatar (Article 1[3], Law No. 38 of 2005 on
the Acquisition of Qatari nationality 3812005); Romania (Article 3(1), Law No.
21 of 1 March 1991), Russia (Article 12[2], Federal Law on the Citizenship of the
Russian Federation, 15 May 2002); Rwanda (Article 9, Organic Law N° 30/2008
of 25/07/2008 relating to Rwandan Nationality 25 July 2008); Saint Kitts and
Nevis (Items 95[5][c], 1983 Constitution); Saint Lucia (Article 7[2] of the Law of
Nationality, Constitution of I 978 as cited in the database of European Union
Democracy Observatory on Citizenship); Samoa (Part II, Item 6(3),Citizenship
Act of 2004); San Marino (See Council of Europe
bulletin: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/nationality/Bulletin_en_files/Sa
n%20Marino%20E.pdf); Sao Tome & Principe (Article 5(1) (e) and 5(2), Law of
Nationality dated September 13, 1990); Saudi Arabia (Item No. 7[2], Saudi
Arabian Citizenship System (Regulation), Decision no. 4 of 25/1/1374 Hijra, 23
September 1954); Serbia (Article 13, Law on Citizenship of the Republic of
Serbia); Singapore (Article 140[13], Third Schedule, Constitution of the Republic
of Singapore, 9 August 1965); Slovakia (Section 5(2)(b), Act No. 40/1993 Coli.
On nationality of the Slovak Republic of 19 January 1993); Slovenia (Article 9,
Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act); Somalia (Article 15, Law No. 28 of
22 December 1962 Somali Citizenship as amended); South Africa (Article 44,
South African Citizenship Act No. 88 of 1995); South Sudan (Item 8[4],
Nationality Act of 2011, 7 July 2011); Spain (Spanish Civil Code, Book One Title
I, Article 17[1][d]); Sri Lanka (Item No. 7, Citizenship Act of Sri Lanka); Sudan
(Section 5, Sudanese Nationality Act 1994); Suriname (Article 4, State Ordinance
of24 November 1975 for the Regulation of the Surinamese Nationality and
Residence in Suriname), Swaziland (Section 17, Swaziland Citizenship Act, 1992,
Act 14/1992, 1 December 1992); Sweden (Section 2, Swedish Citizenship Act);
Switzerland (Article 6, Federal Act on the Acquisition and Loss of Swiss
Citizenship as amended); Taiwan (Article 2[3], Nationality Act as amended, 5
February 1929), Tajikistan (Article 19, 13 Constitutional Law of the Republic of
Tajikistan on Nationality of the Republic of Tajikistan, 8 August 2015); Timor-
Leste (Section 3[2][b], Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste);
Togo (Article 2, Nationality Act); Tunisia (Articles 9 and 10, Code of Tunisian
Nationality Law No. 63-6); Turkey (Article 8, Turkish Citizenship Law of 2009);
Turkmenistan (Article II [1][8], Law of 2013 on Citizenship, 22 June 2013)
Uganda (Item II, Constitution of the Republic of Uganda); Ukraine (Article 7, Law
on Ukrainian Citizenship); United Arab Emirates (Article 2[5], Federal Law No.
17 for 1972 Concerning Nationality, Passports and Amendments Thereof, 18
November 1972); United Kingdom (Part I, Item 1(2), British Nationality Act of
1984); United States of America (Immigration and Nationality Act 301(a), 302,
306, 307); Uruguay (Article 74, Constitution of the Oriental Republic of
Uruguay); Uzbekistan (Article 16, Law on Citizenship in the Republic of
Uzbekistan, 28 July 1992); Vietnam (Article 18, Law on Vietnamese Nationality,
Resolution No: 24/2008/QH12, 13 November 2008); and Yemen (Law No.6 of
1990 on Yemeni Nationality, 26 August 1990).
[381]
 See for instance the Law of Nationality of Mexico, Law No. 63-6.
[382]
 See the Portuguese Nationality Act, Law 37/81, of 3 October as amended;
Spanish Civil Code, Book One: Title II; Cameroon Law No. 1968-LF-3 of the
11th June 1968; Loi n° 1961.212 du 1961 portant code de la
nationalitecentrafricaine of the Central African Republic; Code of Nationality,
Law No. 79-12 of Comoros; Loi No. 6218 AN-RM du 3 fevrier 1962 portant Code
de la nationalitemalienne of Mali; Code de Ia nationalitemarocaine (2011), Dahir
n. 1-58-250 du 21 safar 1378, 6 September 1958 of Morocco; Law of Nationality
dated September 13, 1990 of Sao Tome and Principe; Law No. 28 of 22 December
1962 Somali Citizenship as amended; Code of Tunisian Nationality Law No. 63.
[383]
 See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Canada/United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 299.
[384]
 Article 24 of the ICCPR states:
 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
[385]
 Article 7 of the CRC states:

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right
fi:om birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance

with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
[386]
 Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary General.
Arbitrary deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General,
A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 2009.
[387]
 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the
combined 2-4th Periodic Reports of Fiji, adopted by the committee at its sixty-
seventh session (1-19 September 2014), CRC/C/FIJ/C0/2-4.
[388]
 454 Phil. 504-642 (2003).
[389]
 The Preamble of the 1935 Constitution states:
The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of
the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and
democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
[390]
 The Preamble of the 1987 Constitution provides:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our
ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
[391]
 Id.
[392]
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Proposed Amendments to the
Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion OC-
4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, para. 35.
[393]
 See Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Warren in 2 356 U.S. 44, 64-65, 78 S.
Ct. 568, 579-80, 2 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958).
[394]
 Batchelor, Carol A. Developments in International Law: the Avoidance of
Statelessness through Positive Application of the Right to a Nationality.
1st European Convention on Nationality. (Strasbourg, 18 and 19 October 1999).
[395]
 1987 Constitution, Article V, Section 1.
[396]
 Id., Article XIV, Section 1 (right to quality education at all levels); Article
XIV, Section 2(5) (right to be provided training in civics, vocational efficiency
and other skills).
[397]
 Id., Section 18, Article XI.
[398]
 The following economic rights are restricted to Philippine citizens under the
Constitution: right to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the nation's marine
wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zoml
(Article XII, Section 2); right to engage in small-scale utilization of natural
resources (Article XII, Section 2); right to lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares of public alienable land, by
purchase, homestead, or grant (Article XII, Section 3); right to be a transferee of
public land (Article XII, Section 7);
[399]
 These include the right to participate in certain areas of investments (Article
XII, Section 10); right to be granted a franchise certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility (Article XII, Section 11);
[400]
 The Constitution allows only citizens to exercise the following rights: the right
to be the executive and managing officers of a corporation or association engaged
in any public utility enterprise (Article XII, Section 11 ); Right to practice a
profession (Article XII, Section 14); right to own, control and administer
educational institutions (Article XIV, Section [2]); Right to own and manage mass
media (Article XVI, Section 11[1]); Right to become an executive and managing
officer of an entity engaged in the advertising industry (Article XVI, Section
11[2]); Right to engage in the advertising industry (Article XVI, Section 11[2]).

The ownership of the following businesses are also reserved for Philippine
citizens: Retail trade enterprises with paid-up capital of less than US $2,500,000
(Section 5, R.A. 8762); cooperatives (Chapter III, Article 26, R.A. 6938); private
security agencies (Section 4, R.A. 5487); small-scale mining (Section 3[C], R.A.
7076); ownership, operation and management of cockpits (Section 5[a], PD 449);
Manufacture of firecrackers and other pyrotechnic devices (Section 5, R.A. 7183).
[401]
 Article Xll, Section 14; The following professions are also restricted by
statute: Aeronautical engineering (Section 14[b], R.A. 1570); Agricultural
engineering (Section 13[a], R.A. 8559); Chemical engineering (Section 2, R.A.
9297); Civil engineering (Section 12[b], R.A. 544); Electrical engineering (Section
16[a], R.A. 7920); Electronics and communication engineering (Section 14[a],
R.A. 9292); Geodetic engineering (Section 12[a], R.A. 8560); Mechanical
engineering (Section 14[a], R.A. 8495); Metallurgical engineering (Section 17[a],
R.A. 10688); Mining engineering (Section 19[a], R.A. 4274); Naval architecture
and marine engineering (Section 11[b], R.A. 4565); Sanitary engineering (Section
17[b], R.A. 1364); Medicine (Section 9[1], R.A. 2382 as amended); Medical
technology (Section 8[1], R.A. 5527 as amended); Dentistry (Section 14[a], R.A.
9484); Midwifery (Section 13, R.A. 7392); Nursing (Section 13[a], R.A. 9173);
Nutrition and dietetics (Section 18[a], P.D. 1286); Optometry (Section 19[a], R.A.
8050); Pharmacy (Section 18[a], R.A. 5921); Physical and occupational therapy
(Section 15[a], R.A. 5680); Radiologic and x-ray technology (Section 19[a], R.A.
7431); Veterinary medicine (Section 15[a], R.A. 9268); Accountancy (Section
14[a], R.A. 9298); Architecture (Section 13[a], R.A. 9266); Criminology (Section
12[a], R.A. 6506); Chemistry (Section 13[a], R.A. 754); Customs brokerage
(Section 16[a], R.A. 9280); Environmental planning (Section 13[b], P.D. 1308);
Forestry (Section 14[b], R.A. 6239); Geology (Section 15, R.A. 4209); Interior
design (Section 13[a], R.A. 8534); Law (Art. VIII, Section 5[5], 1987
Constitution; Rule 138[2], Rules of Court); Librarianship (Section 15[a], R.A.
9246); Marine deck officers (Section 14[a], R.A. 8544); Marine engine officers
(Section 14[a], R.A. 8544); Master plumbing (Section 12[b], R.A. 1378); Sugar
technology (Section 14[a], R.A. 5197); Social work (Section 12[a], R.A. 4373);
Teaching (Section 15[a], R.A. 7836); Agriculture (R.A. 8435); Fisheries (Section
2[b], R.A. 8550); Guidance counseling (Section 13[a], R.A. 9258); Real estate
service (Section 14[a], R.A. 9646); Respiratory therapy (R.A. 10024); and
Psychology (Section 12[a], R.A. 10029).
[402]
 Right to manufacture, repair, stockpile and/or distribute biological, chemical
and radiological weapons and anti-personnel mines; and the right to manufacture,
repair, stockpile and/or distribute nuclear weapons (10th Foreign Negative
Investment List, Executive Order 184, 29 May 2015, citing Article II, Section 8 of
the 1987 Constitution and Conventions and Treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory); and right to become members oflocal police agencies (Section 9[1]
R.A. 4864).
[403]
 See Civil Code, Article 15. The next section includes a more detailed
discussion of adoption and foundlings.
[404]
 See Section 2, R.A. 4090: Providing for State Scholarships for Poor But
Deserving Students (1964); Part V(A)(1)(1.3), Amended Implementing Rules and
Regulations for Republic Act No. 7687, DOST-DepED Joint Circular (2005);
Section 5 (a) (i), Administrative Order No. 57, Educational Reform Assistance
Package for Mindanaoan Muslims (1999).
[405]
 The following  positions  in the Executive branch must be occupied  by
natural-born  Philippine citizens: President  (Article  VII,  Section  2,  1987 
Constitution);  Vice-President  (Article  VII, Section  3,  1987 Constitution); 
Director or Assistant Director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences  (Section
2, PD 1281 as amended by PD 1654 [1979]; Undersecretary of Defense for
Munitions (Section 2, R.A. 1884, Establishment  of a Government  Arsenal
[1957]);  Assistant  Director  of the Forest  Research  Institute (Section 7[a], PD
607, Creating the Forest Research Institute in the Department of Natural 
Resources [1974]); Officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (Section 12, R.A. 9993,
Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 [2010]);  Commissioner  or  Deputy
Commissioners  of  Immigration  (Section  4[b],  C.A. 613, The Philippine 
Immigration Act of 1940 [1940]); Secretary and Undersecretary  of the
Department of Agrarian  Reform  (Section  50,  R.A. 3844  as amended  by  R.A.
6389  [1971]);  Directors,  Assistant Directors of Bureaus in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (Section 50-G, R.A. 3844 as amended  by R.A. 6389,
Agricultural  Land Reform Code [1971]); Chairman and Commissioners  of the
Tariff Commission  (Section  502, PD 1464 as amended,  Harmonized 
Commodity  Description  and Coding System 2002 Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines [2002]);  Director or Assistant  Directors of the  Bureau  of  Forest
Development  (Section  6,  PD 705,  Revised  Forestry  Code  of the  Philippines
[1975]); City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscals of Manila  (Section  38, R.A. 409 as
amended  by R.A. 4631, Revised Charter of City of Manila [1965]); and
Prosecutors in the National Prosecution Service (Section 603, DOJ Department
Circular No. 050-10, [2010]).

In the legislative  branch, the occupants  of the following  posts are required  to be
natural-born  citizens: Senator (Article VI, Section 6, 1987 Constitution); 
Members of the House of Representatives  (Article VI, Section 3, 1987
Constitution); nominees for party-list representatives (Section 9, Party-List System
Act, R.A. 7941 [1995]).

The following  members of the judicial  branch are required to be natural-born

citizens: Members of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts (Article VIII,
Section 7, 1987 Constitution); Regional Trial Court Judges (Section  15, BP 129
as amended by R.A. 8369, the Family Courts Act of 1997 [1997]); Judges of a
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(Section 26, BP 129 as amended); Presiding Judge and Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan  (Section  1, PD 1486  as amended  by  PD 1606,  Creating  the
Sandiganbayan  [1978]);  Judges  of the  Shari'a  Circuit Court (Art. 152, PD 1083,
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines [1977]).

Other constitutional  offices are reserved to natural-born citizens: Ombudsman and

his Deputies (Article XI, Section 8, 1987 Constitution); BSP  Board  of  Governors
(Article XII, Section 20, 1987 Constitution);  Chairman and Commissioners of the
Civil Service Commission (Article IX [B], Section I, 1987 Constitution;  Book V,
Title  I, Subtitle  A, Chapter  3, Section  10; Executive  Order No. 292,
Administrative Code of 1987; Article V, Section 8 (b); PD 807, Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines or Civil Service Law of 1975 [1975)); Chairman and
Commissioners  of the Commission  on Elections (Article  IX[C], Section  I, 1987
Constitution;  Book V, Title  II, Subtitle C, Chapter 2, Section 4, EO 292,
Administrative  Code of 1987 [1987]); Chairman and Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (Article IX [D], Section 1, 1987 Constitution); Chairman
and Members of the Commission  on Human Rights (Article XIII, Section 17[2],
1987 Constitution; Book V, Title II, Subtitle A, Section  I, EO 292, Administrative
Code of 1987 [1987]).
[406]
 The following positions in the local government are included: Regional
Governor and Vice Governor of the ARMM (Article VII, Section 3, R.A. 9054,
Strengthening and Expanding the ARMM Organic Act [2001]); Members of the
Regional Assembly of the ARMM (Article VI, Section 6 [I], R.A. 9054,
Strengthening and Expanding the ARMM Organic Act [2001]); Regional
Secretary, Regional Undersecretaries, Assistant Regional Secretary, Assistant
Secretary for Madaris, Bureau Directors, and Assistant Bureau Directors of the
ARMM Department of Education (Article II, Section 22, Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 279-10, ARMM Basic Education Act of 2010 [2010];
Regional Governor and Vice Governor of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
(Article V, Sections 2 and 3, R.A. 8438, Organic Act of Cordillera Autonomous
Region [1997]).
[407]
 Members of these government commissions, boards, administrations are
required to be natural-born citizens: Chairman and Members of the Energy
Regulatory Commission (Section 38, R.A. 9136, Electric Power Industry Reform
Act of 2001 [2001]); Commissioners of the Commission on the Filipino Language
(Section 6, R.A. 7104, Commission on the Filipino Language Act [1991]); Board
of the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (Section 9 [a], R.A.
10086, Strengthening Peoples' Nationalism Through Philippine History Act
[2010]); Executive Director and Deputy Executive Directors of the NHCP
(Section 17, R.A. 10086, Strengthening Peoples' Nationalism Through Philippine
History Act [2010]); Commissioners of National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (Section 3 [a] Rules and Regulations Implementing The Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, NCIP Administrative Order No. 01-98, [1998]);
Members of Provincial, Regional and National Consultative Bodies of the NCIP
(Sections 22 [a] NCIP Administrative Order No. 1-03, Guidelines for the
Constitution and Operationalization ofthe Consultative Body [2003]); Chairman
and Members of the Board of Agriculture (Article III, Section 6 (a] PRC Board of
Agriculture Resolution No. 02-02, Rules and Regulations implementing PRC
Resolution No. 2000 663 [2002]); Members of the Board of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (Section 2, PD 1986, Creating the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board [1985]); Chairman and
Members of the Board of Fisheries (Article III, Section 7 [a] PRC Board of
Fisheries Resolution no. 01-02, Rules and Regulations Implementing PRC
Resolution No. 2000-664); Representative of Consumers at the Price Control
Council (Section 2, R.A. 6124, Fixing of the Maximum Selling Price of Essential
Articles or Commodities [1970]); Members of the Anti-Dummy Board (Section 1,
R.A. 1130 as amended by R.A. 6082 [1969]); Chairman, Members of the Board
and General Manager of the Public Estates Authority/Philippine Reclamation
Authority, (Section 6, PO 1084, Charter of the Public Estates Authority [1977]);
Chairman and Members of the Land Tenure Administration (Section 4, R.A. 1400,
Land Reform Act of 1955 [1955]); Board of Directors of the Panay Development
Authority (Section 17, R.A. 3856, Creation of Panay Development Authority
[1964]; Administrator of the Agricultural Credit Administration (Section 101,
R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, Agricultural Land Reform Code [1971]);
Director-General, Deputy Director-General, and Executive Directors of the
National Manpower Youth Council [absorbed by TESDA pursuant to PO 850]
(Article 53, PO 442 as amended by PO 850 Amendments to P.O. No. 442, Labor
Code of the Philippines [1975]); Governor and Deputy Governors of the Land
Authority (Section 50, R.A. 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, [1963]).
[408]
 Project Director of the Mindoro Office of the Mindoro Integrated Rural
Development Office (Section 6 [a], PO 805, Implementing the Mindoro Integrated
Rural Development Program and Providing Funds therefore [1975]); Project
Director of the Cagayan Integrated Agricultural Development Project (Section 6
[a], PO 1189, Implementing the Cagayan Integrated Agricultural Development
Project [1977]); Project Director of the Samar Office of the Samar Integrated
Rural Development Project (Section 4 [a], PO 1048, Implementation of the Samar
Integrated Rural Development Project [1976]); Members of the Central Luzon-
Cagayan Valley Authority (Section 2 [e], R.A. 3054, Creation of Central Luzon-
Cagayan Valley Authority [1961]); Project Director of the Rural Infrastructure
Project Office in the DOTC (Section 3, PO 1298, Implementing the Rural
Infrastructure Project [1978]); Members of the Cooperative Development
Authority (Section 5 [a], R.A. 6939, Cooperative Development Authority Law
[1990]); Board of Directors of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority
(Section 9 [b], Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, R.A. 7227
[1992]); Program Director at the Cotabato-Agusan River Basin Program Office 
(Section 3, PO 1556, Creation of the Cotabato-Agusan River Basin Program
Office [1978]); Executive Director of the River Basin Council (Section 5, EO 412,
Creation of Bicol River Basin Council [1973]); Board of Directors of the
Philippine National Oil Company (Section 6, Presidential Decree 334 as amended
by PO 405, Creating the Philippine National Oil Company); Board of Governors
of the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan (Section 3, PO 1411, Dissolving the GSIS
Hospital, Inc. [1978]); Board of Directors of the Philippine Export Credit
Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (Section 8, R.A. 6424, Philippine Export
Credit Insurance and Guarantee Corporation Act [1972]); President of the
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation [later Trade and
Investment Development Corporation, now Phil. Export Import Credit Agency
(Section 14, PO 1080 as amended by R.A. 8494).
[409]
 Members of the Board of Directors of the following banks are required to be
natural-born citizens: Philippine National Bank (Section 10, EO 80, The 1986
Revised Charter of the Philippine National Bank [1986]); Land Bank of the
Philippines (Section 86, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by R.A. 7907, Code
of Agrarian Reform in the Phil. [1995]); Development Bank of the Philippines
(Section 8, R.A. 8523, Strengthening the Development Bank of the Philippines
[1998]).
[410]
 Presidents of State Universities imd Colleges (Section 5.1, CHED
Memorandum Order 16 [2009]) and the College President of the Compostela
Valley State College (Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
10598 [2014]).
[411]
 These include: Members of the Board of Examiners of Criminologists (Section
3 [1], R .A. 6506, Creation of Board of Examiners for Criminologists [1972]);
Chairman and Members of the Professional Regulatory Board of Geology (Section
8 [a], R.A. 10166, Geology Profession Act of 2012 [2012]); Chairperson and
Members of the Professional Regulatory Board of Psychology (Section 5 [a], R.A.
10029, Philippine Psychology Act of 2009 [2010]); Chairperson and Members
ofthe Board of Respiratory Therapy (Section 5 [a], R.A. 10024, Philippine
Respiratory Therapy Act of 2009 [2010]); Chairman and Members of the
Professional Regulatory Board of Dentistry (Section 7 [a], R.A. 9484, The
Philippine Dental Act of 2007 [2007]); Chairperson and Members of the
Professional Regulatory Board for Librarians (Section 7 [a], R.A. 9246, The
Philippine Librarianship Act of 2003 [2004]); Members of the Professional
Regulatory Board of Accounting (Section 6 [a], R.A. 9298, Philippine
Accountancy Act of 2004 [2004]); Chairman and Members of the Board of
Chemical Engineering (Section 7 [a], R.A. 9297, Chemical Engineering Law of
2004 [2004]); Members of the Philippine Landscape Architecture Board (Section
4 [a], R.A. 9053, Philippine Landscape Architecture Act of2000 [2001]);
Chairperson and Members of the Board of the Professional Regulatory Board of
Nursing  Section 4, R.A. 9173, Philippine Nursing Act of 2002 [2002]); Member
of the Professional Regulatory Board of Accountancy (Section 6 [a], R.A. 9298,
Philippine Accountancy Act of 2004 [2004]); Members of the Board of
Agricultural Engineering (Section 5 [a], R.A. 8559, Philippine Agricultural
Engineering Act of 1998 [1998]); Members of the Board of Geodetic Engineering
(Section 4 [a], R.A. 8560, Philippine Geodetic Engineering Act of 1998 [1998]);
Chairperson and members of the Professional Regulatory Board for Foresters
(Section 7 [a], R.A. 10690, The Forestry Profession Act [2015]); Members of the
Board of Examiners for Forester (Section 6 [a], R.A. 6239, The Forestry
Profession Law [1971]; Members ofthe Board of Pharmacy Section 7 [a], R.A.
5921, Pharmacy Law [1969]); Members of the Board of Medical Examiners
(Section 14, R.A. 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224, The Medical Act of 1959 as
amended [1965]); Members of the Board of Mechanical Engineering (Section 5 [a]
R.A. 8495, Philippine Mechanical Engineering Act of 1998 [1998]); Members of
the Board of Optometry, (Section 8 [a], R.A. 8050, Revised Optometry Law of
1995 [1995]); Members of the Board of Electrical Engineering (Section 5 [a], R.A.
7920, New Electrical Engineering Law [1995]).
[412]
 In particular, all officers of the Regular Force of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (Section 4 [b], R.A. 291, Armed Forces Officer Personnel Act of 1948
[1948]); Officers of the Women's Auxiliary Corps (Section 2, R.A. 3835, An Act
to Establish the Women's Auxiliary Corps in the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to provide the Procurement of its Officers and Enlisted personnel, and for Other
Purposes [1963]).

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I dissent from the majority opinion.

With the ruling of the majority today, a presidential candidate who is deemed a
natural-born Filipino citizen by less than a majority of this Court, deemed not a
natural-born Filipino citizen by five Justices, and with no opinion from three
Justices, can now run for President of the Philippines even after having been
unanimously found by the Commission on Elections En Banc (COMELEC) to be
not a natural-born Filipino citizen. What is clear and undeniable is that there is no
majority of this Court that holds that petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe
Llamanzares (petitioner) is a natural-born Filipino citizen. This ruling of the
majority will lead to absurd results, making a mockery of our national elections by
allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially
elected to the Office of the President, an office expressly reserved by the
Constitution exclusively for natural-born Filipino citizens.

This means that the majority of this Court wants to resolve the citizenship status of
petitioner after the elections, and only if petitioner wins the elections, despite
petitioner having already presented before the COMELEC all the evidence she
wanted to present to prove her citizenship status. This will make a mockery of our
election process if petitioner wins the elections but is later disqualified by this
Court for not possessing a basic qualification for the Office of the President - that
of being a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Those who voted for petitioner would have utterly wasted their votes. This is not
how the natural-born citizenship qualification for elective office mandated by the
Constitution should be applied by the highest court of the land.

There is no dispute that petitioner is a Filipino citizen, as she publicly claims to be.
However, she has failed to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the 9 May
2016 elections. Petitioner is not eligible to run for President of the Republic of the
Philippines for lack of the essential requirements of citizenship and residency
under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.[1] Petitioner's certificate of
candidacy (COC), wherein she stated that she is qualified for the position of
President, contains false material representations, and thus, must be cancelled.
Petitioner, not being a natural-born Filipino citizen, is also a nuisance candidate
whose COC can motu proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section 69 of
the Omnibus Election Code.

The Case

These consolidated certiorari petitions[2] seek to nullify the Resolutions[3] of the

COMELEC for allegedly being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the assailed Resolutions, the COMELEC
cancelled petitioner's COC for the position of President for the 9 May 2016
elections on the ground of "false material representations" when she stated therein
that she is a "natural-born Filipino citizen" and that her "period of residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016" is "10 years and 11 months,"
which is contrary to the facts as found by the COMELEC.

The Issues

The core issues in this case are (1) whether petitioner, being a foundling, is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and (2) whether she is a resident of the Philippines
for ten years immediately preceding the 9 May 2016 national elections. The
resolution of these issues will in turn determine whether petitioner committed false
material representations in her COC warranting the cancellation of her COC. If
petitioner is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, the issue arises as a necessary
consequence whether she is a nuisance candidate whose COC can motu proprio be
cancelled by the COMELEC.

COMELEC Jurisdiction

Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power,
among others, to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, x x x."[4] Screening initially the qualifications of all
candidates lies within this specific power. In my dissent in Tecson v. COMELEC,
[5]
 involving the issue of Fernando Poe, Jr.'s citizenship, I discussed the
COMELEC's jurisdiction, to wit:

x x x. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the
power and function to "[E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
tu the conduct of an election." The initial determination of who are qualified to file
certificates of candidacies with the Comelec clearly falls within this all-
encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The conduct of an election
necessarily includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing
laws to run for public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelec's certified list
of candidates will be cluttered with unqualified candidates making the conduct of
elections unmanageable. For this reason, the Comelec weeds out every presidential
election dozens of candidates for president who are deemed nuisance candidates
by the Comelec.

Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to
"[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections
x x x. " The power to decide "all questions affecting elections" necessarily
includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications
required by law for election to public office. This broad constitutional power and
function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation where
a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal remedy. If one who is
obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger,
runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after
the elections before such candidate may be disqualified.[6] (Italicization in the
original; boldfacing supplied)

Clearly, pursuant to its constitutional mandate, the COMELEC can initially

determine the qualifications of all candidates and disqualify those found lacking
any of such qualifications before the conduct of the elections. In fact, the
COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs of nuisance candidates.
[7]
 In Timbol v. COMELEC,[8] the Court stated thus:
Respondent's power to motu proprio
deny due course to a certificate of
candidacy is subject to the candidate's
opportunity to be heard.

Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office[.]" To run for public office is a
mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law." Among these limitations is
the prohibition on nuisance candidates.

Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to
put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among
the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate." x
x x. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, who files a
certificate of candidacy for President, "put[s] the election process in mockery" and
is therefore a nuisance candidate. Such person's certificate of candidacy can motu
proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which empowers the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio the COC if it "has
been filed to put the election process in mockery."

In Pamatong v. COMELEC,[9] cited in Timbol,[10] the Court explained the reason

why nuisance candidates are disqualified to run for public office:
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run
for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State
takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never
exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same
time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a
textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic
institutions. x x x.

xxxx

x x x. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is

onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or
capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process.
This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to
constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae
covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of
these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
To allow a person, who is found by the COMELEC not to be a natural born
Filipino citizen, to run for President of the Philippines constitutes a mockery of the
election process. Any person, who is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, running
for President is obviously a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Allowing a nuisance candidate to run for President renders
meaningless the COMELEC's constitutional power to "[e]nforce and administer all
laws x x x relative to the conduct of an election, x x x." The election process
becomes a complete mockery since the electorate is mercilessly offered choices
which include patently ineligible candidates. The electorate is also needlessly
misled to cast their votes, and thus waste their votes, for an ineligible candidate.
The COMELEC cannot be a party to such mockery of the election process;
otherwise, the COMELEC will be committing a grave abuse of discretion.

Citizens of the Philippines

It is the sovereign power and inherent right of every independent state to

determine who are its nationals. The Philippines, and no other state, shall
determine who are its citizens in accordance with its Constitution and laws.

In this case, the 1935 Philippine Constitution shall be applied to determine

whether petitioner is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines since she was born in
1968 when the 1935 Constitution was in effect.

Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution identifies who are Filipino citizens,
thus:
Article IV.-Citizenship

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
 2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

From this constitutional provision, we find that, except for those who were already
considered citizens at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, there were, as
there are still now, only two methods of acquiring Philippine citizenship: (1) by
blood relation to the father (or the mother under the 1987 Constitution) who must
be a Filipino citizen; and (2) by naturalization according to law.[11]

The Philippines adheres to the jus sanguinis principle or the "law of the blood" to

determine citizenship at birth. An individual acquires Filipino citizenship at
birth solely by virtue of biological descent from a Filipino father or mother. The
framers of the 1935 Constitution clearly intended to make the acquisition of
citizenship available on the basis of the jus sanguinis principle. This view is made
evident by the suppression from the Constitution of the jus soli principle, and
further, by the fact that the Constitution has made definite provisions for cases not
covered by the jus sanguinis principle, such as those found in paragraph 1, Section
1 of Article IV, i.e., those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, and in paragraph 2, Section 1 of the same
Article, i.e., those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of the Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines.[12]

In terms of jurisprudence, there was a period when the Court was uncertain
regarding the application of jus soli or "law of the soil" as a principle of
acquisition of Philippine citizenship at birth.[13] In Tan Chong v. Secretary of
Labor,[14] decided in 1947, the Court finally abandoned the jus soli principle,
and jus sanguinis has been exclusively adhered to in the Philippines since then.[15]

Based on Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, petitioner's citizenship

may be determined only under paragraphs (3), (4) and (5). Paragraph (1) of
Section 1 is not applicable since petitioner is not a Filipino citizen at the time of
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution as petitioner was born after the adoption of
the 1935 Constitution. Paragraph (2) of Section 1 is likewise inapplicable since
petitioner was not born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of the Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines.

Of the Filipino citizens falling under paragraphs (3), (4) and (5), only those in
paragraph (3) of Section 1, whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, can be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens since they are Filipino citizens from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
[16]
 In short, they are Filipino citizens by the mere fact of birth.

Under paragraph (4) of Section 1, those Filipino citizens whose mothers are
Filipinos and whose fathers are aliens cannot be considered natural-born Filipino
citizens since they are still required to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority -they are not Filipino citizens by the mere fact of birth.
However, under paragraph (2), Section 1 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution,
those whose fathers are Filipino citizens and those whose mothers are Filipino
citizens are treated equally. They are considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
[17]
 Moreover, under Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to
paragraph (3), Section 1 of the same Article, those born before 17 January 1973 of
Filipino mothers and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority are also deemed natural-born Filipino citizens.

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[18] the Court held that

the constitutional provision treating as natural-born Filipino citizens those born
before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers and alien fathers, and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, has a retroactive effect.
The Court declared that this constitutional provision was enacted "to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-
born."[19] The Court explained:
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?

Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue
of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or
qfter January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
228; Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the
interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973
Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under
the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?

Fr. Bernas: Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well
written book, he said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate
former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no
retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against
this intention by supporting the amendment?

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my
thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of
Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born
Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress...

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it
to the body to approve that provision of section 4.

Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as
unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot
be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation.

Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those
born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records ofthe
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the
provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation
resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.[20]
Therefore, the following are deemed natural-born Filipino citizens: (1) those
whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, and (2) those whose mothers are
Filipino citizens and were born before 17 January 1973 and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Stated differently, those whose
fathers or mothers are neither Filipino citizens are not natural-born Filipino
citizens. If they are not natural-born Filipino citizens, they can acquire Philippine
citizenship only under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935
Constitution which refers to Filipino citizens who are naturalized in accordance
with law.

Intent of the Framers of the 1935 Constitution

Petitioner concedes that she does not fall under paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section
1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. However, petitioner claims that the mere
fact that she is a foundling does not exclude her from paragraphs (3) and (4) of the
same provision. Petitioner argues in her Petition that "the pertinent deliberations of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention, on what eventually became Article IV of the
1935 Constitution, show that the intent of the framers was not to exclude
foundlings from the term "citizens" of the Philippines."[21]

Likewise, the Solicitor General asserts in his Comment[22] that "[t]he deliberations

ofthe 1934 Constitutional Convention indicate the intention to categorize
foundlings as a class of persons considered as Philippine citizens. x x x. The 1935
Constitution's silence cannot simply be interpreted as indicative of an intent to
entrench a disadvantaged class in their tragedy. Not only is there no evidence of
such intent, but also the silence can be explained in a compassionate light, one
that is geared towards addressing a fundamental question of justice."[23]
Petitioner and the Solicitor General are gravely mistaken. The framers of the 1935
Constitution voted to categorically reject the proposal to include foundlings as
citizens of the Philippines. Petitioner's Petition, and the Solicitor General's
Comment, glaringly omitted that the 1934 Constitutional Convention actually
voted upon, and rejected, the proposal to include foundlings as citizens of the
Philippines. The following exchange during the deliberations of the Convention
shows this unequivocally.
SPANISH ENGLISH
SR. RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS:
Para una enmienda. Propongo que despues For an amendment, I propose that after
del inciso 2 se inserte lo siguiente: "Los subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The
hijos naturales de un padre extranjero y de natural children of a foreign father and a
una madre filipina no reconocidos por Filipino mother not recognized by the
aquel. father.
xxxx xxxx
EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT: [We] would like to request a
La Mesa desea pedir una aclaracion del clarification from the proponent of the
proponente de la enmienda. Se refiere Su amendment. The gentleman refers to natural
Señoria a hijos naturales o a toda clase de children or to any kind
hijos ilegitimos? of illegitimate children?
SR. RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS: To all kinds
A toda clase de hijos ilegitimos. Tambien se of illegitimate children. It also includes
incluye a los hijos naturales de padres natural children of unknown parentage,
desconocidos, los hijos naturales o natural or illegitimate children of unknown
ilegitimos, de padres desconocidos. parents.
SR. MONTINOLA: MR. MONTINOLA:
Para una aclaracion. Alli se dice "de padres For clarification. The gentleman said "of
desconocidos." Los Codigos actuales unknown parents." Current codes consider
consideran como filipino, es decir, i me them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish
refiero al codigo español quien I considera Code wherein all children of unknown
como espafioles a todos los hijos de padres parentage born in Spanish territory are
desconocidos nacidos en territorio español, considered Spaniards, because the
porque la presuncion es que el hijo de presumption is that a child of unknown
padres desconocidos es hijo de un español, parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may
y de esa manera se podra aplicar en be applied in the Philippines in that
Filipinas de que un hijo desconocido aqui y a child of unknown parentage born in the
nacido en Filipinas se considerara que es Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and
hijo filipino y no hay necesidad ... there is no need ...
SR. RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS:
Hay necesidad, porque estamos relatando There is a need, because we are relating the
las condiciones de los que van a ser conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
filipinos.
SR. MONTINOLA: MR. MONTINOLA:
Pero esa es la interpretacion de la ley, But that is the interpretation of the law,
ahora, de manera que no hay necesidad de  therefore, there is no [more] need for the
la enmienda. amendment.
SR. RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS:
La enmienda debe leerse de esta manera: The amendment should read thus: "Natural
"Los hijos naturales o ilegitimos de un or illegitimate children of a foreign father
padre extranjero y de una madre filipina and a Filipino mother recognized by the
reconocidos por aquel o los hijos de padres former, or the children of unknown
desconocidos. parentage."
SR. BRIONES: MR. BRIONES: The amendment [should]
Para una enmienda con elfin de significar: mean children born in the Philippines of
The amendment [should] mean children los unknown parentage.
hijos nacidos en Filipinas de padres born in
the Philippines of unknown desconocidos
SR. RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS:
Es que el hijo de una filipina con un The son of a Filipina to a foreigner,
extranjero, aunque este no reconozca al although the latter does not recognize
hijo, no es desconocido. the child, is not of unknown parentage.
EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
Acepta Su Señoria o no la enmienda? Does the gentleman accept the amendment
or not?
SR. RAFOLS: MR.RAFOLS:
No acepto la enmienda, porque la I do not accept the amendment because the
lenmienda excluiria a los hijos de una amendment would exclude the children of a
filipina con un extranjero que este no Filipina with a foreigner who does not
reconoce. No son desconocidos y yo creo recognize the child. Their parentage is not
que esos hijos de madre filipina con unknown and I believe that these children
extranjero y el padre no reconoce, deben ser of a Filipino mother by a foreigner who
tambien considerados como filipinos. does not recognize them should also be
considered Filipinos.
EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
La cuestion en orden es la enmienda a la The question to be settled is the amendment
enmienda del Delegado por Cebu, Sr. to the amendment of the delegate from
Briones. Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Mr. BULSON: MR. BUSLON:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be Mr. President, don't you think it would be
better to leave the matter in the hands of the better to leave the matter in the hands of the
Legislature? Legislature?
SR.ROXAS: MR. ROXAS:
Senor Presidente, mi opinion humilde es Mr. President, my humble opinion is that
que estos son casos muy pequeños y these cases are very insignificant and very
contados, para que la constitucion necesite few that the constitution need not make
referirse a ellos. Por leyes internacionales se reference to them. International law
reconoce el principia de que los hijo las per recognizes the principle that the children or
o as nacidas en un pais de padres persons in a country of unknown parents are
desconocidos son ciudadanos de esa nacion, citizens of that nation and it is not necessary
y no es necesario incluir una disposicion to include a restrictive provision on this
taxativa sobre el particular. subject.
LA ENMIENDA BRIONES ES THE BRIONES AMENDMENT IS
RETIRADA WITHDRAWN
EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
Insiste el Caballero por Cebu, Sr. Briones, Does the gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
en su enmienda? Briones, insist in his amendment?
SR. BRIONES: SR. BRIONES:
No tengo especial interes, señor Presidente, I have no special interest, Mr. President, in
en esa enmienda y la retiro. the amendment and I withdraw.
EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
Por retirada. Withdrawn.
LA ENMIENDA RAFOLS ES THE RAFOLS AMENDMENT IS
RECHAZADA REJECTED
EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
Insiste el Caballero por Cebu, Sr. Rafols, en Does the gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Rafols,
su enmienda? insist in his amendment?
SR. RAFOLS: SR. RAFOLS:
Si. Yes.
EL PRESIDENTE: La Mesa sometera a PRESIDENT:
votacion dicha enmienda. Los que esten Let us submit to a vote the amendment.
conformes con la misma, que digan si. (Una Those who agree with it, say yes. (a
minoria: SI.) Los que no lo esten, que digan minority: YES.) Those who are not, say no.
no. (Una mayoria: NO.) Queda rechazada la (a majority: NO.) The amendment is
enmienda.[24] rejected. (Emphasis supplied)
During the 26 November 1934 deliberations of the Constitutional Convention,
Delegate Rafols proposed an amendment to declare as Filipino citizens those
natural or illegitimate children of Filipino mothers and alien fathers who do not
acknowledge them. Such proposed amendment, according to Delegate Rafols,
included "children of unknown parentage."

Three delegates voiced their objections to Rafols's amendment, namely Delegates

Buslon, Montinola, and Roxas.

Delegate Teofilo Buslon suggested that the subject matter be left in the hands of
the legislature, which meant that Congress would decide whether to categorize as
Filipinos (1) natural or illegitimate children of Filipino mothers and alien fathers
who do not recognize them; and (2) children of unknown parentage. If that were
the case, foundlings were not and could not validly be considered as natural-born
Filipino citizens as defined in the Constitution since Congress would then provide
the enabling law for them to be regarded as Filipino citizens. Foundlings would be
naturalized citizens since they acquire Filipino citizenship "in accordance with
law" under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
Significantly, petitioner and the Solicitor General, who agrees with petitioner's
position, conveniently left out Delegate Buslon's opinion.

Petitioner quotes the opinions of Delegates Ruperto Montinola and Manuel Roxas
to support her theory. Petitioner argues that "the pertinent deliberations of the
1934 Constitutional Convention show that the intent of the framers was not to
exclude foundlings from the term 'citizens of the Philippines,' but simply to avoid
redundancy occasioned by explicating what to them was already a clear principle
of existing domestic and international law."[25]

Petitioner is again gravely mistaken.

There was no domestic law as well as international law existing during the
proceedings of the 1934 Constitutional Convention explicitly governing
citizenship of foundlings, and thus, there could not have been a redundancy of any
law to speak of.

Delegate Montinola applied the Spanish Civil Code provision, stating that children
of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory were considered Spaniards, and
opined that the same concept could be applied in the Philippines and thus children
of unknown parentage born in the Philippines should be considered Filipino
citizens.

However, this was an erroneous application since the provisions of the Spanish
Civil Code (which Delegate Montinola was relying on) were no longer in effect as
of the end of Spanish rule in the Philippines. The provisions of the Spanish Civil
Code cited by Delegate Montinola ceased to have effect upon the cession by Spain
of the Philippines to the United States. As early as 1912, in Roa v. Collector of
Customs,[26] the Court stated:
Articles 17 to 27, inclusive, of the Civil Code deal entirely with the subject of
Spanish citizenship. When these provisions were enacted, Spain was and is now
the sole and exclusive judge as to who shall and who shall not be subjects of her
kingdom, including her territories. Consequently, the said articles, being political
laws (laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the former
sovereign), must be held to have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the United States.
"By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another,
either following a conquest or otherwise, * * * those laws which are political in
their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately
cease upon the transfer of sovereignty." (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1889.)
Thus, Delegate Montinola's opinion was based on an erroneous premise since the
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code he cited had already long been repealed and
could no longer be applied in the Philippines.

The same can be said of Delegate Manuel Roxas's opinion regarding the supposed
international law principle which recognizes a foundling to be a citizen of the
country where the foundling is found. At that time, there was nothing in
international law which automatically granted citizenship to foundlings at birth. In
fact, Delegate Roxas did not cite any international law principle to that effect.

Only the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws, which articulated the presumption on the place of birth of
foundlings, was in existence during the deliberations on the 1935 Constitution. As
will be discussed further, the 1930 Hague Convention does not guarantee a
nationality to a foundling at birth. Therefore, there was no prevailing customary
international law at that time, as there is still none today, conferring automatically
a nationality to foundlings at birth.

Moreover, none of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term
"natural-born" in relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935
Constitution, only those whose fathers were Filipino citizens were considered
natural-born Filipino citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers were still required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing them from
being natural-born Filipino citizens. If, as petitioner would like us to believe, the
framers intended that foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this
would have created an absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage
would be placed in a better position than a child whose mother is actually known
to be a Filipino citizen. The framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have
intended to create such an absurdity.

In any event, Delegate Rafols's amendment, when put to a vote, was clearly
rejected by the majority of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional
Convention. To reiterate, Delegate Rafols's proposal was defeated in the
voting. The rejection of the Rafols amendment not only meant the non inclusion in
the text of the Constitution of a provision that children with unknown parentage
are Filipino citizens, but also signified the rejection by the delegates of the idea or
proposition that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth just like natural-hom
citizens. While the framers discussed the matter of foundlings because of Delegate
Rafols's amendment, they not only rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly
manifested that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like
children of Filipino fathers. Stated differently, the framers intended to exclude
foundlings from the definition of natural-born Filipino citizens.

Clearly, there is no "silence of the Constitution" on foundlings because the

majority of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention expressly rejected
the proposed amendment of Delegate Rafols to classify children of unknown
parentage as Filipino citizens. There would have been "silence of the Constitution"
if the Convention never discussed the citizenship of foundlings. There can never
be "silence of the Constitution" if the Convention discussed a proposal and
rejected it, and because of such rejection the subject of the proposal is not
found in the Constitution. The absence of any mention in the Constitution of
such rejected proposal is not "silence of the Constitution" but "express rejection in
the Constitution" of such proposal.

Further, to include foundlings among those born of Filipino fathers or Filipino

mothers based solely on Montinola's and Roxas's opinions during the deliberations
of the Constitutional Convention is a strained construction of the Constitution
which clearly runs counter to the express provisions of the Constitution and
contravenes the jus sanguinis principle underlying the citizenship provisions of
the Constitution.

Besides, there is nothing in the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional

Convention indicating that a majority of the delegates agreed with the opinion of
either Delegate Montinola or Delegate Roxas. The opinions of Delegates
Montinola and Roxas remained their personal opinions, just like the countless
opinions of other delegates who aired their opinions during the deliberations of the
Convention without such opinions being put to a vote. Delegate Buslon proposed
that the citizenship of foundlings be addressed through legislation by Congress, a
proposal that carried more weight since it falls squarely under paragraph 5, Section
1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution authorizing Congress to enact
naturalization laws.

Definition of the Term "'Natural-Born Citizens"

The term "natural-born citizen" was first discussed by the framers of the 1935
Constitution in relation to the qualifications of the President and Vice-President. In
particular, Delegate Roxas elaborated on this term, explaining that a natural-born
citizen is a "citizen by birth" - a person who is a citizen by reason of his or her
birth and not by operation of law. Delegate Roxas explained:
Delegate Roxas. - Mr. President, the phrase, 'natural-born citizen,' appears in the
Constitution of the United States; but the authors say that this phrase has never
been authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in view
of the fact that there has never been raised the question of whether or not an
elected President fulfilled this condition. The authors are uniform in the fact that
the words, 'natural-born citizen,' means a citizen by birth, a person who is a citizen
by reason of his birth, and not by naturalization or by a further declaration required
by law for his citizenship. In the Philippines, for example, under the provisions of
the article on citizenship which we have approved, all those born of a father who is
a Filipino citizen, be they persons born in the Philippines or outside, would be
citizens by birth or 'natural-born.'

And with respect to one born of a Filipino mother but of a foreign father, the
article which we approved about citizenship requires that, upon reaching the age of
majority, this child needs to indicate the citizenship which he prefers, and if he
elects Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, then he shall be
considered a Filipino citizen. According to this interpretation, the child of a
Filipino mother with a foreign father would not be a citizen by birth, because the
law or the Constitution requires that he make a further declaration after his birth.
Consequently, the phrase, 'natural-born citizen,' as it is used in the English text
means a Filipino citizen by birth, regardless of where he was born. [27] (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to refer to natural-
born citizens as only those who were Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being
born to fathers who were Filipino citizens -nothing more and nothing less. To
repeat, under the 1935 Constitution, only children whose fathers were Filipino
citizens were natural-born Filipino citizens. Those who were born of alien fathers
and Filipino mothers were not considered natural-born Filipino citizens, despite
the fact that they had a blood relation to a Filipino parent. Since a natural-born
citizen is a citizen by birth who need not perform any act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship, then those born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers and
who had to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, an overt act to
perfect citizenship, were not considered natural-born Filipino citizens. As a matter
of course, those whose parents are neither Filipino citizens or are both unknown,
such as in the case of foundlings, cannot be considered natural born Filipino
citizens.

Foundlings and International Law

A. Each State Determines its Citizens

Fundamental is the principle that every independent state has the right and
prerogative to determine who are its citizens. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
[28]
 decided in 1898, the United States Supreme Court enunciated this principle:
It is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and
according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be
entitled to its citizenship.
In our jurisdiction, the Court similarly echoed in the 1912 case of Roa v. Collector
of Customs[29] this incontrovertible right of each state to determine who are its
citizens. Hence, every independent state cannot be denied this inherent right to
determine who are its citizens according to its own constitution and laws.

Article 1, Chapter I of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating

to the Conflict of Nationality Laws explicitly provides:
It is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law
shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international
conventions, international custom, and the principles oflaw generally recognized
with regard to nationality.
This means that municipal law, both constitutional and statutory, determines and
regulates the conditions on which citizenship is acquired.[30] There is no such thing
as international citizenship or international law by which citizenship may be
acquired.[31] Whether an individual possesses the citizenship of a particular state
shall be determined in accordance with the constitution and statutory laws of that
state.

B. Conventional International Law, Customary International Law, and

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Petitioner invokes conventional international law, customary international law and

generally accepted principles of international law to support her claim that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. A review of these concepts is thus inevitable.

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice sets out the following
sources of international law: (1) international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (2)
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.[32]

Essentially, conventional international law is the body of international legal

principles contained in treaties or conventions as opposed to customary
international law or other sources of intemationallaw.[33]

Customary international law is defined as a general and consistent practice of

states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.[34] I had occasion to
explain the concept of customary international law as used in our Constitution in
this wise:
Generally accepted principles of international law, as referred to in the
Constitution, include customary international law. Customary international law is
one of the primary sources of international law under Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice. Customary international law consists of acts
which, by repetition of States of similar international acts for a number of years,
occur out of a sense of obligation, and taken by a significant number of States. It is
based on custom, which is a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions,
which has grown under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according
to international law, obligatory or right. Thus, customary international law requires
the concurrence of two elements: [1] the established, wide-spread, and consistent
practice on the part of the States; and [2] a psychological element known as opinio
juris sive necessitatis (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element
is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it.[35]
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,[36] the International Court of Justice held
that "[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need
for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element is implicit in the very
notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis."

Moreover, to be considered as customary international law, a rule must apply to

all, or majority of all, states. One possible exception to the universal applicability
of customary international law is local or special custom. A local or special
customary international rule binds only a group of states, regional or otherwise.
[37]
 "Regional customary international law refers to customary international law
that arises from state practice and opinio juris of a discrete and limited number of
states; as it departs from generally applicable customary international law, it is
only binding upon and opposable against those states participating in its
formation."[38]

Generally accepted principles of international law are those legal principles which
are so basic and fundamental that they are found universally in the legal systems
of the world. These principles apply all over the world, not only to a specific
country, region or group of states. Legal principles such as laches, estoppel, good
faith, equity and res judicata are examples of generally accepted principles of
international law.[39] In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Duque III,[40] the Court further explained the concept of generally
accepted principles of law, to wit:
Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a
primary source of international law because they have the "character of jus
rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." (Judge Tanaka in
his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 296).
O'Connell holds that certain principles are part of international law because they
are "basic to legal systems generally" and hence part of the jus gentium. These
principles, he believes, are established by a process of reasoning based on the
common identity of all legal systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement,
one must look to state practice and determine whether the municipal law principle
provides a just and acceptable solution. x x x
C. There is No Customary International Law
Presuming a Foundling as a Citizen
of the Country Where the Foundling is Found

Petitioner claims that under customary international law and generally accepted
principles of international law, she (1) has a right to a nationality from birth; (2)
has a right to be protected against statelessness; and (3) is presumed to be a citizen
of the Philippines where she was found.

Petitioner anchors her claims on the (1) 1989 Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC), (2) 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), (3) 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), (4) 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws (1930 Hague Convention), and (5) the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (CRS), among others.

1. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments
in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January
1990 and ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The Convention defines a child to
mean every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law
applicable to the child, the age of majority is attained earlier.

Since petitioner was born in 1968 or more than 20 years before the Convention
came into existence, the Convention could not have applied to the status of her
citizenship at the time of her birth in 1968. Petitioner's citizenship at birth could
not be affected in any way by the Convention.

The Convention guarantees a child the right to acquire a nationality, and requires

the contracting states to ensure the implementation of this right, in particular
where the child would otherwise be stateless. Thus, as far as nationality is
concerned, the Convention guarantees the right of the child to acquire a nationality
so that the child will not be stateless. The Convention does not guarantee
a child a nationality at birth, much less a natural born citizenship at birth as
understood under the Philippine Constitution, but merely the right to acquire
a nationality in accordance with municipal law.

2. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,

language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.

xxxx

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. (Emphasis supplied)

Adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes "the ideal of free
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and
want which can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may
enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural
rights."[41]

The Philippines is a signatory to this international treaty. Similar to the text of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the ICCPR does not obligate states to
automatically grant a nationality to children at birth. The Covenant merely
recognizes the right of a child to acquire a nationality. In short, the Covenant
does not guarantee a foundling a nationality at birth, much less natural-born
citizenship at birth as understood under the Philippine Constitution.

3. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Article 15.

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality. (Emphasis supplied)
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on 10 December 1948 whereby "Member States (including the
Philippines) have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms."[42] It sets out, for the first time, fundamental human
rights to be universally protected.[43]

Article 15(1) of the UDHR simply affirms the right of every human being to a
nationality. Being a mere declaration, such right guaranteed by the UDHR
does not obligate states to automatically confer nationality to a foundling at
birth, much less natural-born citizenship at birth as understood under the
Philippine Constitution.

4. The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of

Nationality Laws
Article 14.

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country
of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined
by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found.

Article 15.

Where the nationality of a State is not acquired automatically by reason of birth on

its territory, a child born on the territory of that State of parents having no
nationality, or of unknown nationality, may obtain the nationality of the said
State. The law of that State shall determine the conditions governing the
acquisition of its nationality in such cases. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is not a signatory to this Convention, and therefore, it is not bound
by the Convention. Petitioner, however, claims that this Convention is evidence of
"generally accepted principles of international law," which allegedly created the
presumption that a foundling is a citizen at birth of the state in which the foundling
is found.

Article 14 merely states that a foundling "shall have the nationality of

the country of birth." It does not say that a foundling shall have
the nationality at birth of the country where the foundling is found. Nowhere in
Article 14 is nationality guaranteed to a foundling at birth, much less natural-
born citizenship at birth as understood under the Philippine
Constitution. Likewise, Article 14 merely lays down the presumption that a
foundling is born in the territory of the state in which the foundling is found. This
is the only presumption that Article 14 establishes.

Article 15 acknowledges the fact that acquisition of nationality by reason of birth

in a state's territory is not automatic. Article 15 expressly states that municipal
law shall "determine the conditions governing the acquisition of its
nationality" by a foundling. Thus, to implement the Convention the contracting
parties have to enact statutory legislation prescribing the conditions for the
acquisition of citizenship by a foundling. This rules out any automatic acquisition
of citizenship at birth by a foundling.

5. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

Article 1

1. A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory
who would otherwise be stateless. Such nationality shall be granted:

(a) at birth, by operation of law, or

(b) upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on

behalf of the person concerned, in the manner prescribed by the national
law. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, no such application
may be rejected.

A Contracting State which provides for the grant of its nationality in accordance
with sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph may also provide for the grant of its
nationality by operation of law at such age and subject to such conditions as may
be prescribed by the national law.

xxxx

Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within that territory
of parents possessing the nationality of that State. (Emphasis supplied)
A 1961 United Nations multilateral treaty, the primary aim of the Convention is
the prevention of statelessness by requiring states to grant citizenship to children
born in their territory, or born to their nationals abroad, who would otherwise be
stateless. To prevent statelessness in such cases, states have the option to grant
nationality (1) at birth by operation of law, or (2) subsequently by
application. In short, a contracting state to the Convention must enact an
implementing law choosing one of the two options before the Convention can
be implemented in that state.

The Philippines is not a signatory to this Convention, and thus, the Philippines is a
non-contracting state. The Convention does not bind the Philippines. Moreover,
this Convention does not provide automatically that a foundling is a citizen at birth
of the country in which the foundling is found.

Article 2 of the Convention provides, "A foundling found in the territory of a

Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to
have been born of parents possessing the nationality of that state." Dr. Laura van
Waas explains the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention, as follows:
Once more, the wording of this provision is evidence of the compromise reached
between jus soli and jus sanguinis countries. Rather than determining that
a child found abandoned on the territory of the state will automatically
acquire the nationality of that state, it declares that the child will be assumed to
have both the necessary jus soli and jus sanguinis links with the state: born on the
territory to parents possessing the nationality of the state. This means that
the child will then simply acquire nationality ex lege under the normal
operation of the state's nationality regulations - the effect being the same in
both jus soli and jus sanguinis regimes. No attempt is made to further define the
type of evidence that may be accepted as "proof to the contrary", this being left to
the discretion of the contracting states.[44] (Emphasis supplied)
First, Article 2 applies only to a "foundling found in the territory of a
Contracting State." The Philippines is not a contracting state to the Convention
and thus Article 2, and the entire Convention, does not apply to the Philippines.

Second, there must be "absence of proof" that the parents of the foundling do not
possess the nationality of another state. This means there must be an
administrative or judicial proceeding to determine this factual issue, an act
necessary to acquire the citizenship of the state where the foundling is found. This
also means that the grant of citizenship under Article 2 is not automatic, as Dr.
Laura van Waas explains. This factual determination prevents the foundling from
acquiring natural-born citizenship at birth as understood under our Constitution,
assuming Article 2 applies to the Philippines.

Third, the grant of citizenship under Article 2 is ex lege which means by operation
of law - referring to municipal statutory law. Assuming Article 2 applies to the
Philippines, and it does not, this grant of citizenship refers to naturalization by
operation of law, the category of citizens under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution (now Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1987
Constitution), or "[t]hose who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Nationality at birth may result because the law applicable is either jus soli or jus
sanguinis. A child born in the United States to foreign parents is a citizen of the
United States at birth because the United States adopts the jus soli principle. Under
the jus soli principle, the place of birth determines citizenship at birth, not blood
relation to the parents. In contrast, a child born in the Philippines to foreign
parents is not a Philippine citizen at birth but a foreigner because the Philippines
follows the jus sanguinis principle. Under the jus sanguinis principle, citizenship
at birth is determined by blood relation to the parents.

Nationality at birth does not necessarily mean natural-born citizenship as

prescribed under the Philippine Constitution. The Constitution recognizes natural-
born citizens at birth only under the principle of jus sanguinis there must be a
blood relation by the child to a Filipino father or mother. Even assuming, and there
is none, that there is an international law granting a foundling citizenship, at birth,
of the country where the foundling is found, it does not necessarily follow that the
foundling qualifies as a natural-born citizen under the Philippine Constitution. In
the Philippines, any citizenship granted at birth to a child with no known blood
relation to a Filipino parent can only be allowed by way of naturalization as
mandated by the Constitution, under paragraph 5, Section 1 of Article IV of the
1935 Constitution,[45] paragraph 4, Section 1 of Article III of the 1973
Constitution,[46] and paragraph 4, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
[47]
 Such a child is a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In sum, there is no international treaty to which the Philippines is a contracting

party, which provides expressly or impliedly that a foundling is deemed a natural-
born citizen of the country in which the foundling is found.[48] There is also
obviously no international treaty, to which the Philippines is not a party, obligating
the Philippines to confer automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at
birth.
Since the Philippines is not a signatory to the various international conventions
regulating nationality,[49] we shall scrutinize whether the relevant provisions on
foundlings contained in the international conventions cited by petitioner have
become part of customary international law or generally accepted principles of
international law on nationality.

We shall first lay down the basic premise for an international rule to be considered
customary international law. Such a rule must comply with the twin elements of
widespread and consistent state practice, the objective element; and opinio juris
sive necessitatis, the subjective element. State practice refers to the continuous
repetition of the same or similar kind of acts or norms by states. It is demonstrated
upon the existence of the following elements: (1) generality or widespread
practice; (2) uniformity and consistency; and (3) duration. On the other
hand, opinio juris, the psychological element, requires that the state practice or
norm be carried out in the belief that this practice or norm is obligatory as a matter
of law.[50]

The pertinent provisions on foundlings are found in the 1930 Hague Convention
and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention and Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness state, respectively: (1) "A foundling is, until the contrary is proved,
presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found";
and (2) "A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within that
territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State."

We shall limit our discussion to Article 2 of the Convention on the Reduction of

Statelessness since the presumption in Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention
concerns merely the place of birth of foundlings. In this case, the parties admit
that petitioner was born in Jaro, Iloilo in the Philippines, which is the same place
where she was found. Therefore, it is no longer presumed that petitioner was born
in the territory of the Philippines since it is already an admitted fact that she was
born in the Philippines.

There are only 64 States which have ratified the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness as of February 2016.[51] Out ofthe 193 Member States of the United
Nations,[52] far less than a majority signified their agreement to the Convention.

One of the essential elements of customary international law is the widespread and
consistent practice by states of a specific international principle, in this case, that
foundlings are presumed to be born to parents who are citizens of the state where
the foundling is found. Petitioner failed to prove this objective element. Prof.
Malcolm N. Shaw, in his widely used textbook International Law, explains the
meaning of widespread and consistent practice in this way:
One particular analogy that has been used to illustrate the general nature of
customary law as considered by de Visscher. He likened the growth of custom to
the gradual formation of a road across vacant land. After an initial uncertainty as
to direction, the majority of users begin to follow the same line which becomes a
single path. Not long elapses before that path is transformed into a road accepted
as the only regular way, even though it is not possible to state at which precise
moment this latter change occurs. And so it is with the formation of a custom. De
Visscher develops this idea by reflecting that just as some make heavier footprints
than others due to their greater weight, the more influential states of the world
mark the way with more vigour and tend to become the guarantors and defenders
ofthe way forward.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
Prof. Shaw concludes, "Accordingly, custom should to some extent mirror the
perceptions of the majority of states, since it is based upon usages which are
practiced by nations as they express their power and their hopes and fears." [54]

Petitioner manifestly failed to show that Article 2 of the Convention on the

Reduction of Statelessness is an "established, widespread and consistent
practice" of a majority of sovereign states. There is no showing that this
Convention was in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the members
of the United Nations. Petitioner claims that "ratification by a majority of states is
not essential for a principle contained in an international treaty or convention to be
'customary international law.'"[55] On the other hand, it is generally accepted by
international law writers that the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
does not constitute customary international law precisely because of the small
number of states that have ratified the Convention. Dr. Laura van Waas
summarizes the state of the law on this issue:
In order to contend that a rule of customary international law has thereby been
established, we must also prove that states are legislating in this way due to the
conviction that they are legally compelled to do so - the opinio juris sive
necessitatis. The codification of the obligation to grant nationality to
foundlings in the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Statelessness
Convention cannot be taken as sufficient evidence due, mainly, to the low
number of state parties to both instruments.[56] (Emphasis supplied)
It is hornbook law that there is no general international law, whether customary
international law or generally accepted principle of international law, obligating
the Philippines, or any state for that matter, to automatically confer citizenship to
foundlings at birth. As Prof. Serena Forlati writes: "It is thus not possible to
conclude that every child who would otherwise be stateless is automatically
entitled to the nationality of her or his country of birth under the ICCPR, the CRC
or general internationallaw."[57]

Out of the 64 parties to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, only 13

states provide for the automatic and unconditional acquisition of nationality
by foundlings.[58] This means that the majority of the contracting states to the
Convention do not automatically confer nationality to foundlings at birth. In fact,
the majority of the contracting states impose various conditions for the acquisition
of nationality to prevent statelessness, such as proof of unknown parentage, the
specific place where the foundling is found, and whether the foundling is a
newborn infant or a child of a certain age, among others. These conditions must
necessarily be established in the appropriate proceeding before the foundling can
acquire citizenship. These conditions for the acquisition of citizenship effectively
prevent a foundling from being automatically considered a citizen at birth. In the
Philippines, such conditions will prevent a foundling from being considered a
natural-born citizen as defined under the Philippine Constitution.

Since the first essential element for an international rule to be considered a

customary international law is missing in this case, the second essential element
of opinio juris is logically lacking as well. In fact, petitioner failed to demonstrate
that any compliance by member states with the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness was obligatory in nature. In Bayan Muna v. Romulo,[59] the Court
held:
Absent the widespread/consistent-practice-of-states factor, the second or the
psychological element must be deemed non-existent, for an inquiry on why states
behave the way they do presupposes, in the first place, that they are actually
behaving, as a matter of settled and consistent practice, in a certain manner. This
implicitly requires belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. Like the first element, the second element
has likewise not been shown to be present.
Moreover, aside from the fact that the Philippines is not a contracting party to the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Article 2 of the Convention is
inapplicable to this case because the Convention, which took effect after the birth
of petitioner, does not have retroactive effect. Paragraph 3, Article 12 of the
Convention explicitly states:
3. The provisions of Article 2 of this Convention shall apply only to foundlings
found in the territory of a Contracting State after the entry into force of the
Convention for that State. (Emphasis supplied)
In short, even if the Philippines were to ratify the Convention today, the
Convention would still not benefit petitioner who was born in 1968.

D. Applicable Customary International Law on

Citizenship of Foundlings

While there is no customary international law conferring nationality to foundlings

at birth, there is no dispute that petitioner has the right to a nationality and the
corollary right to be protected against statelessness.

The Philippines is not a signatory to the 1930 Hague Convention or to the

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. However, the Philippines is a
signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Philippines also adheres to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The salient provisions of the CRC, the ICCPR and the UDHR on nationality
establish principles that are considered customary international law because of the
widespread and consistent practice of states and their obligatory nature among
states. Generally, most states recognize the following core nationality provisions:
(1) every human being has a right to a nationality; (2) states have the obligation to
avoid statelessness; and (3) states have the obligation to facilitate the
naturalization of stateless persons, including foundlings living within such states.

Right to a Nationality

Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that "everyone

has the right to a nationality." With these words, the international community
recognizes that every individual, everywhere in the world, should hold a legal
bond of nationality with a state.[60]

The right to a nationality is a fundamental human right[61] from which springs

the realization of other cardinal human rights. Possession of a nationality carries
with it the diplomatic protection of the country of nationality and is also often a
legal or practical requirement for the exercise of political and civil rights.
Consequently, the right to a nationality has been described as the "right to have
rights."[62]

Obligation to Avoid Statelessness

Closely linked to the right of the individual to a nationality is every state's

obligation to avoid statelessness since the non-fulfillment of such right results in
statelessness.[63] In determining who are its nationals, every state has an obligation
to avoid cases of statelessness.

Obligation to Facilitate the Naturalization of Stateless Persons, Including

Foundlings

The right to confer nationality, being an inherent right of every independent state,
carries with it the obligation to grant nationality to individuals who would
otherwise be stateless. To do this, states must facilitate the naturalization of
stateless persons, including foundlings. Therefore, states must institute the
appropriate processes and mechanisms, through the passage of appropriate statutes
or guidelines, to comply with this obligation.

Most states recognize as customary international law the right of every human
being to a nationality which in tum, requires those states to avoid statelessness,
and to facilitate the naturalization of stateless persons, including foundlings.
However, there is no customary international law conferring automatically
citizenship at birth to foundlings, much less natural-born citizenship at birth as
understood under the Philippine Constitution.

E. General Principle of International Law Applicable to Foundlings

Considering that there is no conventional or customary international law

automatically conferring nationality to foundlings at birth, there are only two
general principles of international law applicable to foundlings. First is that a
foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is found. A
foundling is merely considered to have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at
birth. Stated otherwise, a foundling receives at birth a domicile of origin which is
the country in which the foundling is found.[64]

Second, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a foundling is deemed born in the
country where the foundling is found.[65] These two general principles of
international law have nothing to do with conferment of nationality.

F. Status of International Law Principles in the Philippines

Under Section 3, Article II of the 1935 Constitution,[66] Section 3, Article II of the

1973 Constitution,[67] and Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,[68] the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. International law can become part of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation.[69] The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as domestic legislation.[70] The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the
force of domestic law.[71]
The Philippine Constitution adheres to the incorporation method.

Any treaty, customary international law, or generally accepted international law

principle has the status of municipal statutory law. As such, it must conform to
our Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines. If a treaty, customary
international law or generally accepted international law principle does not
contravene the Constitution and statutory laws, then it becomes part of the law of
the land. If a treaty, customary international law or generally accepted
international law principle conforms to the Constitution but conflicts with
statutory law, what prevails is the later law in point of time as international law
has the same standing as municipal statutory law.[72] However, if a treaty,
customary international law or generally accepted international law principle
conflicts with the Constitution, it is the Constitution that prevails. The Constitution
remains supreme and prevails over any international legal instrument or principle
in case of conflict. In explaining Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
constitutionalist Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J. narrated:
When Commissioner Guingona asked whether "generally accepted principles of
international law" were adopted by this provision as part of statutory law or of
constitutional law, Nolledo's answer was unclear. He seemed to suggest that at
least the provisions of the United Nations Charter would form part of both
constitutional and statutory law. Nobody adverted to the fact that Nolledo's
interpretation was a departure from what had hitherto been the accepted meaning
of the provision. Later, however, during the period of amendment, Commissioner
Azcuna clarified this by saying that generally accepted principles of
international law were made part only of statutory law and not of
constitutionallaw.[73] (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties, customary international law and the generally accepted principles of
international law concerning citizenship cannot prevail over the provisions of the
Constitution on citizenship in case of conflict with the latter.[74] Treaties,
customary international law or generally accepted international law principles on
acquisition of citizenship that contravene the language and intent of the
Constitution cannot be given effect in the Philippines for being unconstitutional.

Assuming arguendo that there was in 1935 and thereafter a customary

international law conferring nationality to foundlings at birth, still foundlings
could not be considered as natural-born Filipino citizens since to treat them as
such would conflict with the concept of jus sanguinis under the 1935 Constitution.
As stated, in case of conflict between customary international law and the
Constitution, it is the Constitution that prevails. The 1935 Constitution clearly
required blood relation to the father to establish the natural-born citizenship of
a child. The 1935 Constitution did not contain any provision expressly or
impliedly granting Filipino citizenship to foundlings on the basis of birth in the
Philippines (jus soli or law of the soil),[75] with the presumption of Filipino
parentage so as to make them natural-born citizens.

Even assuming there was in 1935 and thereafter a customary international law
granting to foundlings citizenship at birth, such citizenship at birth is not identical
to the citizenship of a child who is biologically born to Filipino parents. The
citizenship of a foundling can be granted at birth by operation of law, but the
foundling is considered "naturalized in accordance with law" and not a natural-
born citizen. Since a foundling's nationality is merely granted by operation of
statutory law, specifically customary international law (which has the status of
statutory law) assuming such exists, a foundling can only be deemed a Filipino
citizen under paragraph 5, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution which
refers to naturalized Filipino citizens. To add another category of natural-born
Filipino citizens, particularly foundlings born in the Philippines whose parents are
unknown, conflicts with the express language and intent of the 1935 Constitution
to limit natural-born Filipino citizens to those whose fathers are Filipino citizens.

In short, there is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli, and
citizenship at birth because of jus sanguinis. The former may be granted to
foundlings under Philippine statutory law pursuant to paragraph (5), Section 1 of
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution but the Philippine citizenship thus granted is
not that of a natural-born citizen but that of a naturalized citizen. Only those
citizens at birth because of jus sanguinis, which requires blood relation to a
parent, are natural-born Filipino citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.

Foundlings as Naturalized Filipino Citizens

If a child's parents are neither Filipino citizens, the only way that the child may be
considered a Filipino citizen is through the process of naturalization in accordance
with statutory law under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935
Constitution. If a child's parents are unknown, as in the case of a foundling, there
is no basis to consider the child as a natural born Filipino citizen since there is no
proof that either the child's father or mother is a Filipino citizen. Thus, the only
way that a foundling can be considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935
Constitution, as well as under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for the
foundling to be naturalized in accordance with law.

In the Philippines, there are laws which provide for the naturalization of
foreigners. These are Commonwealth Act No. 473,[76] as amended by Republic Act
No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which refers to judicial
naturalization, and Republic Act No. 9139,[77] which pertains to administrative
naturalization.

Significantly, there is no Philippine statute which provides for the grant of Filipino
citizenship specifically to foundlings who are found in the Philippines. The
absence of a domestic law on the naturalization of foundlings can be sufficiently
addressed by customary international law, which recognizes the right of every
human being to a nationality and obligates states to grant nationality to avoid
statelessness. Customary international law can fill the gap in our municipal
statutory law on naturalization of foundlings in order to prevent foundlings from
being stateless. Otherwise, a foundling found in the Philippines with no known
parents will be stateless on the sole ground that there is no domestic law providing
for the grant of nationality. This not only violates the right of every human being
to a nationality but also derogates from the Philippines' obligation to grant
nationality to persons to avoid statelessness.

Customary international law has the same status as a statute enacted by Congress.
Thus, it must not run afoul with the Constitution. Customary international law
cannot validly amend the Constitution by adding another category of natural-born
Filipino citizens, specifically by considering foundlings with no known parents as
natural-born citizens. Again, under paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 1, Article
IVofthe 1935 Constitution, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, only those born of Filipino fathers or Filipino mothers are considered
natural-born Filipino citizens.

Applying customary international law to the present case, specifically the right of
every human being to a nationality and the Philippines' obligation to grant
citizenship to persons who would otherwise be stateless, a foundling may be
naturalized as a Filipino citizen upon proper application for citizenship. This
application should not be interpreted in the strictest sense of the word. On the
contrary, the term "application" for purposes of acquiring citizenship must be
construed liberally in order to facilitate the naturalization of foundlings. The
application for citizenship may be any overt act which involves recognition by the
Philippines that the foundling is indeed its citizen. Thus, the application for
citizenship may be as simple as applying for a Philippine passport, which serves as
evidence of citizenship.[78]  An application for a passport is an application for
recognition that the holder is a citizen of the state issuing such passport. In the
case of petitioner, she applied for, and was issued a Philippine passport on the
following dates: (1) 4 April 1988;[79] (2) 5 April 1993;[80] (3) 19 May 1998;[81] (4)
13 October 2009;[82] (5) 19 December 2013;[83] and (6) 18 March 2014.[84]

In any event, for a foundling to be granted citizenship, it is necessary that

the child's status as a foundling be first established. It must be proven that
the child has no known parentage before the state can grant citizenship on account
of the child being a foundling. In the Philippines, a child is determined to be a
foundling after an administrative investigation verifying that the child is of
unknown parentage. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Act No.
3753[85] and Other Laws on Civil Registration provide that the barangay captain or
police authority shall certify that no one has claimed the child or no one has
reported a missing child with the description of the foundling.[86] Rule 29 of the
said IRR provides:
RULE 29. Requirements for Registration of Foundling. - No foundling shall be
recorded in the civil registrar unless the following requirements are complied with:

a) Certificate of Foundling (OCRG Form No. 101, Revised January 1993)

accomplished correctly and completely;

b) Affidavit of the finder stating the facts and circumstances surrounding the
finding of the child, and the fact that the foundling has been reported to the
barangay captain or to the police authority, as the case may be; and

c) Certification of the barangay captain or police authority regarding the

report made by the finder, stating among other things, that no one has
claimed the child or no one has reported a missing child whose description
may be the same as the foundling as of the date of the certification. (Emphasis
supplied)
Before a foundling is conferred Philippine citizenship, there must first be a factual
determination of the child's status as a foundling after an administrative
investigation. Once factually determined that a child is a foundling,
that child through its guardian may thereafter initiate proceedings to apply for
Philippine citizenship, e.g., apply for a Philippine passport.
This need for a factual determination prevents the foundling from automatically
acquiring Philippine citizenship at birth. The fact of unknown parentage must first
be proven in an administrative proceeding before a foundling is granted citizenship
on account of the child's foundling status. Such factual determination is a
necessary act to acquire Philippine citizenship, preventing the foundling from
being a natural-born Filipino citizen. In contrast, for natural-born Filipino citizens,
no factual determination in an administrative proceeding is required to grant
citizenship since the certificate of live birth speaks for itself- it establishes natural-
born citizenship.

Erroneous Interpretation of Statistics

During the Oral Arguments, the Solicitor General insisted that petitioner is a
natural-born Filipino citizen based on the 99.93% statistical probability that
any child born in the Philippines from 2010 to 2014 would be a natural-born
Filipino citizen. From 1965 to 1975, there is a 99.83% statistical probability that
a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino citizen. To buttress
his position, the Solicitor General presented a certification from the Philippine
Statistics Authority showing the "number of foreign and Filipino children born
in the Philippines: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014."

This is grave error.

There is no law or jurisprudence which supports the Solicitor General's contention

that natural-born citizenship can be conferred on a foundling based alone on
statistical probability. Absent any legal foundation for such argument, the Solicitor
General cannot validly conclude that a 99.93% (or 99.83%) statistical probability
that a foundling born in the Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen legally
confers on such foundling natural-born citizenship. There is no constitutional
provision or statute that confers natural-born citizenship based on statistical
probability.

The Solicitor General's data speak of foreign and Filipino births in the
Philippines. The data collected show the number of foreign and Filipino children
born in the Philippines during the periods covered. This means that the figures
reflect the total number of children born in the Philippines with known parents,
either Filipino or foreigner. The data do not show the number of foundlings
(those with unknown parentage) born in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975 and
from 2010 to 2014. The data also do not show the number of foundlings who were
later determined to have Filipino parentage. This is precisely because foundlings
have unknown parents. A foundling's unknown parentage renders it quite difficult,
if not impossible, to collect data on "the number of foreign and Filipino
foundlings."

For the Solicitor General's proposition to be correct, he should have presented

statistics specifically based on the number of foundlings born in the Philippines,
and not on the number of children born in the Philippines with known foreign or
Filipino parents. Children with known parents constitute a class entirely different
from foundlings with unknown parents. Gathering data from the number of
children born in the Philippines with known parents to determine the number of
foundlings born in the Philippines to confer natural-born citizenship on foundlings
resembles comparing apples with oranges and avocados. Since the figures were
collected from the universe of children with known parents, either Filipinos or
foreigners, and not from the universe of foundlings, the Solicitor General's
proposition is fallacious in concluding that foundlings in the Philippines are
natural-born Filipino citizens.

Further, if there is a 99.93% (or 99.83%) probability that a child born in the

Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen, it does not automatically follow that
there is a 99.93% (or 99.83%) probability that a foundling born in the Philippines
is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The data, if any, on the universe of foundlings
may show a different statistical probability. There is evidently no such statistical
data. Therefore, the Solicitor General's argument that the probability that a
foundling born in the Philippines would be a natural-born Filipino is 99.93% (or
99.83%) based on the number of children born in the Philippines with known
parents is glaringly nonsequitur.

The following exchange between Justice Carpio and the Solicitor General
illustrates the fallacy of the so-called 99.93% (99.83%) statistical probability
advanced by the Solicitor General. Such statistical probability would result in
patent absurdities.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, how does the Constitution define natural-born citizen?

xxxx

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. Let us assume that an infant is found, a three day infant is found today
in front of the Manila Cathedral. The infant has blue eyes, blonde hair, milky
white skin. The parish priest looks around and doesn't find any one claiming
the child. So, the parish priest goes to the DSWD, turns over the child to the
DSWD. The DSWD conducts an investigation, a formal investigation, to find
out if the biological parents are around if they can be found. Nobody comes
out, so the DSWD issues a foundling certificate, okay. What is the nationality
of the child? Is the child a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

I would consider the child a natural-born citizen of the Philippines because
99.9 percent of the time, that child will be a natural born citizen.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
So even if the child has blue eyes, blonde hair, Caucasian skin...

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

It's possible for Filipinos to have blue eyes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: Blonde hair?

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

It's possible Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
How many percent?

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Again, Your Honor, if we are looking at percentage....

JUSTICE CARPIO:
How many percent of Filipinos, natural-born, have blue eyes, blonde hair, white
skin, 99.9 percent?

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

I don't know about the specific numbers.....

xxxx

JUSTICE CARPIO:
You don't have the statistics.

xxxx

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

I don't, Your Honor, I don't.

xxxx

JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, you would say that every child born in the Philippines who has blue eyes,
blonde hair, white skin, whose parents cannot be found, and there is a certificate
by the DSWD that's a foundling, they are all natural born citizens of the
Philippines. If Filipino....

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Your Honor, I am not threatened by people with blue eyes and, you know,
blonde...

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, but my question is, what is the nationality of those children, of those infants?

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Natural-born Filipinos still, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Supposing now, there is a DNA taken from the child[ren], you say they are
natural-born citizens. The DNA shows that they have Caucasian genes, no
Asian genes at all, would you say they are natural-born citizens of the
Philippines?

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Well, it's possible for Caucasians to be Filipinos, Your Honor, and natural-born
Filipinos.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
If their parents are Filipinos.

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Yes, exactly, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
But if you don't know who their parents....

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Then I, again, would go back to 99.9 percent, which is a rather comfortable
number for me.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, but how many percent of Filipinos have blue eyes, blonde hair and white
skin?

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

That is an irrelevant fact for me, Your Honor. I'm not looking at the class of
citizens....

xxxx

JUSTICE CARPIO:
You have to look at the statistics also.

SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Yes, Your Honor, ofcourse.[87] (Emphasis supplied)
For the Solicitor General to assert that a foundling with blond hair, blue eyes, and
milky white Caucasian skin, with no Asian gene in the foundling's DNA, is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, is the height of absurdity. The Solicitor General's
position amends the Constitution and makes jus soli the governing principle for
foundlings, contrary to the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in the 1935, 1973,
and 1987 Constitutions.

Philippine Laws and Jurisprudence on Adoption

Not Determinative of Natural-Born Citizenship

During the Oral Arguments, the Chief Justice cited Republic Act No. 8552 (RA
8552) or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 and Republic Act No. 8043 (RA
8043) or the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 in arguing that there are domestic
laws which govern the citizenship of foundlings.

This is an obvious mistake.

The term "natural-born Filipino citizen" does not appear in these statutes
describing qualified adoptees. In fact, while the term "Filipino" is mentioned, it is
found only in the title of RA 8552 and RA 8043. The texts of these adoption laws
do not contain the term "Filipino." Specifically, the provisions on the qualified
adoptees read:
RA 8552, Section 8

Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. - The following may be adopted:

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or
judicially declared available for adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to

that of legitimacy;

(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been
consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since
minority;

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no

proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said
parent(s).

RA 8053, Section 8

Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. - Only a legally free child may be the subject of

inter-country adoption. x x x.
Clearly, there is no specific provision in these adoption laws requiring that
adoptees must be Filipinos, much less natural-born Filipinos. These adoption laws
do not distinguish between a Filipino child and an alien child found in the
Philippines, and thus these adoption laws apply to both Filipino and alien children
found in the Philippines. In other words, either Filipino or alien children found in
the Philippines, over which the Philippine government exercises jurisdiction as
they are presumed domiciled in the Philippines, may be subject to adoption under
RA 8552 or RA 8043.

However, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8552, issued by the

Department of Social Welfare and Development, provide that they shall "apply to
the adoption in the Philippines of a Filipino child by a Filipino or alien qualified
to adopt under Article III, Section 7 of RA 8552."[88] The IRR, in effect, restricted
the scope of RA 8552 when the IRR expressly limited its applicability to the
adoption of a Filipino child when the law itself, RA 8552, does not distinguish
between a Filipino and an alien child. In such a case, the IRR must yield to the
clear terms of RA 8552. Basic is the rule that the letter of the law is controlling
and cannot be amended by an administrative rule. In Perez v. Phil. Telegraph and
Telephone Co.,[89] the Court declared:
At the outset, we reaffirm the time-honored doctrine that, in case of conflict, the
law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. The
authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be
valid, a rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of
the enabling statute. As such, it cannot amend the law either by abridging or
expanding its scope. (Emphasis supplied)
In Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank of the Philippines,[90] the Court ruled:
x x x [I]n case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued
to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned.
In Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Drilon,[91] the Court stated:
x x x [I]t is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract
from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of
Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage
increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The
implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the
law.

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a

particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
The following exchange during the Oral Arguments highlights the Chief Justice's
glaringly erroneous interpretation of RA 8552 and RA 8043, thus:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, Let's go to x x x adoption laws. x x x [W]e have an adoption law, correct?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
x x x Republic Act...8552?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
It says who can be adopted, correct? Who may be adopted? Section 8, correct?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Does it say there that the adoptee must be a citizen of the Philippines?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
x x x Can you read Section 8.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
I stand corrected, Your Honor, it does not require citizenship.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
There is no requirement.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Because the law covers citizens of the Philippines and children not citizens of
Philippines but found here.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
If a foundling cannot be shown to be a citizen of the Philippines, can we exercise
jurisdiction and have that child adopted?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Do we have the power, the State has the power? Yes, because a foundling is
deemed to be domiciled where?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
In the place ofhis birth.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
If his place [of] birth is unknown, where is he presumed to be domiciled?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
He is presumed to be domiciled in the territory of the State where the foundling is
found.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, because the domicile of a foundling is presumed to be where he is found.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
That's why the State has jurisdiction over him for adoption purposes. And if no
other State will claim him with more reason, we will have jurisdiction over a
foundling, correct?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. So, the law does not distinguish whether Philippine citizen or non-
Philippine citizen, whether natural born-Filipinos or naturalized, none. There's no
distinction?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
That's correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. Let's go to the Supreme Court x x x rule on adoption. We adopted this in
2002. What does it say? Who may be adopted?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Any person below 18 years of age...

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Does it say that only citizens of the Philippines?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
There's no...

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
...nothing there which says only citizens of the Philippines can be adopted.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Precisely because we don't know the citizenship of a foundling.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
That's right, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
That's why it's not required that he would be a Filipino, correct?

COMMISSIOl'JER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. Let's go to the implementing rule and regulation of R.A. 8552. x x x. It says
here, this is an implementing rule and regulation to implement Republic Act 8552.
So this was promulgated by the administrative agency, by DSWD, correct?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. It says here applicability, Section 2, the Rule shall apply to the adoption in
the Philippines of a Filipino child by a Filipino or alien qualified to adopt. So it
limits adoption to Philippines citizens, to a Filipino child?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, This is supposed to implement the law. Can the implementing rules restrict
the law?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Water cannot rise higher than its source, Your Honor...

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
The IRR....

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Do you have a decision, jurisprudence for that, that an Implementing Rule cannot
expand and cannot deduct from what the law provides?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
I cannot cite one now, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. Cebu Oxygen v. Drilon, x x x. It says here it is a fundamental rule that
Implementing Rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed
to implement. x x x. But this implementing rule says only Filipinos can be
adopted. That cannot be done, correct?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Fundamental rule, if the Court says fundamental rule, all practicing lawyers must
know that, correct?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.[92]
Moreover, contrary to the opinion of the Chief Justice during the Oral Arguments,
the cases of Ellis v. Republic of the Philippines[93] and Duncan v. CFI Rizal[94] do
not apply in this case since the Ellis and Duncan cases do not involve foundlings
or their citizenship. These two cases are about adoption, not about citizenship or
foundlings.

In Ellis, the only issue before the Court was whether petitioners, not being
permanent residents in the Philippines, were qualified to adopt Baby Rose. The
citizenship of the abandoned Baby Rose was not put in issue. Baby Rose's mother
was known since she delivered Baby Rose at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital but
left Baby Rose four days later to the Heart of Mary Villa, an institution for unwed
mothers and their babies. The Court in Ellis stated:
Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959, at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital.
Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa -
an institution for unwed mothers and their babies - stating that she (the mother)
could not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family.).
[95]

In short, Baby Rose was not a foundling because her mother was known. The
Court merely mentioned in the decision that Baby Rose was a "citizen of the
Philippines," thus, the local courts have jurisdiction over her status. The term
"natural-born Filipino citizen" is not found in the decision.

On the other hand, the case of Duncan involved solely the issue of whether or not
the person who gave the consent for adoption, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez,
was the proper person required by law to give such consent. The unwed mother
entrusted the baby to Atty. Velasquez who knew the mother. The Court
in Duncan stated:
Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition, undisputedly
declared as only three days old then, was turned over by its mother to witness
Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The natural and unwedded mother, from that
date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in court which started in mid- year
of said 1967, and up to the present, has not bothered to inquire into the condition
of the child, much less to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the
same. x x x.We are convinced that in fact said mother had completely and
absolutely abandoned her child.[96]
In short, the baby was not a foundling because the mother was known. Again, the
Court did not mention the term "natural-born Filipino citizen." Neither did the
Court classify the abandoned infant as a Filipino citizen.

Burden of Proof

Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving
his or her Philippine citizenship.[97] Any person who claims to be qualified to run
for the position of President of the Philippines because he or she is, among others,
a natural-born Filipino citizen, has the burden of proving he or she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Any doubt whether or not he or she is natural-born Filipino
citizen is resolved against him or her. The constitutional requirement of a natural-
born citizen, being an express qualification for election as President, must be
complied with strictly. As the Court ruled in Paa v. Chan:[98
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to
the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.[99] (Emphasis
supplied)
This statement in Paa was reiterated in the 2009 case of Go, Sr. v. Ramos.
[100]
 Paa and Go lay down three doctrines: First, a person claiming Philippine
citizenship has the burden of proving his claim. Second, there can be no
presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship. This negates petitioner's claim to
any presumption that she is a natural-born Filipino Citizen. Third, any doubt on
citizenship is resolved against the person claiming Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, a person claiming to be a Filipino citizen, whether natural-born or
naturalized, cannot invoke any presumption of citizenship but must establish such
citizenship as a matter of fact and not by presumptions, with any doubt resolved
against him or her.

While it is the burden of the private respondents to first prove the fact of
disqualification before the petitioner is called upon to defend herself with
countervailing evidence,[101] in this case, there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling with unknown biological parents. Since petitioner's parentage is
unknown as shown in her Certificate of Live Birth, such birth certificate does not
show on its face that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. This shifted the burden
of evidence to petitioner to prove that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen eligible
to run as President of the Philippines.

Since the Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines shall be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, it is imperative that petitioner prove that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, despite the fact that she is a foundling. The
burden of evidence shifted to her when she admitted her status as a foundling with
no known biological parents. At that moment, it became her duty to prove that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen.[102]

DNA Evidence

As the burden of evidence has shifted to petitioner, it is her duty to present

evidence to support her claim that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and thus
eligible to run for President. The issue of parentage may be resolved by
conventional methods or by using available modem and scientific means.[103] One
of the evidence that she could have presented is deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
evidence[104] which could conclusively show that she is biologically (maternally or
paternally) related to a Filipino citizen, which in tum would determine whether she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The probative value of such DNA evidence, however, would still have to be
examined by the Court. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the
Court would consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples
were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.[105] More specifically, they
must be evaluated in accordance with A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC or the Rule on DNA
Evidence:[106]
Sec. 9. Evaluation of DNA Testing Results. - In evaluating the results of DNA
testing, the court shall consider the following:

(a) The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of
mismatching DNA evidence;

(b) The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence
presented in the case; and that

(c) DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive
proof of non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of Paternity[107] is less than
99.9% the results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall
be a disputable presumption of paternity.
Petitioner is Not a Natural-Born Filipino Citizen

The 1987 Philippine Constitution is clear: "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, x x x, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." Is
petitioner, being a foundling, a natural-born Filipino citizen?

The answer is clearly no. First, there is no Philippine law automatically conferring

Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Even if there were, such a law would
only result in the foundling being a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether

natural-born or naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a matter of fact and
any doubt is resolved against the person claiming Philippine citizenship.

Third, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings
from being considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The Constitution adopts the
jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those
whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to prove that either
her father or mother is a Filipino citizen.

Fourth, there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of

international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at
birth. Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a customary international law. At
best, there exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in the
country where the foundling is found.

Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary international law presuming that a
foundling is a citizen of the country where the foundling is found, or is born to
parents possessing the nationality of that country, such presumption cannot prevail
over our Constitution since customary international law has the status merely of
municipal statutory law. This means that customary international law is inferior to
the Constitution, and must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since the
Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino
citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, then
petitioner must prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen for her to
be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any international law which
contravenes the jus sanguinis principle in the Constitution must of course be
rejected.

Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Being a foundling, she admitted that she does not know her
biological parents, and therefore she cannot trace blood relation to a Filipino father
or mother. Without credible and convincing evidence that petitioner's biological
father or mother is a Filipino citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-
born Filipino citizen.

Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his or her status as a
foundling, to acquire Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be
deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because the foundling has to perform an act
to acquire Philippine citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law specifically
governing the citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by
customary international law, namely: the right of every human being to a
nationality, and the State's obligations to avoid statelessness and to facilitate the
naturalization of foundlings.
During the Oral Arguments, the purportedly sad and depressing plight of
foundlings if found not to be natural-born Filipino citizens, particularly their
disqualification from being elected to high public office and appointed to high
government positions, had been pointed out once again. As I have stated, this
appeals plainly to human emotions.[108] This emotional plea, however,
conveniently forgets the express language of the Constitution reserving those high
positions, particularly the Presidency, exclusively to natural-born Filipino citizens.
Even naturalized Filipino citizens, whose numbers are far more than foundlings,
are not qualified to run for President. The natural-born citizenship requirement
under the Constitution to qualify as a candidate for President must be complied
with strictly. To rule otherwise amounts to a patent violation of the Constitution. It
is basic in Constitutional Law that the qualification requirements prescribed by the
Constitution must be complied with by all presidential candidates, regardless of
popularity or circumstances. Being sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution,
the Members of this Court have no other choice but to apply the clear letter and
intent of the Constitution.

However, a decision denying natural-born citizenship to a foundling on the ground

of absence of proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent never becomes final.
[109]
 Res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. In Moy Ya Lim Yao v.
Commissioner of Immigration,[110] cited in Lee v. Commissioner of Immigration,
[111]
 this Court declared that:
[e]very time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. x x x.
Likewise, in Go, Sr. v. Ramos,[112] which involved the citizenship of Jimmy T. Go,
as well as his father Carlos, who was alleged to be an illegal and undesirable alien
in our country and thus was subjected to deportation proceedings, the Court stated
that citizenship cases are sui generis and res judicata does not apply in such cases:
x x x Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of
an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided
upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, we said that decisions
declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future
status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Indeed, if the issue of one's citizenship, after it has been passed upon by
the courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why
the government should not be precluded from questioning one's claim to
Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has never been threshed out by
any tribunal.

xxxx

Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other
cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of
decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as
the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship
only if the following concur:

1. a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where

said person is a party;

2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and

3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Consequently, if in the future, petitioner can find a DNA match to a Filipino
parent, or any other credible and convincing evidence showing her Filipino
parentage, then petitioner can still be declared a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Not being a natural-born Filipino citizen, petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose

certificate of candidacy for President can motu proprio be cancelled by the
COMELEC. In fact, the COMELEC is duty-bound to cancel petitioner's COC
because to allow a person who, as found by the COMELEC is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to run for President makes a mockery of the election process.
Since petitioner is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, I deem it irrelevant to
discuss the issue of whether petitioner complied with the ten-year residency
requirement to run for President. At any rate, assuming petitioner is a natural-born
Filipino citizen, which she is not, I concur with Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo's
Dissenting Opinion on the residency issue.

A final word. The Constitution defines natural-born citizens as "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." "From birth" means that the
possession of natural-born citizenship starts at birth and continues to the present
without interruption. The phrase "without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship" means that a person is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen if he or she has to take an oath of allegiance before a public
official to acquire or reacquire Philippine citizenship. This precludes the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship that has been lost through renunciation of
Philippine citizenship. The fact that the reacquisition of citizenship is made
possible only through legislation by Congress - Republic Act No. 9225[113] means
that Philippine citizenship is acquired pursuant to paragraph (4), Section 1 of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, referring to "[t]hose who are naturalized in
accordance with law."

In short, natural-born Filipino citizens who have renounced Philippine citizenship

and pledged allegiance to a foreign country have become aliens, and can reacquire
Philippine citizenship, just like other aliens, only if "naturalized in accordance
with law." Otherwise, a natural-born Filipino citizen who has absolutely
renounced and abjured allegiance to the Philippines and pledged sole
allegiance to the United States, undertaking to bear arms against any foreign
country, including the Philippines, when required by U.S. law,[114] could still
become the Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines by
performing a simple act taking an oath of allegiance before a Philippine public
official to reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship. The framers of the
Constitution, and the Filipino people who ratified the Constitution, could not have
intended such an anomalous situation. For this reason, this Court should one day
revisit the doctrine laid down in Bengson III v. HRET.[115]
ACCORDINGLY, there being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission on Elections En Banc, I vote to DISMISS the petitions.

[1]
 This provision reads:

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately  preceding such election. (Emphasis supplied)
[2]
 Under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[3]
 In G.R. Nos. 221698-700, petitioner assails the COMELEC Resolutions dated
11 December 2015 (issued by the COMELEC's First Division) and 23 December
2015 (issued by the COMELEC En Banc).

In G.R. No. 221697, petitioner assails the COMELEC Resolutions dated 1

December 2015 (issued by the COMELEC's Second Division) and 23 December
2015 (issued by the COMELEC En Banc).
[4]
 This provision pertinently reads:

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers

and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall
[5]
 468 Phil. 421, 624-642 (2004).
[6]
 Id. at 625-626.
[7]
 Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a

verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put
the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
(Emphasis supplied)
[8]
 G.R. No. 206004, 24 February 2015.
[9]
 G.R. No. 161872, 13 April 2004, 427 SCRA 96, 104, 105.
[10]
 Supra note 8.
[11]
 Eduardo Abaya, A Critical Study on the Effect of Adoption on Citizenship
Status in the Philippines, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, February
1948, p. 444 (http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wpcontent/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume
%2023/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201/PLJ%20volume
%2023%20number%201%20-04-%20Eduardo%20Abaya%20-%20A%20Critical
%20Study%20on%20the%20effect%20of%20adoption%20on%20citizenship
%20status%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf; last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[12]
 Eduardo Abaya, A Critical Study on the Effect of Adoption on Citizenship
Status in the Philippines, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, February
1948, p. 448, http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wpcontent/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume
%2023/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201/PLJ%20volume
%2023%20number%201%20-04-%20Eduardo%20Abaya%20-%20A%20Critical
%20Study%20on%20the%20effect%20of%20adoption%20on%20citizenship
%20status%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf; last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[13]
 Some of the cases applying the jus soli principle:

Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912)

Vaño v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 480 (1912)
US v. Ang, 36 Phil. 858 (1917)
US v. Lim Bin, 36 Phil. 924 (1917)
Go Julian v. Government of the Philippines, 45 Phil. 289 (1923)
[14]
 79 Phil. 249 (1947).
[15]
 See Irene R. Cortes and Raphael Perpetuo M. Lotilla, Nationality and
International Law from the Philippine Perspective, Philippine Law Journal, Vol.
60, No. 1, Supplemental Issue, 1985, p. 18 (http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp-
content/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2060/PLJ%20volume
%2060%20supplemental%20issue/PLJ%20Volume%2060%20supplemental
%20issue%20-01%20Irene%20R.%20Cortez%20&%20Rapael%20Perpetuo
%20M.%20Lotilla%20-%20Nationality%20and%201nternational%20Law.pdf;
last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[16]
 Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution reads:

SECTION 2.  Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
[17]
 Sections l and 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provide:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section l hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
[18]
 276 Phil. 758 (1991).
[19]
 Id. at 784.
[20]
 Id. at 782-783.
[21]
 Petitioner's Petition, p. 112. Underscoring in the original and boldfacing
supplied.
[22]
 Manifestation dated 4 January 2016, adopting the Solicitor General's Comment
in G.R. No. 221538, Rizalito Y. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal. Emphasis
supplied.
[23]
 Comment in G.R. No. 221538, pp. 6, 9, 10.
[24]
 Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV, 26
November 1934, pp. 186-188.
[25]
 Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 103-104.
[26]
 23 Phil. 315, 330-331 (1912).
[27]
 This is the English translation of the explanation given by Delegate Roxas
during the deliberations.  Jose M. Aruego, THE FRAMING oF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION, 1949, Vol. 1, pp. 404-405.

The portions of the records read:

SR. ROXAS. Señor Presidente, Ia frase natural born citizen aparece en la

Constitucion de los Estados Unidos; pero los autores dicen que esta frase nunca ha
sido interpretada autoritativamente por la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos,
en vista de que nunca se habia suscitado la cuestion de si un Presidente elegido,
reunia o no esta condicion. Los autores estan uniformes en que las
palabras natural born citizen, quiere decir un ciudadano por nacimiento, una
persona que es ciudadano por razon de su nacimiento y no por naturalizacion o por
cualquiera declaracion ulterior exigida por la ley para su ciudadania. En Filipinas,
por ejemplo, bajo las disposiciones de los articulos sabre ciudadania que hemos
aprobado, seria ciudadano por nacimiento, o sea natural born todos aquellos
nacidos de un padre que es ciudadano filipino, ya sea una persona nacida en
Filipinas o fuera de elias.

Y con respeto de uno nacido de madre filipina, pero de padre extranjero, el

articulo que aprobamos sobre ciudadania, requiere de que al llegar a la mayoria de
edad, este hijo necesita escoger la ciudadania por la cual opta, y si opta por la
ciudadania filipina al llegar a la mayoria de edad, entonces sera considerado
ciudadano filipino. Bajo esta interpretacion el hijo de una madre filipina con padre
extranjero, no seria un ciudadano por nacimiento, por aquello de que la ley o la
Constitucion requiere que haga una declaracion ulterior a su nacimiento. Porlo
tanto, la frase a natural born citizen, tal como se emplea en el texto ingles, quiere
decir un ciudadano filipino por nacimiento, sin tener en cuenta donde ha nacido.
(Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. V, 18 December
1934, pp. 307-308).
[28]
 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
[29]
 Supra note 26.
[30]
 Eduardo Abaya, A Critical Study on the Effect of Adoption on Citizenship
Status in the Philippines, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, February
1948, p. 443 (http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wpcontent/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume
%2023/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201/PLJ%20volume
%2023%20number201%20-04-%20Eduardo%20Abaya%20-%20A%20Critical
%20Study%20on%20the%20effect%20ot%20adoption%20on%20citizenship
%20status%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf; last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[31]
 Eduardo Abaya, A Critical Study on the Effect of Adoption on Citizenship
Status in the Philippines, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, February
1948, p. 443 (http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wpcontent/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume
%2023/PLJ%20volume%2023%20number%201/PLJ%20volume
%2023%20number%201%20-04-%20Eduardo%20Abaya%20-%20A%20Critical
%20Study%20on%20the%20effect%20of%20adoption%20on%20citizenship
%20status%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf; last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[32]
 http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2; last accessed on 2 March 2016.
[33]
 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/conventional_international_law; last accessed
on 2 March 2016.
[34]
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
561 Phil. 386 (2007).
[35]
 Dissenting Opinion, Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 656 Phil. 246, 326 (2011).
[36]
 Judgment of 20 February 1969, at 77 (http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/5l/556l.pdf; last accessed on 1 March 2016).
[37]
 Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, International Law
Commission, UFRGS Model United Nations Journal, p. 192
(http://www.ufrgs.br/ufrgsmun/2013/wp-content/uploads/2013110/Formation-and-
Evidence-of-Customary-Intemationai-Law.pdf; last accessed on 1 March 2016).
[38]
 John H. Currie, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Second Edition, 2008
(https://www.irwinlaw.com/cold/regional_customary_international_law; last
accessed on 1 March 2016).
[39]
 See Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Seventh Edition, 2014, pp.
69-77.
[40]
 Supra note 34, at 400, citing Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter,
Hans Smith, International Law, Cases and Materials, 2nd Ed., p. 96. Emphasis
omitted.
[41]
 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professional/interestlpages/ccpr.aspx; last accessed on
2 March 2016.
[42]
 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/; last accessed on 2 March 2016.
[43]
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/UDHRIndex.aspx; last accessed on 2
March 2016.
[44]
 Laura van Waas, Nationality Matters: Statelessness under International
Law, pp. 69-70, Volume 29, School of Human Rights Research Series, Intersentia,
2008 (http://www.stichtingros.nl/site/kennis/files/Onderzoek%20statenloosheid
%20Laura%20van%20Waas.pdf; last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[45]
 Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution reads in part:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

[46]
 Section 1, Article III of the 1973 Constitution reads in part:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

[47]
 Section 1, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

[48]
 See Jaime S. Bautista, No customary international law automatically confers
nationality to foundlings, The Manila Times Online
(http://www.manilatimes.net/no-customary-intemational-law-automatically-
confers-nationality-to-foundlings/221126; last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[49]
 See Irene R. Cortes and Raphael Perpetuo M. Lotilla, Nationality and
International Law from the Philippine Perspective, Philippine Law Journal, Vol.
60, No. 1, Supplemental Issue, 1985, p. 16 (http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp-
contentluploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2060/PLJ%20volume
%2060%20supplemental%20issue/PLJ%20Volume%2060%20supplemental
%20issue%20-01-%20Irene%20R.%20Cortez%20&%20Rapael%20Perpetuo
%20M.%20Lotilla%20-%20Nationality%20and%20International%20Law.pdf;
last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[50]
 Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 656 Phil. 246, 303 (2011).
[51]
 See Dean Ralph A. Sanniento, The Right to Nationality of Foundlings in
International Law,
(http://attyralph.com/2015/12/03/foundlingsnationality/; last accessed on 1 March
2016).
[52]
 http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml, last accessed on 7 March 2016.
[53]
 Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Seventh Edition, 2014, p. 56,
citing De Visscher, Theory and Reality, p. 149. See also Hersch Lauterpacht, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 368; Pitt Cobbett, LEADING
CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4th Edition, London, 1922, p. 5, and
Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, British Yearbook of
International Law, 1975, Vol. 47, pp. 22-3.
[54]
 Id.
[55]
 Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 174, citing Mijares v. Rañada (495 Phil. 372
[2005]) and Razon v. Tagitis (621 Phil. 536 [2009]).
[56]
 Laura van Waas, Nationality Matters: Statelessness under International Law,
pp. 70-71, Volume 29, School of Human Rights Research Series, Intersentia, 2008
(http://www.stichtingros.nl/site/kennis/files/Onderzoek%20statenloosheid
%20Laura%20van%20Waas.pdf; last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[57]
 Prof. Serena Forlati, Nationality as a Human Right, pp. 22-23, The Changing
Role of Nationality in International Law, edited by Alessandra Annoni and Serena
Forlati, Routledge Research International Law, 2015 Kindle Edition; emphasis
supplied.
[58]
 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/protection-against-statelessness?
p=dataEUCIT&application=modesProtectionStatelessness&search=1&modeby=id
mode&idmode=S02; last accessed on 2 March 2016.

These countries are:

1. Belgium
2. Bulgaria
3. Croatia
4. Finland
5. France
6. Germany
7. Hungary
8. Lithuania
9. Montenegro
10. Netherlands
11. Romania
12. Serbia
13. Sweden
[59]
 656 Phil. 246, 306 (2011 ).
[60]
 https://www.unhcr.it/sites/53a16111Ob80eeaac7000002/assets/53a164ab0b80e
eaac70001fe/preventing_and_reducing_statelessness.pdf; last accessed on 2 March
2016.
[61]
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/Nationality.aspx; last accessed on 2
March 2016.
[62]
 See http://www.ijrcenter.org/thematic-research-guides/nationality-citizenship/;
last accessed on 2 March 2016.
[63]
 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/Internationa1DB/docs/Explanatory%20report
%20Convention%20avoidance%20statelessness%20in%20relation%20to%20State
%20succession%20CETS%20200%20PDF.pdf; last accessed on 1 March 2016.
[64]
 See The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Private
International Law, The Law of Domicile, p. 4
(http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/321217989/6557/repl07.pdf; last accessed
on 3 March 2016). See also M.W. Jacobs, A Treatise on the Law of Domicil, 1887,
p. 167
(http://famguardian.org/Publications/TreatOnLawOfDomicile/A_Treatise_on_the_
Law_of_Domicil_Nation.pdf, citing Savigny, System, etc. § 359 (Guthrie's trans.
p. 132), citing Linde, Lehrbuch, § 89; Felix, Droit Int. Priv. no. 28; Calvo, Manuel,
§ 198; Id. Dict. verb. Dom.; Westlake, Priv. Int. L. 1st ed. no. 35, rule 2; Id. 2d ed.
§ 236; Dicey, Dom. p. 69, rule 6; Foote, Priv. Int. Jur. p. 9; Wharton, Confl. of L.
§ 39, citing Heffter, pp. 108, 109, last accessed on 3 March 2016).
[65]
 John Bassett Moore, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. III, 1906,
p. 281 (http://www.unz.org/Pub/MooreJohn-1906v03:289; last accessed on 3
March 2016).
[66]
 Section 3, Article II of the 1935 Constitution provides:

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as a part of the law of the
Nation.
[67]
 Section 3, Article II of the 1973 Constitution provides:

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the

generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land,
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.
[68]
 Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the

generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations.
[69]
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
supra note 34, citing Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT (NOTES AND CASES), Part I (2005).
[70]
 Id.
[71]
 Id.
[72]
 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165 (2000).
[73]
 Joaquin Bernas, S.J., THE INTENT or THE 1986 CoNSTITUTION
WRITERS, 1995, pp. 75-76.
[74]
 See Irene R. Cortes and Raphael Perpetuo M. Lotilla, Nationality and
International Law from the Philippine Perspective, Philippine Law Journal, Vol.
60, No. 1, Supplemental Issue, 1985, p. 1. (http://plj.upd.edu.ph/wp-
content/uploads/plj/PLJ%20volume%2060/PLJ%20volume
%2060%20supplemental%20issue/PLJ%20Volume%2060%20supplemental
%20issue%20-01-%20Irene%20R.%20Cortez%20&%20Rapael%20Perpetuo
%20M.%20Lotilla%20-%20Nationality%20and%20Intemational%20Law.pdf;
last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[75]
 See Jaime S. Bautista, No customary international law automatically confers
nationality to foundlings, The Manila Times, 28 September 2015
(http://www.manilatimes.net/no-customary-international-lawautomatically-
confers-nationality-to-foundlings/221126/, last accessed on 2 March 2016). See
also Joel Ruiz Butuyan, Legal and emotional entanglements in Poe issue, 6
October 2015, Philippine Daily Inquirer (http://opinion.inquirer.net/89141/legal-
and-emotional-entanglements-in-poe-issue, last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[76]
 An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
Naturalization, and to Repeal Acts Numbered Twenty-Nine Hundred and Twenty-
Seven and Thirty-Four Hundred and Forty-Eight.
[77]
 An Act Providing for the Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship for Certain
Aliens by Administrative Naturalization and for Other Purposes.
[78]
 See Francis Wharton, LL.D., A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw
oF THE UNITED STATES, Vol. II, 1886, p. 465, § 192 (Mr. Fish, Secretary of
State, to Mr. Davis, January 14, 1875, MSS. Inst., Germ. XVI 6). See also Paul
Weis, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Second Edition, 1979, p. 228 (https://books.google.com.ph/books?
id=hSLGDXqXeegC&printsec=frontcover&dq=paul+weis+nationality&hl=en&sa
=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=paul%20weis%20nationality&f=false; last
accessed on 2 March 2016).
[79]
 Philippine Passport No. F927287.
[80]
 Philippine Passport No. L881511.
[81]
 Philippine Passport No. DO156616.
[82]
 Philippine Passport No. XX4731999.
[83]
 Philippine Passport No. DE0004530.
[84]
 Philippine Passport No. EC0588861.
[85]
 Civil Registry Law, 27 February 1931.
[86]
 See Rules 26-30, IRR of Act No. 3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration,
18 December 1992.
[87]
 TSN, 16 February 2016, pp. 152-157.
[88]
 Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations pertinently reads:

SECTION 2. Applicability. These Rules shall apply to the adoption in the

Philippines of a Filipino child by a Filipino or alien qualified to adopt under
Article III, Section 7 of RA 8552.

xxxx
[89]
 602 Phil. 522, 537 (2009).
[90]
 247 Phil. 154, 162 (1988). Citations omitted.
[91]
 257 Phil. 23, 29 (1989).
[92]
 TSN, 2 February 2016, pp. 135-141.
[93]
 117 Phil. 976 (1963).
[94]
 161 Phil. 397 (1976).
[95]
 Supra note 93, at 978.
[96]
 Supra note 94, at 407.
[97]
 Carpio, J., Dissenting Opinion, Tecson v. Comelec, 468 Phil. 421, 634 (2004).
[98]
 128 Phil. 815 (1967).
[99]
 Id. at 825.
[100]
 G.R. No. 167569, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA 266.
[101]
 Fernandez v. HRET, 623 Phil. 628 (2009).
[102]
 See Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013, 699
SCRA 522.
[103]
 Tijing v. Court of Appeals, 406 Phil. 449 (2001).
[104]
 In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, 406 Phil. 449 (2001), the Court held that to
establish parentage, the DNA from the mother, alleged father and child are
analyzed since the DNA of a child, which has two copies, will have one copy from
the mother and another copy from the father.
[105]
 See People v. Vallejo, 431 Phil. 798 (2002).
[106]
 Dated 2 October 2007.
[107]
 Section 3(f) of the Rule on DNA Evidence defines "Probability of Parentage"
as the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent
compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in a
given population.
[108]
 See Joel Ruiz Butuyan, Legal and emotional entanglements in Poe issue, 6
October 2015, Philippine Daily Inquirer (http://opinion.inquirer.net/89141/legal-
and-emotional-entanglements-in-poe-issue; last accessed on 2 March 2016).
[109]
 See Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, 553 Phil. 331, 343-344 (2007), where
the Court stated in the dispositive portion of the Decision that "respondent
Gregory S. Ong x x x is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the
position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and
discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed
all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to
show that he is a natural born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth
and citizenship."
[110]
 148-B Phil. 773, 855 (1971).
[111]
 149 Phil. 661, 665 (1971).
[112]
 Supra note 100, at 288, 290-291.
[113]
 Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
[114]
 The oath of allegiance to the United States that naturalized Am ricans take
states:
I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty,
of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will
support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that Iwill bear true faith and allegiance
to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required
by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the
United States when required by the law; that Iwill perform work of national
importance under civilian direction when required by the Jaw; and that I take this
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help
me God.
(https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/naturalization-test/naturalization-oath-
allegiance-united-statesamerica; last accessed on 7 March 2016). Emphasis
supplied.
[115]
 409 Phil. 633 (2001).

CONCURRING OPINION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I concur with the ponencia and will add the following only for emphasis.

On Residency

It is established that to acquire a new domicile one must demonstrate three things:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain
there (animus manendi); and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus
non revertendi).

There is no issue as to Sen. Poe's actual bodily presence in the Philippines since
May 24, 2005, whence she, per her 2015 Certificate of Candidacy, reckons her
residency in the country. What has been questioned is the animus to stay in the
Philippins and to abandon the domicile in the United States of America (US) since
then. As the ponencia explained, the facts recited, and the evidence presented by
Sen. Poe sufficiently portrays her intent to stay in the Philippines and to abandon
the US since May 2005, to wit:
35.  As a result of the untimely demise of her father, and her desire to be with and
to comfort her grieving mother, Petitioner and her husband, sometime in the first
quarter of 2005, decided to return to the Philippines for good. They consulted their
children, who likewise expressed their wish to relocate permanently to the
Philippines. The children also wanted to support their grandmother and Petitioner.

36.  In 2004, petitioner had already resigned from her work in the U.S.A. and she
never again sought employment there. In early 2005 Brian (Poe's son) and Hanna's
(Poe's eldest daughter) schools in Virginia, U.S.A., were likewise notified that
they would be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester.

37.  As early as March 2005, Petitioner and her husband began obtaining
quotations and estimates from property movers regarding the total cost of
relocating to Manila all of their household goods, furniture, and cars then in
Virginia, U.S.A. One of these property movers was Victory Van International, a
private freight forwarding company, with whom Petitioner and her husband had a
series of email correspondence from 2005 to 2006. The spouses also intended to
bring along their pet dog and they inquired with Philippine authorities on the
procedure to accomplish this in August 2005.

38.  On 24 May 2005, or shortly before the start ofthe academic year in the
Philippines, Petitioner returned to the country. Her three (3) children also arrived
in the country in the first half of 2005. Petitioner's husband, on the other hand,
stayed in the U.S.A. to finish pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the
family home there.

39.  After their arrival in the Philippines from the U.S.A., Petitioner and her
children initially lived with Petitioner's mother in x x x San Juan City. The
existing living arrangements at the house of Petitioner's mother even had to be
modified to accommodate Petitioner and her children, Petitioner's mother also
assigned to Petitioner her father's long-time driver, because Petitioner and her
family would henceforth be based in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Petitioner and
her children prepared for the start of the school year, with Brian and Hanna
attending Philippine schools starting June 2005. x x x

40.  Shortly after arriving in the Philippines, Petitioner immediately submitted hers
lf to the local tax jurisdiction by registering and securing a TIN from the BIR.

xxxx

42.  In the meantime, in the second half of 2005, Petitioner and her husband had
acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium (and its corresponding
parking slot), located at x x x San Juan, Metro Manila, to be used as the family's
temporary residence.
42.1 On 20 February 2006, the Register of Deeds for San Juan City issued to
Petitioner and her husband CCT No. x x x covering Unit 7F of One Wilson Place,
and CCT No. x x x covering the parking slot for Unit 7F.

42.2 On 25 April 2006, Unit 7F of One Wilson Place and its corresponding
parking slot were declared, for real estate tax purposes, in Petitioner's and her
husband's names.

42.3 Petitioner and her family lived at One Wilson Place until the completion of
their family home at Corinthian Hills, Quezon City. x x x
43. On 14 February 2006, Petitioner briefly travelled to the U.S.A. for the purpose
of supervising the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings. Around this time, Petitioner's and her family's furniture and other
household goods were still in the process of being packed for collection, storage
and eventual transport to the Philippines. Petitioner donated to the Salvation Army
some of the family's personal properties which could no longer be shipped to the
Philippines. Petitioner returned to the Philippines shortly after, or on 11 March
2006.

44.  In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the United States
Postal Service of the family's change, and abandonment, of their former address in
the U.S.A. The family home in the U.S.A. was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.

45.  In April 2006, Petitioner's husband resigned from his work in the U.S.A., and
on 4 May 2006, he returned to the Philippines. Beginning July 2006, he worked in
the Philippines for a major Philippine company.

46. Meanwhile, in early 2006, Petitioner and her husband acquired a vacant 509-
square meter lot at x x x Corinthian Hills, Bagong Ugong Norte, Quezon City (the
"Corinthian Hills Lot") where her family could finally establish their new family
home.

46.1  On 1 June 2006, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City issued to Petitioner
and her husband Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 290260 covering
the Corinthian Hills Lot.
46.2 Petitioner and her husband eventually built a house on the Corinthian Hills
Lot. To this day, this house is their family home.

47. After Petitioner and her family settled themselves, she turned her attention to
regaining her natural-born Filipino citizenship. She was advised that she could
legally reacquire her natural-born Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the provision of R.A. No.
9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."

48. On July 7, 2006, Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225, to wit: x x x 

49. On 10 July 2006, petitioner filed with the B.I. a sworn petition to reacquire her
natural-born Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and its
implementing rules and regulations. Upon advice, and simultaneous with her own
petition, petitioner filed petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three
children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time. x x x

50. On 18 July 2006, the B.I. issued an Order granting Petitioner's applications x x
x.

51. On 31 July 2006, the B.L issued Identification Certificates ("I.C.") in

Petitioner's name and in the name of her three children x x x.

52. On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC registered Petitioner as a voter at

Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City.

53.  On 13 October 2009, or over two (2) years before her U.S.A. Passport was set
to expire (on 18 December 2011), Petitioner secured from the DFA her new
Philippine Passport with No. x x x (which was valid until 12 October 2014).

54.  On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Petitioner as

Chairperson of the MTRCB, a post which requires natural-born Philippine
citizenship. Petitioner did not accept the appointment immediately, because she
was advised that before assuming any appointive public office, Section 5(3), R.A.
No. 9225 required her to: (a) take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; and (b) renounce her U.S.A. citizenship. She complied with the
requirements before assuming her posts as MTRCB Chairperson on 26 October
2010.

55.  On 20 October 2010, Petitioner executed before a notary public in Pasig City
an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" of even date. x x x

56.  On 21 October 2010, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1986 and
Section 5 (3) of R.A. No. 9225, Petitioner took her oath of office as Chairperson
of the MTRCB, before President Benigno S. Aquino III. x x x

57.  To ensure that even under the laws of the U.S.A., she would no longer be
considered its citizen, Petitioner likewise renounced her U.S.A. citizenship in
accordance with the laws of that country. However, Petitioner was not legally
required under Philippine law to make another renunciation, as her earlier
renunciation of U.S.A. citizenship on October 20, 2010 was sufficient to qualify
her for public office.

57.1  On 12 July 2011, Petitioner executed before the Vice Consul at the U.S.A.
Embassy in Manila, an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation ofNationality ofthe
United States.

57.2. On the same day, Petitioner accomplished a sworn "Questionnaire" before

the U.S. Vice Consul, wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 21 October 2010, with the intent, among others, of relinquishing
her U.S.A. citizenship.

57.3 In the same Questionnaire, Petitioner stated that she had resided "Outside of
the United States," i.e., in the "Philippines," from 3 September 1968 to 29 July
1991 and from "05 2005" to "Present.": On page 4 of the Questionnaire, Petitioner
stated:
I became a resident of the Philippine once again since 2005. My mother still
resides in the Philippines. My husband and I are both employed and own
roperties in the Philippines. As a dual citizen (Filipino-American) since 2006, I've
voted in two Philippine national elections. My three children study and reside in
the Philippines at the time I performed the act as described in Part I item 6.
58.  On 9 December 2011, the U.S.A. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a
"Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States." Said Certificate attests
that under U.S.A. laws, Petitioner lost her U.S.A. citizenship effective 21 October
2010, which is when she took her oath of office as MTRCB Chairperson. This fact
is likewise reflected on the last page ofPetit oner:s former U.S.A. Passport.

59.  On 27 September 2012, Petitioner accomplished her COC for Senator, which
she filed with the COMELEC on 2 October 2012. Section 12 of the COC was,
agam, an affirmation of the Oath of

Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which Petitioner had taken on 7 July
2006 (and which she had reaffirmed on 2.1 October 2010 when she took her oath
of office as MTRCB Chairperson). x x x

60.  During the 13 May 2013 National Elections, petitioner ran for and was
overwhelmingly elected as Senator. She garnered over 20 million votes, the
highest among her fellow Senatorial candidates, and a record in Philippine election
history. On 16 May 2013, Petitioner was proclaimed Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines.

61.  On 19 December 2013, the DFA issued to Sen. Poe Diplomatic Passport No. x
x x (valid until December 2018), and on 18 March 2014, the DFA issued in her
favor Philippine Passport No. x x x. Like her earlier Philippine passports, these
two (2) most recent passports uniformly state that Sen. Poe is a "citizen of the
Philippines."

62.  On 15 October 2015, Sen. Poe filed with COMELEC her COC as President
("COC for President") in the 9 May 2016 national and local elections. In her COC,
she stated that she is a "NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN" and that her
"RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09,
2016" would be "10" years and "11" months (counted from 24 May 2005).
As "intent" is basically a "state of mind" that exists only in idea;[1] its existence can
only be determined by the overt acts that translate it to fact. The realization of such
intent need not be made in one fell swoop by the execution of a single formal act.
Rather, the fulfillment of the intent to change domicile can be made via a series of
steps through what the Court adverts in Mitra v. COMELEC[2] and Sabili v.
COMELEC[3] as an "incremental process" or the execution of"incremental transfer
moves."

The facts of the case suggest that Sen. Poe's change of domicile and repatriation
from the US to the Philippines was, to borrow from Mitra, "accomplished, not in a
single key move but, through an incremental process"[4] that started in early 2005.
Specifically, Sen Poe took definite albeit incremental moves to reacquire her
domicile of origin as shown by the repatriation of her children and their pet, if I
may add, from the US to the Philippines; the enrollment of her children in
Philippine schools; the sale of their family home in the US; the repatriation of her
husband and his employment in the Philippines; the transfer of their household
goods, furniture, cars and personal belongings from the US to the Philippines; the
purchase of a residential condominium in the Philippines; the purchase of a
residential lot; the construction of her family home in the country; her oath of
allegiance under RA 9225; her children's acquisition of derivative Philippine
citizenship; the renunciation of her US citizenship; her service as chairperson of
the MTRCB; and her candidacy and service as a senator of the Philippines. All
these acts are indicative of the intent to stay and serve in the country permanently,
and not simply to make a "temporary" sojourn.

Indeed, the foreknowledge of Sen. Poe's repatriation and her desire for it, i.e., her
intent to go back to and reestablish her domicile the Philippines, is readily
discernible from her acts executed even before her return to the country in May
2005.

The foregoing indicia of Sen. Poe's intent to reestablish her domicile in the country
cannot be frivolously dismissed as insufficient on the pretext that "this case
involves relocation of national domicile from the US to the Philippines by an
alien, which requires much stronger proof, both as to fact and intent."[5]

The suggestion that Sen. Poe's animus manendi only existed at the time she took
her oath of allegiance under RA 9225 in July 2006 and that her animus non
revertendi existed only in October 2010 when she renounced her US citizen is
simply illogical. The fact that what is involved is a change of national domicile
from one country to another, separated as it were by oceans, and not merely from
one neighboring municipality to another like in Mitra and Sabili, it is with more
reason that the teachings in Mitra and Sabili are applicable.

It should be of judicial cognizance that even a temporary travel from one country
to another is no easy feat. It takes weeks or even months to plan and execute. By
no means is the permanent transfer of residence in one country to another an easier
undertaking. Like in petitioner's case, it would be a long process that will take
months, if not years, to accomplish from the initial inquiry with the movers and
the concerned government agencies in both countries, to the actual packing and
transportation of one's belongings, the travel of the children and the pet,. their
enrollment in schools, the acquisition of a new family home, and the reintegration
to Philippine society. The intent to reestablish national domicile cannot be
plausibly determined by one isolated formal act or event but by a series of acts that
reveal the preceding desire and intent to return to one's country of origin.

Sen. Poe is not an ordinary "alien" trying to establish her domicile in a "foreign
country." She was born and raised in the Philippines, who went through the
tedious motions of, and succeeded in, reestablishing her home in the country. She
is, by no means, foreign to the Philippines nor its people. She maintained close
ties to the country and has frequently visited it even during the time she was still
recognized as a US citizen. Her parents lived in the country, her friends she grew
up with stayed here. In a manner of speaking, her past, her roots were in the
Philippines so that it should not be rendered more burdensome for her to establish
her future in the country.

After all, the residence requirement was in context intended to prevent a stranger
from holding office on the assumption that she would be insufficiently acquainted
with the conditions and needs of her prospective constituents.[6] Having helped her
father during his presidential campaign and having served as a senator and before
that an MTRCB chairperson, it cannot be contested that she has more than enough
knowledge of the country, its people, and the many issues and problems that beset
them. The mischief that the residency requirement was designed to prevent is
clearly not present in this case.

The Court's pronouncements in Coquilla v. Commission on Elections,[7] Caballero

v. Commission on Elections[8] and Japzon v. Commission and Elections and Jaime
S. Ty[9] did not establish an absolute rule that a Filipino who became naturalized
under the laws of a foreign country can only re-establish his or her domicile in the
Philippines from the moment he or she swears allegiance to the country under RA
9225. Instead, the Court considered the acquisition of dual-citizenship under RA
9225 or the application for a residency permit as one of many possible, not the
only, evidence of animus manendi. The Court did not state that any evidence of
residence before the acquisition of a residence visa or the reacquisition of
citizenship must be ignored.

Unfortunately, in these three cases, the concerned candidates had presented

negligible or no evidence of reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines before
their repatriation. As Sen. Poe pointed out, the only pieces of evidence
in Coquilla showing that he might had had the intent to reside in the Philippines
were: (a) his Community Tax Certificate; and (b) his verbal declarations that he
intended to run for office. In Japzon, there was absolutely no evidence of the
candidate's residence before he reacquired his citizenship and all the evidence
pertained to events after his repatriation. Finally, in Caballero, the candidate failed
to show that his residence had been for more than a year prior to the May 2013
elections. On the contrary, he admitted that he had only 9 months "actual stay" in
Uyugan, Batanes.

Thus, the Court had no choice but to reckon the residency of the concerned
candidates in Coquilla, Jopzon, and Caballero either from the time they reacquired
their citizenship or the time they procured a resident visa because there was simply
insufficient proof offered by the candidates before such event. The same cannot be
said of Sen. Poe in the instant case.
As previously discussed, Sen. Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her
permanent relocation to the Philippines, her actual residence, and intent to stay in
the Philippines since May 2005, i.e., even before she took her oath of allegiance
under RA 9225 in July 2006. Hence, Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections[10] is the
better precedent. In Jalosjos, the Court reckoned the candidate's domicile in the
Philippines even before he reacquired his citizenship under RA 9225, without
mentioning the need for a residence visa, because he was able to satisfactorily
prove that he had lived with his brother prior to taking his oath of allegiance. The
Court held, thus:
But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos' domicile of origin, the
place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his
domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live

with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with
intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian
citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay
despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice
and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man
must have a domicile or residence somewhere.[11]
Yet, it has also been advanced that Sen. Poe has not positively shown an intent to
abandon the US, or animus non revertendi, prior to her formal renunciation of her
American citizenship in October 2010. To this is added that she even acquired a
house in the US in 2008 as proof of her alleged intent not to abandon that country.
Proponents of this argument cite Reyes v. Commission on Elections.[12] However,
Reyes was on a starkly different factual milieu. Unlike Sen. Poe, the petitioner
therein had not reacquired her Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 or renounced
her American citizenship.[13] In fact, the only proof she offered of her residency
was her service as a provincial officer for seven (7) months.

The alleged fact that Sen. Poe acquired a house in the US in 2008, cannot be taken
as an argument against her animus non revertendi vis-a-vis the evidence of her
manifest intent to stay, and actual stay, in the Philippines. Certainly, the element of
intent to abandon an old domicile does not require a complete and absolute
severance of all physical links to that country, or any other country for that matter.
It is simply too archaic to state, at a time where air travel is the norm, that
ownership of a secondary abode for a temporary visit or holiday negates an intent
to abandon a foreign country as a legal domicile.

On Citizenship
There is no question that Sen. Poe has no known biological parents and was found
on September 3, 1968 in Jaro, Iloilo when she was but a newborn. She was then
adopted by spouses Ronald Allan Kelly and Jesusa Sonora Poe in May 1974. The
nagging question is: Is Sen. Poe a natural born Filipino citizen?

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution merely provides:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The term "natural-born" Filipino does not even appear in the above quoted
provision. This Court, however, has construed the term to refer to those falling
under items one to four of the section, as opposed to those who underwent
naturalization under item number 5. But Sen. Poe was not born before the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution so that the first item is inapplicable. That being
said, her status as a foundling does not foreclose the likelihood that either or both
of her biological parents were Filipinos rendering her a natural-born Filipino under
items 3 and/or 4 of Section 1, Article IV ofthe 1935 Constitution.

Indeed, while it is not denied that Sen. Poe was abandoned by her biological
parents, her abandonment on the date and specific place above indicated does not
obliterate the fact that she had biological parents and the private respondents had
not shown any proof that they were not Filipino citizens.

Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the
duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the
amount of evidence required by law. The private respondents had not presented
even an iota of proof to show that Sen. Poe was not born to Filipino parents. Thus,
it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to conclude that Sen. Poe was
not a natural-born Filipino and had deliberately misrepresented such fact.

To shift the burden of proof to foundlings like, Sen. Poe, to prove the citizenship
of their parents who had abandoned them is as preposterous as rubbing salt on an
open bleeding wound; it adds insult to injury. The State cannot allow such
unconscionable interpretation of our laws. Instead, the judiciary, as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, must ensure that the
abandoned children, the foundlings, those who were forced into an unfavorable
position are duly protected.

As pointed out by petitioner, the same view was shared by the framers of the 1935
Constitution. A delegate to the 1934 Constitutional Convention, Sr. Nicolas
Rafols, proposed to explicitly include "children of unknown parentage" in the
enumeration of jus sanguinis Philippine Citizens in Section 1, Article IV of the
1935 Constitution. The suggestion, however, was not accepted but not on the
ground that these children are not Philippine citizens. Rather, that the cases of
foundlings are "few and far in between," as pointed out by delegate Manuel Roxas,
and that citing a similar Spanish Law, they are already presumed to have been
born to Filipinos.[14]

An alternative construction of the 1935, not to say the present Constitution,

presents dire consequences. In such a scenario, abandoned children with no known
parents will be considered stateless. This violates the rights of a child to immediate
registration and nationality after birth, as recognized in the United Nation's
Convention on the Rights of a Child. Thus, I cannot subscribe to the proposal that
foundlings, like Sen. Poe, are not natural-born Filipino citizens.

[1]
 Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Ed., for the iPhone/iPad/iPod touch. Version 2.1.2
(B13195), p. 883 citing John Salmond, Jurisprudence 378 (Glanville L. Williams
ed., 10th ed. 1947).
[2]
 G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010 and October 19,2010.
[3]
 G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012.
[4]
 Mitra, supra.
[5]
 Justice Del Castillo's Opinion.
[6]
 Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453, 459 ( 1941 ); cited in Fernandez v. HRET, G.R.
No. 187478, December 21, 2009.
[7]
 G.R. No. 151914, July 31,2002.385 SCRA 607.
[8]
 G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
[9]
 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 354.
[10]
 G.R. No. 191970, April24, 2012.
[11]
 Emphasis supplied.
[12]
 G.R. No. 207264, June 25,2013,699 SCRA 522.
[13]
 Regina 0. Reyes- admitted in her submissions under oath before the
COMELEC in SPA 13-053 that RA 9225 does not apply to her as she claims to be
a dual citizen of the United States of America and the Philippines by virtue of her
marriage to a US citizen. Belatedly, Reyes attempted to show that she availed of
RA 9225, in a volte face, before the Court in G.R. No. 207264, entitled Reyes v.
COMELEC, by presenting a questionable Identification Certificate allegedly
issued by the Bureau of Immigration.
[14]
 Per the interpellation of Delegate Ruperto Montinola.
 SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

I begin this Dissenting Opinion by outrightly expressing my view that the opinion
of Honorable Justice Jose P. Perez on the issue of natural-born citizenship which
was joined by six (6) other Justices including the Honorable Chief Justice Ma.
Lourdes P.A. Sereno, if not overturned, will wreak havoc on our constitutional
'system of government.

By their opinion, the seven (7) Justices would amend the 1935 Constitution which
was in effect when petitioner was born, to add "foundlings found in the Philippines
whose parents are unknown" in the enumeration of natural-born citizen, as
follows:
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
(1935 Constitution)

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines .

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines [and foundlings found in
the Philippines whose parents are unknown].

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law. (Emphases supplied.)
This amendment of the Constitution by the judicial opinion put forth by the seven
(7) Justices is based mainly on extralegal grounds and a misreading of existing
laws, which will have unimaginable grave and far reaching dire consequences in
our constitutional and legal system and national interest which this Dissenting
Opinion will explain below.

For the above reason and other reasons, I dissent to the Ponencia of Mr. Justice
Jose P. Perez that the four consolidated petitions seeking the annulment and
setting aside of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) December 1, 2015 and
December 23, 2015 Resolutions in SPA Nos. 15-001 (DC); and, the December 11,
2015 and December 23, 2015 Resolutions in 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-
139 (DC) should be granted.

It is my humble submission that petitioner Senator Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-

Llamanzares (Poe for brevity) failed to show that the COMELEC En banc gravely
abused its discretion in affirming its Second Division's December 1, 2015 and its
First Division's December 11, 2015 Resolutions, both denying due course to
and/or cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines, particularly with respect to the finding that she
made therein material representations that were false relating to her natural-born
citizenship and ten-year period of residence in the Philippines that warrant the
cancellation ofher COC.

In gist, the bases for my dissent in the disposition of the cases, which will be
discussed in seriatim, are as follows - contrary to the findings in the Ponencia:

On the Procedural/Technical Issues

I. The review power of this Court relative to the present petitions filed
under Rule 64 vis-a-vis Rule 65 both of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is limited to the jurisdictional issue of whether or not the
COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

II. Petitioner Poe failed to satisfactorily show that the COMELEC was so
grossly unreasonable in its appreciation and evaluation of the pieces of
evidence submitted by the parties as to transgress the limits of its
jurisdiction;

III. All the four petitions filed, inclusive of the Tatad Petition, subject of
the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC, adduced ultimate facts
establishing the cause of action for a petition based on Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC);

IV. The COMELEC correctly considered the allegations contained in the

Tatad Petition as one filed under Section 78 of the OEC;

V. The COMELEC did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal when it took cognizance of the petitions
to deny due course to or cancel the COC of petitioner Poe; the
distinction between jurisdictions of the two tribunals has already been
settled in Tecson v. COMELEC, the jurisdiction of the PET can only
be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice
President and the question of qualifications of candidates for President
or Vice-President properly belongs to the COMELEC;

VI. Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is a valid

exercise of the rule-making powers of the COMELEC, which is not
inconsistent and can be harmonized with its constitutional mandate to
promulgate rules of procedure to expedite the dispositions of election
cases;

VII. The COMELEC has the power to determine petitioner Poe's

citizenship notwithstanding the decision of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal which is still pending appeal and which deals with different
issues; and

On the Substantive/Focal Issues

 I. Sections 1 and 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution clearly and
categorically define who are natural-born citizens: they are citizens
from birth with blood relationship to a Filipino father or mother,
following the "jus sanguinis" principle;

II. Salient Rules of Interpretation and/or Construction of the Constitution

dictate that the clear and unambiguous letter of the Constitution must
be obeyed;

III. Statutes, Treaties and International Covenants or Instruments must

conform to the provisions of the Constitution;

IV. Pursuant to the Constitution, natural-born citizenship is an

indispensable requirement for eligibility to constitutionally identified
elective positions like the Presidency;

V. Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention

and Re-acquisition Act of 2003," makes natural-born citizenship an
indispensable requirement for the retention and/or re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship; in other words, the right to avail of dual
citizenship is only available to natural-born citizens who have earlier
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of acquisition of foreign
citizenship;

VI. Petitioner Poe obtained dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
by misrepresenting tCJ the Bureau of Immigration that she is the
biological child of a Filipino father and Filipino mother such that the
Bureau was misled into believing that "[petitioner Poe] was a former
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino
parents," which is a false factual averment not an erroneous legal
conclusion; and (it) the said order was not signed by the Commissioner
of the BI as required by Department of Justice (DOJ) Regulation;

VII. As a consequence of petitioner Poe's above-stated misrepresentations,

the July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of Immigration granting
petitioner Poe's application for dual citizenship or the re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was clearly invalid and her taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic did not result in her re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship; and

VIII. Not having validly reacquired natural-born citizenship, she is not

eligible to run for the Presidency pursuant to Section 2, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution; and even assuming arguendo that she has re-
acquired natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
petitioner Poe has failed to establish her change of domicile from the
United States, her domicile of choice to the Philippines through clear
and unmistakable evidence.

The Procedural Issues

Petitioner Poe seeks the annulment of the December 1, 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division and December 23, 2015 Resolution ofthe
COMELEC En banc, in SPA Nos. 15-001 (DC); and the December 11, 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and December 23,2015 Resolution of
the COMELEC En banc, in SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC) and 15-139
(DC) via the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[1] This mode of review is based on the limited
ground of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
Court held in Jalover v. Osmeña[2] that:
"Grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use
of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a
decisionwmaker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC,
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial
evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support
a conclusion. In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do
not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally
involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation

and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of
being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present,
resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one
of jurisdiction. (Citations omitted.)
The COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of the evidence adduced by
petitioner Poe is said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Poe failed to hurdle the bar set by this Court in Mitra v. Commission on
Elections[3] and Sabili v. Commission on Elections,[4] which is to prove that the
COMELEC was so grossly unreasonable in its appreciation and evaluation of
evidence as to amount to an error of jurisdiction. Petitioner

Poe's insistence that the COMELEC utterly disregarded her "overwhelming and
unrefuted evidence" is baseless. As stated in Mitra, substantial evidence is not a
simple question of number. The emphasis must be on what the pieces of evidence
are able to substantiate and what they cannot. I find that the COMELEC's
assessment of the evidence is logical and well-founded. The conclusions it reached
are adequately supported by evidence and are well in accord with the applicable
laws and settled jurisprudence on the matter.

The petitions filed by respondents Elamparo, Contreras, and Valdez sufficiently

alleged the ultimate facts constituting the cause(s) of action for a petition under
Section 78 of the OEC, that petitioner Poe falsely represented in her COC that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she complied with the ten-year residency
requirement. Also, they averred that such false representations were made with
intent to deceive the electorate.

With respect to the petition of private respondent Tatad, the COMELEC properly
relied on the allegation of said petition instead of its caption as a petition for
disqualification under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Clearly,
private respondent Tatad squarely put in issue the truthfulness of the declarations
of petitioner Poe in her COC. Specifically, he alleged that petitioner Poe lacked
natural-born citizenship and failed to meet the ten-year residency requirement,
which are grounds for the cancellation of her COC under Section 78.

As to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis that of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal's (PET), I strongly disagree in the conclusion that the COMELEC, in
ruling on the four Section 78-petitions, usurped the jurisdiction of the PET.
Petitioner Poe espouses that due to the absence of a false material
misrepresentation in her COC, the COMELEC should have dismissed the petitions
outright for being premature as they are in the nature of petitions for quo
warranto, which is within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the PET. This is
plain error. The jurisdiction of the PET over election contests attaches only after
the President or the Vice-President concerned had been elected and
proclaimed. Tecson v. Commission on Elections[5] clearly laid out that:
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election
scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto
which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. x x x.

xxxx

The rules [Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal] categorically speak of the
jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice President," of the Philippines, and not
of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest
can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held. (Emphases supplied, citation omitted.)
Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution sustains this above quoted ruling.
The grant of jurisdiction to the PET follows the provisions on the preparations of
the returns and certificates of canvass for every election for President and Vice-
President and the proclamation of the person who obtained the highest number of
votes.
SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote
of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No
person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four
years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-
President shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates
of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day
of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass
the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis,
supplied.)
In his separate opinion in Tecson, retired Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno was
uncompromising about the jurisdiction of the PET, to wit:
The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can
only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice
President. There can be no "contest" before a winner is proclaimed.
[6]
 (Emphasis supplied.)
And likewise in a separate opinion in the same case, retired Justice Alicia Austria-
Martinez emphasized that -
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction
by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice-President, Senators,
and, Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that
these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after
a candidate has already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and
15 ofthe Rules ofthe Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or
Vice-President, election protest or quo warranto may be filed after the
proclamation of the winner.[7] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
Section 2(2), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which expressly vests upon the
COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction over election
"contests" involving local officials is consistent with this doctrine. Election
"contests" has a definite meaning under the Constitution, which involve the
qualification of proclaimed winning candidates in an election.

On the other hand, Section 2, Article IX(C) of the 1987 Constitution providing
that the COMELEC shall have the power to:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (Emphasis supplied.)
is sufficient basis to entrust to the COMELEC all issues relative to the
qualifications of all "candidates" to run in National or Local Elections.
Implementing the aforementioned provision is Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, or the
"Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines" (OEC), which provides for the
cancellation of a candidate's Certificate of Candidacy on grounds stated in Section
78 thereof. A contrary construction of the Constitution will result in emasculating
the Constitutional mandate of the COMELEC to ensure fair, honest and credible
elections. The overbroad interpretation of the power of the PET under the
Constitution will prohibit the COMELEC from even disqualifying nuisance
candidates for President.

Hence, it is beyond cavil that it is the COMELEC, not the PET, which has
jurisdiction over the petitions for the cancellation of the COC of petitioner Poe
who is still a candidate at this time.

With the foregoing, I cannot but register my strong dissent to the opinion in the
Ponencia that "[t]he exclusivity of the ground (that petitioner Poe made in the
certificate a false material representation) should hedge in the discretion of the
COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issues of the qualifications of the
candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification of lack thereof of the candidate." This
opinion is contrary to the ruling penned by Justice Perez himself in Reyes v.
COMELEC.[8]

According to the Ponencia, the COMELEC cannot, in a Section 78- petition, look
into the qualification of the candidate (for Representative, Senator, Vice-President
and President) simply because per its perusal of the 1987 Constitution, the latter
failed to categorically state that the COMELEC was granted the power to look into
the qualifications of candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Representatives. It is insisted that the specific provisions of the same giving the
PET, SET and HRET jurisdiction over the "election, returns, and qualifications" of
the President, VicePresident, Senator and Representatives are sure fire evidence
that the COMELEC does not have the authority to look into the qualification of
said candidates prior to a determination in a prior proceeding by an authority with
proper jurisdiction to look in to the same. Simply put, the Ponencia would have the
fact of a Presidential, Vice-Presidential, Senatorial or Congressional candidate's
qualification established in a prior proceeding that may be by statute, executive
order, or judgment by a competent court or tribunal, before her/his COC can be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false material representations as to
her/his qualifications.
The Ponencia's analysis is utterly incorrect. As shown above, such analysis
disregards existing jurisprudence stating that these electoral tribunals exercise
jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in an election.

If the Ponencia's analysis is allowed to become the leading jurisprudence on the

matter, the Court is as good as amending the OEC by deleting the Section 78
thereof- there can no longer be a petition for denial of due course to or cancellation
of COC because the COMELEC has now been disallowed to look into the whether
or not a candidate has made a false claim as to her/his material qualifications for
the elective office that she/he aspires for. That a Section 78-petition would
naturally look into the candidate's qualification is expected of the nature of such
petition. As elucidated in Fermin v. COMELEC,[9] to wit:
After studying the said petition in detail, the Court finds that the same is in the
nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the
OEC. The petition contains the essential allegations of a "Section 78" petition,
namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the
representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive
rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for which he filed his
certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the intention
to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him
ineligible. It likewise appropriately raises a question on a candidate's
eliaibilitv for public office, in this case, his possession of the one-year
residency requirement under the law.

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made
a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate
states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section
78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is
false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC
since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with
the distinction mainly. in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.

At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be
interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different
remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities.
Private respondent's insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the
COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under
Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," does not
persuade the Court.
But the Ponencia misconstrues the above clear import of Fermin. It uses the latter
case as its authority to push its erroneous view that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction or power to look into the eligibility of candidates in the absence of a
specific law to that effect.

Further, with all due respect to the Ponente, I submit that his position that it is only
the PET/SETIHRET that has jurisdiction over the qualifications of candidates for
President, Vice-President, Senator, or Representative runs counter to this Court's
pronouncement in its Resolution in G.R. No. 20724, Reyes v. Commission on
Elections and Joseph Socorro B. Tan[10], of which he was also the Ponente, that -
Contrary to petitioner's claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the
following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a
petition is duly filed with said tribunaL Petitioner has not averred that she has filed
such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered
a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members x x x.
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a
candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral -Tribunal's supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction
over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)
And, interestingly, it was held that -
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as
well as her one-year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the
COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
With the indulgence of my colleagues, to emphasize the incongruity of the
position taken by the majority in this case led by the Ponente, allow me to quote
verbatim the relevant facts and findings of the Court in Reyes as written by
the Ponente of this case, to wit:
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation
of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration
showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
"balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing
upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-
born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention.
Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability ofR.A. No. 9225 to her.

xxxx
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on
petitioner's citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.

xxxx

All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC
is summary in nature, the COMELEC is given much discretion in the
evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of
determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled x x x.

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show
that grave abuse of discretion exists.
With the above, I am at a loss how the Court, through the majority, could rule the
way it did in this case when not so long ago it took the opposite position and
dismissed the petition of Reyes.

Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, which

reads:
SEC. 8. Effect if Petition Unresolved. - If a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy is unresolved by final judgment on the day of
elections, the petitioner may file a motion with the Division or Commission En
Banc, as may be applicable, to suspend the proclamation of the candidate
concerned, provided that the evidence for the grounds for denial to or cancel
certificate of candidacy is strong. For this purpose, at least three (3) days prior to
any election, the Clerk of the Commission shall prepare a list of pending cases and
furnish all Commissioners copies of the said list.

A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in case of a Division

ruling, no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, or in
cases of rulings of the Commission En Banc, no restraining order is issued by the
Supreme Court within five (5) days from receipt of the decision or resolution.
(Emphasis supplied.)
does not violate Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which states that
-
SEC. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules is a valid exercise of the rule making
powers of the COMELEC notwithstanding Section 7, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution. The condition "[u]nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
by law" that is mentioned in the latter provision gives the COMELEC the
flexibility to fix a shorter period for the finality of its decision and its immediate
execution in consonance with the necessity to speedily dispose of election cases,
but without prejudice to the continuation of the review proceedings before this
Court. Certainly, this is not inconsistent with Commission's constitutional mandate
to promulgate its own rules of procedure to expedite the dispositions of election
cases, viz.:
 ARTICLE IX
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
The Substantive Issues

The issue is whether or not the COMELEC En banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled the COC
for Presidency of Petitioner Poe on the substantive grounds of lack of citizenship
and residency qualifications.

I hold that it did not.

Ground for Petition for

Cancellation of COC under
Section 78 of the OEC

Section 78 of the OEC provides that -

SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny .due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied.)
In relation thereto, Section 74 also of the OEC requires:
SECTION 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved
proceeding, a certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which
he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the
name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed
under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name
after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there
are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each
candidate, upon being made aware of such fact, shall state his paternal and
maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and
surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also
include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known
in the locality.

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
In her 2016 COC for President, much like in her 2013 COC for

Senator, petitioner Poe made the following verified representations, viz.:

7. PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE

DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016:

10 No. of Years 11 No. of Months

8. I AM A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN.

xxxx

9. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

TO.[11]

Materiality of the Representation

With respect to the issue of materiality of the representation, as above

discussed, Mitra has settled that "critical material facts are those that refer to a
candidate's qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and
residence"; thus, the materiality of the representations on citizenship, residence
and/or eligibility is no longer in issue.

Falsity of the Representation

But the truthfulness of the material representation remains an issue to be resolved.

Citizenship Requirement

In the present case, I submit that petitioner Poe's representation that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, hence, eligible to run for and hold the position of
President, is false. My position is anchored on the following reasons:

Under the Constitution, natural

born Filipino citizenship is based
on blood relationship to a Filipino
father or mother following the
"jus sanguinis" principle

Petitioner Poe being a foundling, does not come within the purview of this
constitutionally ordained principle.
During the effectivity of the Spanish Civil Code in the Philippines on December 8,
1889, the doctrines of jus soli and jus sanguinis were adopted as the principles of
attribution of nationality at birth.[12]

Upon approval of the Tydings-McDuffie Act (Public Act No. 127), a

Constitutional Convention was organized in 1934. The Constitution proposed for
adoption by the said Convention was ratified by the Philippine electorate in 1935
after its approval by the President of the United States.[13]

It was in the 1935 Constitution that the Philippines adopted the doctrine of jus
sanguinis, literally translated to right by blood, or the acquisition of citizenship by
birth to parents who are citizens of the Philippines. The doctrine of jus
sanguinis considers blood relationship to one's parents as a sounder guarantee of
loyalty to the country than the doctrine of jus soli, or the attainment of a
citizenship by the place of one's birth.[14] The case of Tecson v. Commission on
Elections traced the history, significance, and evolution of the doctrine of jus
sanguinis in our jurisdiction as follows:
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was
a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any
such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship —
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers [or mothers] are citizens ofthe Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically
lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted
in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the
framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on
citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized m accordance with law."

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that -
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provlSlons of the 1973 Constitution,
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
"Section 1, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption ofthis
Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens ofthe Philippines.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized m accordance with law."

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include 'those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship.'

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during
the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship -naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and
the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or
blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship
bybirth.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
The changes in the provisions on citizenship was done to harmonize the Article on
Citizenship with the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men under Section 14, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, contrary to the insistence of petitioner Poe that there is nothing in our
Constitutions that enjoin our adherence to the principle of "jus sanguinis" or "by
right of blood," said principle is, in reality, well entrenched in our constitutional
system. One needs only to read the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and the
jurisprudence detailing the history of the well deliberated adoption of the jus
sanguinis principle as the basis for natural-born Filipino citizenship, to understand
that its significance cannot be lightly ignored, misconstrued, and trivialized.

Natural-born Citizenship by Legal

Fiction or Presumption of Law is
Contrary to the Constitution under
Salient Rules of Interpretation of
the Constitution

In this case, petitioner Poe's original birth certificate stated that she was a
foundling, or a child of unknown father or mother, found in Jaro, Iloilo, on
September 3, 1968. The Constitution in effect then was the 1935 Constitution. To
reiterate, it enumerated the "citizens of the Philippines" in Section 1, Article IV,
which included the following:
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner Poe would want this Court to look beyond the above-quoted
enumeration and apply the disputable or rebuttable presumption brought about by
the principles of international law and/or customary international law. However,
the above-quoted paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article IV are clear, unequivocal and
leave no room for any exception.

Rule of Verba Legis

Basic in statutory construction is the principle that when words and phrases of a
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
This plain-meaning or verba legis rule, expressed in the Latin maxim "verba legis
non est recedendum," dictates that "from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."[16]

Undeniably, petitioner Poe does not come within the scope of Filipino citizens
covered by paragraphs (3) and (4). From a literal meaning of the said provisions,
she cannot be considered a natural-born citizen. Paragraphs 3 and 4, Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, the organic law in effect during the birth of
petitioner Poe, were clear and unambiguous, it did not provide for any exception
to the application of the principle of "jus sanguinis" or blood relationship between
parents and child, such that natural-born citizenship cannot be presumed by law
nor even be legislated by Congress where no blood ties exist.

Function of Extrinsic Aid Such as

the Deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention

Petitioner Poe claims that "foundlings" were intended by the delegates of the 1934
Constitutional Commission to be considered natural-born citizens. Specifically,
she maintains that during the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols proposed
an amendment to include foundlings as among those who are to be considered
natural-born citizens; that the only reason that there was no specific reference to
foundlings in the 1935 Philippine Constitution was because a delegate mentioned
that foundlings were too few to warrant inclusion in a provision of the
Constitution and their citizenship is dealt with by international law.

The above inference or conclusion drawn from the debates adverted to is not
accurate.

Firstly, the deliberations did not evince the collective intent of the members of the
1934 Constitutional Convention to include "foundlings" in the list of Filipino
citizens in the Article on Citizenship. Moreover, there was no mention at all of
granting them natural-born citizenship.

A review of the transcript of the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional

Convention actually proved prejudicial to petitioner Poe's cause. The suggestion of
Delegate Rafols to include in the list of Filipino citizens children of unknown
parentage was voted down by the delegates when the amendment and/or
suggestion was put to a vote. In other words, the majority thereof voted not to
approve Delegate Rafol's amendment.

Secondly. Petitioner Poe's use of the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional

Convention to expand or amend the provision of the Constitution is unwarranted.

The Constitution is the basis of government. It is established by the people, in their

original sovereign capacity, to promote their own happiness, and permanently to
secure their rights, property, independence, and common welfare. When the
people associate, and enter into a compact, for the purpose of establishing
government, that compact, whatever may be its provisions, or in whatever
language it may be written, is the Constitution of the state, revocable only by
people, or in the manner they prescribe. It is by this instrument that government is
instituted, its departments created, and the powers to be exercised by it conferred.
[17]

Thus, in the construction of the Constitution, the Court is guided by the principle
that it (constitution) is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and it is
supreme, imperious, absolute, and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates.[18]

In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[19] this Court enunciated that -

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings
of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the
polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framer's understanding thereof. (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted.)
And as eloquently observed by Charles P. Curtis, Jr.-

The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could

discover what it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that
is to say, what they meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding
force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they set down in the document,
prying into what else they wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only
advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason why we should
eavesdrop on theirs.[20]

Synthesized from the aforequoted, it is apparent that debates and proceedings of

constitutional conventions lack binding force. Hence
If at all, they only have persuasive value as they may throw a useful light upon the
purpose sought to be accomplished or upon the meaning attached to the words
employed, or they may not. And the courts are at liberty to avail themselves of any
light derivable from such sources, but are not bound to adopt it as the sole
ground of their decision.[21]
Moreover, while the opinions of the members of the constitutional convention on
the article on citizenship of the 1935 Philippine Constitution may have a
persuasive value, it is, to repeat, not expressive of the people's intent. To recap:
The proceedings of the Convention are less conclusive on the proper construction
of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction
of a statute, for in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature the courts seek,
while in the former, courts seek to arrive at the intent of the people through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives. The conventional wisdom
is that the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which
framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is
that of the people.[22]
In the present case, given that the language of the third and fourth paragraphs of
the article on citizenship of the 1935 Philippine Constitution clearly follow only
the doctrine of jus sanguinis, it is, therefore, neither necessary nor permissible to
resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention. A
foundling, whose parentage and/or place of birth is obviously unknown, does not
come within the letter or scope of the said paragraphs of the Constitution.
Considering the silence of the Constitution on foundlings, the people who
approved the Constitution in the plebiscite had absolutely no idea about the debate
on the citizenship of foundlings and therefore, they could not be bound by it.

Rule that Specific Provisions of

Law Prevails Over General
Provisions

The specific provision of Article IV of the Constitution prevails over the general
provisions of Section 21, Article III of the Constitution. General international law
principles cannot overturn specifically ordained principles in the Constitution.

Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis supplied.)
Generally accepted principles of international law "may refer to rules of customary
law, to general principles of law x x x, or to logical propositions resulting
from judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law and municipal
analogies."[23] And it has been observed that, certainly, it is this judicial
reasoning that has been the anchor of Philippine jurisprudence on the
determination of generally accepted principles of international law and consequent
application of the incorporation clause.[24]

Petitioner Poe would like to apply to her situation several international law
conventions that supposedly point to her entitlement to a natural-born Filipino
citizenship, notwithstanding her lack of biological ties to a Filipino father or
mother. In effect, she wants to carve an exception to the "jus sanguinis" principle
through that generally accepted principles of international law which, under the
theory of incorporation, is considered by the Constitution as part of the law of the
land.[25]

Basic is the principle in statutory construction that specific provisions must prevail
over general ones, to wit:
A special and specific provision prevails over a general provision irrespective of
their relative positions in the statute. Generalia specialibus non derogant. Where
there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in
its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the
particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken
to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the
provisions of the particular enactment.
Hence, the general provision of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution on
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies" cannot supersede, amend or
supplement the clear provisions of Article IV on "Citizenship."

International Law Instruments/

Conventions are not self-executing

Petitioner Poe cannot find succor in the provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention
on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, in claiming natural-born Filipino
citizenship primarily for the following reasons: firstly, the Philippines has not
ratified said International Conventions; secondly, they espouse a presumption by
fiction of law which is disputable and not based on the physical fact of biological
ties to a Filipino parent; thirdly, said conventions are not self-executing as the
Contracting State is granted the discretion to determine by enacting a domestic or
national law the conditions and manner by which citizenship is to be granted;
and fourthly, the citizenship, if acquired by virtue of such conventions will be akin
to a citizenship falling under Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution,
recognizing citizenship by naturalization in accordance with law or by a special
act of Congress.

The cited international conventions are as follows:

(a) 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict
ofNationality Laws;
(b) 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; (c) 1989 UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child;

(d) 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and

(e) 1947 UN Declaration on Human Rights

Notice must be made of the fact that the treaties, conventions, covenants, or
declarations invoked by petitioner Poe are not self-executing, i.e., the international
instruments invoked must comply with the "transformation method" whereby "an
international law [must first] be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as locallegislation."[26]

Each of the aforementioned recognizes the need for its respective provisions to be
transformed or embodied through an enactment of Congress before it forms part of
the domestic or municipal law, viz.:

(a) The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws, which provides:
Article 14.

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the

country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found.

Article 15.

Where the nationality of a State is not acquired automatically by reason of birth on

its territory, a child born on the territory of that State of parents having no
nationality, or of unknown nationality, may obtain the nationality of the said
State. The law of that State shall determine the conditions governing the
acquisition of its nationality in such cases.
(b) The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, provides:
Article 1

1. A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its
territory who would otherwise be stateless. Such nationality shall be granted:

(a) At birth, by operation of law, or

(b) Upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on

behalf of the person concerned, in the manner prescribed by the national law.
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, no such application may be
rejected.

A Contracting State which provides for the grant of its nationality in accordance
with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph may also provide for the grant of its
nationality by operation of law at such age and subject to such conditions as
may be prescribed by the national law.
xxxx

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence

of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within that territory
of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
Conspicuously, the Philippines has neither acceded nor ratified any of the above
conventions.

The other international instruments to which the Philippines has acceded, require
initially conversion to domestic law via the transformation method of
implementing international instruments. They are:

(a) The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, ratified by the Philippines
on August 21, 1990, providing that:
Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance

with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
(b) The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the
Philippines ratified on October 23, 1986 providing that:
Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,

language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

(c) The 1947 Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
Article 15

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
The foregoing international conventions or instruments, reqmrmg implementing
national laws to comply with their terms, adhere to the concept of statehood and
sovereignty of the State, which are inviolable principles observed in the
community of independent States. The primary objective of said conventions or
instruments is to avoid statelessness without impairing State sovereignty. Hence,
the Contracting State has the discretion to determine the conditions and manner by
which the nationality or citizenship of a stateless person, like a foundling, may be
acquired. Neither do they impose a particular type of citizenship or nationality.
The child of unknown parentage may acquire the status of a mere "national."
Nowhere in the identified international rules or principles is there an obligation to
accord the stateless child a citizenship that is of a "natural-born" character.
Moreover, even if it so provided, it cannot be enforced in our jurisdiction because
it would go against the provisions of the Constitution.

Statutes and Treaties or

International Agreements or
Conventions are accorded the
Same Status in Relation to
the Constitution

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the former always
prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws, whether
domestic or international, must conform to. The duty of the Court under Section
4(2), Article VIII is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws, and by
express provisions of said Section treaties or international agreements that do not
conform to it.[27] In a catena of cases, the Supreme ourt further instructed that:
In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, the Court held that, "It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be
valid if it conflicts with the Constitution." In Sabia v. Gordon, the Court held
that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the 'basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform." In Atty. Macalintal v.
Commission on Elections, the Court held that, "The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and
all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional." In Manila Prince Hotel v.
Government Service Insurance System, the Court held that:
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since
the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.[28] (Emphases
supplied; citations omitted.)
Citizenship by "Naturalization"
under International Law

Citizenship is not automatically conferred under the international conventions

cited but will entail an affirmative action of the State, by a national law or
legislative enactment, so that the nature of citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant
thereto, is citizenship by naturalization. There must be a law by which citizenship
can be acquired by a foundling. By no means will this citizenship can be
considered that of a natural-born under the principle of jus sanguinis, which is
based on the physical existence of blood ties to a Filipino father or Filipino
mother. It will be akin to citizenship by naturalization if conferred by fiction
created by an international convention, which is of legal status equal to a statute or
law enacted by Congress.
Probabilities/Possibilities Based on Statistics

The Solicitor General argues for Petitioner Poe citing the ratio of children born in
the Philippines of Filipino parents to children born in the Philippines of foreign
parents during specific periods. He claims that based on statistics, the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural-born
Filipino is either 99.93% or 99.83%, respectively, during the period between 2010
to 2014 and 1965 to 1975. This argument, to say the least, is fallacious.

Firstly, we are determining blood ties between a child and her/his

parents. Statistics have never been used to prove paternity or filiation. With
more reason, it should not be used to determine natural-born citizenship, as a
qualification to hold public office, which is of paramount importance to national
interest. The issue here is the biological ties between a specific or named
foundling and her parents, which must be supported by credible and competent
evidence. We are not dealing with the entire population of our country that will
justify a generalized approach that fails to take into account that the circumstances
under which a foundling is found may vary in each case.

Secondly, the place of birth of the foundling is unknown but the argument is based
on the wrong premise that a foundling was born in the place where he/she was
found. The age of the foundling may indicate if its place of birth is the place where
he or she is found. If the foundling is a newly born baby, the assumption may have
solid basis. But this may not always be the case. It does not appear from the
documents on record that petitioner Poe was a newborn baby when she was found.
There is no evidence as to her place of birth. The Solicitor General cannot,
therefore, use his statistics of the number of children born to Filipino parents and
to alien parents in the Philippines since the places of birth of foundlings are
unknown.

Natural-born citizenship, as a qualification for public office, must be an

established fact in view of the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in the
Constitution, which should not be subjected to uncertainty nor be based in
statistical probabilities. A disputable presumption can be overcome anytime by
evidence to the contrary during the tenure of an elective official. Resort to this
interpretation has a great potential to prejudice the electorate who may vote a
candidate in danger of being disqualified in the future and to cause instability in
public service.

A Foundling does not Meet the

Definition of a Natural-born
Filipino Citizen under Section 2,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution

Other than those whose fathers or mothers are Filipinos, Section 2, Article IV of
the Constitution further defines "natural-born citizens" to cover "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform an act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."

A foundling is one who must first go through a legal process to obtain an official
or formal declaration proclaiming him/her to be a foundling in order to be granted
certain rights reserved to Filipino citizens. This will somehow prevent opening the
floodgates to the danger foreseen by Justice del Castillo that non-Filipinos may
misuse a favorable ruling on foundlings to the detriment of national interest and
security. Stated otherwise, the fact of being a foundling must first be officially
established before a foundling can claim the rights of a Filipino citizen. This being
the case, a foundling does not meet the above-quoted definition of a natural-born
citizen who is such "from birth".

To illustrate, Republic Act Nos. 8552 and 9523, provide, respectively:

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8552

SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). -It shall be the duty of the
Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of
the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be
the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9523:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

xxxx

(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or

guardianship, or whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least
three (3) continuous months, which includes a foundling.

xxxx

SECTION 4. Procedure for the Filing of the Petition. - The petition shall be filed
in the regional office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandoned.

The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if
sufficient in form and substance and shall authorize the posting of the notice of the
petition in conspicuous places for five (5) consecutive days in the locality where
the child was found.

The Regional Director shall act on the same and shall render a recommendation
not later than five (5) working days after the completion of its posting. He/she
shall transmit a copy of his/her recommendation and records to the Office of the
Secretary within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of the recommendation.

SECTION 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. -Upon finding merit in the

petition, the Secretary shall issue a certification declaring the child legally
available for adoption within seven (7) working days from receipt of the
recommendation.

Said certification, by itself, shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance
by the local civil registrar of a foundling certificate. Within seven (7) working
days, the local civil registrar shall transmit the foundling certificate to the National
Statistics Office (NSO).

SECTION 8. -The certification that a child is legally available for adoption shall
be issued by the DSWD in lieu of a judicial order, thus, making the entire
process administrative in nature.

The certification, shall be, for all intents and purposes, the primary evidence that
the child is legally available in domestic adoption proceeding, as provided in
Republic Act No. 8552 and in an inter-country adoption proceeding, as provided
in Republic Act No. 8043.
The above laws, though pertaining to adoption of a Filipino child, clearly
demonstrate that a foundling first undergoes a legal process to be considered as
one before he/she is accorded rights to be adopted available only to Filipino
citizens. When the foundling is a minor, it is the State under the concept of
"parens patriae" which acts for or on behalf of the minor, but when the latter
reaches majority age, she/he must, by herself/himself, take the necessary step to be
officially recognized as a foundling. Prior to this, the error of out-rightly invoking
the "disputable presumption" of alleged "natural-born citizenship" is evident as
there can be no presumption of citizenship before there is an official determination
of the fact that a child or person is a foundling. It is only after this factual premise
is established that the inference or presumption can arise.[29]

That being so, a foundling will not come within the definition of a natural-born
citizen who by birth right, being the biological child of a Filipino father or mother,
does not need to perform any act to acquire or perfect his/her citizenship.

It should also be emphasized that our adoption laws do not confer "natural-born
citizenship" to foundlings who are allowed to be adopted. To read that
qualification into the adoption laws would amount to judicial legislation. The said
laws of limited application which allows the adoption of a foundling, cannot also
be used as a basis to justify the natural-born citizenship of a foundling who has
reached majority age like petitioner Poe who applied to reacquire her citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225. The opinion of the seven (7) Justices if pursued, there will
be no need for a foundling to misrepresent himself or herself as a
biological child of her adoptive parents like what petitioner Poe did, and instead, a
foundling can be truthful and just submit a Foundling Certificate to be entitled to
the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Since from their point of view a foundling need not
perform any act to be considered a natural-born citizen, said foundling need not
prove the veracity of the Foundling Certificate. This will include a Foundling
Certificate in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) prepared list of evidence of natural-
born citizenship. This is pure and simple judicial legislation. Foundlings are not
even mentioned at all in R.A. No. 9225.

Pursuing this logic further, will one who wish to take the Bar Examinations or to
be appointed to the Judiciary need to submit only a Foundling Certificate to the
Supreme Court and the Judicial Bar Council to prove his/her qualification as a
natural-born citizen? The same question can be raised in other situations where
natural-born citizenship is required, not only by law, but most especially by the
Constitution. Do the seven (7) Justices intend that the question be answered in the
affirmative? If so, my humble submission is that, apart from violating the
Constitution, it will be a reckless position to take as a Foundling Certificate should
not automatically confer natural-born citizenship as it can easily be obtained by
impostors who pretend to have found a child of unknown parents.

The July 18, 2006 Order of the

Bureau of Immigration approving
petitioner Poe's application for
dual citizenship was not valid.

First, petitioner Poe's claim to a dual citizenship by virtue of R.A. No. 9225 is
invalid for the simple reason that the said law limits its application to natural-born
Filipino citizens only. In other words, the right to avail of dual citizenship is only
available to natural-born citizens who have earlier lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of acquisition of foreign citizenship. Second, petitioner Poe obtained
dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by misrepresenting to the BI that
she is the biological child of a Filipino father and Filipino mother such that the
Bureau was misled in to believing that "[petitioner Poe] was a former citizen of
the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents. Third, the said
order was not signed by the Commissioner of the BI as required by implementing
regulations. And her re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship being clearly invalid,
petitioner Poe's acceptance and assumption to public office requiring natural-born
citizenship as condition sine qua non is likewise invalid.

Republic Act No. 9225 (the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003)
[30]
 governs the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship by a natural-
born Filipino who acquired citizenship in a foreign country. Under Section 3
thereof, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines specifically stated therein. [31] The
foregoing point is reiterated under the Bureau of Immigration's Memorandum
Circular No. AFF. 05-002 (Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004),
particularly Section 1 thereof, it is categorically provided that
Section 1. Coverage. These rules shall apply to natural-born citizens of the
Philippines as defined by Philippine law and jurisprudence, who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country.
Hence, given my preceding discussion on the citizenship of petitioner Poe, I
submit that she could not have validly repatriated herself under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225 for purposes of "reacquiring" natural born Filipino
citizenship.

Another point that I wish to emphasize is the fact that in her Petition for Retention
and/or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship filed before the BI on July 10,
2006, petitioner Poe knowingly committed a false representation when she
declared under oath that she was "a former natural-born Philippine citizen,
born on Sept. 3, 1968 at Iloilo City to Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, a Filipino citizen
and Jesusa Sonora Poe, a Filipino citizen[.]" [Emphasis supplied.]

In so answering the blank form of the petition, petitioner Poe plainly represented
that she is the biological child of the spouses Ronald Allan Kelly Poe and Jesusa
Sonora Poe; thereby effectively concealing the fact that she was a foundling who
was subsequently adopted by the said spouses.

This false representation paved the way for the issuance by the BI of the Order
dated July 18, 2006 that granted Poe's petition, which declared that she "was a
former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, being born to Filipino parents
and is presumed to be a natural-born Philippine citizen[.]"

Another point worthy of note is the fact that the said Order was not signed by the
Commissioner of the BI as required under the aforementioned Memorandum
Circular No. AFF. 05-002, to wit:
Section 10. Compliance and approval procedures. - All petitions must strictly
comply with the preceding requirements prior to filing at the Office of the
Commissioner or at nearest Philippine Foreign Post, as the case may be x x x.

If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and in substance, the evaluating

officer shall submit the findings and recommendation to the Commissioner of
Immigration or Consul General, as the case may be x x x.

[T]he Commissioner of Immigration, x x x, or the Consul General, x x

x, shall issue, within five (5) days from receipt thereof, an Order of
Approval indicating that the petition complies with the provisions of R.A. 9225
and its IRR, and the corresponding IC, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied.)
A perusal of the said order will show that an indecipherable signature or autograph
is written above the type written name of then Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez,
Jr. (Fernandez). The said writing was not made by Commissioner Fernandez as the
word "for" was similarly written beside the name of the latter indicating that the
said signature/autograph was made in lieu of the named person's own
signature/autograph. Whose signature/autograph it was, and under whose authority
it was made, are not evident from the document.

On the basis of the above undisputed facts, I submit that the July 18, 2006 Order
of the BI granting petitioner Poe's application for the reacquisition of her
supposedly lost natural-born citizenship was not only improvidently issued, but
more importantly, it was null and void. The nullity stemmed from her concealment
or misrepresentation of a material fact, not an error of law, regarding the identity
of her biological parents. The unlawful product of this concealment was
carried over in her pursuit of high government positions requiring natural-
born citizenship as a qualification. Therefore, the same could not be the source
of her reacquisition of all the attendant civil and political rights, including the
rights and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines, granted to
natural-born Filipino citizens.

Petitioner Poe's re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship was not validly approved

as it was based on an erroneous finding of fact based on the false representation by
petitioner Poe as to her parentage.

The Residency Requirement

The assailed COMELEC resolutions uniformly held that petitioner Poe falsely
claimed in her COC that she had been a resident of the Philippines for ten years
and eleven months up to the day before the May 9, 2016 elections. Assuming
petitioner Poe may be validly repatriated under Republic Act No. 9225, the
COMELEC ruled that it was only when she reacquired her Filipino citizenship on
July 18, 2006 that she could have reestablished her domicile in the Philippines.

Before this Court, petitioner Poe primarily argues that the COMELEC "acted
whimsically and capriciously, ignored settled jurisprudence and disregarded the
evidence on record in ruling that she made a false material representation in her
COC for President when she stated therein that her 'period of residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016' would be '10' years and '11'
months."[32] Petitioner Poe contends that she reestablished her domicile of choice
in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005, even before she reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the qualifications for
the position of President, to wit:
ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such election. (Emphasis supplied.)
For election purposes, the term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation.[33] In contemplation of election
laws, residence is synonymous with domicile. Domicile is the place where a
person actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain.
It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.[34]

In Domino v. Commission on Elections,[35] the Court stressed that domicile denotes

a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in
mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can
have but one residence or domicile at a time.

Domicile is classified into: (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every

person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the
domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes
to a person independently of his residence or intention.[36] To acquire a new
domicile of choice, the following requirements must concur: (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.[37]

In Coquilla v. Commission on Elections,[38] the Court held in no uncertain terms

that naturalization in a foreign country results in the abandonment of domicile in
the Philippines.

Thereafter, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,[39] the Court construed the

requirement of residence under election laws vis-a-vis the provisions of Republic
Act No. 9225. The respondent in said case, JaimeS. Ty, was a natural-born
Filipino who became an American citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and ran for Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Manuel B. Japzon, a rival candidate,
questioned Ty's residency in said place. The Court ruled that -
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a
natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under
such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at
all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage
of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for
the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention
any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the
current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic
Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
Since a natural born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the
foreign country of which he is also a citizen.

Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino
with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Breaking down the aforequoted provision, for a natural-born Filipino, who
reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to
run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

xxxx

As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty's reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the
USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his
residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.[40] (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the instant cases, it is beyond question that
petitioner Poe lost her domicile in the Philippines when she became a naturalized
American citizen on October 18, 2001. From then on, she established her new
domicile of choice in the U.S. Thereafter, on July 7, 2006, petitioner Poe took her
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Republic Act No. 9225.
Again, on the assumption that petitioner Poe can validly avail herself of the
provisions of said law, she was deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship under the latter date. Subsequently, on October 20, 2010, petitioner
Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American Citizenship (Affidavit of Renunciation).

Following Japzon, petitioner Poe's reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship did

riot automatically make her regain her residence in the Philippines. She merely
had the option to again establish her domicile here. The length of petitioner Poe's
residence herein shall be determined from the time she made the Philippines her
domicile of choice. Whether petitioner Poe complied with the ten-year residency
requirement for running for the position of the President of the Philippines is
essentially a question of fact that indeed requires the review and evaluation of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties before the COMELEC.

On this note, I concur with the ruling in Justice Del Castillo's Dissenting Opinion
that the evidence[41] submitted by petitioner Poe was insufficient to establish her
claim that when she arrived in the Philippines on May 24, 2005, her physical
presence was imbued with animus manendi. At that point in time, petitioner Poe's
status was merely that of a non-resident alien.

Notably, when petitioner arrived in the Philippines on May 24, 2005, the same was
through a visa-free entry under the Balikbayan Program.[42] Under Republic Act
No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program),[43] as amended by Republic
Act No. 9174,[44] the said program was instituted "to attract and encourage
overseas Filipinos to come and visit their motherland."[45]

Under Section 3 of the above-mentioned law, petitioner Poe was merely entitled to
a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year.[46] Thus, her stay
then in the Philippines was certainly not for an indefinite period of time.[47] This
only proves that petitioner Poe's stay was not impressed with animus manendi, i.e.,
the intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice for an indefinite period of time.

In Coquilla v. Commission on Elections,[48] We disregarded the period of a

candidate's physical presence in the Philippines at the time when he was still a
non-resident alien. In this case, Teodulo M. Coquilla lost his domicile of origin in
Oras, Eastern Samar when he joined the U.S. Navy in 1965 and he was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. On October 15, 1998, he came to the
Philippines and took out a resident certificate. Afterwards, he still made several
trips to the U.S. Coquilla later applied for repatriation and took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines on November 10, 2000. Coquilla thereafter filed his
COC for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern Samar. A rival candidate sought the
cancellation of Coquilla's COCas the latter had been a resident of Oras for only six
months after he took his oath as a Filipino citizen.
The Court ruled that Coquilla indeed lacked the requisite period of residency.
While he entered the Philippines in 1998 and took out a residence certificate, he
did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for only one
year. He then entered the country at least four more times using the same visa-
free balikbayan entry. From 1965 until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
on November 10, 2000, Coquilla's status was held to be that of "an alien without
any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have
allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien." The Court also explained
that:
The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately,
when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an
alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under § 13[49] of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and
thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire
Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he
is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status
as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.[50] (Citations omitted.)
The Court, thus, found that Coquilla can only be held to have waived his status as
an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as
a citizen of the Philippines. The Court arrived at the same ruling in the earlier case
of Ujano v. Republic[51] and Caasi v. Court of Appeals.[52]

In the cases at bar, petitioner Poe similarly failed to prove that she waived her
status as a non-resident alien when she entered the Philippines on May 24, 2005 as
a visa-free balikbayan visitor. Her status only changed when she ostensibly took
her oath of allegiance to the Republic under Republic Act No. 9225 on July 7,
2006.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,[53] the entitlement to the full civil and
political rights concomitant with the reacquired citizenship shall commence only
when the requirements in the said law have been completed and the Philippine
citizenship has been acquired. It is only then that that Filipinos who have
reacquired their citizenship can be said to gain the right to exercise their right of
suffrage or to seek elective public office, subject to the compliance with the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and existing laws.

Thus, it is the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic on July 7, 2006
presumably conferred upon petitioner Poe not only Philippine citizenship but also
the right to stay in the Philippines for an unlimited period of time. It was only then
that she can claim subject to proof, that her physical presence in the Philippines
was coupled with animus manendi. Any temporary stay in the Philippines prior to
the aforesaid date cannot fall under the concept of residence for purposes of
elections. The animus manendi must be proven by clear and unmistakable
evidence since a dual citizen can still freely enjoy permanent resident status in
her/his domicile of choice if said status is not given up or officially waived.

Anent the pieces of evidence[54] that petitioner Poe submitted to prove her animus

non revertendi to her domicile in the U.S., I agree with the dissent of Justice Del
Castillo that little weight can likewise be properly ascribed to the same, given that
they referred to acts or events that took place after May 24, 2005. As such, they
were also insufficient to establish petitioner's claim that she changed her domicile
as of May 24, 2005. Petitioner Poe's evidence was insufficient to prove animus
non revertendi prior to her renunciation of her U.S. citizenship on October 20,
2010. Before the renunciation, it cannot be said that there was a clear and
unmistakable intent on the part of petitioner Poe to abandon her U.S. domicile. To
be clear, one cannot have two domiciles at any given time. It was thus incumbent
upon the petitioner Poe to prove by positive acts that her physical presence in the
Philippines was coupled with the intent to relinquish her domicile in the U.S.

As pointed out by Justice Del Castillo, the continued use of her American passport
in her travels to the U.S., as well as her ownership and maintenance of two
residential houses in the said country until the present time, only served to weaken
her stance that she actually and deliberately abandoned her domicile in the U.S.
when she came here on May 24, 2005. This is because she continued to represent
herself as an American citizen who was free to return to the said country whenever
she wished. Moreover, although petitioner Poe supposedly reacquired her
Philippine citizenship on July 7, 2006, she was issued a Philippine passport only
three years thereafter on October 13, 2009. Thus, I concur with the finding of
the Ponencia that petitioner Poe's affidavit of renunciation of U.S. citizenship was
the only clear and positive proof of her abandonment of her U.S. domicile.

Given the above findings, the petitioner's evidence fails to substantiate her claim
that she had established her domicile of choice in the Philippines starting on May
24, 2005.

By stating in her COC that she had complied with the required ten year residency
when she actually did not, petitioner made a false material representation that
justified the COMELEC's cancellation ofher COC.

The majority opinion, however, reached a dissimilar conclusion and ruled

that Coquilla, Japzon, Caballero and Reyes are inapplicable to the case at bar.
The maj?rity posited that, unlike in the aforesaid cases where the evidence
presented on residency was sparse, petitioner Poe's evidence is overwhelming and
unprecedented. The majority furthermore asserted that there is no indication in the
said cases that the Court intended to have its ruling therein apply to a situation
where the facts are different

I strongly beg to differ.

But of course, the factual milieu of these cases is different from those of Coquilla,
Japzon, Caballero and Reyes. No two cases are exactly the same. However, there
are no substantial differences that would prevent the application here of the
principles enunciated in the said decided cases. Moreover, absolutely nowhere in
the said cases did the Court expressly say that the rulings therein only apply pro
hac vice (meaning, "for this one particular occasion").[55] On the contrary, the
doctrines laid down in said cases are cited in a catena of election cases, which
similarly involve the residency requirement for elective positions. Simply put, the
jurisprudential doctrines and guidelines set out in said cases, along with other
cases dealing with the same subject matter, serve as the standards by which the
pieces of evidence of a party in a specific case are to be measured. Even petitioner
Poe herself adverts to our ruling in Jafzon, Coquilla and Caballero, albeit in a
manner that tends to suit her cause.[56]
In relation to the application of Coquilla to these cases relative to petitioner Poe's
utilisation of the visa-free balikbayan entry, the majority opines that under
Republic Act No. 6768, as amended, balikbayans are not ordinary transients in
view of the law's aim of "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary
training enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of
society upon their return to the country" in line with the government's
"reintegration program." The majority, thus, concluded that the visa-free period is
obviously granted to allow a balikbayan to re-establish his life and reintegrate
himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal
requirements of repatriation.

On this point, the majority apparently lost sight of the fact that the training
program envisioned in Republic Act No. 6768, as amended, that is to be pursued
in line with the government's reintegration program does not apply to petitioner
Poe. It applies to another set of balikbayans who are Filipino overseas workers.
Section 6 of the law expressly states that:
SEC. 6. Training Programs. - The Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) through the OWWA, in coordination with the Technology and
Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC), Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA), livelihood corporation and other concerned
government agencies, shall provide the necessary entrepreneurial training and
livelihood skills programs and marketing assistance to a balikbayan, including
his or her immediate family members, who shall avail of
the kabuhayan program in accordance with the existing rules on the
government's reintegration program.

In the case of non-OFW balikbayan, the Department of Tourism shall make the

necessary arrangement with the TLRC and other training institutions for possible
livelihood training. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is a government
agency that is primarily tasked to protect the interest and promote the welfare of
overseas Filipino workers (OFWs).[57] Among the benefits and services it renders
is a Reintegration Program, which defines reintegration as "a way of preparing for
the return of OFWs into the Philippine society."[58] Not being an OFW, petitioner
Poe is not the balikbayan that is envisioned to be the recipient of the above
reintegration program.

If she indeed wanted to reestablish her life here, petitioner Poe should have
applied for a Returning Former Filipino Visa, instead availing herself of a visa-
free balikbayan entry. This visa may be applied for by a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who has been naturalized in a foreign country, and is returning to the
Philippines for permanent residence, including his/her spouse and minor children.
By this visa, she would be allowed, inter alia, to stay in the Philippines
indefinitely, establish a business, and allowed to work without securing an alien
employment permit. This would have definitely established her intent to remain in
the Philippines permanently. Unfortunately for petitioner Poe, she did not apply
for this visa.

The majority opinion also ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC for giving more weight to the 2013 COC of petitioner Poe instead of
looking into the many pieces of evidence she presented in order to see if she was
telling the truth that she already established her domicile in the Philippines from
May 24, 2005. The majority points out that when petitioner Poe made the
declaration in her 2013 COC that she has been a resident for a period of six (6)
years and six (6) months counted up to the May 13, 2013 elections, she naturally
had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator, which was
satisfied by her declared years of residence. The majority even belabors the
obvious fact that the length of residence required of a presidential candidate is
different from that of a senatorial candidate.

To this I likewise take exception.

It bears pointing out that the COMELEC did not tum a blind eye and deliberately
refused to look at the evidence of petitioner Poe. A reading of the assailed
COMELEC resolutions reveals that the pieces of evidence of the petitioner were
indeed considered, piece by piece, but the same were adjudged insufficient to
prove the purpose for which they were offered. To repeat, the emphasis must be on
the weight of the pieces of evidence, not the number thereof. The COMELEC,
perforce, arrived at an unfavorable conclusion. In other words, petitioner Poe's
evidence had actually been weighed and measured by the COMELEC, but same
was found wanting.

Moreover, I do not find significant the distinction made on the residency

requirement for a presidential candidate and that of a senatorial candidate for
purposes of these cases. The truth of a candidate's statement on the fact of her
residency must be consistent and unwavering. Changes in a candidate's assertion
of the period of residency in the Philippines shall not inspire belief or will not be
credible.

Deceit

As to the view that the material representation that is false should be "made with
an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public
office,"[59] I cannot but deviate therefrom.

Again, Section 78 of the OEC, provides that

SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphases supplied.)
In Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[60] the Court had the
occasion to enlighten that "the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less
one's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is
enough that the person's declaration of a material qualification in the CoC he
false." The Court therein further acknowledged that "an express finding that the
person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
determination of whether one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not" [61]; and
concluded that "[w]hat remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to
den due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis o ineligibility and that the
same he granted without any qualification."[62]
The above standard is in keeping with the tenor of Section 78 of the OEC. The
said law used the phrase material representation qualified by the term false; and
not misrepresentation per se. This distinction, I believe, is quite significant.

A deeper analysis and research on the import and meaning of the language of
Section 78, led to the conclusion that as opposed to the use of the term
"misrepresentation" which, colloquially is understood to mean a statement made
to deceive or mislead,[63] the qualifying term "false" referring to the phrase
"material representation" is said to have "two distinct and well-recognized
meanings. It signifies (1) intentionally or knowingly, or negligently untrue, and
(2) untrue by mistake, accident, or honestly after the exercise of reasonable
care."[64] Thus, the word "false" does not necessarily imply an intention to deceive.
What is important is that an untrue material representation is made.

Relating to the disqualification under Section 78 of the OEC, the requirement of

the said law (that a cancellation of a candidate's COC be exclusively grounded on
the presence of any VS. contained therein that is required under Section 74 of the
same is false) should only pivot on the candidate's declaration of a material
qualification that is false, and not on the deliberate intent to defraud. With this,
good faith on the part of the candidate would be inconsequential.

In these present cases, there is no need to go into the matter of questioning

petitioner Poe's intent in making a material representation that is falseIt is enough
that she signified that she is eligible to run for the Presidency notwithstanding the
fact that she appeared to know the legal impediment to her claim of natural-born
Filipino citizenship, as borne out by her concealment of her true personal
circumstances, and that she is likewise aware of the fact that she has not fulfilled
the ten-year residency requirement as shown by her inconsistent and ambivalent
stand as to the start of her domicile in the Philippines. Apparently, she is cognizant
of the fact that she is actually ineligible for the position.

However, that while an intent to deceive in petitioner Poe's actions is not an

indispensable element under a Section 78 Petition, the COMELEC's affirmative
finding on the existence of deceit is not without basis. The COMELEC observed,
and I quote:
The simplicity and clarity of the terms used in our Constitution and laws on
citizenship, the fact that [petitioner Poe] is a highly educated woman and all other
circumstances found by the Honorable Second Division to be present in this case,
would leave little doubt as to the intention of [petitioner Poe] when she made the
false representations in the Certificates x x x that is, to mislead [the] people into
thinking that she was then a Filipino.

The Commission is especially bothered by [petitioner Poe's] representation in the

Petition for Retention and/or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship that she was
BORN TO her adoptive parents. To recall, it was this Petition, granted by the
BID, that led to [petitioner Poe] supposed acquisition of Filipino citizenship in
July 2006 under RA 9225 - a law which limits its application only to natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenships. The design to mislead in order to satisfy the
requirements of the law is evident, reminiscent of the intent to mislead in the 2016
COC, put in issue in the present case.
All told, the foregoing misrepresentations may be for different purposes, but all
seems to have been deliberately done. It is, therefore, hard to think, given the
aforementioned pattern of behavior, that the representation in [petitioner Poe's]
2016 COC for President that she was a natural-born citizen was not a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render her
ineligible for the office that she seeks to be elected to.[65]
On the matter of her residency requirement, petitioner Poe concedes that she
indicated in her 2013 COC that her "period of residence in the Philippines before
May 13, 2013" was "6 years and 6 months." Consequently, her residence in the
Philippines could have only begun on November 2006, such that by May 9, 2016,
her aggregate period of residence in the Philippines was approximately only 9
years and 6 months, which is short ofthe period of residence required for
presidential candidates.

Petitioner Poe explains, however, that she made the above statement as an "honest
misunderstanding" of what was being asked of her.[66] She contends that she did
not fully comprehend that the phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013" in her 2013 COC actually referred to the period of residence
on the day right before the May 13, 2013 elections. She allegedly construed it to
mean her "period of residence in the Philippines as of the submission of COCs in
October 2012 (which is technically also a period 'before May 13, 2013')."[67] Thus,
she counted backwards from October 2012, instead from May 13, 2013 and in so
doing she brought herself back to "March-April 2006," which was the period
when her house in the U.S. was sold and when her husband resigned from his job
in the U.S.[68] She argues that that was the period she indicated, albeit it was a
mistake again on her part as it should have been May 24, 2005.

Petitioner Poe's ambivalent or varying accounts do not inspire beliefs of the

truthfulness of her latest allegation of the period of her residence in the
Philippines.

It is indeed incredible of someone of her stature to gravely misinterpret the phrase

"Period of Residence in the Philippines before the May 13, 2013" in the 2012
COC. At any rate, having been informed as early as June 2015 of this supposedly
honest mistake, it is quite perplexing that the same was not immediately rectified.
As it were, the above mentioned explanations that were belatedly given even
muddled the issue further. Petitioner Poe can hardly blame the COMELEC for
casting a suspicious and skeptic eye on her contentions regarding her residency.

Petitioner Poe's claim of good faith, thus, stands on very shaky grounds. As found
by the COMELEC En banc:
x x x worthy of note are certain arguments raised such as [petitioner Poe's] claim
that she never hid from the public her supposed mistake in the 2013 COC, as
evinced by the following: 1.) she publicly acknowledged the same in an interview
in June 2015, after the issue of compliance with the residency requirement for
President was raised by Navotas City Representative and then United Nationalist
Alliance Secretary General Tobias Tiangco; and 2.) that as early as September 1,
2015, in her Verified Answer filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter "SET") in SET Case No. 001-15, she already made it of record that as
of May 13, 2013, she had been residing in the Philippines "for more than six (6)
years and six (6) months."
While the two statements were indeed made before respondent filed her 2016
COC, it was nonetheless delivered at a time when, at the very least, the possibility
of [petitioner Poe] running for President of the country in 2016, was already a
matter of public knowledge. By then, [petitioner Poe could have already been
aware that she cannot maintain her declaration in the 2013 COC as it would be
insufficient to meet the 10- year residency requirement for President.

Indeed, the Commission finds it hard to believe that a woman as educated as

[petitioner Poe], who was then already a high-ranking public official with, no
doubt, a competent staff and a band of legal advisers, and who is not herself
entirely unacquainted with Philippine politics being the daughter of a former high-
profile presidential aspirant, would not know how to correctly fill-up a pro-forma
COC in 2013. We are not convinced that the subject entry therein was an honest
mistake.
Conclusion

The foregoing discussion points to the failure of petitioner Poe to prove her cases.
Therefore, I submit that the two assailed COMELEC En banc Resolutions dated
December 23, 2015, separately affirming the December 1, 2015 Resolution of the
Second Division and the December 11, 2015 Resolution of the First Division are
not tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Petitioner Poe implores this Court not to allow the supposed disenfranchisement of
the sovereign people by depriving them of "of something rightfully theirs: the
consideration of petitioner as a viable and valid choice for President in the next
elections."[69]

But the Constitution itself is the true embodiment of the supreme will of the
people. It was the people's decision to require in the Constitution, which they
approved in a plebiscite, that their President be a natural-born Filipino citizen. The
people did not choose to disenfranchise themselves but rather to disqualify those
persons, who did not descend by blood from Filipino parents, from running in an
election for the Presidency.

The will of the electorate will never cure the vice of ineligibility. As so eloquently
reminded by then Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections[70]:
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice
of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship.
WHEREFORE, I vote to (i) DISMISS the four petitions for certiorari filed by
petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares; and (ii) LIFT the temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on December 28, 2015.

[1]
 Section 2, Rule 64 ofthe Rules of Court states:

SEC. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the

Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the
aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as
hereinafter provided.
[2]
 G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267, 279-280.
[3]
 636 Phil. 753 (2010).
[4]
 686 Phil. 649 (2012).
[5]
 468 Phil. 421,461-462 (2004).
[6]
 Id. at 518.
[7]
 Id. at 562-563.
[8]
 G.R. No. 20724, June 25, 2013.
[9]
 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
[10]
 June 25, 2013.
[11]
  Annex "B" ofthe Petition in G.R. No. 221697.
[12]
 Irene R. Cortes and Raphael Perpetuo M. Lotilla, Nationality and International
Law from the Philippine Perspective, published in the Philippine Law Journal,
Volume LX, March 1985, University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law, p.
7.; citing Art. 17 (1 and 2) Spanish Civil Code.
[13]
 Id. at 10.
[14]
 Id.
[15]
 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, supra note 5 at 469-471.
[16]
 Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216691, July 21, 2015.
[17]
 Words and Phrases, Vol. 2, p. 1462; Citing McKoan vs. Devries, 3 Barb., 196,
198 [quoting 1 Story, Const., Sees. 338, 339]; Church vs. Kelsey, 7 Sup. Ct., 897,
898; 121 U.S., 282; 30 L. ed., 960, and Bates vs. Kimball [Vt.], 2 D. Chip., 77, 84.
[18]
 Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 335 Phil. 82,
101 (1997).
[19]
 272 Phil. 147, 169-170 (1991).
[20]
 Charles P. Curtis, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2, Houghton Mifflin, 1947.
[21]
 Dennis B. Funa, Cannons of Statutory Construction (2012 Edition); Citing
Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the
Laws, p. 30, quoting City of Springfield v. Edwards, 84 IlL 626.
[22]
 Retired Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno's Separate Opinion in Integrated Bar of
the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 668-669 (2000).
[23]
 Separate Opinion of J. Carpio-Morales in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 627
Phil. 37, 80 (2010); citing IAN BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International
Law, Sixth Ed., 18 (2003).
[24]
 Id.
[25]
 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 2.
[26]
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
561 Phil. 386, 398 (2007).
[27]
 Tawang Multi-Purpose Coopetative v. La Trinidad Water District, 661 Phil.
390 (2011).
[28]
 Id. at 402-403.
[29]
 Martin v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[30]
 Approved on August 29, 2003.
[31]
 Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 states:

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have re acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
[32]
 Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 241.
[33]
 Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, 434 Phil. 861, 871 (2002).
[34]
 Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 575 Phil. 253, 263 (2008).
[35]
 369 Phil. 798, 818 (1999).
[36]
 Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra. at 263.
[37]
 Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 430 Phil. 754, 770 (2002).
[38]
 Supra at 872.
[39]
 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
[40]
 Id. at 367-370.
[41]
 In petitioner's Memorandum, she cited the following pieces of evidence to
prove her animus manendi, or intent to stay permanently in the Philippines, among
others:

(a) Petitioner's travel records, which show that whenever she was absent for a trip
abroad, she would consistently return to the Philippines;

(b) Affidavit of Ms. Jesusa Sonora Poe, attesting to, inter alia, the fact that after
their arrival in the Philippines in early 2005, petitioner and her children first lived
with her at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan City, which even
necessitated a modification of the living arrangements at her house to
accommodate petitioner's family;

(c) School records of petitioner's·children, which show that they had been
attending Philippine schools continuously since June 2005;

(d) Petitioner's TIN I.D., which shows that shortly after her return in May 2005,
she considered herself a taxable resident and submitted herself to the Philippines'
tax jurisdiction; and

(e) CCT for Unit 7F and a parking slot at One Wilson Place, purchased in early
2005, and its corresponding Declarations of Real Property for real property tax
purposes, which clearly establish intent to reside permanently in the Philippines.
[42]
 Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 249-250.
[43]
 Approved on November 3, 1989.
[44]
 Approved on November 7, 2002.
[45]
 The relevant portion of Section l of Republic Act No. 9174 states:

SEC. 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6768 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section 1. Balikbayan Program. - A Balikbayan Program is hereby instituted

under the administration of the Department of Tourism to attract and encourage
overseas Filipinos to come and visit their motherland. This is in recognition of
their contribution to the economy of the country through the foreign exchange
inflow and revenues that they generate."
[46]
 Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9174 states:

SEC. 3. Section 3 of the [Republic Act No. 6768] is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"Sec. 3 Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. - The balikbayan and his or her
family shall be entitled to the following benefits and privileges:

xxxx

(c) Visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year for foreign
passport holders, with the exception of restricted nationals[.]"
[47]
 The one year period may be extended for another one (1), two (2) or six (6)
months, subject to specific requirements.
[http://www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa-inquiry/balikbayan-previlege. Last
accessed: February 27, 2016.]
[48]
 Supra note 33.
[49]
 The pertinent portions of this provision states:

"Under the conditions set forth in this Act, there may be admitted in the
Philippines immigrants, termed "quota immigrants" not in excess of fifty (50) of
any one nationality or without nationality for any one calendar year, except that
the following immigrants, termed "nonquota immigrants," may be admitted
without regard to such numerical limitations.

The corresponding Philippine Consular representative abroad shall investigate and

certifY the eligibility of a quota immigrant previous to his admission into the
Philippines. Qualified and desirable aliens who are in the Philippines under
temporary stay may be admitted within the quota, subject to the provisions of the
last paragraph of Section 9 of this Act.

xxxx

(g) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines, who has been naturalized in a foreign
country, and is returning to the Philippines for permanent residence, including the
spouse and minor children, shall be considered a non-quota immigrant for
purposes of entering the Philippines (As amended by Rep. Act No. 4376, approved
June 19, 1965)."
[50]
 Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, supra note 33 at 873-875.
[51]
 17 SCRA 147.
[52]
 191 SCRA 229.
[53]
 Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 states:

SECTION 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or

reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the

armed forces ofthe country which they are naturalized citizens.
[54]
 In petitioner's Memorandum, she cited the following pieces of evidence to
prove her animus non revertendi, or intent to abandon her U.S.A. domicile, among
others:

(a) Affidavit of Ms. Jesusa Sonora Poe, attesting to, among others, the reasons
which prompted the petitioner to leave the U.S.A. and return permanently to the
Philippines;

(b) Affidavit of petitioner's husband, Mr. Teodoro V. Llamanzares, corroborating

the petitioner's statement and explaining how he and the petitioner had been
actively attending to the logistics of their permanent relocation to the Philippines
since March 2005;

(c) The petitioner and her husband's documented conversations with property
movers regarding the relocation of their household goods, furniture, and cars, then
in Virginia, U.S.A., to the Philippines, which show that they intended to leave the
U.S.A. for good as early as March 2005;

(d) Relocation of their household goods, furniture, cars, and other personal
property then in Virginia, U.S.A., to the Philippines, which were packed and
collected for storage and transport to the Philippines on February and April 2006;

(e) Petitioner's husband's act of informing the U.S.A. Postal Service of their
abandonment of their former U.S.A. address on March 2006;

(f) Petitioner and her husband's act of selling their family home in the U.S.A. on
April 27, 2006;
(g) Petitioner's husband's resignation from his work in the U.S.A. in April 2006;
and

(h) The return to the Philippine's of petitioner's husband on May 4, 2006.

[55]
 Partido Ng Manggagawa v. Commission on Elections, 519 Phil. 644, 671
(2006).
[56]
 See Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 268, 271, 272.
[57]
 Overseas Workers Welfare Administration v. Chavez, 551 Phil. 890, 896
(2007).
[58]
 http://www.owwa.gov.ph/?q=node/23/#reintegration. Last accessed on March
11, 2016 at 1:52 p.m.
[59]
 Salcedo v. Commission on Elections. 371 Phil. 377, 390 (1999).
[60]
 G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013.
[61]
 Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, citing Miranda v.
Abaya, 370 Phil. 642.
[62]
 Id.
[63]
 Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.
[64]
 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, D.C. Mun. App., 37 A.2d 345, 350.
[65]
 COMELEC Decision in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), pp. 30-31.
[66]
 Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 285.
[67]
 Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 285.
[68]
 Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 286-287.
[69]
 Petition in G.R. No. 221697, p.1; rollo, p. 1.
[70]
 G.R. No. 87193, [June 23, 1989], 255 PHIL 934-947.

DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:

I write this DISSENTING OPINION to express my disagreements with

the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice JOSE P. PEREZ, who wrote
the majority opinion of this Court.

The ponencia is based on the exclusive ground that the COMELEC

committed "grave abuse of discretion" in "denying due course to and/or
cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy for the President for the May 9, 2016
elections for false material representation as to her citizenship and
residency."

I write as well to offer help to the general public so that they may be enlightened
on the issues already darkened by political and self-interested claims and
counterclaims, all aired by the media, paid and unpaid, that only resulted in
confusing what would otherwise be fairly simple and clear-cut issues.

I respond most especially to the appeal of our President Benigno C. Aquino for
this Court to rule with clarity for the sake of the voting public. Even a Dissent can
contribute to this endeavor. Thus, I write with utmost frankness so that everyone
may know what really transpired within the Court's veiled chambers.

For a systematic and orderly approach in presenting my Dissent, I shall:

• First summarize the ponencia and the votes of the ruling majority (Part A);

• Then proceed to my more specific objections to the ponencia's egregious

claims; (Part B) and

• quote the portions of my original Separate Concurring Opinion that specifically

dispute the majority's ruling (Part C).

In this manner, I can show how mistaken and misplaced the majority's ruling had
been, and how it dishonored our Constitution through its slanted reading that
allows one who does not qualify to serve as President, to be a candidate for this
office.

Shorn of the glamor and puffery that paid advertising and media can provide, this
case is about an expatriate - a popular one - who now wants to run for the
presidency after her return to the country. Her situation is not new as our
jurisprudence is replete with rulings on similar situations. As early as 1995, a great
jurist - Justice Isagani Cruz[1] - (now deceased but whose reputation for the
energetic defense of and respect and love for the Constitution still lives on) gave
his "take" on this situation in his article Return of the Renegade. He wrote:
"... Several years ago a permanent resident of the United States came back to
the Philippines and was elected to a local office. A protest was lodged against
him on the ground of lack of residence. The evidence submitted was his green
card, and it was irrefutable. The Supreme Court ruled that his permanent
and exclusive residence was in the United States and not in the municipality
where he had run and won. His election was annulled.

Where a former Filipino citizen repents his naturalization and decides to

resume his old nationality, he must manifest a becoming contrition. He
cannot simply abandon his adopted country and come back to this country as
if he were bestowing a gift of himself upon the nation. It is not as easy as
that. He is not a donor but a supplicant.

In a sense, he is an apostate. He has renounced Philippine citizenship by a

knowing and affirmative act. When he pledged allegiance to the adopted
country, he also flatly disavowed all allegiance to the Philippines. He cannot
erase the infidelity by simply establishing his residences here and claiming the
status he has lost.

The remorseful Filipino turned alien by his own choice cannot say that he
sought naturalization in another country only for reasons of
convenience. That pretext is itself a badge of bad faith and insincerity.
It reflects on his moral character and suggests that he is not an honest person.
By his own admission, he deceived his adopted country when he pretended
under oath to embrace its way of life." [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
Of course, this is only one side of the story and cannot represent the total truth of
the returning citizen situation. Still, it would be best to remember the renegade,
lest we forget this hidden facet of this case as we hear many impassioned pleas for
justice and fairness, among them for foundlings, within and outside the Court.
What should be before us should be one whole story with all the pieces woven
together, both for and against the parties' respective sides. Part of this story should
be the general public whose interests should be foremost in our minds. In
considering them, we should consider most of all the Constitution that that they
approved in the exercise of their sovereign power.

PART A

SUMMARY OF THE PONENCIA'S VOTES & POSITIONS

Of the nine (9) members of the Court supporting the ponencia, four ( 4) - among
them, Justices Benjamin Caguioa, Francis Jardeleza, and Mario Victor M.V.F.
Leonen, as well as Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno herself - submitted
their respective opinions to explain their own votes as reasons for supporting
the ponencia 's conclusions.

While they offered their respective views (particularly on Poe's claimed natural-
born citizen status, ten-year residency, and the COMELEC's conclusion of false
representations), they fully concurred (by not qualifying their respective
concurrences) with the ponencia's basic reason in concluding that grave abuse of
discretion attended the COMELEC's challenged rulings.

On the other hand, the other four (4) members who voted with the majority fully
concurred without qualification with the ponencia, thus fully joined it.

In granting Poe's certiorari petitions, the ponencia ruled that-

"...[t]he procedure  and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. [Poe] is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the May 9,
2016 National Elections."[2] [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Under the terms of this grant, the ponencia confirmed its position that the
COMELEC ruling was attended by grave abuse of discretion and this was the sole
basis for the Court decision that COMELEC ruling should be nullified and set
aside.

The ponencia gave the following explanations, which I quote for specific

reference (as I do not wish to be accused of maliciously misreading the ponencia):
"The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of [Poe] should be
denied due course or cancelled 'on the exclusive ground' that she made in the
certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should
hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue
of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue
is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot
itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.

xxxx

x x x as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration

by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified 'is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.[3]

x x x The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior

proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior
determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by
judgment of a competent court or tribunal."[4]

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without prior finding that he or she is

suffering from a disqualification 'provided by law or the Constitution, ' neither
can the [CoC] be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false material
representations regarding his or her qualifications, such prior authority being the
necessary measure by which falsity of representation can be found. The only
exception that can be made conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions xx x [which] are equivalent to
prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined". [5]
To summarize all these in a more straight-forward format, the ponencia concluded
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling Poe's CoC because:
(1) the Comelec did not have the authority to rule on Poe's citizenship and
residency qualifications as these qualifications have not yet been determined
by the proper authority.

(2) since there is no such prior determination as to Poe's qualifications, there

is no basis for a finding that Poe's representations are false;

(3) while a candidate's CoC may be cancelled without prior disqualification

finding from the proper authority, the issues involving Poe's citizenship and
residency do not involve self evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity from which the falsity of representation could have been determined;
and

(4) The COMELEC's determinations on Poe's citizenship and residency are

acts of grave abuse of discretion because:

(a) Poe's natural-born citizenship is founded on the intent of the framers of

the 1935 Constitution, domestically recognized presumptions, generally
accepted principles of international law, and executive and legislative actions;
and
(b) Poe's residency claims were backed up not only by jurisprudence, but
more importantly by overwhelming evidence.
Justice Caguioa additionally offered the view that the requirement of "deliberate
intent to deceive" cannot be disposed of by a simple finding that there was false
representation of a material fact. Rather, there must also be a showing of the
candidate's intent to deceive animated the false material representation. [6]

J. Caguioa also pointed out that the COMELEC shifted the burden to Poe to prove
that she had the qualifications to run for President instead of requiring the private
respondents (as the original petitioners in the petitions before the COMELEC) to
prove the three (3) elements required in a Section 78 proceeding. It failed to
appreciate that the evidence of both parties rested, at the least, at equipoise, and
should have been resolved in favor of Poe.

A.1. The  ponencia  on Poe's citizenship

First, on Poe's citizenship, i.e, that Poe was not a natural-born Philippine

citizen; the ponencia essentially ruled that although she is a foundling, her
blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable.[7]

J. Leonen agreed with this point and added[8] that all foundlings in the Philippines
are natural-born being presumptively born to either a Filipino biological father or
mother, unless substantial proof to the contrary is shown. There is no requirement
that the father or mother should be identified. There can be proof of a reasonable
belief that evidence presented in a relevant proceeding substantially shows that
either the father or the mother is a Filipino citizen.

For his part, J. Caguioa submitted that if indeed a mistake had been made
regarding her real status, this could be considered a mistake on a difficult question
of law that could be the basis of good faith.[9]

Second, more than sufficient evidence exists showing that Poe had Filipino
parents since Philippine law provides for presumptions regarding paternity.
[10]
 Poe's admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden of proof to her
because her status did not exclude the possibility that her parents are Filipinos. [11]

The factual issue is not who the parents of Poe are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents were Filipinos.[12] The following circumstantial evidence
show that Poe was a natural-born Filipino: (1) statistical probability that
any child born in the Philippines at the time of Poe's birth is natural-born Filipino;
(2) the place of Poe's abandonment; and (3) Poe's Filipino physical features. [13]

Third, the framers of the 1935 Constitution and the people who adopted this
Constitution intended foundlings to be covered by the list of Filipino citizens.
[14]
 While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language that would definitely exclude foundlings.[15]

Thus viewed, the ponencia believes that Poe is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines by circumstantial evidence, by presumption, and by implication from
the silent terms of the Constitution.

The ponencia also clarified that the Rafols amendment pointed out by Poe was not
carried in the 1935 Constitution not because there was any objection to their
inclusion, but because the number of foundlings at the time was not enough to
merit specific mention.[16]

More than these reasons, the inclusion of foundlings in the list of Philippine
citizens is also consistent with the guarantee of equal protection of the laws and
the social justice provisions in the Constitution.[17]

J. Jardeleza particularly agreed with these reasons and added that in placing
foundlings at a disadvantaged evidentiary position at the start of the hearing and
imposing upon them a higher quantum of evidence, the COMELEC effectively
created two classes of children: (1) those with known biological parents; and (2)
those whose biological parents are unknown. This classification is objectionable
on equal protection grounds because it is not warranted by the text of the
Constitution. In doing so, the COMELEC effectively subjected her to a higher
standard of proof, that of absolute certainty.[18]

Fourth, the domestic laws on adoption and the Rule on Adoption support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos as these include foundlings among the
Filipino children who may be adopted.[19]

In support of this position, J. Leonen additionally pointed out that the legislature
has provided statutes essentially based on a premise that foundlings are Philippine
citizens at birth, citing the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006; and that the
Philippines also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which are legally
effective and binding by transformation.

J. Leonen further argued that the executive department had, in fact, also assumed
Poe's natural-born status when she reacquired citizenship pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, hereinafter RA
9225) and when she was appointed as the Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTR CB).[20] Her natural-born status
was recognized, too, by the people when she was elected Senator and by the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) when it affirmed her qualifications to run for
Senator.[21]

The Chief Justice added, on this point, that the SET decision is another document
that shows that she was not lying when she considered herself a natural-born
Filipino. At the very least, it is a prima facie evidence finding of natural-born
citizenship that Poe can rely on. The SET ruling negated the element of deliberate
attempt to mislead.[22]

Fifth. the issuance of a foundling certificate is not an act to acquire or perfect

Philippine citizenship that makes a foundling a naturalized Filipino at best.
"Having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In the case of foundlings, the determination of his/her foundling status is
not done by himself, but by the authorities.[23]

Sixth, foundlings are Philippine citizens under international law, i.e., the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child (UNCRC), and the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), all obligate the Philippines to grant them nationality from birth
and to ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time
of birth which cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
Naturalization Laws.[24]

The principle - that the foundlings are presumed to have the nationality of the
country of birth, under the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the 1961 United Nations Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness - is a generally accepted principle of international
law. "Generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on
international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations."[25]

The requirement of opinio Juris sive necessitates in establishing the presumption

of the founding State's nationality in favor of foundlings under the 1930 Hague
Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness as generally accepted
principle of international law was, in fact, established by the various executive and
legislative acts recognizing foundlings as Philippine citizens, i.e., by the executive
through the Department of Foreign Affairs in authorizing the issuance of passports
to foundlings, and by the Legislature, via the Domestic Adoption Act. Adopting
these legal principles in the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis
regime in our Constitution.[26]

Lastly, the COMELEC disregarded settled jurisprudence that repatriation results in

the reacquisition of natural-born Philippine citizenship.[27] Poe's repatriation under
RA No. 9225 did not result in her becoming a naturalized Filipino, but restored her
status as a natural-born Philippine citizen. Repatriation is not an act to "acquire or
perfect one's citizenship" nor does the Constitution require the natural-born status
to be continuous from birth.[28]

A.2. The ponencia on Poe's residency

The ponencia ruled that the COMELEC gravely erred on the residency issue when
it blindly applied the ruling in Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero reckoning the
period of residence of former natural-born Philippine citizens only from the date
of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, and relied solely in her statement in her
2012 CoC as to the period of her residence in the Philippines. The COMELEC
reached these conclusions by disregarding the import of the various pieces of
evidence Poe presented establishing her animus manendi and animus non-
revertendi.[29]

Poe, in fact, had shown more than sufficient evidence that she established her
Philippine residence even before repatriation. The cases of Coquilla, Japzon,
Caballero, and Reyes are not applicable to Poe's case because in these cases, the
candidate whose residency qualification was questioned presented "sparse
evidence"[30] on residence which gave the Court no choice but to hold that
residence could only be counted from the acquisition of a permanent resident visa
or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Under this reasoning, Poe showed
overwhelming evidence that she decided to permanently relocate to the Philippines
on May 24, 2005, or before repatriation.[31]
J. Leanen, on this point, added that the COMELEC's dogmatic reliance on formal
preconceived indicators has been repeatedly decried by the Court as grave abuse
of discretion. Worse, the COMELEC relied on the wrong formal indicators of
residence.[32]

As the ponencia did, J. Leanen stressed that the COMELEC disregarded Poe's

evidence of re-establishment of Philippine residence prior to July 2006 when it
merely invoked Poe's status as one who had not reacquired Philippine citizenship.
To him, the COMELEC relied on a manifestly faulty premise to justify the
position that all of Poe's evidence before July 2006 deserved no consideration. [33]

Second, Poe may re-establish her residence notwithstanding that she carried a
balikbayan visa in entering the Philippines. The one year visa-free period allows a
balikbayan to re-establish his or her life and to reintegrate himself or herself into
the community before attending to the formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. There is no overriding intent under the balikbayan program to treat
balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. [34]

Third, Poe committed an honest mistake in her 2012 CoC declaration on her
residence period.[35] Following jurisprudence, it is the fact of residence and not the
statement in a CoC which is decisive in determining whether the residency
requirement has been satisfied. The COMELEC, in fact, acknowledged that the
query on the period of residence in the CoC form for the May 2013 elections was
vague; thus. it changed the phrasing of this query in the current CoC form for the
May 9, 2016 elections. It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat
the 2012 CoC as binding and conclusive admission against Poe.

Fourth, assuming that Poe's residency statement in her 2015 CoC is erroneous, Poe
had no deliberate intent to mislead or to hide a fact as shown by her immediate
disclosure in public of her mistake in the stated period of residence in her 2012
CoC for Senator.[36]

PART B

SPECIFIC REFUTATION OF THE PONENCIA'S OUTSTANDING ERRORS

My original Separate Concurring Opinion (to the original ponencia of Justice

Mariano del Castillo) deals with most, if not all, of the positions that the majority
has taken. My Separate Concurring Opinion is quoted almost in full below (with
some edits for completeness) as my detailed refutation of the ponencia.

Nevertheless, I have incorporated Part B in this Opinion to address the ponencia's

more egregious claims that, unless refuted, would drastically change the
constitutional and jurisprudential landscape in this country, in order only to justify
the candidacy of one popular candidate. As I repeated often enough in my
Separate Concurring Opinion, the Court operates outside of its depth and could
possibly succeed in drowning this nation if it adds to, detracts from, negates,
enlarges or modifies the terms of the Constitution as approved by the sovereign
people of the Philippines.
B.1. The ponencia on the Comelec's lack of jurisdiction

The ponencia presented two arguments in concluding that the COMELEC lacked

the jurisdiction to determine Poe's eligibility to become President in the course of
a section 78 proceeding against her:

First, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution on the COMELEC's jurisdiction had
no specific provision regarding the qualification of the President, Vice President,
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, while Article VI, Section
17 and Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution specifically included
contest involving the qualifications of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, and of the President and Vice-President, to the jurisdiction of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET), the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) respectively.[37]

Second, Fermin v. Comelec,[38] citing the Separate Opinion of Justice Vicente V.

Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec,[39] noted that "the lack of provision
for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
rule."[40] This view was adopted in the revision of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure in 2012, as reflected in the changes made in the 2012 Rules from the
1993 Rules of Procedure,[41] as follows:

1993 Rules of Procedure:

Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

2012 Rules of Procedure:

Rule 25, Section 1. Grounds, - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found
by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny or to

cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance
Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

The ponencia read Fermin and the 2012 Rules of Procedure to mean that there is
no authorized proceeding to determine the qualifications of a candidate before the
candidate is elected. To disqualify a candidate, there must be a declaration by a
final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is
guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution."[42]

Thus, the ponencia held that a certificate of candidacy "cannot be cancelled or

denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified,
such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-
evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial
confessions."[43]

The arguments in my original Separate Concurring Opinion regarding the

COMELEC's jurisdiction to rule on Section 78 cases address the ponencia 's
arguments, as follows:

a) The COMELEC's quasi-judicial power in resolving a Section 78 proceeding

includes the determination of whether a candidate has made a false material
representation in his CoC, and the determination of whether the eligibility he
represented in his CoC is true.

b) In Tecson v. COMELEC"[44] the Court has recognized the COMELEC's

jurisdiction in a Section 78 proceeding over a presidential candidate.

c) Fermin's quotation of Justice Mendoza's Separate Opinion in Romualdez-

Marcos should be taken in context, as Fermin itself clarified:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required
of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the
OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to
a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in
the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition
for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
[45]
 [underscoring supplied]

Aside from these arguments, I point out that:

d) The ponente's conclusion contradicts his own recent affirmation of the

COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine the eligibility of a candidate through a
Section 78 proceeding in Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 207264, June
25, 2013) and in Cerafica v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014).

In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court, speaking through J. Perez, affirmed

the COMELEC's cancellation of Ongsiako-Reyes' CoC and affirmed its
determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is neither a Philippine citizen nor a resident of
Marinduque.

The Court even affirmed the COMELEC's capability to liberally construe its own
rules of procedure in response to Ongsiako-Reyes' allegation that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in admitting newly-discovered evidence that had not
been testified on, offered and admitted in evidence. The Court held:
All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the CoC is
summary in nature, the COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and
admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of determining of
whether or not the CoC should be cancelled. We held in Mastura v. COMELEC:

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by
courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it
concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC - created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself -
on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad
powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
[46]
 [emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied]

In Cerafica, the Court, again speaking through J. Perez, held that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica (a candidate for
councilor) did not file a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be substituted by
Olivia Cerafica. Kimberly's CoC is considered valid unless the contents therein
(including her eligibility) is impugned through a Section 78 proceeding. As
Kimberly's CoC had not undergone a Section 78 proceeding, then her CoC
remained valid and she could be properly substituted by Olivia. In so doing, the
Court quoted and reaffirmed its previous ruling in Luna v. COMELEC:[47]

"If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in
his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a
verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the Election Code."[48] [italics supplied]

e) The ponencia's conclusion would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence

recognizing the COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine a candidate's eligibility in
the course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it.

The ponencia disregarded the following cases where it recognized the

COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine eligibility as part of determining false
material representation in a candidate's CoC. Cases involving Section 78 since the
year 2012 (the year the COMELEC amended its Rules of Procedure) are shown in
the table below:

Case Ponente , Ruling:

Division
Aratea v. Carpio, J. En The Court affirmed the Comelec's determination
Comelec banc that Lonzanida has served for three terms already
C.R. No. 195229 and therefore misrepresented his eligibility to run
October 9, 2012 for office; this, according to the Court, is a
ground for cancelling Lonzanida's CoC under
Section 78.
Maquiling V. Sereno, CJ, En The Court reversed the Comelec's determination
Comelec, G.R. banc of the Arnado's qualification to run for office
No. 195649, because of a recanted oath of allegiance, and thus
April 16, 2013 cancelled his Coe and proclaimed Maquiling as
the winner. The Court, in reviewing the
 Comelec's determination, did not dispute its
capacity to determine Arnado's qualifications.
Ongsiako Reyes Perez, J., En The Court affirmed the Comelec's evaluation and
v. Comelec, G.R. Banc determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is not a
No. 207264, Philippine citizen and a resident of the
June 25, 2013 Philippines.

It even upheld the Comelec's cognizance of

"newly-discovered evidence" and held that the
Comelec can liberally construe its own rules of
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
before it.
Cerafica v. Perez, J. En The Court held that the Comelec gravely abused
Comelec, G.R. Banc Decision its discretion in holding that Kimberly did not file
No. 205136 a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be
December 2, substituted by Olivia; in so doing, the Court
2014 quoted and reaffirmed its previous ruling in Luna
v Comelec, thus:

"If Hans Roger made a material

misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in
his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may
only be impugned through a verified petition to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the Election
Code."
Luna v. Carpio, J. En Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of
Comelec, G.R. Banc candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna
No. 165983 complied with all the procedural requirements for
April 24, 2007 a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute
(cited as for Hans Roger.
reference to its
affirmation in xxx
Cerafrica)
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation
as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of
candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned
through a verified petition to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Election Code.

In this case, there was no petition to deny due

course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that
Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of
candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in
the petition to deny due course to or cancel
Luna's certificate of candidacy. In effect, the
COMELEC, without the proper proceedings,
cancelled Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy
and declared the substitution by Luna invalid.

f) Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the
COMELEC's jurisdiction in determining the eligibility of a candidate in the
course of ruling on a Section 78 proceeding.
The second paragraph in Rule 23 delineates the distinction between a Section
78 ca ncellation proceeding and a Section 68 disqualification proceeding; to
avoid the muddling or mixing of the grounds for each remedy, the
COMELEC opted to provide that petitions that combine or substitute one
remedy for the other shall be dismissed summarily.

Naturally, the text of this second paragraph also appears in Rule 25, which
provides for the grounds for a petition for disqualification.

Rule 23 provides:

Section 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certifcate of Candidacy. -

A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for

any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly registered
political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive
ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is
false.

A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking

grounds other than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or
combining grounds for a separate remedy, shall be summarily dismissed;

Thus, Rule 23 recognizes material misrepresentation in the CoC as the sole ground
for Section 78 without amending the definition of false material representation that
jurisprudence has provided as early as 1999 in Salcedo II v. COMELEC:[49]

The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy
and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition
for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds -
(1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be
initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results. Under
section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office,
[21] and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

xxxx

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated

by section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a
candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.[23] It could not
have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and
substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake:

xxxx
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78
must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.[25] In other words, it must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public
office. xxx
B.1.a. Effect of the ponencia's misinterpretation of
Section 78 proceedings to the Court's certiorari
jurisdiction over the present case

If we were to follow the ponencia's limitation on the COMELEC's function to

determine Poe's eligibility to become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the
logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poe's citizenship
and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC
ruling; any declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum.

In practical terms, the Court's ruling only assured Poe the chance to run;
conceivably, if she wins, the Court, through the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
will then rule that the people have spoken and that they cannot be denied their
voice after the elections. Based on the present circumstances, this is a scenario that
cannot be entirely ruled out.

To reiterate, the ponencia declared that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to

determine, even preliminarily, the eligibility of candidates prior to an election
under a Section 78 proceeding, except for disqualifications already or previously
acted upon by the proper authorities or where the facts are self-evident or of
unquestioned or unquestionable veracity from which the falsity of representation
could readily be determined.

Since the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction "to rule and cannot even preliminarily
determine questions of eligibility, then the issues involving the COMELEC's
alleged grave abuse of discretion in ruling on Poe's eligibilities cannot effectively
be resolved except through a ruling that, given the lack of authority, it was grave
abuse of discretion for COMELEC to rule as it did. And given the same lack of
authority, the reversal of the cancellation of her CoC must follow as a
consequence. Thus, her CoC effectively remains valid.

The consequence of ruling that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to determine

eligibility as part of a Section 78 proceeding is that any other subsequent
discussions by this Court upholding Poe's eligibilities would be obiter dicta, or
pronouncements that are not essential to the resolution of a case. With the
COMELEC stripped of the jurisdiction to determine, even preliminarily, Poe's
citizenship and residence, then its determinations are null and void, leading to the
further conclusion that this Court no longer has any issue left to review and to
decide upon as neither would it be necessary to determine Poe's eligibilities.

In other words, any pronouncements outside the COMELEC's limited jurisdiction

in Section 78 would only be expressions of the COMELEC's opinion and would
have no effect in the determination of the merits of the Section 78 case before it.
Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved or even be
touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a candidate for
the presidency, with her eligibilities open to post-election questions, if still
necessary at that point.

B.1.b. Aruego's account of the deliberations,

as cited in the ponencia

Ironically, the ponencia's citation of Jose M. Aruego's recounting of the

deliberations even reinforces my position that the framers never intended to
include foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitution's parentage
provisions. Aruego allegedly said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an

amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also
foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a
provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international
law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in
the Constitution of the proposed amendment.[50]

Aruego's account of the deliberations reinforces my position for the following

reasons:

First, Aruego said that "this amendment was defeated primarily because the

Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a
provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory
legislation."

In saying this, Aruego also recounted that many, if not most, of the majority of
those who voted against the inclusion of foundlings in the 1935 Constitution
believed that the matter of their citizenship should be governed by statutory
legislation because the cases of foundlings are too few to be included in the
Constitution.

Thus, the principle of international law on foundlings is merely supportive of the

primary reason that the matter should be governed by statute, or is a secondary
reason to the majority's decision not to include foundlings in Article IV, Section 1
of the 1935 Constitution.

Notably, both the text of the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention
and the account of its member Jose Aruego do not disclose that the intent behind
the non-inclusion of foundlings in Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
was because they are deemed already included.

What deliberations show is that a member of the Convention thought that it would
be better for a statute to govern the citizenship of foundlings, which Aruego, in his
subsequent retelling of what happened in the deliberations, described as
the primary belief of the majority. At the very least, there was no clear agreement
that foundlings were intended to be part of Article IV, Section 1.
The ponencia's ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of
citizenship based on the father or the mother under the 1935 Constitution; it
also misreads what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the
children of Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, although able
to trace their Filipino parentage, must yield to the higher categorization
accorded to foundlings who do not enjoy similar roots.

Another drastic change appears to be coming for no clear and convincing legal
reason in the present case: Section 78 would now be emasculated despite
established rulings by this very Court on what the COMELEC can undertake
within its Section 78 jurisdiction.

A close reading of Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, also penned by J. Perez as

above noted, will show that the issues the COMELEC decided there were
practically the same issues in this cited case. Yet, the Court's majority in the
present case holds that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to rule on the issues of a
candidate's citizenship and residence requirements in the course of a Section 78
proceeding, despite its previous affirmation of the same COMELEC power
in Ongsiako-Reyes also in a Section 78 proceeding. Have established precedents
been sacrificed to achieve desired results?

But the worst impact yet on the Constitution is the discovery that this Court can
play around even with the express wordings of the Constitution. While this may
already be known to those in the legal profession, the reality becomes glaring and
may be a new discovery for the general public because of the recent EDCA case;
the present case and ruling may very well be considered another instance of
judicial tinkering with the express terms of the Constitution.

B.1.c. Burden of Proof.

A contested issue that surfaced early on in these cases is the question: who carries
the burden of proving that the petitioner is a natural-born Philippine citizen?

Lest we be distracted by the substance of this question, let me clarify at the outset
that the cases before us are petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 (in relation to
Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. In these types of petitions, the petitioner challenges
the rulings/s made by the respondent pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution. Thus, it is the petitioner who carries the burden of showing that the
respondent, the COMELEC in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion.

Of course, in making the challenged ruling, the COMELEC had a wider view and
had to consider the parties' respective situations at the outset. The present private
respondents were the petitioners who sought the cancellation of Poe's CoC and
who thereby procedurally carried the burden of proving the claim that Poe falsely
represented her citizenship and residency qualifications in her CoC.

I would refer to this as the procedural aspect of the burden of proof issue. The
original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present
petitions) - from the perspective of procedure - carried the burden under its Section
78 cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material
representations; she claimed in her CoC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
when she is not; she also claimed that she has resided in the Philippines for ten
years immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections, when she had not. The
original petitioners had to prove what they claimed to be false representations.

Thus viewed, the main issue in the case below was the false material
representation, which essentially rested on the premises of citizenship and
residence - is Poe a natural-born citizen as she claimed and had she observed the
requisite qualifying period of residence?

The original petitioners undertook the task on the citizenship issue by alleging that
Poe is a foundling; as such, her parents are unknown, so that she is not a
Philippine citizen under the terms of the 1935 Constitution.

Poe responded by admitting that indeed she is a foundling, but claimed that the
burden is on the original petitioners to prove that she is in fact a foreigner through
proof that her parents are foreigners.

Since Poe indeed could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine
citizen, the COMELEC concluded that the original petitioners are correct in their
position that they have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC
considered and relied on the terms of the 1935 Constitution.

With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe to
prove that despite her admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a natural-
born Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and
by legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is
a natural-born citizen.

The same process was repeated with respect to the residency issue, after which, the
COMELEC ruled that Poe committed false representations as, indeed, she is not a
natural-born Philippine citizen and had not resided in the country, both as required
by the Constitution.

These were the processes and developments at the COMELEC level, based on
which the present Court majority now say that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion for not observing the rules on the burden of proof on the
citizenship and the residency issues.

Separately from the strictly procedural aspects of the cancellation of CoC

proceedings, it must be considered that the petitioner, by filing a CoC, actively
represents that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for the office she is running for.

When this representation is questioned, particularly through proof of being a

foundling as in the present case, the burden should rest on the present petitioner to
prove that she is a natural-born Philippine citizen, a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately prior to the election, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a registered voter. This is the
opportunity that the COMELEC gave Poe to the fullest, and I see no question of
grave abuse of discretion on this basis.
From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to determine
who its citizens are.[51] By conferring citizenship on a person, the State obligates
itself to grant and protect the person's rights. In this light and as discussed more
fully below, the list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as
exclusive and exhaustive.

Thus, this Court has held that any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in
favor of the State.[52] In other words, citizenship cannot be presumed; the person
who claims Filipino citizenship must prove that he or she is in fact a Filipino.
[53]
 It is only upon proper proof that a claimant can be entitled to the rights granted
by the State.[54]

This was the Court's ruling in Paa v. Chan[55] where this Court categorically ruled
that it is incumbent upon the person who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to
the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. This should be true
particularly after proof that the claimant has not proven (and even admits the lack
of proven) Filipino parentage. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be
resolved in favor of the State.

The Court further explained that the exercise by a person of the rights and/or
privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof that he or
she is a Philippine citizen. A person, otherwise disqualified by reason of
citizenship, may exercise and enjoy the right or privilege of a Philippine citizen by
representing himself to be one.[56]

Based on these considerations, the Court majority's ruling on burden of proof at

the COMELEC level appears to be misplaced. On both counts, procedural and
substantive (based on settled jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to the
legal requirements. Thus, the Court majority's positions on where and how the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave
abuse at the COMELEC level, the present petitioner's own burden of proof in the
present certiorari proceedings before this Court must necessarily fail.

PART C

MY ORIGINAL "SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION"

TO THE PONENCIA OF
JUSTICE MARIANO DEL CASTILLO

I am submitting this original Separate Concurring Opinion to refute in detail

the ponencia 's main points that I disagree with. For convenience, the original
numbering system of the original has been retained and I have introduced edits and
supplied the footnotes that were missing when this Opinion was circulated on
Monday, March 7, 2016.

The deadline for submission of Opinions was on March 8, 2016. The deliberation
and the vote were originally scheduled for Wednesday, March 9, 2016 to allow the
individual Justices to read through all the submitted Opinions. Unfortunately, for
reasons not fully disclosed to me, the actual deliberation and voting took place on
March 8, 2016 (when I was on leave for medical reasons).

Thus, while my Separate Concurring Opinion was circulated, made available on

time to all the Justices and accounted for in the Court's count of votes, I did not
have the full opportunity to orally expound on them. In this light, this Dissenting
Opinion is my opportunity to cover the views I have not orally aired.

I.

The Relevant Facts and their Legal Significance.

I.A. The Petitions for Cancellation of CoC and the COMELEC ruling

Four (4) petitions were filed with the COMELEC to cancel Poe's CoC for the
Presidency under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The first petition before the COMELEC was the petition for cancellation filed
by Estrella C. Elamparo, which was docketed as G.R. No. 221697.

The other three (3) petition were similarly for the cancellation of Poe's CoC filed
by separate parties - by Francisco S. Tatad, Amado D. Valdez, and Antonio P.
Contreras - and are before this Court under G.R. Nos. 221298-700.

The petitions before this Court - all of them for the nullification of the
COMELEC en banc rulings through a writ of certiorari - were consolidated for
hearing and handling because they all dealt with the cancellation of Poe's Coe.

These petitions essentially raised two grounds as basis for the cancellation prayed
for:

First, she falsely represented her citizenship in her CoC because she is not a

natural-born Filipino citizen; and

Second, she falsely represented the period of her residency prior to the May 9,

2016 elections as she has not resided in the Philippines for at least ten (10) years
before the day of the election.

These issues were raised based on the constitutional command that:

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election. [Article VII, 1987 Constitution,
emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The COMELEC en banc - in the appeal that Poe filed from the COMELEC
Divisions' decisions - ruled that Poe's CoC should be cancelled for the false
representations she made regarding her citizenship and residency. In the petitions
before us, Poe claims that the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it made this ruling.

Thus, the issue before this Court is not per se about the COMELEC's legal
authority to rule on the cancellation of Poe's CoC, but about the manner the
COMELEC exercised its jurisdiction, its allegedly abusive acts that caused it to
exceed its jurisdiction.

I say this under the view that the COMELEC's primary authority in this case is to
pass upon the candidates' certificates of candidacy and to order their
cancellation if warranted, for false representation on material points. But the
COMELEC can, in the exercise of this authority, preliminarily (and as a
necessarily included power) pass on the correctness of the claims made on the
material points of citizenship, residency, and other qualifications. I explain this
point more extensively below.

I.B. The Citizenship Table

The citizenship issues relate to Poe's status as a citizen of the Philippines and to
the character of this citizenship: whether or not she is a Philippine citizen; if
so, whether or not she is a natural-born citizen as the Constitution requires.

The issues started because of the undisputed evidence that Poe is a foundling,
which raised the question:

(a) what is the status of a foundling under the 1935 Constitution given that
this is the governing law when Poe was found in September of 1968.
Poe was likewise naturalized as an American citizen and thereafter applied for the
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA No. 9225. This circumstance gave
rise to the questions:

(a) was she qualified to apply under RA No. 9225 given that the law
specifically applies only to former natural-born citizens;

(b) even granting arguendo that she can be considered natural-born, did she -

under RA 9225 - reacquire her natural-born status or is she now a
naturalized citizen in light of the constitutional definition of who is a natural-
born citizen?
The COMELEC, after considering the evidence and the surrounding
circumstances, noted that Poe's citizenship claim was based on the material
representation that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines when in fact, she
is not; thus her representation on a material point was false. On this basis, the
COMELEC resolved to cancel Poe's CoC based on her citizenship statements.

The false material representation started in Poe's application for reacquisition of

citizenship under RA No. 9225 which became the foundation for the exercise of
critical citizenship rights (such as the appointment to the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board [MTRCB], her candidacy and election to the
Senate, and her present candidacy for the presidency).

Had Poe early on identified herself as a foundling (i.e., one who cannot claim
descent from a Filipino parent), then the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) would have at least inquired further because this undisclosed
aspect of her personal circumstances touches on her former natural-born
citizenship status - the basic irreplaceable requirement for the application of RA
No. 9225.

Notably, the BID approval led the career of Poe to her appointment to the MTRCB
and her subsequent election to the Senate. Both positions require the natural-born
citizenship status that the BID previously recognized in approving Poe's RA No.
9225 application.

For easy and convenient reference and understanding of the essential facts and
issues, separate tables of the major incidents in the life of Poe, relevant to the
issues raised and based on the duly footnoted parties' evidence, are hereby
presented.

Table I

CITIZENSHIP TABLE

DATE Particular's (with legal significance)

September 3, 1968 The date Poe was found; her parentage as well as the exact
date and actual place of birth are unknown.

Poe claims that she was born on this date when Edgardo
Militar found her at the Jaro Iloilo Cathedral.[57]

• Legal significance: Our Constitution requires a President to

be a natural-born citizen. Poe admitted that she is a
foundling (i.e., one born of unknown parents)[58] and later
claimed that she is a natural-born citizen.[59]

• She made her representation on the basis of a claimed

presumption of Filipino citizenship (apparently stemming
from the circumstances under which she was found [on
September 3,1968 in Jaro Iloilo])[60] and on the basis of
international law which allegedly gave her natural-born
citizenship status.

• Poe never formally claimed that she is presumed a Filipino

citizen under Philippine adoption laws, although adoption
was mentioned  in passing in her Memorandum.[61]
September 6, 1968 Emiliano reported Poe as a foundling with the Office I of the
Civil Registrar (OCR) in Jaro, Iloilo for registration.[62]

• Legal significance: official record that Poe is a foundling.

No legal question has been raised about this document.
November 27, 1968 The OCR issued the foundling certificate under the name
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."[63]

• The Original Certificate of Live Birth dated November 27,

1968 contains the notation· 'foundling" and now appears to
have erasures, to reflect apparently the subsequent adoption
 of Poe by Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe.
1973 When Poe was five years old, Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa
Sonora Poe filed a petition for Poe's I adoption.[64]
May 13, 1974 The Court approved the Spouses Poe's petition for adoption.
Poe's name was changed to "Mary Grace Sonora Poe.[65]

• Legal Significance: She officially assumed the status of a

legitimate child  by adoption of the Spouses Poe, but the
adoption did not affect her citizenship status; under P.D. 603
(The Child and Youth Welfare Code), the adopted child does
not follow the citizenship of the adopting parents.[66]
In 2006 • Significantly, no question arose regarding Poe's legal
capacity to be adopted as the law likewise does not bar the
adoption of an alien.[67]

• Jesusa Sonora Poe registered Poe's birth and secured a birth

certificate from the National Statistics Office on May 4, 2006.
The certificate did not reflect that she was a foundling who
had been adopted by the spouses Poe.[68] The changes were in
accordance with Adm. Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the
Implementing Rules on the Civil Registry Law, and P.D. 603
(The Child and Youth Welfare Code) which specifically
allows the confidential treatment of the adoption.
December 13, 1986 The Comelec issued a voter's identification card to Poe for
Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila [69]

• Legal Significance: The records of the case do not disclose

the documents Poe used to support her voter registration, but
she must have surely claimed to be a Filipino citizen;
otherwise, the voter's ID would not have been issued.[70]
April 4, 1988 Poe Obtained her Philippine Passport No. F927287[71] from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

She renewed her passport on April 5, 1993 (Passport i No.

L881511) and on May 19, 1998 (Passport No. I DD155616).
[72]

• Legal Significance: She could have been granted a passport

only if she had applied as, and claimed that she is a Filipino
citizen.[73]

Filipino citizenship is expressly stated on the faces of the

passports.[74]

• The exercise of the rights of a Filipino citizen does not ripen

to nor can it be the basis for claim of Filipino citizenship.[75]
July 29, 1991 Poe left for the U.S. after she married Daniel Llamanzares (an
American citizen of Filipino extraction) in the Philippines on
July 27, 1991.[76]

• Legal Significance: Her US. residency status did not affect

the Philippine citizenship status reflected in her passport and
voter's ID, but affected her Philippine residency status as soon
as she applied for and was granted US. residency status.
 Specifically, she abandoned the Philippine domicile that she
had from the time she was found.[77]
October 18, 2001 Poe became a naturalized United States (US.) citizen.[78]

• Legal significance: Poe  lost whatever claim she had to

Philippine citizenship through "express renunciation of the
citizenship.[79]

U.S. citizenship confirmed her abandonment of the Philippine

citizenship whose rights she had been exercising, as well as
her Philippine residence.[80]

• Note that in her oath to the U.S., she "absolutely and

entirely renounce[d] and abjure[d] all allegiance and fidelity
... to any state ... of whom or which I have heretofore been a
subject or citizen." (This was the "infidelity" that the Return
of the Renegade quotation, above, referred to.)

• She turned her back on the Philippines under these terms.

December 19, 2001 Poe obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793, expiring on
December 18, 2011.[81]

• Legal Significance: Part of her right as a U.S. citizen.

October 18, 2001 to July Various travels of Poe to the Philippines before she applied
18, 2006 for Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225. She used her
U.S. Passport and entered the Philippines through
Philippine Balikbayan visas.[82]

Visa Passport
Dates of Arrival
December 27, 2001 Balikbayan US Passport
January 13, 2002 Balikbayan US Passport
November 9, 2003 Balikbayan US Passport
April 8, 2004 Balikbayan US Passport
December 13, 2004 Balikbayan US Passport
May 24, 2005 Balikbayan US Passport
September 14, 2005 Balikbayan US Passport
January 7, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
March 11, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
July 5, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
        

• Legal Significance: During this period, Poe - an American

citizen - was a visitor who had abjured all allegiance and
fidelity to the Philippines; she was not a Filipino citizen or a
legal resident of the country.
July 7, 2006 She took her oath of allegiance to the Philippines.[83]

• Legal Significance: The start of the process of reacquiring

Filipino· citizenship by an alien under RA No. 9225. The
process assumes that the applicant was a NATURAL-BORN
Philippine citizenship before she lost this citizenship.
July l0, 2006 Poe filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
 (BID) applications for: (a) reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225; and (b)
derivative citizenship for her three minor children.[84]

• Legal Significance: RA No. 9225 is available only to

former natural-horn Filipino citizens.[85] Thus, the validity of
her RA No. 9225 reacquired Philippine citizenship depended
on the validity of her natural-born citizenship claim.

• She falsely represented under oath in her RA No. 9225

application that she was a former natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and was the daughter of Ronald and Susan Poe,
thereby also concealing that she had been a foundling who
was adopted by the Spouses Poe, not their natural-
born  child. As an adopted child, she could not have been a
natural-born citizen who followed the citizenship of the
Spouses Poe under the rule of  jus sanguinis.

• This false material representation became the basis for her

subsequent claim to be a natural-born citizen, notably in her
MTRCB appointment, her election to the Senate and her
present candidacy for President. The COMELEC 's ruling on
Poe 's CoC for President is now the subject of the present
petitions.

• Despite the privilege under the adoption laws and

rules[86] to keep the fact of adoption confidential, she still had
the duty to disclose her foundling status under RA No. 9225
because this is material information that the law mandatorily
requires to be made under oath as a condition for the
application of the law.[87]
July 18, 2006 The BID approved Poe's application for Philippine citizenship
and the applications for derivative citizenship for her three
children.[88]

• Legal Significance: The approval of Poe's RA No. 9225

application, on its face, entitled her to claim dual citizenship
status - Philippine and American.[89]

• To quote the BID Order approving Poe's application - "the

petitioner was a former natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, having been born to Filipino parents ...." This
Order immeasurably facilitated Poe's subsequent claim to
natural-born status.

• The present case is not the medium to question validity of

the BID approval, but still lays open the question of whether
Poe committed false material representations in the
application process - a question of fact that the COMELEC
ruled upon,[90] i.e., that she falsely represented that she had
been a natural-born citizen.
July 31, 2006 The BID issued to Poe her Identification Certificate No. 06-
10918[91] pursuant to RA No. 9225 in relation with
Administrative Order No.91, series of 2004 and
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005.
August 31, 2006 Poe registered again as voter in Barangay Santa Lucia, San
Juan City.[92]

• Legal Significance: Under RA No. 9225, a dual citizen can

vote but cannot be voted upon to elective position unless a
renunciation of the other citizenship is made.[93]
October 31, 2006 Poe obtained Philippine Passport No. XX473199.[94]

• Legal Significance: The passport was issued after the

approval of Poe's RA No. 9225 citizenship and was therefore
on the strength of the approval made.
July 18, 2006 - October Poe travelled abroad using her U.S. passport; the BID
13, 2009 stamped the entry "RC" and/or "IC No. 06- 10918" for her
travels to and from the Philippines on these dates:[95]
(The date of the
BID's approval, to the Visa Passport
date of the issuance of Dates of Arrival
Poe's Philippine passport July 21, 2007 RC US Passport
March 28, 2008 RC US Passport
May 8, 2008 RC US Passport
October 2, 2008 RC US Passport
October 5, 2008 RC US Passport
April 20, 2009 RC US Passport
May 21, 2009 RC US Passport
July 31, 2009 RC US Passport
       

• Legal Significance: The BID allowed Poe to enter and leave

the country as "RC." Atty. Poblador mentioned that "RC"
means "resident citizen" to claim the marking as evidence of
continuing res id ency.
October 6, 2010 Poe was appointed Chair of the MTRCB.[96]

• Legal significance: Poe could have been appointed as MTR

CB Chairperson only if she had been a natural-born citizen.
[97]

October 20, 2010 Poe renounced her U.S. allegiance and citizenship to comply
with RA No. 9225's requirements.[98]

• Legal Significance: Her renunciation of US. Citizenship

complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 and would
have made her a "pure" Filipino citizen if she had validly
reacquired Philippine citizenship under this law.[99]

• A seldom noticed aspect of this renunciation is that Poe only

renounced her U.S. citizenship because it was required by her
appointment and subsequent assumption to office at the
MTRCB.[100]
October 21, 2010 Poe took her Oath of Office for the position of MTRCB
Chairperson.[101]
October 26, 2010 Poe assumed the duties and responsibilities of the Office of
the MTRCB Chairperson.[102]

• Legal significance: Poe could have been appointed as MTR

 CB Chairperson only if she had been a natural-born Filipino
Citizenship.[103]

U.S. government actions on the renunciation of U.S.

citizenship that Poe made.

The U.S. immigration noted in Poe's passport that she

repatriated herself on this date.[104]
July 12, 2011 Poe executed the Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of U.S.
Nationality at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.[105]
December 9, 2011 She also executed a Statement of Voluntary Relinquishment
of U.S. Citizenship.[106]
February 3, 2012 The U.S. Vice Consul signed a Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the U.S.[107]

The U.S. Department of State approved the Certificate of Loss

of U.S. Nationality.[108]

• Legal significance: Confirmatory renunciation, before U.S.

authorities, of her previous renunciation under RA No. 9225.
Up until these series of acts, Poe was a dual citizen.

• Legally, this was the conclusive evidence that she had

abandoned her U.S. domicile, as a traveler carrying a purely
Philippine passport, she could no longer travel at will to and
from the U.S.. nor reside in that country.
October 2, 2012 Poe filed her CoC for Senator for the May 13, , 2013
Elections; she stated that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
[109]

• Legal Significance: This is another case involving the

material representation of being a · natural-born Filipino,
having been born to Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora
Poe.

• She was elected Senator without any question about her

citizenship being raised.
November 18, 2015 The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) (voting 5 to 4) issued its
Decision[110] dismissing the Quo Warranto petition of Rizalito
David which was based on the claim that Poe is not a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.

• Legal Significance - The SET ruling does not bind nor bar
the COMELEC from ruling on the cancellation of CoC
petitions because these tribunals are different, the cause of
actions before them are different, and the parties are likewise
different.

• Significantly, the dissents at the SET were wholly based on

legal considerations - on the Constitution, on international
law, and Philippine statutes. The SET majority ruling relied
more on political considerations.
October 15, 2015 Poe filed her CoC[111] for PRESIDENT for the May 9, 2016
Elections; she signed the statement under oath that she is a
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN.

• Legal Significance: This is the citizenship issue in the

present case which posed to the Comelec 2 sub-issues:

First . Is Poe a natural-born Filipino citizen

After considering her foundling status, her

Acquisition of U.S. citizenship and the consequent loss of her

claimed natural-born Philippine citizenship, and her alleged
reacquisition under RA No. 9225?

Second . Since she claimed she was a natural-born citizen,

did she commit false material representations in her CoC and
in the official documents supporting her claim? If she did,
should this false material representation lead to the
cancellation of her CoC?

Given the succession of falsities that Poe made on her

natural-born status, may the COMELEC be faulted with GAD
for ruling as it did?

• Ironically, she claims in the present CoC cancellation case

that the grant by the Philippines of her right to vote, her
passport, and her appointment to the MTRCB should be·
considered evidence of government recognitions of her
natural-born Philippine citizen status.[112] She thus wants her
very own misdeeds to be the evidence of her natural-born
status.

• The previous false claims open the question: could they

count as evidence of natural-born status if they have all been
rooted on documents that were based on misrepresentations?

• More importantly, could her election or appointment to

public office have worked to automatically grant or restore
her Philippine citizenship?

• While the fact of adoption is confidential information in the

Amended Certificate of Live Birth (but must appear in the
Registry of Birth), the grant of confidentiality is not an
absolute shield against the disclosure of being a foundling nor
a defense against false representation. While in RA No. 9225,
the natural-born requirement is a statutory one that arguably
stands at the same level and footing as the confidential
privilege on the law on adoption, in the present case, the
natural-born requirement is a constitutional one that stands
on a very much higher plane than the confidentiality
privilege. In the latter case, national interest is already plainly
involved in electing the highest official of the land.

• Note, too, that in Frivaldo v. COMELEC,[113] the Court

ruled that the election of a former Filipino to office does not
automatically restore Philippine citizenship, the possession of
 which is an indispensable requirement for holding public
office. "The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified.[114]

I.C. RESIDENCY TABLE

The residency issues mainly stemmed from two events - (1) the naturalization of
Poe as a U.S. citizen; and (2) her application for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225.

The first made her a domiciliary of the U.S.,[115] while the second (assuming the

claimed reacquisition to be valid) gave her the right to reside in the Philippines
and to be considered a domiciliary of the Philippines for the exercise of her
political rights, i.e., for election purposes, based on her compliance with the
requisites for change of residence. Still assuming that she complied with the RA
9225 requisites, the consolidated petitions still pose the following questions to the
COMELEC and to this Court:

(a) Whether she became a resident of the Philippines for election purposes;

and

(b) If so, when did she become a resident.

The COMELEC, after considering the evidence and the surrounding

circumstances, ruled that she engaged in false material representations in claiming
her residency status in her CoC for the Presidency; she tailor-fitted her claim to
the requirements of the position by deviating from the claim she made when she
ran/or the Senate.

While she claimed that a mistake intervened in her Senate CoC, she failed to
adduce evidence on the details and circumstances of the mistake, thus making her
claim a self-serving one. Her claim, too, went against established jurisprudence
which holds that the counting of the period of residency for election purposes
starts - at the earliest - from the approval of the RA No. 9225 application.

Table 2

THE RESIDENCY TABLE

DATE Particulars (with legal significance)

Days prior to September With Poe's parentage unknown, her residence from the time
3, 1968 - the date Poe was of her birth until she was found is likewise unknown.
found in Jaro, Iloilo
• Legal Significance: Poe's circumstances of birth have been
a big cipher from the very beginning.
[116]
September 3, 1968 This is Poe's declared birthday, which is really the date Poe
was found by Edgardo Militar at the Jaro Iloilo Cathderal.
 She was subsequently given to the care of Emiliano Militar
and his wife, residents of Jaro, Iloilo.

• Legal Significance: The spouses Militar became Poe's de

facto guardians; hence, Poe technically became a resident of
Jara, Iloilo
1973 Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe filed a petition for
Poe's adoption.[117]
May 13, 1974 The court approved the Spouses Poe's petition for adoption.
Poe's name was changed to "Mary Grace Sonora Poe.[118]

• Legal Significance: She officially assumed the status of a

legitimate child after the Spouses Poe adopted her. She then
followed her adoptive parents' residence as her domicile of
origin.

• Under the Civil Code, the general effect of a decree of

adoption is to transfer to the adoptive parents parental
authority over the adopted child ... they must have the same
residence.[119]
December 13, 1986 The COMELEC issued a voter's identification card to Poe for
Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.[120]

• Legal Significance: She could have been registered as a

voter only if she had represented that she was a Filipino
citizen and a resident of the Philippines for at least one year
and of Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila for at least six
months immediately preceding the elections.[121]

Poe went to the U.S. to continue her tertiary studies at the

Boston College in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.[122]

• Legal Significance: Poe remained a Philippine resident

while studying in the US. Absence from Philippine domicile
to pursue studies overseas does not constitute loss of domicile
or residence.
1991 Poe graduated from Boston College.[123]

• Legal significance. Absence from the domicile of origin to

pursue studies does not constitute loss of domicile or
residence.

• While a student in the U.S., Poe's permanent residence

remained in the Philippines,· there was intent to return to the
Philippines or  animus revertendi.[124] There is no evidence or
proven intent to make Boston her fixed and permanent home.
[125]

• Thus, Poe was a permanent Philippine resident for 23 years

(1968 to 1991).
July 29, 1991 Poe left for the U.S. after she married Daniel Llamanzares (an
American citizen of .Filipino extraction) in the Philippines on
 July 27, 1991.[126]

• Legal Significance: Her initial US stay was presumably

preparatory to being a permanent resident of the U.S. for
purposes of the U.S. citizenship that she eventually claimed.

• Significantly, Poe admits that she willingly chose to live

with her husband in the U.S., and thus left on July 29, 1991.
Very clearly, Poe intended to abandon her Philippine
residence for a new residence in the U.S. when she went with
her husband to the U.S.[127]

1991-2001 Poe lived with her husband and children in the U.S.[128] They
travelled frequently to the Philippines but only to visit family
and friends.

• Legal Significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident from the

time she secured permanent U.S. visa status. The permanent
resident status confirmed her intent to establish family life,
and thus, residence, in the U.S.[129]
October 18, 2001 Poe became a naturalized American Citizen[130]

• Legal significance: U.S. citizenship erased all doubts that

Poe had completely abandoned her Philippine residence.
[131]
  It confirmed as well that she had been a permanent
resident of the U.S. before her application for U.S.
citizenship.

• The Philippine domicile she abandoned was the domicile

she had from the time she was adopted by the spouses Poe.[132]

• To qualify for citizenship under U.S. naturalization laws, it

is required that one must have been a permanent resident for
3 {three) years or more if one is filing for naturalization as
the spouse of a U.S. citizen.[133]

• Her subsequent acts of living and remaining in the U.S. for

ten years until her naturalization in 2001 point to the
conclusion that at some point during this time (after arrival
in 1991), she was already a U.S. and could no longer be
considered a Philippine resident.
2004 Poe resigned from her work in the U.S. and allegedly never
sought re-employment.[134]

• Legal Significance: Resignation from work had no

immediate legal effect on residence and is thus immaterial to
Poe's claimed Philippine residency status. Poe remained a
US resident and was in fact a U.S. citizen domiciled in that
country.

• Resignation from one's employment per se does not amount

to abandonment of residence.[135]
April 8, 2004 up to July 7, Poe travelled to the Philippines with her daughter, Hanna. Poe
2004 also wanted to give birth to Anika in the Philippines and to
give moral support to her parents during her father's
 campaign for the presidency.[136]

• Legal significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident.

• Poe's travels (to and from the U.S. and the Philippines)
between April 2004 and February 2005 did not affect her
U.S. residency status.

• The admitted purposes for these travels had nothing to do

with any intent to re-establish Philippine residence.
July 8, 2004 Poe returned to the U.S. with her two daughters.[137]

• Legal significance: This return trip further proves that Poe

remained a U.S. resident.
December 13, 2004 up to Poe was in the Philippines when Fernando Poe, Jr. was
February 3, 2005 hospitalized. She eventually took care of settling his affairs
after he died.[138]

• Legal significance: Poe remained q U.S. resident.

• The admitted purposes of her stay in the Philippines during

this period had nothing to do with the re-establishment of her
residence in the Philippines.
First Quarter of 2005 Poe and her husband allegedly decided to return to the
Philippines for good.[139]

• Legal Significance: Poe did not abandon her US.

Residence. Their (Poe and her husband's) alleged intent are
internal subjective acts that are meaningless without external
supporting action under the legal conditions that would allow
a change of domicile. Notably, Poe was in the Philippines
during the year as a Visitor under a Balikbayan visa.[140]

• Mere change of residence in the exercise of the civil

right to change residence is likewise different from a change
of domicile for the exercise of the political right to be voted
into public office. For the exercise of this political right, the
candidate must be a Philippine citizen.

• US. residency - which started in 1991 and which was later

confirmed by Poe's acquisition of US. citizenship - remained
until specifically given up, for as long as the right to reside
in the U.S. subsisted.

Note: Poe argues that her travels to and initial stay in the
Philippines were preparatory acts in the goal to establish
residence in the Philippines. Even assuming that they were
preparatory acts, they are not material to the issue of when
Poe became a Philippine resident (as contemplated by the
Constitution and or election laws). They are not also
conclusive on when she abandoned her U.S. residence.
In early 2005 Poe and her husband informed their children's schools that the
children would be transferring to Philippine schools in the
 next semester.[141]

• Legal Significance: Poe remained a US. resident. This act

establishes the intent to transfer schools, but does not, by
itself, conclusively prove the intent to change or to abandon
her US. residence.

• Absence from her US. residence (and presence in the

Philippines) to pursue studies does not constitute loss of US.
domicile and acquisition of a new domicile in the Philippines.
May 24, 2005 Poe returned to the Philippines and allegedly decided to
resettle here for good.[142] Note that Poe was still under a
Balikbayan visa and was thus a visitor to the Philippines.[143]

Poe argues that she re-established permanent Philippine

residence at this point. Can a US. citizen, on a Balikbayan
visit to the Philippines, thereby establish residence for
purposes of the exercise of political rights in the Philippines?

• Legal Significance: The evidence speak for themselves.

Poe's Balikbayan visa does not point to or confirm any intent
to permanently settle in the Philippines.[144]

• Since she entered the Philippines under a Balikbayan visa

and was thus a temporary visitor to the country under Section
13 of CA 613 (as amended by RA No. 4376), her alleged
intent was not supported by her contemporaneous act.

• Consider too from here on that from the perspective

of change of domicile, although Poe's acts may collectively
show her intent to settle m the Philippines, they do not
conclusively the intent to abandon her U.S. domicile. She
was at this point still a US. citizen who had been a permanent
resident since 1991 and who could return at will to the US. as
a resident.
March 2005 to November Poe and her husband transacted with shipping agents for the
2006 transport of their personal belongings and other personal
property from the U.S. to the Philippines in view of their
decision to resettle in the Philippines.[145]

• Legal Significance: Poe remained a US. Resident

temporarily in the Philippines; her visa status did not point to
residence that could be credited as legal residence for
election purposes. She might have been physically present in
the Philippines but what was the nature of her stay in the
Philippines? She was legally in the country for purposes
only of a temporary stay and had no legally established basis
to stay beyond this.[146]

• An important point to note is that she was not exercising

any political right to reside in the Philippines at this point.

• Again, an obvious missing element was her clear intent to

abandon her US. domicile. Her claimed acts do not clearly
show Poe's intent to abandon her US. Domicile.
August 2005 Poe and her husband inquired with the Philippine authorities
on the procedure to bring their pet dog from the U.S.A. to the
Philippines.[147]

• Legal Significance: Poe's inquiry did not affect her

residency at all; she remained a US. resident, and is totally
worthless as she did not even show by subsequent evidence
that she actually brought the dog to the Philippines. This act,
too, does not prove abandonment of their US. residence.
June 2005 Poe enrolled her children m different schools m the
Philippines.[148]

• Legal Significance: This act does not prove Poe's intent to

abandon their U.S. domicile,· Poe's children entered the
Philippines for a temporary period under the Balikbayan
program. Note too, that the enrollment in schools is only for
a period of one school year. At most, this shows that Poe and
her children were physically present in the Philippines at this
time. Note that under certain conditions, aliens like Poe, can
enroll their children in the Philippines.[149]

• Absence from her U.S. residence (and presence in the

Philippines) to pursue studies does not conclusively point to
the loss of U.S. domicile and acquisition of a new Philippine
domicile. Note that Poe herself previously studied in the U.S.
without losing her Philippine residence.
July 22, 2005 Poe registered with and secured Tax Identification No. (TIN)
[150]
 from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

• Legal Significance: This act was undertaken as an alien and

does not prove Poe's intent to remain in the Philippines or
the intent to abandon U.S. domicile (animus non revertendi);
hence, it is not legally significant for the residency issue
before the Court. She was then on a temporary visitor who
was simply physically present in the Philippines. A Taxpayer
Identification No. could have been necessary for the purposes
indicated below as Poe was a forced heir of Ronald Poe who
recently died.

• "Any person, whether natural or juridical, required under the

authority of the Internal Revenue Code to make, render or file
a· return, statement or other documents, shall be supplied
with or assigned a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) to
be indicated in the return, statement or document to be filed
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for his proper
identification for tax purposes." (Sec. 236 (i) of the Tax
Code).

• The absence of definitive abandonment of U.S. residency

status and lack of legal capacity to establish Philippine
residence for election purposes can only point to the
conclusion that Poe remained a U.S. resident until July 18,
2006,[151] the date she acquired the right to reside in the
 Philippines.
February 20, 2006 The Register of Deeds (RD) of San Juan City issued to Poe
and her husband CCT No. 11985-R covering Unit 7F of One
Wilson Place, and CCT No. 11986-R covering the parking
slot for Unit 7F.[152]

• Legal Significance: This act does not prove Poe's intent to

abandon U.S. domicile (animus non-revertendi). It is, at best,
evidence of an investment in Philippine real estate - a move
that aliens can make.

• Aliens or foreign nationals, whether former natural-born

Filipino citizens or not, can acquire condominium units and
shares in condominium corporations up to 40% of the total
and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino owned or
controlled condominium Corporation, per RA No. 4726, as
amended by RA No. 7899, (or An Act to Define
Condominium, Establish Requirements For Its Creation, And
Govern Its Incidents).[153]
February 14, 2006 to Poe travelled to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of
March 11, 2006 her family's remaining household belongings.[154] She returned
to the Philippines on March 11, 2006.[155]

• Legal Significance: Poe remained a US. resident. This is an

unequivocal act that does not prove Poe's intent to abandon
her US. domicile (animus non-revertendi).
Late March 2006 Poe's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of
their change of their U.S. address.[156]

• Legal Significance: Poe and her husband may have merely

complied with the US. Laws for convenience and for mail
forwarding purposes while on extended but temporary
absence.

• This act, by itself, does not prove the establishment of

domicile in the Philippines. Poe did not have at that point the
legal capacity or right to establish domicile or residence in
the country. The act does not conclusively signify
abandonment of U.S. domicile.
April 25, 2006 Unit 7F of One Wilson Place and its parking slot were
declared for taxation purposes under Poe and her husband's
names.[157]

• Legal Significance: It does not establish permanent

residence in the Philippines. It is merely in compliance with
an obligation that arises from ownership of real property in
the Philippines - an obligation that even alien owners of real
property must fulfill.
April 27, 2006 Poe's U.S. family home was sold.[158]

• Legal Significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident. The sale

of their family home may indicate intent to transfer residence
(within or without the U.S.) but it does not automatically
 result m reacquiring domicile m the Philippines. Sale of the
family home is a practical recourse for one who may be on
extended absence; or who may be relocating for employment
purposes; or who is simply engaged in profit-taking.

• What is important for the exercise of political right at issue

is the legal capacity to establish residence in the Philippines.
Notably, too, in terms of the legal status of her Philippine
stay, she was still under a Balikbayan Visitor's Visa at this
time.
June 1, 2006 The RD for Quezon City issued to Poe and her husband TCT
No. 290260 covering a 509-square meter lot located at No.
106 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Barangay Ugong Norte,
Quezon City to be used as their new family home.[159]

• Legal Significance: Poe still remained a US. resident for

lack of legal capacity and the right to establish residence in
the Philippines. She was also still a US. citizen who had not
conclusively abandoned her US. domicile.

• Even alien non-residents who were former Filipino citizens

can be transferees of up to 5, 000 sqm. of urban land or 3
has. of rural land for business or other purposes under RA
No. 7042, as amended by RA No. 8179,[160] in relation with
Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution,[161] without the need
to reacquire Philippine citizenship or to re-establish
Philippine residence, provided they were former natural-born
Filipinos. Acquisition of Philippine real estate is not evidence
of the citizenship of former Filipino citizens, much less of
their natural-born status.

• The original ponencia of Justice Mariano C. de/ Castillo

noted that after this sale, Poe and her husband still owned
and retained two (2) other residential properties in the U.S.
[162]
  The retained properties negate whatever evidentiary
worth the sale of the "family home" provided, Poe could still
return to a residence the couple already own.
July 7, 2006 Poe took her oath of allegiance to the Philippines.[163]

• Legal Significance: Poe's oath of allegiance to the

Philippines started the legal process under RA No. 9225 but
had no immediate legal effect on her change of domicile; she
was still a U.S. resident at this point and would remain to be
so even after her RA No. 9225 is approved.

• Dual citizens do not become Philippine domiciliaries upon

the approval of their RA No. 9225 petitions; note that former
natural-born Filipino citizens who are U.S. residents can
apply under RA No. 9225 even without need of establishing
actual Philippine residence.[164] All they have after approval
is the civil and political right to establish residence in the
Philippines, but this they must do by complying with the rules
on change of domicile.
July 10, 2006 Poe filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
 (BID) an application for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003"; she also filed for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three children, who were all
below eighteen years of age at that time.[165]

• Legal Significance: RA No. 9225 is available only to former

natural-born citizens.[166] Thus, the validity of Poe's RA No.
9225 reacquired Philippine citizenship depends on the
validity of her natural-born citizenship claim.

• Poe's application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

(RA No. 9225) did not, by that act alone, conclusively prove
abandonment of her US. domicile. As noted below, Poe, at
that point, had the option to establish residence in both the
Philippines and the US.
July 18, 2006 The BID approved Poe's application for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225, and the
applications for derivative citizenship for her three children.
[167]

• Legal Significance: Subject to the reservation made above,

the approval entitled her to recognition as a dual citizen -
Philippine and American.[168]

• Assuming Poe to be a former natural-born citizen, July 18,

2006 would be the earliest possible reckoning point for Poe
to establish Philippine residency for purposes of the
exercise of political rights as it was only then that she was
granted civil and political rights. To vote and be voted for
are both political rights.

• But note that actual residence is still necessary as an RA

No. 9225 Filipino citizen is a dual citizen who can reside
either in the Philippines or in the other country of dual
citizenship.[169]  As already mentioned, the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship only gives the RA No. 9225 dual citizen
an option to re-establish residence in the Philippines and to
exercise the limited right of suffrage in national elections but
not the right to run for public office.

• At this exact point, the resolution of the issue of residence is

still unclear as Poe was a dual Philippine-US citizen who
could be a resident physical as opposed to legal or juridical
resident - of both the US. And the Philippines. Note that Poe
started as a U.S. domiciliary. This characterization stays
until she could carry a change of domicile into effect. This
change admits of evidence showing compliance with the
required elements, and becomes conclusive only when dual
citizenship is given up in favor of one of the citizenships;
upon this surrender, the right to reside in the other country
is likewise given up.

• In the case of Poe, she secured her civil and political rights
as a RA No. 9225 dual citizen on July 18, 2006. This is the
 earliest date she could exercise her right to reside in the
Philippines for the exercise of her political rights,
particularly of her right to vote. But she enjoys the right to be
voted upon as a candidate upon the renunciation of her other
citizenship. It was only then that that she conclusively gave
up the US. domiciliary tag that she started with. Of course,
hanging above and beclouding these issues is the natural-
born citizenship question - was she in the first place a former
natural-born Filipino who could avail of RA No. 9225?[170]
July 31, 2006 The BID issued Poe Identification Certificate No. 06- 10918
pursuant to RA No. 9225 in relation with Administrative
Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-2-005.[171] Her children were likewise issued their
respective Identification Certificate Nos.[172]

• Legal Significance: These are the effects of the approval of

Poe's application for Philippine citizenship under RA No.
9225, and relate primarily to the citizenship, not to the
residency issue. The right to reside in the Philippines of
course came when the RA No. 9225 application was
approved. The exercise of this right is another matter.
August 31, 2006 Poe registered as voter in Brgy. Santa Lucia, San Juan City.
[173]

• Legal Significance: Registration as a voter could serve as

proof of the start of Poe's stay in the Philippines after she
acquired the legal capacity to do so through RA No. 9225,
but does not conclusively establish her intent to remain m the
Philippines or the intent to abandon her US. citizenship and
domicile.

• She could have been registered as a voter only if she had

represented that she was a resident of the Philippines for at
least one year and of Brgy. Santa Lucia, San Juan City for at
least six months immediately preceding the elections.[174]

• In Japzon v. COMELEC,[175] the Court considered Ty's

registration as a voter as evidence of his intent to establish a
new domicile of choice in General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar.
October 18, 2001 to July On these dates, Poe returned to the Philippines using her U.S.
18, 2006 Passport under the Balikbayan program[176] per the entry "BB"
or "1 YR" and stamped dates in her U.S. Passport:[177]

Visa Passport
Dates of Arrival
December 27, 2001 Balikbayan US Passport
January 13, 2002 Balikbayan US Passport
November 9, 2003 Balikbayan US Passport
April 8, 2004 Balikbayan US Passport
December 13, 2004 Balikbayan US Passport
May 24, 2005 Balikbayan US Passport
September 14, 2005 Balikbayan US Passport
 January 7, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
March 11, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
July 5, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
November 4, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
       

• Legal Significance: These notations are evidence of the

character of Poe's stay in the Philippines from May 24, 2005
up to the time her RA No. 9225 application was approved.

• During this period, Poe - an American citizen - was a

visitor to the Philippines, not a Filipino citizen nor a legal
resident of this country.
July 18, 2006 to October On these dates,[178] Poe travelled to and from the Philippines
13, 2009 using her U.S. Passport, but the BID stamp on her U.S.
Passport changed from "BB" or "l YR" to "RC" and/or "IC
No. 06-10918:"[179]

Visa Passport
Dates of Arrival
July 21, 2007 RC US Passport
March 28, 2008 RC US Passport
May 8,2008 RC US Passport
October 2, 2008 RC US Passport
October 5, 2008 RC US Passport
April 20, 2009 RC US Passport
May21, 2009 RC US Passport
July 31, 2009 RC US Passport
       

• Legal Significance - The continued use of Poe's US.

passport could be explained by Poe's lack of a Philippine
passport. The delay of three years between the RA No. 9225
approval and the issuance of the passport on October 13,
2009 raises questions about her intents, both the intent to
remain in the Philippines and the intent to abandon her US.
domicile. During this period at least, any claimed residence
for the exercise of the right to be voted upon as a candidate
cannot and should not be recognized; her abandonment of
her US domicile was incomplete and uncertain.
October 13, 2009 Poe obtained Philippine Passport No. XX473199.[180]

• Legal Significance: The issuance of a Philippine passport,

per se, has no legal effect on Poe's Philippine residency
status. A Philippine citizen on dual citizenship status is
entitled to a Philippine passport.

• The BID allowed Poe to enter and leave the country as "RC
"Atty. Poblador mentioned that "RC" means "resident
citizen."
October 6, 2010 Poe was appointed as the Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).[181]
 • Legal Significance: Poe could have been appointed as
MTRCB Chairperson only if she had been a natural-born
Filipino citizen, and a resident of the Philippines  for
purposes of the exercise of political rights.[182] The natural-
born citizenship status is a direct legal requirement.
Residency, on the other hand, is a consequence of the need to
make a renunciation of the other citizenship (pursuant to RA
No. 9225), as renunciation would leave the appointee with no
other residence other than the Philippines.
October 20, 2010 Poe renounced her U.S. allegiance and citizenship.[183]

• Legal Significance:  This is a requirement under RA No.

9225 and served to complete the necessary requirements
before she could assume appointive public office.

• The event should be very significant for a Presidential

candidate who had been previously naturalized in a foreign
country, and who now claims residency status for the period
required by the Philippine Constitution. This should serve
as the conclusive proof that the candidate has undertaken a
change of domicile through proof of abandonment of her
old domicile.

• The strictest rule of interpretation and appreciation of

evidence should be used given the previous loss of both
Philippine citizenship and residency status. She is not the
usual candidate as she is vying for the highest office in
the land whose citizenship she previously renounced.

• Her renunciation of her foreign citizenship should be the

lowest acceptable level of proof ·of Poe's intent to abandon
her US. domicile (animus non-revertendi), as pointed out by
Justice Del Castillo during the third round of oral
arguments.)

• Note that by her own admission, Poe renounced her US.

Citizenship and thereby likewise abandoned her US.
domiciliary status only to comply with the requirements o[RA
No. 9225 and the MTRCB appointment extended to her.[184]
October 21, 2010 Poe took her Oath of Office for the position of MTRCB
Chairperson.[185]
October 26, 2010 Poe assumed the duties and responsibilities of the Office of
the MTRCB Chairperson.[186]

• Legal significance: Poe could have been appointed as MTR

CB Chairperson only if she had been a natural-born
Filipino citizen, and a resident of the Philippines  for
purposes of exercising political rights.[187]
October 2, 2012 Poe filed her CoC for Senator for the May 13, 2013 Elections;
she stated in Item No. 7 of her CoC that her " PERIOD OF
RESIDENCE BEFORE MAY 13, 2013" was '6 years and 6
months."[188] This statement was made on October 2, 2012.

• Legal Significance: The residency statement in the CoC for

 the Senate was a material representation that Poe now
claims to be a mistake.

• Ironically for Poe, the period she claimed in her Senate

CoC dovetailed with her Philippine residency computed
from the time her RA No. 9225 application was approved.

• Poe never introduced any evidence relating to her claimed

"mistake," thus leaving this claim a self-serving one that
allows her this time to qualify for the residency requirement
for the Office of the President of the Philippines.
December 19, 2013 The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issued to Poe,
Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530.[189]

 No effect on Poe's residency status.

March 14, 2014 The DF A issued to Poe, Philippine Passport No. EC0588861.
[190]

 No effect on Poe's residency status.

October 15, 2015 Poe filed her CoC for the Presidency for the May 9, 2016
Elections; she stated in Item No. 7 of her CoC that her
"PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO
THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016 is 10 YEARS, 11
MONTHS,"[191] which the petitions before us now claim to be
a false material representation.

• Legal significance: The residency claim, under the given

facts and in light of the Senate CoC statement, gives rise to
the question: did Poe commit a false material representation
regarding her compliance with the residency requirement?

• Poe claims that she made a  mistake in the Senate CoC

declaration, but the claim remained self-serving with no
evidence to support it.

• An unavoidable observation is that Poe's belated claim of

mistake in her Senate CoC now allows her to claim the
longer period of residency that her candidacy for the
Presidency now requires.

• Should the COMELEC be now faulted for arriving at this

obvious conclusion?

II.

Preliminary I Threshold Issues and Concerns

II.A. Nature of the Present Petition and the Court's Responses.

As the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and of our laws, this Court will have
the final say in the case now before us. Our collective actions and decisions are not
subject to review by any other institution of government; we are the ultimate
Guardians with no other guardians to check, correct, and chastise us. Beyond the
dictates of the established standards of legal interpretation and application, only
our individual conscience guides us; as unelected officials, only history can judge
us.

Thus, for the sake of the country and for the maintenance of the integrity of this
Court, we must render our ruling with the utmost circumspection.

As defined, the problem directly before the Court is the determination of

the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's
cancellation of petitioner Poe's CoC for its invalidity, based on the false material
representations the COMELEC found in her statements of citizenship and
residency qualifications for the position of President of the Philippines. From the
perspective of the Court, the present case calls for the exercise of the
Court's power of judicial review.

The main issues in this case - the conformity of the COMELEC 's ruling with
legal[192] and constitutional standards[193] - are directly governed by the
Constitution. Thus, the dispute before us is a constitutional law case, not simply
an election nor a social justice case, and one that should be dealt with according
to the terms of the Constitution, following the norms of the rule of law.

To be sure, the applicable measuring standards cannot simply be the individual

Justices' notions of the fairness of the constitutional terms involved (which are
matters of policy that the Court cannot touch), nor their pet social and human
rights advocacies that are not justified by the clear terms of the Constitution.

If these constitutional terms are clear, the only option for the Court is to apply
them; if they lack clarity, the Court may interpret them using the established
canons of constitutional interpretation but without touching on matters of policy
that an authority higher than the Court's - that of the sovereign Filipino people -
has put in place.[194]

If indeed the Court deems the constitutional terms to be clear but tainted with
unfairness, the Court's remedy is to note the tainted terms and observe that they
should be raised with the people and their representatives for constitutional
amendment; the Court cannot act on its own to remedy the unfairness as such step
is a political one that the Court cannot directly undertake. Definitely, the remedy
is not to engage in interpretation in order to read into the Constitution what is
not written there. This is judicial legislation of the highest order that I do not want
to be a party to.

II.B. The Parameters of the Court's Exercise of Judicial Power in acting on the

case.

II.B.1. The Exercise of the Power of Judicial Review.

The Supreme Court in entertaining the present petitions acts pursuant to Article
VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. [Underscoring supplied)
In the seminal case of Angara v. Electoral Tribunal[195] the Court mandated in no
uncertain terms that judicial review is "limited to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented," and without passing upon "questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. " With the scope of the justiciable
issue so delimited, the Court in resolving the constitutional issues likewise cannot
add to, detract from, or negate what the Constitution commands; it cannot
simply follow its sense of justice based on how things out to be, nor lay down its
own policy, nor slant its ruling towards the individual Justices' pet advocacies. The
individual Justices themselves cannot simply raise issues that the parties did not
raise at the COMELEC level, nor explore constitutional issues for the first time. at
this stage of the case.

Procedurally, the present case comes to this Court under Rule 64, in relation with
Rule 65, of the Rules of Court - a petition for certiorari that calls for the judicial
review of the COMELEC decision to ensure that the COMELEC acts within its
jurisdiction.

The Court's review is limited by the grave abuse of discretion standard that the
Constitution itself provides - to determine the propriety of the COMELEC action
based on the question of whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in
cancelling Poe's CoC.

"Grave abuse of discretion" as mentioned in the Constitution and as implemented

by the Court under Rule 65 and in its established rulings, carries a specific
meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice
or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or
to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been
done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross."[196]

Thus, for this Court to strike down and nullify the challenged COMELEC rulings,
the COMELEC must be considered to have acted without jurisdiction because
it did not simply err, either in the appreciation of the facts or the laws involved,
but because it acted in a patent and gross manner, thereby acting outside the
contemplation of the law.[197]

II.C. The Separation of Powers Principle.

The same cited Angara ruling, in expounding on what "judicial power"

encompasses, likewise fully provided a constitutional standard to ensure that the
judiciary and its exercise of the power of judicial review do not exceed defined
parameters. The standard is the separation of powers principle that underlies the
Constitution.

Separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

govemment[198] that divides the powers of government into the legislative, the
executive, and judicial.[199] The power to enact laws lies with the legislature; the
power to execute is with the executive; and, the power to interpret laws rests with
the judiciary.[200] Each branch is supreme within its own sphere.

Thus, the judiciary can only interpret and apply the Constitution and the laws as
they are written; it cannot, under the guise of interpretation in the course of
adjudication, add to, detract from or negate what these laws provide except to
the extent that they run counter to the Constitution. With respect to the
Constitution and as already mentioned above, the judiciary cannot interpret the
Constitution to read into it what is not written there.

The separation of powers can be very material in resolving the present case as
petitioner Poe essentially relies on two positions in claiming natural-born
Philippine citizenship as a foundling. The first of these positions is the claim that
foundling's fall within the listing of "citizens of the Philippines" under the 1935
Constitution, under the view that this was the intent of the framers of the
Constitution.

As I reason out below, foundlings are simply not included in the wordings of the
Constitution and cannot be read into its clear and express terms. Nor can any intent
to include foundlings be discerned. Thus, foundlings are not within the 1935
constitutional listing, except to the extent that the application of its general terms
would allow their coverage.

11.D. The Equal Protection Clause.

11.D.1. In General.

The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guaranty of the equal

application of the laws to all persons. The equality guaranteed does not deny the
State the power to recognize and act upon factual differences between individuals
and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to
classify.[201]

The well-settled principle is that the equal protection of the laws guaranty is not
violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.[202]

Thus, the problem in equal protection cases is primarily in the determination of the
validity of the classification made by law,[203] if resort to classification is justified.
For this reason, three (3) different standards of scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of classifications have been developed over time[204] - the rational
basis test; the intermediate scrutiny test; and strict scrutiny test.

II.D.2. The Applicable Tests.

Under the rational basis test, courts will uphold a classification if it bears a

rational relationship to an accepted or established governmental end.[205] This is a
relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that classification is an
unavoidable legislative task. The presumption is in favor of the classification's
validity.[206]
If the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless gives rise to
recurring constitutional difficulties, or if a classification disadvantages a "quasi-
suspect class"[207] it will be treated under a heightened review called the
intermediate scrutiny test.[208]

Intermediate scrutiny requires that the classification serve an important

governmental end or objective and is substantially related to the achievement of
this objective.[209] The classification is presumed unconstitutional and the burden of
justification for the classification rests entirely with the government.[210]

Finally, the strict scrutiny test is used when suspect classifications or fundamental

rights are involved. This test requires that the classification serve a compelling
state interest and is necessary to achieve such interest. [211]

A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most
invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e. on
the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation, and to a certain
extent, sex and sexual orientation.[212]

The Court has found the strict scrutiny standard useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. By this
standard, the legislative classification is presumed unconstitutional and the burden
rests on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest. The strict scrutiny standard was eventually used to assess the validity of
laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights, as the earlier applications had been expanded to encompass
the coverage of these other rights.[213]

II.D.3. The Application of the Equal Protection Clause to a constitutional

provision.

The argument that the equal protection clause should be applied to the
constitutional provisions on citizenship is patently misplaced. The Constitution is
supreme; as the highest law of the land, it serves as the gauge or standard for all
laws and for the exercise of all powers of government. The Supreme Court itself is
a creation of, and cannot rise higher than, the Constitution.

Hence, this Court cannot invalidate a constitutional provision; it can only act on
an unconstitutional governmental action trampling on the equal protection
clause, such as when a constitutional provision is interpreted in a way that fosters
the illegal classification that the Constitution prohibits. This is the question now
before this Court.

II.D.4. The Citizenship of a Foundling.

The citizenship provisions of the Constitution authorize the State's exercise of its
sovereign power to determine who its citizens are. These citizens constitute one of
the pillars in the State's exercise of its sovereignty.[214] Based on this exercise, the
State accordingly grants rights and imposes obligations to its citizens. This granted
authority and its exercise assume primary and material importance, not only
because of the rights and obligations involved, but because the State's grants
involve the exercise of its sovereignty.

Aside from the above discussions on the application of the equal protection clause
to the terms of the Constitution itself, it must further be considered in appreciating
the equal protection clause in relation with foundlings that:

First, foundlings do not fall under any suspect class.

A "suspect class" is identified as a class saddled with such disabilities, or

subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process. Examples of suspect classifications are based on
race or national origin, alienage, or religion.[215]

Foundlings are not being treated differently on the basis of their race, national
origin, alienage, or religion. It is the lack of information on the circumstances of
their birth because of their unknown parentage and the jus sanguinis standard of
the Constitution itself, that exclude them from being considered as natural-born
citizens. They are not purposely treated unequally nor are they purposely rendered
politically powerless; they are in fact recognized under binding treaties to have the
right to be naturalized as Philippine citizens. All these take place because of
distinctions that the Constitution itself made.

Second, there is likewise no denial of a fundamental right that does not emanate
from the Constitution. As explained elsewhere in this Opinion, it is the
Constitution itself that requires that the President of the Philippines be a natural-
born citizen and must have resided in the country for 10 years before the day of
the election.

Thus, naturalized citizens and those who do not fall under the definition of a
natural-born citizen, again as defined in the Constitution itself, have no actionable
cause for complaint for unfair treatment based on the equal protection clause. This
consideration rules out the application of the strict scrutiny test as the COMELEC
recognized distinctions the Constitution itself made.

On the test of intermediate scrutiny, the test has been generally used for legislative
classifications based on gender or illegitimacy. Foundlings, however, may
arguably be subject to intermediate scrutiny since their classification may give rise
to recurring constitutional difficulties, i.e. qualification questions for other
foundlings who are public officials or are seeking positions requiring Philippine
citizenship.

To pass an intermediate scrutiny, it must be shown that the legislative purpose is

important and the classification is substantially related to the legislative purpose;
otherwise, the classification should be invalidated.

The classification of foundlings vis-a-vis Philippine citizens is undeniably

important as already explained and the purpose of the classification is the State
exercise of sovereignty: it has the inherent power to determine who are included
and excluded as its own nationals. On these considerations, I rule out the use of
the intermediate scrutiny test.
Third, under the circumstances, the most direct answer can be provided by the
rational basis test in considering the petitioner's charge that the COMELEC denied
her equal protection by applying the constitutional provisions on citizenship they
way it did.

It is a well-settled principle that the equal protection guaranty of the laws is not
violated by a legislation (or governmental action) based on reasonable
classification. A classification, to be reasonable must: 1) rely on substantial
distinctions; 2) be germane to the purpose of the law; 3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and 4) apply equally to all members of the same class.[216]

To restate and refine the question posed to us in the context of the present
petition: did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it did not
include Poe in the natural-born classification?

This question practically brings us back to the main issues these consolidated
cases pose to us.

To start from square one, I start with the admitted fact that Poe is a foundling, i.e.,
one whose parents are not known. With no known parents, the COMELEC could
not have abused the exercise of its discretion when it concluded that Poe did not
fall under the express listing of citizens under the 1935 Constitution and,
hence, cannot even be a citizen under the express terms of the Constitution.

In the context of classification, the COMELEC effectively recognized that Poe,

whose parents are unknown, cannot be the same, and cannot be similarly treated,
as other persons born in the Philippines of Filipino parents as provided under
Article IV, Section 1, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution.

The COMELEC did not also favorably entertain Poe's view that the 1935
Constitution impliedly recognized a foundling to be included in its listing. Based
on the reasons on the merits that are more lengthily discussed elsewhere in this
Opinion, the COMELEC - at the most - could have erred in its conclusions, but its
reasoned approach, even assuming it to be erroneous, cannot amount to grave
abuse of discretion as I have above specifically defined.

Lastly, the COMELEC did not recognize that the Philippines is bound under
international law to recognize Poe as a natural-born citizen; these treaties merely
grant Poe the right to acquire a nationality. This COMELEC conclusion is
largely a conclusion of law and is not baseless; in fact, it is based on the clear
terms of the cited treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory and on the
principles of international law. Thus, again, the COMELEC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in its ruling on this point.

This same conclusion necessarily results in considering Poe's argument that she
should be treated like other foundlings favorably affected by treaties binding on
the Philippines. All foundlings found in the Philippines and covered by these
treaties have the right to acquire Philippine nationality; it is a question of availing
of the opportunity that is already there. Thus, I can see no cause for complaint in
this regard. In fact, Poe has not pointed to any foundling or to any specific treaty
provision under which she would be treated the way she wants to - as a natural-
born citizen.
In these lights, the COMELEC's exercise in classification could not but
be reasonable, based as it were on the standards provided by the Constitution.
This classification was made to give effect to the Constitution and to protect
the integrity of our elections. It holds true, not only for Poe, but for all
foundlings who may be in the same situation as she is in.

II.E. Jurisdictional Issues

The petitioner questions the COMELEC's decision to cancel her CoC on the
ground that she falsely represented her Philippine citizenship because it allegedly:

a. ignored the Senate Electoral Tribunal's (SET) Decision dated November 17,
2015, as well as relevant law and jurisprudence bestowing on foundlings
the status of Philippine citizenship;

b. disregarded the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and

Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) in its application of RA No.
9225; and

c. prematurely raised eligibility challenges that is properly the jurisdiction of

the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).

In particular, the petitioner Poe argues that the COMELEC does not have
the primary jurisdiction to resolve attacks against her citizenship. The DOJ, as the
administrative agency with administrative control and supervision over the BID,
has the authority to revoke the latter's Order approving her reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship. Petitions for cancellation of CoCs are thus, by their
nature, prohibited collateral attacks against the petitioner's claimed Philippine
citizenship.

Additionally, since the allegations in the petitions for cancellation of CoC seek to
establish Poe's ineligibilities to become President, the issue lies within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the PET, and should be filed only after she has been
proclaimed President.

At the core of these challenges lie two main inquiries, from which all other issues
raised by the petitioner spring:
First, what is the scope and extent of the COMELEC's jurisdiction in a
Section 78 proceeding?

Second, given the scope and extent of the COMELEC's jurisdiction in a

Section 78 proceeding, did it gravely abuse its discretion in its interpretation
and application of the law and jurisprudence to the evidence presented before
it?
To my mind, the COMELEC has ample jurisdiction to interpret and apply the
relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence in the Section 78 proceeding against
the petitioner, and did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in doing so.

II.E.1. The COMELEC's authority to act on petitions

for cancellation of CoC's of presidential candidates.
As the constitutional authority tasked to ensure clean, honest and orderly elections,
the COMELEC exercises administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial
powers granted under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.

These constitutional powers are refined and implemented by legislation, among

others, through the powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC). These statutory powers include the authority to cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, which provides:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. [emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
The petitioner injects her desired color to Section 78 with the argument that the
COMELEC 's jurisdiction in these proceedings is limited to determining
deliberate false representation in her CoC, and should not include the substantive
aspect of her eligibility. On this view, Poe asserts that she had not deliberately
misrepresented her citizenship and residence.

II.E.2. The COMELEC's power under Section 78 is Quasi-Judicial in

Character.

In Cipriano v. COMELEC,[217] this Court recognized that this authority is quasi-

judicial in nature. The decision to cancel a candidate's CoC, based on grounds
provided in Section 78, involves an exercise of judgment or discretion that
qualifies as a quasi-judicial function by the COMELEC.

Quasi-judicial power has been defined as:

x x x the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons
before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to
it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.[218]
In Section 78 proceedings, the COMELEC determines whether the allegations in a
petition to cancel a CoC are supported by sufficient evidence. In the process, the
COMELEC allows both the petitioner and the respondent-candidate the
opportunity to present their evidence and arguments before it. Based on these
submissions, the COMELEC then determines whether the candidate's CoC should
be cancelled.
To arrive at its decision in a cancellation case, the COMELEC must determine
whether the candidate committed a material representation that is false - the
statutory basis for the cancellation - in his or her CoC statements. While Section
78 itself does not expressly define what representation is "material," jurisprudence
has defined "materiality" to be a false representation related to the candidate's
eligibility to run for office.[219] The representation is "false" if it is shown that the
candidate manifested that he or she is eligible for an elective office that he or she
filed a CoC for, when in fact he or she is not.

Thus, we have affirmed the cancellation of CoCs based on a candidate's false

representations on citizenship, residence, and lack of a prior criminal record.
These cases also refer to the need to establish a candidate's deliberate intent to
deceive and defraud the electorate that he or she is eligible to run for office.

The linkage between the qualification the elective office carries and the
representation the candidate made, directly shows that Section 78 proceedings
must necessarily involve:
(i) an inquiry into the  standards for eligibility (which are found in the law and
in jurisprudence);

(ii) the application of these standards to the candidate; and

(iii) the representations he or she made as well as the facts surrounding these

representations.
Only in this manner can the COMELEC determine if the candidate falsely
represented his or her qualification for the elective office he or she aspires for.

Aside from inquiring into the applicable laws bearing on the issues raised, the
COMELEC can interpret these laws within the bounds allowed by the principles
of constitutional and statutory interpretation. It can then apply these laws to the
evidence presented after they are previously weighed.

The capacity to interpret and apply the relevant laws extends to situations where
there exists no jurisprudence squarely applicable to the facts established by
evidence. The exercise of a function that is essentially judicial in character
includes not just the application by way of stare decisis of judicial precedent; it
includes the application and interpretation of the text of the law through
established principles of construction. To say otherwise would be to unduly
cripple the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions every time a
case before it finds no specific precedent.

II.E.2(a). Poe and the Section 78 Proceedings.

II.E.2(a)(i) Intent to Deceive as an Element.

In the present case, the private respondents sought the cancellation of Poe's CoC
based on the false representations she allegedly made regarding her Philippine
citizenship, her natural-born status, and her period of residence. These are all
material qualifications as they are required by the Constitution itself.
To determine under Section 78 whether the representations made were false, the
COMELEC must necessarily determine the eligibility standards, the application
of these standards to Poe, and the claims she made i.e., whether she is indeed a
natural-born Philippine citizen who has resided in the Philippines for at least ten
years preceding the election, as she represented in her CoC, as well as the
circumstances surrounding these representations. In relation to Poe's defense,
these circumstances relate to her claim that she did not deliberately falsely
represent her citizenship and residence, nor did she act with intent to deceive.

The element of "deliberate intent to deceive" first appeared in Philippine

jurisprudence in Salcedo III v. COMELEC[220] under the following ruling:
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78
must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public
office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public
as to ones identity, is not within the scope of the provision. [italics supplied]
Salcedo III cited Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,[221] which provided that
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought
to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification. [italics supplied]
From Salcedo and with the exception of Tagolino v. HRET,[222] the "deliberate
intent to deceive" element had been consistently included as a requirement for a
Section 78 proceeding.

The Court in Tagolino v. HRET[223] ruled:

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the
misrepresentation, much less one 's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a
Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's declaration of a material
qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an
express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of
little consequence in the determination of whether one's CoC should be deemed
cancelled or not. What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to
deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one's ineligibility and
that the same be granted without any qualification. [emphasis, italics, and
underscoring supplied]
This statement in Tagolino assumes validity and merit when we consider
that  Romualdez-Marcos, the case that Salcedo III used as basis, is not a
Section 78 proceeding, but a disqualification case.

Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's Separate Opinion[224] in Romualdez-Marcos pointed

out that the allegations in the pleadings in Romualdez-Marcos referred to Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos' disqualification, and not to an allegation for the
cancellation of her CoC. This was allowable at the time, as Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, prior to its nullification in Fermin v. Comelec,
[225]
 had allowed the institution of disqualification cases based on the lack of
residence.
The quoted portion in Romualdez-Marcos thus pertains to the challenge
to Romualdez-Marcos' residence in a disqualification proceeding, and not in a
CoC cancellation proceeding.

The Court held that the statement in Romualdez-Marcos's CoC does not
necessarily disqualify her because it did not reflect the necessary residence period,
as the actual period of residence shows her compliance with the legal
requirements. The statement "[t]he said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible" should thus be understood
in the context of a disqualification proceeding looking at the fact of a
candidate's residence, and not at a CoC cancellation proceeding determining
whether a candidate falsely represented her eligibility.

Arguably, the element of "deliberate intent to deceive," has been entrenched in our
jurisprudence since it was first mentioned in Salcedo III. Given the history of this
requirement, and the lack of clear reference of "deliberate intent to deceive" in
Section 78, this deliberate intention could be anchored from the textual
requirement in Section 78 that the representation made must have been false,
such that the representation was made with the knowledge that it had not been
true.

Viewed from this perspective, the element of "deliberate intent to deceive" should
be considered complied with upon proof of the candidate's knowledge that the
representation he or she made in the CoC was false.

Note, at this point, that the CoC must contain the candidate's representation, under
oath, that he or she is eligible for the office aspired for, i.e., that he or she
possesses the necessary eligibilities at the time he or she filed the CoC. This
statement must have also been considered to be true by the candidate to the best of
his or her knowledge.

Section 74 of the OEC, which lists the information required to be provided in a

CoC, states:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. [italics and
underscoring supplied]
More specifically, COMELEC Resolution No. 9984 requires the following to be
contained in the 2015 CoC:
Section 4. Contents and Form of Certificate of Candidacy. - The COC shall be
under oath and shall state:

a. office aspired for;

xxxx

g. citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized;

xxxx

k. legal residence, giving the exact address and the number of years residing in
the Philippines x x x;

xxxx

n. that the aspirant is eligible for said office;

xxxx

t. that the facts stated in the certificate are true and correct to the best of' the
aspirant's knowledge;

xxxx

The COC shall be sworn to before a Notary Public or any official authorized to
administer oath. COMELEC employees are not authorized to administer oath,
even in their capacities as notary public. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The oath, the representation of eligibility, and the representation that the
statements in the CoC are true to the best of the candidate's knowledge all operate
as a guarantee from a candidate that he or she has knowingly provided
information regarding his or her eligibility. The information he or she provided
in the CoC should accordingly be considered a deliberate representation on his or
her part, and any falsehood regarding such eligibility would thus be considered
deliberate.

In other words, once the status of a candidate's ineligibility has been determined, I
do not find it necessary to establish a candidate's deliberate intent to deceive the
electorate, as he or she had already vouched for its veracity and is found to have
committed falsehood. The representations he or she has made in his or her CoC
regarding the truth about his or her eligibility comply with the requirement that he
or she deliberately and knowingly falsely represented such information.

II.E.2(a)(ii) Poe had the "Intent to Deceive"

But even if we were to consider deliberate intent to deceive as a separate

element that needs to be established in a Section 78 proceeding, I find that the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in concluding that Poe
deliberately falsely represented her residence and citizenship qualifications.

The COMELEC, in concluding that Poe had known of her ineligibilities to run for
President, noted that she is a highly-educated woman with a competent legal team
at the time she filled up her 2012 and 2015 CoCs. As a highly educated woman,
she had the necessary acumen to read and understand the plain meaning of the
law. I add that she is now after the highest post in the land where the
understanding of the plain meaning of the law is extremely basic.

The COMELEC thus found it unconvincing that Poe would not have known how
to fill up a pro-forma CoC, much less commit an "honest mistake" in filling it up.
(Interestingly, Poe never introduced any evidence explaining her "mistake" on the
residency issue, thus rendering it highly suspect.)

A plain reading of Article JV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution could have
sufficiently appraised Poe regarding her citizenship. Article IV, Section 1 does
not provide for the situation where the identities of both an individual's parents
from whom citizenship may be traced are unknown. The ordinary meaning of this
non-inclusion necessarily means that she cannot be a Philippine citizen under the
1935 Constitution's terms.

The COMELEC also found that Poe's Petition for Reacquisition of Philippine

citizenship before the BID deliberately misrepresented her status as a former
natural-born Philippine citizen, as it lists her adoptive parents to be her parents
without qualifications. The COMELEC also noted that Poe had been falsely
representing her status as a Philippine citizen in various public documents. All
these involve a succession of falsities.

With respect to the required period of residency, Poe deliberately falsely

represented that she had been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
prior to the May 9, 2016 elections. Poe's CoC when she ran for the Senate in the
May 2013 national elections, however, shows that she then admitted that she had
been residing in the Philippines for only six years and six months. Had she
continued counting the period of her residence based on the information she
provided in her 2012 CoC, she would have been three months short of the required
Philippine residence of ten years. Instead of adopting the same representation,
her 2015 CoC shows that she has been residing in the Philippines from May 24,
2005, and has thus been residing in the Philippines for more than ten years.

To the COMELEC, Poe's subsequent change in counting the period of her

residence, along with the circumstances behind this change, strongly indicates
her intent to mislead the electorate regarding her eligibility.

First, at the time Poe executed her 2012 CoC, she was already a high ranking
public official who could not feign ignorance regarding the requirement of
establishing legal domicile. She also presumably had a team of legal advisers at
the time she executed this CoC as she was then the Chair of the MTRCB. She also
had experience in dealing with the qualifications for the presidency, considering
that she is the adoptive daughter of a former presidential candidate (who himself
had to go to the Supreme Court because of his own qualifications).

Second, Poe's 2012 CoC had been taken under oath and can thus be considered an
admission against interest that cannot easily be brushed off or be set aside
through the simplistic claim of "honest mistake."
Third, the evidence Poe submitted to prove that she established her residence (or
domicile) in the Philippines as she now claims; mostly refer to events prior to her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, contrary to the established jurisprudence
requiring Philippine citizenship in establishing legal domicile in the Philippines
for election purposes.

Fourth, that Poe allegedly had no life-changing event on November 2006 (the
starting point for counting her residence in her 2012 CoC) does not prove that she
did not establish legal domicile in the Philippines at that time.

Lastly, Poe announced the change in the starting point of her residency period
when she was already publicly known to be considering a run for the presidency;
thus, it appears likely that the change was made to comply with the
residence period requirement for the presidency.

These COMELEC considerations, to my mind, do not indicate grave abuse of

discretion. I note particularly that Poe's false representation regarding her
Philippine citizenship did not merely involve a single and isolated statement, but
a series of acts - a series of falsities  - that started from her RA No. 9225
application, as can be seen from the presented public documents recognizing her
citizenship.

I note in this regard that Poe's original certificate of live birth (foundling
certificate) does not indicate her Philippine citizenship, as she had no known
parents from whom her citizenship could be traced. Despite this, she had been
issued various government documents, such as a Voter's Identification Card and
Philippine passport recognizing her Philippine citizenship. The issuance of these
subsequent documents alone should be grounds for heightened suspicions given
that Poe's original birth certificate provided no information regarding her
Philippine citizenship, and could not have been used as reference for this
citizenship.

Another basis for heightened suspicion is the timing of Poe's amended birth
certificate, which was issued on May 4, 2006 (applied for in November 2005),
shortly before she applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship with the BID.
This amended certificate, where reference to being an adoptee has all been erased
as allowed by law, was not used in Poe's RA No. 9225 BID application.

The timing of the application for this amended birth certificate strongly suggest
that it was used purposely as a reserve document in case questions are raised about
Poe's birth; they became unnecessary and were not used when the BID accepted
Poe's statement under oath that she was a former natural-born citizen of the
Philippine as required by RA No. 9225.

That government documents that touched on Poe's birth origins had been tainted
with irregularities and were issued before Poe ran for elective office strongly
indicate that at the time she executed her CoC, she knew that her claimed
Philippine citizenship is tainted with discrepancies, and that she is not a
Philippine citizen under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution.

II.E.2(a)(iii) Poe and her Residency Claim

On Poe's residence, I find it worthy to add that the information in her 2012 CoC
(for the Senate) complies with the requirement that a person must first be a
Philippine citizen to establish legal domicile in the Philippines. Based on Poe's
2012 COC, her legal domicile in the Philippines began in November 2006, shortly
after the BID issued the Order granting her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
on July 18, 2006.

That her 2012 CoC complies with the ruling in Japzon v. Comelec,[226] a 2009 case
requiring Philippine citizenship prior to establishing legal domicile in the
Philippines, indicates Poe's knowledge of this requirement. It also indicates her
present deliberate intent to deceive the electorate by changing the starting point of
her claimed residency in the Philippines to May 24, 2005. This, she did despite
being in the Philippines at that time as an alien under a balikbayan visa.

II.E.3. The COMELEC's interpretation of the law despite the Senate Electoral

Tribunal's (SET) decision in the  quo warranto  case against the petitioner.

I cannot agree with the petitioner's pos1t10n that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it did not consider the SET's decision dated November 17,
2005.

By way of background, the petitioner's Philippine citizenship was earlier

challenged in a quo warranto proceeding before the SET. A quo
warranto proceeding involves a direct, not a preliminary challenge (unlike in a
cancellation proceeding), to a public officer's qualification or office. The
SET, voting 5 to 4, dismissed the petition and effectively held that she was fit to
hold office as Senator.

The SET's dismissal of the quo warranto petition against Poe, however, is not

binding on the COMELEC, nor does it have any effect on the COMELEC's
authority to render its own decision over the Section 78 proceedings filed against
her.

A First important point to consider in looking at the SET decision is that until
now it is still the subject of judicial review petition before this Court but does not
serve as a prejudicial question that must be resolved before the COMELEC can
rule on the separate and distinct petition before it. Rizalito Y. David, the petitioner
who initiated the quo warranto proceeding, timely invoked the expanded
jurisdiction of the Court in G.R. No. 221538. While the decision's implementation
has not been prohibited by the Court, its legal conclusions and reasoning are still
under question. Thus, the decision has not yet been affirmed by the Court and
cannot be applied, by way of judicial precedent, to the COMELEC's decision-
making.

Note in this regard that only rulings of the Supreme Court are considered as part of
the laws of the land and can serve as judicial precedent.[227] Cases decided by the
lower courts, once they have attained finality, may only bar the institution of
another case for res adjudicata, i.e., by prior judgment (claim preclusion) or the
preclusion of the re-litigation of the same issues (issue preclusion).[228] For res
judicata to take. Effect, however, the petitioner should have raised it as part of her
defense and properly established that the elements for its application are present.
The petitioner has done neither.

Likewise note that a court's ruling on citizenship, as a general rule, does not have
the effect of res judicata, especially when the citizenship ruling is only antecedent
to the determination of rights of a person in a controversy.[229] This point is
further discussed below.

Second, the COMELEC can conduct its own inquiry regarding the petitioner's
citizenship, separate from and independently of the SET.

The COMELEC, in order to determine the petitioner's eligibility and decide on

whether her CoC should be cancelled, can inquire into her citizenship. Courts,
including quasi-judicial agencies such as the COMELEC, may make
pronouncements on the status of Philippine citizenship as an incident in the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy.

In making this determination (and separately from the reasons discussed

above), the COMELEC is not bound by the SET's decision since these
constitutional bodies are separate and independent from one another, each with
its own specific jurisdiction and different issues to resolve. The COMELEC, as
the independent constitutional body tasked to implement election laws, has the
authority to determine citizenship to determine whether the candidate committed
false material representation in her CoC. The SET, on the other hand, is a
constitutional body tasked to resolve all contests involving the eligibility of
Senators to hold office.

That these two bodies have separate, distinct, and different jurisdictions mean
that neither has the authority nor the ascendancy over the other, with each body
supreme in its own sphere of authority. Conversely, these bodies have no
ascendancy to rule upon issues outside their respective specific authority, much
less bind other bodies with matters outside their respective jurisdictions. The
decision of the SET, with its specific jurisdiction to resolve contests involving the
qualifications of Senators, does not have the authority to bind the COMELEC,
another constitutional body with a specific jurisdiction of its own.

Consider, too, that the actual ruling and reasoning behind the SET's decision are
suspect and ambiguous. All the members of the SET, except for Senator Nancy
Binay (who voted with the minority), issued his or her own separate opinion to
explain his or her vote: aside from the three members of the SET who dissented
and issued their own separate opinions, the five members of the majority also
wrote their own separate opinions explaining their votes.

Notably, one member of the SET majority opined that the SET's decision is a
political one since the majority of SET membership comes from the political
legislative branch of government.

While I do not subscribe to this view, the fact that this was said by one of the
members in the majority could reasonably affect the COMELEC's (and even the
public's) opinion on the SET's grounds for its conclusion.

Another member of the SET majority in fact pointedly said:

The composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is predominantly political, six
Senators and three Justices of the Supreme Court. The Philippine Constitution
did not strictly demand a strictly legal viewpoint in deciding disqualification
cases against Senators. Had the intention been different, the Constitution should
have made the Supreme Court also sit as the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The fact
that six Senators, elected by the whole country, form part of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal would suggest that the judgment of the whole Filipino nation must be
taken into consideration. [Emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied]
Still another member of the SET majority openly explained that his vote stems
from the belief that the SET is "predominantly a political body" that must take
into consideration the will of the Filipino people, while another expressly stated
that her opinion should not be extended to the issues raised in the COMELEC:
Finally, it is important for the public to understand that the main decision of the
SET and my separate opinion are limited to the issues raised before it. This does
not cover other issues raised in the Commission on Elections in connection with
the Respondent's candidacy as President or issues raised in the public fora.
These opinions reasonably cast doubt on the applicability - whether as precedent
or as persuasive legal points of view - to the present COMELEC case which
necessarily has to apply the law and jurisprudence in resolving a Section 78
proceeding.

Given the structure and specific jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the SET, as
well as the opinions of some of the latter's members regarding the nature of their
decision, the COMELEC could not have acted beyond its legitimate jurisdiction
nor with grave abuse of discretion when it inquired into the petitioner's citizenship.

II.E.4. The COMELEC's authority under Section 78

and the BID 's Order under RA No. 9225.

Neither do I agree that the COMELEC's decision amounted to a collateral attack

on the BID Order, nor that the COMELEC usurped the DOJ's primary jurisdiction
over the BID Order.

In the present case, the private respondents sought the cancellation of the
petitioner's CoC based on her false material representations regarding her
Philippine citizenship, natural-born status, and period of residence. The BID, on
the other hand, passed upon petitioner Poe's compliance with RA No. 9225 when
she applied for the "reacquisition" of Philippine citizenship. The BID approved the
application and thus certified Poe as a dual Philippine-U.S. citizen.

Whether the COMELEC's Section 78 decision is a collateral attack on the BID

Order depends on the COMELEC's purpose, authority to make the inquiry, and the
effect of its decision on the BID Order.

As I pointed out earlier, the COMELEC can make pronouncements on the status
of Philippine citizenship as an incident in the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy that is within its jurisdiction to rule on.[230]

A significant point to understand on citizenship is that RA No. 9225 - the law

authorizing the BID to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and
pursuant to which Poe now claims Filipino citizenship - does not ipso facto
authorize a former natural-born Philippine citizen to run for elective office.
An RA No. 9225 proceeding simply makes a finding on the applicant's compliance
with the requirements of this law. Upon approval of the application, the applicant's
political and civil rights as a Philippine citizen are restored, with
the subsequent enjoyment of the restored civil and political rights "subject to
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines x x x."

In other words, the BID handles the approval process and the restoration of the

applicant's civil and political rights, but how and whether the applicant can
enjoy or exercise these political rights are matters that are covered by other laws;
the full enjoyment of these rights also depends on other institutions and agencies,
not on the BID itself whose task under RA No. 9225 at that point is finished.

Thus, the BID Order approving petitioner Poe's reacquisition of her Philippine
citizenship allowed her the political right to file a CoC, but like other candidates,
she may be the subject of processes contesting her right to run for elective office
based on the qualifications she represented in her CoC.

In the petitioner's case, her CoC has been challenged under Section 78 of the OEC
for her false material representation of her status as a natural-born Philippine
citizen and as a Philippine resident for at least ten years before the May 9, 2016
elections. Thus, as Section 78 provides, the COMELEC conducted its own
investigation and reached its conclusions based on its investigation of the claimed
false material representations. As this is part of its authority under Section 78, the
COMELEC cannot be faulted for lack of authority to act; it possesses the required
constitutional and statutory authority for its actions.

More importantly in this case, the COMELEC's action does not amount to a
collateral attack against the BID Order, as the consequences of the BID Order
allows the petitioner to enjoy political rights but does not exempt her from the
liabilities and challenges that the exercise of these rights gave rise to.

In more precise terms, the COMELEC did not directly hold the Order to be
defective for purposes of nullifying it; it simply declared - pursuant to its own
constitutional and statutory power - that petitioner Poe cannot enjoy the
political right to run for the Presidency because she falsely represented her
natural-born citizenship and residency status. These facts are material because
they are constitutional qualifications for the Presidency.

It is not without significance that the COMELEC 's determination under Section
78 of the OEC of a candidate's Philippine citizenship status despite having
reacquired it through RA No. 9225 has been affirmed by the Court several times -
notably, in Japzon v. Comelec,[231] Condon v. Comelec,[232] and Lopez v. Comelec.
[233]

II.E.5. The claimed COMELEC encroachment on the powers of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).

The petitioner posits on this point that the COMELEC, by ruling on her
qualifications for the Presidency, encroached on the power of the PET to rule on
election contests involving the Presidency. In short, she claims that the
COMELEC, without any legal basis, prematurely determined the eligibility of a
presidential candidate.

To properly consider this position, it must be appreciated that the COMELEC is

not an ordinary court or quasi-judicial body that falls within the judicial
supervision of this Court. It is an independent constitutional body that enjoys
both decisional AND institutional independence from the three branches of the
government. Its decisions are not subject to appeal but only to
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court for the correction of grave abuses in the
exercise of its discretion - a very high threshold of review as discussed above.

If this Court holds that the COMELEC did indeed encroach on the PET's
jurisdiction determining the qualifications of Poe in the course of the exercise of
its jurisdiction under Section 78 of the OEC, the ruling vastly delimits the
COMELEC's authority, while the Court will itself unconstitutionally expand its
own jurisdiction.

For easy reference, tabulated below is a comparison of the history of the grant of
power, with respect to elections, to the Commission and to the PET (now
transferred to the Supreme Court):

The Supreme Court COMELEC

Republic Act No. 1793 (1957): Commonwealth Act No. 607 ( 1940), Sec.
2:
Sec. l. There shall be an independent
residential Electoral Tribunal to be The Commission on Elections shall have
composed of eleven members which shall exclusive charge of the enforcement and
be the sole judge of all contests relating to administration of all laws relative to the
the election returns, and qualifications of conduct of elections. It shall decide save
the president-elect and the vice-president- those involving the right to vote, all
elect of the Philippines x x x x administrative questions affecting elections
xxx
1935 Constitution (as amended m 1940),
Art. X, Sec. 2:

The Commission on Elections shall have

exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and shall exercise all
other functions which may be conferred
upon it by law. It shall decide, save those
involving the right to vote, all
administrative questions affecting elections,
including the determination of the number
and location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and of
other election officials. All law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, when so required by the
Commission, shall act as its deputies for the
purpose of insuring free, orderly, and
honest election. The decisions, orders, and
rulings of the Commission shall be subject
 to review by the Supreme Court. Xxx
Batas Pambansa Big. 884 (1985), Sec. 1: 1973 Constitution, Art. XII-C, Sec. 2:

There shall be an independent Presidential The Commission on Elections shall have

Electoral Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as the following powers and functions:
the Tribunal, to be composed of the nine
members which shall be the sole judge of 1. Enforce and administer all laws relative
all contests relating to the election, returns to the conduct of elections. xxxx
and qualifications of the President and the
VicePresident of the Philippines.xx x 3. Decide, save those involving the right to
vote, administrative questions affecting
elections, including the determination of the
number and location of polling places, the
appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and the registration of votes.
1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4: 1987 Constitution, Art. IX-C, Sec. 2:

xxxx The Commission on Elections shall exercise

the following powers and functions:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to (1) Enforce and administer all laws and
the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may Regulations relative to the conduct of an
promulgate its rules for the purpose. election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall.

xxxx

(3) Decide, except those involving the right

to vote , all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
1987 Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 7: 1987 Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. I:

x x x Unless otherwise provided by this The Constitutional Commissions, which

Constitution or by law, any decision, order, shall be independent, are the Civil Service
or ruling of each Commission may be Commission, the Commission on Elections,
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari and the Commission on Audit.
by the Aggrieved party within thirty days Executive Order 292 ( 1987), Book V, Title
from receipt o r a copy thereof. I, Subtitle C, Chapter 1, Sec. 2:

Powers and functions. - In addition to the

powers and functions conferred upon it by
the constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of
insuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections, and shall:

(20) Have exclusive jurisdiction

 over all pre-proclamation controversies. It
may motuproprio or upon written petition,
and after due notice and hearing, order the
partial or total suspension of the
proclamation of any candidate-elect or
annul partially or totally any proclamation,
if one has been made, as the evidence shall
warrant. Notwithstanding the pendency of
any pre-proclamation controversy, the
Commission may, motuproprio or upon
filing of a verified petition and after due
notice and hearing, oder the proclamation of
other winning candidates whose election
will not be affected by the outcome of the
controversy.

II.E.5(a). History of the PET.

An examination of the 1935 Constitution shows that it did not provide for a
mechanism for the resolution of election contests involving the office of the
President or Vice-President. This void was only filled in 1957 when Congress
enacted RA No. 1793,[234] creating the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Until then,
controversies or disputes involving election contests, returns, and qualifications of
the President-elect and Vice-President-elect were not justiciable.[235]

RA No. 1793 gave the Supreme Court, acting as the PET, the sole jurisdiction to
decide all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the
President-elect and the Vice-President elect.

The PET became irrelevant under the 1973 Constitution since the 1973 President
was no longer chosen by the electorate but by the members of the National
Assembly; the office of the Vice-President in tum ceased to exist.[236]

The PET was only revived in 1985 through Batas Pambansa

Blg. (B.P.) 884[237] after the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution restored to
the people the power to directly elect the President and reinstalled the office of the
Vice-President.

The PET under B.P. 884 exercised the same jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President and
the Vice-President, albeit it omitted the suffix "-elect." It was also an entirely
distinct entity from the Supreme Court with membership composed of both
Supreme Court Justices and members of the Batasang Pambansa. [238]

The PET's jurisdiction was restored under the 1987 Constitution with the Justices
of the Supreme Court as the only members. Presently, this Court, sitting en banc,
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President.

The grant of jurisdiction to the PET is exclusive but at the same time, limited. The
constitutional phraseology limits the PET's jurisdiction to election contests which
can only contemplate a post-election and post proclamation controversy[239] since
no "contest" can exist before a winner is proclaimed. Understood in this sense, the
jurisdiction of the members of the Court, sitting as PET, does not pertain to
Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidates but to the President (elect) and Vice-
President (elect).

II.E.S(b). The COMELEC's History.

The PET's history should be compared to the history of the grant of jurisdiction to
the COMELEC which was created in 1940, initially by statute whose terms were
later incorporated as an amendment to the 1935 Constitution. The COMELEC was
given the power to decide, save those involving the right to vote,
all administrative questions affecting elections.

When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, this COMELEC power was retained
with the same limitations.

The 1987 Constitution deleted the adjective "administrative" in the description of

the COMELEC's powers and expanded its jurisdiction to decide all questions
affecting elections, except those involving the right to vote. Thus, unlike the very
limited jurisdiction of election contests granted to the Supreme Court/PET, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction, with its catch-all provision, is all encompassing; it
covers all questions/issues not specifically reserved for other tribunals.

The Administrative Code of 1987 further explicitly granted the COMELEC

exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.

Section 78 of the OEC still further refines the COMELEC's power by expressly
granting it the power to deny due course or to cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground of false material representation. Ex necessitate
legis. Express grants of power are deemed to include those of necessary or fair
implication, or incident to the powers expressly conferred, or essential thereto.
This power under Section 78, therefore, necessarily includes the power to make a
determination of the truth or falsity of the representation made in the CoC.

The bottom line from this brief comparison is that the power granted to the PET is
limited to election contests while the powers of the COMELEC are broad and
extensive. Except for election contests involving the President or Vice-President
(and members of Congress)[240] and controversies involving the right to vote, the
COMELEC has the jurisdiction to decide ALL questions affecting the elections.
Logically, this includes pre-proclamation controversies such as the determination
of the qualifications of candidates for purpose of resolving whether a candidate
committed false material representation.

Thus, if this Court would deny the COMELEC the power to pass upon the
qualifications of a Presidential candidate - to stress, not a President or a
President-elect - on the ground that this power belongs to the PET composed of
the members of this Court, we shall be self-servingly expanding the limited power
granted to this Court by Article VII, Section 4, at the expense of limiting the
powers explicitly granted to an independent constitutional comm1ss10n. The
Court would thus commit an unconstitutional encroachment on the COMELEC's
powers.
II.E.S(c). Jurisprudence on COMELEC-PET Jurisdiction.

In Tecson v. COMELEC,[241] the Court indirectly affirmed the COMELEC's

jurisdiction over a presidential candidate's eligibility in a cancellation proceeding.
The case involved two consolidated petitions assailing the eligibility of
presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ): one petition, G.R. No. 161824,
invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
over a COMELEC decision in a CoC cancellation proceeding, while the other,
G.R. No. 161434, invoked the Court's jurisdiction as a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.

The G.R. No. 161824 petition, in invoking the Court's jurisdiction over the
COMELEC's decision to uphold FPJ's candidacy, argued that the COMELEC's
decision was within its power to render but its conclusion is subject to the Court's
review under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and Article IX, Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution.

In contrast, the G.R. No. 161434 petition argued that that the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction to decide a presidential candidate's eligibility, as this could only be
decided by the PET. It then invoked the Court's jurisdiction as the PET to rule
upon the challenge to FPJ's eligibility.

The Court eventually dismissed both petitions, but for different reasons. The Court
dismissed G.R. No. 161824 for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC. G.R. No. 161434 was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The difference in the reasons for the dismissal of the two petitions in effect
affirmed the COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine a presidential candidate's
eligibility in a pre-election proceeding. It also clarified that while the PET also has
jurisdiction over the questions of eligibility, its jurisdiction begins only after a
President has been proclaimed.

Thus, the two Tecson petitions, read in relation with one another, stand for the
proposition that the PET has jurisdiction over challenges to a proclaimed
President's eligibility, while the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the eligibilities
and disqualifications of presidential candidates filed prior to the proclamation of a
President.

This is the precise point of my discussions above.

As against the Tecson ruling, the case of Fermin v. COMELEC[242] that petitioner

Poe relies on, does not divest the COMELEC of its authority to determine a
candidate's eligibility in the course of resolving Section 78 petitions.

Fermin held that a candidate's ineligibility is not a ground for a Section 68

proceeding involving disqualification cases, despite a COMELEC rule including
the lack of residence (which is an ineligibility) in the list of grounds for a petition
for disqualification. It then characterized the disputed petition as a petition for the
cancellation of a CoC and not a petition for disqualification, and held that it had
been filed out of time.
The Court's citation in Fermin of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's Separate Opinion
in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC[243] thus refers to the COMELEC's lack of
authority to add to the grounds for a petition for disqualification as provided in
the law, even if these grounds involve an ineligibility to hold office. It cannot be
construed to divest the COMELEC of its authority to determine the veracity of
representations in a candidate's CoC, which, to be considered material, must
pertain to a candidate's eligibility to hold elective office. Fermin itself clarified
this point when it said that:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate
made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC
that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course
to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC
since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate.[244] [emphases and italics supplied]
III.

The Claim of Grave Abuse of Discretion with respect to the CITIZENSHIP

ISSUE

Aside from committing acts outside its jurisdiction, petitioner Poe claims that the
COMELEC also committed acts of grave abuse of discretion when it misapplied
the law and related jurisprudence in holding that Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution does not grant her natural-born Philippine citizenship and in
disregarding the country's obligations under treaties and the generally-accepted
principles of international law that require the Philippines to recognize the
Philippine citizenship of foundlings in the country.

Petitioner Poe also questions the COMELEC's evaluation of the evidence, and
alleges that it disregarded the evidence she presented proving that she is a natural-
born Philippine citizen.

Poe lastly raises the COMELEC's violation of her right to equal protection, as it
has the right to be treated in the same manner as other foundlings born after the
Philippines' ratification of several instruments favorable to the rights of the child.

III.A. The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in interpreting Article
IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution.

III.A.1. Article IV, Section 1ofthe1935 Constitution does not, on its face,

include foundlings in listing the "citizens of the Philippines."

Jurisprudence has established three principles of constitutional

construction: first, verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of the statute
there should be no departure; second, when there is ambiguity, ratio legis est
anima - the words of the Constitution should be interpreted based on the intent of
the framers; and third, ut magis valeat quam pereat - the Constitution must be
interpreted as a whole.[245]

I hold the view that none of these modes support the inclusion of foundlings
among the Filipino citizens listed in the 1935 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution
does not expressly list foundlings among Filipino citizens.[246] Using verba legis,
the Constitution limits citizens of the Philippines to the listing expressly in its text.
Absent any ambiguity, the second level of constitutional construction should not
also apply.

Even if we apply ratio legis, the records of the 1934 Constitutional Convention do

not reveal an intention to consider foundlings to be citizens, much less natural-
born ones. On the contrary the Constitutional Convention rejected the inclusion
of foundlings in the Constitution. If they were now to be deemed included, the
result would be an anomalous situation of monstrous proportions -
foundlings, with unknown parents, would have greater rights than those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and who had to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

In interpreting the Constitution from the perspective of what it expressly contains

(verba legis), only the terms of the Constitution itself require to be considered.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution on Citizenship provides:
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided
by law.
To reiterate, the list of persons who may be considered Philippine citizens is
an exclusive list. According to the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, items not provided in a list are presumed not to be included in it.[247]

In this list, Paragraphs (1) and (2) need not obviously be considered as they refer
to persons who were already born at the time of the adoption of the 1935
Constitution. Petitioner Poe was born only in 1968. Paragraphs (5),on the other
hand and except under the terms mentioned below, does not also need to be
included for being immaterial to the facts and the issues posed in the present case.
Thus, we are left with paragraphs (3) and (4) which respectively refer to a
person's father and mother. Either or both parents of a child must be Philippine
citizens  at the time of the  child's birth so that the child can claim Philippine
citizenship under these paragraphs.[248]

This is the rule of jus sanguinis or citizenship by blood, i.e., as traced from one or
both parents and as confirmed by the established rulings of this Court.
[249]
 Significantly, none of the 1935 constitutional provisions contemplate the
situation where both parents' identities (and consequently, their citizenships) are
unknown, which is the case for foundlings.

As the list of Philippine citizens under Article IV, Section 1 does not include
foundlings, then they are not included among those constitutionally granted or
recognized to be Philippine citizens except to the extent that they full under the
coverage of paragraph 5, i.e., if they choose to avail of the opportunity to be
naturalized. Established rules of legal interpretation tell us that nothing is to be
added to what the text states or reasonably implies; a matter that is not covered
is to be treated as not covered.[250]

The silence of Article IV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution, in particular of

paragraphs (3) and (4) parentage provisions, on the citizenship of foundlings in the
Philippines, in fact speaks loudly and directly about their legal situation. Such
silence can only mean that the 1935 Constitution did not address the situation of
foundlings via paragraphs (3) and (4), but left the matter to other provisions
that may he applicable as discussed below.

Specifically, foundlings can fully avail of Paragraph (5) of the above list, which
speaks of those who are naturalized as citizens in accordance with law. Aside from
the general law on naturalization,[251] Congress can pass a law specific to
foundlings or ratify other treaties recognizing the right of foundlings to acquire
Filipino citizenship. The foundling himself or herself, of course, must choose to
avail of the opportunity under the law or the treaty.

To address the position that petitioner Poe raised in this case, the fact that the 1935
Constitution did not provide for a situation where both parents are unknown (as
also the case in the current 1987 Constitution) does not mean that the provision on
citizenship is ambiguous with respect to foundlings; it simply means that the
constitutional provision on citizenship based on blood or parentage has not been
made available under the Constitution but the provision must be read in its totality
so that we must look to other applicable provision that are available, which in this
case is paragraph (5) as explained above.

In negative terms, even if Poe's suggested interpretation via the parentage

provision did not expressly apply and thus left a gap, the omission does not mean
that we can take liberties with the Constitution through stretched interpretation,
and forcibly read the situation so as to place foundlings within the terms of the
Constitution's parentage provisions. We cannot and should not do this as we would
thereby cross the forbidden path of judicial legislation.

The appropriate remedy for the petitioner and other foundlings, as already
adverted to, is via naturalization, a process that the Constitution itself already
provides for. Naturalization can be by specific law that the Congress can pass for
foundlings, or on the strength of international law via the treaties that binds the
Philippines to recognize the right of foundlings to acquire a nationality.
(Petitioner Poe obviously does not want to make this admission as, thereby, she
would not qualify for the Presidency that she now aspires for.) There, too, is the
possible amendment of the Constitution so that the situation of foundlings can be
directly addressed in the Constitution (of course, this may also be an unwanted
suggestion as it is a course of action that is too late [or the 2016 elections.)

Notably, the government operating under the 1935 Constitution has recognized
that foundlings who wish to become full-fledged Philippine citizens must undergo
naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473. DOJ Opinion No. 377 Series of
1940, in allowing the issuance of Philippine passports to foundlings found in the
Philippines, said:
However under the principles of International Law, a foundling has the nationality
of the place where he is found or born (See chapter on the Conflict of Law,
footnote, p. 57 citing Bluntschli in an article in the Revue de Trait int. for 1870, p.
107; Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to Switzerland, July
12, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, 760; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 281;
Garcia's Quizzer on Private International Law, p. 270) which in this case, is the
Philippines. Consequently, Eddy Howard may be regarded as a citizen of the
Philippines for passport purposes only if he desires to be a full-fledged Filipino,
he may apply for naturalization under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
473 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535. [emphasis, italics, and
underscoring supplied]
A subsequent DOJ Opinion, DOJ Opinion No. 189, series of 1951, stated:
However under the principles of International Law, a foundling has the nationality
of the place where he is found or born (See chapter on the Conflict of Law,
footnote, p. 57 citing Bluntschli in an article in the Revue de Trait int. for 1870, p.
107; Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to Switzerland, July
12, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, 760; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 281)
which in this case, is the Philippines. Consequently, Anthony Satan Hale may be
regarded as a citizen of the Philippines, and entitled to a passport as such.
The two DOJ opinions both say that a foundling is considered a Philippine
citizen for passport purposes. That the second DOJ Opinion does not categorically
require naturalization for a foundling to become a Philippine citizen does not mean
it amended the government's stance on the citizenship of foundlings, as these
opinions were issued to grant them a Philippine passport and facilitate their
right to travel. International law is cited as reference because they would be
travelling abroad, and it is possible that other countries they will travel to
recognize that principle. But for purposes of application in the Philippines, the
domestic law on citizenship prevails, that is, Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution. This is why DOJ Opinion No. 377, Series of 1940 clarified that if a
foundling wants to become a full-fledged Philippine citizen, then he should apply
for naturalization under CA No. 473.

In any case, DOJ Opinion No. 189, Series of 1950 should not be interpreted in
such a way as to contravene the 1935 Constitution, and it most certainly cannot
amend or alter Article IV. Section l, of the 1935 Constitution.

III.A.2. The Constitution did not intend to include

foundlings within its express terms but did not
totally leave them without any remedy.

Poe, in arguing this point, effectively imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
COMELEC for not recognizing that an ambiguity exists under paragraphs (3) and
(4) of Section 1, of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, and for not recognizing
that the framers of the 1935 Constitution intended to include foundlings in the
constitutional listing.

I see no ambiguity as explained above, but I shall continue to dwell on this point
under the present topic to the extent of petitioner Poe's argument that the exclusio
unios principle is not an absolute rule and that "unfairness" would result if
foundlings are not deemed included within the constitutional listing.

I shall discuss these points though in relation with the petitioner's second point -
the alleged intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to include foundlings
within the terms of the 1935 Constitution. The link between the first and the
second points of discussion lies in the claim that ambiguity and fairness render the
discussion of the framers' intent necessary.

Poe bases her ambiguity and unfairness argument on the Court's ruling in People
v. Manantan[252] which provided an exception to the exclusio unius est exclusio
alterius principle under the ruling that:
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to
particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other
persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest
injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, should not be invoked.[253]
The petitioner appears to forget that, as discussed above, the terms of the
Constitution are clear - they simply did not provide for the situation of foundlings
based on parentage - but left the door open for the use of another measure, their
naturalization. There is thus that backdoor opening in the Constitution to provide
for foundlings using a way other than parentage.

The 1935 Constitution did not also have the effect of fostering unfairness by not
expressly including foundlings as citizens via the parentage route as foundlings
could not rise any higher than children: whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines. Like them, they fell under the naturalized classification under the
terms of the 1935 Constitution. That under the terms of the subsequent
Constitutions the children of Filipino mothers were deemed natural-born citizens
of the Philippines does not also unfairly treat foundlings as there is a reasonable
distinction between their situations - the former have established Filipino
parentage while the latter's parents are unknown.

From these perspectives, the Constitution did not leave out the situation of
foundling's altogether so that there could be a gap that would call for
interpretation. Apparently, the petitioner simply objects because she wants the
case of foundlings to be addressed via the parentage route which is a matter of
policy that is not for this Court to take. In the absence of a gap that would call for
interpretation, the use of interpretative principles is uncalled for.

III.A.3. Neither did the framers of the 1935

Constitution intend to include foundlings within the
parentage provisions of this Constitution.

The full transcript of the deliberations shows that the express inclusion of
foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitution was taken up during its
deliberations. These records show that the proposal to include them was rejected.
Other than this rejection, no definitive decision was reached, not even in terms of
a concrete proposal to deem them included, within the meaning of the parentage
provisions of Article IV, Section l of the 1935 Constitution; there were only vague
and inconclusive discussions from which we cannot and should not infer the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to consider and then to include them within its
terms.

In this regard, the Court should not forget the fine distinction between the
evidentiary value of constitutional and congressional deliberations: constitutional
deliberation discussions that are not reflected in the wording of the Constitution
are not as material as the congressional deliberations where the intents expressed
by the discussants come from the very legislators who would reject or approve the
law under consideration. In constitutional deliberations, what the framers express
do not necessarily reflect the intent of the people who by their sovereign act
approve the Constitution on the basis of its express wording.[254]

To refer to the specifics of the deliberations, Mr. Rafols, a Constitutional

Convention member, proposed the inclusion of foundlings among those who
should be expressly listed as Philippine citizens. The proposal was framed as an
amendment to the agreed provision that children born of Filipina mother and
foreign fathers shall be considered Philippine citizens.

As petitioner Poe pointed out, Mr. Roxas raised the point (as an observation, not
as an amendment to the proposal on the table) that the express inclusion of
foundlings was no longer needed as their cases were rare and international law at
that time already recognized them as citizens of the country where they are born
in.

Mr. Buslon, another member, voiced out another point - that the matter should be
left to the discretion of the legislature.

The present dispute essentially arose from these statements which preceded the
vote on the Rafols proposal (which did not reflect either of the observations
made). For clarity, the exchanges among the Convention members went as
follows:

Table 3

Español English
SR. RAFOLS: Para una enmienda, Senor MR. RAFOLS: For an amendment, Mr.
Presidente. Propongo que despues def Chairman. I propose that after the paragraph
inciso 2 se inserte lo siguiente: "Los hijos 2, the following be inserted: "The natural
natura!es de un padre extranjero y de una children of a foreign father and a Filipino
madre filipina no reconocidos por aquel, mother recognized that"

xxxx xxxx
EL PRES/DENTE: La Mesa desea pedir THE PRESIDENT: The Board wishes to
una aclara. cion def proponente de la request a clarification to the proponent of
enmienda. ;,Se refiere Su Senoria a hijos the amendment. Does His Honor· refer to
naturales o a toda clase de hijos natural children or any kind
ilegitimos? of illegitimate children.

SR. RAFOLS: A toda clase de hijos MR. RAFOLS: To all kinds

ilegitimos. Tambien se incluye a los hijos of illegitimate children. It also includes the
naturales de padres conocidos, y los hijos natural children of unknown parentage, and
naturales o ilegitimos de padres natural or illegitimate children of unknown
desconocidos. parentage.

SR. MONTINOLA: Para una aclaracion. MR. Montinola: for clarification. They are
Alli se dice de padres desconocidos. Los called "of unknown parents." The Codes
Codigos actuates considera como filipino, actually consider them Filipino, that is, I
es decir, me refiero al Codigo espanol que mean the Spanish Code considers all
considera como espanoles a todos los hijos children of unknown parents born m
da padrea desconcidos nacidos en Spanish territory as Spaniards because the
terrilorio espanol, porque la presuncion es presumption is that the child of unknown
que el hijo de padres desconocidos es hijo parentage is the son of a Spaniard; this
de un espanol, y de igual manera se podra treatment can likewise be applied in the
aplicar eso en Filipinas, de que un hijo de Philippines so that a child of unknown
padre desconocido y nacido en Filipinas se father born in the Philippines is Filipino, so
considerara que es filipino. de modo que no there is no need ...
hay necesidad . ..
 
SR. RAFOLS: Hay necesidad, porque
estamos relatando las condiciones de los MR. RAFOLS: There is a need, because we
que van a ser filipinos. are relating those conditions to those who
are going to be Filipinos.
SR. MONTINOLA: Pero esa es la
interpretacion de la ley ahora, de manera MR. Montinola: But that's the lay
de que no hay necesidad de la enmienda. interpretation of law now, so there is no
need for the amendment.
SR. RAFOLS: La enmienda debe leerse de
esta manera: "Los hijos naturales o
ilegitimos de un padre extranjero y de una MR. RAFOLS: The amendment should be
madre filipina, no reconocidos par aquel, o read this way: "The natural
los hijos de padres desconocidos. " or illegitimate children of a foreign father
and a Filipino mother, not recognized by
xxxx either one, or the children of unknown
parents."
SR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don't you
think it would be better to leave this matter x x x x
to the hands of the Legislature? (original in
English) MR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don't you
think it would be better to leave this matter
SR. ROXAS: Senor Presidente, mi opinion to the hands of the Legislature?
hum ii de es que estos son casos muy
insignificantes y contados, para que la MR. ROXAS: Mr. President, my humble
Constitucion necesite referirse a ellos. Por opinion is that these are very insignificant
las /eyes internacionales se reconoce el and rare cases for the Constitution to refer
principio de que los hijos o las personas to them. Under international law the
nacidas en un pais y de padres principle that children or people born in a
desconocidos son ciudadanos de esa country and of unknown parents are
nacion, y no es necesario incluir en la citizens of that nation is recognized, and it
Constitucion una disposicion taxativa sobre is not necessary to include in the
el particular. Constitution an exhaustive provision on the
matter.
xxxx
 
EL PRESIDENTE: La Mesa sometera a
votacion dicha enmienda. Los que esten xxxx
conformes con la misma, que digan Si.
(Una minoria: Si.) Los que no lo esten, que THE PRESIDENT: The Chair places the
digan No. (Una mayoria: No.) Queda amendment to a vote. Those who agree with
rechazada la enmienda. the amendment, say Yes. (A minority: Yes.)
Those who do not, say No. (the majority:
No.) The amendment is rejected.

Mr. Roxas, a known and leading lawyer of his time who eventually became the
fifth President of the Philippines, was clearly giving his personal "opinion
humilde" (humble opinion) following Mr. Buslon's alternative view that the matter
should be referred to the legislature. He did not propose to amend or change the
original Rafols proposal which was the approval or the rejection of the inclusion to
the provision "[t]he natural or illegitimate children of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother, not recognized by either one, or the children of unknown
parents."

The Convention rejected the Rafols proposal. As approved, paragraph 3 of Section

1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution finally read: "Those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship."

Under these simple unadorned terms, nothing was thus clear except the Rafols
proposal to include "children of unknown parents," after which a vote followed.
As the transcripts show, the assemblage rejected the proposal. To be sure, the
rejection was not because foundlings were already Philippine citizens under
international law; the Rafols proposal was not amended to reflect this reasoning
and was simply rejected after an exchange of views.

To say under these circumstances that foundlings were in fact intended to be

included in the Filipino parentage provision is clearly already a modification of
the records to reflect what they do not say.

The most that can perhaps be claimed under these records is that the framers were
inconclusive on the reason for the rejection. It should not be lost on the Court that
the deemed inclusion that Poe now claims does not logically arise from the main
provision that Mr. Rafols wanted to amend; his proposal had a premise different
from the Filipino parentage that was sought to be modified.

In clearer terms, the main provision sought to be amended was based on the

existence of a Filipino mother; what Rafols wanted was to include a situation
of completely unknown parentage. This Rafols proposal was rejected. Nothing
was decided on why the rejection resulted. Anything beyond this simple reading
is conjectural.

To my mind, these considerations should caution us against bowing to petitioner

Poe's self-serving interpretation of Mr. Roxas's statement - in effect, an
interpretation, not of an express constitutional provision, but of an observation
made in the course of the constitutional debate.

To summarize my reasons for disagreeing with this proposition are as follows:

(1) another member of the 1934 Constitutional Convention provided for a different
reason for not including foundlings in the enumeration of citizens under Article
IV, i.e., that the· matter should be left to the discretion of the legislature;
(2) Mr. Roxas' statement could in fact reasonably be construed to be in support as
well of this alternative reason; what is certain is that Mr. Roxas did not support
the Rafols proposal;
(3) Mr. Roxas's view is only one view that was not supported by any of the
members of the Constitutional Convention, and cannot be considered to have
been representative of the views of the other 201 delegates, 102 of whom were
also lawyers like Mr. Roxas and might be presumed to know the basics of
statutory construction;
(4) references to international law by members of the Constitutional Convention
cannot, without its corresponding text in the Constitution, be considered as
appended to or included in the Constitution;
(5) Poe's position is based on an interpretation of a lone observation made in the
course of the constitutional debate; it is not even an interpretation of a
constitutional provision;
(6) the deemed inclusion would have rendered paragraph 3 of Section 1 absurdly
unfair as foundlings would be considered Filipino citizens while those born of
Filipina mothers and foreign fathers would have to undertake an election; and
lastly,
(7) the sovereign Filipino people could not be considered to have known and
ratified the observation of one member of the Constitutional Convention,
especially when the provisions which supposedly reflect this observation do not
indicate even a hint of this intent.

These reasons collectively provide the justification under the circumstances that
lead us to the first and primordial rule in constitutional construction, that is, the
text of the constitutional provision applies and is controlling. Intent of the
Constitution's drafters may only be resorted to in case of ambiguity, and after
examining the entire text of the Constitution. Even then, the opinion of a member
of the Constitutional Convention is merely instructive, it cannot be considered
conclusive of the people's intent.

III.A.4. The application of Article JV, Section 1 of the 1935

Constitution does not violate social justice principles
or the equal protection clause.

In light of the clarity of the text of Article IV, Section l of the 1935 Constitution
regarding the exclusion of foundlings and the unreliability of the alleged intent of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention to include foundlings in the list of Philippine
citizens, I do not think the 1987 Constitution's provisions on social justice and the
right of a child to assistance, as well as equal access to public office should be
interpreted to provide Philippine citizenship to foundlings born under the 1935
Constitution.
As I earlier pointed out, there is no doubt in the provision of Article IV, Section 1
of the 1935 Constitution. Foundlings had been contemplated at one point to be
included in the provision, but this proposition was rejected, and the ultimate
provision of the text did not provide for the inclusion of persons with both parents'
identities unknown.

Additionally, I do not agree that the Court should interpret the provisions of a
new Constitution (the 1987 Constitution) to add meaning to the provisions of the
previous 1935 Constitution. Indeed, we have cited past Constitutions to look at
the history and development of our constitutional provisions as a tool for
constitutional construction. How our past governments had been governed, and the
changes or uniformity since then, are instructive in determining the provisions of
the current 1987 Constitution.

I do not think that a reverse comparison can be done, i.e., that what the 1935
Constitution provides can be amended and applied at present because of what
the 1987 Constitution now provides. It would amount to the Court amending what
had been agreed upon by the sovereign Filipino nation that ratified the 1935
Constitution, and push the Court to the forbidden road of judicial legislation.

Moreover, determining the parameters of citizenship is a sovereign decision

that inherently discriminates by providing who may and may not be considered
Philippine citizens, and how Philippine citizenship may be acquired. These
distinctions had been ratified by the Filipino nation acting as its own sovereign
through the 1935 Constitution and should not be disturbed.

In these lights, I also cannot give credence to Poe's assertion that interpreting the
1935 Constitution to not provide Philippine citizenship to foundlings is "baseless,
unjust, discriminatory, contrary to common sense", and violative of the equal
protection clause.

Note, at this point, that the 1935 Constitution creates a distinction of citizenship
based on parentage; a person born to a Filipino father is automatically considered a
Philippine citizen from birth, while a person born to a Filipino mother has the
inchoate right to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Distinguishing the kind of citizenship based on who of the two parents is Filipino
is a hallmark (justly or unjustly) of the 1935 Constitution, and allowing persons
with whom no parent can be identified for purposes of tracing citizenship would
contravene this distinction.

Lastly, as earlier pointed out, adhering to the clear text of the 1935
Constitution  would not necessarily deprive foundlings the right to become
Philippine citizens, as they can undergo naturalization under our current laws.

III.A.5. The Philippines has no treaty obligation to

automatically bestow Philippine citizenship to
foundlings under the 1935 Constitution.

Treaties are entered into by the President and must be ratified by a two-thirds vote
of the Philippine Senate in order to have legal effect in the country.[255] Upon
ratification, a treaty is transformed into a domestic law and becomes effective in
the Philippines. Depending on the terms and character of the treaty obligation,
some treaties need additional legislation in order to be implemented in the
Philippines. This process takes place pursuant to the doctrine of transformation.
[256]

The Philippines has a dualist approach in its treatment of international law.

[257]
 Under this approach, the Philippines sees international law and its international
obligations from two perspectives: first, from the international plane, where
international law reigns supreme over national laws; and second, from
the domestic plane, where the international obligations and international
customary laws are considered in the same footing as national laws, and do not
necessarily prevail over the latter.[258]

The first approach springs from the international customary law of pacta sunt
servanda that recognizes that obligations entered into by states are binding on
them and requires them to perform their obligations in good faith.[259] This
principle finds expression under Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties,[260] which provides that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.[261]

Thus, in the international plane, the Philippines cannot use its domestic laws to
evade compliance with its international obligations; noncompliance would result
in repercussions in its dealings with other States.

On the other hand, under Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, a treaty may be the
subject of judicial review,[262] and is thus characterized as an instrument with the
same force and effect as a domestic law.[263] From this perspective, treaty
provisions cannot prevail over, or contradict, constitutional provisions;[264] they
can also be amended by domestic laws, as they exist and operate at the same level
as these laws.[265]

As a last point, treaties are - in the same manner as the determination of a State's
determination of who its citizens are - an act made in the exercise of sovereign
rights. The Philippines now has every right to enter into treaties as it is
independent and sovereign. Such sovereignty only came with the full grant of
Philippine independence on July 4, 1946.

Thus, the Philippines could not have entered into any binding treaty before this
date, except with the consent of the U.S. which exercised foreign affairs powers
for itself and all colonies and territories under its jurisdiction. No such consent was
ever granted by the U.S. so that any claim of the Philippines being bound by any
treaty regarding its citizens and of foundlings cannot but be empty claims that do
not even deserve to be read, much less seriously considered.

III.A.5(a). The Philippines' treaty obligations

under the JCCPR and UNCRC do not require the immediate
and automatic grant of Philippine citizenship
to foundlings.

While the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

and United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) are valid
and binding on the Philippines as they have been signed by the President and
concurred in by our Senate, our obligations under these treaties do not require
the immediate and automatic grant of Philippine citizenship, much less of natural-
born status, to foundlings.

Treaties are enforceable according to the terms of the obligations they impose. The
terms and character of the provisions of the ICCPR and UNCRC merely require
the grant to every child of the right to acquire a nationality.

Section 3, Article 24 of the IC CPR on this point provides:

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. [Emphasis supplied]
while Article 7, Section 1 of the UNCRC provides:
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. [emphasis supplied]
The right to acquire a nationality is different from the grant of an outright
Filipino nationality. Under the cited treaties, States are merely required to
recognize and facilitate the child's right to acquire a nationality.

The method through which the State complies with this obligation varies and
depends on its discretion. Of course, the automatic and outright grant of
citizenship to children in danger of being stateless is one of the means by which
this treaty obligation may be complied with. But the treaties allow other means of
compliance with their obligations short of the immediate and automatic grant of
citizenship to stateless children found in their territory.

These treaties recognize, too, that the obligations should be complied with within
the framework of a State's national laws. This view is reinforced by the provisions
that implement these treaties.

Article 2 of the ICCPR on this point provides:

2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present
Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect
to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
On the other hand, Article 4 of the UNCRC states:
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and
other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present
Convention. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties
shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources
and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation. [emphasis
and italics supplied]
These terms should be cross-referenced with Section 2, Article 7 of the UNCRC,
which provides:
States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
[Emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied]
Taken together, these ICCPR and UNCRC implementation provisions reveal the
measure of flexibility mentioned above.[266] This flexibility runs from the absolute
obligation to recognize every child's right to acquire a nationality, all the way to
the allowable and varying measures that may be taken to ensure this right. These
measures may range from an immediate and outright grant of nationality, to the
passage of naturalization measures that the child may avail of to exercise his or her
rights, all in accordance with the State's national law.

This view finds support from the history of the provision "right to acquire
nationality" in the ICCPR. During the debates that led to the formulation of this
provision, the word "acquire" was inserted in the draft, and the words "from his
birth" were deleted. This change shows the intent of its drafters to, at the very
least, vest discretion on the State with respect to the means of facilitating the
acquisition of citizenship.

Marc Bussoyt, in his Guide to the "Travaux Preparatoires" of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,"[267] even concluded that "the word
'acquire' would infer that naturalization was not to be considered as a right of the
individual but was accorded by the State at its discretion."

III.A. 5(b). The right to a nationality under the UDHR

does not require its signatories to automatically grant
citizenship to foundlings in its respective territories.

Neither does the Philippines' participation as signatory to the United Nation

Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)[268] obligate it to automatically grant
Filipino citizenship to foundlings in its territory.

Allow me to point out at the outset that the  UDHR is not a treaty that directly
creates legally-binding obligations for its signatories.[269] It is an international
document recognizing inalienable human rights, which eventually led to the
creation of several legally-binding treaties, such as the ICCPR and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
[270]
 Thus, the Philippines is not legally-obligated to comply with the provisions of
the UDHR per se. It signed the UDHR because it recognizes the rights and values
enumerated in the UDHR; this recognition led it to sign both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR.[271]

To be sure, international scholars have been increasingly using the provisions of

the UDHR to argue that the rights provided in the document have reached the
status of customary international law. Assuming, however, that we were to accord
the right to nationality under the UDHR the status of a treaty obligation or of a
generally-accepted principle of international law, it still does not require the
Philippine government to automatically grant Philippine citizenship to foundlings
in its territory.

Article 15 of the UDHR provides:

Article 15.

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
Thus, the language of the UDHR itself recognizes the right of everyone to a
nationality, without imposing on the signatory States how they would recognize
this right.
Interestingly, Benigno Aquino, the then Philippine delegate to the United Nations,
even opposed the declaration of the right to nationality under the UDHR, and
opined that the UDHR should be confined to principles whose implementation
should be left to the proposed covenant.

III.A.5(c). The Philippines' compliance with its

international obligations does not include the grant
of natural-born Philippine citizenship to foundlings.

In legal terms, a State is obliged to ensure every child's right to acquire a

nationality through laws in the State's legal system that do not contradict the
treaty.

In the Philippines, the Constitution defines the overall configuration of how

Filipino citizenship should be granted and acquired. Treaties such as the ICCPR
and UNCRC should be complied with, in so far as they touch on citizenship,
within the terms of the Constitution's Article on Citizenship.

In the context of the present case, compliance with our treaty obligations to
recognize the right of foundlings to acquire a nationality must be undertaken under
the terms of, and must not contradict, the citizenship provisions of our
Constitution.

The 1935 Constitution defined who the citizens of the Philippines then were and
the means of acquiring Philippine citizenship at the time the respondent was found
(and born). This constitutional definition must necessarily govern the
petitioner's case.

As repeatedly mentioned above, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution generally

follows the jus sanguinis rule: Philippine citizenship is determined by blood, i.e.,
by the citizenship of one's parents. The Constitution itself provides the instances
when jus sanguinis is not followed: for inhabitants who had been granted
Philippine citizenship at the time the Constitution was adopted; those who were
holding public office at the time of its adoption; and those who are naturalized as
Filipinos in accordance with law.

As earlier explained, the constitutional listing is exclusive. It neither provided nor

allowed for the citizenship of foundlings except through naturalization. Since the
obligation under the treaties can be complied with by facilitating a child's right to
acquire a nationality, the presence of naturalization laws that allow persons to
acquire Philippine citizenship already constitutes compliance.

Petitioner Poe argues against naturalization as a mode of compliance on the view

that this mode requires a person to be 18 years old before he or she can apply for a
Philippine citizenship. The sufficiency of this mode, in light particularly of the
petitioner's needs, however, is not a concern that neither the COMELEC nor this
Court can address given that the country already has in place measures that the
treaties require - our naturalization laws.

As likewise previously mentioned, the ICCPR and the UNCRC allow the States a
significant measure of flexibility in complying with their obligations. How the
Philippines will comply within the range of the flexibility the treaties allow is
a policy question that is fully and wholly within the competence of the Congress
and of the Filipino people to address.

To recall an earlier discussion and apply this to the petitioner's argument, the
country has adopted a dualist approach in conducting its international affairs. In
the domestic plane where no foreign element is involved, we cannot interpret and
implement a treaty provision in a manner that contradicts the Constitution; a treaty
obligation that contravenes the Constitution is null and void.

For the same reason, it is legally incorrect for the petitioner to argue that the
ICCPR, as a curative treaty, should be given retroactive application. A null and
void treaty provision can never, over time, be accorded constitutional validity,
except when the Constitution itself subsequently so provides.

The rule in the domestic plane is, of course, separate and different from our rule in
the international plane where treaty obligations prevail. If the country fails to
comply with its treaty obligations because they contradict our national laws, there
could be repercussions in our dealings with other States. This consequence springs
from the rule that our domestic laws cannot be used to evade compliance with
treaties in the international plane. Repercussions in the international plane,
however, do not make an unconstitutional treaty constitutional and valid. These
repercussions also cannot serve as an excuse to enforce a treaty provision that is
constitutionally void in the domestic plane.

III.A.6. The alleged generally accepted principles of international law

presuming the parentage of foundlings is contrary to the 1935 Constitution.

III.A.6(a). Generally accepted principles of international law.

Unlike treaty obligations that are ratified by the State and clearly reflect its consent
to an obligation, the obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law are recognized to bind States because state practice shows that
the States themselves consider these principles to be binding.

Generally accepted principles of international law are legal norms that are
recognized as customary in the international plane. States follow them on the
belief that these norms embody obligations that these States, on their own, are
bound to perform. Also referred to as customary international law, generally
accepted principles of international law pertain to the collection of international
behavioral regularities that nations, over time, come to view as binding on them as
a matter of law.[272]

In the same manner that treaty obligations partake of the character of domestic
laws in the domestic plane, so do generally accepted principles of international
law. Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that these legal norms
"form part of the law of the land." This constitutional declaration situates in clear
and definite terms the role of generally accepted principles of international law in
the hierarchy of Philippine laws and in the Philippine legal system.

Generally accepted principles of international law usually gain recognition in the

Philippines through decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, pursuant to
the doctrine of incorporation.[273] The Supreme Court, in its decisions, applies
these principles as rules or as canons of statutory construction, or recognizes them
as meritorious positions of the parties in the cases the Court decides. [274]

Separately from Court decisions, international law principles may gain recognition
through actions by the executive and legislative branches of government when
these branches use them as bases for their actions (such as when Congress enacts a
law that incorporates what it perceives to be a generally accepted principle of
international law).

But until the Court declares a legal norm to be a generally accepted principle of
international law, no other means exists in the Philippine legal system to
determine with certainty that a legal norm is indeed a generally accepted principle
of international law that forms part of the law of the land.

The main reason for the need for a judicial recognition lies in the nature of
international legal principles. Unlike treaty obligations that involve the express
promises of States to other States, generally accepted principles of international
law do not require any categorical expression from States for these principles to
be binding on them.[275]

A legal norm requires the concurrence of two elements before it may be

considered as a generally accepted principle of international law: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinio juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity).[276] Implicit in the latter element is the belief that the practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is

Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which
provides that the ICJ shall apply international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law.[277] The material sources of custom include state
practices, state legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in
treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form,
the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in
the United Nations General Assembly.[278]

Sometimes referred to as evidence of international law, these sources identify the

substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the state
practice and the opinio juris requirements of international law.

In the usual course, this process passes through the courts as they render their
decisions in cases. As part of a court's function of determining the applicable law
in cases before it (including the manner a law should be read and applied), the
court has to determine the existence of a generally applied principle of
international law in the cases confronting it, as well as the question of whether and
how it applies to the facts of the case.

To my mind, the process by which courts recognize the effectivity of general

principles of international law in the Philippines is akin or closely similar to the
process by which the Supreme Court creates jurisprudence. Under the principle
of stare decisis, courts apply the doctrines in the cases the Supreme Court decides
as judicial precedents in subsequent cases with similar factual situations. [279]

In a similar manner, the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the application of

generally accepted principles of international law to the cases it decides are not
only binding on the immediately resolved case, but also serve as judicial
precedents in subsequent cases with similar sets of facts. That both jurisprudence
and generally accepted principles of international law form "part of the law of the
land" (but are not laws per se) is, therefore, not pure coincidence.[280]

To be sure, the executive and legislative departments may recognize and use
customary international law as basis when they perform their functions. But while
such use is not without legal weight, the continued efficacy and even the validity
of their use as such cannot be certain. While their basis may be principles of
international law, their inapplicability or even invalidity in the Philippine legal
setting may still result if the applied principles are inconsistent with the
Constitution - a matter that is for the Supreme Court to decide.

Thus viewed, the authoritative use of general principles of international law can
only come from the Supreme Court whose decisions incorporate these principles
into the legal system as part of jurisprudence.

III.A.6(b). The concept and nature of generally accepted

principles of international law is inconsistent with the State's
sovereign prerogative to determine who may or may
not be its citizens.

Petitioner Poe argues that the presumption of the parentage of foundlings is a legal
norm that has reached widespread practice and is indicative of the opinio juris of
States so that the presumption is binding. Thus, it is a generally-accepted principle
of international law that should be recognized and applied by the Court.

I cannot agree with this reasoning as the very nature of generally accepted
principles of international law is inconsistent with and thus inapplicable to, the
State's sole and sovereign prerogative to choose who may or may not be its
citizens, and how the choice is carried out.

A generally accepted principle of international law is considered binding on a

State because evidence shows that it considers this legal norm to be obligatory. No
express consent from the State in agreeing to the obligation; its binding authority
over a State lies from the inference that most, if not all States consider the norm to
be an obligation.

In contrast, States have the inherent right to decide who may or may not be its
citizens, including the process through which citizenship may be acquired. The
application of presumptions, or inferences of the existence of a fact based on the
existence of other facts, is part of this process of determining citizenship.

This right is strongly associated with and attendant to state sovereignty.

Traditionally, nationality has been associated with a State's "right to exclude
others", and to defend the territory of the nation from external aggression has been
a predominant element of nationality.[281]
Sovereignty in its modem conception is described as the confluence of
independence and territorial and personal supremacy, expressed as "the supreme
and independent authority of States over all persons in their territory."[282]

Indeed, a State exercises personal supremacy over its nationals wherever they may
be. The right to determine who these nationals are is a pre-requisite of a State's
personal supremacy, and therefore of sovereignty.[283]

It is in this context that Oppenheimer said that:

It is not for International Law, but for Municipal Law to determine who is, and
who is not considered a subject.[284]
Given that the State's right to determine who may be its nationals (as well as how
this determination is exercised) is inextricably linked to its sovereignty, I cannot
see how it can properly be the subject of state consensus or norm dictated by the
practice of other States. In other words, the norm pertaining to the determination
of who may or may not be a citizen of a State cannot be the subject of an implied
obligation that came to existence because other States impliedly consider it to be
their obligation.

In the first place, a State cannot be obligated to adopt a means of determining who
may be its nationals as this is an unalterable and basic aspect of its sovereignty and
of its existence as a State. Additionally, the imposition of an implied obligation on
a State simply because other States recognize the same obligation contradicts and
impinges on a State's sovereignty.

Note at this point, that treaty obligations that a State enters into involving the
determination of its citizens has the express consent of the State; under Philippine
law, this obligation is transformed into a municipal law once it is ratified by the
Executive and concurred in by the Senate.

The evidence presented by petitioner Poe to establish the existence of generally-

accepted principles of international law actually reflects the inherent inconsistency
between the State's sovereign power to determine its nationals and the nature of
generally-accepted principles of international law as a consensus-based, implied
obligation. Poe cites various laws and international treaties that provide for the
presumption of parentage for foundlings. These laws and international treaties,
however, have the expressed imprimatur of the States adopting the presumption.

In contrast, the Philippines had not entered into any international treaty
recognizing and applying the presumption of parentage of foundlings; neither is it
so provided in the 1935 Constitution. References to international law in the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention - without an actual ratified
treaty or a provision expressing this principle - cannot be considered binding upon
the sovereign Filipino people who ratified the 1935 Constitution. The ratification
of the provisions of the 1935 Constitution is a sovereign act of the Filipino
people; to reiterate for emphasis, this act cannot be amended by widespread
practice of other States, even if these other States believe this practice to be
an obligation.

III.A.6(c). The presumption of parentage contradicts the distinction set out in

the 1935 Constitution.
Further, even if this presumption were to be considered a generally accepted
principle of international law, it cannot be applied in the Philippines as it
contradicts the jus sanguinis principle of the 1935 Constitution, as well as the
distinction the 1935 Constitution made between children born of Filipino fathers
and of Filipina mothers.

As earlier discussed, a presumption is an established inference from facts that are

proven by evidence.[285] The undisputed fact in the present case is that the
petitioner was found in a church in Jara, Iloilo; because of her age at that time,
she may conceivably have been born in the area so that Jaro was her birth place.

This line of thought, if it is to lead to Poe's presumption, signifies a presumption

based on jus soli or place of birth because this is the inference that is nearest
the established fact of location of birth. Jus sanguinis (blood relationship) cannot
be the resulting presumption as there is absolutely no established fact leading to
the inference that the petitioner's biological parents are Filipino citizens.

Jus soli, of course, is a theory on which citizenship may be based and is a

principle that has been pointedly rejected in the country, at the same time that
jus sanguinis has been accepted. From this perspective, the petitioner's advocated
presumption runs counter to the 1935 Constitution.

The same result obtains in the line of reasoning that starts from the consideration
that a principle of international law, even if it is widely observed, cannot form part
of the law of the land if it contravenes the Constitution.

Petitioner Poe's desired presumption works at the same level and can be compared
with existing presumptions in determining the parentage of children and their
citizenship, which are based on the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence.
[286]
 These are the presumptions formulated and applied in applying our citizenship
laws, particularly when the parentage of a child is doubtful or disputed.

For instance, a child born during his or her parent's marriage is presumed to be

the child of both parents.[287] Thus, the child follows the citizenship of his or her
father. A child born out of wedlock, on the other hand, can only be presumed to
have been born of his or her mother, and thus follows the citizenship of his or her
mother until he or she proves paternal filiations. These Civil Code presumptions
are fully in accord with the constitutional citizenship rules.

A presumption that a child with no known parents will be considered to have

Filipino parents, on the other hand, runs counter to the most basic rules on
citizenship under the 1935 Constitution.

Other than through naturalization or through outright constitutional grant, the 1935
Constitution requires that the father or the mother be known to be Filipino for a
person to acquire Filipino citizenship. This is a consequence of the clear and
categorical jus sanguinis rule that the 1935 Constitution established for the
country.

Under its terms, should a child's father be Filipino, then he or she acquires
Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, should his or her father be a foreigner
but the mother is a Filipina, the 1935 constitutional Rule is to give the child the
right to elect Philippine citizenship when he or she reaches 18 years of age.

Without the identity of either or both parents being known in the case of
foundlings, no determination of the foundling's citizenship can be made under jus
sanguinis. Specifically, whose citizenship shall the foundling follow: the
citizenship of the father, or the option to elect the citizenship of the mother?

Applying Poe's desired presumption would obviously erase the distinction that the
1935 Constitution placed in acquiring Philippine citizenship, and only strengthens
the lack of intent (aside from a lack of textual provision) to grant Philippine
citizenship to foundlings.

This inherent irreconcilability of Poe's desired presumption with the 1935

Constitution renders futile any discussion of whether this desired presumption
has reached the status of a generally accepted principle of international law
applicable in the Philippines. We cannot (and should not) adopt a presumption
that contradicts the fundamental law of the land, regardless of the status of
observance it has reached in the international plane.

I recognize of course that in the future, Congress may, by law, adopt the
petitioner's desired presumption under the 1987 Constitution. A presumption of
Filipino parentage necessarily means a presumption of jus sanguinis for
foundlings.

But even if made, the presumption remains what it is - a presumption that must
yield to the reality of actual parentage when such parentage becomes
known unless the child presumed to be Filipino by descent undertakes a
confirmatory act independent of the presumption, such as naturalization.

Note that the 1987 Constitution does not significantly change the jus sanguinis
rule under the 1935 Constitution. Currently, a natural-born Filipino is one whose
father or mother is a Filipino at the time of the child's birth. As in 1935, the current
1987 Constitution speaks of parents who are actually Philippine citizens at the
time of the child's birth; how the parents acquired their own Philippine citizenship
is beside the point and is not a consideration for as long as this citizenship status is
there at the time of the child's birth.

A presumption of Filipino parentage cannot similarly apply or extend to the

character of being natural-born, as this character of citizenship can only be based
on reality; when the Constitution speaks of "natural-born," it cannot but refer
to actual or natural, not presumed birth. A presumption of being natural-born is
effectively a legal fiction that the definition of the term "natural-born" under
the Constitution and the purposes this definition serves cannot accommodate.

To sum up, the petitioner's argument based on a foundling's presumed Filipino

parentage under a claimed generally accepted principle of international law is
legally objectionable under the 1935 Constitution and cannot be used to recognize
or grant natural-born Philippine citizenship.

III.B. Grave Abuse of Discretion in Resolving the Citizenship Issues:

Conclusions.
Based on all these considerations, I conclude that the COMELEC laid the correct
premises on the issue of citizenship in cancelling Poe's CoC.

To recapitulate, Poe anchors her arguments mostly on two basic points: first, that
the framers of the 1935 Constitution agreed to include foundlings in the
enumeration of citizens in Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution although
they did not expressly so provide it in its express provisions; and second, that the
Philippines' international obligations include the right to automatically vest
Philippine citizenship to foundlings in its territory.

With her failure on these two points, the rest of Poe's arguments on her natural-
born citizenship status based on the 1935 Constitution and under international law,
and the grave abuse of discretion the COMELEC allegedly committed in
cancelling her CoC, must also necessarily fail. The unavoidable bottom line is that
the petitioner did indeed actively, knowingly, and falsely represent her
citizenship and natural-born status when she filed her CoC.

IV.

The Claim of Grave Abuse of Discretion in relation with the RESIDENCY

Issues.

I likewise object to the majority's ruling that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling Poe's CoC for falsely representing that she has complied
with the ten-year residence period required of Presidential candidates.

The COMELEC correctly applied prevailing jurisprudence in holding that Poe has
not established her legal residence in the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately prior to the May 9, 2016 elections.

In addition, I offer my own views regarding the political character of the right to
establish domicile, which necessarily requires Philippine citizenship before
domicile may be established in the Philippines.

In my view, aliens who reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 may
only begin establishing legal residence in the Philippines from the time they
reacquire Philippine citizenship. This is the clear import from the Court's
rulings in  Japzon v. COMELEC[288] and Caballero v. COMELEC,[289] cases
involving candidates who reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA No.
9225; their legal residence in the Philippines only began after their
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

I find it necessary to elaborate on this legal reality in light of Poe's insistence that
the Court's conclusions in Coquilla,[290] Japzon, and Caballero do not apply to her.
To emphasize, these cases - Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero - are one in counting
the period of legal residence in the Philippines from the time the candidate
reacquired Philippine citizenship.

Poe resists these rulings and insists that she established her legal residence in the
Philippines beginning May 24, 2005, i.e., even before the BID Order, declaring
her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, was issued on July 18, 2006.
She distinguishes her situation from Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero, on the
position that the candidates in these cases did not prove their legal residence in the
Philippines before acquiring their Philippine citizenship. In contrast, Poe claims to
have sufficiently proven that she established her domicile in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005, or ten years and eleven months prior to the May 9, 2016
elections. That the COMELEC ignored the evidence she presented on this point
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

To my mind, the conclusion in Japzon and Caballero is not just based on the

evidence that the candidates therein presented. The conclusion that candidates who
reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 may only establish residence
in the Philippines after becoming Philippine citizens reflects the character of the
right to establish a new domicile for purposes of participating in electoral
exercises as a political right that only Philippine citizens can exercise. Thus,
Poe could only begin establishing her domicile in the Philippines on July 18, 2006,
the date the BID granted her petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Furthermore, an exhaustive review of the evidence Poe presented to support

her view shows that as of May 24, 2005, Poe had not complied with the
requirements for establishing a new domicile of choice.

IV.A. Domicile for purposes of determining political

rights and civil rights.

The term "residence" is an elastic concept that should be understood and construed
according to the object or purpose of the statute in which it is employed. Thus, we
have case law distinguishing residence to mean actual residence, in contrast
to domicile, which pertains to a permanent abode. Note, however, that both terms
imply a relation between a person and a place.[291] determining which connotation
of the term residence applies depends on the statute in which it is found.

Generally, we have used the term "residence" to mean actual residence when
pertaining to the exercise of civil rights and fulfillment of civil obligations.

Residence, in this sense pertains to a place of abode, whether permanent or

temporary, or as the Civil Code aptly describes it, a place of habitual residence.
Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)

Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them or any other provision does
not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the
place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their
principal functions. (41a) [emphases supplied]
Still, the actual residence for purposes of civil rights and obligations may be
further delineated to residence in the Philippines, or residence in a municipality in
the Philippines, depending on the purpose of the law in which they are employed.
[292]

On the other hand, we generally reserve the use of the term residence as domicile
for purposes of exercising political rights. Jurisprudence has long established that
the term "residence" in election laws is synonymous with domicile. When the
Constitution or the election laws speak of residence, it refers to the legal or
juridical relation between a person and a place- the individual's permanent
home irrespective of physical presence.

To be sure, physical presence is a major indicator when determining the person's

legal or juridical relation with the place he or she intends to be voted for. But, as
residence and domicile is synonymous under our election laws, residence is a
legal concept that has to be determined by and in connection with our laws,
independent of or in conjunction with physical presence.

Domicile is classified into three, namely: (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired

by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon
abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law,
which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention.

Domicile of origin is the domicile of a person's parents at the time of his or her
birth. It is not easily lost and continues until, upon reaching the majority age, he or
she abandons it and acquires a new domicile, which new domicile is the domicile
of choice.

The concept of domicile is further distinguished between residence in a particular

municipality, city, province, or the Philippines, depending on the political right to
be exercised. Philippine citizens must be residents of the Philippines to be eligible
to vote, but to be able to vote for elective officials of particular local government
units, he must be a resident of the geographical coverage of the particular local
government unit.

To effect a change of domicile, a person must comply with the following

requirements: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and (3) acts which correspond with such purpose.

In other words, a change of residence requires animus manendi coupled

with animus non revertendi. The intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
be actual.[293]

In Limbona v. COMELEC,[294] the Court enumerated the following requirements to

effect a change of domicile or to acquire a domicile by choice:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;

(2) a bona fide intention to remain there; and

(3) a bona fide intention to abandon the old domicile.

The latter two are the animus manendi and the animus non revertendi that those
considering a change of domicile must take into account.

Under these requirements, no specific unbending rule exists in the appreciation of

compliance because of the element of intent[295] - an abstract and subjective
proposition that can only be determined from the surrounding circumstances. It
must be appreciated, too, that aside from intent is the question of the actions
taken pursuant to the intent, to be considered in the light of the applicable
laws, rules, and regulations.

Jurisprudence, too, has laid out three basic foundational rules in the consideration
of residency issues, namely:

First, a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;

Second, when once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and

Third, a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.[296]

These jurisprudential foundational rules, hand in hand with the established rules
on change of domicile, should be fully taken into account in appreciating Poe's
circumstances.

IV.A.1. The right to establish domicile is imbued

with the character of a political right that only citizens
may exercise.

Domicile is necessary to be able to participate in governance, i.e., to vote and/or

be voted for, one must consider a locality in the Philippines as his or her
permanent home, a place in which he intends to remain in for an indefinite period
of time (animus manendi) and to return to should he leave (animus revertendi).

In this sense, the establishment of a domicile not only assumes the color of, but
becomes one with a political right because it allows a person, not otherwise able,
to participate in the electoral process of that place. To logically carry this line of
thought a step further, a person seeking to establish domicile in a country must
first posses the necessary citizenship to exercise this political right.

Note, at this point, that Philippine citizenship is necessary to participate in

governance and exercise political rights in the Philippines. The preamble of our
1987 Constitution cannot be clearer on this point:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution. [emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied)
It is the sovereign Filipino people (i.e., the citizens through whom the State
exercises sovereignty, and who can vote and participate in governance) who
shall establish the Government of the country (i.e. one of the purposes why
citizens get together and collectively act), and they themselves ordain and
promulgate the Constitution (i.e., the citizens themselves directly act, not anybody
else).

Corollarily, a person who does not possess Philippine citizenship, i.e., an alien,
cannot participate in the country's political processes. An alien does not have the
right to vote and be voted for, the right to donate to campaign funds, the right to
campaign for or aid any candidate or political party, and to directly, or indirectly,
take part in or influence in any manner any election.

The character of the right to establish domicile as a political right becomes even
more evident under our election laws that require that a person's domicile and
citizenship coincide to enable him to vote and be voted for elective office. In more
concrete terms (subject only to a few specific exceptions), a Philippine citizen
must have his domicile in the Philippines in order to participate in our electoral
processes.

Thus, a Philippine citizen who has chosen to reside permanently abroad may be
allowed the limited opportunity to vote (under the conditions laid down under the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act)[297] but he or she cannot be voted for; he or she is
disqualified from running for elective office under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC).[298]

In the same light, an alien who has been granted a permanent resident visa in the
Philippines does not have the right of suffrage in the Philippines, and this should
include the right to establish legal domicile for purposes of election laws. An alien
can reside in the Philippines for a long time, but his stay, no matter how lengthy,
will not allow him to participate in our political processes.

Thus, an inextricable link exists among citizenship, domicile, and sovereignty;

citizenship and domicile must coincide in order to participate as a component
of the sovereign Filipino people. In plainer terms, domicile for election law
purposes cannot be established without first becoming a Philippine citizen; they
must coincide from the time domicile in the Philippines is established.

IV.A.2. The right to RE-ESTABLISH domicile in the Philippines may be

exercised only after reacquiring Philippine citizenship.
Unless a change of domicile is validly effected, one
with reacquired Filipino citizenship acquires the right to reside in the
country, hut must have a change of domicile,· otherwise,
he is a Filipino physically in the Philippines hut is
domiciled elsewhere.
Once a Philippine citizen permanently resides in another country, or becomes a
naturalized citizen thereof, he loses his domicile of birth (the Philippines) and
establishes a new domicile of choice in that country.

If a former Filipino reacquires his or her Philippine citizenship, he reacquires as

well the political right to reside in the Philippines, but he does not become a
Philippine domiciliary unless he validly effects a change of domicile; otherwise,
he remains a Filipino physically in the Philippines but is domiciled elsewhere.
The reason is simple: an individual can have only one domicile which remains
until it is validly changed.

In Coquilla,[299] the Court pointed out that "immigration to the [U.S.] by virtue of a

green card, which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does
naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines."

Thus, Philippine citizens who are naturalized as citizens of another country not

only abandon their Philippine citizenship; they also abandon their domicile in the
Philippines.

To re-establish the Philippines as his or her new domicile of choice, a returning

former Philippine citizen must thus comply with the requirements of physical
presence (or the required period (when exercising his political right), animus
manendi, and animus non-revertendi.

Several laws govern the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former

Philippine citizens-aliens each providing for a different mode of, and different
requirements for, Philippine citizenship reacquisition. These laws
are Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473; RA No. 8171; and RA No. 9225.

All these laws are meant to facilitate an alien's reacquisition of Philippine

citizenship by law. CA No. 473[300] as amended,[301] governs reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by naturalization; it is also a mode for original acquisition of
Philippine citizenship. RA No. 8171,[302] on the other hand, governs repatriation of
Filipino women who lost Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and Filipinos
who lost Philippine citizenship by political or economic necessity; while RA No.
9225[303] governs repatriation of former natural-born Filipinos in general.

Whether termed as naturalization, reacquisition, or repatriation, all these

modes fall under the constitutional term "naturalized in accordance with
law" as provided under the 1935, the 1973, and the 1935 Constitutions.

Note that CA No. 473[304] provides a more stringent procedure for acquiring

Philippine citizenship than RA Nos. 9225 and 8171 both of which provide for a
more expedited process. Note, too, that under our Constitution, there are only two
kinds of Philippine citizens: natural-born and naturalized. As RA Nos. 8171 and
9225 apply only to former natural-born Filipinos (who lost their Philippine
citizenship by foreign naturalization), CA No. 4 73 - which is both a mode for
acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship - logically applies in general
to all former Filipinos regardless of the character of their Philippine citizenship,
i.e., natural-born or naturalized.

The difference in the procedure provided by these modes of Philippine citizenship

reacquisition presumably lies in the assumption that those who had previously
been natural-born Philippine citizens already have had ties with the Philippines for
having been directly descended from Filipino citizens or by virtue of their
blood and are well-versed in its customs and traditions; on the other hand, the
alien-former Filipino in general (and no matter how long they have resided in the
Philippines) could not be presumed to have such ties.

In fact, CA No. 473 specifically requires that an applicant for Philippine

citizenship must have resided in the Philippines for at least six months before his
application for reacquisition by naturalization.

Ujano v. Republic[305] interpreted this residence requirement to mean domicile, that

is, prior to applying for naturalization, the applicant must have maintained a
permanent residence in the Philippines. In this sense, Ujano held that an alien
staying in the Philippines under a temporary visa does not comply with the
residence requirement, and to become a qualified applicant, an alien must have
secured a permanent resident visa to stay in the Philippines. Obtaining a
permanent resident visa was, thus, viewed as the act that establishes domicile in
the Philippines for purposes of complying with CA No. 473.

The ruling in Ujano is presumably the reason for the Court's reference that
residence may be waived separately from citizenship in Coquilla. In Coquilla, the
Court observed that:
The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately,
when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an
alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 [28] of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)[29] and
thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire
Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he
is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status
as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.[306] [underscoring supplied]
The separate waiver refers to the application for Philippine citizenship under CA
No. 437, which requires that the applicant alien be domiciled in the Philippines as
evidenced by a permanent resident visa. An alien intending to become a Philippine
citizen may avail of CA No. 473 and must first waive his domicile in his country
of origin to be considered a permanent resident alien in the Philippines, or he may
establish domicile in the Philippines after becoming a Philippine citizen through
direct act of Congress.

Note, at this point, that the permanent residence requirement under CA No.

473 does not provide the applicant alien with the right to participate in the
country's political process, and should thus be distinguished from domicile in
election laws.

In other words, an alien may be considered a permanent resident of the

Philippines, but without Philippine citizenship, his stay cannot be considered in
establishing domicile in the Philippines for purposes of exercising political rights.
Neither could this period be retroactively counted upon gaining Philippine
citizenship, as his stay in the Philippines at that time was as an alien with no
political rights.

In these lights, I do not believe that a person reacquiring Philippine citizenship

under RA No. 9225 could separately establish domicile in the Philippines prior
to becoming a Philippine citizen, as the right to establish domicile has, as earlier
pointed out, the character of a political right.

RA No. 9225 restores Philippine citizenship upon the applicant's submission of the
oath of allegiance to the Philippines and other pertinent documents to the BID (or
the Philippine consul should the applicant avail of RA No. 9225 while they remain
in their country of foreign naturalization). The BID (or the Philippine consul) then
reviews these documents, and issues the corresponding order recognizing the
applicant's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Upon reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225, a person

becomes entitled to full political and civil rights, subject to its attendant liabilities
and responsibilities. These include the right to reestablish domicile in the
Philippines for purposes of participating in the country's electoral processes.
Thus, a person who has reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
does not automatically become domiciled in the Philippines, but is given the
option to establish domicile in the Philippines to participate in the country's
electoral process.

This, to my mind, is the underlying reason behind the Court's consistent ruling
in Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero that domicile in the Philippines can be
considered established only upon, or after, the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under the expedited processes of RA No. 8171 or RA No. 9225. More
than the insufficiency of evidence establishing domicile prior to the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, this legal reality simply disallows the establishment of
domicile in the Philippines prior to becoming a Philippine citizen.

To reiterate, the Court in these three cases held that the candidates therein could
have established their domicile in the Philippines only after reacquiring their
Philippine citizenship.

Thus, the Court in Coquilla said:

In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his
Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not
reacquire his legal residence in this country.[307] [underscoring supplied]
In Japzon, the Court noted:
"[Ty's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under [RA] No. 9225 had no
automatic impact or effect on his residence /domicile. He could still retain his
domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the
option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The
length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.[308]
Caballero, after quoting Japzon, held:
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did
not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still
prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned
from the time he made it as such.[309]
In these lights, the COMELEC correctly applied the doctrine laid out
in Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero in Poe's case, i.e., that her physical
presence allegedly coupled with intent should be counted, for election purposes,
only from her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship or surrender of her
immigrant status. Any period of residence prior to such reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship or surrender of immigrant status cannot simply be counted
as Poe, at such time, was an alien non-resident who had no right to permanently
reside anywhere in the Philippines.

Significantly, these are the established Court rulings on residency of former

natural-born Filipinos seeking elective public office that would be disturbed if
the Court would allow Poe to run for the Presidency in the May 9, 2016
elections. Application of the social justice and equity principles that some sectors
(within and outside the Court) urge this Court to do and their persistent appeal to
fairness must not be allowed to weigh in and override what the clear terms laws
and these jurisprudence provide.

IV.B. Poe's representation as to her residence: Poe has not been a Philippine

resident (or the period required by Article VII, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Based on the foregoing laws, principles, and relevant jurisprudence, I find the
COMELEC correct in ruling that Poe does not meet the Constitution's ten-year
residence requirement for the Presidency.

IV.B.1. Poe was not a natural-born citizen who could validly reacquire

Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225; hence, she could not have re-
established residence in the Philippines under the laws' terms even with the
BID's grant of her RA No. 9225 application.

The simplified repatriation procedure under RA No. 9225 applies only to former
natural-born Filipino citizens who became naturalized foreign citizens.
Thus, persons who were not natural-born citizens prior to their foreign
naturalization cannot reacquire Philippine citizenship through the simplified
RA No. 9225 procedure, but may do so only through the other modes CA No.
63[310] provides, i.e., by naturalization under CA No. 473, as amended by RA No.
530, or by direct act of Congress.

Prior to a valid reacquisition under RA No. 9225, a former Philippine citizen does
not have political rights in the Philippines, as he or she is considered an alien. His
political rights begin only upon reacquisition of Philippine citizenship: 12

In Poe's case, she was not a natural-born citizen who could have validly repatriated
under RA No. 9225. As she did not reacquire Philippine citizenship under the
appropriate mode, she likewise did not reacquire the right to reside in the
Philippines save only as our immigration laws may have allowed her to stay as
visitor. But regardless of its length, any such period of stay cannot be counted as
residence in the Philippines under the election laws' terms.

IV.B.2.  Assuming, arguendo, that Poe reacquired Philippine Citizenship; she

still has not been a Philippine resident [or "10 years and 11 months" on the day
before the election.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Poe reacquired Philippine citizenship with the

BID's grant of her RA No. 9225 application, she still fails to meet the
Constitution's ten-year residence requirement, as explained below.

IV.B.2(a). Poe arrived in the Philippines using her U.S. passport as an

American citizen and under a "Balikbayan" visa; hence, she could not have re-
established Philippine residence beginning May 24, 2005.

When Poe returned to the Philippines on May 24, 2005, she was a non-resident
alien - a naturalized American citizen. She used her U.S. passport in her travel to
and arrival in the Philippines under a "Balikbayan" visa, as the parties' evidence
show and as even Poe admits. These dates stamped in her U.S. passport, in
particular, bear the mark "BB" (which stands for Balikbayan) or "1 YR" (which
stands for 1-Year stay in the Philippines): September 14, 2005, January 7, 2006
(arrival), March 11, 2006 (arrival), July 5, 2006 (arrival), and November 4, 2006
(arrival).[311]

The term "balikbayan" refers to a Filipino citizen who has been continuously out
of the Philippines for a period of at least one (1) year, a Filipino overseas worker,
or former Filipino citizen and his or her family who had been naturalized in a
foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines.[312]

In other words, a balikbayan may be a Filipino citizen or a former Filipino who

has been naturalized in a foreign country. Notably, the law itself provides that a
former Filipino citizen may "come or return" to the Philippines - this means that
he/she may be returning to permanently reside in the country or may just visit for a
temporary stay.

RA No. 6768, as amended, further provides for the privilege of a visa-free entry to
the Philippines for a period of one (1) year for foreign passport holders, with the
exception of restricted nationals.[313] I stress in this regard that not
all balikbayans enter the Philippines via a visa-free entry, as the privilege applies
only to foreign passport holders and not to Filipino citizens bearing Philippine
passports upon entry.

The distinction is significant because a Filipino balikbayan, by virtue of his

Philippine citizenship, has the right to permanently reside in any part of the
Philippines. Conversely, a foreigner-balikbayan, though a former Philippine
citizen, may only acquire this right by applying for an immigrant visa and an
immigrant certificate of residence or by reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
[314]
 Evidently, the nature of the stay of a foreigner-balikbayan who avails of the
visa-free entry privilege is only temporary, unless he acquires an immigrant visa or
until he reacquires Philippine citizenship.

The BID itself designates a balikbayan visa-free entry under the temporary

visitor's visa category for non-visa required nationals.[315] In addition, the visa-free
entry privilege is limited to a period of one (1) year subject to extensions for
another one (1), two (2) or six (6) months, provided that the balikbayan presents
his/her valid passport and fills out a visa extension form and submits it to the Visa
Extension Section in the BID Main Office or any BID Offices nationwide. After
thirty-six (36) months of stay, an additional requirement will be asked from a
balikbayan who wishes to further extend his/her stay.[316]

From her arrival on May 24, 2005 until the BID Order recognized her
Philippine citizenship on July 18, 2006, Poe was an alien under a balikbayan
visa who had no right to permanently reside in the Philippines save only in the
instances and under the conditions our Immigration laws allow to foreign
citizens. This period of stay under a temporary visa should thus not be considered
for purposes of Article VII, Section 2 of the Constitution as it does not fall within
the concept of "residence."

IV.B.2(b). Poe reacquired Philippine citizenship only on July 18, 2006 when the
BID granted her RA No. 9225 application, hence, July 18, 2006 should be the
earliest possible reckoning point (or her Philippine residence.

To recall, Poe reacquired Philippine citizenship only on July 18, 2006 when the
BID granted her RA No. 9225 application.[317] Under Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225,
the right to enjoy full civil and political rights that attach to Philippine citizenship
begins only upon its reacquisition. Thus, under RA No. 9225, a person acquires
the right to establish domicile in the Philippines upon reacquiring Philippine
citizenship. Prior to this, a former Philippine citizen has no right to reside in the
Philippines save only temporarily as our Immigration laws allow.

In this light, the COMELEC correctly ruled that July 18, 2006 is the earliest
possible date for Poe to establish her domicile in the Philippines, as it is only then
that Poe acquired the right to establish domicile in the Philippines. Counting the
period of her residence in the Philippines to begin on July 18, 2006, however,
renders Poe still ineligible to run for President, as the period between July 18,
2006 to May 9, 2016 is 9 years, 9 months, and 20 days, or 2 months and 10 days
short of the Constitution's ten-year requirement.

IV.B.2(c). Poe's moves to resettle in the Philippines prior to July 18, 2006 may
have supported her intent which intent became truly concrete beginning only on
July 18, 2006.

I do not deny that Poe had taken several moves to re-establish her residence in the
Philippines prior to July 18, 2006. As the evidence showed, which the COMELEC
considered and reviewed, Poe had taken several actions that may arguably be read
as moves to relocate and resettle in the Philippines beginning May 24, 2005,
namely: (1) enrolling her children in Philippine schools in July 2005 as shown by
their school records;[318] (2) purchasing real property in the Philippines as
evidenced by the February 20, 2006 condominium unit and parking lot titles,
[319]
 the June 1, 2006 land title,[320] and the tax declarations for these;[321] (3) selling
their U.S. home as shown by the April 27, 2006 final settlement;[322] ( 4) arranging
for the shipment of their U.S. properties from the U.S. to the Philippines;[323] (5)
notifying the U.S. Postal Service of their change of their U.S. address;[324] and (6)
securing a Tax Identification Number (TIN) from the BIR on July 22, 2005.[325]

I clarify, however, that any overt resettlement moves Poe made beginning May 24,
2005 up to and before July 18, 2006 may be considered merely for the purpose of
determining  the existence of the subjective intent to re-establish Philippine
residence (animus revertendi), but should not be considered for the purpose of
establishing the fact of residence that the Constitution contemplates.

As earlier explained, entitlement to the enjoyment of the civil and political rights
that come with the reacquired citizenship that RA No. 9225 grants attaches when
the requirements have been completed and Philippine citizenship has been
reacquired. Only then can reacquiring Filipino citizens secure the right to reside
in the country as Filipinos with the right to vote and be voted for public office
under the requirements of the Constitution and applicable existing laws. Prior to
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, they are entitled only to such rights as the
Constitution and the laws recognize as inherent in any person.

Significantly, these pieces of evidence do not prove Poe's intent to abandon U.S.
domicile (animus non-revertendi) as she was, between May 24, 2005 and July 18,
2006, a temporary visitor physically present in the Philippines. I submit the
following specific reasons.
Poe's purchase of real property in the Philippines. Aliens, former natural-born
Filipinos or not, can own condominium units in the Philippines; while aliens who
were former natural-born Filipinos can purchase Philippine urban or rural land
even without acquiring or reacquiring Philippine citizenship with the right to
permanently reside herein.

Under RA No. 4726[326] as amended by RA No. 7899,[327] aliens or foreign

nationals, whether former natural-born Filipino citizens or not, can acquire
condominium units and shares in condominium corporations up to 40o/o of the
total and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino owned or controlled condominium
Corporation.

On the other hand, under RA No. 7042,[328] as amended by RA No. 8179, former
natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship and who has the legal
capacity to contract "may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area
of five thousand (5, 000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3)
hectares in the case of rural land xx x for business or other purposes."[329]

In short, Poe's purchase of a condominium unit and an urban land, as well as her
declaration of these for tax purposes, do not sufficiently prove that she re-
established residence in the Philippines. At most, they show that she acquired real
property in the Philippines for purposes which may not necessarily be for
residence, i.e., business or other purposes; and that she complied with the law's
requirements for owning real property in the Philippines.

The sale of U.S. home and notice to the U.S. Postal service. The sale of their U.S.
home on April 27, 2006 establishes only the fact of its sale. At most, it may
indicate intent to transfer residence (within or without the U.S.) but it does not
automatically result in the change of domicile from the U.S. to the Philippines.

The notice to the U.S. Postal Service in late March of 2006, on the other hand,
merely shows that they may have complied with the U.S. laws when transferring
residence, for convenience and for mail forwarding purposes while on extended
but temporary absence. This act, however, does not conclusively signify
abandonment of U.S. residence, more so reestablishment of Philippine domicile.

Note that at both these times, Poe did not have the established legal capacity or the
right to establish residence in the Philippines. Besides, the winding up of a would-
be candidate's property affairs in another country is not a qualification requirement
under the law for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship nor is it a condition to the
residency requirement for holding public office.

The enrollment of her children in Philippine schools. The enrollment of Poe's

children in Philippine schools in June 2005 establishes their physical presence in
the Philippine during this time, but not her intent to abandon U.S. domicile. Note
that her children entered the Philippines for a temporary period under
their balikbayan visas. Enrollment, too, in schools is only for a period of one
school year, or about ten months.

Moreover, aliens or foreign national students can, in fact, enroll and study in the
Philippines without having to acquire Philippine citizenship or without securing
immigrant visas (and ICRs). Foreigners or aliens at least 18 years of age may
apply for non-immigrant student visa, while those below 18 years of age
elementary and high school students may apply for Special Study Permits.[330]

Poe's BIR TIN number. Poe's act of securing a TIN from the BIR on July 22,
2005 is a requirement for taxation purposes that has nothing to do with residence
in the Philippines. Under Section 236(i) of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC), "[a]ny person, whether natural or juridical, required under the
authority of the Internal Revenue Code to make, render or file a return, statement
or other documents, shall be supplied with or assigned a Taxpayer Identification
Number (TIN) to be indicated in the return, statement or document to be filed with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for his proper identification for tax purposes."
Under the same Tax Code, nonresident aliens are subject to Philippine taxation
under certain circumstances,[331] thus likewise requiring the procurement of a TIN
number.

Over and above all these reasons, it should be pointed out, too, that the nature and
duration of an alien's stay or residence in the Philippines is a matter determined
and granted by the Constitution and by the law. As the COMELEC correctly
noted, a foreigner's capacity to establish Philippine residence is limited by and is
subject to regulations and prior authority of the BID.[332] Indeed, the State has the
right to deny entry to and/or impose conditions on the entry of aliens in the
Philippines, as I have elsewhere discussed in this Opinion; and, in the exercise of
this right, the State can determine who and for how long an alien can stay in its
territory. An alien's intent regarding the nature and duration of his or her stay
in the Philippines cannot override or supersede the laws and the State's right,
even though the alien is a former natural-born Filipino citizen who intends to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225.

In short, these pieces of evidence Poe presented may be deemed material only for
the purpose of determining the existence of the subjective intent to effect a change
of residence (from the U.S. to the Philippines) prior to reacquiring Philippine
citizenship (with the concomitant right to reestablish Philippine domicile). For the
purpose of counting the period of her actual legal residence to determine
compliance with the Constitution's residency qualification requirement,
these antecedent actions are immaterial as such residence should be counted only
from her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

To summarize all these: Poe may have hinted her intention to resettle in the
Philippines on May 24, 2005, which intention she supported with several overt
actions. The legal significance of these overt actions, however, is at best equivocal
and does not fully support her claimed animus non-revertendi to the U.S. She can
be considered to have acted on this intention under the election laws' terms only on
July 18, 2006 when she reacquired Philippine citizenship legally securing to
herself the option and the right to re-establish legal residence in the Philippines.
(But even then, as discussed below, when she became a dual RP-U.S. citizen, she
could at anytime return to the U.S.; thus her abandonment of her U.S. domicile is,
at best, an arguable matter.)

IV.C. Poe was still an American citizen with residence

in the United States between May 24, 2005 to
July 18, 2006.
Conversely, Poe's incapacity to establish domicile in the Philippines because she
lacks the requisite Philippine citizenship reflects her status as an American with
residence in the United States.

As a requirement to establish domicile, a person must show that he or she

has animus non-revertendi, or intent to abandon his or her old domicile. This
requirement reflects two key characteristics of a domicile: first, that a person can
have only one residence at any time, and second, that a person is considered to
have an animus revertendi (intent to return) to his current domicile.

Thus, for a person to demonstrate his or her animus non revertendi to the old
domicile, he or she must have abandoned it completely, such that he or she can no
longer entertain any animus revertendi with respect to such old domicile. This
complete abandonment is necessary in light of the one-domicile rule.

In more concrete terms, a person seeking to demonstrate his or her animus non-

revertendi must not only leave the old domicile and is no longer physically present
there, he or she must have also shown acts cancelling his or her animus revertendi
to that place.

Note, at this point, that a person who has left his or her domicile is considered not
to have abandoned it so long as he or she has animus revertendi or intent to return
to it. We have allowed the defense of animus revertendi for challenges to a
person's domicile on the ground that he or she has left it for a period of time, and
held that a person's domicile, once established, does not automatically change
simply because he or she has not stayed in that place for a period of time.

Applying these principles to Poe's case, as of May 24, 2005, her overt acts may
have established an intent to remain in the Philippines, but do not comply with
the required animus non-revertendi with respect to the U.S., the domicile that
she was abandoning.

On May 24, 2005, Poe and her family's home was still in the U.S. as they sold
their U.S. family home only on April 27, 2006. They also officially informed
the U.S. Postal Service of their change of their U.S. address only in late
March 2006. Lastly, as of this date (May 24, 2005), Poe's husband was still in
the U.S. and a legal resident thereof.

Taken together, these facts show that as of May 24, 2005, Poe had not completely
abandoned her domicile in the U.S.; thus, she had not complied with the
necessary animus non-revertendi at that date.

Note, too, that Poe's travel documents between May 24, 2005 and July 18, 2006
strongly support this conclusion. In this period, she travelled to and from the
Philippines under a balikbayan visa that, as earlier pointed out, has a fixed period
of validity and is an indication that her stay in the Philippines during this period
was temporary.

While it is not impossible that she could have entered the Philippines under
a balikbayan visa with the intent to eventually establish domicile in the
Philippines, her return to the U.S. several times while she was staying in the
Philippines under a temporary visa prevents me from agreeing to this
possibility.

On the contrary, Poe's acts of leaving the Philippines for the U.S. as an American
citizen who had previously stayed in the Philippines under a temporary visa is an
indication of her animus revertendi to the U.S., her old domicile.

Worthy of note, too, is that in between Poe's arrival on May 24, 2005 and her
acquisition of Philippine citizenship, Poe made four trips to and from the U.S. in a
span of one year and two months; this frequency over a short period of time
indicates and supports the conclusion that she has not fully abandoned her
domicile in the U.S. during this period.

Additionally, too, during this time, Poe continued to own two houses in the U.S.,
one purchased in 1992 and another in 2008 (or after her reacquisition of the
Philippine citizenship.[333] The ownership of these houses, when taken together
with her temporary visa in travelling to the Philippines from May 24, 2005 to July
18, 2006, manifest the existence of an animus revertendi to the U.S., which means
that as of May 24, 2005, she had not yet completely abandoned the U.S. as her
domicile.

IV.D. Poe made several inconsistent claims regarding her period of residence in

the Philippines that shows a pattern of deliberate attempt to mislead and to
qualify her for the Presidency.

Lest we forget, I reiterate that Poe declared in her 2012 CoC for Senator that she
has been a resident of the Philippines for at least "6 years and 6 months" before the
May 13, 2013. This was a personal declaration made under oath, certified to
be true and correct, and which she announced to the public to prove that she
was eligible for the Senatorial post.

Six (6) years and six (6) months counted back from the day before the May 13,
2013 elections point to November 2006 as the beginning of her Philippine
residence - which period of residence before the May 9, 2016 elections leads to
only 9 years and 6 months, short of the ten-year requirement for the Presidency.

When she realized this potential disqualifying ground sometime in June of

2015, she told a different story to the public by claiming that she counted the
"6-year 6-month" period as of the day she filed her CoC for Senator on
October 2, 2012.[334] Effectively, she claimed that she had been a resident of the
Philippines since April 2006 thereby removing her ineligibility.

Subsequently, she claimed that she has been a resident of the Philippines since
May 24, 2005 when she arrived in the Philippines and has allegedly decided to re-
settle here for good. Thus, in her 2015 CoC for President, she declared the "10-
year and 11-month" period as her Philippine residence.

As with her 2012 CoC, this was a personal declaration which she made under
oath and which she announced to the public to prove that she was eligible, this
time for the Presidency. This declaration, however, is contrary to the declaration
she made in her 2012 CoC as well as to the declarations she made to the public
in 2015 when she tried to explain away her potential disqualifying circumstance.
I clarify that these declarations, particularly the declaration Poe made in the 2012
CoC, are not- and the COMELEC did not consider them to be - evidence of the
actual number of years she had been legally residing in the Philippines from which
I draw the conclusion that she has not been a Philippine resident for ten years and
thus committed false material representation. As the COMELEC did, I do not
conclude that Poe has only been a Philippine resident for 9 years and 6 months
following her 2012 CoC declaration.

Rather, I consider these declarations to be evidence of

falsehoods and inconsistent representations with respect to her residency
claim: she made a representation in her 2015 CoC that is completely different
from her representation in her 2012 CoC as well as from her public
declarations. Poe's public declarations under oath considered as a whole
reveal a pattern that confirms her deliberate attempt to mislead and to falsely
represent to the electorate that she was eligible for the Presidency. This
evidence fully justified the COMELEC decision to cancel her CoC.

V.

CONCLUSION

In light of all these considerations, I vote for the reversal of the majority's ruling
granting the petitions based on the COMELEC's grave abuse of discretion. In lieu
thereof, the Court should enter a Revised Ruling dismissing the petitions and
ordering the COMELEC to proceed with the cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner Grace Poe.

[1]
 Philippine Daily Inquirer,' Return of the Renegade" Mar. 4, 1995.
[2]
 See p. 16, par. I of the ponencia.
[3]
 Seep. 20, last paragraph of the ponencia.
[4]
 See p. 21, par. I of the ponencia.
[5]
 See p. 21, par. 2 of the ponencia.
[6]
 See p. 4 of J. Caguioa's Separate Concurring Opinion.
[7]
 See p. 22, par. I of the ponencia.
[8]
 See p. 2 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's Opinion.
[9]
 See p. 10 of J. Caguioa's Separate Concurring Opinion.
[10]
 See p. 22, par. 2 of the ponencia.
[11]
 Seep. 22, par. 2 of the ponencia.
[12]
 Seep. 22, par. 3 of the ponencia.
[13]
 See p. 22-23 of the ponencia
[14]
 See p. 24-28 of the ponencia.
[15]
 See p. 24, par. I of the ponencia.
[16]
 See p. 26, par. I of the ponencia.
[17]
 See pp. 27-28 par. 2 of the ponencia.
[18]
 See p.25 of the first circulated version of J. Jardeleza's Opinion.
[19]
 See p. 28, pars. I and 2 of the ponencia.
[20]
 Seep. 66 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's Opinion.
[21]
 See p. I and p.66 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's Opinion.
[22]
 See page 68 of the originally circulated opinion.
[23]
 See pp. 28-29 of the ponencia.
[24]
 See pp. 29- 30 of the ponencia
[25]
 See pp. 30-32 of the ponencia
[26]
 See pp. 33, pars. 2 and 3 of the ponencia.
[27]
 See pp. 34-36 of the ponencia
[28]
 See p. 35, par. 2 of the ponencia.
[29]
 See pp. 36-39 of the ponencia.
[30]
 See p. 39. Par. 2 of the ponencia.
[31]
 See discussions on pp. 38-39 of the ponencia on these points.
[32]
 See p. 86 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's Opinion.
[33]
 See discussions on pp. 84 to 87 of the first circulated version of J. Leonen's
Opinion.
[34]
 See pp. 39-40 of the ponencia.
[35]
 See discussion on pp. 41-44 of the ponencia on these points.
[36]
 See discussion on pp. 41-44 of the ponencia on these points.
[37]
 See pp. 17-18 of the ponencia.
[38]
 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
[39]
 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300.
[40]
 See p. 19 of the ponencia.
[41]
 See p. 20 of the ponencia.
[42]
 See pp. 20 - 21 of the ponencia.
[43]
 Ibid.
[44]
 G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277.
[45]
 595 Phil. 449, 465-67 (2008).
[46]
 Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522,
543 - 544.
[47]
 G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007.
[48]
 Cerajica v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014.
[49]
 G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 459.
[50]
 See p. 26 of the ponencia, citing I Jose M. Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution 209 (1949).
[51]
 Alexander Marie Stuyt, The General Principles of Law as Applied by
International Tribunals to Disputes on Attribution and Exercise of State
Jurisdiction (2013), p. 101.
[52]
 Gov. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451 (2009).
[53]
 Ibid.
[54]
 J. Bernas SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A
Commentary, 1st edition (1987), p. 500, citing Justice Warren's dissenting opinion
in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
[55]
 Paa v. Chan, 128 Phil. 815 (1967).
[56]
 Ibid.
[57]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 12, 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-
700, pp. 15, 17. See also Foundling Certificate, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "l"
(both of Tatad, and Contreras/Valdez case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex
"I-series", Exhibit "l" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[58]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 10, 12 (pars. 12 and 13), 109-120
(subsection 8.3), 112 (par. 148), and 120 (par. 156); and petition in G.R. No.
221698-700, pp. 6, 7, 15 (par. 17), 79-89 (subsection 8.3), 84 (pars. 122 and
122.l), and 87 (par. 125).
[59]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 9, 10, 94 (subsection 8), 97-109
(subsection 8.2), 109-120 (subsection 8.3), 153 (par. 202), 156 (par. 204.8), and
157 (par. 205); and petition in· G.R. No. 221698-700, pp. 5, 24 (par. 47), 55-59
(subsection 8 and 8.1 ), 69-76, 79-89, and 141-146 (subsection B.11).
[60]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 104-108 (pars. 136-138); and petition in
G.R. No. 221698- 700, pp. 72-76 (pars. 106-108).
[61]
 See Paragraph 4.23.8 of Poe's Memorandum with Formal Offer of Evidence
and Motion for Reconsideration, both in the Tatad case, Annexes "N" and "U" of
G.R. No. 221698-700.

Paragraph 4.23.8 stated:

ii. Official acts in recognition of Respondent's [Poe's] Philippine citizenship

4.23.8. On 13 May 1974, the San Juan Court issued a Decision granting the
Spouses Poe's petition to adopt Respondent. Article 15 of the Civil Code states
that "(l)aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." Respondent does not argue, and has never argued, that her
adoption by the Poe spouses conferred citizenship on her. However, the adoption
affirms that Respondent was a Filipino in the first place. The San Juan Court could
not have applied Philippine adoption law (which relates to "family rights and
duties" and to "status" of persons), if it did not in the first place, consider
Respondent to be a Filipino who would be "bound" by such laws.

Page 24 of Poe's Motion for Reconsideration, on the other hand, read:

30.6. On 13 May 1974, the San Juan Court issued a Decision granting the Spouses
Poe's petition to adopt Respondent. Respondent does not argue that her citizenship
is derived from her Filipino adoptive parents; rather it is her position that the
adoption affirms that she was a Filipino in the first place. The San Juan Court
could not have applied Philippine adoption law (which relates to "family rights
and duties" and to "status" of persons), if it did not in the first place, consider
Respondent to be a Filipino who would be "bound" by such laws.
[62]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 12, 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-
700, pp. 15, 17. See also Foundling Certificate, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "l"
(both of Tatad, and Contreras/Valdez case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex
"I-series", Exhibit "1" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[63]
 Foundling Certificate (LCR 4175), Annex "M-series'', Exhibit "1" (both of
Tatad, and Contreras/Valdez case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series'',
Exhibit "I" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[64]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, par. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
par. 19.
[65]
 MTC Decision, Annex "M-series'', Exhibit "2" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No.
221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.

See also Certificate of Finality dated October 27, 2005, Annex "M-series'', Exhibit
"2-A" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2-
A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[66]
 Art. 39(1) of PD 603.
[67]
 See Articles 337 and 339 of the Civil Code and Section 2, Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court. - the governing laws and rules on adoption at the time Grace Poe was
adopted by the spouses Poe. Articles 337 and 339 provides who may be adopted;
impliedly, they allow adoption of aliens, save those aliens whose government the
Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations. Section of Rule 99, on
the other hand, enumerates the contents of a petition for adoption; the petition does
not require allegation that the child is a Philippine citizen.
[68]
 See NSO Birth Certificate, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "10" (of Tatad case) in
G.R. No. 221698- 700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "10" (of Elamparo case) in
G.R. No. 221697.
[69]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, par. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
par. 20. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "3" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "3" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[70]
 See Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution. It reads:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage. [Emphasis supplied]
[71]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 13; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
17. Annex "Mseries'', Exhibit "4" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and
Annex "I-series", Exhibit "4" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[72]
 Annex "M-series", Exhibits "4-A" and "4-B" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No.
221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibits "4-A" and "4-B" (of Elamparo case)
in G.R. No. 221697.
[73]
 Section 5 of RA No. 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) pertinently states:

SECTION 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. - No passport shall be

issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is
satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the
following requirements:

a) A duly accomplished application form and photographs of such number, size

and style as may be prescribed by the Department;

xxxx
g) If the applicant is an adopted person, the duly certified copy of court order of
adoption, together with the original and amended birth certificates duly issued and
authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General shall be presented:
Provided, That in case the adopted person is an infant or a minor or the applicant is
for adoption by foreign parents, an authority from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development shall be required: Provided, further, That the adopting
foreign parents shall also submit a certificate from their embassy or consulate that
they are qualified to adopt such infant or minor child xx x. [emphases supplied]
[74]
 Section 3(d) of RA No. 8239 states: "x x x (d) Passport means a document
issued by the Philippine Government to its citizens and requesting other
governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in case of need to
give him/her all lawful aid and protection.

See Poe's Philippine passport issued on May 19, 1998, October 2009, and March
18, 2014; and her Diplomatic passport issued on December 19, 2013, Annex "M-
series" in GR Nos. G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series in GR No. 221697.
[75]
 Paa v. Chan, 128 Phil. 815, 824 (1967).
[76]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 18.
[77]
 See Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 434 Phil. 861, 872-873 (2002); Romualdez v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, 248 SCRA 300, 328-329 (1995), citing Faypon v.
Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954); Nuval v. Ouray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Koh v. Court
of Appeals, 160-A Phil. 1034, 1042 (1975); Caraballo v. Republic, 114 Phil. 991
(1962); Fule v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785, 797-798 (1976).
[78]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p.
18.
[79]
 " I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure
all allegiance and fidelity to foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of
whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all
enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the
same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the
law; .that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United
States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance
under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God. "

Source: The Immigration and Nationality Act of the

U.S. https://www.uscis.gov/uscitizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization (last
accessed on February 15, 2016).
[80]
 See the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
U.S. https://www.uscis.gov/uscitizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization (last
accessed on February 7, 2016).
[81]
 Poe's U.S. passport, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No.
221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[82]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[83]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p.
24. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "19" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "13" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"19" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[84]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p.
25. Annex "Mseries", Exhibits "20" and "21" to "21-B" (of Tatad case), Exhibits
"14" and "15" to "15-B" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and
Annex "I-series'', Exhibits "20" and "21" to "21-B" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.
[85]
 See Section 3 of RA No. 9225. It pertinently reads:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

xxxx

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath. [Emphases supplied]
[86]
 Art. 38 of PD 603.
[87]
 M.C. No. Aff-04-01, Secs. 2-5 and 8.
[88]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p.
25. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "22" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "16" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"22" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[89]
 The full title of RA No. 9225 reads: "AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP
OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEAL TH ACT.
NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES".

See also Section 2 of RA 9225. It states:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
See also excerpts of Congress deliberations on RA 9225 in AASJS v. Hon.
Datumanong, 51 Phil. 110, 116-117 (2007).
[90]
 See December 23, 2015 Comelec en banc resolution in the Elamparo case,
Annex "B" of G.R. No. 221697; and December 23, 2015 Comelec en banc
resolution in the Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez cases, Annex "B" of G.R. No.
221698-700.
[91]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p.
26. Poe's Identification Card was signed by signed by Commission Alipio
Fernandez: Annex "M-series", Exhibit "23" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "17" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"23" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[92]
 See also the Identification Certificates of her children: Annex "M-series",
Exhibits "23-A" to "23- C" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "17-A" to "17-C" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698- 700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibits
"23-A" to "23-C" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[93]
 RA No. 9225, Sec. 5(1) and (2).
[94]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 26.
Annex "I-series", Exhibit "25" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697; and Annex
"M-series", Exhibit "25" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700.
[95]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "I-series"', Exhibit "5" (ofElamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[96]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "26" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "19" (of
Contrera/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"26" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[97]
 See Sections 2 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1986, enacted on October 5,
1985. Section 2 pertinently provides:

Section 2. Composition; Qualifications; Benefits - The BOARD shall be

composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all
be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice-
Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (1)
year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause. x x x.

No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral
character and standing in the community xx xx. [emphasis supplied]
[98]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 22; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "27" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "21" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"27" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[99]
 See Japzon v. Comelec, 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
[100]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21, par. 49; and petition in G.R. No.
221698-700, pp. 26-27, par. 54.

Under Sec. 5(3) of RA No. 9225, "[t]hose appointed to any public office shall
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, that
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath."
'Emphases and underscoring supplied]
[101]
 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "29" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "!- series", Exhibit "29" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[102]
 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "26-A" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "20" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibit
"26-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[103]
 See Sections 2 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1986, enacted on October 5,
1985. Section 2 pertinently provides:

Section 2. Composition; Qualifications; Benefits - The BOARD shall be

composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all
be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice-
Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (1)
year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause. x x x.

No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral
character and standing in the community xx x. [emphasis supplied]
[104]
 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and
Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[105]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 24; petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 30.
Annex "M-series", Exhibit "30" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "22" (of Contreras/Valdez
cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "30" (of Elamparo
case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[106]
 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "30-A" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "23" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"30-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[107]
 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "31" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "24" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"31" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 2216971.
[108]
 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "31" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "24" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"31" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[109]
 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "32" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and
Annex "I-series", Exhibit "32" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.

See also Come lee en banc December 11, 2015 resolution in SPA No. 15-002
(DC), SPA No. 15- 007 (DC), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC), pp. 43 and 47, Annexes
"A" and "Bin G.R. No. 221698- 700.
[110]
 Annex "M-series", Exhibit "43" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and
Annex "I-series", Exhibit "43" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[111]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221697,
pp. 62-63 and 70-72. Annex "C" both in G.R. No. 221697 and G.R. No. 221698-
700.
[112]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 102-104; and petition in G.R. No.
221698-700, pp. 69-72.
[113]
 255 Phil. 934 (1989).
[114]
 Frivaldo v. Comelec, 255 Phil. 934 (1989).
[115]
 US citizenship acquires requires a prior period of permanent residence in that
country.
[116]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 12, 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-
700, pp. 15, 17. See also Foundling Certificate (LCR 4175), Annex "M-series",
Exhibit "I" (both of Tatad and Contreras/Valdez case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "I" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[117]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, par. 14, and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
par. 19.
[118]
 MTC Decision, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "2" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No.
221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No.
221697.

See also Certificate of Finality dated October 27, 2005, Annex "M-series", Exhibit
"2-A" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "2-
A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.

See also OCR Certification of receipt of MTC Decision, Annex "M-series",

Exhibit "2-B" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series",
Exhibit "2-B" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[119]
 See Tolentino, A. (1960). Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.I, pp. 651-652, in
relation top. 624.
[120]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, par. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
par. 20. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "3" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "3" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[121]
 See Article V, Section I of the Constitution.
[122]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 17.
[123]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 12, 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-
700, pp. 15, 17.
[124]
 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954); Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928);
Koh v. Court of Appeals, 160-A Phil. 1034, 1042 (1975); Caraballo v. Republic,
114 Phil. 991, 995 (1962); Fule v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785, 797-798
(1976).
[125]
 Ibid.
[126]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 18.
[127]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 14, par. 19; and petition in G.R. No.
221698-700, p. 17, par. 24.
[128]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, pp. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 18.
[129]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 14; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 17.
[130]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 18.
[131]
 See Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
[132]
 Romualdez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, 248 SCRA 300, 328-329 (1995),
citing Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954); Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651-
652 (1928); Koh v. Court of Appeals, 160-A Phil. 1034 (1975); Caraballo v.
Republic, 114 Phil. 991, 995 (1962); Fule v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785, 797-
798 (I 976).
[133]
 See US Immigration and Nationality Act. https://www.uscis.gov/us-
citizenship/citizenshipthrough-naturalization (last accessed on February 7, 2016).
[134]
 See petition G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p.
20.
[135]
 Jurisprudence tells us that absence from one's residence to pursue study or
profession someplace else does not amount to abandonment of that residence
(Supra note 7). Analogously, it can be argued that resignation from one's
employment does not ipso facto translate to abandonment of residence (in cases
where the place of employment is the same as the place of residence).
[136]
 See petition G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p.
18-19. See also Poe's U.S. passport, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case)
in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in
G.R. No. 221697.
[137]
 See petition G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p.
19.
[138]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 15; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 19.
[139]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 19-20.
[140]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 28-29. See Poe's U.S. passport, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case)
in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in
G.R. No. 221697.
[141]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 20. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "7" and "7-A" to "7-F" (of Tatad case), and
Exhibits "3" and "3-A" to "3-F" (of Contreras and Valdez cases) in G.R. No.
221698-700; Annex "I-series", Exhibits "7" and "7-A" to "7-F" (of Elamparo case)
in G.R. No. 221697.
[142]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 20.
[143]
 Oral Arguments, January 19, 2016.
[144]
 See Coquilla v. Comelec, 434 Phil. 861, 875 (2002).

"Under § 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term
balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a
foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled,
among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (I) year"
(§ 3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates
in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was
valid for one year only." [emphasis supplied]
[145]
 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "6-series" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "2-series"
(of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series",
Exhibit "2-series" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[146]
 See Romualdez v. RTC. G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA
408, 415-416.
[147]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 20.
[148]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 17; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 21. See also Annex "M-series", Exhibits "7" to "7-F" (of Tatad case) and
Exhibits "3" to ''3-F" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and
Annex "I-series", Exhibits "7" to "7-F" (of Elamparo case), in G.R. No. 221697.
[149]
 See Section 9(f) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, Executive Orders
No. 423 (signed in June 1997) and Executive Order No. 285 (signed in September
4, 2000).

In 2011, the Bureau of Immigration records show that the Philippines had more
than 26,000 foreign students enrolled in various Philippine schools; more than
7,000 of these are college enrollees while the rest were either in elementary and
high school or taking short-term language courses
(see http://globalnation.inguirer.net/978l/philippines-has-26k-foreign-students last
accessed on February 12, 2016).

See also The International Mobility of Students in Asia and the Pacific, published
in 2013 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/ Documents/international-
student-mobility-asia-pacific-education-2013-en.pdf (last accessed on February
12, 2016); and Immigration Policies on Visiting and Returning Overseas
Filipinos http://www.cfo.gov.ph/pdf/handbook/Immigration_Policies_on_Visiting
_and_Returning_Overseas_Filipinos-chapterIV.pdf (last accessed on February 15,
2016).
[150]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 17; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 22. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "8" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "4" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698- 700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"8" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[151]
 Romualdez v. RTC, G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA 408,
415-416.
[152]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 22. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "II" and "12" in G.R. No. 221698-700; and
Annex "I-series'', Exhibits "5" and "6" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[153]
 Section 5 of RA No. 4726 reads:

Sec. 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or

other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided
interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or
shareholdings in the condominium corporation: Provided, however, That where
the common areas in the condominium project are owned by the owners of
separate units as co-owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be
conveyed or transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens, or corporations at
least sixty percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except
in cases of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium
project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid
ifthe concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the
corporation will cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits
imposed by existing laws.

See also Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., 558 Phil. 683, 698-699 (2008).
[154]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 2. Annex"!- series", Exhibits "6-series", "15", and "15-A" (of Elamparo case) in
G.R. No. 221697; Annex "M-series", Exhibits "6-series", "15", and "15-A" (ofT
atad case), Exhibits "2-series", "9" and "9-A" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R.
No. 221698-700.
[155]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 23.
[156]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "16" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "10" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"16" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[157]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "13 and 14" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "7" and
"8" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series'',
Exhibits "13'' and "14" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[158]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 23. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "17" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "II" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"17" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[159]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 23. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "17" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "I I" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"17" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[160]
 "AN ACT TO PROMOTE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, PRESCRIBE THE
PROCEDURES FOR REGISTERING ENTERPRISES DOING BUSINESS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES", enacted on March 28,
1996.

Section l 0 of RA No. 7042, as amended by R.A. 8179, states:

SEC. l 0. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of

Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution. - Any natural born citizen who has Jost
his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract
under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area
of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3)
hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other purposes.
In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall
not exceed the maximum herein fixed. [emphasis supplied]
[161]
 Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution reads:

SECTION 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by Jaw. [emphasis
supplied]
[162]
 See Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 278-279; ponencia, pp. 45-47.
[163]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 24. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "19" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "13" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"19" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[164]
 See Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-006 or the "2008
Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship Under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 and Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 91, Series of 2004.
[165]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 25. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "20" and "21" to "21-B" (of Tatad case),
Exhibits "14" and "IS" to "15-B" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-
700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibits "20" and "21" to "21-B" (of Elamparo case) in
G.R. No. 221697.
[166]
 See Section 3 of RA 9225. It pertinently reads:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

xxxx

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath. [emphases supplied]
[167]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 25. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "22" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "16" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"22" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[168]
 The full title of RA No. 9225 reads: "AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP
OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT.
NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES".

See also Section 2 of RA 9225. It states:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

See also excerpts of Congress deliberations on RA 9225 in AASJS v. Hon.

Datumanong, 51 Phil. II0, 116-117 (2007).
[169]
 See the cases of Japzon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576
SCRA 331; and Caballero v. Comelec. G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
[170]
 R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic. See Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
198742, August 10, 2012, 678 SCRA 267.
[171]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 26. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "23" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "17'' (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
''23" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[172]
 See Annex "M-series", Exhibits "23-A" to "23-C" (of Tatad case), Exhibits
"17-A" to "17-C" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex
"I-series", Exhibits "23-A" to "23- C" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[173]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 26. Annex "Mseries", Exhibit "24" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "18" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"24" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[174]
 See Article V, Section I of the Constitution.
[175]
 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2002, 576 SCRA 331.
[176]
 Under Section 3 of R.A. 6768, as amended, a balikbayan, who is a foreign
passport holder, is . entitled to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of
one (1) year, with the exception of restricted nationals.
[177]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (ofElamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[178]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (ofElamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[179]
 Grace Poe's Identification Certificate Number.
[180]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 26. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "25" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "25" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[181]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 28-29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "26" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "19" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"26" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[182]
 See Sections 2, 3, and 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1986, enacted on
October 5, 1985. Section 2 pertinently provides:

Section 2. Composition; Qualifications; Benefits - The BOARD shall be

composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all
be appointed by the President of t:ie Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice-
Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (I)
year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause. xxx
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral
character and standing in the community x x x

Section 3 of PD No. 1986, on the other hand, enumerates the powers, functions,
and duties of the MTRCB Board, while Section 5 enumerates the powers of the
Chairman of the Board who shall likewise act as the Chief Executive Officer of
the Board.
[183]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 22; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 29. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "27" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "21" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"27" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[184]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 21, par. 49; and petition in G.R. No.
221698-700, pp. 26-27, par. 54.
[185]
 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "29" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "(- series", Exhibit "29" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[186]
 See Annex "M-series'', Exhibit "26-A" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "20" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"26-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[187]
 See Sections 2, 3, and 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1986, enacted on
October 5, 1985.

Section 2 pertinently provides:

Section 2. Composition; Qualifications, Benefits - The BOARD shall be composed

of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all be
appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman,
and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (1) year,
unless sooner removed by the President for any cause. x x x

No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (2 I) years of age, and of good moral
character and standing in the community x x x

Section 3 of PD 1986, on the other hand, enumerates the powers, functions, and
duties of the MTRCB Board, while Section 5 enumerates the powers of the
Chairman of the Board .who shall likewise act as the Chief Executive Officer of
the Board.
[188]
 See Comelec en banc December 11, 2015 resolution in SPA No. 15-002 (DC),
SPA No. 15-007 (DC), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC), pp. 43 and 47, Annexes "A"
and "Bin G.R. No. 221698-700. See also petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 168.
[189]
 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "33" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex "I- series", Exhibit "33" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[190]
 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "34" (of Tatad case) in G.R. No. 221698-700;
and Annex"!- series", Exhibit "34" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[191]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221697,
pp. 62-63 and 70-72. Annex "C" both in G.R. No. 221697 and G.R. No. 221698-
700.
[192]
 Sections 78 and 52, in relation with Sections 74 and 63 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
[193]
 See Article IX-C, Section 2 in relation with Article VIII, Section I of the
Constitution. Article VIII, Section I provides in no categorical terms:

SECTION I. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [emphases supplied]
[194]
 See Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 885 (2003).
[195]
 63 Phil. 139, 158-59 (1936).
[196]
 Beluso v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450,
456; Fajardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157707, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA
156, 163; People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 158780-82, October 12, 2004, 440
SCRA 206, 212.
[197]
 Varias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010, 612
SCRA 386.
[198]
 Justice Puno 's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Macalintal v.
Comelec, 453 Phil: 586, 740 (2003) citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139 (1936).
[199]
 Justice Puna 's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Macalintal v.
Comelec, 453 Phil. 586 (2003).
[200]
 Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary, 558 Phil. 338
(2007).
[201]
 Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitutiun of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, (2003), pp. 136-137.
[202]
 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, l 8 (1939).
[203]
 Bernas, id. note 1, at 137.
[204]
 See J. Leonardo-De Castro, Concu1Ting Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R.
No. I 79267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 435.
[205]
 J. Panganiban, Dissenting Opinion. Central Bank Employees Association Inc.
v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA
299, 392.
[206]
 Bernas, S.J. The l 987 Constitution of the Rep11blic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, (2009), p. 139.
[207]
 J. Carpio-Morales, Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Association
Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 699
SCRA 352, 435.

Examples of these so-called "quasi-suspect" classifications are those based on

gender, legitimacy under certain circumstances, legal residency with regard to
availment of free public education, civil service employment preference for armed
forces veterans who are state residents upon entry to military service, and the right
to practice for compensation the profession for which certain persons have been
qualified and licensed.
[208]
 Ibid.
[209]
 Ibid.
[210]
 Ibid.
[211]
 J. Leonardo-De Castro, Concurring Opimon in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No.
179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 435. Emphasis supplied.
[212]
 J. Brion, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014.
[213]
 Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA
237.
[214]
 Article II, Section 1 states that "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them."

Following the definition of the concept of "state" provided under Article I of the
Montevideo Convention of 1933, the elements of a state: people, territory,
sovereignty, and government.

Bernas defines "people" as "a community of persons sufficient in number and

capable of maintaining continued existence of the community and held together by
a common bond of law." On the other hand, he defines "sovereignty" as "the
competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct international
relations with other states, as well as the political, technical and financial
capabilities to do so." (See Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines: A Commentary, (2009), pp. 40 and 54, respectively).

Cruz, citing Malcolm, defines it as "a people bound together by common

attractions and repulsions into a living organism possessed of a common pulse,
common intelligence and inspiration, and destined apparently to have a common
history and a common fate." While he defines "sovereignty" as "the supreme and
uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that state is governed." (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, (2007), pp. 16 and 26, respectively).
[215]
 J. Carpio Morales, Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Association
Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 699
SCRA 352, 435.
[216]
 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).
[217]
 G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004, 436 SCRA 45.
[218]
 Bedol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. 179830, December 3, 2009, 606
SCRA 554, 570-71.
[219]
 Salcedo II v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447;
Lluz and Adeloesa v. Comelec, G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 456.
[220]
 G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 459.
[221]
 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 326.
[222]
 706 Phil. 534 (2013).
[223]
 Id. at 551.
[224]
 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 392-400.
[225]
 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
[226]
 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2002, 576 SCRA 331.
[227]
 See Civil Code, Art. 8. See also Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, March
31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694, 704-705; Cabigon v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 168030, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 149, 156-157; Hacienda
Bino/Hortencia Starke, Inc., G.R. No. 150478, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 300,
309.
[228]
 See Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Phlippines, G.R. No. 164195,
October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 727, 760; Filipinas Palmoil Processing, Inc. v.
Dejapa, G.R. No. 167332, February 7, 2011, 641 SCRA 572, 581. See
also Pasiona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165471, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA
137.
[229]
 See Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 473 (2009). See also Moy Ya Lim Yao v.
Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-21289, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292,
367; Lee v. Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-23446, December 20. 1971, 42
SCRA 561, 565; Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95612-
13, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 854, 877-878.
[230]
 Palaran v. Republic, 4 Phil. 79 (1962).
[231]
 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
[232]
 G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012, 678 SCRA 267.
[233]
 581 Phil. 657 (2008).
[234]
 An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try,
Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the
Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing
the Same (21 June 1957).
[235]
 Lopez v. Roxas, 124 Phil. 168 (1966).
[236]
 1973 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 2.
[237]
 An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try,
Hear and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the President and Vice-
President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes (1985) .
[238]
 B.P. 883, Sec. I.
[239]
 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424
SCRA 277; Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618,
November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.
[240]
 Art. VI, Sec. 17.
[241]
 G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277.
[242]
 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
[243]
 318 Phil. 329 ( 1995).
[244]
 595 Phil. 449, 465-67 (2008).
[245]
 Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003); Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173 (2012).
[246]
 193 5 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE IV, SECTION 1:

"Section I. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

[247]
 Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal
Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 602, 649.
[248]
 This is also the prevailing rule under Section 1 (2), Article IV of the 1987
Constitution.
[249]
 Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 73 Phil. 307 (1941 ); Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil.
52 (1952); Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil 421 (2004).
[250]
 A. Scalia and B. Gamer. Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
(2012 ed.), p. 93.
[251]
 CA No. 473.
[252]
 115 Phil. 657 (1962).
[253]
 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657, 668-69 (1962).
[254]
 See Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. 460 Phil. 830, 887 (2003).
[255]
 CONSTITUTION, Article Vil, Section 21.
[256]
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
561 Phil: 386, 399 (2003).
[257]
 M. Magallona. "The Supreme Court and International Law: Problems and
Approaches in Philippine Practice" 85 Philippine Law Journal 1, 2 (2010).
[258]
 See: Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165, 212-213 (2000).
[259]
 Ibid.
[260]
 Signed by the Philippines on May 23, 1969 and ratified on November 15,
1972. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, March 23, 1969, 1115
U.N.T.S. 331, 512. Available
at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20l155/volume-1155-1-
18232-English.pdf
[261]
 Id. at 339.
[262]
 Section 5, (2)(a), Article VIII provides:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx
[263]
 See: I. Cortes and R. Lotilla. "Nationality and International Law From the
Philippine Perspective" 60(1) Philippine Law Journal 1, 1-2 (1990); and, M.
Magallona. "The Supreme Court and International Law: Problems and Approaches
in Philippine Practice" 85 Philippine law Journal 1, 2-3 (2010).
[264]
 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4('2) on the power of the Supreme
Court to nullify a treaty on the ground of unconstitutionality. See also: M.
Magallona, supra note 111, at 6-7.
[265]
 M. Magallona, supra note 111, at 4, citing Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil.
1156 (1957).
[266]
 See: M. Dellinger. "Something is Rotten in the State of Denmark: The
Deprivation of Democratic Rights by Nation States Not Recognizing Dual
Citizenship" 20 Journal of Transnational law & Policy 41, 61 (2010-2011).
[267]
 See: M. Bussuyt. "Guide to the"Travaux Preparatoires" of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1987).
[268]
 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948.
Available from http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-
rights/index.html
[269]
 See: Separate Opinion of CJ Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note I
04, at 577.
[270]
 See: J. von Bemstorff. "The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Tum to Rights in
International Law" 19(5) European Journal of International Law 903, 913-914
(2008).
[271]
 See: Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 50-51 (2008) and
Separate Opinion of CJ Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra Note 104 at
577.
[272]
 J Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September
16, 2014, 735 SCRA 208, 209; citing E. Posner and J. L Goldsmith, "A Theory of
Customary International Law" (1998). See also Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil.
536, 600-605 (2009).
[273]
 See CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 2.
[274]
 See Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque
III, 561 Phil. 386, 399 (2003).
[275]
 See: M. Magallona, supra note 111, at 2-3.
[276]
 Razon v. Tagitis, supra note 119, at 601.
[277]
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(b). Available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2
[278]
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
supra note 115, at 199.
[279]
 Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. b76, 687 (2009).
[280]
 CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 2 in relation to CIVIL CODE, Article 8.
[281]
 See: K. Hailbronner. "Nationality in Public International Law and European
Law," EUDO Citizenship Observatory, (2006). Available
at http://eudocitizenship.eu/docs/chapter1_Hailbronner.pdf
[282]
 See: P. Weiss. "Nationality and Statelessness in International Law" Sijthoff &
Noordhoff International Publishers B. V., (1979).
[283]
 Ibid
[284]
 I. Oppenheim, International Law 643 (8th ed. 1955).
[285]
 Metropolitan Bank Corporation v. Tobias, supra note 63, at 188-189.
[286]
 CIVIL CODE, Title VIII, Chapter I.
[287]
 Id., Article 255
[288]
 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
[289]
 G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
[290]
 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
[291]
 See Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329 (1995).
[292]
 Thus, for purposes of determining venue for filing personal actions, we look to
the actual address of the person or the place where he inhabits, and noted that a
person can have more than one residence. We said this in light of the purpose
behind fixing the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions, which is to
provide rules meant to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party
litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them i.e., to
both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other of the courts of justice.
[293]
 Limbona v. Comelec, 578 Phil. 364 (2008).
[294]
 619 Phil. 226 (2009). See also Macalintal v. Comelec, 453 Phil. 586 (2003).
[295]
 See Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larazzabal v. Commission on
Elections, 278 Phil. 275 (1991). See also Pundaodaya v. Comelec, 616 Phil. 167
(2009).
[296]
 See Pundaodaya v. Comelec, 616 Phil. 167 (2009) and Jalosjos v. Comelec,
686 Phil. 563 (2012).
[297]
 See: Sections 4, 5, 6 & 8 of R.A. No. 9189
[298]
 Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - x x x Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
[299]
 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
[300]
 Entitled "An Act To Provide For The Acquisition Of Philippine Citizenship By
Naturalization, And To Repeal Acts Numbered Twenty-Nine Hundred And
Twenty-Seven And Thirty-Four Hundred and Forty-Eight", enacted on June 17,
1939.

CA No. 63, as worded, provides that the procedure for re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by naturalization shall be in accordance with the procedure for
naturalization under Act No. 2927 (or The Naturalization Law, enacted on March
26, 1920), as amended. CA No. 473, however, repealed Act No. 2927 and 3448,
amending 2927.
[301]
 Entitled "An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization", enacted on
June 16, 1950.
[302]
 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN
WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO
ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS. Approved on October 23,
1995.

Prior to RA No. 8171, repatriation was governed by Presidential Decree No. 725,
enacted on June 5, 1975. Paragraph 5 of PD No. 725 provides that: (1) Filipino
women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural
born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may require Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications
are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration. "Note that the repatriation procedure under
PD No. 725 is similar to the repatriation procedure under Section 4 of CA No. 63.
[303]
 See Section 3 of RA 9225. It pertinently reads:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

xxxx

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath. [emphases supplied]
[304]
 CA No. 473 provides the following exceptions: (1) the qualifications and
special qualifications prescribed under CA No. 473 shall not be required; and (2)
the applicant be, among others, at least twenty-one years of age and shall have
resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization.
Per Section 3 of CA No. 63:

"The applicant must also: have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations
with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is
living; and subscribe to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and
perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of
which he was a citizen or subject."
Section 7 of CA No. 473. It states in full:

Sec. 7. Petition for citizenship. - Any person desiring to acquire Philippine

citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied
by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his
present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his
birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age,
birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate
date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation,
and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that
he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is
not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has
complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the
time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the
applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two
credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally
know the petitioner to be a resident of die Philippines for the period of time
required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and
that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and, is not in any way disqualified under the provisions
of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and post-office addresses of
such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case.
The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the
petition.
See Section 9 of CA No. 473. It reads:

Sec. 9. Notification and appearance. - Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it

shall be the duty of-the clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner's
expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in
one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner
resides, and to have copies of said public and conspicuous place in his office or in
the building where said office is located, setting forth in such notice the name,
birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the
Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce
support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing
shall not be held within ninety days from the date of the last publication of the
notice. The clerk shall, as soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the
sentence, the naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data to the Department
of the interior, the Bureau of Justice, the provincial Inspector of the Philippine
Constabulary of the province and die justice of the peace of the municipality
wherein the petitioner resides.
See also Sections 1and 2 of RA No. 530 amending Sections 9 and 10 of CA No.
473. They read:

SECTION 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for

Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the
publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the
application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after
the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General on his
representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening time the
applicant has (I) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to
a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial
to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

SEC. 2. After the finding mentioned in section one, the order of the court granting
citizenship shall be registered and the oath provided by existing laws shall be
taken by the applicant, whereupon, and not before, he will be entitled to all the
privileges of a Filipino citizen.
And Section 4 of CA No. 4 73 which states:

Sec. 4. Who are disqualified - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine

citizens:

1. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or

group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;

2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal

assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;

3. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;

7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines
are at war, during the period of such war;

8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
[305]
 G.R. No. L-22041, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 147.
[306]
 434 Phil. 861, 873-875 (2002).
[307]
 434 Phil. 861, 873 (2002).
[308]
 596 Phil. 354, 369-370 (2009).
[309]
 G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
[310]
 Sec. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. - Citizenship may be reacquired:
(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the
disqualification's prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred
and twenty-seven; (2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp:
Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the
termination of the marital status; and (3) By direct act of the National Assembly.
[311]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 23; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
pp. 28-29. See Poe's U.S. passport, Annex "M-series", Exhibit "5" (of Tatad case)
in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "5" (of Elamparo case) in
G.R. No. 221697.
[312]
 R.A. 6768, as amended by R.A. 9174, Section 2(a).
[313]
 Id. at Section 3(c).

This visa is issued under the government's "Balikbayan" program instituted under
the administration of the Department of Tourism to attract and encourage overseas
Filipinos to come and visit their motherland. in addition to the one-year visa-free
stay, the program also provides for a kabuhayan shopping privilege allowing tax-
exempt purchase of livelihood tools and providing the opportunity to avail of the
necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant
members of society upon their return to the country. The program also intends to
showcase competitive and outstanding Filipino-made products.

The program also provides tax-exempt maximum purchases in the amount of USO
1,500, or the equivalent in Philippine and other currency, at Philippine
Government-operated duty free shops, and exemption from Travel Tax, provided
that their stay in the Philippines is one year or less. If their stay in the Philippines
exceeds one year, Travel tax will apply to them.
[314]
 Coquilla v. Comelec, 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
[315]
 Bureau of Immigration, Visa Inquiry - Temporary Visitor's Visa. Available
at http://www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa-inQuiry/temporary-visitor-s-visa.
[316]
 Ibid.
[317]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 20; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 25. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "22" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "16" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit
"22" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[318]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 17; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 21. See also Annex "M-series", Exhibits "7" to "7-F" (of Tatad case) and
Exhibits "3" to "3-F" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and
Annex "I-series", Exhibits "7" to "7-F" (of Elamparo case), in G.R. No. 221697.
[319]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 22. Annex "Mseries", Exhibits "11" and "12" in G.R. No. 221698-700; and
Annex "I-series", Exhibits "5" and "6" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[320]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 24. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "18" (of Tatad case); Exhibit "12" (of Contreras
Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "18" (of
Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[321]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibits "13 and 14" (of Tatad case), Exhibits "7" and
"8" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series",
Exhibits "13" and "14" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[322]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 19; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "17'' (of Tatad case), Exhibit "11" (of Contreras
Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "17" (of
Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[323]
 See Annex "M-series", Exhibit "6-series" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "2-series"
(of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series",
Exhibit "2-series" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697. See also petition in
G.R. No. 221697, p. 16; and petition in G.R. No. 221698- 700, p. 20. Also, see
petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700, p. 2.
Annex "I-series", Exhibits "6-series", "15", and "15-A" (of Elamparo case) in G.R.
No. 221697; Annex "M-series", Exhibits "6-series", "15", and "15-A" (of Tatad
case), Exhibits "2- series", "9" and "9-A" (of Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No.
221698-700.
[324]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 18; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 23. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "16" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "JO" (of Contreras
Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698-700; and Annex "I-series", Exhibit "16" (of
Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[325]
 See petition in G.R. No. 221697, p. 17; and petition in G.R. No. 221698-700,
p. 22. Annex "M-series", Exhibit "8" (of Tatad case), Exhibit "4" (of
Contreras/Valdez cases) in G.R. No. 221698- 700; and Annex "I-series'', Exhibit
"8" (of Elamparo case) in G.R. No. 221697.
[326]
 "An Act to Define Condominium, Establish Requirements For Its Creation,
And Govern Its Incidents'', enacted on June 18, 1966.

Section 5 of RA No. 4 726 reads:

Sec. 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or

other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided
interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or
shareholdings in the condominium corporation: Provided, however, That where
the common areas in the condominium project are owned by the owners of
separate units as co-owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be
conveyed or transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens. or corporations at
least sixty percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except
in cases of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium
project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid
if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the
corporation will cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits
imposed by existing laws.
See also Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., 588 Phil. 23 (2008).
[327]
 "An Act Amending Section Four And Section Sixteen of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty-Six, Otherwise Known As The
Condominium Act'', approved on February 23, 1995.
[328]
 "AN ACT TO PROMOTE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, PRESCRIBE THE
PROCEDURES FOR REGISTERING ENTERPRISES !JOING BUSINESS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES", enacted on March 28,
1996.
[329]
 See Section 10 of RA No. 7042, as amended by R.A. 8179.
[330]
 See Section 9(f) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, Executive Orders
No. 423 (signed in June 1997) and Executive Order No. 285 (signed in September
4, 2000).

In 2011, the Bureau of Immigration records show that the Philippines had more
than 26,000 foreign students enrolled in various Philippine schools; more than
7,000 of these are college enrollees while the rest were either in elementary and
high school or taking short-term language courses
(see http://globalnation.inquirer.net/9781/philippines-has-26k-foreign-students las
accessed on February 12, 2016).

See also The International Mobility of Students in Asia and the Pacific, published
in 2013 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization http://www.uis.unesco.org/Libraiy/Documents/international-student-
mobility-asia-pacificeducation-2013-en.pdf (last accessed on February 12, 2016);
and Immigration Policies on Visiting and Returning Overseas Filipinos

http://www.cfo.gov.ph/pdf/handbook/Immigration_Policies_on_Visiting_and_Ret
urning_Overseas_Filipinos-chapterIV.pdf (last accessed on February 12, 2016).
[331]
 See Sections 25 and 28(8) of the NIRC.
[332]
 See Comelec's en banc's December 23, 2015 resolution in SPA Nos. 15-
002(DC), 15-007(DC) and 15-139(DC), Annex "B" of GR Nos. 221698-700
(Tatad case).
[333]
 In her Memorandum, Poe admitted to owning two (2) houses in the U.S. up to
this day, one purchased in 1992 and the other in 2008. She, however, claims to no
longer reside in them. Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 278-279.
[334]
 See page 19 of the Comelec en banc 's December 23, 2015 resolution in SPA
No. 15-001 (DC) (Elamparo case), Annex "B" of G.R. No. 221697.

DISSENTING OPINION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A person who aspires to occupy the highest position in the land must obey the
highest law of the land.[1]

Since the second Monday of May of 1992 and every six years thereafter, [2] the
Filipino people have been exercising their sacred right to choose the leader who
would steer the country towards a future that is in accordance with the aspirations
of the majority as expressed in the fundamental law of the land. At stake is the
Presidency, the highest position in the land.

The President wields a vast array of powers which includes "control of all the
executive departn1ents, bureaus and offices."[3] He/she is also the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines[4] and can "grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment,"[5] as well as amnesty, subject to the concurrence of Congress.
[6]
 For the rest of the world, he/she is the representation and the representative of
the Filipino people.

Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) aspires to occupy

the exalted position of the President of the Republic of the Philippines so that on
October 15, 2015, she filed her Certificate of Candidacy (2015 CoC) attesting that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of this country for 10 years and
11 months immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections. However, several
sectors were not convinced of petitioner's representations, prompting them to file
petitions to deny due course to and cancel her 2015 CoC and for disqualification.
The cases

Before us are petitioner's consolidated Petitions for Certiorari assailing the

Commission on Elections' (Comelec) Resolutions which cancelled her 2015 CoC.
In GR. No. 221697, the Petition for Certiorar[7] assails the Second Division's
December 1, 2015 Resolution[8] and the En banc's December 23, 2015
Resolution[9] in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) which granted private respondent Estrella
C. Elamparo's (Elamparo) Petition and cancelled petitioner's 2015 CoC for
President. In GR. Nos. 221698-700, the Petition for Certiorari[10] assails the First
Division's December 11, 2015 Resolution[11] and the En banc's December 23, 2015
Resolution[12] which granted private respondents Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez's (Valdez) petitions in
SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC),
respectively, and likewise cancelled petitioner's 2015 CoC for President.

Factual Antecedents

On September 3, 1968, petitioner, who was then still an infant, was found
abandoned in Jaro, Iloilo City.[13] Her biological parents were unknown. Five years
later, petitioner was adopted by spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa
Sonora Poe. In 1991, petitioner graduated from Boston College in Massachusetts,
with a degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies.

On July 27, 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a

citizen of both the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.A. or U.S.)
from birth, at the Santuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan.[14] On July 29, 1991,
the couple left the Philippines, settled in the U.S., and started a family there. On
October 18, 2001, petitioner became a naturalized U.S. citizen.[15]

On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance[16] to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225[17] (RA 9225). On July 18, 2006,
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued an Order[18] granting her
petition for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under the said law.

On August 31, 2006, petitioner registered as a voter in Barangay Sta. Lucia, San

Juan.[19] After more than three years, petitioner secured a Philippine passport valid
until October 12, 2014.[20]

On October 6, 2010, petitioner was appointed as Chairperson of the Movie and

Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).

On October 20, 2010, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of

Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship (Affidavit of Renunciation).[21] The following day, October 21, 2010,
petitioner took her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson before President
Benigno S. Aquino III.[22]

On July 12, 2011, petitioner executed a document entitled Oath/Affirmation of

Renunciation of Nationality of the United States[23] before the U.S. Vice-Consul.
Thus, on December 9, 2011, the latter issued her a Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States.[24]
In a bid for a Senate seat, petitioner secured and accomplished a CoC for
Senator[25] on September 27, 2012 (2012 CoC). To the question "PERIOD OF
RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE MAY 13, 2013," she answered
six years and six months. Then on October 2, 2012, petitioner filed said CoC with
the Comelec.

Petitioner won and was proclaimed Senator of the Philippines on May 16, 2013.

In June 2015, Navotas Rep. Tobias M. Tiangco pointed out through the media that
based on petitioner's entry in her 2012 CoC, she does not meet the 10-year
residency requirement for purposes of the 2016 presidential election.

Desirous of furthering her political career in the Philippines, and notwithstanding

the looming issue on her period of residency in the Philippines, petitioner next
focused on the Presidency and filed her CoC therefor on October 15, 2015.

The Petitions before the Comelec:

1) SPA No. 15-001 (DC)- (Elamparo Petition, now GR. No. 221697)

On October 21, 2015, Elamparo filed before the Come lee a Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.[26] Elamparo asserted that petitioner
falsely represented to the Filipino people that she had been a resident of the
Philippines for a period of 10 years and 11 months immediately prior to the May
9, 2016 elections and that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Elamparo
advanced the following arguments in support of her position that petitioner is not a
natural-born Filipino:

a) Under the 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of petitioner's birth,
"the status of natural-born citizen could be determined only by descent from a
known Filipino father or mother."[27] Since petitioner's biological parents were
unknown, she could not categorically declare that she descended from Filipino
parents.

b) Petitioner's subsequent adoption by Filipino citizens did not vest upon her a
natural-born status. Adoption merely "established a juridical relationship between
her and her adoptive parents"[28] but did not confer upon her the citizenship of her
adoptive parents.[29] Moreover, adoption laws are civil in nature; they do not
detem1ine citizenship which is a political matter.[30]

c) No international agreement or treaty supports petitioner's claim of natural-born

citizenship.

c-1) The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws provides that State laws determine who are its nationals. [31]

c-2) Petitioner could not rely on the presumption provided in Article 2 of the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness that a "foundling found in the
territory of a Contracting State" is born to "parents possessing the nationality of
that State" for the following reasons: One, the Philippines could not be considered
as a "Contracting State" since it did not ratify or accede to the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction ofStatelessness.[32] Two, even on the assun1ption that the
Philippines will ratify the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, it
will not have any retroactive application on the case of petitioner pursuant to
Section 2, Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties[33] and
Section 12(3) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Three,
while admittedly, non-signatories to international agreements may be bound by
such agreements if such agreements are transformed into customary laws, [34] the
presumption under Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness has not yet ripened into customary international law as to bind the
Philippines.[35]

c-3) The 1959 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child and the 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child have no binding force.[36] The principle
stated therein that a child is entitled to a nationality is merely "an authoritative
statement" with no corresponding "demandable right."[37] In any case, what is
conferred by these declarations is nationality, not natural-born status. Moreover,
municipal law governs matters of nationality.[38]

d) Mere presumption of natural-born citizenship does not comply with the strict

constitutional requirement.[39] No uncertainty on the qualification of the President
must be entertained.[40]

e) "Place of birth is not a recognized means of acquiring such citizenship, much

less a reason to claim that one is a natural-born Filipino."[41] Petitioner has the
burden of proving her natural-born status.[42]

f) RA 9225 applies only to former natural-born Filipinos. Since petitioner is not a

natural-born Filipino, then she is not qualified to apply for reacquisition or
retention of citizenship under RA 9225.[43]

g) Even assuming that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino, she lost such status by
becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen.[44] And assuming that she could avail herself
of the benefits of RA 9225, her status as Filipino citizen is considered "not from
birth" but from July 18, 2006 when the BID approved her application for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.[45]

h) "When she applied for reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship and took her
oath of allegiance, she had to perform an act to acquire her Philippine
citizenship"[46] which is anathema or antithetical to the concept of natural-born
citizenship.

i) The use by the petitioner of her U.S. passport even after she renounced her
American citizenship is tantamount to recantation of the renunciation of her U.S.
citizenship[47] pursuant to the rulings in Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections[48] and Amado v. Commission on Elections.[49] During oral arguments
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET), Atty. Manuelito Luna argued that the
records of the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs showed that
petitioner still used her U.S. passport in September 2011 or after her renunciation
of U.S. citizenship.

As regards residency, Elamparo put forth that, at most, petitioner's residency in the
Philippines is only nine years and 10 months, or short of two months to comply
with the residency requirement for Presidency. In support of her contention, she
argued that:

a) Petitioner abandoned her domicile of origin in the Philippines when she became
a naturalized U.S. citizen and established her new domicile of choice in the U.S. [50]

b) Petitioner "did not go to the U.S. and be naturalized as a U.S. citizen to pursue
any calling, profession or business" but with the intention of starting a family
there.[51] Thus, her trips back/visits to the Philippines prior to July 2006 (when she
took the oath of allegiance to the Philippines and applied to reacquire her
Philippine citizenship with the BID) should be considered temporary in nature and
for a specific purpose only;"[52] i.e., to visit family and friends and not to establish
a new domicile or residence.

c) Having established her domicile of choice in the U.S., the burden of proof rests
upon petitioner to prove that she is abandoning her domicile in the U.S. and
establishing a new domicile in the Philippines.[53]

d) Petitioner's status as a naturalized U.S. citizen and her continued use of her U.S.
passport from 2006 to 2011 are indicative of her intention to retain her domicile in
the U.S.[54]

e) Not being a natural-born Filipino, petitioner is not eligible to apply for

reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225. Consequently, she could
not have established her domicile of choice in the Philippines.[55]

f) Even on the argument that petitioner reacquired her Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance, it cannot be said that she automatically regained or
reestablished her new domicile, At most, what she had was the option to choose or
establish a new domicile.[56] Thus, the earliest date that she could have
reestablished her legal residence in the Philippines was on July 18, 2006 when she
reacquired her status as a Filipino citizen.[57] Reckoned from July 18, 2006,
petitioner's residence in the country by May 2016 would only be nine years and 10
months, or two-months shy of the 10-year residency requirement for presidential
candidates.[58]

g) Petitioner is estopped from denying that her residency in the Philippines prior to
the May 13, 2013 elections is six years and six months as stated in her 2012
senatorial CoC.[59]

h) The period of residency stated in petitioner's 2012 CoC cannot be considered as

an honest mistake.[60]

2) SPA Nos.15-002(DC),15-007 (DC) and 15-139 (DC), (the Tatad Petition,

Contreras Petition, and Valdez Petition, now GR. Nos. 221698-700)

Valdez and Contreras also filed petitions seeking to cancel or deny due course to
petitioner's 2015 CoC while Tatad filed a petition for disqualification.

Invoking Section 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,[61] Tatad, in his Petition,

echoed most of Elamparo's arguments that petitioner miserably lacked the
residency and citizenship requirements. In addition, he contended that in case of
conflict between international conventions and treaties on one hand, and the
Constitution on the other, the latter prevails. Moreover, since petitioner has no jus
sanguinis citizenship she could not be considered a natural-born Filipino and
would not be permitted to run for President.[62] Citing the Hague Convention of
1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws, he argued that any question relating to
nationality must be resolved in accordance with the law of the state. [63] He also
pointed out that the 1930 Protocol in Relation to Certain Case of Statelessness, the
1930 Hague Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness, the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, do not have binding effect.[64] He explained that
international rules are at par only with congressional acts and could not in any
manner supplant or prevail over the Constitution.[65]

Anent the issue of residency, Tatad noted that in the 2012 senatorial CoC,
petitioner's period of residence in the country immediately before the May 13,
2013 elections is six years and six months. Adding the period from May 13, 2013
up to May 9, 2016, petitioner's period of residence in the Philippines would only
be nine years and five months, which is short of the 10-year requirement.[66] Tatad
likewise alleged that petitioner's intention to abandon the U.S. domicile and
establish a new domicile in the country could not be inferred from her acts. At
most, petitioner's visits here were only for the purpose of consoling her adoptive
mother and participating in the settlement of the estate of her adoptive father since
her husband remained in the U.S. during this period. In fact, petitioner renounced
her U.S. citizenship only on October 20, 2010,[67] or long after the death of her
adoptive father.

Tatad maintained that petitioner is not qualified to avail herself of RA 9225

because she is not a natural-born Filipino. There is no showing that she descended
from parents who are Filipino citizens.[68] He further posited that the Order of the
BID granting petitioner's application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
was not signed by Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr.; hence, it is
null and void.[69] Finally, Tatad asserted that petitioner's travels to the U.S. after
renouncing her U.S. citizenship are equivalent to a repudiation of her earlier
renunciation.[70]

The Petition[71] filed by Contreras focused only on the failure of petitioner to

comply with the residency requirement and her false representation - that by May
9, 2016 she would have resided in the country for 10 years and 11 months.[72] For
Contreras, it "is a blatant attempt to undermine the rule of law and the Constitution
when one submits a certificate of candidacy falsely claiming the possession of a
qualification that is specified in the Constitution as a requirement to run for
President of the Republic of the Philippines."[73] According to Contreras, petitioner
is deemed to have abandoned her domicile in the Philippines when she became a
naturalized U.S. citizen. And, in order for her to have at least 10 years of residency
in the country, she should have reacquired her Philippine domicile at the latest by
May 9, 2006. However, since she reacquired her Philippine citizenship only on
July 18, 2006, petitioner failed to comply with the 10 year residency requirement.
Her visits in the country before July 18, 2006 should not inure to her benefit since
at that time she was traveling not as a Filipino but as a U.S. citizen. [74] By his
reckoning, petitioner's residency in the country by May 9, 2016 would only be
nine years, nine months and 22 days.[75]
Contreras postulated that had petitioner really intended to establish a new domicile
in the Philippines and to abandon her U.S. domicile, she should have applied for
an immigrant status before the BID which will in turn issue an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR).[76] Contreras noted that in her application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, petitioner did not indicate an ICR
or an Alien Certificate of Registration, unlike on the part of her three children,
which "would have been relevant information x x x on the issue of her
residence."[77]

For his part, Valdez, in his Petition[78] to cancel or deny due course to petitioner's
CoC, argued that since petitioner had to perform an overt act to reacquire her
citizenship, then she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen as defined in Article IV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.[79] Valdez asserted that it is not possible for
petitioner to reacquire a natural-born status on July 18, 2006 since at that time she
had dual allegiance to the Philippines and the U.S. which is prohibited under
Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution.[80] Neither did RA 9225 bestow a natural-
born status upon her; at most, she was "only 'deemed' not to have lost her
Philippine citizenship."[81]

Valdez also contended that petitioner lacked the residency requirement or

misrepresented her period of residency. He pointed out that petitioner cited
varying dates regarding the establishment of her residency in the Philippines. [82] In
her 2015 CoC, petitioner claimed that by May 9, 2016 she would have resided in
the country for a period of 10 years and 11 months. By simple mathematical
computation, petitioner was claiming that she started residing in the Philippines in
June 2005. In stark contrast, petitioner stated in her 2012 CoC that her residency in
the country prior to May 13, 2013 is six years and six months, which means that
she has been a resident of the Philippines only since November 13, 2006. [83] For
Valdez, the "conflicting admissions x x x [petitioner] voluntarily, willingly, and
knowingly executed as to when she established her residency in the Philippines
[demonstrate] a deliberate attempt on her part to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would render her ineligible for the position of President of the Philippines."[84]

Valdez reckoned that July 18, 2006 would be the earliest date that petitioner could
have established her new domicile of choice as this was the time she reacquired
her Philippine citizenship. Valdez insisted that her stay in the Philippines prior to
reacquiring Philippine citizenship could not be favorably considered for purposes
of the residency requirement.[85] He emphasized that at that time, petitioner did not
even secure a permanent resident visa; consequently, she could only be considered
as a foreigner temporarily residing in the country.[86] He elaborated that petitioner's
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship did not affect her domicile; what petitioner
had at the time was only an option to change or establish a new domicile of choice.
[87]

Valdez averred that petitioner could not claim "honest mistake made in good
faith"[88] especially "when one runs for public office and for a national post x x x
[as] natural human experience and logic dictate that one should be very well aware
of the qualifications required for that position and whether x x x one possesses
those qualifications. x x x More importantly, one is highly expected to give
accurate information as regards his/her qualifications."[89]

Finally, Valdez opined that petitioner failed to prove that she intended to
permanently reside in the Philippines for a period of 10 years prior to the May 9,
2016 elections. Having already abandoned her domicile in the Philippines upon
her naturalization as a U.S. citizen, it can only be construed that her subsequent
trips to the Philippines were temporary in nature. More importantly, petitioner's
2014 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) showed that she still
maintains two houses in the U.S.[90] which she bought in 1992 and in 2008.

The Answers of Petitioner before the Comelec:

1) SPA No. 15-001 (DC) (Elamparo Petition)

Petitioner claimed that Elamparo's Petition failed to state a cause of action for it
did not aver that there was a false representation in her 2015 CoC amounting to a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible or that it was intended to deceive the electorate as
regards the candidate's qualifications.[91] She also posited that the burden of proof
rests upon Elamparo to show that her representations in the CoC are false. [92] She
alleged that the pronouncement in the 1967 case of Paa v. Chan[93] to the effect that
there is no presumption of Philippine citizenship had already been superseded by
later rulings.[94]

Petitioner also assailed the jurisdiction of the Comelec. She claimed that it is the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which has the primacy jurisdiction to rule on the
validity of the June 18, 2006 Order of the BID granting her natural-born status;
[95]
 and pending this determination, the Comelec must refrain from ruling on
whether she could avail herself of the benefits of RA 9225.[96] In addition, she
averred that the Elamparo Petition is essentially one for quo warranto since it
seeks a ruling on her eligibility or lack of qualifications and therefore must be
lodged with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). However, since there is no
election yet and no winner had been proclaimed, the Petition is premature.[97]

Petitioner asserted that she is a natural-born Filipino based on the intent of the
framers of the 1935 Constitution[98] and treaties such as the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child[99] and the 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Right.[100] She averred that although these treaties were not yet
in force at the time of her birth, they could be given retroactive application.[101] In
addition, generally accepted principles of international law and customary
international law support her thesis that she is a natural-born Filipino. She also
cited the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Conflict of
Nationality Laws[102] and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
[103]

Petitioner insisted that "the natural-born citizenship of a person may be established

using presumptions."[104] She maintained that "there is nothing unconstitutional
about presuming that [she] was born of Filipinos or that she is a natural-born
Filipino, even though she cannot, as yet, prove that she is related by blood to
citizens of the Philippines."[105] Petitioner claimed that by the official acts of the
Philippine Government, she had been repeatedly and consistently recognized as a
natural-born Filipino thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is a natural-
born Filipino.[106] Moreover, she surmised that since she was not naturalized, then
she is natural-born.[107]
Petitioner conceded that she abandoned her Philippine citizenship by becoming a
naturalized U.S. citizen on October 18, 2001. However, she claimed that she
reacquired her natural-born Filipino status by virtue of RA 9225[108] particularly
when she took her oath of allegiance[109] on July 7, 2006. Thereafter, she
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She insisted that she never repudiated the
renunciation of her U.S. citizenship.[110]

As regards the issue of residency, petitioner maintained that by May 9, 2016, she
would have resided in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months. She asserted
that since May 24, 2005[111] she had been bodily present in the Philippines and that
her subsequent acts, which "must be viewed 'collectively' and not 'separately' or in
isolation,"[112] were indicative of her intention to permanently stay in the country.
[113]
 Otherwise stated, on May 24, 2005, she left the U.S. for good[114] without
intention of returning there.[115] She opined that her occasional trips to U.S. did not
negate her intent to reside permanently in the Philippines.[116] Neither would
possession of a U.S. passport be considered indicative of her intent to return to the
U.S. She explained that she kept her U.S. passport "in the meantime because it was
plainly convenient for travel purposes."[117]

Petitioner also contended that she could legally establish her domicile in the
Philippines even before reacquiring her Philippine citizenship.[118] She surmised
that domicile or residence required only physical presence and intent, and not
necessarily Filipino citizenship.[119] She posited that "residency is independent of,
or not dependent on, citizenship."[120] In fact, RA 9225 by which she reacquired her
Filipino citizenship "treats citizenship independently of residence."[121] She argued
that if only Filipinos could establish residence in the Philippines, "then no alien
would ever qualify to be naturalized as a Filipino, for aliens must be residents
before they can be naturalized."[122]

Finally, petitioner admitted that she committed a mistake, albeit an honest one and
in good faith, when she claimed in her 2012 senatorial CoC that her period of
residence was six years and six months.[123] She insisted that despite said mistake,
she still complied with the two-year residency requirement for senatorial
candidates; that she misinterpreted the phrase "period of residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013;" and that she reckoned her period of residence in
the Philippines from March-April 2006 as this was the time that her family had
substantially wrapped up their affairs in the U.S.[124] She claimed that her period of
residence should be reckoned from May 24, 2005, as stated in her 2015
presidential CoC.[125] She asserted that she is not estopped from correcting her
mistake, which in fact she did when she executed her 2015 CoC. [126]

2) SPA No. 15-002 (DC)- (Tatad Petition)

Petitioner's Answer[127] to Tatad's Petition is almost a restatement of the arguments

she raised in her Answer to the Elamparo Petition. In addition, she averred that
although Tatad's Petition was filed under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code[128] (OEC) in relation to Section 1, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules, it failed to
allege grounds for disqualification as enumerated thereunder.[129] Instead, it cited
lack of citizenship and residency requirements which are not grounds for a petition
filed under Section 68 of the OEC. According to petitioner, if Tatad's Petition
were to be considered a quo warranto petition, it should be filed with the PET and
only if petitioner "is elected and proclaimed President, and not before then."[130] As
such, the Tatad Petition must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
[131]
 Moreover, the Tatad Petition could not be considered as a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC as it did not allege as ground material misrepresentation
in the CoC; neither did it pray for the cancellation of or denial of due course to
petitioner's CoC.[132]

3) SPA No. 15-139 (DC) - Valdez Petition

Likewise, petitioner's Answer[133] to the Petition of Valdez repleads the arguments

in her Answer to the Elamparo Petition. At the same time, she stressed that
considering that her "representation in her [CoC] on her citizenship is based on
prevailing law and jurisprudence on the effects of repatriation and [RA 9225] x x x
said representation in her [CoC] cannot be considered 'false.'"[134] As regards the
issue of residency, particularly on Valdez's postulation that petitioner's period of
residence must be counted only from October 20, 2010 or upon renunciation of her
U.S. citizenship, petitioner countered that such argument "would be tantamount to
adding a fourth requisite"[135] in establishing a new domicile of choice, that is,
possession of permanent resident visa/possession of Philippine citizenship and/or
prior renunciation of U.S. citizenship.[136] Petitioner reiterated that she could
legally reestablish her Philippine domicile even before renouncing her U.S.
citizenship in 2010.[137] As regards Valdez's allegation that petitioner still maintains
two houses in the U.S. (after she took her oath of allegiance to the Philippines, and
even purchased one of the houses in 2008 after she took her oath in 2006, and after
they supposedly sold their family home in the U.S. in 2006), petitioner couched
her denial as follows:
2.13. The allegation in paragraph 98 of the Petition is DENIED insofar as it is
made to appear that Respondent "resides" in the 2 houses mentioned in said
paragraph. The truth is that Respondent does not "reside" in these houses, but in
her family home in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City (where she has lived with her
family for almost a decade).[138]
4) SPA No. 15-007 (DC)- (Contreras Petition)

Petitioner's Answer[139] to the Petition filed by Contreras is likewise a reiteration of

her contentions in the Answer she filed to the Elamparo Petition. She maintained
that she did not commit any material misrepresentation in her 2015 CoC when she
stated that by May 9, 2016, she would have resided in the Philippines for 10 years
and 11 months.[140] She also averred that she could legally reestablish her domicile
in the Philippines even before she reacquired her natural-born citizenship.[141]

Rulings of the Commission on Elections

A. SPA No. 15-001 (DC) - Elamparo Petition

On December 1, 2015, the Second Division of the Comelec issued its

Resolution[142] granting Elamparo's Petition and cancelling petitioner's 2015 CoC.
It held that petitioner's representations in her CoC with regard to her citizenship
and residency are material because they pertain to qualifications for an elective
office.[143] Next, it ruled that petitioner's representation that she would have resided
in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months immediately preceding the May 9,
2016 elections is false vis-a-vis the admission she made in the 2012 CoC that her
residence in the Philippines prior to May 13, 2013 was only six years and six
months. It characterized petitioner's claim of honest mistake as self-serving.
Besides, there was no showing of any attempt to correct the alleged honest
mistake. The Second Division also noted that the earliest point from which to
reckon petitioner's residency would be on July 18, 2006 when the BID granted her
application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225. Thus, her
period of residence prior to May 2016 would only be nine years and 10 months, or
two months short of the required period of residence. The Second Division opined
that prior to July 2006, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed her to stay as a visitor
or as a resident alien.[144]

The Comelec's Second Division rejected petitioner's claim that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. It held that the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on
citizenship clearly showed that only children born of Filipino fathers are
considered n.atu. ral-b.orn. As such, the representation in the 2015 CoC that she is
a natural-born Filipino is false.[145] The Second Division also ruled that as a well-
educated Senator, petitioner ought to know that she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen since our country has consistently adhered to the jus sanguinis principle.
[146]
 It likewise rejected petitioner's argument that the members of the 1934
Constitutional Convention intended to include children of unknown parents as
natural-born citizens, reasoning out that a critical reading of the entire records of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention discloses no such intent.[147] It also gave short
shrift to petitioner's invocation of international law, particularly the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, because the Philippines is not a signatory thereto; besides, these
international laws/conventions do not categorically state that children of unknown
parents must be categorized as natural-born. Furthermore, even assuming that
these conventions or treaties classified these children as natural-born, the same
could not supplant or alter the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on citizenship.
[148]

The Comelec's Second Division found that petitioner deliberately attempted to

mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, when she declared in her 2015 CoC that her
period of residency immediately prior to May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11
months.[149] However, as regards her citizenship, it ruled that there was no
conclusive evidence of any deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
from the electorate. It ratiocinated that the citizenship issue regarding foundlings is
one of first impression and thus petitioner could be presumed to have acted in
good faith in making such a declaration.[150]

Both petitioner and Elamparo moved for reconsideration. While petitioner prayed
for a complete reversal of the Comelec's Second Division ruling, Elamparo prayed
for partial reconsideration,[151] that is, for the Comelec to pronounce petitioner as
likewise guilty of misrepresenting her citizenship status. She pointed out that there
is a pattern of misrepresentation on the part of petitioner regarding her citizenship.
She claimed that in three certificates of title[152] issued prior to July 2006, petitioner
declared that she was a Filipino when in fact she was not; and, that in her Petition
for Retention and/or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship Under RA 9225,
petitioner also falsely represented that she "is a former natural-born Philippine
citizen born x x x to Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a Filipino citizen and Jesusa Sonora
Poe, a Filipino citizen."
On December 23, 2015, the Comelec En Banc issued its Resolution[153] denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and granting Elamparo's motion for partial
reconsideration. Accordingly, it declared that petitioner is likewise guilty of
misrepresenting her citizenship in her 2015 CoC, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
[petitioner] is hereby DENIED and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
[Elamparo] is hereby GRANTED.

ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution dated 1 December 2015 of the COMELEC

Second Division is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. [Petitioner's]
Certificate of Candidacy for President in the 9 May 2016 National, Local and
ARMM Elections contains material misrepresentations as to both her citizenship
and residency.

THEREFORE, the Certificate of Candidacy for President in the 9 May 2016

National, Local and ARMM elections filed by [petitioner] Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.

FURTHER, the Urgent Motion to Exclude of [Elamparo] is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[154]
The Comelec En Banc debunked petitioner's allegation in her motion for
reconsideration that the Second Division based its Resolution on the 2012 CoC
alone. It clarified that the Second Division, much like trial courts, is not obliged to
itemize all the evidence presented by the parties, but only that it should duly
evaluate such evidence.[155] In any event, the Comelec En Banc again scrutinized
the evidence presented by the petitioner and concluded that they all pertained to
events that transpired before July 2006,[156] or prior to her reacquisition of her
Philippine citizenship. Thus, the same had no probative value in light of settled
jurisprudence that "the earliest possible date that petitioner could reestablish her
residence in the Philippines is when she reacquired her Filipino citizenship [in]
July 2006."[157] The Comelec En Banc held that petitioner's statement in her 2012
CoC was properly considered as an admission against interest and being a notarial
document is presumed to be regular.[158] It also held that the burden rests upon
petitioner to prove that the 2015 CoC contained uue statements and that the
declarations made in the 2012 CoC were not done in bad faith.[159]

The Comelec En Banc was not convinced that petitioner "stated truthfully her
period of residence in the [2015] CoC" and that "such false statement was made
without a deliberate attempt to mislead."[160] It considered petitioner's so-called
public acknowledgment of her mistakes as contrived since they were delivered at
the time when the possibility of her running for President was already a matter of
public knowledge.[161] The Comelec En Banc held that:
Indeed, this Commission finds it hard to believe that a woman as well-educated as
[petitioner], who was then already a high-ranking public official with, no doubt, a
competent staff and a band of legal advisers, and who is not herself entirely
unacquainted with Philippine politics being the daughter of a former high-profile
presidential aspirant, would not know how to correctly fill-up [sic] a pro-forma
COC in 2013. We are not convinced that the subject entry therein was [an] honest
mistake.[162]
On the issue of citizenship, the Comelec En Banc ruled that petitioner cannot rely
on presumptions to prove her status as natural-born citizen.[163] It concurred with
the Second Division that the cited international laws/conventions have no binding
force.[164] It also held that it is not bound by the November 17, 2015 Decision of
the SET in a quo warranto proceeding questioning petitioner's qualification as a
Senator where she was declared as a natural-born Filipino. The Comelec En Banc
ratiocinated that it is an independent constitutional body which does not take its
bearings from the SET or any other agency of the government; and that in any
case, the SET's Decision has been elevated to and is still pending with this Court.
[165]

In addition, the Comelec En Banc lent credence to Elamparo 's claim that there is
substantial evidence, borne out by public documents, showing petitioner's pattern
of misrepresentation as regards her citizenship.[166] The Comelec En Banc opined
that petitioner's educational attainment and other prevailing circumstances,
coupled with the simplicity and clarity of the terms of the Constitution, lead to no
other conclusion than that she made the false material representation in her 2015
CoC to mislead the electorate into thinking that she is a Filipino and eligible to run
for President.[167] Thus, the Comelec En Banc modified the Resolution of the
Second Division by holding that petitioner committed material false representation
in her citizenship as well.

B. On the Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez Petitions

The Comelec's First Division, in its December 11, 2015 Resolution, [168] arrived at
the same conclusion that petitioner falsely represented her citizenship and period
of residency. Hence it ordered the cancellation of petitioner's 2015 CoC. Apart
from the ratiocinations similar to those made in the resolution of Elamparo's
Petition, the Comelec's First Division made some additional points.

On the procedural aspect, the Comelec's First Division held that although the
Petition of Tatad was denominated as a petition for disqualification, it is not barred
from taking cognizance of the same since it "impugns the citizenship and
residency of [petitioner], and therefore generally questions the truthfulness of her
CoC stating that she has the qualification and eligibility to run for and be elected
President x x x."[169] And since the said Petition raised proper grounds for
cancellation of a CoC under Section 1,[170] Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, it falls within the Comelec's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78 of the
OEC.

As to the Comelec 's jurisdiction over the questioned citizenship, the Comelec's
First Division held that it is not bound by the BID Order; otherwise, it would be
deprived of its constitutionally-granted power to inquire into the aspiring
candidate's qualifications and to determine whether there is commission of
material misrepresentation.[171]

Lastly, the Comelec's First Division thumbed down petitioner's clain1s that the
petitions are premature and that the issues raised therein are appropriate in a quo
warranto proceeding. The Comelec's First Division pointed out that the petitions
raised the issue of material misrepresentation;[172] it also declared that petitioner's
CoC is riddled with inconsistencies with regard to her period of residency, which
is indicative of her deliberate attempt to mislead; and that the Comelec has
Jurisdiction over the petitions since they were filed before proclamation. [173]

On the substantive aspect, the Comelec's First Division, with regard to petitioner's
citizenship status, held that those persons who are not' included in the enumeration
of Filipino citizens in the 1935 Constitution, such as petitioner, should not be
considered as Filipino citizens.[174] It opined that "[e]xtending its application to
those who are not expressly included in the enumeration and definition of natural-
born citizens is a disservice to the rule of law and an affront to the
Constitution."[175] It ruled that one's citizenship must not be anchored on mere
presumptions and that any doubt thereon must be resolved against the claimant
who bears the burden of proof.[176]

The Comelec 's First Division also held that no international law supports
petitioner's claim of natural-born citizenship.[177] In any event, the status of
international laws is equivalent to or at par with legislative enactments only and
could not in any manner supplant or prevail over the Constitution.[178] Neither can
petitioner find solace in generally accepted principles of international law and
customary international law as there is no showing that recognition of persons
with unknown parentage as natural-born citizens of the country where they are
found has become established, widespread and consistently practiced among
states.[179] The Comelec's First Division posited that, if at all, persons with no
known parents may be considered Filipino citizens, but not natural-born Filipino
citizens.[180] Ergo, petitioner could not have validly availed of the benefits of
repatriation under RA 9225. Even on the assumption that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen, it could not be said that she reacquired such status by virtue of RA
9225; what she reacquired was merely Philippine citizenship, not her purported
natural-born status.[181]

As regards petitioner's residency, the Comelec's First Division pointed out that
petitioner can only start counting her residency, at the earliest, from July 2006
when she reacquired her Philippine citizenship; and that from that point, her intent
to permanently reside here became manifest only when she registered as a voter
of Barangay Sta. Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006. Hence, she is deemed
to have reestablished her Philippine domicile only from said date.[182]

The Comelec En Banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration[183] and

affirmed the First Division in a Resolution[184] dated December 23, 2015.

Aside from upholding the reasons underlying the Comelec's First Division's
Resolution, the Comelec En Banc stressed that assuming, for the sake of
argument, that petitioner may invoke the presumption that she is a natural-born
citizen, establishing this presumption by solid, incontrovertible evidence is a
burden that shifted to her when she admitted that she does not know who her
biological parents are.[185]

The dispositive portion of the Comelec En Banc Resolution in the Tatad,

Contreras and Valdez Petitions reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR
MARY GRACE NATNIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution
dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[186]
Hence, these Petitions for Certiorari brought via Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.[187] In both Petitions, petitioner "seeks to nullify, for having
been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction"[188] the assailed Comelec Resolutions.

On December 28, 2015, this Court issued Temporary Restraining

Orders[189] enjoining the Comelec from cancelling petitioner's 2015 CoC due to
time constraints before these petitions could be resolved and so as not to render the
same moot and academic should this Court rule in petitioner's favor. Then, in a
Resolution[190] dated January 12, 2016, the petitions were consolidated.

I find that the Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion or exercise its
judgment in a whimsical or capricious manner as to amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the cancellation of and denying due course to petitioner's
2015 CoC.

The power of this Court to review the

assailed Resolutions is limited to the
determination of whether the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion;
the burden lies on the petitioner to
indubitably show that the Comelec
whimsically or capriciously exercised
its judgment or was "so grossly
unreasonable" as to exceed the limits
of its jurisdiction in the appreciation
and evaluation of the evidence.

It bears stressing at the outset that these petitions were brought before this Court
via Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, as held
in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, [191] this Court's review power is based on a
very limited ground - the jurisdictional issue of whether the Comelec acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

We explained in Mitra that:
As a concept, 'grave abuse of discretion' defies exact definition; generally, it refers
to 'capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction'; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of
wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a
decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC,
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial
evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support
a conclusion.

In the light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do

not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally
involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation

and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its jurisdiction to the point of
being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to inter1vene. When grave abuse of discretion is present,
resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one
of jurisdiction.[192]
In fine, there is grave abuse of discretion when the exercise of judgment is
capricious, whimsical, despotic or arbitrary, engendered by reason of passion and
hostility. Also, the abuse of discretion must be so gross and so patent as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

In Sabili v. Commission on Elections,[193] this Court spoke, through Chief Justice

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, that there is an error of jurisdiction when the
Comelec's appreciation and evaluation of evidence is so grossly unreasonable.[194]

Pursuant thereto, it is incumbent upon petitioner to clearly demonstrate via these

petitions that the Comelec was so grossly unreasonable in the appreciation and
evaluation of the pieces of evidence submitted that it overstepped the limits of its
jurisdiction.

In short, petitioner must satisfactorily hurdle this high bar set in Sabili and
companion cases in order for the petitions to be granted.

In these petitions, the Comelec found that petitioner committed material

misrepresentation when she stated in her 2015 CoC that her period of residence in
the Philippines up to the day before May 9, 2016 is 10 years, 11 months and that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that her
evidence, which the Comelec allegedly disregarded, negates any false material
representation on her part.

But first off, the procedural questions.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The respective petitions filed

by respondents with the Comelec were
properly characterized as petitions
for cancellation and/or denial of due
course to petitioner's 2015 CoC

Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Comelec the
power and function to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." This
constitutional grant of power is echoed in Section 52 of the OEC which
emphasizes that the Comelec has "exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections." Also, in Bedol v.
Commission on Elections,[195] this Court explained that the Comelec's quasi-
judicial functions pertain to its power "to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies x x x.[196]

In line with this power, Section 78[197] of the OEC, in relation to Section
74[198] thereof, provides for a mechanism for the cancellation or denial of due
course to a CoC based on the exclusive ground of material misrepresentation. The
misrepresentation must refer to a material fact, such as one's citizenship or
residence.[199]

To be sufficient, a Section 78 petition must contain the following ultimate facts:

"(1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the representation
pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the
candidate (the right to run for the elective position for which he filed his
certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the intention
to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render him
ineligible."[200]

I find that the Petitions filed by Elamparo, Contreras, and Valdez with the
Comelec distinctly and sufficiently alleged the ultimate facts constituting the
cause/s of action for a Section 78 petition.[201] The Petitions of Elamparo and
Valdez both alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations in her CoC in
stating that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least 10 years. The Petition of Contreras alleged the same
commission by petitioner of material misrepresentation with respect to her period
of residency. All three petitions sought the cancellation or denial of due course to
petitioner's 2015 CoC based on the said material misrepresentations which were
allegedly made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to her qualifications
for President.

With respect to Tatad's Petition, petitioner points out that the same was fatally
infirm because while captioned as a "Petition for Disqualification" under Section
68 of the OEC in relation to Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules, the allegations therein
did not make out a case for disqualification. Petitioner posits that Tatad clearly
resorted to a wrong remedy, hence, the Comelec should have dismissed his
petition outright and should not have taken cognizance of it as a petition for
cancellation or denial of due course to a CoC.

Contrary to petitioner's argument, I believe that the Comelec acted correctly in not
outrightly dismissing Tatacl's Petition. In Spouses Munsalud v. National Housing
Authority,[202] this Court held that the dismissal of a complaint "should not be
based on the title or caption, especially when the allegations of the pleading
support an action."[203] "The caption of the pleading should not be the governing
factor, but rather the allegations in it should determine the nature of the action,
because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts [or tribunal] may
nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence introduced."[204] Here, I agree with the Comelec that
the essential facts alleged by Tatad in his Petition do. really establish a clear case
for the cancellation of or denial of due course to petitioner's 2015 COC. Hence, the
Comelec properly treated the same as a Section 78 petition.

In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,[205] this Court declared a petition for

disqualification filed with the Comelec as one for cancellation of or denial of due
course to therein petitioner Mike A. Fermin's CoC. This was after it found that
although captioned as a petition for disqualification, the allegations contained
therein made out a case for cancellation and/or denial of due course to a CoC
under Section 78 of the OEC.

Anent the contention that the Comelec lacks jurisdiction over candidates for
national positions, suffice it to state that Section 78 of the OEC does not
distinguish between CoCs of candidates running for local and those running for
national positions. It simply mentions "certificate of candidacy." Ubi lex non
distinguit nee nos distingu-ere debemus - when the law does not distinguish, we
must not distinguish. This is a basic rule in statutory construction that is applicable
in these cases. Hence, the Comelec has the power to determine if the CoC of
candidates, whether running for a local or for a national position, contains false
material representation. In other words, any person may avail himself/herself of
Section 78 of the OEC to assail the CoC of candidates regardless of the position
for which they are aspiring.

Petitioner further argues that the issues raised by respondents in their petitions
properly pertain to a quo warranto proceeding which can only be initiated after
she should have won the election for and proclaimed as President.

This Court in Fermin had already explained, viz:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made
a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court bas already likened a proceeding under Section
78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they
both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.[206] (Emphasis supplied. Italics in the original.)
While it is admitted that there is a similarity between a petition under Section 78
of the OEC and a quo warranto proceeding in that they both deal with the
eligibility or qualification of a candidate, what sets them apart is the time when the
action is filed, that is, before or after an election and proclamation. As the election
subject of these petitions is yet to be held, there can be no doubt that the issues
raised by respondents were properly set forth in their respective petitions for
cancellation and/or denial of due course to petitioner's CoC.

Therefore, the Comelec was not so grossly unreasonable that it exceeded the limits
of its jurisdiction when it duly characterized the petitions as ones for cancellation
and/or deniai of due course to petitioner's 2015 CoC. Indeed, in these cases the
Comelec did not exercise its judgment in a whimsical, capricious, arbitrary, or
despotic manner. Othe1wise stated, petitioner failed to show that the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
holding that the petitions before it are for cancellation and/or denial of due course
to petitioner's 2015 CoC.

The Comelec did not usurp the

jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.

Apropos to the above discussion is petitioner's argument that the Comelec usurped
the PET's jurisdiction.

As heretofore stated, a petition under Section 78 seeks to cancel a candidate's CoC

before there has been an election and proclamation. Such a petition is within the
Comelec's jurisdiction as it is ''the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies."[207]

On the other hand, the PET is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines."[208] Particularly, the PET has jurisdiction over an election contest
initiated through an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the
President or Vice-President.[209] The PET's adjudicative powers come into play
after the President or the Vice-President concerned had been elected and
proclaimed. Under the PET Rules an election protest may be filed only within 30
days after proclamation of the winner,[210] while a quo warranto petition may be
initiated within 10 days after the proclamation of the winner.[211] In other words, it
is the date of proclamation of the candidate concerned that is determinative of the
time when the PET's jurisdiction attaches.

Pertinently, in Tecson v. Commission on Elections,[212] this Court held that

ordinarily, the term "contest" refers to "post-election scenario" and that election
contests have one objective, which is to unseat the winning candidate. Hence it
stressed that the PET's jurisdiction covers contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President," and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President.

Against this backdrop, it is beyond cavil that the Comelec has the power and
jurisdiction to rule on a petition to deny due course to or to cancel the CoC of a
candidate, whether for a local or national position, who may have committed
material misrepresentation in his/her CoC.

Verily, the Comelec did not usurp, as indeed it could not have usurped, the PET's
jurisdiction if only because the herein petitioner remains a mere candidate for
President and has not yet been elected and proclaimed President. Therefore, the
petitioner failed to prove that the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of these cases.

The validity of Section 8, Rule 23

of the Comelec Rules is upheld.
Petitioner challenges the validity of Section 8, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules
which reads as follows:
Section 8. Effect if Petition Unresolved - If a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy is unresolved by final judgment on the day of
elections, the petitioner may file a motion with the Division or Commission En
Banc as may be applicable, to suspend the proclamation of the candidate
concerned, provided that the evidence for the grounds for denial to or cancel
certificate of candidacy is strong. For this purpose, at least three (3) days prior to
any election, the Clerk of the Commission shall prepare a list of pending cases and
furnish all Commissioners copies of the said list.

A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in case of a Division

ruling, no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, or in
cases of rulings of the Commission En Banc, no restraining order is issued by the
Supreme Court within five (5) days from receipt of the decision or
resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that paragraph 2 of Section 8 above, which declares that rulings
of the Comelec En Banc shall be final within five days from receipt of the
resolution or decision sans any temporary restraining order from this Court, is
invalid because it violates Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution which
gives the aggrieved party 30 days from receipt of the assailed Comelec Resolution
within which to challenge it before the Supreme Court. Section 7 reads:
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
I am, however, unable to perceive any conflict between the two provisions.

Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Rule 23 emanates from the Comelec 's rule-making

power under Section 3 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
At the risk of belaboring a point, the 1987 Constitution explicitly grants the
Comelec rule-making powers in deciding election cases. Thus, in fulfilment of its
Constitutional mandate of deciding election cases with reasonable dispatch, the
Comelec promulgated rules of procedure to provide for an orderly means, ways or
process of deciding election cases. The insertion in the above-quoted Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution of the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or law," makes it abundantly clear that the
Constitution itself recognizes the rule-making power of the Comelec and, as a
necessary corollary, invests it with authority to determine the reasonable period
within which its decision or resolution shall be considered final and executory.

Thus, far from invalidating paragraph 2, Section 8 of Rule 23 of the Comelec

Rules for being contrary to Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, the
two provisions in fact do work in harmony. Under the principle of interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus, every statute must be
so construed in harmony with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[213]

There being no conflict between Section 8, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules and
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and given that this Section 8,
Rule 23 recognizes the Comelec 's rule-making power, the validity of the subject
Comelec rule must be sustained.

The Comelec is not precluded by the

SET's Decision from determining
petitioner's citizenship.

Despite the November 17, 2015 Decision of the SET declaring petitioner a natural-
born Filipino citizen, the Comelec is not precluded from ruling on petitioner's
citizenship.

As earlier explained, the Comelec, under Section 78 of the OEC, has the power to
determine whether a candidate committed any material misrepresentation in his or
her CoC. In view thereof, the Comelec can also properly determine the candidate's
citizenship or residency as an adjunct to or as a necessary consequence of its
assessment on whether the CoC contains material misrepresentation. To my mind,
this does not amount to a usurpation of the SET's power to determine the
qualifications or eligibility of a candidate; neither does it amount to a usurpation of
this Court's prerogative to resolve constitutional issues. Rather, I view it as part of
the Comelec's duty to examine a candidate's representations in his/her CoC
pursuant to the aforementioned Section 78. Clearly, for the Comelec to shirk or
evade from, or to refuse to perform, or abandon this positive duty would amount to
grave abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, the Comelec is an independent constitutional body separate and

distinct from the SET. While the SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the Senate,[214] its decisions
do not have any doctrinal or binding effect on the Comelec. It is settled that there
is "only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts [or tribunals]
should take their bearings."[215] Here, the November 17, 2015 SET Decision is the
subject of a Petition for Certiorari entitled David v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and docketed as GR. No. 221538, that is still pending before this Court.
Until said petition is decided with finality by this Court, any ruling on petitioner's
citizenship does not, subject to the conditions that will be discussed later,
constitute res judicata.

Consequently, the Comelec correctly held that it is not precluded from

determining petitioner's citizenship insofar as it impacts on its determination of
whether the petitioner's CoC contains material false representation. Conversely
stated, petitioner failed to prove that the Comelec acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of these
cases.

The July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau

of Immigration and Deportation is not
binding on the Comelec

Petitioner argues that it is only the DOJ which can revoke the BID's Order
presumptively finding her a natural-born Filipino citizen and approving her
petition for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.[216]

The argument is specious. It is settled that whenever the citizenship of a person is

material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, the decision of the
court or tribunal on the issue of citizenship is generally not considered as res
judicata. This is so because the issue on citizenship may be "threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand."[217] To accept petitioner's contention that
it is the DOJ that has jurisdiction to revoke the grant of her petition for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship would be to veer away from the said settled
rule because this implies that no subsequent contrary findings may be arrived at by
other bodies or tribunals.

In Go, Sr. v. Ramos,[218] this Court held that res judicata may apply in citizenship

cases only if the following conditions or circumstances concur:
1. a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where
said person is a party;

2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and

3. the finding o[f] citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Since the foregoing conditions or circumstances are not present in these cases, the
BID's previous finding on petitioner's citizenship cannot be binding on the
Comelec.

Moreover, while the BID stated in its July 18, 2006 Order that "petitioner was a
former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino
parents,"[219] this is contrary to petitioner's own assertion that she had no known
blood relatives - the very reason why her citizenship is now being questioned.
Notably, too, the BID did not categorically declare that petitioner is a natural-born
Filipino, but merely presumed her to be one.[220] Being merely presumed, that
presumption can be overturned at any time by evidence to the contrary. Most
importantly and as correctly held by the Comelec, it cannot be bound by the BID
Order because a contrary view will deprive it of its constitutional mandate to
inquire into and examine the qualifications of candidates, and determine whether
they committed material misrepresentation in their CoC.[221] Clearly, thus,
petitioner's purported natural-born Filipino citizenship may be correctly
determined by the Comelec, as it in fact already did, despite the aforesaid BID
Order.

In sum, petitioner failed to prove that the Comelec capriciously and whimsically
exercised its judgment, or that it acted in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility, or was so grossly unreasonable when it took cognizance
of the cases; indeed, in these cases, the Comelec committed no error of
jurisdiction.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Material misrepresentation

Under Section 74[222] of the OEC, a person running for public office is required to
state in his CoC the following details:
(1) if running for Member of the [House of Representatives], the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent;

(2) the political party to which he belongs;

(3) civil status;

(4) his date of birth;

(5) residence;

(6) his post office address for all election purposes; and

(7) his profession or occupation.

In addition, the aspirant is required to state under oath that:
(1) he/she is announcing his/her candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he/she is eligible for the said office;

(2) he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;

(3) he/she will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities;

(4) he/she is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;

(5) the obligation imposed by his/her oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and

(6) the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his/her
knowledge.
As previously discussed, Section 78 of the OEC provides that within 25 days from
the time of filing of the CoC, any person may file a petition to deny due course to
and/or to cancel it on the exclusive ground that any material representation stated
therein as required by Section 7 4 of the OEC, is false. In the same vein, Section I,
Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure states that a CoC may be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground that any material representation
contained therein as required by law is false."

In Marcos v. Commission on Elections,[223] this Court declared that there is material

misrepresentation when a statement in a CoC is made with the intent to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,[224] it was explained that to constitute a

material misrepresentation, the false representation must not only pertain to a
material fact which would affect the substantive right of a candidate to run for the
position stated in the CoC, but must also consist of a "deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible."[225] Simply put, the false representation must have been done "with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office."[226]

Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections[227] reiterated the pronouncement that a

material misrepresentation is not just the falsity of the information declared in the
CoC but also consists in the very materiality of the said information, and the
deliberate attempt by the candidate to mislead or deceive the electorate as to that
candidate's qualification for public office.

Stated differently, before the Comelec may deny due course to and/or cancel a
CoC, it must be shown: (a) that the representation pertains to a material fact; (b)
that it is in fact false; and (c) that there was a deliberate attempt to deceive,
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render the candidate
ineligible to run for the position. Under the third element, the deception must be
such as to lead the electorate to believe that the candidate possesses the
qualifications for the position he/she is running for, when in truth the candidate
does not possess such qualifications, thus making him/her ineligible to run.

Here, petitioner wants to run for the Presidency in the 2016 elections and claims in
her 2015 CoC that she possesses the five qualifications set forth in Section 2,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election. (Emphases supplied)
Respondents, however, insist that petitioner committed false material
representation when she declared in her 2015 CoC that she is a natural-born
Filipino and that she is a resident of this country for more than 10 years prior
to the May 9, 2016 elections. (Emphasis supplied.)

In its assailed Resolutions, the Comelec found petitioner to have falsely

represented material facts in her 2015 CoC.

Residency

The controversy with respect to petitioner's residency qualification arose when it

was observed that she made the following entry in Item 11 of her 2012 CoC for
Senator:
PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE MAY 13, 2013:

06   No. of Years           06   No. of Months

Based on the said entry, it could be deduced that by her own reckoning, petitioner
started residing in the Philippines in November 2006. Thus by May 8, 2016, or the
day immediately preceding the elections on May 9, 2016, her period of residency
in the Philippines would only be nine years and six months, or short of the
mandatory 10-year residency requirement for the presidential post. In contrast,
petitioner attested in her 2015 CoC that her period of residency in the Philippines
on the day before the May 9, 2016 elections is "10 years and 11 months." Clearly,
these are contrasting declarations which give the impression that petitioner
adjusted the period of her residency in her 2015 CoC to show that she is eligible to
run for the Presidency. This rendered her vulnerable to the charge that she
committed material misrepresentations in her 2015 CoC.

Section 2 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as reproduced above, requires,

among others, that a person aspiring to become a President must be a resident of
the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election. This
requirement is mandatory and must be complied with strictly. For one, no less than
our Constitution itself imposes it. For another, Section 2 was couched in a
negative form - an indication of the intention of the framers of our Constitution to
make it mandatory. "A statute or provision which contains words of positive
prohibition, such as 'shall not,' 'cannot; or 'ought not,' or which is couched in
negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated,
is mandatory."[228] Moreover, Section 63[229] of Article IX of the OEC imposes the
same 10-year residency requirement.

For purposes of election laws, this Court, as early as 1928,[230] held that the term
residence is synonymous with domicile.[231] Domicile denotes the place "'where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home,' where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain"[232] (animus manendi).

In deviating from the usual concepts of residency, the framers of our Constitutions
intended "'to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community' from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain."[233] Their decision to adopt the
concept of domicile "is rooted in the recognition that [elective] officials x x x
should not only be acquainted with the metes and bounds of their constituencies;
more importantly, they should know their constituencies and the unique
circumstances of their constituents - their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials
for growth and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare.
Familiarity, or the opportunity to be familiar, with these circumstances can only
come with residency x x x."[234] At the same time, the residency requirement gives
the electorate sufficient time to know, familiarize themselves with, and assess the
true character of the candidates.

Domicile is classified into three types according on its source, namely: (1)
domicile of origin, which an individual acquires at birth or his first domicile; (2)
domicile of choice, which the individual freely chooses after abandoning the old
domicile; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law assigns to an
individual independently of his or her intention.[235] A person can only have a
single domicile at any given time.[236]

To acquire a new domicile of choice, one must demonstrate:

1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality;

2. An intention to remain there (animus manendi); and

3. An intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi).[237]

"To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose."[238] In the absence of clear and positive proof of the
above mentioned requisites, the current domicile should be deemed to continue.
Only with clear evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity of residence be rebutted, for a change of legal residence
requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the old domicile.[239] Elsewise
put, if any of the above requisites is absent, no change of domicile will result. [240]

Having dispensed with the above preliminaries, I shall now discuss whether
petitioner satisfactorily proved that the Comelec acted with grave abuse of
discretion an1ounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in ruling that there was
material misrepresentation when she declared in her 2015 CoC that on the day
immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections, she would have been a resident
of this country for 10 years and 11 months. Otherwise stated, was there substantial
evidence showing that petitioner committed material misrepresentation as regards
her period of residency?

Elements of material
misrepresentation in relation
to Petitioner's claimed period
of residence in the Philippines:
a) materiality; b) falsity,· and
c) deliberate attempt to  
deceive, mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact which would
otherwise render her ineligible
to run for the position of
President.

A. Residency as a material fact.

As to the first element, it is jurisprudentially settled that residence is a material fact

because it involves the candidate's eligibility or qualification to run for public
office.[241] In view of this and considering that the parties do not dispute that the
matter of a candidate's residency in the Philippines is a material fact, there is no
need to dwell further upon this element.

B. Falsity of petitioner's
declaration as to the period
of her residency in her
2015 CoC

At this juncture, it must be stressed that on October 18, 2001, petitioner not only
formally abandoned the Philippines as her domicile, but she also renounced her
Philippine citizenship by becoming a naturalized American citizen. She preferred
and chose to be domiciled in the U.S. than in the Philippines. And she did so not
out of necessity or fur temporary leisure or exercise of profession but to
permanently live there with her family. Fifteen years later, petitioner is before this
Court claiming that she had decided to abandon and had in fact abandoned her
U.S. domicile and that she had decided to establish and had in fact established a
new domicile of choice in the Philippines. She would want us to believe that she
had complied with all the requirements in establishing a new domicile of choice.

The question now is: As a U.S. citizen who was domiciled in the U.S., how can
petitioner reestablish her domicile in the Philippines? Obviously, petitioner must
abandon or lose her domicile in the U.S. Also, she has to satisfactorily prove intent
to permanently stay in the country and make the Philippines her new domicile of
choice.

For easy reference, I hereby reiterate the requirements in establishing a new

domicile of choice, to wit: a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; b)
an intention to remain there (animus manendi); and c) an intention to abandon the
old domicile (animus non revertendi).

Petitioners evidence of animus

manendi; earliest possible
date that her physical presence
 
in the Philippines can be
characterized as coupled with
animus manendi.

In support of her claim that from the time she arrived in the Philippines on May
24, 2005 her physical presence here was imbued with animus manendi, petitioner
offered the following evidence:

a. travel records which show that she would consistently return to the
Philippines from her trips abroad;

b. the affidavit of her adoptive mother attesting to the fact that after petitioner
and her children's arrival in the Philippines in early 2005, they first lived
with her in Greenhills, San Juan;

c. school records which show that her children had been attending Philippine
schools continuously since June 2005;

d. TIN which shows that shortly after her return to the Philippines in May
2005, she considered herself a taxable resident and a subject of the
country's tax jurisdiction;

e. Condominium Certificate of Title for Unit 7F and a parking lot at One

Wilson Place purchased in early 2005 and its corresponding Declarations of
Real Property for real property tax purposes;

f. reacquisition of her natural-born Filipino citizenship and applications for

derivative citizenship for her minor children;

g. registration as a voter on August 31, 2006;

h. renunciation of her U.S. citizenship on October 20, 2010;

i. acceptance of her appointment as MTRCB Chairperson on October 21,

2010;

j. Questionnaire - Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S.

Citizenship wherein petitioner indicated that she considered herself a
resident of the Philippines starting May 2005.
Petitioner claims that had the Comelec considered her evidence in its totality and
not in isolation, it would have concluded that she intended to remain in the
Philippines since May 24, 2005.

I do not agree.

What must not be overlooked is that these pieces of evidence fly in the face of the
fact that from May 24, 2005 to July 18, 2006 petitioner was an alien on temporary
sojourn here. It should be emphasized that after petitioner abandoned the
Philippines as her domicile and became a naturalized U.S. citizen on October 18,
2001, the U.S. became her domicile of choice. In Coquilla v. Commission on
Elections[242] and reiterated in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,[243] this Court
held that a Filipino who applies for naturalization as an American citizen has to
establish legal residence in the U.S. which would consequently result in the
abandonment of Philippine domicile as no person can have two domiciles at any
given time. Hence, beginning October 18, 2001, petitioner was domiciled in the
U.S.[244]

When petitioner arrived in the Philippines on May 24, 2005, she in fact did so as a
foreigner balikbayan as she was then still a U.S. citizen. Normally, foreign
nationals are required to obtain a visa before they can visit the Philippines. But
under RA 6768,[245] as amended by RA 9174,[246] foreigner balikbayans[247] are
accorded the privilege of visa-free entry to the Philippines. This visa-free privilege
is, however, not without conditions for it allows such balikbayans to stay in the
Philippines for a limited period of one year only. Thus:
SEC. 3. Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. - The balikbayan and his or her
family shall be entitled to the following benefits and privileges:

xxxx

(c) Visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year for foreign
passport holders, with the exception of restricted nationals.
Since petitioner availed herself of RA 6768, her stay in the Philippines from the
time she arrived here as a foreigner balikbayan on May 24, 2005 was not
permanent in character or for an indefinite period of time. It was merely
temporary. At most, her stay in the Philippines would only be for one year. This
only proves that her stay was not impressed with animus manendi, i.e., the intent
to remain in or at the domicile of choice for an indefinite period of time.[248] Thus
in Coquilla, we did not include the period of the candidate's physical presence in
the Philippines while he was still an alien. In that case, Teodulo M. Coquilla
(Coquilla) was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1965. He returned to the Philippines
in 1998 and was repatriated under RA 8171 on November 7, 2000. He took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines on November 10, 2000. Subsequently, he filed
his CoC for Mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar. A petition to cancel Coquilla's CoC
was filed on the ground of material misrepresentation based on his representation
that he met the one-year residency requirement. This Court affirmed the Comelec
finding that Coquilla lacked the required residency. While Coquilla arrived in the
Philippines as early as 1998, his presence here from that point until his
naturalization on November 10, 2000 was excluded in counting the length of his
residency in the Philippines because during that time he had no right to reside
permanently here. Thus:
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S.
citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November
10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien
without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may
have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.[249]
Also, in the 1966 case of Ujano v. Republic,[250] the trial court denied Melecio
Clarinio Ujano's (Ujano) petition to reacquire citizenship for failure to meet the six
months residency requirement. In so ruling, it reasoned out that Ujano, "who is
presently a citizen of the United States of America, was admitted into this country
as a temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the
present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up
to the present. "[251] This Court adopted and sustained the trial court's ratiocination
and added that "[t]he only way by which [Ujano] can reacquire his lost Philippine
citizenship is by securing a quota for permanent residence so that he may come
within the purview of the residence requirement of Commonwealth Act No.
63."[252] Clearly, as early as 1966, jurisprudence has unrelentingly and consistently
applied the rule that the law does not include temporary visits in the determination
of the length of legal residency or domicile in this country. Indeed it is illogical
and absurd to consider a foreign national to have complied with the requirements
of animus manendi, or intent to permanently stay in this country, if he/she was
only on a temporary sojourn here.

Petitioner's claim that she had established animus manendi upon setting foot in

this country on May 24, 2005 has, therefore, no leg to stand on. The pieces of
evidence she presented in support of this proposition are irrelevant, and are
negated by the undisputed fact that she was then a foreigner temporarily staying
here as a balikbayan. In this context, petitioner's imputation of grave abuse of
discretion falls flat on its face.

I also subjected petitioner's evidence of animus manendi to utmost judicial

scrutiny, particularly in relation to her claim that such intent concurs with her
physical presence in the Philippines beginning May 24, 2005. However, I find
them wanting and insufficient.

I start off with the fundamental precept that if a person alleges that he/she has
abandoned her domicile, it is incumbent upon that person to prove that he/she was
able to reestablish a new domicile of choice.[253] Applied to this case, this means
that it is upon the intrinsic merits of petitioner's own evidence that her claim of
reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines on May 24, 2005 must rise or fall.

After a critical review, I am satisfied that the Comelec correctly found petitioner's
evidence relative to her claim of animus manendi beginning May 24, 2005 both
wanting and insufficient. For instance, securing a TIN is not conclusive proof of
intent to remain in the Philippines considering that under the country's tax laws,
any person, whether a citizen, non-citizen, resident or non-resident of the
Philippines, is required to secure a TIN for purposes of tax payment. If at all,
procurement of a TIN merely suggests or indicates an intention to comply with the
obligation to pay taxes which may be imposed upon any person, whether a citizen
or an alien. In fact, by her own admission, petitioner secured a TIN precisely for
the purpose of "settling her late father's estate."[254] At any rate, a TIN was issued
to petitioner on July 22, 2005,[255] or almost two months after her claimed starting
point of residency in the Philippines.
Under the same parity of reasoning, petitioner's acquisition of a condominium unit
and parking lot at One Wilson Place in San Juan City, as well as her acquisition of
a parcel of land in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City and the subsequent construction
of a house thereon, do not evince an intent to remain in the Philippines for good.
Speaking for the Court in Svetlana Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections,[256] Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno declared that "ownership of a house or some
other property does not establish domicile."[257] After all, acquisition of properties
may also very well be for investment purposes only. Besides, it bears emphasis
that by petitioner's own allegation, the condominium unit and parking lot were
acquired in the second half of 2005, the lot in Corinthian Hills was bought in
2006, and the house standing thereon was constructed that same year (2006)-all
after May 24, 2005.

The claimed intent also becomes shrouded in doubt in light of petitioner's

maintaining a house in the U.S. which she bought in 1992 and the subsequent
acquisition of a residential house in the U.S. in 2008.

It must be stressed that in the Petition of Valdez before the Comelec, particularly
par. 98 thereof, he pointed out that: "per respondent's [herein petitioner] own
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth for 2014, she still maintains two
(2) residential houses in the U.S., one purchased in 1992, and the other in
2008."[258] Petitioner had the opportunity to categorically deny, refute or discuss
head on this contention of Valdez in her Verified Answer. Unfortunately, she did
not seize the chance. Instead, in paragraph 2.13 of her Verified Answer, petitioner
couched her "'denial" that she still owns two houses in the U.S. as follows:
2.13. The allegation in paragraph 98 of the Petition is DENIED insofar as it is
made to appear that [Petitioner] "resides" in the 2 houses mentioned in said
paragraph. The truth is that [Petitioner] does not "reside" in these houses, but in
her family home in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City (where she has lived with her
family for almost a decade).[259]
From the foregoing, petitioner in effect admitted the veracity and truthfulness of
Valdez's assertion regarding the acquisition of the two residential houses; her
denial pe11ained only to the fact that she was residing thereat. Thereafter, no
further mention of this matter was made.

The care by which petitioner crafted her Answer regarding the sale of her family's
real property in the U.S. is also obvious. In her four Verified Answers, she averred
thus:
x x x The family home in the U.S.A. was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.[260]
By adverting solely and exclusively to the "family home" as the real property that
had been sold in April 2006, petitioner effectively avoided, and withheld,
mentioning and discussing her family's other remaining real properties in the U.S.,
such as the two other residential houses.

Also, in Valdez's Comment/Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari,

[261]
 particularly in paragraphs 11.14 and 17 4, he manifested that the existence of
these two houses in the U.S. was in fact admitted, not at all denied, by petitioner.
Thus:
11.14. x x x In 2014, petitioner indicated in her Statement of Assets and Liabilities
that she has two (2) residential properties in the U.S.A., a fact that she also
confirmed during the clarificatory hearing on 25 November 2015 as herein
provided.[262]

174. Her counsel also admitted in the clarificatory hearing that PETITIONER still
own[s] two properties in the US, one purchased in 1992, and the other in 2008, up
to the present time. This is inconsistent with animus non revertendi. In fact, the
properties remain as a physical link with the US which is her domicile of choice
for many years, which is inconsistent with her claim that she completely
abandoned.[263]
Furthermore, during the oral argument on January 19, 2016, the undersigned
inquired if petitioner's family still owns prope1ties of whatever kind in the U.S.
Her counsel denied any knowledge.[264] When it was the turn of Valdez to be
interpellated and the undersigned again brought up the alleged ownership of
petitioner's family of two or more properties in the U.S., Valdez affirmed the
allegation.[265] Constrained to discuss the matter, petitioner now admits in her

Memorandum[266] that she and her family indeed do own two houses in the U.S.

These houses are obviously not considered by petitioner as their family home;
nonetheless, considering the circumstances prevailing in the case, their acquisition
and maintenance are relevant to the determination of whether petitioner had indeed
abandoned her U.S. domicile and whether she had effectively reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines.

Thus, to follow petitioner's proposition that acquisition of residential properties is

an indicia of aminus manendi is actually detrimental to her cause considering that
subsequent to her purchase of a condominium unit and a residential lot in the
Philippines in 2006, she later on acquired a residential property in the U.S. in
2008. In addition, she maintained one other residential property in the U.S. which
was bought in 1992.

I also agree with the observation of respondent Contreras regarding the failure of
petitioner to secure an ICR for herself as she did with her children. For Contreras,
this not only shows that petitioner was fully cognizant of the nature of her
residency status and the applicable laws/rules regarding the same; more
significantly, it was clear and positive evidence of her intention or ambivalence
not to become a permanent resident of the Philippines at that time. Thus:
x x x For foreign nationals, of which petitioner was one prior to her reacquisition
of her Filipino citizenship, intent to remain for good could not just rest on being
physically present, and performing acts such as buying a condominium unit and
enrolling her children here, for such are also the acts of expatriates who are
working in the country. As foreign nationals, to be even considered as resident
aliens, these expats and their dependents have to obtain the appropriate visas for
their stay to be legal. Petitioner fully knew this well, when she registered her
children, who were also foreign nationals like her, with the BI to obtain an ACR
for each of them, as such would have been a requirement for enrolment in schools.
It is for this that she could not feign ignorance of the real nature of her residency
status in the country from 24 May 2005 until July 2006, when she did not possess
an ACR since she failed to register with the BI, and hence did not acquire the
status of a permanent resident in the country. As such, she did not lose her
domicile in the US during that period, and could therefore not rightfully claim to
have re-established her domicile in the Philippines.[267]
x x x [T]he fact that she obtained immigration documents for her three (3) children
in the form of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR), even if she failed to obtain
one for herself, is an incontrovertible proof that she could not claim total
ignorance about the limitations imposed on a non-resident alien in the country.[268]
Finally, it is my opinion that the Comelec correctly considered petitioner's
declarations in her 2012 CoC as an admission against interest. An admission is any
statement of fact made by a party against his/her interest or is inconsistent with the
facts alleged by him/her.[269] It is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, which states:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
"To be admissible, an admission must: (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law;
(b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be
adverse to the admitter's interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and
inadmissible."[270]

All these requisites are present in these cases. The entry in petitioner's 2012
CoC, i.e., six years and six months, refers to her period of residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013 - a matter which without a doubt involves a
question of fact. The same is categorical and definite, and was made under oath.
The entry is adverse to petitioner's interest, specifically in respect to her present
claim in her 2015 CoC that she has been a resident of the Philippines for 10 years
and 11 months up to the day before the May 9, 2016 elections. Clearly, the
questioned entry in petitioner's 2012 CoC is admissible as an admission against
her interest.

"Admissibility, however, is one thing, weight is another."[271] Indeed, when the

admission is contained in a document as in this case, the document is the best
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale
for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself/herself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume
that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his/her fault if it does not.
[272]
 It bears emphasizing, though, that this does not preclude a declarant from
refuting his/her admission.[273] In this case, petitioner must show clear, convincing,
and more than preponderant evidence in order to refute the facts stated in her 2012
CoC considering that it is a sworn document which the Rules of Court presumes
had been executed in the regular course of law.[274]

Petitioner thus asserts that the statement in the 2012 CoC about her period of
residence was a result of an honest mistake and not binding on her. She
invokes Marcos v. Commission on Elections where we held that "it is the fact of
residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution's
residency qualification requirement."

However, I am not convinced with petitioner's invocation of honest mistake.

Among other reasons, the defense of honest mistake interposed in Marcos was
found tenable because therein petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Imelda)
wrote in her CoC "seven" months as her period of residence - an entry which was
obviously short of the one-year residency requirement for the position for which
she filed her CoC. Hence, the Court stated that it would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a CoC which would
lead to her disqualification. It can be concluded, therefore, that the defense of
honest mistake is available only if the mistake in the CoC would make a qualified
candidate ineligible for the position. It cannot be invoked when the mistake would
make an ineligible candidate qualified for the position. For in the first case, no
candidate in his/her right mind would prevaricate or make the electorate believe
that he/she is not qualified for the position he/she is aspiring for. Hence, there
could be no other conclusion than that the mistake was committed honestly.
Whereas in the second case, the intention to mislead can be deduced from the fact
that an aspirant, although not qualified, makes it appear in his/her CoC that he/she
is eligible to run for public office when in truth he/she is not. Here, petitioner
made it appear that she did meet the 10-year residency requirement when in fact,
she did not.

And even assuming that she committed an honest mistake, still, the same cannot
outweigh her categorical, definite, voluntary, and sworn declaration in her 2012
CoC, which is favored by the prima facie presumption of regularity.[275] Said entry
in petitioner's 2012 CoC which, as previously discussed is an admission against
interest, tends to prove that she intended to stay permanently in the Philippines
starting only in November 2006 (or in April 2006 assuming her claim of honest
mistake is tn1e, but still far from her claim of May 24, 2005). In other words,
petitioner has miserably failed to present evidence sufficient to overthrow the facts
she herself supplied in her 2012 CoC. She cannot now, therefore, adjust or readjust
the dates from which to reckon her reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines
in order to meet the 10-year constitutional residency requirement. As correctly
observed by the Comelec, petitioner's actions only highlight her ambivalence in
reestablishing domicile, viz.:
4.149. Petitioner claims to have re-established her domicile in the Philippines on
24 May 2005. xx x

4.150. It is incorrect based on petitioner's own submissions which are conflicting.

4.151. In her COC for Senator in the May 2013 election filed in October 2012,
[petitioner] stated:
"PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE MAY 13, 2013 - 6
YEARS AND 6 MONTHS".
The above sworn entry in her COC for Senator meant that [petitioner] had been a
Philippine resident only since November 2006.

4.152. She later claimed that the Comelec form confused her, that actually that
entry of "6 years and 6 months" was meant to be up to the date of filing said COC
in October 2012. Assuming this to be correct, and applying the "6 years and 6
months" as up to October 2012, this means that [petitioner] had been a Philippine
resident only since April 2006.

4.153. In her present COC for President in the May 2016 elections, her sworn
entry on residency is "10 years and 11 months" up to the day before May 9, 2016
which would be a residency since June 2005.

4.154. So which is which?

May 24, 2005 as the date she claims to have re-established her Philippine
domicile?
Or is it April 2006 as she also claims relative to her 2012 senatorial COC
reckoned up to the date of its filing in October 2012?

Or is it November 2006 which is the plain import of her sworn entry in her

senatorial COC?

Or is it June 2005 which would be the reckoning date per her 2015 COC for
President in the May 2016 elections?[276]
In fine, even if it be conceded that petitioner's evidence (i.e., TIN, acquisition of
residential properties, enrollment of her children in Philippine schools), taken
singly or collectively, somehow evinces her claimed intent to remain in the
Philippines, the same cannot outweigh the evidence on record that her presence in
the country as of May 24, 2005 was temporary in nature. "Evidence is assessed in
terms of quality, not quantity. It is to be weighed, not counted. "[277]

At this point, I wish to make it abundantly clear that it is not my position that
petitioner could not reestablish her domicile in the country prior to taking the oath
of allegiance to the country. In retrospect, petitioner could have made her stay in
the Philippines permanent in character beginning May 24, 2005 or thereabouts had
she applied for an immigrant status as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 613 or
The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by RA 4376,[278] which
allows a natural-born Filipino citizen (assuming that she is) who was naturalized
abroad to return as a non-quota immigrant entitled to permanent residence. As
correctly argued by respondent Contreras, "[t]he possession of a permanent
resident visa is not an added element, but is simply evidence that sufficiently
proves the presence of an act that would indicate the element of animus
manendi that applies to foreign nationals who would like to make the Philippines
as their new domicile of choice."[279] But for some reason petitioner did not apply
for an immigrant status, and there is no indication that she was subsequently
granted an immigrant visa, or a permanent resident status.

As a U.S. citizen, petitioner failed to perform an act necessary to show that as of

May 24, 2005 she intended to permanently remain in the Philippines. Such
intention may be inferred from her waiver of non-resident status by obtaining a
permanent resident visa or an ACR or by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, which petitioner neither availed of on or before May 24, 2005.

Nevertheless, while petitioner entered the Philippines on May 24, 2005 as a

foreigner balikbayan with a limited period of stay, her status changed when she
took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic under RA 9225 on July 18, 2006. This
conferred upon her not only Philippine citizenship but also the right to stay in the
Philippines for an unlimited period of time. Section 5 of the said law provides:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines. xxx
Thus, it is from this date, July 18, 2006, that petitioner can rightfully claim that her
physical presence in the Philippines was with animus manendi. Her becoming a
Filipino, albeit still a dual citizen, on said date, allowed her to thenceforth stay
permanently here.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship neither automatically resulted in the reestablishment of her Philippine
domicile nor in the abandonment of her U.S. domicile. It is settled that RA 9225
treats citizenship independently of residence.[280] It does not provide for a mode of
reestablishing domicile and has no effect on the legal residence of those availing
of it. "This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he[/she] may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he[/she] is also a citizen."[281]

A case in point is Caballero v. Commission on Elections.[282] In that case, Rogelio

Batin Caballero (Caballero) ran for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13,
2013 elections, His rival candidate, however, filed a petition to cancel his CoC on
the ground of false representation as Caballero declared in his CoC that he was
eligible to run for Mayor despite being a Canadian citizen and not a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately before the elections. Caballero
argued that Uyugan has always been his domicile because he was born and
baptized there; that he studied, worked, and built his house in Uyugan; that he was
a registered voter of said municipality and used to vote there; and, that he availed
herself of RA 9225 on September 13, 2012 and renounced his Canadian
citizenship on October 1, 2012.

In denying Caballero's petition, the Court En Banc speaking through Justice

Diosdado P. Peralta and with no member dissenting, ruled that Caballero's
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 did not enable him to
automatically regain his domicile in Uyugan. He must still prove that after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, he had reestablished his domicile in
Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections. Thus:
Petitioner was a natural-born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
In Coquilla v. Comelec, we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may
result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in
petitioner's case as permanent residence status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned
his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada
His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.

The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?

In Japzon v. Comelec, wherein respondent [Jaime S.] Ty reacquired his Philippine

citizenship under RA. No. 9225 and [ran] for Mayor of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in issue, we had the
occasion to state, thus:
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He
could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his
domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty
merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new
domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from
the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of
his birth.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did
not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still
prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned
from the time he made it as such.

The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to

prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of
one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was
only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on
September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he reestablished his
domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence
thereat, coupled with an actual intent to re-establish his domicile there. However,
the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one
year residency required by law.

xxxx

Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident
of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of
elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
[283]
 (Underlining ours)
Contrary to petitioner's interpretation, we did not reckon the period of residency
in Caballero from the time Caballero reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA
9225. We there held that since Caballero abandoned his Philippine domicile when
he was naturalized abroad, he has to prove that he had reestablished his domicile
in Uyugan. He likewise had to prove the date when he reestablished his domicile
there for purposes of determining whether he met the one-year residency
requirement. However, there being no other evidence showing his intent to
reestablish his domicile in the Philippines and abandon his former domicile
abroad, and since Caballero took his oath of allegiance under RA 9225 only on
September 13, 2012 or less than one year prior to the May 13, 2013 elections, he
could no longer possibly prove compliance with the one-year residency
requirement.

Similarly, I find no sufficient evidence showing that petitioner intended to

reestablish a new domicile in the Philippines prior to taking her Oath of Allegiance
on July 7, 2006; as such petitioner still has to prove that after taking said oath she
has reestablished the Philippines as her new domicile by demonstrating that her
physical presence here is coupled with animus manendi and an undeniable and
definite intention to abandon her old domicile. However, since petitioner took her
Oath of Allegiance in July 2006 and renounced her U.S. citizenship in October
2010, both events having occurred less than 10 years prior to the May 9, 2016
elections, the conclusion becomes inexorable that she could no longer possibly
prove compliance with the 10-year residency requirement.

Petitioners evidence of animus  

non revertendi; earliest
possible date that petitioners
physical presence in the
Philippines can be said to be
coupled with animus non
revertendi.

The element of intention to abandon an old domicile is as important as in the case

of acquisition of new domicile.[284] Thus, if a person establishes a new dwelling
place, but never abandons the intention of returning to the old dwelling place, the
domicile remains at the old dwelling place.[285]

Upon this score, petitioner offered the following pieces of evidence:

1. the affidavit of her adoptive mother attesting to the reasons which prompted
petitioner to leave the U.S. and return permanently to the Philippines;

2. the affidavit of Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, corroborating her

adoptive mother's statement and narrating how he and petitioner were
actively attending to the logistics of their permanent relocation to the
Philippines;

3. the documented communication between petitioner or her husband with the

property movers regarding the relocation of their household goods,
furniture, and cars from Virginia, U.S.A. to the Philippines;

4. relocation of their household goods, furniture, cars and other personal

property from Viginia, U.S.A. to the Philippines which were packed,
collected for storage, and transported in February and April 2006;

5. her husband's act of informing the U.S. Postal Service of the abandonment
of their former U.S. address on March 2006;

6. their act of selling their family home in the U.S. on April 27, 2006;

7. her husband's resignation from his work in the U.S. in April 2006 and his
return to the Philippines on May 4, 2006;

8. Questionnaire - Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S.

Citizenship wherein petitioner indicated that she no longer considered
herself a resident of the U.S. since May 2005 until the present.

At first blush, it would seem that petitioner's evidence did tend to prove her
claimed intent to abandon her old domicile in the U.S. However, what prevents me
from lending unqualified support to this posture is that all these pieces of evidence
refer to dates after May 24, 2005. Such evidence could not, therefore, be of much
help in establishing her claim that she changed domicile as of May 24, 2005.

Furthermore, petitioner's evidence cannot prove animus non revertendi prior to her
renunciation of her U.S. citizenship on October 20, 2010. This is so because prior
thereto, petitioner could return anytime to the U.S., stay there as its citizen and
enjoy all the rights, privileges and protection the U.S. government extends to its
nationals, including the right to a legal residence. In fact, from May 24, 2005 to
October 20, 2010, petitioner did go back to the U.S. no less than five times:
February 14, 2006, April 20, 2009, October 19, 2009, December 27, 2009 and
March 27, 2010.[286] And when she went to the U.S. on those dates, she used her
U.S. passport and stayed there not as an alien but as its citizen,. It should also be
recalled that petitioner and her family still own and maintain two residential
houses in the U.S. which they purchased in 1992 and in 2008, or two years after
petitioner had taken her oath of allegiance to the Philippines. Hence the only clear
and positive proof that petitioner abandoned her U.S. domicile was when she
executed her Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American Citizenship[287] on October 20, 2010
because that was the point when she concretized and exteriorized her intention to
abandon her U.S. domicile. It is this act that unequivocally and irremissibly sealed
off any intent of her retaining her U.S. domicile. Prior to that, it cannot be said that
she has complied with the third requirement.

This is not to say that I am adding a fourth requirement for relinquishing foreign
citizenship as a condition to reestablishing domicile. My discussion is still
premised on compliance with the third requirement of bona fide intent to abandon
the former domicile. To be sure, petitioner could have established her animus non
revertendi to the U.S. had she applied for a Philippine resident visa on May 24,
2005 or thereabouts, as earlier discussed. But since she did not, the only fact or
circumstance that can be considered as indicative of her clear and positive act of
abandoning U.S. domicile was when she renounced her U.S. citizenship. This
conclusion is consistent with our ruling in the 2013 case of Reyes v. Commission
on Elections[288] where this Court, speaking through Justice Jose P. Perez, said:
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost
her natural-born status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First
Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque:
"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons
his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to
RA 9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the
Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be
counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already re-
acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she
has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that [petitioner]
had re119unced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned
her domicile of choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the one-year
residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in
Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not
sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner] has never
regained her domicile in Marindugue as she remains to be an American
citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that
she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA."[289] (Underlining
ours)
Against this backdrop, petitioner's evidence relative to animus non
revertendi becomes irrelevant for such evidence does not at all prove that she had
in fact abandoned her U.S. domicile on May 24, 2005. Nonetheless, I still tried to
evaluate the pieces of evidence that petitioner had submitted. However, I still find
them wanting and insufficient.

As part of the evidence to prove her intent to abandon her old domicile, petitioner
puts forward her husband's act of informing the U.S. Postal Service in March 2006
of the abandonment of their former U.S. address. I carefully studied the copy of
the online acknowledgement from the U.S. Postal Service regarding this[290] and
deduced therefrom that what petitioner's husband did was actually to request the
U.S. Postal Service for a change of address and not to notify it of their
abandonment of their U.S. address per se. At any rate, there was no showing that
the change of address was from their old U.S. address to their new Philippine
address. And, again, it must be mentioned that this was done only in March 2006.

Likewise submitted to prove animus non revertendi was the series of electronic

correspondence between petitioner/her husband on one hand, and the Victory Van
Corporation (Victory)/National Veterinary Quarantine Service of the Bureau of
Animal Industry of the Philippines, on the other, regarding the logistics for the
transport of their personal properties and pet dog, respectively, from the U.S. to
the Philippines. The first in the series of electronic mails (e-mails) from Victory
was dated March 18, 2005.[291] Apparently, the communication was a reply to
petitioner's inquiry about the rates for the packing, loading and transport of their
household goods and two vehicles to Manila. Petitioner's animus non revertendi to
the U.S. at least as of date of the said e-mail (March 18, 2005) cannot, however, be
deduced from her mere act of making such inquiry. It must be stressed that the
intent to abandon an old domicile must be established by clear and positive
proof[292] While making such an inquiry may be construed as the initial step to the
actual transport or transportation of the goods, that by itself, is short of the clear
and positive proof required to establish animus non revertendi. At the most, all
that can be inferred from the said e-mail is petitioner's mere "interest" at that point
but not yet the "intent" or the resolve to have her family's personal properties
shipped to the Philippines for purposes of relocation. It is true that petitioner's
inquiry led to negotiations between her and/or her husband and Victory until the
goods and effects were finally transported to the Philippines starting February
2006 as shown by the succeeding exchange of communication; however, these
negotiations, based on the other e-mails submitted, did not start immediately after
March 18, 2005 or on or before May 24, 2005. The negotiations only actually
started the following year, or in January 2006, months after May 24, 2005. The
same is true with respect to the e-mail relative to the transport of their pet dog
which bears the date August 3, 2005.

Notably, even petitioner did not reckon this date, March 18, 2005, as the starting
point of her animus non revertendi. Hence, it could be said that even petitioner
herself could not categorically state that by March 18, 2005, she already had the
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile.

Petitioners conduct tending to

show animus manendi and
animus non revertendi cannot
 
be taken as part of an
incremental process of/for
changing domicile.

Petitioner invokes the cases of Mitra and of Sabili where this Court held that
relocation to a new domicile is basically an incremental process. Thus, petitioner's
counsel maintained during the oral arguments that their evidence consisted of
documents that were executed, events that took place, and acts done, after May 24,
2005 precisely because they all form part of a process which began on May 24,
2005 and continued to be in progress thereafter.

Petitioner's case is nowhere nearly congruent to Mitra and Sabili because in those

cases, the evidence of therein petitioners were plainly viewed by the Court as
positive acts that formed part of the incremental process of changing domicile.
That same perspective cannot, however, be applied to petitioner's case because,
unlike in Mitra and Sabili, her change of domicile, as previously discussed, was
inevitably and inextricably intertwined with her citizenship. It bears reiterating that
as a naturalized U.S. citizen, petitioner is duty-bound to comply with our
immigration laws before her stay in this country could be considered for purposes
of the elections. Just because she thought of permanently staying in the Philippines
does not mean that upon setting foot on this country she has instantly reestablished
domicile here. As an alien wanting to reestablish a domicile here, petitioner must
first reacquire Philippine citizenship (or at least ought to have secured a permanent
resident visa) before the totality of her acts or actions tending to show animus
manendi can be regarded part of an incremental process of establishing domicile.
The same is true with respect to animus non revertendi: she must have first
renounced her U.S. citizenship (or applied for a Philippine immigrant visa).

The records also show that petitioner has not only procrastinated in renouncing her
U.S. citizenship; in fact she also did it unwittingly. It should be recalled that the
President appointed her Chairperson of the MTRCB on October 6, 2010. At that
time, petitioner was still a dual citizen owing allegiance both to the Philippines
and to the U.S. Hence she could not accept the said appointment without
renouncing her U.S. citizenship first, conformably with Section 5(3) of RA 9225,
which reads:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath.
When petitioner thus executed her Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance on
October 20, 2010, there could be no two opinions about the fact that her primary
purpose was to meet the requirement for her appointment as MTRCB Chairperson.
This is buttressed by the fact that she assumed office the following day and by the
answers she wrote in the Questionnaire/Information for Determining Possible Loss
of U.S. Citizenship that she submitted with the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the
U.S. Department of State. There she explicitly stated that she was relinquishing
her U.S. citizenship because she was appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB and
she wanted to comply with both U.S. and Philippine laws. Even then, it bears
notice that in that document she made no categorical declaration at all that she was
relinquishing her U.S. citizenship to transfer domicile here. In other words,
petitioner did not renounce her U.S. citizenship upon her own volition with the
deliberate intent or intention of reestablishing legal residence here. It only
incidentally arose as an inevitable consequence of her having to comply with the
requirements of Section 5(3) of RA 9225. Be that as it may, I consider her act of
renouncing her foreign allegiance on October 20, 2010 as amounting to sufficient
compliance with the third requirement in reestablishing domicile for it carried with
it a waiver of her right to permanently reside in the U.S. Regrettably, this date
does not jibe with what petitioner declared in her 2015 CoC for President.

Stronger proof is required in reestablishment of national domicile.

Petitioner protests that in Perez v. Commission on Elections[293] and Jalover v.

Osmeña[294] the candidates were deemed to have transferred their domiciles based
on significantly less evidence compared to what she has presented.

But there is a marked distinction between the present case and the cases cited.
Perez and Jalover involved transfer of domicile within the same province or within
the confines of our country. In Perez, a petition to disqualify Rodolfo E.
Aguinaldo (Aguinaldo) as candidate for Congressman of the third district of
Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections was filed on the ground that he, allegedly,
is a resident of Gattaran which is in the first (not third) district of Cagayan. What
was in question was Aguinaldo's residence in the third district of Cagayan, his
residency in said province having been established beyond doubt. Jalover, on the
other hand, emanated from a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel John
Henry R. Osmeña's (Osmeña) CoC for Mayor of Toledo City on the ground that
he made a false declaration in his CoC when he stated that he had been a resident
of said city for 15 years prior to the May 13, 2013 elections. Notably, Osmeña
previously served as Congressman of the third district of Cebu which includes
Toledo City.

The present case, however, involves a personality who formerly abandoned the
Philippines as her domicile, and renounced her Philippine citizenship by becoming
a naturalized U.S. citizen. Thus, what is involved here is a transfer of domicile
from one country to another by a naturalized U.S. citizen. Petitioner now tries to
convince this Court that she had abandoned her U.S. domicile and had
successfully reestablished her new domicile of choice in this country. To stress,
this case involves relocation by an alien of the national domicile from the U.S. to
the Philippines, which requires much stronger proof, both as to fact and intent,
than in the case of a change of domicile from one municipality, or subordinate
subdivision of a country, to another, by a Filipino citizen who never renounced
such citizenship.[295] "[I]t requires stronger and more conclusive evidence to justify
the court in deciding that a man has acquired a new domicile in a foreign country,
than would suffice to warrant the conclusion that he has acquired a new domicile
in a country where he is not a foreigner."[296] In Perez and Jalover, for instance, it
was no longer necessary for this Court to determine whether the candidates had the
legal right to permanently reside in their chosen domicile because, being Filipinos,
they can reside anywhere in the Philippines. In the case of the herein petitioner,
however, it is not only the length of her stay in the Philippines that must be
determined, but also the legality and nature thereof for, as heretofore discussed,
the period of her physical presence here, as an alien, should not be included in the
computation of the length of her residency as the same was temporary in character
or not permitted by our immigration laws. Also, while citizenship and residency
are different from and independent of each other, one may invariably affect the
other. For instance, petitioner had to abandon her Philippine domicile when she
applied for U.S. naturalization in 2001. Corollarily, she cannot reestablish
domicile here unless she first reacquires her Philippine citizenship (or enter the
Philippines as an immigrant). Thus, unlike in Perez and Jalover, the petitioner in
this case has the added burden of proving, among others, the character and
legitimacy of her presence here since she earlier abandoned her Filipino
citizenship and Philippine domicile to become a U.S. citizen and its domiciliary.

Another important reason for the distinction is that demanded by the purpose of
the residency requirement of election laws. Those living in the same province
albeit in another district as in Perez and Jalover, can still maintain familiarity with
the conditions and needs of nearby communities. They and the people there are
exposed to the same environment, speak the same language, are similarly affected
by the growth or fluctuation of local economy, and must brave and suffer the same
natural calamities. These are beyond the immediate and direct senses and
perceptions of foreigners or aliens living abroad.

Likewise misplaced is petitioner's reliance on the cases of Japzon and Rommel

Apolinario Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections,[297] considering that said cases are
not on all fours with her case. In said cases, the candidates who were charged with
making false material representation in their CoC took their oath of allegiance
more than one year before the elections, thereby making it possible for them to
prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement of the Local
Government Code. Thus, in Japzon, Jaime S. Ty reacquired his Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 on October 2, 2005 and ran for Mayor of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2007 election. While Rommel
Apolinario Jalosjos reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 on
November 26, 2008, or four days after arrival in the Philippines, and ran for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay in the May 10, 2010 elections.

In the case of petitioner, however, she took her oath of allegiance only on July 7,
2006. Therefore, she could not possibly prove that she has been residing in the
Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections.
July 7, 2006 to May 9, 2016 is about two months short of 10 years.

Under these circumstances, the entry in petitioner's 2015 CoC for President that
her period of residency in the Philippines as of May 9, 2016 is 10 years and 11
months is, false, as indeed it is.

C. Petitioners deliberate
attempt to deceive, mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render her
ineligible to run for the
position of President

It was pointed out to petitioner as early as June 2015 that the period of residence
she entered in her 2012 CoC was six years and six months before May 13, 2013.
Notwithstanding that her attention was called to such fact, petitioner never
bothered to correct her 2012 CoC. Instead, she filed her 2015 CoC for President
declaring therein a period of residency that is markedly different from and does
not jibe with what she declared under oath in her 2012 CoC.
Petitioner then proceeded to make the point that the declaration about her period of
residence in her 2015 CoC is correct. Explaining the discrepancy between her
2012 and 2015 CoCs, she asserts that her entry of six years and six months in her
2012 CoC was the result of an honest mistake. She claims that she accomplished
her 2012 CoC without the assistance of counsel and that she did not know that
what was required by the phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines before
May 13, 2013" is the period of her residence on the day right before the May 13,
2013 elections; that instead, she interpreted it to mean as her period of residence in
the Philippines as of her filing of the 2012 CoC on October 2, 2012, which
technically is also a period "before May 13, 2013." To convince the Court that the
aforementioned phrase is susceptible of causing confusion, petitioner calls
attention to the fact that the Comelec, after apparently realizing the same, had
revised the CoC forms for the May 9, 2016 elections. The amended phrase which
can now be found under Item No. 7 of the latest CoC form reads as follows:
PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE
MAY 09, 2016:

I am not persuaded.
The import of the phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013" as found in petitioner's 2012 CoC is too plain to be mistaken and too
categorical to be misinterpreted. As can be observed, a fixed date was given as a
reference point, i.e., May 13, 4013. Indeed, even an average person would be able
to tell that what comes before May 13, 2013 is May 12, 2013. From a plain
reading of the said phrase, therefore, it can readily be discerned or understood that
what was being required by Item No. 11 is a candidate's period of residence in the
Philippines until May 12, 2013.

To argue that any period which is not until May 12, 2013 but prior to May 13,
2013 is technically still a period "before May 13, 2013" is like clutching at straws.
To an astute political aspirant like petitioner, filing a CoC necessarily presupposes
knowledge on her part of the qualifications required by the office where she seeks
to be elected. After all, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his or
her concerns.[298] For a senatorial candidate, the required qualifications are found
under Section 3, Article VI of the Constitution which provides, viz.:
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able
to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, read in the light of the other material entries required in the 2012 CoC for
Senator such as Age (Item No. 14), the fact of being a Natural-born Filipino
Citizen (Item No. 8) and, of being a Registered Voter (Item No. 19), it is obvious
that what the fo1m was trying to elicit were a senatorial candidate's qualifications
in accordance with the above-quoted constitutional provision. And assuming that
the phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" is indeed
susceptible of causing confusion as to until what period before May 13, 2013 was
being asked, such confusion can easily be dispelled by a quick reference to the
constitutional provision which states in no uncertain terms that a Senator must be a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the
day of the election. Under this premise, the only logical interpretation that should
have been available to petitioner at the time she was filling out her 2012 CoC is
that what was required by Item No. 11 - the period of her residence in the
Philippines as of the day immediately preceding May 13, 2013, which is May 12,
2013.

Totally unacceptable is the assertion that the change in the wording of the item
respecting the period of residence as found in the latest CoC form is an
acknowledgment by the Comelec that the previous version is indeed unclear. The
change is a mere semantic exercise devoid of any serious significance.

Petitioner's personal circumstances and those surrounding the filing of her 2012
CoC provide little solace to her claim of honest mistake. As petitioner alleges, she
pursued a college degree in Development Studies in one of the country's premiere
universities - the University of the Philippines in Manila. In 1988, she went to
Boston College in the U.S. where, as can reasonably be expected, she learned
concepts on politics after graduating with a degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political
Studies. When she filed her 2012 CoC, she was not technically a neophyte in the
Philippine political arena, she having been on her adoptive father's side during the
campaign for his presidential bid in 2004. At that time, she was, for two years, at
the helm of MTRCB where her duties impacted not only media and entertainment
culture but also society at large. Being the educated woman that she is, coupled by
her brief but memorable stint in politics and relevant government experience, I
find it hard to believe that she misinterpreted the clear and simple import of the
phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" as pertaining
to her period of residence in the Philippines as of the submission of her 2012 CoC
on October 2, 2012. To repeat, the phrase is too plain to be mistaken and too
categorical to be misinterpreted, more especially by one of her educational and
professional stature.

That petitioner was not assisted by counsel when she accomplished her 2012 CoC
is of no moment. For one, the plain and simple language used in the subject CoC
form does not require a legal mind to be understood. For another, it was not as if
petitioner had no choice but to accomplish the subject CoC without the assistance
of counsel. Her own allegations revealed that she accomplished her 2012 CoC on
September 27, 2012 and that she only filed the same five days thereafter or on
October 2, 2012.[299] This shows that petitioner had.had ample time not only to
reflect on the declarations she made in her 2012 CoC, but also to consult a lawyer
regarding the entries that she provided therein should there be matters which were
indeed unclear to her. After all, she is not expected to have simply taken the filling
out of her CoC lightly since aside from its being a sworn document, a CoC is in
the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate's political
creed or lack thereof.[300] It is a statement by a person seeking to run for a public
office certifying that he/she announces his/her candidacy for the office mentioned
and that he/she is eligible for that office.[301] Indeed, a valid CoC, much like the
sacred ballot that a voter casts in a free and honest elections is the bedrock of the
electoral process. Its execution or accomplishment cannot be taken lightly,
because it mirrors the character and integrity of the candidate who executes or
accomplishes it - that candidate's uncompromising fidelity to truth and rectitude.
Yes, indeed, especially if that candidate is aspiring to be elected to the highest
office in the land: the Presidency, from whom only the best and finest attributes of
the truly Filipino character, intellect, patriotism, allegiance and loyalty are sought
after and expected. Verily, this explains why the law provides for grounds for the
cancellation and denial of due course to CoC.[302] Here it appears, however,
petitioner's actions evinced unusual regrettable tendency to becloud plain and
simple truth concerning such commonplace things as the real time-stretch of her
residence in this country. Petitioner chose not to secure a resident visa. She
therefore knew that prior to her taking her oath of allegiance to the Republic and
her abandoning her U.S. domicile, her stay here was merely temporary. This
presumed knowledge is imposed upon every individual by Article 3 of the Civil
Code which states that "[i]gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith."

Notably, when one runs for an elective public office, it is imperative to first know
the qualifications required of the office and then to assess whether such
qualifications have been met. Hence, petitioner is reasonably expected to know the
requirements of the office she is running for, and to determine whether she
satisfactorily meets those requirements. One cannot just aspire to occupy a
position without making some self-examination whether he/she is qualified. In
petitioner's case, precisely because her adoptive father's qualifications were then
under question when he ran for President in 2004, then there is more reason for
petitioner to carefully evaluate and assess her eligibility and qualifications so that
she would not be trapped into the same quagmire her adoptive father fell into.

Petitioner invokes the case of Marcos. There, petitioner Imelda, in her CoC for
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the May 8, 1995 elections, initially
answered "seven" months on the space requiring information on her "residence in
the constituency where she seeks to be elected immediately preceding the
election." A couple of weeks after her filing of the said CoC and also following the
initiation by her then would-be opponent Cirilo Roy Montejo (Montejo) of a
Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification before the Comelec, Imelda sought
to correct the said entry by changing it from "seven" to "since childhood" through
an Amended/Corrected CoC. During the proceedings relative to the said petition,
Imelda averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original CoC was the
result of an "honest misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected CoC. Although debunked by
the Comelec, Imelda's claim of honest representation was upheld when the case
eventually reached the Court.

To be sure, petitioner cannot rely on Marcos to support her claim of honest

mistake. There, what prompted Imelda to jot down the questioned entry in her
CoC was the confusion caused by the attendant circumstances, viz.:
[W]hen herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City
to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo
opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban
City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District
which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible
source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks
election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy.

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
 8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
_______ Years and Seven Months

Having been forced by private respondent [Montejo] to register in her place of

actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space
which required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 - the first requiring actual residence
and the second requiring domicile - coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified.[303]
It was under the said factual milieu that this Court held that Imelda committed an
honest mistake when she entered the word "seven" in the space for residence in the
constituency where she seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election. In
the case of petitioner, no analogous circumstance exists as to justify giving similar
credit to her defense of honest mistake. No seemingly related item was juxtaposed
to Item No. 11 of the 2012 COC as to cause confusion to petitioner. And as earlier
discussed, Item No. 11 is clear and simple as to its meaning and import. More
important, the question raised in Marcos was Imelda's lack of eligibility to run
because she failed to comply with residency requirement. In contrast, the question
raised in petitioner's case is her false material representations in the entries she
made in her 2015 CoC. We also hasten to add that as correctly discerned by
respondent Contreras:
And unlike the petitioner in Romualdez Marcos whose false entry in her COC
would disqw:llify her even as the correct period satisfies the requirement by law
and would therefore render her qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives, the false entry in herein petitioner's COC would allow her to be
qualified even as the true period of legal residence is deficient according to law
and would render her unqualified for the position of President.[304]
It is in this context that l cannot accept petitioner's claim of honest mistake.

True, petitioner did try to correct her alleged mistakes through her public
statements. But since her defense of honest mistake is now debunked, this
becomes irrelevant. Besides, I cannot help but conclude that these public
statements were for the purpose of representing to the general public that
petitioner is eligible to run for President since they were made at a time when she
was already contemplating on running for the position. They were not made at the
earliest opportunity before the proper forum. These statements could even be
interpreted as part of petitioner's continuing misrepresentation regarding her
qualification and eligibility to run as President.

Based on the foregoing, it is my conclusion that petitioner knowingly made a false

material representation in her 2015 CoC sufficient to mislead the electorate into
believing that she is eligible and qualified to become a President.

No grave abuse of discretion  

on the part of the Comelec in
denying due course to and/or
cancelling petitioners 2015
CoC based on petitioner's
material misrepresentation as
to her period of residence in
the Philippines.

In sum, I find that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion,

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the petitions
and in denying due course to and cancelling petitioner's 2015 CoC. To my mind, it
properly exercised its power to determine whether a candidate's CoC contains
false material representation; its resolution was anchored on settled jurisprudence
and fair appreciation of facts; and it accorded the parties ample opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence. Conversely stated, it is my opinion that the
Comelec did not usurp the jurisdiction of the SET, or the PET, or the DOJ or any
other tribunal; it did not disregard or contravene settled jurisprudence; and it did
not violate the parties' right to due process. Thus, I find that petitioner miserably
failed to hurdle the bar set by this Court in Sabili, that is, to prove that the
Comelec was so grossly unreasonable in its appreciation and evaluation of
evidence as to amount to an error of jurisdiction. Petitioner miserably fell short of
portraying that the Comelec had whimsically, arbitrarily, capriciously and
despotically exercised its judgment as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.

Citizenship

Considering the conclusion I have reached relative to petitioner's material

misrepresentation regarding her period of residence in the Philippines, and
considering further that based even only thereon, her 2015 CoC should be
cancelled and denied due course, I deem it wise and prudent to withhold passing
judgment at this time regarding petitioner's citizenship. Indeed, it is tempting to
seize this opportunity to sit in judgment on the issue of citizenship, which has
generated so much attention, invited heated and vigorous discussion, and evoked
heightened emotions; not only that, the issue at hand is novel and of first
impression, However, a loftier interest dictates that we take pause and exhaust all
possible avenues and opportunities to study the issue more dispassionately. After
all, any judgment at this time upon this issue might directly impact on GR. No.
221538 (Rizalito Y. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal), which is a Quo
Warranto case seeking the removal of petitioner as a Senator of the Philippines
wherein her natural-born citizenship status is directly assailed.

I believe that the resolution of the issue on petitioner's citizenship must be

carefully studied and deliberated upon. I venture to say that we may not only be
dealing with foundlings per se. Any hasty or ill-considered ruling on this issue
could open the floodgates to abuse by certain groups and individuals looking only
after their own interest to the prejudice and undoing of our motherland. Non-
Filipinos might use the ruling to advance their vested interests by simply posing as
foundlings so that they would be presumed or cloaked with natural-born
citizenship. They could use this as an avenue to obtain Filipino citizenship or
natural-born status which they could not ordinarily gain through ordinary
naturalization proceedings. I am not pretending to be a doomsayer, far from it, but
I prefer to tread carefully. After all, it is no less than the supremely precious
interest of our country that we wish both to defend and to protect. Our country
must not only be defended and protected against outside invasion, it must also be
secured and safeguarded from any internal threat against its sovereignty and
security. I do not want to wake up someday and see my beloved country teeming
with foreigners and aliens posing as natural-born Filipinos while the real natives
are thrown into oblivion or relegated second or third class citizens who have
become strangers in their own homeland. My objective is only to secure, protect
and defend the Philippines from being ruled by non-Filipinos. This Court should
stand firm on its own bearing and not allow itself to be swept by the tides of
sentimentality and emotion. 'The Filipino people expect no less from us but to
carefully, deliberately, objectively and dispassionately resolve the issue with
national interest utmost in our heart and mind.

But there is more. For no less consequential is the Doctrine of Constitutional

Avoidance, under which this Court may choose to ignore or side-step a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which the case can be
disposed of.[305] Such is the situation in this case.

It is not improbable, of course, that petitioner was born to Filipino parents; yet the
fact remains that their identities are unknown. In short, petitioner's citizenship is
uncertain. Thus, I feel that we should not overlook altogether her much publicized
efforts to obtain deoxytibonucleic acid (DNA) evidence to prove her genealogy.
She could use this breather to gather such evidence. Petitioner surely has
biological parents. It is indeed surprising that these parents, or any close relatives,
have not come forward to claim their ties to someone so highly respected and so
well recognized as one of the worthy leaders of the country. While it defies human
nature to resist the natural impulse to claim one's own child, the sad reality is that
there are still many parents who abandon their child, depriving said child not only
of parental love and care, but also identity and pedigree. Every opportunity should
thus be given to the innocent child to trace his/her parentage and determine
compliance with the Constitution. This opportunity and this privilege should not
be time-bound, and should be afforded to every foundling at any stage of his/her
life. Thus, even if the Court rules on her citizenship now, that ruling can be
changed or altered any time when there is certainty or definiteness about her
biological lineage because there is generally no res judicata in matters of
citizenship. As the Court has declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigration.[306] whenever the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable
in a judicial or administrative case, the ruling therein as to the person's citizenship
is generally not considered as res judicata. Thus, it may be threshed out again and
again as the occasion demands,[307] stock being taken of the fact that the requisites
enumerated in In re Petition for Naturalization of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic,
[308]
 reiterated in Go, Sr. v. Ramos,[309] are all present.

According unto petitioner ample opportunity to trace her genealogy is also better
than a) creating a presumption that she is a natural-born citizen or fashioning a
new specie/category of citizenship based on statistical probabilities; or b) denying
her claim of citizenship outright. Aliens with known parents may just take
advantage of such presumption by representing themselves as foundlings if only to
be entitled to purchase real property, engage in nationalized business, or even run
for public office where a natural-born status is required. On the other hand, we
might unwittingly deny petitioner her rightful citizenship which she could very
well establish via the exertion or employment of more deliberate, vigorous, and
sustained efforts.

Indeed, it is imperative for the Court to carefully tread on the issue of citizenship.
As petitioner postulates in her Petitions, "[w]hat is at stake in this case is not only
a foundling's right to run for high public offices, but the enjoyment of a host of
even seemingly ordinary rights or positions which our laws reserve only for
natural-born citizens."[310] After all, the issue of citizenship impacts not solely on
petitioner but also on those similarly situated like her; it also involves the
sovereignty and security of our country. We must not lose sight of the fact that the
citizens of the country are the living soul and spirit of the nation, and the very
reason and justification for its existence and its preservation. Our rights,
prerogatives and privileges as Filipino citizens are the bedrock of our Constitution.

In ending, I wish to reiterate the very precept and principle that is at once the
capstone and the polestar that had guided the undersigned in drafting his opinion
in this landmark case: this statement from the December 1, 2015 Resolution of the
Comelec's Second Division in SPA No. 15-001 (DC): "A person who aspires to
occupy the highest position in the land must obey the highest law of the land."

This is as it should be.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to DISMISS the petitions.

[1]
 See December 1, 2015 Resolution of the Comelec's Second Division in SPA No.
15-001 (DC); rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 222.
[2]
 CONSTITUTION, Article XVIII, Section 5.
[3]
 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 12.
[4]
 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 18.
[5]
 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 19.
[6]
 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section19.
[7]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 3-189,
[8]
 Id. at 190-223; signed by Presiding Commissioner Al A. Parreño and
Commissioners Arthur D. Lim and Sheriff M. Ahas.
[9]
 Id. at 224-259; signed by Chairman J. Andres D. Bautista (with Separate
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion), Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim
(inhibited), Commissioner Al A. Parreño (concurred in the result but maintained
that there is no material misrepresentation as to citizenship), Commissioner Luie
Tito F. Guia (with Separate Opinion), Commissioner Arthur D. Lim,
Commissioner Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon (concurred in the result), and
Commissioner Sheriff M. Abas.
[10]
 Rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, pp. 3-213.
[11]
 Id. at 214-264; signed by Presiding Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim
(with Dissenting Opinion), Commissioner Luie Tito F. Gi1ia (with Separate
Concurring Opinion), and Commissioner Ma. Rowena Amelia V Guanzon.
[12]
 Id. at 352-381, signed by Chairman J. Andres D. Bautista (with Separate
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion), Commissioner Christian Robe1t S. Lim
(dissented), Commissioner Al A. Paireño (concurred with the result but
maintained that there is no material misrepresentation as to citizenship),
Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia (with Separate Opinion), Commissioner Arthur
O. Lim (opined that the earliest reckoning date as to residency should be July
2006, still short of the 10-year residency requirement), Commissioner Ma.
Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon and Commissioner Sheriff M. Abas (joined the
opinion of Commissioner Arthur D. Lim that the earliest possible reckoning period
for residency is July 2006).
[13]
 See Foundling Certificate, rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. II, p. 1138.
[14]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 16.
[15]
 Id. at 17.
[16]
 ld. at22.
[17]
 AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO
ACQUIRED FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES OR THE CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND
REACQUISITION ACT OF 2003.
[18]
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. II, p. 1269.
[19]
 Id. at 1279.
[20]
 Id. at 1280-1302.
[21]
 Id. at 1305.
[22]
 Id. at 1308.
[23]
 Id. at 1309.
[24]
 Id. at 1315.
[25]
 Id. at 13 16.
[26]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 326-397.
[27]
 Id. at 340.
[28]
 Id. at 34 I.
[29]
 Id. at 344.
[30]
 Id. at 339.
[31]
 Id.
[32]
 Id. at 346.
[33]
 Id. at 342.
[34]
 Id. at 347.
[35]
 Id. at 348, 350.
[36]
 Id. at 354.
[37]
 Id.
[38]
 Id.
[39]
 Id.
[40]
 Id. at 359.
[41]
 Id. at 363.
[42]
 Id. at 364.
[43]
 Id. at 365.
[44]
 Id. at 366.
[45]
 Id. at 368.
[46]
 Id. at 370.
[47]
 Id. at 372.
[48]
 GR. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420.
[49]
 GR. No. 210164, August 18, 2015.
[50]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 379.
[51]
 Id. at 384,
[52]
 Id.
[53]
 Id.
[54]
 Id. at 385.
[55]
 Id. at 386.
[56]
 Id. at 387.
[57]
 Id. at 388.
[58]
 Id.
[59]
 Id.
[60]
 Id. at 389.
[61]
 Rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, pp. 397-399.
[62]
 Id. at 408.
[63]
 Id. at 412.
[64]
 Id. at 412-413.
[65]
 Id. at 413.
[66]
 Id. at 415.
[67]
 Id.
[68]
 Id. at 417.
[69]
 Id.
[70]
 Id.
[71]
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. II, pp. 783-796.
[72]
 Id. at 784.
[73]
 Id. at 785.
[74]
 Id. at 785-786, 789.
[75]
 Id. at 786.
[76]
 Id. at 791.
[77]
 Id.
[78]
 Id. at 882-923.
[79]
 Id. at 884.
[80]
 Id. at 897-898.
[81]
 Id. at 898.
[82]
 Id. at 913.
[83]
 Id. at 891.
[84]
 Id. at 914.
[85]
 Id. at 903-904.
[86]
 Id. at 904.
[87]
 Id. at 910.
[88]
 Id.at915.
[89]
 Id. at 915-916.
[90]
 Id. at 917.
[91]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. II, p. 528.
[92]
 Id. at 529.
[93]
 128 Phil. 815 (1967).
[94]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. II, pp. 533-534.
[95]
 Id. at 552.
[96]
 Id. at 554.
[97]
 Id. at 558.
[98]
 Id. at 561-567.
[99]
 Id. at 572.
[100]
 Id. at 573.
[101]
 Id. at 577-580.
[102]
 Id. at 594.
[103]
 Id. at 592.
[104]
 Id. at606.
[105]
 Id. at 607.
[106]
 Id. at 535.
[107]
 Id. at 607, 611.
[108]
 Id. at 622.
[109]
 Id. at 623, 627.
[110]
 Id. at 627-631.
[111]
 Id. at 636.
[112]
 Id. at 645.
[113]
 Id. at 637.
[114]
 Id. at 642.
[115]
 Id. at 642-645.
[116]
 Id. at 645, 647.
[117]
 Id. at 648.
[118]
 Id.
[119]
 Id. at 649.
[120]
 Id. at 650.
[121]
 Id.
[122]
 Id. at 65 J.
[123]
 Id. at 657.
[124]
 Id. at 658.
[125]
 Id. at 659.
[126]
 Id. at 660.
[127]
 Rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. II, pp. 613-782.
[128]
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (1985).
[129]
 Rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. H, p. 640.
[130]
 Id.
[131]
 Id. at 645.
[132]
 Id. at 646.
[133]
 Id. at 1044-1102.
[134]
 Id. at 1062.
[135]
 Id. at 1080.
[136]
 Id.
[137]
 Id. at I 088.
[138]
 Id. at 1055.
[139]
 Id. at 823-871.
[140]
 Id. at 835.
[141]
 Id. at 857, 860.
[142]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 190-223.
[143]
 Id. at 204-206.
[144]
 Id. at 207-211.
[145]
 Id. at21 l-212.
[146]
 ld.at213.
[147]
 Id. at 214·216.
[148]
 Id. at216-219.
[149]
 Id. at219-221.
[150]
 Id. at219-223.
[151]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. III, pp. 1945-1958.
[152]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. II, pp. 807-810, 819-822.
[153]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 224-259.
[154]
 Id. at 258.
[155]
 Id. at236.
[156]
 Id.
[157]
 Id.
[158]
 Id. at 241.
[159]
 Id.
[160]
 Id. at 242.
[161]
 Id.
[162]
 Id. at 243.
[163]
 Id. at 249-250.
[164]
 Id. at 250.
[165]
 Id. at 251.
[166]
 Id. at 252-253.
[167]
 Id. at 253.
[168]
 Rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, pp. 216-264.
[169]
 Id. at 229.
[170]
 Section 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy. -A
verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for
any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly registered
political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive
ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is
false.
[171]
 Rollo (0.R Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, pp, 231-232.
[172]
 Although the same was not explicitly stated in the Tatad Petition.
[173]
 Rollo (GR. Nos, 221698-700), Vol. I, pp. 233-234 citing Jalosjos, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 601 (2012), which likewise cited Fermin v.
Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
[174]
 Id. at 238.
[175]
 Id. at 240.
[176]
 Id.
[177]
 Id. at24l.
[178]
 Id.
[179]
 Id. at 244.
[180]
 Id. at 247.
[181]
 Id. at 247-248.
[182]
 Id. at 257-258.
[183]
 Rollo (G.R. N(ls. 221698-700), Vol. IV, pp. 2250-2341.
[184]
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, pp. 352-381.
[185]
 Id. at 368.
[186]
 Id. at 381.
[187]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 3-189; Rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol.
I, pp. 3-213.
[188]
 Id. at 8; Id. at 12-13.
[189]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. III, pp. 2011-2013; Rollo (GR. Nos. 2;21698-
700), Vol. IV, pp. (unpaginated).
[190]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. V, pp. 3084-A- 3084-C; Rollo (G.R. Nos.
221698-700), Vol. VI, pp. 3930-A-3930-D.
[191]
 636 Phil. 753 (2010).
[192]
 Id.at777-778.
[193]
 686 Phil. 649 (2012).
[194]
 Id. at 668.
[195]
 621 Phil. 498 (2009).
[196]
 Id. at 510.
[197]
 Section 78, Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
-A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
[198]
 Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. -  The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the [House of
Representatives], the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
[199]
 Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 575 Phil. 253, 261 (2008).
[200]
 Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra note 173 at 165.
[201]
 Section 1, Rule 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. I. Commencement of Action or Proceedings by Parties. - Any natural or

juridical person authorized by these rules to initiate any action or proceeding shall
file with the Commission a protest or petition alleging therein his personal
circumstances as well as those of the protestee or respondent, the jurisdictional
facts, and a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting his cause or causes
of action and specifying the relief sought. He may add a general prayer for such
further or other relief as may be deemed just or equitable.
[202]
 595 Phil. 750 (2008).
[203]
 Id. at 754.
[204]
 Id. at 765.
[205]
 Supra note 173.
[206]
 Supra note 173 at 465-467.
[207]
 Bedol v. Commission on Elections, supra note 195 at 510,
[208]
 2010 PET Rules, Rule 13. Jurisdiction. -The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President of the Philippines.
[209]
 2010 PET Rules, Rule 14, How Initiated - - An election contest is initiated by
the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warrantv against the President
or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quv warranto.
A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
[210]
 2010 PET Rules, Rule 15. Election Protest, - The registered candidate for
President or Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or Vice-
President, as the case may be, by filing a verified election protest with the Clerk of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty days after the proclamation of the
winner.
[211]
 2010 PET Rules, Rule 16. Quo Warranto. -A verified petition for quo warranto
contesting the election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of
ine1igibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may be filed by any
registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten days after the
proclamation of the winner,
[212]
 468 Phil. 421, 461-462 (2004).
[213]
 Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, 609 Phil. 245, 254 (2009); Spouses
Algura v. Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, 536 Phil. 819, 835 (2006),
citing Agpalo's Legal Words and Phrases (1997), 480.
[214]
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 17.

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
[215]
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuiller Pawnshop, Inc., 453
Phil. 1043, l 059 (2003).
[216]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 42-43; rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I,
p. 43.
[217]
 Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 148-B Phil. 773, 855
(1971).
[218]
 614 Phil. 451, 473 (2009).
[219]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. II, p. 828.
[220]
 Id.
[221]
 Rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, pp. 231-232.
[222]
 Supra note 198.
[223]
 318Phil.329 (1995).
[224]
 371 Phil. 377 (1999).
[225]
 Id. at 390.
[226]
 Id.
[227]
 660 Phil. 225 (2011).
[228]
 See Ruben Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 4th ed., 1998, p. 338, as cited
in Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 670 Phil. 169, 178 (2011).
[229]
 SECTION 63. Qualifications for President and Vice-President of the
Philippines. - - No person may be elected President or Vice-President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write,
at least forty years of age on the day of election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
[230]
 See Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 64 5 (1928).
[231]
 Id. at 651.
[232]
 Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 467 (1995).
[233]
 Id. at 499, citing Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941).
[234]
 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, supra note 191 at 764.
[235]
 25 Am Jur 2d Domicil § 12-15,pp.12-13.
[236]
 Marcos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 223 at 386.
[237]
 Romualdez v. RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, September 14,
1993, 226 SCRA 408, 415; Mitra v. Commission on Elections, supra note 191 at
781; Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 596 Phil. 354, 372 (2009); Papandayan
Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 430 Phil. 754, 770.
[238]
 Domino v. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798, 819 (1999).
[239]
 Marcos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 223 at 386-387.
[240]
 Domino v. Commission on Elections, supra at 820.
[241]
 Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014,
717 SCRA 312, 323.
[242]
 434 Phil. 861 (2002)
[243]
 Supra note 237.
[244]
 See Coquilla v. Comelec, supra at 872.
[245]
 AN ACT INSTITUTING A BALIKBAYAN PROGRAM.
[246]
 AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 6768, ENTITLED,
"AN ACT INSTITUTING A BALIKBAYAN PROGRAM" BY PROVIDING
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES TO BALIKBAYAN AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
[247]
 A balikbayan is a Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the
Philippines for a period of at least one (1) year, a Filipino overseas worker, or a
former Filipino citizen and his or her family x x x who had been naturalized in a
foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines. (Section 2 of RA 6768.)
[248]
 Romualdez v. RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City, supra note 237 at 415.
[249]
 Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, supra note 242 at 872.
[250]
 123 Phil. 1017 (1966).
[251]
 Id. at 1019.
[252]
 Id. at 1020.
[253]
 Caballero v. Commission on Elections, GR. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
[254]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. II, p. 511; rollo (GR. Nos. 221698.-700), Vol.
II, p. 618; id. at 826; id. at 1048.
[255]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. II, p. 804.
[256]
 GR. No. 193314, February 26, 2013, 691 SCRA 646.
[257]
 Id. at 659, citing Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 623 Phil. 628, 655 (2009).
[258]
 Rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. II, pp. 917.
[259]
 Id. at l 055.
[260]
 Id. at I 049; Id. at I 075; Id. at 827, 850; Id. at 620, 761.
[261]
 Rollo (GR. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. IV, pp. 3852-3930.
[262]
 Id. at 3859.
[263]
 Id. at 3902.
[264]
 JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:
What was she doing in the States, xx x was [she] already planning to come back
here xxx for good[?] x x x [H]ow come she kept on returning to the States?

ATTY. POBLADOR:
They were still trying to sell their house, they were disposing of their assets, in
fact they had to donate most of these assets. They were able to sell their house
only in April 2006 and ... (interrupted).

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

And what other properties do they have there in the States?

ATTY. POBLADOR:
As far as I know ... (inte1rnpted)

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

Remember they stayed there for more than ten years, so they must have acquired
tremendous amount of property there.

ATTY. POBLADOR:
I'm not aware of any other assets, Your Honor, but what I'm aware of is ...
(interrupted)

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

No bank accounts?

ATTY. POBLADOR:
I'm not aware of the bank accounts.

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

Did she vote there in the States when she was staying there'? Did she vote for any
public, for any official running for public office?
ATTY. POBLADOR:
Did she vote, I'm not aware, Your Honor.

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

Did she acquire, for instance, a burial lot? This may sound funny but all of us
would do this, burial lot?

ATTY. POBLADOR:
I'm not aware ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

x x x [Y]ou 're not aware of that. Has she disposed of all her properties in the
States?

ATTY. POBLADOR:
To our knowledge, Your Honor, in that period as part of her relocation process
here, they disposed of all their assets, or most of their assets. (TSN, January 19,
2016, pp. 23-25).
[265]
 JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:
Good evening, Counsel. Among the four respondents, you are the only one who
mentioned about the 2014 assets and liabilities of the petitioner. X x x [Y]ou
mentioned that the petitioner xx x maintains two residential houses in the U.S.;
one which she purchased in 1992 and the other one in 2008, is that correct,
Counsel?

ATTY. VALDEZ:
Yes, Your Honor. I did some internet research.

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

And what was ....

ATTY. VALDEZ:
And this was continued by her own Statement of Assets and Liabilities.

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

What was your purpose in bringing that to light?

ATTY. VALDEZ:
Well, we thought, Your Honor, please, that because there were two competing
domiciles. We are looking at it from the stand point of private international law.
When she reacquired Filipino citizenship without renouncing her American
citizenship, during that very critical period, where she was [is] a status that is
inimical to the interest of the country, as per the Constitution. There was a
competing interest on the part of the U.S. claiming her as a domiciliary of the U.S.
and the Philippines claiming her as a domiciliary of the Philippines, that's why it's
very critical that your Decisions in Coquilla, in Caballero, in Japzon, and [in] the
previous case [of] Jalosjos that the most relevant date when a person will be
considered to be domicile[ d] in this country is when he renounces his American
citizenship because with that ...
JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:
What was ....

ATTY. VALDEZ:
Because with that....

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

Yes, I understand now what you are driving at. What I'm trying to clarify from you
is, what is the relevance of your mentioning there that the Petitioner still maintains
two residential houses in the States, one which was purchased in 1992 and the
other one in 2008?

Does it have something to do with the Petitioner?

ATTY. VALDEZ:
The animus ...

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

... selling her family home in April of2006. In other wonjs, are you saying that,
okay, so she sold her family home in the states in April of 2006 to show that her
reacquisition of domicile in the Philippines is imbued with animus revertendi. ls
that what you ....

ATTY. VALDEZ:
There is still the presence of animus non revertendi by the fact that she still
maintain[s] substantial asset and these are residences in the United States plus the
fact that she used her passport for five times and ....

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

Yes, we know the other matters. I just want to focus on the real property that a ...
because she sold, that's what she's saying, that she sold the family home in April of
2006, fine. It would really, it would seem that you are abandoning already for
good your intention to remain in the states but then you still buy, you still bought a
residential house in 2008.

Atty. Valdez:
Precisely.

JUSTlCE DEL CASTILLO:

Now, she is maintaining these two ... is it your position, are you trying to tell that
she is still maintaining these two real properties in the States?

ATTY. VALDEZ:
Precisely, Your Honor, because she has been a resident of the US in fact for about
19 years so it could not be easily understandable that x x x selling her propeties
and establishing a residence here yet leaving some properties that could be better
signs of wanting to still remain in the US would negate whatever manifestations or
acts on her part that she has chosen to stay in the Philippines. (TSN, February 16,
2016, pp. 230-233).
[266]
 5-264. 18. In par. 98 of his petition in the proceedings a quo, Private
Respondent Valdez alleged that Sen. Poe "still maintains two (2) residential
houses in the US, one purchased in 1992, and the other in 2008." In her Verified
Answer, Sen. Poe ;"DENIED" par. 98 "insofar as it is made to appear that (she)
resides' in the 2 houses mentioned in said paragraph." Sen. Poe further explained
that she "does not 'reside' in these houses, but in her family home in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City (where she has lived with her family for almost a decade).
Private Respondent Valdez did not present any proof to controvert Sen. Poe's
response to par. 98 of this petition.

5.264.19. The net result of this exchange is that Sen. Poe owns two houses in the
U.S.A. which she does not reside in.

xxxx

5.264.21. If a candidate for public office is jurisprudentially allowed to

simultaneously maintain several residences in different places without abandoning
her domicile of choice, it follows that Sen. Poe could successfully establish her
domicile in the Philippines despite the fact that she continues to own or acquires a
house/sin the U.S.A. (which she does not even reside in). Contrary to Private
Respondent Valdez's stance, the mere ownership of these houses in the U.S.A.
cannot, by itself, prove that Sen. Poe does not possess animus non-revertendi to
the U.S.A. The totality of the evidence and circumstances showing Sen. Poe's
reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines since 24 May 2005 certainly ought
to outweigh the singular fact that she also owns houses in the U.S.A.

5.264.22. Lastly, the rule is that a person could have only one domicile at any
given time. Considering that Sen. Poe has been domiciled in the Philippines since
24 May 2005, it is a legal impossibility for her to simultaneously have any other
domicile elsewhere. Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. VI, pp. 4039-4041.
[267]
 Rollo (GR. Nos, 221698-700), Vol. VI, p, 3717.
[268]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. VI, p. 3654.
[269]
 Lacbayan v. Samay, 661 Phil. 306, 318 (2011).
[270]
 Id.
[271]
 Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Osco Workers Fraternity labor Union
(OWFLU), 110 Phil. 627, 632 (1961).
[272]
 Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Spouses Deloy, 710 Phil. 427, 441
(2013), citing Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Sps. Ducat and Kiong, 597 Phil. 5, 16
(2009).
[273]
 Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, 478 Phil. 544, 558 (2004).
[274]
 Id. at 559.
[275]
 Id.
[276]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. VI, p. 3775.
[277]
 People v. Alberto, 625 Phil. 545, 556 (2010).
[278]
 AN ACT AMENDING SECTION THIRTEEN OF COMMONWEALTH
ACT NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED THIRTEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
"THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940" SO AS TO INCLUDE AS
NON-QUOTA IMMIGRANTS WHO MAY BE ADMITTED INTO THE
PHILIPPINES, NATURAL BORN CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN
NATURALIZED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY AND DESIRE TO RETURN FOR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE.
[279]
 Rollo (G.R. Nos, 221698-700), Vol. VI, p. 3721.
[280]
 Japzon v. Commission on Elections, supra note 237 at 367; Caballero v,
Commission on Elections, supra note 253.
[281]
 Japzon v. Commission on Elections, id.
[282]
 Supra note 253.
[283]
 Caballero v. Commission on Elections, supra note 253.
[284]
 Kossuth Kent Kennan, LL.D., A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, 111e
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, Rochester, N.Y., 1934, § 95 pp. 200-
201.
[285]
 25 Am Jur 2d § 24, p. 19.
[286]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. VI, p. 3830.
[287]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 489.
[288]
 GR. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522.
[289]
 Id. at 543.
[290]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. II, pp. 815-816.
[291]
 Id. at 771.
[292]
 Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, Supra note 256 at 657.
[293]
 375 Phil. 1106 (1999).
[294]
 GR No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA267.
[295]
 Kossuth Kent Kennan, I.L.D., A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, 1934,
The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, Rochester, N. Y., § 92, p. 195.
[296]
 Id.
[297]
 686 Phil. 563 (2012).
[298]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(d).
[299]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 27.
[300]
 Sinaca v. Mula, 373 Phil. 896, 908 (1999).
[301]
 Id.
[302]
 Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642, 658 (1999).
[303]
 Id. at 381.
[304]
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. VI p. 3726.
[305]
 Dissenting Opinion of former Chief Justice Panganiban in Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 630
(2004), reads:

In the United States more than sixty years ago, Justice Brandeis delineated the
famous canons of avoidance under which their Supreme Court had refrained from
passing upon constitutional questions, One such canon is that the Court must "not
anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it x x x. It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." In addition, the
Court must not "pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of"

Applying to this case the contours of constitutional avoidance Brandeis brilliantly

summarized, this Court may choose to ignore the constitutional question presented
by petitioner, since there is indeed some other ground upon which this case can be
disposed of -- its clear lack of urgency, by reason of which Congress should be
allowed to do its primary task of reviewing and possibly amending the law.
[306]
 Supra note 217 at 855.
[307]
  Id.
[308]
 151-A Phil. 720. It was held that

[W]here the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by

an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown
hearing, with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative, and this finding on the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this
Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such person's
citizenship, in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance
will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered
conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in
accordance with the procedure herein stated. (Id. at, 730-731.)
[309]
 Supra note 218.
[310]
 Rollo (GR. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 7.

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I am honored to concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Associate

Justice Jose Portugal Perez. I submit this Opinion to further clarify my position.

Prefatory

The rule of law we swore to uphold is nothing but the rule of just law. The rule of
law does not require insistence in elaborate, strained, irrational, and irrelevant
technical interpretation when there can be a clear and rational interpretation that is
more just and humane while equally bound by the limits of legal text.

The Constitution, as fundamental law, defines the mmtmum qualifications for a

person to present his or her candidacy to run for President. It is this same
fundamental law which prescribes that it is the People, in their sovereign capacity
as electorate, to determine who among the candidates is best qualified for that
position.

In the guise of judicial review, this court is not empowered to constrict the
electorate's choice by sustaining the Commission on Elections' actions that show
that it failed to disregard doctrinal interpretation of its powers under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, created novel jurisprudence in relation to the
citizenship of foundlings, misinterpreted and misapplied existing jurisprudence
relating to the requirement of residency for election purposes, and declined to
appreciate the evidence presented by petitioner as a whole and instead insisted
only on three factual grounds which do not necessarily lead to its inference. The
Commission on Elections' actions are a clear breach of its constitutional
competence. It acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of as well as
excess of jurisdiction.

It is our law that a child, abandoned by her parents and left at the doorsteps of a
rural cathedral, can also dream to become President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The minimum requirements of the Constitution is that she be a
natural-born Filipina at the time of the filing of her Certificate of Candidacy and
have domicile in the Philippines for at least ten (10) years prior to the elections. [1]

Given the facts of this case, petitioner has complied with these requirements.

When she filed her certificate of candidacy, this court has yet to squarely rule on
the issue of whether a foundling-a child abandoned by her parents-is a natural-
born Filipino citizen.

There are earlier rulings-Senate Electoral Tribunal Decision[2] and the Bureau of

Immigration Order[3]-that clearly state that petitioner is a natural born Filipina. She
was elected as Senator of the Republic, garnering more than 20 million votes.
[4]
 The position of Senator requires that the person be a natural-born Filipino.[5]

The assertion that petitioner made in her Certificate of Candidacy for President
that she is a natural-born citizen is a grounded opinion. It does not constitute a
material misrepresentation of fact. In much the same way, a Justice of this court
does not commit material misrepresentation when he or she construes the
Constitution in an opinion submitted for this case that a foundling is a natural-born
citizen absent any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In the first place,
this is an interpretation of law-not a statement of material fact.

Doing justice and discharging our duty to uphold the rule of law require that we
conclude that foundlings are natural-born Filipino citizens absent any evidence
that proves the contrary. This is the inescapable conclusion when we read the
provisions on citizenship in the context of the entire Constitution, which likewise
mandates equality, human dignity, social justice, and care for abandoned children.

The Constitution requires that either the father or the mother is a Filipino citizen.
[6]
 It does not require an abandoned child or a foundling to identify his or her
biological parents.[7] It is enough to show that there is a convincing likelihood that
one of the parents is a Filipino. Contrary to the respondents' submissions, it is not
blood line that is required. One of the parents can be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
[8]
 The reference is only one ascendant generation. The constitutional provision
does not absolutely require being born to an indigenous ethnicity.

There is no rational basis to conclude that the loyalty to this country of a

foundling, discovered in a rural area and adopted by well-to-do parents, will be
more suspect than a child born to naturalized Filipino parents.

That a foundling is a natural-born Filipino, unless clear and convincing evidence is

shown otherwise, is also the definitive inference from contemporaneous acts of
Congress[9] and the Executive.[10] This is also the availing conclusion considering
our binding commitments in international law.[11] There is clear and convincing
evidence from the history of the actual text of the entire Constitution.

In the case at bar, petitioner discharged her burden to prove that she is natural-born
when the parties stipulated as to her status as a foundling found in front of a
church in Jaro, Iloilo.[12] When the yardsticks of common sense and statistics are
used,[13] it borders on the absurd to start with the presumption that she was born to
both a foreign father and a foreign mother. In all likelihood, she was born to at
least a Filipino father or to a Filipino mother, or both.

Foundlings present the only ambiguous situation in our Constitution. There is no

slippery slope. Malevolent actors that wish to avail themselves of this doctrine will
have to prove that they are foundlings. They will have to do so with the requisite
quantum of proof for immigration purposes. They will have to do so if it is also
necessary for them for purposes of being candidates in a relevant election.

The Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack of jurisdiction when it went beyond its competence under Section 78[14] of the
Omnibus Election Code and the Constitution by not ruling exclusively on whether
there was material misrepresentation. The questioned Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections En Banc in these cases create a new and erroneous
doctrine on this point of law. It is contrary to the text and spirit of the Constitution.

Likewise, this court has yet to decide on a case that squarely raises the issue as to
whether the period of residency required by the Constitution of a candidate
running for public office can only commence after he or she reacquires his or her
Filipino citizenship. Neither has this court expressed the ratio decidendi that only
when he or she has a resident visa can we commence to count his or her period of
residency for election purposes. No ratio decidendi exists for these rules because
there has not yet been a case that squarely raised these as issues. No ratio
decidendi exists because this is not relevant nor organic to the purpose of
residency as a requirement for elective public offices.

Our standing doctrines are that: (a) residency is a question of fact;[15] (b) residency,
for election purposes, is equivalent to domicile;[16] and (c) domicile requires
physical presence and animus manendi.[17] Animus manendi is negated by the
absence of animus non-revertendi.

To require a new element for establishing residency in order to deny petitioner's

Certificate of Candidacy is not only unfair; it communicates a suspicious animus
against her. It may give rise to a fair implication that there is partiality for one or
another candidate running for the Office of President. It is a dangerous move on
the part of this court. It will affect the credibility of the next administration and
will undermine our standing as a sentinel for the protection of what is just and
what is prescribed by the rule of law.

However, the grave abuse of discretion by the Commission on Elections does not
end there. The Commission on Elections obviously did not appreciate all of the
evidence presented by the parties in inferring when the residency of petitioner for
the purpose of this election commenced. They relied on only three points: (a) a
prior statement in an earlier Certificate of Candidacy for Senator submitted by
petitioner;[18] (b) inferences from some of the actions of petitioner's husband;
[19]
 and (c) the use of her United States passports.[20]

Petitioner has asserted that her statement in her present Certificate of Candidacy
for President is accurate. She explains that her prior statement in her 2012
Certificate of Candidacy for Senator was a mistake committed in good faith. The
Commission on Elections rejects these statements without valid evidence. It insists
that it is the 2012 Certificate of Candidacy that is true and, thus, the present
Certificate of Candidacy that is falsely represented. In doing so, the Commission
on Elections acts arbitrarily and disregards the doctrine in Romualdez-Marcos v.
Commission on Elections.[21]  In effect, it proposes to overturn the precedent
pronounced by this court.

It is true that petitioner is a political studies graduate.[22] However, it is likewise

true that this court should not expect petitioner to have been thoroughly familiar
with the precise interpretation of the legal concept of residence and to correctly
apply it when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator. We do not expect
that much even from our lawyers. We accept that there can be honest mistakes in
interpretation and application. Otherwise, we should discipline any lawyer who
loses a case with finality in any court filed in this country.

To imply petitioner's lack of intent to establish domicile from the actions of her
husband is a willful misappreciation of the evidence presented by petitioner with
the Commission on Elections. The Commission on Elections infers that the wife
cannot establish domicile separated from the husband. This is clearly not the state
of Philippine law, which requires fundamental equality between men and women.
The Commission on Elections isolates the fact of her husband's continued-albeit
short presence in the United States when petitioner and her children returned to the
Philippines. From there, the Commission on Elections infers that when petitioner
and her children returned to the Philippines, they did not intend to establish their
new permanent home.

The Commission on Elections did not appreciate the following established facts
that established the context of petitioner's return to the Philippines on May 24,
2005:

First, the husband was both a Filipino and American citizen.[23]

Second, the husband and the wife uprooted their children, removed them from
their schools in the United States, and enrolled them in schools in the Philippines.
[24]

Third, one of their children, a baby, was likewise uprooted and brought to the
Philippines to stay here permanently.[25]

Fourth, arrangements were made to transfer their household belongings in several

container vans from the United States to the Philippines.[26]

Fifth, petitioner did not seek further employment abroad.[27]

Sixth, petitioner's husband resigned from his work and moved to the Philippines.
[28]

Seventh, petitioner's husband was employed in the Philippines.[29]

Eighth, they sold the place where they stayed in the United States. [30]

Ninth, they bought property in the Philippines and built a new family home.[31]

Tenth, petitioner registered as a voter again in the Philippines and actually voted.
[32]

Eleventh, petitioner registered as a taxpayer in the Philippines and paid taxes. [33]

Lastly, petitioner and her husband formally made announcements with respect to
their change of postal address.[34]

None of these facts suggested by the Dissenting Opinions can negate the inevitable
conclusion of the intent attendant to the establishment of petitioner's presence in
the Philippines on May 24, 2005.

That she had properties in the United States is not inconsistent with establishing
permanent residence in the Philippines. One who is domiciled in the Philippines is
not prohibited from owning properties in another country. Besides, petitioner's
assertion that the properties they have in the United States are not their residence
was not successfully refuted by private respondents.

Petitioner's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship in July 2006 does not negate

physical presence and her intention to establish permanent residence in the
country. It is not improbable that a foreigner may establish domicile in the
Philippines. She is a returning balikbayan with roots in the Philippines who went
through a process to establish her residency in the Philippines and then applied for
the recognition of her dual citizenship.

Many of the 47 years that petitioner has lived was spent in the Philippines. Except
for the 16 years that she was in the United States, the other 31 years of her life
were spent here in the Philippines. The person who became her mother is of
advanced age and is in the Philippines. She went to school in this country and
made friendships as well as memories. She, together with her husband, now has
significant property here in the Philippines. That she intended to come back to take
care of her recognized mother is a tendency so culturally Filipino, but which may
have been forgotten by the Commission on Elections.

Some of the Dissenting Opinions suggest a new doctrine: the failure of a

balikbayan who is allowed to enter the Philippines visa-free to accomplish an
application to get a resident visa is a requirement to establish residency for
election purposes. This is a new element not contemplated in our current doctrines
on domicile.

Residency for election purposes is different from residency for immigration

purposes. Applying for an alien resident visa was not required of petitioner. She
was legally allowed visa-free entry as a balikbayan pursuant to Republic Act No.
6768, as amended. Within the one-year period of her visa-free stay, there is no
prohibition for a balikbayan to apply to reacquire Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225. This she did. At no time was her stay in the Philippines
illegal.

More importantly, the purpose of the residency requirement is already doctrinally

established. Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections[35] explained that it is meant
"to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their
constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers'
qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for."[36]

The requirement to procure a resident visa has no rational relation to this stated
purpose. It is a stretch to create a new doctrine. To require it now in this case will
have considerable repercussions to the future of our country.

There is no evidence that can challenge the conclusion that on May 24, 2005,
petitioner physically came back with the intention to establish her permanent home
in the Philippines. In truth, the entire process of establishing petitioner's permanent
residence here was completed in April 2006, well before May 9, 2006, 10 years
prior to the upcoming elections.

Neither would it be logical to assert that until July 2006, petitioner had not legally
established domicile in the Philippines. Before May 2006, petitioner and her
husband were already in the Philippines. Neither of them were employed in the
United States. They had their family home here. Their children were enrolled in
schools in the Philippines.

The Commission on Elections' proposed conclusion is simply too absurd.

Given the evidence on which petitioner reckoned her residency, she did not
commit material misrepresentation. Thus, it was not only an error but grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections to trivialize the pieces of
evidence presented by petitioner in order to justify its conclusion.

In a proceeding under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Commission

on Elections is neither constitutionally nor statutorily empowered to enunciate new
legal doctrine or to reverse doctrines laid down by this court. It cannot, on the
basis of new doctrines not known to the candidate, declare that his or her
certificate of candidacy is infected with material misrepresentation.

The Commission on Elections is mandated by the Constitution to enforce and

administer election laws. It cannot discharge this duty when there is any suspicion
that it favors or disfavors a candidate. When it goes beyond its competency under
Section 78 to deny a certificate of candidacy "exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein ... is false," it does not only display a
tendency to abuse its power; it seriously undermines its neutrality. This is
quintessentially grave abuse of discretion.

No effort should be spared so as to ensure that our political preferences for or

against any present candidate for the Presidency do not infect our reading of the
law and its present doctrines. We should surmount every real or imagined
pressure, communicated directly or indirectly by reading the entire Constitution
and jurisprudence as they actually exist.

The propositions of respondents require acceptance of doctrines not yet enunciated

and inferences that do not arise from the evidence presented. This will have
nothing to do with reality. It will be unfair to petitioner, and will amount to
misusing our power of judicial review with an attitude less deferential to the
sovereign People's choices expressed both in the Constitution and in elections.
Upholding the Commission on Elections' Resolutions, which stand on shaky legal
grounds, amounts to multiplying each of our individual political preferences more
than a millionfold.

The Facts

Before this court are consolidated Petitions for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares. She prays for the nullification of the Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections, which cancelled her Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the May 9, 2016 National and
Local Elections.

The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 221697 assails the December 1, 2015
Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second Division, which granted the
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy filed by private
respondent Estrella C. Elamparo (Elamparo) and the Commission on Elections En
Banc's December 23, 2015 Resolution,[37] which denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.[38]

On the other hand, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 221698-700 assails the
December 11, 2015 Resolution[39] of the Commission on Elections First Division,
which granted the Petitions filed by private respondents Francisco S. Tatad
(Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras), and Amado T. Valdez (Valdez) and the
Commission on Elections En Banc's December 23, 2015 Resolution,[40] which
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.[41]

The facts of the case are generally stipulated and well-known. Petitioner is a
foundling. Her biological parents are unknown. All that is known about her origin
is that at about 9:30 a.m. on September 3, 1968, she was found in the parish
church of Jaro, Iloilo by one Edgardo Militar. Edgardo Militar opted to place
petitioner in the care and custody of his relative Emiliano Militar and the latter's
wife.[42]

Emiliano Militar reported the discovery to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
in Jaro, Iloilo on September 6, 1968.[43] A Foundling Certificate was issued. This
Certificate indicated petitioner's date of birth to be September 3, 1968. Petitioner's
full name was recorded as "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." [44]

When petitioner was five (5) years old, she was legally adopted by spouses Ronald
Allan Poe (Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces). The Decision
dated May 13, 1974 by the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Rizal granted the
Petition for Adoption filed by Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces.[45] The court
ordered that petitioner's name be changed "from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."[46]

On April 11, 1980, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City received a copy
of the May 13, 1974 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan. It
inscribed on petitioner's Foundling Certificate that she was adopted by Fernando
Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces on May 13, 1974.[47] A hand written notation was made
on the right-hand side of petitioner's Foundling Certificate, as follows:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as
per Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M.
Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. 138.[48]
In accordance with the May 13, 1974 Decision, the Office ofthe Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City amended petitioner's Foundling Certificate so that her middle name
("Contreras") and last name ("Militar") were to be replaced with "Sonora" and
"Poe," respectively. Further, the names "Ronald Allan Poe" and "Jesusa Sonora
Poe" were entered into petitioner's Foundling Certificate in the spaces reserved for
the names of the individuals who are legally considered as petitioner's parents. [49]

On December 13, 1986, when petitioner was 18 years old, the Commission on
Elections issued her a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila.[50]

On April 4, 1988, petitioner was issued a Philippine passport by the then Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. This passport stated that "(t)he Government of the Republic of
the Philippines requests all concerned to permit the bearer, a citizen of the
Philippines to pass safely and freely and, in case of need, to give (her) lawful aid
and protection."[51]

This passport was valid for a period of five (5) years.[52] It was renewed on April 5,
1993, and subsequently on May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013,
and March 18, 2014.[53]

Petitioner initially enrolled in the Development Studies Program of the University

of the Philippines. However, in 1988, petitioner transferred to the Boston College
in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, USA, where she obtained her Bachelor of Arts
degree in Political Studies in 1991.[54]

On July 27, 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael V. Llamanzares (Teodoro

Llamanzares), a citizen from birth[55] of both the Philippines and the United States.
[56]
 Teodoro Llamanzares was then based in the United States. On July 29, 1991,
petitioner went to the United States to live with her husband.[57]

Petitioner and her husband bore three (3) children. Brian Daniel (Brian) was born
in the United States on April 16, 1992, Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) in the
Philippines on July 10, 1998, and Jesusa Anika (Anika) in the Philippines on June
5, 2004.[58]

Ten years after having been based in the United States,[59] petitioner became a
naturalized American citizen on October 18, 2001.[60] On December 19, 2001, she
was issued United States Passport No. 017037793.[61]

On April 8, 2004, petitioner, who was then pregnant with her third child, returned
to the Philippines.[62] She was accompanied by her daughter Hanna.[63] Petitioner
asserted that her return had two purposes: first, to support her parents as Fernando
Poe, Jr. was then running for President of the Philippines; and second, to give birth
to her third child, Anika, in the Philippines.[64]

It was only on July 8, 2004, after Anika was born on June 5, 2004, that petitioner
returned to the United States.[65]

On December 11, 2004, petitioner's father Fernando Poe, Jr. slipped into a coma
and was confined at St. Luke's Medical Center in Quezon City. Rushing to return
to the Philippines, petitioner arrived on December 13, 2004. Unfortunately,
Fernando Poe, Jr. died before petitioner could reach the hospital.[66] Petitioner
stayed until February 3, 2005 to allegedly "comfort her grieving mother and to
assist [her] in taking care of the funeral arrangements and ... the settlement of her
father's estate."[67]

In 2004, petitioner resigned from her work in the United States.[68] Following her
resignation, she did not seek employment there again.[69]

Petitioner claims that in the first quarter of 2005, after her father's untimely death
and to give moral support to her mother, she and her husband decided to return to
the Philippines for good.[70]

Early in 2005, Brian and Hanna's schools in the United States were informed of
their family's intention to transfer them to Philippine schools for the following
semester.[71]

Beginning March 2005, petitioner and her husband began receiving cost estimates
from property movers as regards the relocation of their properties from the United
States to the Philippines. Among these were those from Victory Van International
(Victory Van).[72] Petitioner noted that e-mails between her and her husband, on
one hand, and Victory Van, on the other, "show the process that [she] and her
family went through to permanently relocate and reestablish themselves in
Philippines[.]"[73] As recalled by petitioner:
2.22.1. On 18 March 2005, with subject heading "Relocation to Manila Estimate",
a representative of Victory Van replied to an inquiry made by Petitioner, and
informed her that they would need at least three (3) forty foot containers to
transport all of the family's household goods, furniture, and two (2) vehicles from
Virginia, U.S.A. to Manila, Philippines. The service would include "packing,
export wrapping, custom crating for chandeliers, marble top and glass tops,
loading of containers ..., US customs export inspection for the vehicles,
transportation to Baltimore, ocean freight and documentation to arrival Manila,
customs clearance, delivery, ... unwrapping and placement of furniture, assisted
unpacking, normal assembly ..., container return to port and same day debris
removal based on three 40' containers."

2.22.2. Petitioner and her husband eventually engaged the services of Victory Van,
and scheduled two (2) moving phases for the packing, collection and storage of
their household goods for eventual transport to the Philippines. The "first phase"
was scheduled sometime in February 2006, with Petitioner flying in to the U.S.A.
to supervise the packing, storage, and disposal of their household goods in
Virginia. The "second phase" was supervised by Petitioner's husband and
completed sometime in April2006.[74] (Citations omitted)
Apart from making arrangements for the transfer of their properties, petitioner and
her husband also asked Philippine authorities about the procedure for bringing
their dogs into the country.[75] They processed an application for import permit
from the Bureau of Animal Industry-National Veterinary and Quarantine Service.
[76]

Petitioner and her three (3) children returned to the Philippines on May 24, 2005.
[77]
 Petitioner's husband was unable to join them and had to stay in the United
States as, according to petitioner, he still had "to finish pending projects and to
arrange for the sale of the family home there."[78]

In returning to the Philippines, petitioner and her children did not obtain visas.
Petitioner emphasized that a visa was not legally required since she and her
children availed themselves of the benefit allowed under the Balikbayan Program
of one-year visa-free entry.[79]

Upon arrival in the Philippines, petitioner and her children initially lived with
petitioner's mother Susan Roces at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan City.
[80]
 Petitioner emphasized that the living arrangements at her mother's house were
modified to accommodate her and her children.[81] Further, her father's long-time
driver was permanently assigned to her.[82]

For the academic year 2005-2006, petitioner enrolled Brian and Hanna in
Philippine schools. Brian was enrolled at Beacon School in Taguig City,[83] while
Hanna at Assumption College in Makati City.[84] In 2007, when she was old
enough to go to school, Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan
City.[85] Brian subsequently transferred to La Salle Greenhills in 2006, where he
finished his high school education in 2009.[86] Hanna finished her grade school and
high school education at Assumption College,[87] where Anika also completed
Kindergarten.[88] She is now a sixth grader in the same school.[89]

Shortly after her arrival in the Philippines, petitioner also registered as a taxpayer
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue.[90] She was issued a Tax Identification
Number by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on July 22, 2005.[91]

Petitioner asserted that sometime in the latter part of 2005, Susan Roces
discovered that the lawyer in charge of petitioner's adoption in 1974 failed to
secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City a new Certificate of
Live Birth indicating petitioner's adopted name and the names of her adoptive
parents.[92] Thus, on November 8, 2005, she executed an affidavit attesting to the
lawyer's omission and submitted it to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City. On May 4, 2006, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City issued a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's name to be "Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe."[93]

In addition, around that time, petitioner and her husband "acquired Unit 7F of One
Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan"[94] (along with a corresponding parking
slot).[95] According to petitioner, this was to serve as their temporary residence
until the completion of their family home in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City.[96]

On February 14, 2006, petitioner left for the United States allegedly to supervise
the disposal her family's remaining belongings. She returned to the Philippines on
March 11, 2006.[97]

On March 28, 2006, as the disposal of their remaining properties had been
completed, petitioner's husband informed the United States Postal Service of their
family's abandonment of their address in the United States.[98]

In April 2006, petitioner's husband resigned from his work in the United States.
[99]
 The packing of petitioner's family's properties, which were to be transported to
the Philippines, was also completed on or about April 25 to 26, 2006. Their home
in the United States was sold on April 27, 2006.[100]

Petitioner's husband then returned to the Philippines on May 4, 2006. By July

2006, he found employment in the Philippines.[101]

In the meantime, in early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square-
meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Barangay Ugong Norte, Quezon City. They built a
house on this lot, which, as petitioner points out, remains to be their family home
to this day.[102]

On July 7, 2006, petitioner took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines[103] pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known
as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Three days later, on
July 10, 2006, she likewise filed before the Bureau of Immigration a Petition for
Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship.[104] She also filed Petitions for Derivate
Citizenship on behalf of her three children who were at that time all below 18
years old.[105]

On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued the Order granting all these
Petitions.[106] The Order stated:
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition
indicate that the petitioner was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines
being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine
citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a holder of an
American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby
deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.[107]
The Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates for petitioner and her
three children.[108] Petitioner's Identification Certificate states that she is a "citizen
of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003 (RA 9225) in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed
by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006." [109]

On August 31, 2006, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San
Juan City.[110]

On October 13, 2009, the Department of Foreign Affair issued to petitioner a

Philippine passport with Passport Number XX4731999.[111]

On October 6, 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as

Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board.
[112]
 Petitioner asserts that she did not immediately accept this appointment as she
was advised that Section 5(3) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003 required two things of her before assuming any appointive public office:
first, to take the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and second,
to renounce her American citizenship.[113]

Thus, on October 20, 2010, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of

Allegiance to the [United States of America] and Renunciation of American
Citizenship,[114] stating:
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently
residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state
that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United
States nationality/ American citizenship, together with all rights and privileges and
all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation
intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any duress or undue
influence.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 20th day of

October 2010 at Pasig City, Philippines.[115]
An original copy of the Affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on
the same day.[116]

Petitioner took her Oath of Office as Chairperson of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board on October 21, 2010.[117] She formally assumed
office as Chairperson on October 26, 2010.[118]

In addition to her Affidavit renouncing her American citizenship, petitioner

executed on July 12, 2011 an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the United States before Somer E. Bessire-Briers, Vice Consul ofthe Embassy
ofthe United States of America in Manila.[119]

On the same day, she accomplished a Questionnaire Information for Determining

Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship,[120] where she stated that on October 21, 2010
she had taken her oath as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board with the intent of relinquishing her American citizenship.
[121]
 She further stated that she had been living in the Philippines from September
3, 1968 to July 29, 1991 and from May 2005 to this present day.[122] On page 4 of
this Questionnaire, petitioner asserted that:
I became a resident of the Philippines once again since 2005. My mother still
resides in the Philippines. My husband and I are both employed and own
properties in the Philippines. As a dual citizen (Filipino-American) since 2006,
I've voted in two Philippine national elections. My three children study and reside
in the Philippines at the time I performed the act as described in Part I item 6. [123]
On December 9, 2011, petitioner was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality by
Jason Galian, Vice-Consul of the Embassy of the United States of America.
[124]
 The Certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service of the United
States' Department of State on February 3, 2012.[125]

Petitioner ran for Senator of the Philippines in the May 2013 elections.[126] She
executed her Certificate of Candidacy on September 27, 2012 and filed it before
the Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.[127]  Petitioner "declared that she
had been a resident of the Philippines for six (6) years and six (6) months
immediately before the 13 May 2013 elections."[128]

On May 16, 2013, petitioner's election as Senator was formally proclaimed by the
Commission on Elections.[129] Petitioner is currently serving her term as Senator.
[130]

On December 19, 2013, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued petitioner a

Diplomatic passport with Passport Number DE0004530 valid until December 18,
2018. Petitioner was also issued a Philippine passport with Passport No.
EC0588861 valid until March 17, 2019.[131]

On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for President of
the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the May 9, 2016 Elections.
[132]
 She stated that she is a natural-hom Filipino citizen and that her "residence in
the Philippines up to the day before May 9, 2016" was to be "10" years and "11"
months.[133]

Petitioner attached to her Certificate of Candidacy the Affidavit Affirming

Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship,[134] in which she emphasized that she never
recanted the Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American Citizenship that she executed on October
20, 2010. Further, she stated that effective October 21, 2010, she was no longer an
American citizen, even within the contemplation of the laws ofthe United States.
[135]
 She further stated:
Although I have long ceased to be a U.S.A. citizen, and without implying that my
previous renunciation of U.S.A. citizenship was in any manner ineffective or
recanted, but solely for the purpose of complying with the requirements for filing
my Certificate of Candidacy ('COC') for President in the 9 May 2016 election
(specifically. Item 10 of the COC) and in light of the pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in Amado vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 210164, 18 August 2015) that
'(t)here is no law prohibiting (me) from executing an Affidavit of Renunciation
every election period if only avert possible questions about (my) qualifications." I
hereby affinn and reiterate that I personally renounce my previous U.S.A.
citizenship, together with all rights, privileges, duties, allegiance and fidelity
pertaining thereto. I likewise declare that, aside from that renounced U.S.A.
citizenship, I have never possessed any other foreign citizenship. [136] (Citation
omitted)
On October 16, 2015, Elamparo filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner.[137] The case was raffled to the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections.[138] On October 19, 2015, Tatad filed a
Verified Petition for Disqualification against petitioner.[139] On October 20, 2015,
Contreras filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner.[140] On November 9, 2015, Valdez also filed a Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner. [141] The
Petitions of Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez were raffled to the Commission on
Elections First Division.[142]

On November 25, 2015, a clarificatory hearing was conducted on the three

Petitions before the Commission on Elections First Division.[143] The parties were
directed to file their respective memoranda until December 3, 2015, 10 days from
the date of the preliminary conference.[144] The case was deemed submitted for
resolution on December 3, 2015, when the parties had submitted their respective
Memoranda.[145]

The Petition filed by Elamparo was likewise submitted for resolution after the
parties had submitted their respective memoranda.[146]

In the Order dated December 1, 2015, the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections granted the Petition of Elamparo.[147]

On December 2, 2015, Elamparo filed an Urgent Motion to Exclude petitioner

from the list of candidates for the Office of President in the official ballots to be
printed for the May 2016 National Elections.[148]

Petitioner filed her Partial Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission on
Elections En Banc on December 7, 2015.[149]

Meanwhile, in the Order dated December 11, 2015, the Commission on Elections
First Division granted the Petitions of Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez and ordered
the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines.[150]

On December 16, 2015, petitioner moved for reconsideration before the

Commission on Elections En Banc.[151]

In the resolutions dated December 23, 2015, the Commission on Elections En

Banc denied petitioner's motions for reconsideration.[152]

On December 28, 2015, petitioner filed before this court the present Petitions with
an accompanying Extremely Urgent Application for an Ex Parte Temporary
Restraining Order/Status Quo Ante Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
[153]

On December 28, 2015, this court issued a temporary restraining order.

[154]
 Respondents were similarly ordered to comment on the present Petitions.
[155]
 The Petitions were later consolidated.[156]

Oral arguments were conducted from January 19, 2016 to February 16, 2016.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their memoranda and the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.

The Issues

For resolution are the following issues:

A. Whether a review of the Commission on Elections' assailed Resolutions via

the consolidated Petitions for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is warranted;

B. Whether Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of

Procedure is valid;

(1) Whether Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Election's Rules of

Procedure violates Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution;

(2) Whether the Commission on Elections may promulgate a rule-

stipulating a period within which its decisions shall become final and
executory-that is inconsistent with the rules promulgated by this court with
respect to the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections;

C. Whether the Commission on Elections should have dismissed and not

entertained the Petition filed by private respondent Francisco S. Tatad
against petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares:

(1) On the ground of failure to state the cause of action;

(2) For invoking grounds for a petition to cancel or deny due course to a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to Rule 23 of the Commission on Election's Rules of Procedure.

D. Whether the Commission on Elections has jurisdiction over the Petitions

filed by private respondents Estrella C. Elamparo, Francisco S. Tatad,
Antonio P. Contreras, and Amado D. Valdez;

(1) Whether the Commission on Elections acted with grave abuse of

jurisdiction and/or in excess of jurisdiction in ruling on petitioner's intrinsic
eligibility, specifically with respect to her citizenship and residency;
 E. Whether grounds exist for the cancellation of petitioner's

Certificate of Candidacy for President;

(1) Whether petitioner made any material misrepresentation in her

Certificate of Candidacy for President;

(a) Whether petitioner's statement that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen

constitutes material misrepresentation warranting the cancellation of her
Certificate of Candidacy for President;

i. Whether the Commission on Elections' conclusion that petitioner,

being a foundling, is not a Filipino citizen under Article IV, Section
1 of the 1935 Constitution, is warranted and sustains the cancellation
of her Certificate of Candidacy for President;

Whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion

in ruling that petitioner has the burden of provmg her natural-born
citizenship in proceedings under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code in relation to Rule 23 of the Commission on Elections' Rules;

ii. Whether the Commission on Elections' conclusion that petitioner did

not validly reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship is warranted
and sustains the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy for
President;

(b) Whether petitioner's statement in her Certificate of Candidacy that her

period of residence in the Philippines is ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months until May 9, 2016 constitutes material misrepresentation warranting
the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy for President;

- Whether the Commission on Elections' conclusion that petitioner did not

meet the required period of residence is warranted and sustains the
cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy for President;

(2) Whether petitioner intended to mislead the electorate in the statements

she made in her Certificate of Candidacy for President;

(1) Whether petitioner intended to mislead the electorate by stating in her

Certificate of Candidacy that she is a natural-born Filipino Citizen; and

(2) Whether petitioner's statement in her Certificate of Candidacy that her

period of residence by May 9, 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months constitutes concealment of "ineligibility" for the Presidency and an
attempt to mislead or deceive the Philippine electorate.

The Petitions should be granted.

We clarify the mode of review and its parameters.

This court's power of judicial review is invoked through petitions for certiorari
seeking to annul the Commission on Elections' resolutions which contain
conclusions regarding petitioner Poe's citizenship, residency, and purported
misrepresentation.

Under Rule 64, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Elections may be brought to this court on
certiorari under Rule 65.[157] For a writ of certiorari to be issued under Rule 65, the
respondent tribunal must have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[158]

The concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution recognizes this court's
jurisdiction to settle actual cases or controversies. It also underscores this court's
jurisdiction to determine whether a government agency or instrumentality
committed grave abuse of discretion in the fulfillment of its actions. Judicial
review grants this court authority to invalidate acts-of the legislative, the
executive, constitutional bodies, and administrative agencies-when these acts are
contrary to the Constitution.[159]

The term "grave abuse of discretion," while defying exact definition, generally
refers to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction:
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough: it must be grave.[160]
In other words: arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of any constitutionally
mandated power has never been sanctioned by the sovereign to any constitutional
department, agency, or organ of government.

The Commission on Elections argues that alleged errors in its conclusions

regarding petitioner's citizenship, residency, and purported misrepresentation were
based on its findings and the evidence submitted by the parties. It emphasizes that
even if its conclusions might have been erroneous, it nevertheless based these on
its own appreciation of the evidence in relation to the law and the Constitution. It
claims to have only exercised its constitutionally bounded discretion.
Consequently, in its view, the Commission on Elections cannot be deemed to have
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.[161]

Grave abuse of discretion exists when a constitutional body makes patently gross
errors in making factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence presented
by a party not traversed or even stipulated by the other parties are ignored.
[162]
 Furthermore a misinterpretation of the text of the Constitution or provisions of
law, or otherwise a misreading or misapplication of the current state of
jurisprudence, also amounts to grave abuse of discretion.[163] In such cases,
decisions are arbitrary in that they do not relate to the whole corpus of evidence
presented. They are arbitrary in that they will not be based on the current state of
our law. Necessarily, these give the strongest suspicion of either capriciousness or
partiality beyond the imagination of our present Constitution.
Thus, writs of certiorari are issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, as where it uses wrong considerations and
grossly misreads the evidence at arriving at its conclusion;[164] (b) where a
tribunal's assessment is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal
and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that
can be used[;]"[165] "(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being
grossly unreasonable[;]"[166] and (d) where the tribunal uses wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding an issue.[167]

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution is designed to ensure that this court will
not abdicate its duty as guardian of the Constitution's substantive precepts in favor
of alleged procedural devices with lesser value.[168] Given an actual case or
controversy and in the face of grave abuse, this court is not rendered impotent by
an overgenerous application of the political question doctrine.[169] In general, the
present mode of analysis will often require examination of the potential breach of
the Constitution m a justiciable controversy.

II

Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure, insofar as

it states that the Commission on Elections' decisions become final and executor
five (5) days after receipt, is valid. It does not violate Article IX, Section 7 of the
Constitution.

Article IX of the 1987 Constitution provides that any decision, order, or ruling of
the Commission on Elections may be brought to this court on certiorari within
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members,
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof (Emphasis
supplied)
Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure, on the
other hand, provides that decisions and rulings of the Commission on Elections En
Banc are deemed final and executory if no restraining order is issued by this court
within five (5) days from receipt of such a decision or resolution, thus:
Section 8. Effect if Petition Unresolved. -
....
A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in case of a Division
ruling, no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, or in
cases of rulings of the Commission En Banc, no restraining order is issued by the
Supreme Court within five (5) days from receipt of the decision or resolution.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Elections has the power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. Article IX-A provides:
Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however,
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Similarly, in Article IX-C:
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
The interpretation of any legal provtston should be one that is in harmony with
other laws on the same subject matter so as to form a complete, coherent, and
intelligible system. "Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretand,"
or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[170] Assessing the validity of the
Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure includes a determination of whether
these rules can co exist with the remedy of certiorari as provided by Article IX,
Section 7 of the Constitution.

A wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings.

[171]
 In exercising this power, this court is to be guided by all the circumstances of
each particular case "as the ends of justice may require."[172] Thus, a writ of
certiorari will be granted where necessary in order to prevent a substantial wrong
or to do substantial justice.[173]

The Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure are evidently procedural rules;

they are remedial in nature. They cover only rules on pleadings and practice. They
are the means by which its power or authority to hear and decide a class of cases is
put into action.[174] Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of
Procedure refers only to the pleadings and practice before the Commission on
Elections itself, and does not affect the jurisdiction of this court.

Accordingly, that the Commission on Elections may deem a resolution final and
executory under its rules of procedure does not automatically render such
resolution beyond the scope of judicial review under Article IX of the 1987
Constitution. Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of
Procedure merely guides the Commission as to the status of a decision for its own
operations; it does not prevent this court from acting on the same decision via
certiorari proceedings. In any event, while it is true that certiorari does not
immediately stay a decision of a constitutional commission, a temporary
restraining order can still be issued, as in this case.

Finally, it should be noted that in promulgating this rule, the Commission on

Elections was simply fulfilling its constitutional duty to "promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases."[175] Cases before the
Commission on Elections must be disposed of without delay, as the date of the
elections is constitutionally and statutorily fixed.[176] The five-day rule is based on
a reasonable ground: the necessity to prepare for the elections.

III

Any interpretation of the scope of the statutory power granted to the Commission
on Elections must consider all the relevant constitutional provisions allocating
power to the different organs of government.

Reading the entirety of the Constitution leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the Commission on Elections' jurisdiction, statutorily granted in Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, with respect to candidates for the Offices of President
and Vice President, is only with respect to determining whether a material matter
asserted in a candidate's certificate of candidacy is false. For purposes of Section
78, a matter may be true or false only when it is verifiable. Hence, the section only
refers to a matter of fact. It cannot refer to a legal doctrine or legal interpretation.
Furthermore, the false representation on a material fact must be shown to have
been done with intent. It must be accompanied with intent to deceive. It cannot
refer to an honest mistake or error made by the candidate.

III.A

A certificate of candidacy is filed to announce a person's candidacy and to declare

his or her eligibility for elective office. Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code
enumerates the items that must be included m a certificate of candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a pennanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved
proceeding, a candidate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which
he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the
name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed
under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name
after perfonning the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there
are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each
candidate, upon being made aware or such fact, shall state his paternal and
maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and
surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also
include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known
in the locality.

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Generally, the Commission on Elections has the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of certificates of candidacy.[177] The Commission on Elections
has the competence to deny acceptance of a certificate of candidacy when a
candidate's lack of qualifications appears patent on the face of the certificate of
candidacy and is indubitable.[178] This is in line with its power to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."[179]
For instance, if the date of birth in the certificate of candidacy clearly and patently
shows that the candidate has not met the required age requirement for the office
for which he or she is running, the Commission on Elections may motu proprio
deny acceptance. Specifically, in such cases, the candidate has effectively made an
admission by swearing to the certificate of candidacy. Therefore, in the interest of
an orderly election, the Commission on Elections may simply implement the law.

This is not the situation in this case. Petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy did not
patently show any disqualification or ineligibility. Thus, the denial of due course
or cancellation of the certificate cannot be done motu proprio, but only when a
petition is filed. The petition must be verified and based on the exclusive ground
that a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false.

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively  on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy ad shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
(Emphasis supplied)
III.B

The Commission on Elections' discretion with respect to Section 78 is limited in

scope.

The constitutional powers and functions of the Commission on Elections are

enumerated in Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Anned Forces of the Philippines,
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their
goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
 Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for
the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases
of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of
each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Except for item (2), all the powers enumerated in Article IX-C, Section 2 are
administrative in nature.[180] These powers relate to the Commission's general
mandate to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election." The Commission on Elections' adjudicatory powers are
limited to having "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials" and "appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction."

The Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction over the elections, returns, and
qualifications of those who are candidates for the Office of President. They also do
not have jurisdiction to decide issues "involving the right to vote[.]"[181]

The Commission on Elections was originally only an administrative agency.

[182]
 Under Commonwealth Act No. 607, it took over the President's function to
enforce election laws.

Pursuant to amendments made to the 1935 Constitution, the Commission on

Elections was transformed into a constitutional body "[having] exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections[.]"[183]

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the Commission on Elections was granted
quasi-judicial powers in addition to its administrative powers. The Commission on
Elections became the sole judge of all election contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of members of the national legislature and elective
provincial and city officials. Thus, in Article XII-C, Section 2(2) of the 1973
Constitution, the Commission on Elections was granted the power to:
SEC. 2....
....

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial
and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)
At present, the quasi-judicial power of the Commission on Elections is found in
item (2) of Article IX-C, Section 2 of the Constitution.

"Contests" are post-election scenarios.[184] Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the

Constitution speaks of "elective officials," not "candidates for an elective
position." This means that the Commission on Elections may take cognizance of
petitions involving qualifications for public office only after election, and this is
only with respect to elective regional, provincial, city, municipal, and barangay
officials.

With respect to candidates for President and Vice President, the Constitution
reserved adjudicatory power with this court. Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution outlines the dynamic relationship of the various constitutional organs
in elections for President and Vice President, thus:
SECTION 4....

....

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be ransmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon

receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of Senate shall, not later than
thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,
upon detennination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting En Banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and q talifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
Reading the text of similar provisions[185] relating to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal,[186] Former Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza observed in
his Separate Opinion in Romualdez-Marcos that there are no "authorized
proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications for an office before his
election."[187] He proposed that the Commission on Elections cannot remedy the
perceived lacuna by deciding petitions questioning the qualifications of candidates
before the election under its power to enforce election laws.[188]

This reading was later on qualified.

In Tecson v. Commission on Elections,[189] the petitions filed by Maria Jeanette

Tecson and Zoilo Velez were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitions
questioned directly before this court, before the elections were held, the
qualifications of Fernando Poe, Jr. as a presidential candidate. With unanimity on
this point, this court stated:
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates for President or Vice
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.

Accordingly, G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G.R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.[190]
On the other hand, with respect to the petitions that questioned the resolutions of
the Commission on Elections, which in tum were decided on the basis of Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, Tecson clarified, with respect to the Petition
docketed as G.R. No. 161824:
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC
deny due course to or cancel FPJ's certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen)
before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code-
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of
the Omnibus Election Code-
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to
the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections.
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize
"any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also
reads-
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly
elevated to, and cold well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view
would be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully
informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
occupy the highest government post in the land.[191] (Citations omitted)
A proper reading of the Constitution requires that every provision be given effect.
Thus, the absurd situation where "contests" are entertained even if no petition for
quo warranto was filed before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,[192] the Senate
Electoral Tribunal,[193] or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [194] must
be avoided. This will be the case should the Commission on Elections be allowed
to take cognizance of all petitions questioning the eligibility of a candidate. The
provisions of the Constitution on the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals over
election contests would be rendered useless.

More importantly, the Commission on Elections' very existence and effectiveness

inherently depend on its neutrality. Scrutiny of the qualifications of candidates for
electoral positions of national importance was intentionally and expressly
delegated to special electoral tribunals. Clearly, the credibility-and perhaps even
the legitimacy-of those who are elected to these important public offices will be
undermined with the slightest suspicion of bias on the part of the Commission on
Elections. This is why the pressure to determine the qualifications of candidates to
these positions has been purposely removed from the Commission on Elections.
After all, given Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, any "case or matter"
decided by a constitutional commission "may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof."[195] The Commission on Elections will find itself in a very difficult
situation should it disqualify a candidate on reasons other than clearly
demonstrable or factual grounds only for this court to eventually overturn its
ruling. The Commission on Elections, wittingly or unwittingly, would provide
justifiable basis for suspicions of partiality.

It is also this evil that we must guard against as we further sketch the contours of
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections and of this court.

Before elections, the Commission on Elections, under Section 78 of the Omnibus

Election Code, may take cognizance of petitions involving qualifications for
public office regardless of the elective position involved, but only on the limited
and exclusive ground that a certificate of candidacy contains a material
representation that is false.

Intent to deceive should remain an element of Section 78 petitions. Otherwise, the

only issue to be resolved in Section 78 petitions would be whether the candidate
possesses the qualifications required under the law. If the Commission acts on
these petitions, it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. As discussed, the Commission
on Elections may validly take cognizance of petitions involving qualifications only
if the petitions were filed after election and only with respect to elective regional,
provincial, city, municipal, and barangay officials.

III.C

Thus, to successfully challenge a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, a

petitioner must establish that:

First, that the assailed certificate of candidacy contains a representation that is

false;

Second, that the false representation is material, i.e., it involves the candidate's
qualifications for elective office,[196] such as citizenship[197] and residency; [198] and

Third, that the false material representation was made with a "deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible"[199] or "with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications for public office."[200]

In using its powers under Section 78, the Commission on Elections must apply
these requirements strictly and with a default preference for allowing a certificate
of candidacy in cases affecting the positions of President, Vice President, Senator,
or Member of the House of Representatives. Section 78 itself mentions that the
ground of material misrepresentation is exclusive of any other ground.
Furthermore, in the guise of this statutory grant of power, the Commission on
Elections cannot usurp the functions of this court sitting as the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal nor of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Likewise, it cannot keep the most important
collective of government-the People acting as an electorate-from exercising its
most potent power: the exercise of its right to choose its leaders in a clean, honest,
and orderly election.

As petitiOner suggests, "the sovereign people, in ratifying the Constitution,

intended that questions of a candidate's qualification ... be submitted directly to
them."[201]  In the words of Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections,[202] the People, on certain legal issues, choose to be the
"final power of final legal adjustment."[203]

Consistent with this legal order, only questions of fact may be resolved in Section
78 proceedings. Section 78 uses the word "false;" hence, these proceedings must
proceed from doubts arising as to the truth or falsehood of a representation in a
certificate of candidacy.[204] Only a fact is verifiable, and conversely, falsifiable, as
opposed to an opinion on a disputed point of law where one's position is only as
good as another's. Under Section 78, the Commission on Elections cannot resolve
questions of law as when it resolves the issue of whether a candidate is qualified
given a certain set of facts-for it would arrogate upon itself the powers duly
reserved to the electoral tribunals established by the Constitution.

Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections articulated the requirement of

"deliberate attempt to mislead" in order that a certificate of candidacy may be
cancelled.[205] In 1995, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for Representative of the First District of Leyte, alleging that she
resided in the district for seven (7) months. She later amended her Certificate to
state that she had resided in Tacloban City "since childhood,"[206] explaining that
her original answer was an "honest mistake."[207] The Commission on Elections
nonetheless cancelled her Certificate of Candidacy for her failure to meet the one-
year residency requirement for the position she was seeking.[208]

Admitting the defense of honest mistake and finding that Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos satisfied the required period of residence, this court reversed the
Commission on Elections' ruling. It stated that:
[I]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in certificate of candidacy which ought
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. [The statement in the certificate
of candidacy] becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately
and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to
his or her disqualification.[209]
In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,[210] this court affirmed the proclamation
of Ermelita Cacao Salcedo as Mayor of Sara, Iloilo despite the contention that her
marriage to Neptali Salcedo was void and that she, therefore, had materially
misrepresented her surname to be "Salcedo."[211]

This court ruled that the use of a specific surname in a certificate of candidacy is
not the material representation contemplated in Section 78.[212]

There was no intent to deceive on the part of Ermelita Cacao Salcedo as she has
been using "Salcedo" years before the election; hence, this court refused to cancel
her Certificate of Candidacy.[213]

Intent to deceive has consistently been required to justify the cancellation of

certificates of candidacy.[214] Yet, in 2013, this court in Tagolino v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal[215] stated that intent to deceive "is of bare
significance to a Section 78 petition."[216] This statement must be taken in context.

In Tagolino, Richard Gomez (Gomez) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for

Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte. An opposing candidate,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a petition before the Commission on
Elections, alleging that Gomez resided in Greenhills, San Juan City, contrary to
his representation in his Certificate of Candidacy that he resided in Ormoc City.
Juntilla prayed for the cancellation of Gomez's Certificate of Candidacy. [217]

In its Resolution dated February 17, 2010, the First Division of the Commission
on Elections granted Juntilla's Petition and declared Gomez "disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of
residency requirement."[218] This Resolution was affirmed by the Commission on
Elections En Banc, after which Gomez manifested that he accepted the finality of
the Resolution.[219]

Thereafter, Lucy Torres-Gomez (Torres-Gomez) filed her Certificate of Candidacy

as substitute candidate for her husband. The Liberal Party, to which Gomez
belonged, endorsed Torres-Gomez's candidacy. Upon recommendation of its Law
Department, the Commission on Elections En Banc allowed Torres-Gomez to
substitute for Gomez in its Resolution dated May 8, 2010.[220]

The next day, on May 9, 2010, Juntilla moved for reconsideration. After the
conduct of elections on May 10, 2010, Gomez, whose name remained on the
ballots, garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for
representative.[221] In view of his substitution, the votes were counted in favor of
Torres-Gomez. Torres-Gomez was then "proclaimed the duly elected
Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte."[222]

To oust Torres-Gomez, Silverio Tagolino filed a petition for quo warranto before

the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Tagolino argued, among others,
that Torres-Gomez failed to validly substitute Gomez, the latter's Certificate of
Candidacy being void.[223]

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal dismissed the petition for quo
warranto and ruled that Torres-Gomez validly substituted for her husband.
According to the tribunal, the Commission on Elections declared Gomez
disqualified; the Commission did not cancel Gomez's Certificate of Candidacy.
Since Gomez was merely disqualified, a candidate nominated by the political party
to which he belonged could validly substitute him.[224]

On certiorari, this court reversed and set aside the Decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.[225] Juntilla's Petition prayed for the
cancellation of Gomez's certificate of candidacy.[226] Although the Commission's
First Division declared Gomez "disqualified" as a candidate for representative, the
Commission nonetheless granted Juntilla's Petition "without any qualification."[227]

Juntilla's Petition was granted, resulting in the cancellation of Gomez's Certificate

of Candidacy. Hence, Gomez was deemed a noncandidate for the 2010 Elections
and could not have been validly substituted by Torres-Gomez. Torres-Gomez then
could not have been validly elected as Representative of the Fourth District
ofLeyte.

In deciding Tagolino, this court distinguished a petition for disqualification under

Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code from a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.[228] As to whether intent to
deceive should be established in a Section 78 petition, this court stated:
[I]t must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one's
intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that
the person's declaration of a material qualification in the [certificate of candidacy]
be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person
committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
detennination of whether one's [certificate of candidacy] should be deemed
cancelled or not. What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to
deny due course to and/or cancel the [certificate of candidacy] on the basis of one's
ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification.[229] (Citations
omitted)
Tagolino notwithstanding, intent to deceive remains an indispensable element of a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.

As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the contentious statement in Tagolino is

mere obiter dictum.[230] That statement was not essential in resolving the core issue
in Tagolino: whether a person whose certificate of candidacy was cancelled may
be validly substituted. This had no direct relation to the interpretation of false
material representations in the certificate of candidacy.

Moreover, this court En Banc affirmed the requirement after Tagolino.

In Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections,[231] Hayudini v. Commission on

Election,[232] Jalover v. Osmeña,[233] and Agustin v. Commission on Election[234]—
all decided after Tagolino—this court reaffirmed "intent to deceive" as an integral
element of a Section 78 petition. Unlike Tagolino, this court's Decisions
in Villafuerte, Hayudini, Jalover, and Agustin directly dealt with and squarely
ruled on the issue of whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its
discretion in granting or denying Section 78 petitions. Their affirmation of intent
to deceive as an indispensable requirement was part of their very ratio decidendi
and not mere obiter dicta. Since this ratio decidendi has been repeated, it now
partakes of the status of jurisprudential doctrine. Accordingly, the statement
in Tagolino that dispenses with the requirement of intent to deceive cannot be
considered binding.

It is true that Section 78 makes no mention of "intent to deceive." Instead, what

Section 78 uses is the word "representation." Reading Section 78 in this way
creates an apparent absence of textual basis for sustaining the claim that intent to
deceive should not be an element of Section 78 petitions. It is an error to read a
provision of law.

"Representation" is rooted in the word "represent," a verb. Thus, by a

representation, a person actively does something. There is operative
engagement in that the doer brings to fruition what he or she is pondering-
something that is abstract and otherwise known only to him or her, a proverbial
"castle in the air." The "representation" is but a concrete product, a manifestation,
or a perceptible expression of what the doer has already cognitively resolved to do.
One who makes a representation is one who intends to articulate what, in his or
her mind, he or she wishes to represent. He or she actively and intentionally uses
signs conventionally understood in the form of speech, text, or other acts.

Thus, representations are assertions. By asserting, the person making a statement

pushes for, affirms, or insists upon something. These are hardly badges of
something in which intent is immaterial. On the contrary, no such assertion can
exist unless a person actually wishes to, that is, intends, to firmly stand for
something.

In Section 78, the requirement is that there is "material representation contained

therein as required by Section 74 hereof is false."[235] A "misrepresentation" is
merely the obverse of "representation." They are two opposite concepts. Thus, as
with making a representation, a person who misrepresents cannot do so without
intending to do so.

That intent to deceive is an inherent element of a Section 78 petition is reflected by

the grave consequences facing those who make false material representations in
their certificates of candidacy.[236] They are deprived of a fundamental political
right to run for public office.[237] Worse, they may be criminally charged with
violating election laws, even with perjury.[238] For these reasons, the false material
representation referred to in Section 78 cannot "just [be] any innocuous
mistake."[239]

Petitioner correctly argued that Section 78 should be read in relation to Section

74's enumeration of what certificates of candidacy must state. Under Section 74, a
person filing a certificate of candidacy declares that the facts stated in the
certificate "are true to the best of his [or her] knowledge." The law does not
require "absolute certainty"[240] but allows for mistakes in the certificate of
candidacy if made in good faith.[241] This is consistent with the "summary character
of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy."[242]

IV

From these premises, the Commission on Elections should have dismissed Tatad's
Petition for Disqualification. The Commission on Elections showed bias and acted
arbitrarily when it motu proprio converted the Petition into one which Tatad did
not intend, contrary to the interest of the other party. While the Commission on
Elections has the necessary and implied powers concomitant with its constitutional
task to administer election laws, it cannot do so by favoring one party over the
other.

Significantly, Tatad was not the only petitioner in those cases. There were three
other petitions against one candidate, which already contained most if not all the
arguments on the issues raised by Tatad. There was, thus, no discernable reason
for the Commission on Elections not to dismiss a clearly erroneous petition. The
Commission on Elections intentionally put itself at risk of being seen not only as
being partial, but also as a full advocate of Tatad, guiding him to do the correct
procedure.

On this matter, the Commission on Elections clearly acted arbitrarily. Section 68

of the Omnibus Election Code grants the Commission on Elections jurisdiction
over petitions for disqualification. Section 68 enumerates the grounds for filing a
disqualification petition:
Sec. 68 Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is
a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and l04; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e,
k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
Apart from the grounds provided in Section 68, the grounds in Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code may likewise be raised in a petition for disqualification.
[243]
 Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code states:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications.- Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Although denominated as a Petition for Disqualification, Tatad's Petition before
the Commission on Elections did not raise any ground for disqualification under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Instead, Tatad argued that petitioner lacked the required qualifications for
presidency; hence, petitioner should not be allowed to run for president.

The law does not allow petitions directly questioning the qualifications of a
candidate before the elections. Tatad could have availed himself of a petition to
deny due course to or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy under Section 78
on the ground that petitioner made a false material representation in her certificate
of candidacy. However, Tatad's petition before the Commission on Elections did
not even pray for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy.

The Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in either implicitly

amending the petition or incorrectly interpreting its procedural device so as to
favor Tatad and allow his petition. The Commission should have dismissed Tatad's
petition for want of jurisdiction. In failing to do so, it acted arbitrarily,
whimsically, and capriciously. The Commission on Elections on this point acted
with grave abuse of discretion.

There was no material misrepresentation with respect to petitioner's conclusion

that she was a natural-born Filipina. Her statement was not false.

The facts upon which she based her conclusion of law was laid bare through her
allegations, and a substantial number of these were the subject of stipulation of the
parties. Neither private respondents nor the Commission on Elections was able to
disprove any of the material facts supporting the legal conclusion of the petitioner.
Petitioner was entitled to make her own legal conclusion from her interpretation of
the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. This court has yet to rule on a
case that-at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy until this moment-
squarely raised the issue of the citizenship and the nature of citizenship of a
foundling.

Thus, the Commission on Elections had no jurisdiction under Section 78 of the

Omnibus Election Code to rule on the nature of citizenship of petitioner. Even
assuming without granting that it had that competence, the Commission gravely
abused its discretion when it cancelled petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy on this
ground. There was no material misrepresentation as to a matter of fact. There was
no intent to deceive. Petitioner, even as a foundling, presented enough facts to
make a reasonable inference that either or both of her parents were Filipino
citizens when she was born.

V.A

The Commission on Elections submits that since petitioner admitted that she is a
foundling, the burden of evidence was passed on to her "to prove that her
representation in her [Certificate of Candidacy]-that she is eligible to run for
President-is not false."[244] The Commission argues that this declaration carried an
admission that petitioner is of unknown parentage. Thus, private respondents do
not need to prove that petitioner's parents are foreigners. Instead, it was petitioner's
burden to show evidence that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.[245]

Elamparo echoed the Commission on Elections' arguments. Petitioner's admission

that she is a foundling was enough substantial evidence on the part of private
respondents to discharge the burden that rested upon them as petitioners before the
Commission on Elections. Petitioner's admission trumped all other evidence
submitted to the Commission on Elections of government recognition of her
citizenship.[246]

As opposed to burden of proof,[247] burden of evidence shifts between the parties.

[248]
 The party who alleges must initially prove his or her claims.[249] Once he or she
is able to show a prima facie case in his or her favor, the burden of evidence shifts
to the other party.[250]

Thus, in an action for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of

the Omnibus Election Code, the person who filed the petition alleging material
misrepresentation has the burden of proving such claim.[251]  He or she must
establish that there is material misrepresentation under the required standard of
evidence. In cases before quasi-judicial bodies, the standard of evidence is
"substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."[252]

If, during the course of hearing, petitioner shows a prima facie case of material
misrepresentation, the burden of evidence shifts. The opposing party will then
need to controvert the claims made.[253]

Private respondents who initiated the action before the Commission on Elections
failed to establish a prima facie case of material misrepresentation to warrant a
shift of burden of evidence to petitioner. Based on this ground, the petitions for
cancellation of certificate of candidacy should have already been dismissed at the
level of the Commission on Elections.

Even assuming that the burden of proof and evidence shifted to petitioner, the
Commission on Elections erred in only considering petitioner's statement that she
is a foundling. It committed a grave error when it excluded all the other pieces of
evidence presented by petitioner and isolated her admission (and the other parties'
stipulation) that she was a foundling in order to conclude that the burden of
evidence already shifted to her.

Petitioner's admission that she is a foundling merely established that her biological
parents were unknown. It did not establish that she falsely misrepresented that she
was born of Filipino parents. It did not establish that both her biological parents
were foreign citizens.

The Commission on Elections was blind to the following evidence alleged by

petitioner and accepted by the other parties:

(1) She was found in a church in Jaro, Iloilo;

(2) When she was found, she was only an infant sufficient to be considered
newborn;

(3) She was found sometime in September 1968; (4) She was immediately
registered as a foundling;

(5) Jaro, Iloilo did not have an international airport; and

(6) The physical characteristics of petitioner are consistent with a large majority of
Filipinos.

All these facts can be used to infer that at least one of her biological parents is
Filipino. These should be sufficient to establish that she is natural-born in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution. The Commission on
Elections arbitrarily disregarded these pieces of evidence. It chose to rely only on
the admitted fact that she was a foundling to claim that the burden of evidence has
already shifted.

V.B

The Commission on Elections was mistaken when it concluded that the burden of
evidence shifted upon admission of the status of a foundling.

For purposes of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondents

still had the burden of showing that: (1) both of petitioner's biological parents
were foreign citizens; (2) petitioner had actual knowledge of both her biological
parents' foreign citizenship at the time of filing of her Certificate of Candidacy;
and (3) she had intent to mislead the electorate with regard to her qualifications.

The Commission on Elections cited and relied heavily on Senior Associate Justice
Antonio Carpio's Dissenting Opinion in Tecson. On the basis of this Dissent, the
Commission on Elections concluded that petitioner cannot invoke any
presumption of natural-born citizenship.[254] The Dissenting Opinion quoted Paa v.
Chan,[255] in that "[i]t is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine
citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and
any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State."[256]

Elementary in citing and using jurisprudence is that the main opinion of this court,
not the dissent, is controlling. Reliance by the Commission on Elections on the
dissent without sufficiently relating it to the pronouncements in the main opinion
does not only border on contumacious misapplication of court doctrine; it is utterly
grave abuse of discretion.

Tecson, correctly read, resolved the issue of citizenship using presumptions. From
the death certificate of Fernando Poe, Jr.'s grandfather Lorenzo Pou, this court
assumed that he was born sometime in 1870 or during the Spanish regime.
[257]
 Lorenzo Pou's death certificate shows San Carlos, Pangasinan as his place of
residence. On this basis, this court inferred that San Carlos, Pangasinan was also
Lorenzo Pou's residence before death such that he would have benefitted from the
Philippine Bill's "en masse Filipinization" in 1902:[258]
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or
not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in tum, depended on whether
or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to
his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.[259]
The Commission on Elections acted with utter arbitrariness when it chose to
disregard this finding and its analogous application to petitioner and, instead,
chose to rely on one of the dissenting opinions.

Moreover, the 1967 case of Paa v. Chan cited by the dissent favored by the
Commission on Elections does not apply to this case.

Paa involved a quo warranto petition questioning the eligibility of an elected

councilor on the ground of being a Chinese citizen.[260] It did not involve a petition
for cancellation of certificate of candidacy.

In Paa, the councilor's registration as alien before the Bureau of Immigration was

undisputed. The councilor's father was also registered as an alien on April 30,
1946.[261]

In petitioner's case, private respondents only relied on her foundling status to

prove her alleged material misrepresentation of her qualifications. They did not
present evidence, direct or circumstantial, to substantiate their claims against
petitioner's candidacy. In other words, unlike Paa where evidence existed to
support a claim of foreign citizenship, private respondents in this case showed
none.

Even assuming that it could apply to this case, the 2004 case of Tecson had
already overturned the 1967 pronouncements in Paa.
The Commission on Elections further submits the 2009 case of Go v. Ramos,
[262]
 which reestablished the ruling against the use of presumptions in favor of
claimants of Filipino citizenship when it reiterated Paa.[263]

Go is likewise inapplicable to this case. It involved a deportation complaint with

allegations that a person-Go, the petitioner-was an illegal and undesirable alien.
[264]
 Unlike in this case, it involved birth certificates clearly showing that Go and
his siblings were Chinese citizens.[265]

Furthermore, Go was also decided by this court sitting in Division. Thus, it cannot
overturn Tecson, which was decided by this court sitting En Banc.

V.C

Tecson v. Commission on Election[266] involved a similar pehhon alleging material

misrepresentation in the Certificate of Candidacy of Fernando Poe, Jr. who
claimed to have been a natural-born Filipino citizen.[267] This court ruled in favor
of Fernando Poe, Jr. and dismissed the petitions even though his natural-born
citizenship could not be established conclusively. This court found that petitioner
in that case failed to substantiate his claim of material misrepresentation.
[268]
 Former Associate Justice Vitug, speaking for the majority, discussed:

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-hom citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.[269] (Emphasis supplied)

V.D

Even if we assume that it was petitioner who had the burden of evidence, a
complete and faithful reading of the provisions of the entire Constitution, together
with the evidence that petitioner presented, leads to the inescapable conclusion
that as a newborn abandoned by her parents in Jaro, Iloilo in 1968, she was at birth
Filipina. Thus, being Filipina at birth, petitioner did not have to do anything to
perfect her Filipino citizenship. She is natural-hom.

Furthermore, there is no shred of evidence to rebut the circumstances of her birth.

There is no shred of evidence that can lead to the conclusion that both  her parents
were not Filipino citizens.

The whole case of private respondents, as well as the basis of the Commission on
Elections' Resolutions, is a presumption that all newborns abandoned by their
parents even in rural areas in the Philippines are presumed not to be Filipinos.
Private respondents' approach requires that those who were abandoned—ven
because of poverty or shame—must exert extraordinary effort to search for the
very same parents who abandoned them and might not have wanted to be
identified in order to have a chance to be of public service.

V.E

Constitutional construction mandates that we begin with the relevant text and give
its words their ordinary meaning whenever possible, consistent with verba legis.
[270]
 As much as possible, the language of the text must be understood in its
common usage and sense so as to maintain its presence in the People's
consciousness.[271] The language of the provision itself is the primary source from
which this court determines constitutional intent.[272]
Thus:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought
to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the
rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.[273] (Emphasis
supplied)
Reading the text of the Constitution requires that its place in the whole context of
the entire document must be considered. The Constitution should be read as a
whole-ut magis valeat quam pereat.[274] Thus, in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary:[275]
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must hannonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory.[276] (Citations omitted)
In granting reconsideration in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,
[277]
 this court discussed that "[t]he Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving
strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow,
parochial interests."[278]

In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,[279] this court's

discussion on statutory construction emphasized the need to adhere to a more
holistic approach in interpretation:
[T]he assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous.
In reality, universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief
wrongly assumes that language is static.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than
parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the
contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be effected
by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order:
the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution
- saligan - demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here,
we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole,
i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal
of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a nonn that should
have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently
read, depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.[280] (Emphasis supplied)
Still faithful with the relevant text and its place in the entire document,
construction of constitutional meaning allows a historical trace of the changes that
have been made in the text-from the choice of language, the additions, the
omissions, and the revisions. The present constitutional text can be compared to
our earlier Constitutions. Changes or retention of language and syntax congeals
meaning.

Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution on who are citizens of the Philippines, for
example, may be traced back to earlier organic laws,[281] and even farther back to
laws of colonizers that were made effective in the Philippine Islands during their
occupation.[282] Some influences of their history, as enshrined in their laws, were
taken and reflected in our fundamental law.

We resort to contemporaneous construction and aids only when the text is

ambiguous or capable of two or more possible meanings.[283] It is only when the
ambiguity remains even after a plain and contemporary reading of the relevant
words in the text and within the context of the entire document that legal
interpretation requires courts to go further. This includes examining the
contemporaneous construction contained in analogous cases, statutes, and
international norms that form part of the law of the land. This also includes
discerning the purpose of the constitutional provision in light of the facts under
consideration. For this purpose, the original understanding of the provisions by the
People that ratified the document, as well as the discussions of those that
participated in the constitutional convention or commission that drafted the
document, taken into its correct historical context, can be illuminating.

Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign's

purpose so as to judge the more viable among competing interpretations of the
same legal text. The words as they reside in the whole document should primarily
provide the clues. Secondarily, contemporaneous construction may aid in
illumination if verba legis fails. Contemporaneous construction may also validate
the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.

Contemporaneous construction is justified by the idea that the Constitution is not

exclusively read by this court. The theory of a constitutional order founded on
democracy is that all organs of government and its People can read the
fundamental law. Only differences in reasonable interpretation of the meaning of
its relevant text, occasioned by an actual controversy, will be mediated by courts
of law to determine which interpretation applies and would be final. The
democratic character of reading the Constitution provides the framework for the
policy of deference and constitutional avoidance in the exercise of judicial review.
Likewise, this is implied in the canonical doctrine that this court cannot render
advisory opinions. Refining it further, this court decides only constitutional issues
that are as narrowly framed, sufficient to decide an actual case. [284]

Contemporaneous construction engages jurisprudence and relevant statutes in

determining the purpose behind the relevant text.

In the hierarchy of constitutional interpretation, discerning purpose through

inference of the original intent of those that participated in crafting the draft
Constitution for the People's ratification, or discerning the original understanding
of the past society that actually ratified the basic document, is the weakest
approach.

Not only do these interpretative methodologies allow the greatest subjectivity for
this court, it may also be subject to the greatest errors. For instance, those that
were silent during constitutional conventions may have voted for a proposition due
to their own reasons different from those who took the floor to express their views.
It is even possible that the beliefs that inspired the framers were based on
erroneous facts.

Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is different from
the original understanding of the People who ratified it. Thus, in Civil Liberties
Union:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings
of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the tenns of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for
their votes, but they give is no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave
the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framer's understanding thereof.[285] (Emphasis supplied)
We apply these considerations in the interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution relevant to this case.

V.F

Petitioner is natural-born under any of two possible approaches.

The first approach is to assume as a matter of constitutional interpretation that all

foundlings found in the Philippines, being presumptively born to either a Filipino
biological father or a Filipina biological mother, are natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof to the contrary. There must be substantial evidence to show that
there is a reasonable probability that both, not just one, of the biological parents
are not Filipino citizens.
This is the inevitable conclusion reached when the entirety of the provisions of the
Constitution is considered alongside the contemporary construction based on
statutes and international norms that form part of the law of the land. It is also the
most viable conclusion given the purpose of the requirement that candidates for
President must be natural-hom.

The second approach is to read the definition of natural-hom in Section 2 in

relation to Article IV, Section 1(2). Section 1(2) requires that the father or the
mother is a Filipino citizen.[286]

There is no requirement that the father or mother should be natural born Filipino
citizens. It is possible that one or both of the parents are ethnically foreign. Thus,
physical features will not be determinative of natural-born citizenship.

There is no requirement of citizenship beyond the first degree of ascendant

relationship. In other words, there is no necessity to prove indigenous ethnicity.
Contrary to the strident arguments of the Commission on Elections, there is no
requirement of Filipino bloodline.

Significantly, there is also no requirement that the father or mother should be

definitively identified. There can be proof of a reasonable belief that evidence
presented in a relevant proceeding substantially shows that either the father or the
mother is a Filipino citizen.

V.G

The minimum constitutional qualifications for President are clearly enumerated in

Article VII, Section 2:
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
Parsing the provision's clear meaning in the order enumerated, the qualifications
are:

One, he or she must be "a natural born citizen"; Two, he or she must be "a
registered voter"; Three, he or she must be "able to read and write";

Four, he or she must be "at least forty years of age on the day of the election" and

Five, he or she must be "a resident of the Philippines at least ten years immediately
preceding such election."

Petitioner's possession of the second, third, and fourth mmtmum qualifications are
not in issue in this case. A closer analysis of this provision makes certain
conclusions apparent.

The phrase, "ten years immediately preceding such election" qualifies "a resident
of the Philippines" as part of the fifth minimum constitutional requirement. It does
not quality any of the prior four requirements. The tenyear requirement does not
qualify "able to read and write." Likewise, it cannot textually and logically qualify
the phrase, "at least forty years of age" or the phrase, "a registered voter."

Certainly then, the ten-year requirement also does not qualify "a natural born
citizen." Being natural-born is an inherent characteristic. Being a citizen, on the
other hand, may be lost or acquired in accordance with law. The provision clearly
implies that: (a) one must be a natural-born citizen at least upon election into
office, and (b) one must be a resident at least ten years prior to the election.
Citizenship and residency as minimum constitutional requirements are two
different legal concepts.

In other words, there is no constitutional anchor for the added requirement that
within the entire ten-year period prior to the election when a candidate is a
resident, he or she also has to have reacquired his or her natural-born citizen
status.

Citizenship refers to political affiliation. It is a fiction created by law. Residence,

on the other hand, refers to one's domicile. It is created by one's acts, which is
indicative of his or her intentions.

To require her natural-born citizenship status in order to legally consider the

commencement of her residency is, therefore, to add and amend the minimum
requirements of the Constitution.

Furthermore, the Constitution intends minimum qualifications for those who wish
to present themselves to be considered by the People for the Office of President.
No educational attainment, profession, or quality of character is constitutionally
required as a minimum. Inherent in the text of the Constitution is an implied
dynamic. The electorate, acting collectively during a specific election, chooses the
weight of other considerations. It is not for the Commission on Elections or this
court to discreetly implant and, therefore, dictate on the electorate in the guise of
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution and declaring what is legal, the
political wisdom of considerations. This is consistent also with Article II, Section
1 of the constitution.[287]

Thus, that petitioner once lost and then reacquired her natural-born citizenship is
not part of the minimum constitutional requirements to be a candidate for
President. It is an issue that may be considered by the electorate when they cast
their ballots.

On a second level of constitutional interpretation, a contemporaneous construction

of Article VII, Section 2 with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act on 2003,[288] supports this reading.

The Constitution provides that "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in

the manner provided by law."[289] On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. On July 10, 2006, she filed
a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, and her Petition was granted.[290]

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides for the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic that may be taken by natural-born citizens of the Philippines who lost
their Philippine citizenship when they became naturalized citizens of another
country, in order to reacquire their Philippine citizenship:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason on their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of £he Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.[291]
Upon taking this Oath, those who became citizens of another country prior to the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire their Philippine citizenship, while
those who became citizens of another country after to the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 9225 retain their Philippine citizenship.

Taking the Oath enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws and the different
solemnities under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225. Different conditions must
be complied with depending on whether one intends to exercise the right to vote,
seek elective public office, or assume an appointive public office, among others:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003' and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn remmciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their ass11mption of office; Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or pennit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
 a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country
of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

b. are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned officers

in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens. (Emphasis supplied)

Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Election[292] discussed the mandatory nature

of the required sworn renunciation under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225.
This provision was intended to complement Article XI, Section 18 of the
Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks
to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country
during his tenure shall be dealt with by law."[293]

Republic Act No. 9225 only requires that the personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship be made "at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy" for those seeking elective public position. It does not require a ten-year
period similar to the residency qualification.

V.H

The concept of natural-born citizens is in Article IV, Section 2:

Sec. 2. Natural born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acq11ire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section I hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Citizens, on the other hand, are enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[294]
The critical question is whether petitioner, as a foundling, was Filipina at birth.

Citizenship essentially is the "right to have rights."[295] It is one's "personal and

more or less permanent membership in a political community. . . . The core of
citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,]
and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance."[296]

Citizenship also entails obligations to the community.[297] Because of the rights and

protection provided by the state, its citizens are presumed to be loyal to it, and
even more so if it is the state that has protected them since birth.

V.I

The first level of constitutional interpretation permits a review of the evolution of

these provisions on citizenship in the determination of its purpose and rationale.
This court in Tecson detailed the historical development of the concept of
Philippine citizenship, dating back from the Spanish occupation.[298] During the
Spanish regime, the native inhabitants of the Islands were denominated as
"Spanish subjects" or "subject of Spain" to indicate their political status.[299] The
Spanish Constitution of 1876 declared persons born in Spanish territory as
Spaniards, but this was never extended to the Philippine Islands due to the
mandate of Article 89 in that the Philippines would be governed by speciallaws.
[300]
 The Civil Code of Spain became effective in this jurisdiction on December 18,
1889, making the first categorical listing on who were Spanish citizens,[301] thus:
(a) Person born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of
any town of the Monarchy.[302]
The Philippine Revolution in 1898 marked the end of the Spanish era and the entry
of the Americans. Spain was forced to cede the Philippine colony to the United
States. Pursuant to the Treaty of Paris between the two countries on December 10,
1989, the native inhabitants were not automatically converted to American
citizens.[303] Since they also ceased to be "Spanish subjects," they were "issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States":[304]
Spanish subject, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom . . .. In case they remain in the territory
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which
declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

Thus—

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress. [305]
The concept of "Philippine citizens" crystallized with the adoption of the
Philippine Bill of 1902,[306] where the term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first
appeared:[307]
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred
and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis
supplied)
The United States Congress amended this section on March 23, 1912 to include a
proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This
was restated in the Jones Law of 1916, otherwise known as the Philippine
Autonomy Act.[308] The proviso in the 1912 amendment reads:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein.[309]
Thus, the Jones Law of 1916 provided that native-born inhabitants of the
Philippines were deemed Philippine citizens as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was
"(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said
date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country."[310]

While common law used by the United States follows jus soli as the mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution adopted jus sanguinis or blood
relations as basis for Philippine citizenship,[311] thus:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution
(2) Those bom in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[312]
Subsection (4), when read with then civil law provisions on the automatic loss of
Filipino citizenship by women who marry foreign husbands and automatically
acquire his foreign citizenship, posed a discriminatory situation for women and
their children.[313] Thus, the 1973 Constitution addressed this concern with the
following revisions:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens ofthe Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SEC. 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law,
to have renounced her citizenship.[314]
The 1973 Constitution also provided a definition for "natural-born citizens" since
the 1935 Constitution, similar to the United States Constitution, required the
President to be a "natural-born citizen" without defining the term. Prior to the
1935 Constitution, public offices were filled through appointment by the
colonizer.[315] Thus, Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution added a
definition for natural-born citizen, as follows:
SEC. 4. A natural-born Citizen is one who is a cttlzen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
[316]
The current Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution
on citizenship, with further amendment in subsection (3) for purposes of
correcting the irregular situation created by the 1935 Constitution.

V.J

Natural-born citizenship is an American concept that we adopted in our

Constitution. This term appears only once in the United States Constitution-in the
presidential qualification clause[317] and has no definition in American laws. No
explanation on the origin or purpose of the presidential qualification clause can
even be found in the Convention's recorded deliberations.[318] Since the United
States was under British rule prior to their independence, some theories suggest
that the concept was introduced in the text as a check against foreign infiltration in
the administration of national government, thus:
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in response
to a letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably to other delegates,
on July 25, 1787, which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong
check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national
Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the American
anny shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had
served valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was
suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting
constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the Convention was concocting
a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign monarch.[319]
The 1935 Constitution borrowed the term "natural-born citizen" without defining
the concept. It was only the 1973 Constitution that provided that "[a] natural-born
citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

V.K

There are only two categories of citizens: natural-hom and naturalized.

A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of

the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, a naturalized citizen is one who is not
natural-born.

In Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[320] this court ruled that

if a person is not naturalized, he or she is considered a natural-hom citizen of the
Philippines
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: ... A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e.,
did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.[321]
Former Associate Justice Panganiban clarifies this concept in his Concurring
Opinion in Bengson. Naturalized citizens are "former aliens or foreigners who had
to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens."[322]

A person who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship is generally required to file a

verified petition.[323] The applicant must prove, among others, that he or she is of
legal age, with good moral character, and has the capacity to adapt to Filipino
culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a
significant period of time.[324] The applicant must prove himself or herself not to be
a threat to the state, the public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs.[325]

Petitioner did not undergo the naturalization process. She reacquired her Filipino
citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225.

The Commission on Elections contends that in availing herself of the benefits

under Republic Act No. 9225, petitioner reacquired Philippine citizenship by
naturalization, not natural-born citizenship, since she had to perform several acts
to perfect this citizenship.[326] Moreover, the earliest time Philippine residency can
be reestablished for those who reacquire Philippine citizenship under Republic No.
9225 ts upon reacquisition of citizenship.[327]

Our jurisprudence holds otherwise. Those who avail themselves of the benefits
under Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. Bengson ruled
that repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of one's
original nationality:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally
a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.[328]
While Bengson involved Commonwealth Act No. 63, its ruling is still consistent
with the declared policy under the current system of reacquiring Philippine
citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225. One's status as a natural-born
Filipino is immutable: "all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."[329] Republic Act No. 9225 requires
certain solemnities, but these requirements are only for the purpose of effecting the
incidents of the citizenship that a naturalized Filipino never lost. These
requirements do not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship commences
only from the time they have been complied with.

To consider petitioner, a foundling, as not natural-born will have grave

consequences. Naturalization requires that petitioner is of legal age. While it is
true that she could exert time and extraordinary expense to find the parents who
might have abandoned her, this will not apply to all foundlings. Thus, this
approach will concede that we will have a class of citizens who are stateless due to
no fault of theirs.

V.L

There is no need for an express statement in the Constitution's citizenship

provisions that foundlings are natural-born Filipino citizens. A contrary
interpretation will be inconsistent with the other provisions of the Constitution.
The Constitution should be interpreted as a whole to "effectuate the whole purpose
of the Constitution."[330]
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution enjoin
the state to defend children's well-being and protect them from any condition that
is prejudicial to their development. This includes preventing discriminatory
conditions in fact as well as in law:
Article II, SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Article XV, SECTION 3. The State shall defend:

....

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,

and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Crucial government positions are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. The 1987 Constitution requires the following positions to be filled by
natural-born citizens:
(1) President;[331]
(2) Vice president;[332]
(3) Senator; [333]
(4) Member of the House ofRepresentatives;[334]
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court;[335]
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission;[336]
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections;[337]
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit;[338]
(9) Ombudsman and his deputies;[339]
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;[340] and
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.[341]
Other positions that are required to be filled by natural-born citizens include,
among others, city fiscals,[342]  assistant city fiscals,[343] Judges and Associate
Judges of the Sandiganbayan, other public offices[344] and some professions.
[345]
 Other incentives are also limited to natural-born citizens.[346]

An interpretation that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens would mean
that we should teach our foundling citizens to never aspire to serve the country in
any of the above capacities.

This is not only inconsistent with the text of our Constitution's citizenship
provisions, which required only evidence of citizenship and not of the identities of
the parents. It unnecessarily creates a classification of citizens with limited rights
based on the circumstances of their births. This is discriminatory.

Our Constitution provides that citizens shall have equal protection of the law and
equal access to opportunities for public service. They are protected from human
indignities and political inequalities:
Article II, SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Article III, SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.

Article XIII, SECTION l. The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good. (Emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause guarantees that "persons under like circumstances and
falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.'"[347]

Apart from the anonymity of their biological parents, there is no substantial

distinction[348] between foundlings and children with known Filipino parents, all of
whom are protected by the state from birth. The foundlings' fortuitous inability to
identify their biological parents who abandoned them cannot be the basis of a law
or an interpretation that has the effect of treating them as less entitled to the rights
and protection given by the state. To base a classification on this circumstance
would be to sanction statelessness and the marginalization of a particular class
who, by force of chance, was already made to start life under tragic circumstances.

This court, as an agent of the state, is constitutionally mandated to defend the well-
being and development of children. We have no competence to reify classes that
discriminate children based on the circumstances of their births. These
classifications are prejudicial to a child's development.

Further, inasmuch as foundlings are citizens of the Philippines, they are human
beings whose dignity we value and rights we respect. Thus:
Article II, SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
V.M

Contemporaneous construction by other constitutional organs deserves

consideration in arriving at a correct interpretation of the Constitution.

Illuminating guidance from how other constitutional organs interpret the

fundamental legal document is premised on the understanding of a basic principle:
the Constitution as law is legible to all of government as well as its People. Its
plain reading, therefore, is accessible to all. Thus, interpretation and application of
its provision are not the sole prerogative of this court, although this court's
interpretation is final for each actual case or controversy properly raised.

The legislature has provided statutes essentially based on a premise that foundlings
are Filipino citizens at birth.

It is also our state policy to protect children's best interest. In Republic Act No.
9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006:
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be
observed at all times:
....
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures
that will ensure the observance of international standards of child protection,
especially those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any
authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner which
allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself freely. The
participation of children in the program and policy fonnulation and
implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the
concerned government agency. (Emphasis supplied)
The "best interest of the child" is defined as the "totality of the circumstances and
conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of
security of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological
and emotional development."[349]

Consistent with this law is the Philippines' ratification[350] of the United

Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This treaty has the effect of law
and requires the domestic protection of children's rights to immediate registration
and nationality after birth, against statelessness, and against discrimination based
on their birth status.[351] Pertinent provisions of the treaty read:
Preamble

The State Parties to the present Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of

the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the
Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity
and worth of the human person, and have detennined to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and
agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations
has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,
....

Have agreed as follows:

....

Article 2

1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the
present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion,
 political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
property, disability, birth or other status.

2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that

the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or
punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family
members.

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public

or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.

2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and

care as is necessary for his or her wellbeing, taking into account
the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall
take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.

....

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall

have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for
by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in

accordance with their national law and their obligations under the
relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where
the child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis supplied)

The Philippines also ratified[352] the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights. This treaty, which has the effect of law, also requires that children
have access to immediate registration and nationality, and defends them against
discrimination, thus:
Article 24....

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,

language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

....
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreement[s] concluded between states in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation."[353] They
require concurrence by the Senate before they become binding upon the state.
Thus, Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Ratification of treaties by the Senate makes it legally effective and binding by
transformation. It is treated similar to a statute. In Pharmaceutical and Health
Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:[354]
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transfonnation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant
to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or
conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied
to domestic conflicts.[355] (Emphasis supplied)
No further legislative act apart from ratification is necessary. Government-
including the judiciary-is obligated to abide by these treaties in accordance with
the Constitution and with our international obligations captured in the maxim
pacta sunt servanda.

Foundlings, by law and through our Constitution, cannot be discriminated against.

They are legally endowed with rights to be registered and granted nationality upon
birth. Statelessness unduly burdens them, discriminates against them, and is
detrimental to their development.

V.N

Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
is entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on Domestic Adoption of
Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted as a means to "provide
alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption of
every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."[356]

Abandoned children may include foundlings:[357]

SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). It shall be the duty of the
Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of
the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be
the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared
abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the Inter Country Adoption
Act of 1995, is entitled An Act establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-
Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and For Other Purposes. It includes
foundlings among those who may be adopted:
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted.- Only a legally free child may be the subject
of inter-country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for
placement, the following documents must be submitted to the Board:

a) Child study;

b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of

parents;

d) Medical evaluation/history;

e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and

f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth
certificates as requirement for the issuance of passports to foundlings to be
adopted by foreign parents under Republic Act No. 8043:
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified true
copy of the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and
amended birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a
Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case the applicant is for adoption
by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall be required:

a) Certified true copy ofthe Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the Death
Certificate of the child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary Commitment executed
after the birth of the child.

b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board bytheDSWD.

c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate.[358]

(Emphasis supplied)
The statutes providing for adoption only allow the recognition of filiation for
children who are Filipinos. They allow adoption of foundlings. Therefore,
foundlings are, by law, presumed to be Filipino.

The executive branch has also assumed petitioner's natural-born status as Filipina.

Petitioner's citizenship status was never questioned throughout her entire life until
she filed her Certificate of Candidacy for President in 2015. Until the proceedings
that gave rise to these consolidated cases, her natural born status was affirmed and
reaffirmed through different government acts.
Petitioner was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration on July 18, 2006. The
President of the Philippines appointed her as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board-a government position that requires
natural-born citizenship[359] on October 6, 2010. The Commission on Elections also
allowed her to run for Senator in the 2013 Elections despite public knowledge of
her foundling status. Petitioner's natural-born status was recognized by the People
when she was elected, and by the Senate Electoral Tribunal when it affirmed her
qualifications to run for Senator on November 17, 2015.

Petitioner was likewise provided a foundling certificate after she was found. She
was also the subject of an adoption process.

V.O

Even if there is no legal presumption of natural-born status for all foundlings,

enough evidence was presented by petitioner before the Commission on Elections
to prove that at least one-if not both-of her parents were Filipino citizens.

Petitioner's Filipino biological lineage cannot be proven easily by direct evidence

such as birth certificates or witness testimonies of her birth. Her status as an
abandoned child makes it improbable, if not too expensive, to prove her
citizenship through DNA evidence.

Our rules, however, allow different manners of proving whether any one of her
biological parents were Filipinos.

Aside from direct evidence, facts may be proved by usmg circumstantial evidence.
In Suerte-Felipe v. People:[360]
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any
inference or presumption; (Lack County vs. Neilon, 44 Or. 14, 21, 74 P. 212)
while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken either
singly or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred
as a necessary or probable consequence (State vs. Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 494, 21
S.W. 193; Reynolds Trial Ev., Sec. 4, p. 8).[361]
Circumstantial evidence is further defined in People v. Raganas:[362]
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact
in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with such fact that in
a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.
[363]
 (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides when circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is generally used for criminal cases. This court, however,
has not hesitated to use circumstantial evidence in other  cases.[364] There is no
reason not to consider circumstantial facts as evidence as a method of proof.

If circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to satisfY conviction on the basis of

the highest standard of proof, i.e. beyond proof beyond reasonable doubt, then it
can also satisfy the less stringent standard of proof required in cases before the
Commission on Elections. As a quasi-judicial body, the Commission on Elections
requires substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[365]

Petitioner was found in Jaro, Iloilo at a parish church on September 3, 1968.

[366]
 Iloilo, as in most if not all provinces of the Philippines, had a population
composed mostly of Filipinos.[367]  Petitioner is described as having "brown
almond-shafed eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped
face."[368] She is only 5 feet and 2 inches tall.[369]

Petitioner wants this court to take judicial notice that majority of Filipinos are
Roman Catholics. Many Filipinos are poor. Poverty and shame may be dominant
reasons why infants are abandoned.[370]

There was also no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo at the time when petitioner
was born.

These circumstances provide substantial evidence to infer the citizenship of her

biological parents. Her physical characteristics are consistent with that of many
Filipinos. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is consistent with the expected
behavior of a Filipino in 1968 who lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic
environment. The nonexistence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo can
reasonably provide context that it is illogical for a foreign father and a foreign
mother to visit a rural area, give birth and leave their offspring there.

The Solicitor General adds that petitioner is, in terms of probability, more likely
born a Filipina than a foreigner with the submission of this table:[371]
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE
PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 AND 2010-2014

YEAR FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN IN FILIPINO CHILDREN

THE PHILIPPINES BORN IN
  THE PHILIPPINES
1965 1,479 795,415
1966 1,437 823,342
1967 1,440 840,302
1968 1,595 898,570
1969 1,728 946,753
1970 1,521 966,762
1971 1,401 963,749
1972 1,784 968,385
1973 1,212 1,045,290
1974 1,496 1,081,873
1975 1,493 1,223,837
 2010 1,244 1,782,877
2011 1,140 1,746,685
2012 1,454 1,790,367
2013 1,315 1,751,523
2014 1,351 1,748,782

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority

[illegible]
Based on the above data, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in
1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% of newborns were foreign. This translates to roughly
99.8% chance that petitioner was born a Filipina at birth.

VI

Petitioner committed no material misrepresentation with respect to her residency.

The facts that can reasonably be inferred from the evidence presented clearly show
that she satisfied the requirement that she had residency 10 years immediately
preceding the election.

VI.A

The requirement for residency is stated in the 1987 Constitution as: "[n]o person
may be elected President unless he is . . . a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election."[372]

In this jurisdiction, "residence" does not admit of a singular definition. Its meaning
varies to relate to the purpose. The "term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and
'residence,' is elastic and should be interpreted in light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed."[373] Residence, thus, is different under
immigration laws, the Civil Code or the Family Code, or election laws.

Article 50 of the Civil Code spells out a distinction between "residence" and
"domicile":
Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.
This distinction has been further explained, as follows:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. 'Residence' is used to
indicate the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary' 'domicile' denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.'
'Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means
necessarily so, since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.[374]
Procedural law on venue follows this conception of residence as "the place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary"[375] and which is distinct from domicile
(also referred to as "legal residence") as "fixed permanent residence."[376] In Ang
Kek Chen v. Spouses Calasan: [377]

The crucial distinction that must be made is between "actual residence" and
"domicile." The case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals had already made the
distinction in 1976. The pertinent portion of the case reads as follows:
But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? ... We
lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules -... residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.[378]

It is clear that in granting respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, the CA

accepted the argument of respondent Atty. Calasan that "residence" is synonymous
with "domicile."

In Saludo, Jr. v. American Express International, Inc., the term "residence" was
equated with "domicile" as far as election law was concerned. However, the case
also stated that:
[F]or purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted.
Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile."[379] (Citations omitted)
In this jurisdiction, it is settled doctrine that for election purposes, the term
"residence" contemplates "domicile."[380]

As early as 1928, when the Jones Law of 1916 was still in effect, this court noted
in Nuval v. Guray[381] that the term residence "is so used as synonymous with
domicile."[382] The 1941 case of Gallego v. Vera,[383] which was promulgated when
the 1935 Constitution was in effect, cited Nuval and maintained the same position.
Under the auspices of the present 1987 Constitution, this court stated in Co v.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives[384] that "the term residence has
been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution."[385]

For the same purpose of election law, the question of residence is mainly one
ofintention.[386] In Gallego v. Vera:[387]
The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile,"
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In order
to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention
to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus non
revertendi and an animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefmite period of time. The acts of the person must
conform with his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary; the
residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual; and to the fact of
residence there must be added the animus manendi.[388]
Jurisprudence has established three (3) fundamental principles governing
domicile: "first, that a man [or woman] must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is
acquired; and third, a man [or woman] can have but one domicile at a time."[389]

Domicile may be categorized as: "(1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by

every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment
of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law,
attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention."[390]

Domicile of origin is acquired at birth and continues until replaced by the

acquisition of another domicile. In effect, one's domicile of origin is the domicile
of one's parents or of the persons upon whom one is legally dependent at birth. [391]

Building on this concept, this court has emphasized that as a rule, "domicile of
origin is not easily lost and that it is lost only when there is an actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with such
purpose."[392] Consistent with this, it has held that there is a "presumption in favor
of a continuance of an existing domicile."[393]

Controversies adverting to loss of domicile must overcome the presumption that

domicile is retained.[394] The burden of proof is, thus, on the party averring its loss.
[395]
 This presum tion is "particularly strong"[396] when what is involved is domicile
of origin.[397]

The rationale for this was explained in this court's citation in In re Eusebio v.
Eusebio:[398]
It is often said, particularly in the English cases, that there is a stronger
presumption against change from a domicile of origin than there is against other
changes of domicile. 'Domicile of origin ... differs from domicile of choice mainly
in this -that is character is more enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken
off.' The English view was forcibly expressed in a Pennsylvania case in which
Lewis, J., said: 'The attachment which every one feels for his native land is the
foundation of the rule that the domicile of origin is presumed to continue until it is
actually changed by acquiring a domicile elsewhere. No temporary sojourn in a
foreign country will work this change.' In a federal case in Pennsylvania the same
point was emphasized.[399]
Likewise, in Faypon v. Quirino:[400]
It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to
the place of his birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth
must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.[401]
Domicile may be lost and reacquired. Domicile of choice "is a domicile chosen by
a person to replace his or her former domicile."[402] It is the domicile acquired by a
person through the exercise of his or her own free will and shown by his or her
specific acts and conduct.

The election of a new domicile must be shown by clear and convincing evidence
that: one, there is an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; two, there is a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and three, there must be definite acts which correspond to the purpose of
establishing a new domicile.[403]

As mentioned, domicile by operation of law is the "domicile that the law attributes
to a person independent of a person's residence or intention."[404] This court has
previously stated that "a minor follows the domicile of his parents."[405] Thus, a
minor's domicile of origin is replaced (by operation of law) when the minor's
parents take the minor along with them in reestablishing their own domicile.

VI.B

This jurisdiction's imposition of residency as a qualification for elective public

office traces its roots from the United States' own traditions relating to elections.
These traditions were imparted to the Philippines as it transitioned from Spanish
colonial rule to American colonial rule, evolving alongside the Philippines'
passage from a colony to a commonwealth of the United States, and ultimately, to
an independent state.

The fifth paragraph of Article II, Section 1 of the United States

Constitution[406] sets forth the eligibility requirements for President of the United
States:
No Person except a natural hom Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the
time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of
President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within
the United States.[407] (Emphasis supplied)
The residency requirement was included in order that the People may "have a full
opportunity to know [the candidate's] character and merits, and that he may have
mingled in the duties, and felt the interests, and understood the principles and
nourished the attachments, belonging to every citizen in a republican
government."[408] Under the framework of the United States Constitution, residence
was "to be understood as not an absolute inhabitancy within the United States
during the whole period; but such an inhabitancy, as includes a permanent
domicile in the United States."[409]

In the Philippines, residency as a requirement for elective public office was

incorporated into the Jones Law of 1916, pertinent provisions of which provided:
Section 13. - Election and Qualification of Senators. That the members of the
Senate of the Philippines, except as herein provided, shall be elected for terms of
six and three years, as hereinafter provided, by the qualified electors of the
Philippines. Each of the senatorial districts defined as hereinafter provided shall
have the right to elect two senators. No person shall be an elective member of the
Senate of the Philippines who is not a qualified elector and over thirty years of
age, and who is not able to read and write either the Spanish or English language,
and who has not been a resident of the Philippines for at least two consecutive
years and an actual resident of the senatorial district from which chosen for a
period of at least one year immediately prior to his election.

Section 14. - Election and Qualifications of Representatives. That the members of

the House of Representatives shall, except as herein provided, be elected
triennially by the qualified electors of the Philippines. Each of the representative
districts hereinafter provided for shall have the right to elect one representative.
No person shall be an elective member of the House of Representatives who is not
a qualified elector and over twenty-five years of age, and who is not able to read
and write either the Spanish or English language, and who has not been an actual
resident of the district from which elected for at least one year immediately prior
to his election: Provided, That the members of the present Assembly elected on
the first Tuesday in June, nineteen hundred and sixteen, shall be the members of
the House of Representatives from their respective districts for the term expiring
in nineteen hundred and nineteen.[410] (Emphasis supplied)
Under the Jones Law of 1916, the requirement was relevant solely to members of
the Legislature as it was only the positions of Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives that were susceptible to popular election. Executive power was
vested in the Governor-General who was appointed by the President of the United
States with the advice and the consent of the Senate ofthe United States. [411]

The Independence Act of 1934, otherwise known as the Tydings McDuffie Act,
paved the way for the Philippines' transition to independence. Under this Act, the
1935 Constitution was adopted. The residency requirement, which under the Jones
Law already applied to legislators, was extended to the President and the Vice
President. Relevant provisions of the 1935 Constitution stated:
Article VI. Section 2. No person shall be a Member of the National Assembly
unless he has been five years a citizen of the Philippines, is at least thirty years of
age, and, at the time of his election, a qualified elector, and a resident of the
province in which he is chosen for not less than one year immediately prior to his
election.

Article VII. Section 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-
President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter,
forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding the election. (Emphasis supplied)
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, the same residency requirement of 10
years was retained for the position of President. The 1973 Constitution abolished
the position of Vice President. Article VII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution
provided:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-hom citizen of the
Philippines. a registered voter, able to read and write, at least fifty years of age on
the day of election for President, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution also retained the residency requirement for those seeking to
become members of the Batasang Pambansa. Article VIII, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution provided:
No person shall be a Member of the Batasang Pambansa as a regional
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day
of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter in the Region in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof
for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.

A sectoral representative shall be a natural-born citizen, able to read and write, and
shall have such other qualifications as may be provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
The present 1987 Constitution retains the residency requirement for elective
officials both in the executive (i.e., President and Vice President) and legislative
(i.e., Senators and Members of the House of Representatives) branches:
Article VI. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-hom
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five
years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.

Article VI. Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.

Article VII. Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-

hom citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Article VII. Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as
the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the
President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such

appointment requires no confirmation. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code[412] provides that, in order
to be eligible for local elective public office, a candidate must possess the
following qualifications: (1) a citizen of the Philippines; (2) a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province or in the case of a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan, the
district where he or she intends to be elected; (3) a resident therein for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and (4) able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

VI.C

This jurisdiction's requirement of residency for elective public office seeks to

ensure that a candidate is acquainted with the conditions of the community where
he or she seeks to be elected and to serve.[413] It is meant "to give candidates the
opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for
growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for
the job they aspire for."[414] Stated differently, it seeks "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community[.]"[415] As Aquino v. Commission on Election[416] added, it is also a
safeguard against candidates "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain."[417]

The length of residency required for an elective post is commensurate with what is
deemed to be the period necessary to acquire familiarity with one's intended
constituency and sensitivity to their welfare.

VI.D

Both requirements for elective public office, citizenship and residency, are two
distinct concepts. One is not a function of the other; the latter is not contingent on
the former. Thus, the loss or acquisition of one does not necessarily result in the
loss or acquisition of the other. Change of domicile as a result of acquiring
citizenship elsewhere is neither inevitable nor inexorable. This is the clear import
of Japzon v. Commission on Elections,[418] where this court dissociated domicile
from citizenship by explaining that the reacquisition of one does not ipso
facto result in the reacquisition of the other:
As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty's reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence I domicile. He could still retain his domicile in
the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his
residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.[419]
(Emphasis supplied)
Though distinct, residency and citizenship may both consider locus. They both
have geographical aspects: citizenship entails inclusion in a political community,
which generally has established territory; residency pertains to one's place of
abode.

Thus, in Caballero v. Commission on Elections,[420] citing Coquilla v. Commission

on Elections,[421] we noted that the acquisition of citizenship in a foreign country
may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This statement was
premised on the specific observation that in Canada, permanent residence was a
requirement for naturalization as a Canadian citizen. Caballero's naturalization as a
Canadian citizen, therefore, also necessarily meant that he was a resident of
Canada:
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
In Coquilla v. COMELEC we ruled that naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds
true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned
his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.
His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.[422] (Emphasis supplied)
VI.E

Even as this court has acknowledged that citizenship may be associated with
residency, the decisive factor in determining whether a candidate has satisfied the
residence requirement remains to be the unique "fact of residence."[423]

There is no shortcut to determining one's domicile. Reference to formalities or

indicators may be helpful-they may serve as guideposts-but these are not
conclusive. It remains that domicile is a matter of intention. For domicile to be
lost and replaced, there must be a manifest intention to abandon one's existing
domicile. If one does not manifestly establish his or her (new) domicile of choice,
his or her (old) domicile of origin remains.

The primacy of intention is settled. In Limbona v. Commission on Elections,

[424]
 this court stated in no uncertain terms that "for purposes of election law, the
question [of] residence is mainly one of intention."[425]

This primacy is equally evident in the requisites for acquisition of domicile of

choice (and concurrent loss of one's old domicile):
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, these must concur: (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there[in], and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile.[426]
These requisites were refined in Romualdez-Marcos:[427]
[D]omicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.[428]

Intention, however, is a state of mind. It can only be ascertained through overt

acts. Ascertaining the second requirement—a bona fide intention to abandon and
replace one's domicile with another—further requires an evaluation of the person's
"acts, activities and utterances."[429] Romualdez-Marcos' inclusion of the third
requirement demonstrates this; bona fide intention cannot stand alone, it must be
accompanied by and attested to by "[a]cts which correspond with the purpose."[430]

Examining a person's "acts, activities and utterances"[431] requires a nuanced

approach. It demands a consideration of context. This court has made it eminently
clear that there is no expedient solution as to how this is determined: "There is no
hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually
resides."[432] Domicile is ultimately a factual matter and is not so easily resolved by
mere reference to whether formalities have been satisfied or whether preconceived
a priori indicators are attendant.

The better considered cases delved deeply and analytically into the overt acts of
the person whose domicile is under scrutiny.
For instance, in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
[433]
 respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed by the Commission on Elections as
the duly elected Representative of the Second Congressional District of Sarna;.
Petitioner Antonio Co protested Ong's proclamation, but the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal upheld his election. This court sustained the
ruling of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Adverting to the
concept of animus revertendi, this court noted that Ong's prolonged stay in Manila
to study and to practice his profession as an accountant was not tantamount to
abandoning his domicile of origin in Laoang, Samar. Instead, the court appreciated
his many trips back to Laoang, Samar as indicative of animus revertendi:
[T]he private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies
and later to practice his profession. There was no intention to abandon the
residence in Laoang, Samar. On thecontrary, the periodical journeys made to his
home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi. [434]
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,[435] this court considered as grave abuse of
discretion the Commission on Elections' use of "highly subjective non-legal
standards" in determining whether an individual has established a new domicile.
[436]

To hearken to Japzon, naturalization has no automatic effect on domicile. One

who changes his or her citizenship merely acquires an option to establish his or her
new domicile of choice.[437]

Romualdez-Marcos[438] emphasized that "it is the fact of residence, not a statement

in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement."[439] A singular statement in a prior certificate of candidacy should
"not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence . . . if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper." [440]

Likewise, this court has held that being a registered voter in a specific district does
not ipso facto mean that a candidate must have been domiciled in that district,
thereby precluding domicile in another district.[441] So too, it has been held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage does not sufficiently establish election of
residency in a specific place, although it engenders a strong presumption of
residence.[442]

In appropriate cases, this court has not shied away from laboring to scrutinize
attendant facts. This court's pronouncements in DumpitMichelena v. Commission
on Elections[443] hinged on the observation that a beach house can hardly be
considered a place of residence as it is at most a place of temporary relaxation.
[444]
 In Sabili v. Commission on Elections,[445] this court noted that apart from the
presence of a place (i.e., a house and lot) where one can actually live in, actual
physical presence may also be established by "affidavits of various person ... and
the Certification of [the] barangay captain."[446]

Even less does the residence requirement justify reference to misplaced, inordinate
standards. A person is not prohibited from travelling abroad lest his or her
domicile be considered lost. This court has clarified that, if at all, return to the
Philippines after travelling abroad affirms one's animus manendi and animus
revertendi.[447] So too, this court has emphasized that the establishment of a new
domicile does not require one to be in that abode 24 hours a day, seven (7) days a
week.[448] It has been stressed that ultimately, what matters is the candidate's
demonstration of intention to establish domicile through clear acts.

Blanket reliance on pre-determined indicators of what suffices to establish or

retain domicile is misguided. Each case arises from a unique context. A nuanced,
context-based examination of each case is imperative.

VI.F

Ideally, one can point to a singular definitive moment when new residence is
acquired and previous residence is simultaneously lost. Good sense, however,
dictates that this situation is hardly availing. This is especially true when a person
is not acting out of a premeditated design to establish formalistic compliance with
legal requirements.

Thus, this court has acknowledged that establishing residence may be an

"incremental process"[449] that may last for an extended period. This highlights the
factual nature of residency questions. Acknowledging that establishing residence
may be effected through a step-by-step process requires a careful examination of
the acts of the person whose residence is in question.

This court has expressly acknowledged that "initial"[450] and "preparatory

moves"[451] count. Thus, residence is deemed acquired (or changed) as soon as
these moves are established. Equally vital are the context in which he or she
accomplished such actions and even seemingly innocuous nuances that could have
actually tilted the course of that person's actions.

This court's Decision in Mitra[452] illustrates how the acquisition or establishment

of residence may transpire through an incremental process. This court agreed with
the position of gubernatorial candidate Abraham Mitra that he had established a
new domicile in Aborlan, Palawan as early as 2008. This court, thus, disagreed
with the Commission on Elections' observation that "the Maligaya Feedmill
building could not have been Mitra's residence because it is cold and utterly
devoid of any indication of Mitra's personality and that it lacks loving attention
and details inherent in every home to make it one's residence."[453]

The following actions of Mitra were instead particularly notable: in January 2008,
he "started a pineapple growing project in a rented farmland near Maligaya
Feedmill and Farm located in Barangay lsaub, Aborlan";[454] a month later, he
"leased the residential portion of the said Maligaya Feedmill."[455] In March 2008,
he "started to occupy and reside in said premises."[456]

Holding that the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in

concluding that Mitra failed to satisfY the residence requirement to qualifY him as
a candidate for Governor of Palawan, this court explained:
The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach
of using subjective norms, as they now argue that given his stature as a member of
the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly
incredible that a small room in a feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.

We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the
COMELEC's use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitra's feed mill dwelling
cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his
transfer of residence, specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence
outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial
position; his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through
a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and the
construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises
he leased pending the completion of his house. These incremental moves do not
offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELEC's highly subjective non-legal
standards do.[457] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Sabili v. Commission on Elections[458] similarly acknowledged that establishing
residence may be an incremental process. In sustaining petitioner Meynardo
Sabili's position that he has been a resident of Lipa City for two (2) years and eight
(8) months leading to the May 2010 Elections, thereby qualifYing him to run for
Mayor of Lipa City, this court explained:
[A] transfer of domicile/residence need not be completed in one single instance.
Thus, in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, where the evidence showed that in
2008, petitioner Mitra had leased a small room at Maligaya Feedmills located in
Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in the same locality a lot where he began
constructing his house, we recognized that petitioner "transferred by incremental
process to Aborlan beginning 2008 and concluded his transfer in early 2009" and
thus, he transferred his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the
period required by law. We cannot treat the transfer to the Pinagtong-ulan house
any less than we did Mitra's transfer to the Maligaya Feedmills room.[459]
In approaching residence questions, therefore, what is crucial is a comprehensive
or holistic, rather than a myopic or isolationist, appreciation of the facts. Not only
must all the pertinent facts be considered, so too must be their relationships and
synergies. To do otherwise would be to render lip service to the basic imperative
of an exacting consideration of facts in residence controversies.

VI.G

Applying these doctrinal principles, petitioner satisfied the residence requirement

provided in Article VII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It was grave abuse of
discretion for the Commission on Elections to hold that she committed a material
misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy for President.

The Commission on Elections committed a grievous error when it invoked the

date petitioner's Philippine citizenship was reacquired (i.e., July 7, 2006) as the
earliest possible point when she could have reestablished residence in the
Philippines. This erroneous premise was the basis for summarily setting aside all
the evidence submitted by petitioner which pointed to the reestablishment of her
residence at any point prior to July 7, 2006. Thus, by this faulty premise, the
Commission on Elections justified the evasion of its legally enjoined and positive
duty to treat petitioner's residence controversy as a factual matter and to embark
on a meticulous and comprehensive consideration of the evidence.

At the onset, the Commission on Elections flat-out precluded the timely

reestablishment of petitioner's residence in the Philippines because it held that "the
earliest possible date that the respondent could have re-established her residence in
the Philippines is when she reacquired her Filipino Citizenship on July
2006."[460] In doing so, it relied on this court's Decisions in Coquillia v.
Commission on Elections,[461] Japzon v. Commission on Elections,
[462]
 and Caballero v. Commission on Elections.[463]

In its assailed December 23, 2015 Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the Petition filed by Elamparo, the Commission on
Elections explained:
Foremost, the Commission is not convinced that the Second Division "chose to
rely on a single piece of evidence" - respondent's 2013 COC, to the exclusion of
all others, in resolving the issue of residence. It does not persuade us that as the
Second Division "entirely omitted" to mention the evidence of respondent
enumerated in Respondent's Motion, it did not consider them at all. A judge is not
bound to mention in his decision every bit of evidence on record. He is presumed
to have regularly discharged his duty to consider and weigh all evidence formally
offered by the parties which are admissible.
....

To indulge respondent, however, the Commission now looks, one by one on the
pieces of evidence allegedly ignored by the Second Division which are, along with
their purpose for offer, are enumerated in Respondent's Motion. Unfortunately, an
examination of these evidence leads to but one crucial and fatal conclusion: that all
of them were executed before July 2006, and/or are offered to prove that she can
reckon her residency before July 2006 - the date of reacquisition by respondent of
her Filipino citizenship. This is fatal because, following the cases of Coquilla v.
COMELEC, Japzon v. COMELEC, and Caballero v. COMELEC, the earliest
possible date that respondent could have re established her residence in the
Philippines is when she re-acquired her Filipino Citizenship on July 2006. Yes, on
this finding, we affirm the Second Division for the reasons that follow.[464]
In its assailed December 23, 2015 Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the petitions filed by Tatad, Contreras, and
Valdez, the Commission on Elections explained:

As a US citizen and a foreigner, Respondent was allowed only temporary

residence in the Philippines, Respondent's alien citizenship remained a legal
impediment which prevented her from establishing her domicile in the Philippines.
To establish permanent residence in the Philippines, it was necessary for
Respondent to secure prior authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation ""BID"), such as in the form of a permanent resident visa issued by
the Republic of the Philippines showing that she was authorized to permanently
reside in the Philippines. This is the rule en:.mciated by the Supreme Court in the
case of Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections et al.[465]

It is this dogmatic reliance on formal preconceived indicators that this court has
repeatedly decried is grave abuse of discretion. Worse, the Commission on
Elections relied on the wrong formal indicators of residence.

The Commission on Elections ignored the basic distinction between citizenship

and residence. Likewise, it erroneously considered a visa-a mere permission to
enter-as a badge of residence, and equated an immigrant with one who is
domiciled in the Philippines. So too, the Commission on Elections' indiscriminate
reliance on Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero indicates a failure in properly
appreciating the factual nuances of those cases as against those of this case.
Citizenship and residency are distinct, mutually exclusive concepts. One is not a
function of the other. Residence is not necessarily contingent on citizenship. The
loss or acquisition of one does not mean the automatic loss or acquisition of the
other. Change of domicile as a result of acquiring citizenship elsewhere is neither
inevitable nor inexorable.

Japzon v. Commission on Elections[466] could not have been more emphatic:

"[R]eacquisition of . . . Philippine citizenship . . . [has] no automatic impact or
effect on residence/domicile."[467]

Residence, as does citizenship, entreats a consideration of locus or geography. It is

true that they may be related or connected, but association is different from
causation.

Caballero v. Commission on Elections[468] was extremely careful in its syntax:

"naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in
the Philippines."[469] The use of the word "may" reveals this court's recognition that
citizenship is not conclusive of domicile. In controversies relating to a candidate's
residence, citizenship may be considered and it may engender implications, but
these implications are never to be considered infallible.

VI.H

As with citizenship, non-possession of a permanent resident or immigrant visa

does not negate residency for election purposes.

A visa is but a travel document given by the issuing country to travelers for
purposes of border control.[470] Holders of a visa are "conditionally authorised to
enter or leave a territory for which it was issued, subject to permission of an
immigration official at the time of actual entry."[471] Conditions of entry usually
include date of validity, period of stay, number of allowed entry, and territory
covered.[472]

In this jurisdiction, visas are issued by a consular officer of the Philippine

Embassy or Consulate as a permit to go to the Philippines and seek permission to
enter the country at its port of entry. The decision to admit or disallow entry into
the country belongs to immigration authorities at the port of entry.[473] Hence, the
mere issuance of a visa does not denote actual admission into, let alone prolonged
stay, i.e., domicile, in the country.

The statutory definition of "immigrant," as provided in Section 50 (j) of

Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, sustains the distinction between an immigrant and one who is actually
domiciled in the Philippines:
SEC. 50. As used in this Act:-
....

(j) The term "immigrant" means any alien departing from any place outside the
Philippines destined for the Philippines, other than a nonimmigrant. (Emphasis
supplied)
The definition's operative terms are contained in the phrases "departing from" and
"destined for." These phrases, which are but different sides of the same coin, attest
to how an immigrant is not necessarily one who establishes domicile in the
Philippines, but merely one who travels from a foreign country into the
Philippines. As with a visa, the fivotal consideration is entry into, not permanent
stay, in the Philippines.[474]

In fact, a former Filipino may obtain an immigrant visa without even intending to
reside or actually residing in the Philippines. As petitioner pointed out:
5.289.5. Thus, a former Filipino who has previously been allowed entry into the
Philippines may secure a "non-quota immigrant visa" provided he or she submits
the following documentary requirements: (a) "Letter request addressed to the
Commissioner;" (b) "Duly accomplished CGAF (BI Form CGAF-001-Rev 2);" (c)
"Photocopy of passport bio-page and latest admission with valid authorized stay;"
(d) "Birth Certificate of the applicant;" (e) "Valid National Bureau of Investigation
[NBI] Clearance, if application is filed six (6) months ormore from the date of first
arrival in the Philippines;" (f) "BI Clearance Certificate;" and (g) "Original or
certified true copy of Bureau of Quarantine Medical Clearance, if applicant is a
national of any of the countries listed under Annex 'A' of Immigration Operations
order No. SBM-14-059-A who arrived in the Philippines on or after June 2014."

5.289.6. None of the 7 documentary requirements listed above would indicate

whether the applicant intends to make the Philippines his or her "permanent
home." None of these documents would show whether he or she, indeed,
necessarily intends to abandon his or her foreign domicile. Indeed, a foreigner
may want to be an permanent resident here, but would always want to return to his
or her home country, which intent to return is determinative of what domicile is
under election law.

5.289.7. It is highly probable, therefore, for a former Filipino to secure an

"immigrant" visa, without really being a "resident" of the Philippines, as the term
is understood in election law.[475] (Emphasis supplied)
The Commission on Elections insists that petitioner should have obtained a visa
that supposedly evidences permanent resident status. However, it failed to
acknowledge that petitioner did not even need a visa to accomplish the purpose
that a visa serves, that is, to enter the Philippines.

Beginning May 24, 2005, petitioner's entries to the Philippines were through the
visa-free Balikbayan Program provided for by Republic Act No. 6768, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9174. Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6768, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 3 Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. - The balikbayan and his or her
family shall be entitled to the following benefits and privileges:
....

(c) Visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year for foreign
passport holders, with the exception of restricted nationals;
Petitioner falls within the definition of a balikbayan, under Section 2(a) of
Republic Act No. 6768, as amended.[476] She is a "Filipino citizen ... who had been
naturalized in a foreign country [who came] or return[ed] to the
Philippines."[477] She was, thus, well-capacitated to benefit from the Balikbayan
Program.

The Balikbayan Program is not only a scheme that dispenses with the need for
visas; it is a system that affirmatively works to enable balikbayans to reintegrate
themselves into the Philippines. Alternatively stated, it works to enable
balikbayans to reestablish domicile in the Philippines. Pertinent provisions of
Republic Act No. 6768, as amended, spell out a "Kabuhayan Program":
Section 1. Balikbayan Program. - ...

The program shall include a kabuhayan shopping privilege allowing tax-exempt

purchase of livelihood tools providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary
training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of
society upon their return to the country. The program shall likewise showcase
competitive and outstanding Filipino-made products.

Sec. 6. Training Programs. - The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)

through the OWWA, in coordination with the Technology and Livelihood
Resource Center (TLRC), Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA), livelihood corporation and other concerned government agencies, shall
provide the necessary entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programs and
marketing assistance to a balikbayan, including his or her immediate family
members, who shall avail of the kabuhayan program in accordance with the
existing rules on the government's reintegration program.

In the case of non-OFW balikbayan, the Department of Tourism shall make the
necessary arrangement with the TLRC and other training institutions for possible
livelihood training.
Enabling balikbayans to establish their livelihood in the Philippines, Republic Act
No. 6768, as amended, can have as a logical result their reestablishment here of
their permanent abodes.

VI.I

The Commission on Elections' erroneous reliance on Coquilla, Japzon,

and Caballero demonstrates its evasion of its duty to engage in the required
meticulous factual analysis. A closer examination of these cases as well as of a
similar case that private respondents Elamparo and Valdez invoked in the
February 16, 2016 oral arguments-Reyes v. Commission on Elections[478]-reveals
that the conclusions in those cases were reached not because of a practically
spellbound invocation of citizenship.

Rather, they were reached because: first, the persons whose residence were in
question failed to present any evidence at all of reestablishing residence of choice
in the Philippines before their repatriation was effected (or if they did, their
evidence were deemed negligible); and second, the countervailing evidence
presented against them demonstrated that they failed to reestablish residence ahead
of their repatriation.

Coquilla involved only two (2) pieces of evidence in favor of Teodulo Coquilla:

[479]
 first, his Community Tax Certificate; and second, his own verbal statements
regarding his intent to run for public office. With only these in support of his
cause, the more reasonable conclusion was that Coquilla did not intend to return
for good to the Philippines, but only to temporarily vacation.[480]

Japzon was not even about reestablishing residence ahead of reacquiring natural-

born citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225. Japzon even militates against
the Commission on Elections' position as it expressly stated that "reacquisition of
his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact
or effect on [the candidate's] residence/domicile"[481] and, thus, should be taken as
an indicator of when residence may or may not be reckoned.

In Reyes, Regina Ongsiako-Reyes argued that she never lost her domicile of origin
(i.e., Boac, Marinduque).[482] As to her claim that she satisfied the residence
requirement, this court approvingly quoted the following observations of the
Commission on Elections First Division:
The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the one-year
residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in
Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 201 L But such fact alone is not
sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner] has never regained her
domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of
her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.[483] (Citations omitted)
Caballero cited Coquilla and, as previously discussed, took pains to dissociate
residence from citizenship. In any case, Rogelio Batin Caballero, candidate for
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes, himself admitted that he only had an actual stay of
nine (9) months in Uyugan, Batanes prior to the 2013Elections, albeit claiming
that it was substantial comgliance with the Local Government Code's one-year
residence requirement.[484]

In contrast with Coquilla, Japzon, Reyes, and Caballero, petitioner here presented

a plethora of evidence attesting to the reestablishment of her domicile well ahead
of her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on July 7, 2006:

(1) United States Passport No. 017037793 issued to petitioner on December 18, 2001,
indicating that she travelled back to the Philippines on May 24, 2005, consisting of
13 pages
(2) E-mail exchanges on various dates from March 18, 2005 to September 29, 2006
between petitioner and her husband and representatives of Victory Van Corporation,
and National Veterinary Quarantine Service of the Bureau of Animal Industry of the
Philippines, consisting of 23 pages
(3) Official Transcript of Records of Brian Daniel Poe Llamanzares, issued by the
Beacon School, consisting of one (1) page
(4) Certification issued by the Registrar of La Salle Green Hills dated April 15, 2015,
consisting of one (1) page
(5) Elementary Pupil's Permanent Record for Hanna Mackenzie Llamanzares, issued by
Assumption College, consisting of two (2) pages
(6) Secondary Student's Permanent Record for Hanna Mackenzie Llamanzares, issued
by Assumption College, consisting of two (2) pages
(7) Certificate of Attendance dated April 8, 2015, issued by the Directress of . the
Learning Connection, Ms. Julie Pascual Penaloza, consisting of one (1) page
(8) Certification dated April 14, 2015 issued by the Directress of the Green Meadows
Learning Center, Ms. Anna Villaluna Reyes, consisting of one (1) page
(9) Elementary Pupil's Permanent Record for Jesusa Anika Carolina Llamanzares, issued
by Assumption College, consisting of one (1) page
(10) Identification Card, issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to petitioner on July
22, 2005, consisting of one (1) page
(11) Condominium Certificate of Title No. 11985-R covering Unit 7F of One Wilson
Place, issued by the Registry ofDeeds of San Juan City on February 20, 2006,
 consisting of four (4) pages
(12) Condominium Certificate of Title No. 11986-R covering the parking slot for Unit 7F
of One Wilson Place, issued by the Registry of Deeds of San Juan City on February
20, 2006, consisting of two (2) pages
(13) Declaration ofReal Property No. 96-39721 covering Unit 7F of One Wilson Place,
issued by the Office of the City Assessor of San Juan City on April25, 2006,
consisting of one (1) page
(14) Declaration of Real Property No. 96-39722 covering the parking slot of Unit 7F of
One Wilson Place, issued by the Office of the City Assessor of San Juan City on
April 25, 2006, consisting of one page
(15) Receipt No. 8217172, issued by the Salvation Army on February 23,2006, consisting
of one (1) page
(16) Receipt No. 8220421, issued by the Salvation Army on February 23, 2006,
consisting of one (1) page
(17) E-mail from the U.S.A. Postal Service, sent on March 28, 2006 to petitioner's
husband, confirming the latter's submission of a request for change of address to the
U.S.A. Postal Service, consisting of one (1) page
(18) Final Statement issued by the First American Title Insurance Company, which
indicates as Settlement Date: "04-27/2006", consisting of two (2) pages
(19) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 290260 covering a 509-square meter lot at No. 106,
Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Barangay Ugong Norte, Quezon City, issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 1, 2006, consisting of four (4) pages
(20) Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship issued
by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, accomplished by
petitioner on July 12, 2011
(21) Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe dated November 8, 2015, consisting of three (3)
pages
(22) Affidavit of Teodoro Llamanzares dated November 8, 2015, consisting of three (3)
pages[485]

The Commission on Elections chose to ignore all these pieces of evidence

showing reestablishment of residence prior to July 7, 2006 by the mere invocation
of petitioner's then status as one who has not yet reacquired Philippine citizenship.
The Commission on Elections relied on a manifestly faulty premise to justify its
position that all of petitioner's evidence relating to the period before July 7, 2006
deserved no consideration. Clearly, this was grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Commission on Elections in two (2) respects: first, in using citizenship as a
shortcut; and second, in evading its positive duty to scrutinize the facts and
evidence.

VI.J

As with Mitra and Sabili, petitioner has shown by substantial evidence that the

incremental process of establishing her residence in the Philippines commenced on
May 24, 2005 and was completed in the latter part of April 2006. The Constitution
requires that a candidate for the May 9, 2016[486] Presidential Elections must
establish residency at least by May 9, 2006.

Her evidence satisfies the three (3) requisites for establishing domicile of choice in
the Philippines:

First, bodily presence in the Philippines is demonstrated by her actual arrival in the
country on May 24, 2005.
Second, animus manendi or intent to remam in the Philippines is demonstrated by:

(1) Petitioner's travel records, which indicate that even as she could momentarily leave
for a trip abroad, she nevertheless constantly returned to the Philippines;
(2) Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe, which attests to how, upon their arrival in the
Philippines on May 24, 2005, petitioner and her children first lived with her at 23
Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan City, thereby requiring a change in the living
arrangements at her own residence;
(3) The school records of petitioner's children, which prove that they have been
continuously attending Philippine schools beginning in June 2005;
(4) Petitioner's Tax Identification Number Identification Card, which indicates that
"shortly after her return in May 2005, she considered herself a taxable resident and
submitted herself to the Philippines' tax jurisdiction";[487] and
(5) Two condominium certificates of title (one for Unit 7F, One Wilson Place, and
another for a corresponding parking slot which were both purchased in early 2005),
and along with corresponding Declarations of Real Property Tax Declarations which
establish intent to permanently reside in the Philippines.

Lastly, animus non revertendi or intent to abandon domicile in the United States is

demonstrated by:

(1) Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe, which "attests to, among others, the reasons which
prompted [petitioner] to leave the [United States] and return permanently to the
Philippines";[488]
(2) Affidavit of petitioner's husband, which affirms petitioner's explanations of how they
made arrangements for their relocation to the Philippines as early as March 2005;
(3) Petitioner and her husband's documented inquiries and exchanges with property
movers as regards the transfer of their effects and belongings from the United States
to the Philippines, which affirms their intent to permanently leave the United States
as early as March 2005;
(4) The actual relocation and transfer of effects and belongings, "which were packed and
collected for storage and transport to the Philippines on February and April2006";[489]
(5) Petitioner's husband's act of informing the United States Postal Service that he and
his family are abandoning their address in the United States as of March 2006;
(6) Petitioner and her husband's sale of their family home in the United States on April
27, 2006;
(7) Petitioner's husband's resignation from his work in the United S tates effective April
2006; and
(8) Petitioner's husband's actual return to the Philippines on May 4, 2006.

With due recognition to petitioner's initial and preparatory moves (as was done
in Mitra and Sabili), it is clear that petitioner's residence in the Philippines was
established as early as May 24, 2005.

Nevertheless, even if we are to depart from Mitra and Sahili and insist on
reckoning the reestablishment of residence only at that point when all of its steps
have been consummated, it remains that petitioner has proven that she has satisfied
Article VII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution's ten-year residence requirement.

VI.K

The evidence relied upon by the Commission on Elections fail to controvert the
timely reestablishment of petitioner's domicile.
Insisting that petitioner failed to timely reestablish residence, the Commission on
Elections underscores three (3) facts: first, her husband, Teodoro Llamanzares,
"remained a resident of the US in May 2005, where he kept and retained his
employment";[490] second, petitioner, using her United States passport, supposedly
travelled frequently to the United States from May 2005 to July 2006; and third, a
statement in the Certificate of Candidacy she filed for Senator indicating that she
was a resident of the Philippines for only six (6) years and six (6) months as of
May 13, 2013, which must mean that: first, by May 9, 2016, she shall have been a
resident of the Philippines for a cumulative period of nine (9) years and six (6)
months; and second, she started to be a resident of the Philippines only in
November 2006.

None of these facts sustain the Commission on Elections' conclusions. Relying on

the residence of petitioner's husband is simply misplaced.

He is not a party to this case. No incident relating to his residence (or even
citizenship) binds the conclusions that are to be arrived at in this case. Petitioner
was free to establish her own residence.

The position that the residence of the wife follows that of the husband is
antiquated and no longer binding. Article 110 of the Civil Code[491] used to provide
that "[t]he husband shall fix the residence of the family." But it has long been
replaced by Article 152 of the Family Code,[492] which places the wife on equal
footing as the husband.

To accept the Commission on Elections' conclusions is to accept an invitation to

return to an antiquated state of affairs. The Commission's conclusions not only run
counter to the specific text of Article 152 of the Family Code; it renounces the
entire body of laws upholding "the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men."[493]

Chief of these is Republic Act No. 7192, otherwise known as the Women in
Development and Nation Building Act. Section 5 of this Act specifically states
that "[w]omen of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to
act . . . which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar
circumstances." As underscored by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin in the
February 9, 2016 oral arguments, a wife may choose "to have her own domicile
for purposes of conducting her own profession or business":[494]
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Yes. Is the position of the COMELEC like this, that a dual citizen can only have
one domicile or ...

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, definitely because that is the ruling in jurisprudence,
"A person can have only one domicile at that time."

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Alright, who chooses that domicile for her?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
In the ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
At that time when he or she was a dual citizen.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
In the context of marriage, it's a joint decision of husband and wife, Yes, Your
Honor.

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Okay, we have a law, a provision in the Civil Code reiterated in the Family
Code ... (interrupted)

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes ...

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
. . . that it is the husband who usually defmes the situs of the domicile?

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Except if the wife chooses to have her own domicile for purposes of conducting
her own profession or business.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
That's under the Women in Nation Building Act.

COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.[495]
Reliance on petitioner's husband's supposed residence reveals an even more basic
flaw. This presupposes that residence as used in the Civil Code and the Family
Code is to be equated with residence as used in the context of election laws. Even
if it is to be assumed that the wife follows the residence fixed by the husband, it
does not mean that what is reckoned in this sense as residence, i.e., the family
home, is that which must be considered as residence for election purposes.

In any case, petitioner amply demonstrated that their family home had, in fact,
been timely relocated from the United States. Initially, it was in her mother's
residence at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan City. Later, it was
transferred to Unit 7F, One Wilson Place; and finally to Corinthian Hills, Quezon
City.

Apart from the sheer error of even invoking a non-party's residence, petitioner's
evidence established the purpose for her husband's stay in the United States after
May 24, 2005: that it was "for the sole and specific purpose of 'finishing pending
projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family home there.'"[496] This assertion is
supported by evidence to show that a mere seven (7) days after their house in the
United States was sold, that is, as soon as his reason for staying in the United
States ceased, petitioner's husband returned to the Philippines on May 4, 2006. [497]

Equally unavailing are petitioner's travels to the United States from May 2005 to
July 2006.

In the first place, petitioner travelled to the United States only twice within this
period. This hardly qualifies as "frequent," which is how the Commission on
Elections characterized her travels.[498] As explained by petitioner:
Her cancelled U.S.A. Passport shows that she travelled to the U.S.A. only twice
during this period. Moreover, each trip (from 16 December 2005 to 7 January
2006 and from 14 February 2006 to 11 March 2006) did not last more than a
month.[499]
The Commission on Elections' choice to characterize as "frequent" petitioner's two
trips, neither of which even extended longer than a month, is a red flag, a badge of
how it gravely abused its discretion in refusing to go about its task of meticulously
considering the evidence.

Moreover, what is pivotal is not that petitioner travelled to the United States.
Rather, it is the purpose of these trips. If at all, these trips attest to the
abandonment of her domicile in the United States and her having reestablished it
in the Philippines. As petitioner explained, it was not out of a desire to maintain
her abode in the United States, but it was precisely to wrap up her affairs there and
to consummate the reestablishment of her domicile in the Philippines:
5.258.1. In her Verified Answers, Sen. Poe explained why she bad to travel to the
U.S.A. on 14 February 2006, and it bad, again, nothing to do with supposedly
maintaining her domicile in the U.S.A.

5.258.2. To reiterate, Sen. Poe's trip to the U.S.A. in February 2006 was "for the
purpose of supervising the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings." The circumstances that lead to her travel to the U.S.A. were
discussed in detail in pars. 5.241 to 5.243 above. During this February 2006 trip to
the U.S.A., Sen. Poe even donated some of the family's household belongings to
the Salvation Army.

5.258.3. On the other hand, Sen. Poe's trip to the U.S.A. from 16 December 2005
to 7 January 2006 was also intended, in part, to "to attend to her family's ongoing
relocation."[500]
The Commission on Elections' begrudging attitude towards petitioner's two trips
demonstrates an inordinate stance towards what animus non revertendi or intent to
abandon domicile in the United States entails. Certainly, reestablishing her
domicile in the Philippines cannot mean a prohibition against travelling to the
United States. As this court emphasized in Jalover v. Osmena,[501] the
establishment of a new domicile does not require a person to be in his home 24
hours a day, seven (7) days a week.[502]

To hold otherwise is to sustain a glaring absurdity.

The statement petitioner made in her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator as

regards residence is not fatal to her cause.

The assailed Commission on Elections' Resolution m G.R. No. 221697 stated that:
Respondent cannot fault the Second Division for using her statements in the 2013
COC against her. Indeed, the Second Division correctly found that this is an
admission against her interest. Being such, it is 'the best evidence which affords
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on
the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such
declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds
with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.

Moreover, a [Certificate of Candidacy], being a notarial document, has in its favor

the presumption of regularity. To contradict the facts stated therein, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. In order for
a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not
enough for him to merely execute a subsequent notarial document. After executing
an affidavit voluntarily wherein admissions and declarations against the affiant's
own interest are made under the solemnity of an oath, the affiant cannot just be
allowed to spurn them and undo what he has done.

Yes, the statement in the 2013 COC, albeit an admission against interest, may later
be impugned by respondent. However, she cannot do this by the mere expedient of
filing her 2016 COC and claiming that the declarations in the previous one were
"honest mistakes". The burden is upon her to show, by clear, convincing and more
than preponderant evidence, that, indeed, it is the latter COC that is correct and
that the statements made in the 2013 COC were done without bad faith.
Unfortunately for respondent, she failed to discharge this heavy burden.[503]
Untenable is the Commission on Elections' conclusion that a certificate of
candidacy, being a notarized document, may only be impugned by evidence that is
clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant because it has in its favor a
presumption of regularity. Notarizing a document has nothing to do with the
veracity of the statements made in that document. All that notarization does is to
convert a private document into a public document, such that when it is presented
as evidence, proof of its genuineness and due execution need no longer be shown.
[504]
 Notarization does not sustain a presumption that the facts stated in notarized
documents are true and correct.

More importantly, Romualdez-Marcos[505] has long settled that "[i]t is the fact of

residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement."[506] It further stated that an "honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence ... if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece ofpaper." [507]

The facts-as established by the evidence-will always prevail over whatever

inferences may be drawn from an admittedly mistaken declaration.  Jurisprudence
itself admits of the possibility of a mistake. Nevertheless, the mistaken declaration
serves neither as a perpetually binding declaration nor as estoppel. This is the
unmistakable import of Romualdez.

This primacy of the fact of residence, as established by the evidence, and how it
prevails over mere formalistic declarations, is illustrated in Perez v. Commission
Elections.[508]

In Perez, the petitioner Marcita Perez insisted that the private respondent Rodolfo
Aguinaldo, a congressional candidate in the 1998 Elections, remained a resident of
Gattaran, Cagayan, and that he was unable to establish residence in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. In support of her claims, she "presented private respondent's [previous]
certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995
elections; his voter's affidavit which he used in the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and
1997 elections; and his voter registration record dated June 22, 1997, in all of
which it is stated that he is a resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel, Municipality
of Gattaran."[509]

This court did not consider as binding "admissions" the statements made in the
documents presented by Perez. Instead, it sustained the Commission on Elections'
appreciation of other evidence proving that Aguinaldo managed to establish
residence in Tuguegarao. It also cited Romualdez-Marcos and affirmed the rule
that the facts and the evidence will prevail over prior (mistakenly made)
declarations:
In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed his
residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on
the basis of the following: (1) the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner
of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where
private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the contract of lease between private
respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential apartment at
Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30,
1996; (3) the marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998, between private
respondent and Lenna Dumaguit; (4) the certificate of live birth of private
respondent's second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to private
respondent and his family, which all show that private respondent was a resident
of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
elections on May 11, 1998.

There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent
had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the
record to detract from the merit of this factual finding.
....

Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC:

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought

to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy

prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan,
the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1)
year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since
July 1990. His claim that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is
credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it
would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the
capital of the province of Cagayan.[510]
Even assuming that an "admission" is worth considering, the mere existence of
any such admission does not imply its conclusiveness. "No doubt, admissions
against interest may be refuted by the declarant."[511] This is true both of
admissions made outside of the proceedings in a given case and of"[a]n admission,
verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case."[512] As regards the latter, the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly provides
that "[t]he admission may be contradicted ... by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake." Thus, by mistakenly "admitting," a party is not considered to
have brought upon himself or herself an inescapable contingency. On the contrary,
that party is free to present evidence proving not only his or her mistake but also
of what the truth is.

Petitioner here has established her good faith, that is, that she merely made an
honest mistake. In addition, she adduced a plethora of evidence, "more convincing
than a mere entry on a piece of paper,"[513] that proves the fact of her residence,
which was reestablished through an incremental process commencing on May 24,
2005.

The fact of petitioner's honest mistake is accounted for. Working in her favor is a
seamless, consistent narrative. This controverts any intent to deceive. It is an
honest error for a layperson.

Firstly, her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator must be appreciated for what it is:
a document filed in relation to her candidacy for Senator, not for President. Under
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, all that election to the Senate
requires is residence in the Philippines for "not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election." For purposes of her Certificate of Candidacy
for Senator, petitioner needed to show residence for only two (2) years and not
more. As petitioner explained, she accomplished this document without the
assistance of a lawyer.[514] Thus, it should not be taken against her (and taken as a
badge of misrepresentation) that she merely filled in information that was then
apropos, though inaccurate.

As Commission on Elections Chairperson Andres Bautista noted in his Concurring

and Dissenting Opinion to the assailed Commission on Elections' Resolution in
G.R. No. 221697:
[The] residency requirement for Senator is two (2) years. Hence, when [petitioner]
stated in her 2013 COC that she was a resident ... for [6 years and 6 months], it
would seem that she did so without really considering the legal or constitutional
requirement as contemplated by law. After all, she had already fully complied with
the two-year residence requirement.[515]
The standard form for the certificate of candidacy that petitioner filed for Senator
required her to specify her "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013."[516] This syntax lent itselfto some degree of confusion as to what the "period
before May 13, 2013" specifically entailed. It was, thus, quite possible for a person
filling out a blank certificate of candidacy to have merely indicated his or her
period of residence as of the filing of his or her Certificate of Candidacy. This
would not have been problematic for as long as the total period of residence
relevant to the position one was running for was complied with.

Affirming the apparent tendency to confuse, the Commission on Elections itself

revised the template for certificates of candidacy for the upcoming 2016 Elections.
As petitioner pointed out, the certificate of candidacy prepared for the May 9,
2016 Elections is now more specific. It now requires candidates to specify their
"Period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016."[517]

It is true that reckoning six (6) years and six (6) months from October 2012, when
petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator, would indicate that
petitioner's residence in the Philippines commenced only in April 2006. This
seems to belie what petitioner now claims: that her residence in the Philippines
commenced on May 24, 2005. This, however, can again be explained by the fact
that petitioner, a layperson, accomplished her own Certificate of Candidacy for
Senator without the better advice of a legal professional.

To recall, jurisprudence appreciates the establishment of domicile as an

incrementalfrocess. In this incremental process, even initial, preparatory moves
count.[518] Residence is deemed acquired (or changed) as soon as these moves are
demonstrated.[519] Nevertheless, the crucial fact about this manner of appreciating
the establishment of domicile is that this is a technical nuance in jurisprudence.
Laypersons can reasonably be expected to not have the acumen to grasp this
subtlety. Thus, as petitioner explained, it was reasonable for her to reckon her
residency from April 2006, when all the actions that she and her family needed to
undertake to effect their transfer to the Philippines were consummated.[520] Indeed,
as previously pointed out, the latter part of April leading to May 2006 is the
terminal point of the incremental process of petitioner's reestablishing her
residence in the Philippines.

Insisting on November 2006 as petitioner's supposedly self-declared start of

residence in the Philippines runs afoul of the entire corpus of evidence presented.
Neither petitioner's evidence nor the entirety of the assertions advanced by
respondents against her manages to account for any significant occurrence in
November 2006 that explains why petitioner would choose to attach her residency
to this date. In the face of a multitude of countervailing evidence, nothing sustains
November 2006 as a starting point.

There were two documents-a 2012 Certificate of Candidacy for Senator and a
2015 Certificate of Candidacy for President-that presented two different starting
points for the establishment of residency. Logic dictates that if one is true, the
other must be false.

The Commission on Elections insisted, despite evidence to the contrary, that it was
the 2015 Certificate of Candidacy for President that was false. Petitioner admitted
her honest mistake in filling out the 2012 Certificate of Candidacy for Senator.
She explained how the mistake was made. She further presented evidence to show
that it is the 2015 Certificate of Candidacy that more accurately reflects what she
did and intended.

By itself, the Commission on Elections' recalcitrance may reasonably raise public

suspicion that its conclusions in its Resolutions were preordained despite the
compendium of evidence presented. It was clearly unfounded and arbitrary-
another instance of the Commission on Elections' grave abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, the conclusion warranted by the evidence stands. The fact of

petitioner's residence as having commenced on May 24, 2005, completed through
an incremental process that extended until April/May 2006, was "established by
means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper." [521]
 VI.L

Another fact cited against petitioner is her continuing ownership of two (2) real
properties in the United States. Specifically, Valdez noted that petitioner "still
maintains two (2) residential houses in the US, one purchased in 1992, and the
other in 2008."[522]

This fails to controvert the timely reestablishment of petitioner's residence in the

Philippines.

First, Valdez's characterization of the two properties as "residential" does not

mean that petitioner has actually been using them as her residence. ClassifYing
real properties on the basis of utility (e.g., as residential, agricultural, commercial,
etc.) is merely a descriptive exercise. It does not amount to an authoritative legal
specification of the relationship between the real property owner and the property.
Thus, one may own agricultural land but not till it; one may own a commercial
property but merely lease it out to other commercial enterprises.

To say that petitioner owns "residential" property does not mean that petitioner is
actually residing in it.

In the Answer[523] she filed before the Commission on Elections, petitioner has

even explicitly denied Valdez's assertion "insofar it is made to appear that (she)
'resides' in the 2 houses mentioned."[524] As against Valdez's allegation, petitioner
alleged and presented supporting evidence that her family's residence has been
established in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City. As pointed out by petitioner, all that
Valdez managed to do was to make an allegation, considering that he did not
present proof that any of the two (2) properties in the United States has been and is
still being used by petitioner's family for their residence.

Second, even on the assumption that the remaining properties in the United States
may indeed be characterized as petitioner's residence, Valdez's assertion fails to
appreciate the basic distinction between residence and domicile. It is this
distinction that permits a person to maintain a separate residence simultaneously
with his or her domicile.

Ultimately, it does not matter that petitioner owns residential properties in the
United States, or even that she actually uses them as temporary places of abode.
What matters is that petitioner has established and continues to maintain domicile
in the Philippines.

Romualdez-Marcos[525] is on point:
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. It is thus, quite perfectly nonnal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite
clearly:
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. 'Residence['] is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily
so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile."[526]
(Citations omitted)
There is nothing preventing petitioner from owning properties in the United States
and even from utilizing them for residential purposes. To hold that mere
ownership of these is tantamount to abandonment of domicile is to betray a lack of
understanding of the timelessly established distinction between domicile and
residence.

VII

It was grave abuse of discretion for the Commission to Elections to cancel

petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy on grounds that find no support in law and
jurisprudence, and which are not supported by evidence. Petitioner made no false
representation in her Certificate of Candidacy, whether in respect of her
citizenship or in respect of her residence. She is a natural-hom Filipina at the time
ofher filing of her Certificate of Candidacy. She satisfies the requirement of
having been a resident of the Philippines 10 years prior to the upcoming elections.

The burden of evidence rests on the person who makes the affirmative allegation.
In an action for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, it is the person who filed the action who has the burden
of showing that the candidate made false representations in his or her certificate of
candidacy.

To prove that there is misrepresentation under Section 78, the person claiming it
must not only show that the candidate made representations that are false and
material. He or she must also show that the candidate intentionally tried to mislead
the electorate regarding his or her qualifications. Without showing these, the
burden of evidence does not shift to the candidate.

Private respondents failed to show the existence of false and material

misrepresentation on the part of petitioner. Instead, it relied on petitioner's
admission that she is a foundling.

Relying on the single fact of being an abandoned newborn is unreasonable,

arbitrary, and discriminatory. It fails to consider all other pieces of evidence
submitted by petitioner for the fair and unbiased consideration of the Commission
on Elections.

The principles of constitutional construction favor an interpretation that foundlings

like petitioner are natural-hom citizens of the Philippines absent proof resulting
from evidence to the contrary. Such proof must show that both-not only one--of
petitioner's parents were foreigners at the time of her birth.

Without conceding that foundlings are not-even presumptively- j natural-hom

Filipinos, petitioner has presented substantial evidence that her biological parents
are Filipinos.

The Constitution provides for only two types of citizens: (1) natural born, and (2)
naturalized citizens. Natural-born citizens are specifically defined as persons who
do not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Filipino citizenship.
These acts refer to those required under our naturalization laws. More particularly,
it involves the filing of a petition as well as the establishment of the existence of
all qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner never had to go through our naturalization processes. Instead, she has
been treated as a Filipino citizen upon birth, subject to our laws. Administrative
bodies, the Commission on Elections, the President, and most importantly, the
electorate have treated her as a Filipino citizen and recognized her natural-born
status.

Not being a Filipino by naturalization, therefore, petitioner could have acquired

Filipino citizenship because her parentis, from her birth, has/have always been
considered Filipino citizen/s who, in accordance with our jus sanguinis principle,
bestowed natural-born citizenship to her under Article IV, Section 1(1) to (3) of
the Constitution.

Our Constitution and our domestic laws, including the treaties we have ratified,
enjoin us from interpreting our citizenship provisions in a manner that promotes
exclusivity and an animus against those who were abandoned and neglected.

We have adopted and continue to adopt through our laws and practice policies of
equal protection, human dignity, and a clear duty to always seek the child's well-
being and best interests. We have also obligated ourselves to defend our People
against statelessness and protect and ensure the status and nationality of our
children immediately upon birth.

Therefore, an interpretation that excludes foundlings from our natural born citizens
is inconsistent with our laws and treaty obligations. It necessarily sanctions
unequal treatment of a particular class through unnecessary limitation of their
rights and capacities based only on their birth status.

Petitioner cannot be expected to present the usual evidence of her lineage. It is

precisely because she is a foundling that she cannot produce a birth record or a
testimony on the actual circumstances and identity of her biological parents.

However, the circumstances of and during her birth lead to her parentis' Filipino
citizenship as the most probable inference.

Petitioner was born in Jaro, Iloilo, the population of which consisted mainly of
Filipinos. Her physical features are consistent with the physical features of many
Filipinos. She was left in front of a Catholic Church, no less-consistent with the
expectation from a citizen in a predominantly Catholic environment. There was
also no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo to and from which foreigners may easily
come and go to abandon their newborn children. Lastly, statistics show that in
1968, petitioner had a 99.8% chance of being born a Filipino.

For these reasons, a claim of material misrepresentation of natural born status

cannot be based solely on a candidate's foundling status. Private respondents
should have been more diligent in pursuing their claim by presenting evidence
other than petitioner's admission of foundling status.

The conclusion that she is a natural-born Filipina is based on a fair and reasonable
reading of constitutional provisions, statutes, and international norms having the
effect of law, and on the evidence presented before the Commission on Elections.

Petitioner has shown by a multitude of evidence that she has been domiciled in the
Philippines beginning May 24, 2005. Her reestablishment of residence was not
accomplished in a singular, definitive episode but spanned an extended period.
Hers was an incremental process of reestablishing residence.

This incremental process was terminated and completed by April 2006 with the
sale of her family's former home in the United States and the return of her husband
to the Philippines following this sale. Specifically, her husband returned to the
Philippines on May 4, 2006.

Whichever way the evidence is appreciated, it is clear that petitioner has done all
the acts necessary to become a resident on or before May 9, 2006, the start of the
ten-year period for reckoning compliance with the 1987 Constitution's residence
requirement for presidential candidates.

The Commission on Elections did not examine the evidence deliberately and with
the requisite analytical diligence required by our laws and existing jurisprudence.
Instead, it arbitrarily ignored petitioner's evidence. It chose to anchor its
conclusions on formalistic requirements and technical lapses; reacquisition of
citizenship, issuance of a permanent resident or immigrant visa, and an inaccuracy
in a prior Certificate of Candidacy.

Misplaced reliance on preconceived indicators of what suffices to establish or

retain domicile-a virtual checklist of what one should, could, or would have done-
is precisely what this court has repeatedly warned against. This is tantamount to
evasion of the legally ordained duty to engage in a meticulous examination of the
facts attendant to residency controversies.

Worse, the Commission on Elections went out of its way to highlight supposedly
damning details-the circumstances of petitioner's husband, her intervening trips to
the United States-to insist upon its conclusions. This conjectural posturing only
makes more evident how the Commission on Elections gravely abused its
discretion. Not only did it turn a blind eye to the entire body of evidence
demonstrating the restoration of petitioner's domicile; it even labored at subverting
them.

Clearly, the Commission on Elections' actions constituted grave abuse of

discretion amounting to utter lack of jurisdiction. These actions being unjust as
well as unchristian, we have no choice except to annul this unconstitutional act.
Admittedly, there is more to democracy than having a wider choice of candidates
during periodic elections. The quality of democracy increases as people engage in
meaningful deliberation often moving them to various types of collective action to
achieve a better society. Elections can retard or aid democracy. It weakens society
when these exercises reduce the electorate to subjects of entertainment, slogans,
and empty promises. This kind of elections betrays democracy.They transform the
exercise to a contest that puts premium on image rather than substance. The
potential of every voter gets wasted. Worse, having been marginalized as mere
passive subjects, voters are then manipulated by money and power.

Elections are at their best when they serve as venues for conscious and deliberate
action. Choices made by each voter should be the result of their own reasoned
deliberation. These choices should be part of their collective decision to choose
candidates who will be accountable to them and further serious and workable
approaches to the most pressing and relevant social issues. Elections are at their
best when the electorate are not treated simply as numbers in polling statistics, but
as partners in the quest for human dignity and social justice.

This case should be understood in this context. There are no guarantees that the
elections we will have in a few months will lead us to more meaningful freedoms.
How and when this comes about should not solely depend on this court. In a
working constitutional democracy framed by the rule of just law, how we conceive
and empower ourselves as a people should also matter significantly.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the consolidated Petitions for Certiorari.

The assailed Resolutions dated December 1, 2015 of the Commission on Elections
Second Division and December 23, 2015 of the Commission on Elections En Banc
in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), and the assailed Resolutions dated December 11, 2015
of the Commission on Elections First Division and December 23, 2015 of the
Commission on Elections En Banc in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007
(DC), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) must be ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares made no material

misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy for President in connection with
the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections. There is no basis for the
cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy.

[1]
 Const., art. VII, sec. 2 provides:

ARTICLE VII. Executive Department

....
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election.
[2]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 2706-2736. The Decision was concurred in by
Senators Paolo Benigno "Bam" A. Aquino IV, Pilar Juliana "Pia" S. Cayetano,
Cynthia A. Villar, Vicente C. Sotto III, and Loren B. Legarda, and dissented from
by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justices Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro and Arturo D. Brion, and Senator Maria Lourdes Nancy S.
Binay.
[3]
 Id. at 3827, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[4]
 COMELEC Official May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections
Results <http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?
r=Archives/RegularElections/2013NLE/Results/SenatorialElections2013> (visited
March 7, 2016).
[5]
 Const., art. VI, sec. 3 provides:

ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department

....
SECTION 3. SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five
years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
[6]
 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1 provides:  ARTICLE IV. Citizenship

SECTION I. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption ofthis
Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

[7]
 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1.
[8]
 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1.
[9]
 See Rep. Act No. 8552 (1998) and Rep. Act No. 8043 (1995).
[10]
 See Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 22-26, Petition. Petitioner was granted an
order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by
the Bureau oflmmigration on July 18, 2006.

The President of the Philippines appointed her as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board-a government position that requires
natural-born citizenship--on October 6, 2010.
[11]
 On August 21, 1990, we ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child. We also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights on October 23, 1986.
[12]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 5, Petition.
[13]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698 221700), p. 4566, Annex C of the Solicitor General's
Memorandum, Certification issued on February 9, 2016 by the Philippine
Statistics Office, signed by Deputy National Statistician Estela T. De Guzman.
[14]
 Batas Big. 881 (1985), Omnibus Election Code, sec. 78 provides:

SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
[15]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329,377 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan,
En Banc].
[16]
 Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453,455-456 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
[17]
 Id. at 456.
[18]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 254, COMELEC First Division Resolution
(SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[19]
 Id.
[20]
 Id.
[21]
 318 Phil. 329,386 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[22]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221 697), p. 3816, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[23]
 Id.; Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[24]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 3821-3822, Petitioner's
Memorandum; Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 218, COMELEC First
Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[25]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3822, Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo (G.R. No.
221698-221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002
(DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[26]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 3819-3820 and 3824, Petitioner's
Memorandum; Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 218, COMELEC First
Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[27]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3819, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[28]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 3824-3825, Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo
(G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 220, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA
Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[29]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3825, Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo (G.R. No.
221698-221700), p. 220, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002
(DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[30]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3824, Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo (G.R. No.
221698-221700), p. 219, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002
(DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[31]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3825, Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo (G.R. No.
221698-221700), p. 220, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002
(DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[32]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 3816 and 3833, Petitioner's
Memorandum; Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 220, COMELEC First
Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[33]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3822, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[34]
 Id. at 3824; Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 219, COMELEC First
Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002(DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[35]
 392 Phil. 342 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[36]
 Id. at 345.
[37]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 224-259, COMELEC En Banc Resolution (SPA
Nos. 15-001 (DC) was signed by Commissioners J. Andres D. Bautista (Chair),
Christian RobertS. Lim, AI A. Parreño, Luie Tito F. Guia, Arthur D. Lim, Ma.
Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon, and SheriffM. Abas.
[38]
 Id. at 258.
[39]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), pp. 216-264, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)) was signed
by Presiding Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim, and Commissioners Luie
Tito F. Guia, and Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon.
[40]
 Id. at 352-381.
[41]
 Id. at 381.
[42]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3814, Petitionds Memorandum.
[43]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 217, COMELEC First Division Resolution
(SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[44]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3814, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[45]
 Id. at 3815.
[46]
 Id.
[47]
 Id.
[4s]
 Id.
[49]
 Id.
[50]
 Id. at 3816.
[51]
 Id. Emphasis supplied.
[52]
 Id.
[53]
 Id. at 2707, SET Decision (SET Case No. 001-15).
[54]
 Id. at 3816, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[55]
 Id.
[56]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division Resolution
(SPA Nos. 15- 002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[57]
 Id.
[58]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3817, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[59]
 Id.
[60]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division Resolution
(SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[61]
 Id.
[62]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 3817-3818, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[63]
 Id. at 3817.
[64]
 Id. at 3818.
[65]
 Id.
[66]
 Id.
[67]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division Resolution
(SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[68]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3819, Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo (G.R. No.
221698-221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002
(DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[69]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3819, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[70]
 Id.
[71]
 Id.
[72]
 Id.; Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 218, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[73]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3819, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[74]
 Id. at 3819-3820.
[75]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), pp. 218-219, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[76]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3820, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[77]
 Id. at 3820-3821.
[78]
 Id. at 3821.
[79]
 Id. Rep. Act No. 6768, sec. 3(c), as amended by Rep. Act No. 9174, sec. 3
provides:

SEC. 3 Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. - The balikbayan and his or her
family shall be entitled to the following benefits and privileges:
....
(c) Visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year for foreign
passport holders, with the exception of restricted nationals;
[80]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3821, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[81]
 Id.
[82]
 Id.
[83]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3822, Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo (G.R. No.
221698-221700), p. 219, COMELEC First Division Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002
(DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[84]
 Id.
[85]
 Id.
[86]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3822, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[87]
 Id.
[88]
 Id.
[89]
 Id.
[90]
 Id.
[91]
 Id. at 2707, SET Decision (SET Case No. 001-15).
[92]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 219, COMELEC First Division Resolution
(SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[93]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3822, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[94]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 219, COMELEC First Division Resolution
(SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[95]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3822, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[96]
 Id.
[97]
 Id. at 3824.
[98]
 Id.
[99]
 Id.
[100]
 Id.
[101]
 Id. at 3824-3825.
[102]
 Id. at 3825.
[103]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 220, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[104]
 Id.
[105]
 Id.
[106]
 Id.
[107]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3827, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[108]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 220, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[109]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3827, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[110]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 220, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[111]
 Id.
[112]
 Id.
[113]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3828, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[114]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 220, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[115]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3828, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[116]
 Id. at 2708, SET Decision (SET Case No. 00 l-15).
[117]
 Id. at 23, Petition.
[118]
 Id.
[119]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 2708, SET Decision {SET Case No. 001-15).
[120]
 Id.
[121]
 Id. at 3832.
[122]
 Id.
[123]
 Id. at 3833.
[124]
 Id. at 2708, SET Decision (SET Case No. 001-15).
[125]
 Id.
[126]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 221, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[127]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3823, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[128]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 221, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[129]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3824, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[130]
 Id. at 2708, SET Decision (SET Case No. 001-15), p. 3.
[131]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 221, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[132]
 Id.
[133]
 Id. at 222.
[134]
 Id.
[135]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3835, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[136]
 Id.
[137]
 Id. at 9, Petition.
[138]
 Id. at 4.
[139]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 222, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)) dated
December 11.
[140]
 Id.
[141]
 Id.
[142]
 Id.at 217.
[143]
 Id. at 222.
[144]
 Id.
[145]
 Id.
[146]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3556-B, Supreme Court Resolution dated
February 16, 2016.
[147]
 Id. at 29-30, Petition.
[148]
 Id. at 33.
[149]
 Id.
[150]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 263, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[151]
 Id. at 357, COMELEC En Banc Resolution (SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007
(DC), and 15-139 (DC)).
[152]
 Id. at 381.
[153]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3.
[154]
 Id. at 2011-2013.
[155]
 Id. at 2012.
[156]
 Id. at 3084-P, Supreme Court Advisory.
[157]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 64 provides:

Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission

on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party
to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
[158]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65 provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising

judicial or quasi judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order
or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
[159]
 Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015,
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/209287.pdf> 8-9 [Per J. Bersamin, En
Banc].
[160]
 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753,777 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En
Banc].
[161]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 4590, COMELEC Memorandum.
[162]
 Abasta Shipmanagement Corporation, 670 Phil. 136, 151 (2011) [Per J. Brion,
Second Division].
[163]
 Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, G.R. No. 212096,
October 14, 2015,<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/october2015/212096.pdf> 7 [Per J. Brion, Second
Division].
[164]
 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777-778, 782 (2010) [Per J.
Brion, En Banc].
[165]
 Id.at 787.
[166]
 Id. at 778.
[167]
 Varias v. Commission on Elections, 626 Phil. 292, 314 (2010) [Perl. Brion, En
Banc].
[168]
 Lambino v. Commission on Elections, 536 Phil. 1, 111 (2006) [Per J. Carpio,
En Banc].
[169]
 Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015, <http://sc.j udiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/ january2015/2057 28.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

[170]
 Lim v. Gamosa, G.R. No. 193964, December 2,
2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/december2015/ 193964.pdf> 15 [Per J. Perez, First Division].
[171]
 Gutib v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 293,307 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second
Division].
[172]
 Id. at 308.
[173]
 Id.
[174]
 Department of Agrarian Reform Aqjudication Board v. Lubrica, 497 Phil. 313,
326 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
[175]
 CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 3.
[176]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 8 and art. VII, sec. 4.
[177]
 Batas Blg. 881 (1985), Omnibus Election Code, sec. 76.
[178]
 Cipriano v. Comelec, 479 Phil. 677, 689 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
[179]
 CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 2(1) provides:

ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions

....
C. The Commission on Elections

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers

and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

[Note however paragraph (2), which limits its quasi judicial power.]
[180]
 Baytan v. Commission on Elections, 444 Phil. 812, 824 (2003) [Per J. Carpio,
En Banc].
[181]
 CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 2(3).
[182]
 Loong v. Commission on Elections, 365 Phil. 386, 423 (1999) [Per J. Puno, En
Banc].
[183]
 Id.
[184]
 See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421,461 (2004) [Per J.
Vitug, En Banc].
[185]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 17.
[186]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 17 provides:

ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department

....
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
[187]
 J. Mendoza, Separate Opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, 318 Phil. 329, 457 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[188]
 Id. at 461-462.
[189]
 468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
[190]
 Id. at 462.
[191]
 Id. at 458-460.
[192]
 CONST., art. VII, sec. 4 partly provides: ARTICLE VII. Executive
Department

SECTION 4....
....
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
[193]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 17 provides:

ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department

....
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
[194]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 17.
[195]
 CONST., art. IX-A, sec. 7. See discussion in part II.
[196]
 See Jalover v. Osmeila, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267
[Per J. Brion, En Banc]; Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900,
April22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]; Villafuerte v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014, 717 SCRA 312
[Per J. Peralta, En Banc]; Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, 660 Phil. 225
(2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc]; Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636
Phil. 753 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]; Maruhom v. Commission on Elections,
611 Phil. 501 (2009) [Per J. Chieo-Nazario, En Banc]; Velasco v. Commission on
Elections, 595 Phil. 1172 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]; Justimbaste v.
Commission on Elections, 593 Phil. 383 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En
Banc]; Lluz v. Commission on Elections, 551 Phil. 428 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc]; and Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 371 Phil. 377,389 (1999) (Per
J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
[197]
 See Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, 660 Phil. 225 (2011) [Per J.
Villarama, En Banc]; Juslimbaste v. Commission on Elections, 593 Phil. 383
(2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]; Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468
Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]
[197]
 See Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267
[Per J. Brion, En Banc]; Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900,
April22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]; Mitra v. Commission on
Elections, 636 Phil. 753 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]; Velasco v. Commission
on Elections, 595 Phil. 1172 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]; and Ugdoracion. Jr.
v. Commission on Elections, 575 Phil. 253 (2008) [Per J. Naehura, En Banc].
[199]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329,380 (1995) [Per
J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[200]
 Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 371 Phil. 377,390 (1999) [Per J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
[201]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3871, Petitioner's Memorandum..
[202]
 327 Phil. 521 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[203]
 J. Puno, Concurring Opinion in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327
Phil. 521, 578 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[204]
 Guzman v. Commission on Elections, 614 Phil. 143, 153 (2009) [Per J.
Bersamin, En Banc].
[205]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329, 380 (1995)
[Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[206]
 Id. at. 366.
[207]
 Id. at 367.
[208]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 6 provides:

ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department

....
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.
[209]
 Romua ldez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329, 380 (1995)
[Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[210]
 371 Phil. 377 (1999) [PerJ. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
[211]
 Id. at 381.
[212]
 Id.at 390-391.
[213]
 Id. at 391.
[214]
 See Talaga v. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 786 (2012) [Per J.
Bersamin, En Banc]; Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, 660 Phil. 225 (2011)
[Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc]; Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753
(2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]; Maruhom v. Commission on Elections, 611 Phil.
501 (2009) [Per J. Chieo-Nazario, En Banc]; Velasco v. Commission on Elections,
595 Phil. 1172 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]; Justimbaste v. Commission on
Elections, 593 Phil. 383 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]; and Tecson v.
Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
[215]
 706 Phil. 534 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[216]
 Id. at 551.
[217]
 Id. at 542-543.
[218]
 Id. at 543.
[219]
 Id.
[220]
 Id. at 544.
[221]
 Id. at 545.
[222]
 Id. at 546.
[223]
 Id. at 546.
[224]
 Id. at 547.
[225]
 Id. at 561
[226]
 Id. at 543.
[227]
 Id.
[228]
 Id. at 550-551.
[229]
 Id. at 551.
[230]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3860, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[231]
 G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014, 717 SCRA 312, 322-323 [Per J. Peralta,
En Banc].
[232]
 G.R. No. 207900, April22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223, 246 [Per J. Peralta, En
Banc].
[233]
 G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267, 282 [Per J. Brion, En
Banc].
[234]
 G.R. No. 207105, November 10,
2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/20 15/november20 15/207105.pdf> 8-9 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

[235]
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (1985), Omnibus Election Code, sec. 78.
[236]
 Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 371 Phil. 377,389 (1999) [Per J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
[237]
 Id.
[238]
 Id. See also Lluz v. Commission on Elections, 551 Phil. 428,445-446 (2007)
[Per J. Carpio, En Banc).
[239]
 Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 371 Phil. 377,389 (1999) [Per J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
[240]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 3862, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[241]
 See Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per
J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[242]
 J. Mendoza, Separate Opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, 318 Phil. 329, 463 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[243]
 The grounds under Section 40 of the Local Government Code may likewise be
raised against a candidate for a local elective position.
[244]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 4619, COMELEC Memorandum.
[245]
 Id.
[246]
 Id. at 5092-5093, Respondent's Memorandum.
[247]
 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 131. See also Matugas v. Commission on
Elections, 465 Phil. 299, 307 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Cortes v.
Court of Appeals, 443 Phil. 42 (2003) [Per J. Austria Martinez, Second Division]
in that "one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it."
[248]
 See J. Tinga, Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468
Phil. 421,612 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], citing Bautista v. Judge Sarmiento,
223 Phil. 181, 185-186 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division].
[249]
 See Advincula v. Atty. Macabata, 546 Phil. 431, 446 (2007) [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, Third Division], citing Uytengsu III v. Baduel, 514 Phil. 1 (2005) [Per J.
Tinga, Second Division] in that "the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegations - ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum
naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit."
[250]
 See Jison v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138 (1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First
Division].
[251]
 See, for example, Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 371 Phil. 377 (1999)
[Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
[252]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5.
[253]
 See Jison v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138 ( 1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First
Division].
[254]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 4627, COMELEC Memorandum.
[255]
 128 Phil. 815 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
[256]
 J. Carpio, Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil.
421, 634 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
[257]
 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 473-474 (2004) [Per J.
Vitug, En Banc].
[258]
 Id. at 473-474 and 488.
[259]
 Id. at 487-488.
[260]
 Paa v. Chan, 128 Phil. 815, 817 (1967) [Perl. Zaldivar, En Banc].
[261]
 Id. at 823.
[262]
 614 Phil. 451,479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
[263]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 4627, COMELEC Memorandum.
[264]
 Go v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 458 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
[265]
 Id. at 475.
[266]
 468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]. C.J. Davide, Jr. with separate
opinion, concurring; J. Puno was on leave but was allowed to vote, with separate
opinion; J. Panganiban was on official leave; was allowed to vote but did not send
his vote on the matter; J. Quisumbing joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and
Morales; case should have been remanded; J. Ynares-Santiago concurs, and also
with J. Puno separate opinion; J. Sandoval-Gutierrez concurs; with separate
opinion; J. Carpio, with dissenting opinion; J. Austria-Martinez, concurs; with
separate opinion; J. Corona, joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales; J.
Carpio Morales, with dissenting opinion; J. Callejo, Sr, with concurring opinion; J.
Azcuna, concurs in a separate opinion; J. Tinga, dissents per separate opinion.
[267]
 Id. at 456.
[268]
 Id. at 488.
[269]
 Id.
[270]
 See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 496, 530 [Per J. Mendoza,
En Banc].
[271]
 See Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Phil. 326, 340
(2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc], citing J.M. Tuason & Co, Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
[272]
 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil.
308, 338 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[273]
 Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 885 (2003) [Per J.
Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing J.M Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970). This was also cited in Saguisag v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/20 16/january20 16/212426.pdf> [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].

[274]
 Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 886 (2003) [Per J.
Carpio Morales, En Banc].
[275]
 272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per C.J. Feman, En Banc].
[276]
 Id. at 162, as cited in Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650
Phil. 326, 341 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
[277]
 486 Phil. 754 (2004) (Resolution) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[278]
 Id. at 773.
[279]
 G.R.  No. 208062, April 7, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/208062.pdf> [Per J, Leonen, En Banc].
[280]
 Id. at 26.
[281]
 The adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, crystallized the concept of "Philippine citizens." See Tecson
v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421,467-468 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En
Banc].
[282]
 For example, the Civil Code of Spain bef'ame effective in the jurisdiction on
Decetnber 18, 1889, making the first categorical listing on who were Spanish
citizens. See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421,465 (2004) [Per J.
Vitug, En Banc).
[283]
 Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, 692 Phil. 407 (2012) [Per J.
Reyes, En Banc]: "Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings,
of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at
the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of two or
more possible meanings."
[284]
 See, for example, In the Matter of" Save the Supreme Court Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of'Judiciary
Development Fund, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/january2015/15143.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1, 278-279 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[285]
 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 887 [Per J. Carpio
Morales, En Banc], citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil.
147, 169-170 (1991) [Per C.J. Feman, En Banc].
[286]
 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1(2) provides:

ARTICLE IV. Citizenship

SECTION I. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

....
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines[.]
[287]
 CONST., art. II, sec. 1 provides:

ARTICLE II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies Principles

SECTION I. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty

resides in the people and ALL government authority emanates from them.
(Emphasis supplied).

[As the source of all governmental power, it must be presumed that certain powers
are to be exercised by the people when it conflicts with any competence of a
constitutional organ like the judiciary or the COMELEC.)
[288]
 Rep. Act No. 9225 was approved on August 29, 2003.
[289]
 CONST. art. IV, sec. 3.
[290]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 4578, COMELEC Memorandum.
[291]
 Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 3.
[292]
 692 Phil. 407 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
[293]
 See Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, 692 Phil. 407 (2012) [Per
J. Reyes, En Banc].
[294]
 The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the
provisions are now substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that the
present Constitution provides clarity for "natural born" status. For comparison, the
1935 provisions state:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines.

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner

provided by law.
[295]
 C.J. Warren, Dissenting Opinion in Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
[296]
 Go v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. 202809, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 138,
149 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing BERNAS, THE 1987
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A
COMMENTARY (2009 ed.).
[297]
 Id.
[298]
 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 464-470 (2004) [Per J.
Vitug, En Banc].
[299]
 Id. at 464.
[300]
 Id. at 465.
[301]
 Id.
[302]
 Id. at 465-466, citing The Civil Code of Spain, art. 17.
[303]
 Id. at 466-467, citing RAMON M. VELAYO, PHILIPPHINE CITIZENSHIP
AND NATURALIZATION, 22-23 (1965).
[304]
 Id. at 467.
[305]
 Id. at 466, citing RAMON M. VELAYO, PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND
NATURALIZATION 22-23 (1965).
[306]
 The Philippine Bill of 1902 is otherwise known as the Philippine Organic Act
of 1902.
[307]
 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 PhiL 421,467-468 (2004) [Per J.
Vitug, En Banc).
[308]
 Id. at 468.
[309]
 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En
Banc].
[310]
 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421,469 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En
Banc].
[311]
 Id.
[312]
 CONST. (1935), art. III, sec. I.
[313]
 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 469 (2004) [Per J. Vitug,
En Banc].
[314]
 CONST. (1973), art. III, secs. 1 and 2.
[315]
 See, for example, Philippine Bill of 1902, sec. I, which provides that the
highest positions were to be filled through appointment by the United States
President:

Section 1. That the action of the President of the United States in creating the
Philippine Commission and authorizing said Commission to exercise the powers
of government to the extent and in the manner and fonn and subject to the
regulation and control set forth in the instructions of the President to the Philippine
Commission, dated April seventh, nineteen hundred, and in creating the offices of
Civil Governor and Vice-Governor of the Philippine Islands, and authorizing said
Civil Governor and Vice Governor to exercise the powers of govefllment to the
extent and in the manner and tonn set torth in the Executive Order dated June
twenty-first, nineteen hundred and one, and in establishing tour Executive
Departments of government in said Islands as set forth in the Act of the Philippine
Commission, entitled "An Act providing an organization for the Departments of
the Interior, of Commerce and Police, of Finance and Justice, and of Public
Instruction," enacted September sixth, nineteen hundred and one, is hereby
approved, ratified, and confirmed, and until otherwise provided by law the said
Islands shall continue to be governed as thereby and herein provided, and all laws
passed hereafter by the Philippine Commission shall have an enacting clause as
follows. "By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Commission." The provisions of section eighteen hundred and ninety-one of the
Revised Statutes of eighteen hundred and seventy-eight shall not apply to the
Philippine Islands.

Future appointments of Civil Governor, Vice-Governor, members of said

Commission and heads of Executive Departments shall be made by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
[316]
 CONST. (1973), art. Ill, sec. 4.
[317]
 See Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The
Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1968).
[318]
 Id. at 3-4.
[319]
 Id. at 5.
[320]
 409 Phil. 633 (200 I) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[321]
 Id. at 651.
[322]
 Id. at 656.
[323]
 See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 5 provides:

SECTION 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person desiring to acquire

Philippine citizenship under this Act shall file with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created under Section 6 hcrcot: a petition of five (5) copies legibly
typed and signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the latter's passport-
sized photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and setting forth the
following:
....
Com. Act No. 473, sec.7 provides:

SECTION 7. Petition for Citizenship. - Any person desiring to acquire Philippine

citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied
by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his
present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his
birth; whether single or married and if the father of children, the name, age,
birthplace and residence of the wife and of the children; the approximate date of
his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he
remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the
qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not
disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has
complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the tiling of the petition up to the
time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the
applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two
credible persons, stating that they arc citizens of the Philippines and personally
know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and
that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of
this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and post-office addresses of
such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case.
The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the
petition.
[324]
 See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section,
any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the following
qualifications:

(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of
tiling of his/her petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying
principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the
community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in
any public school or private educational institution duly recognized by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history,
government and civics arc taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum
and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That
should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them
in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if
he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but
arc unable to practice their profession because they arc disqualified to do so by
reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the
dialects of the Philippines;
and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino
people.

Comm. Act No. 473, scc. 2 provides:

SECTION 2. Qualifications. - Subject to section four of this Act, any person

having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:

First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing
of the petition;

Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not
less than ten years; / Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well
as with the community in which he is living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the
principal Philippine languages;

Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
[325]
 Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Disqualifications. -The following are not qualified to be naturalized
as Filipino citizens under this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) Those convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude;
(c) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(t) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of
such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the
right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Com. Act No. 473 (1939), sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Who are Disqualified. The following can not be naturalized as
Philippine citizens:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the
Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
[326]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 4627, COMELEC Memorandum.
[327]
 Id. at 4636.
[328]
 Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 409 Phil. 633 (2001)
[Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[329]
 Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 2.
[330]
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 ( 1991) [Per
C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
[331]
 CONST., art. VII, sec. 2 provides:
ARTICLE VII. Executive Department
....
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election.
[332]
 CONST., art. VII, sec. 3.
[333]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 3 provides:

ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department

....
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able
to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
[334]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 6 provides:

ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department

....
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.
[335]
 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7(1) provides:

ARTICLE VIII. Judicial Department

....
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A
Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.
[336]
 CONST., art. IX-B, sec. 1(1) provides:
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions
....
B. The Civil Service Commission

SECTION l. (I) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity tor public administration, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment.
[337]
 CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 1(1) provides:
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions
....
C. The Commission on Elections
SECTION 1. (I) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates tor any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereot:including the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
[338]
 CONST., art. IX-D, sec. 1(1) provides:

ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions

....
D. Commission on Audit
SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman
and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and,
at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-tive years of age, certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law tor at least ten years,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same profession.
[339]
 CoNST., art. XI, sec.8 provides:

ARTICLE XI. Accountability of Public Officers

....
SECTION 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of
recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and
must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding
election. The Ombudsman must have tor ten years or more been a judge or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
[340]
 CONST., art. XII, sec. 20 provides:

ARTICLE XII. National Economy and Patrimony

....
SECTION 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary
authority, the members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino
citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall
come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other
qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall
provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have
supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as
may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other
institutions performing similar functions.
[341]
 CONST., art. XIII, sec. 17(2) provides:

ARTICLE XIII. Social Justice and Human Rights

....
Human Rights
SECTION 17....

(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chainnan and four Members who
must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be
members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of
the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
[342]
 Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963), sec. 1. Section thirty-eight of Republic Act
Numbered Four hundred nine, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Eighteen
hundred sixty and Republic Act Numbered Three thousand ten, is further amended
to read as follows:

Sec. 38. The City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscals. - There shall be in the Oftice
of the City Fiscal one chief to be known as the City Fiscal with the rank, salary
and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, an assistant chief to be
known as the first assistant city fiscal, three second assistant city tiscals who shall
be the chiefs of divisions, and fifty-seven assistant fiscals, who shall discharge
their duties under the general supervision of the Secretary of Justice. To be
eligible for appointment as City Fiscal one must be a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and must have practiced law in the Philippines for a period of not less
than ten years or held during a like period of an office in the Philippine
Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requisite. To be eligible for appointment as assistant fiscal one must be a natural
born citizen of the Philippines and must have practiced law for at least five years
prior to his appointment or held during a like period an office in the Philippine
Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requisite. (Emphasis supplied)
[343]
 Rep. Act No. 3537 ( 1963).
[344]
 Examples of these are: the Land Transportation Office Commissioner, the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director, the Executive Director of Bicol River
Basin, the Board Member of the Energy Regulatory Commission, and the National
Youth Commissioner, among others.
[345]
 Examples of these are pharmacists and officers of the Philippine Coast Guard,
among others.
[346]
 Among these incentives are state scholarships in science and certain
investment rights.
[347]
 Sameer v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/august2014/170139.pdf> 18 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[348]
 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939) [Per J. Moran, First Division].
[349]
 Section 4(b).
[350]
 Ratified on August 21, 2000.
[351]
 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of
the Child <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4〈=en>
(visited March 7, 2016).
[352]
 Ratified on October 23, 1986.
[353]
 See Bayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 657-660 (2000) [Per J. Buena, En Banc],
citing the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties.
[354]
 561 Phil. 386 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
[355]
 Id. at 397-398.
[356]
 Rep. Act No. 8552 (1998), sec. 2(b) provides:
Section 2 (b). In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child,
his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets
set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN
Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare
of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally
and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall
provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for
every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned.
[357]
 See also Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), An Act Requiring the Certification of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to Declare a
"Child Legally Available tor Adoption" as a Prerequisite for Adoption
Proceedings, Amending for this Purpose Certain Provision of Rep. Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the Inter-country Adoption Act of 1995, Pres. Dec. No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and for Other Purposes.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.— As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

(1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency

charged to implement the provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority
to issue the certification declaring a child legally available for adoption.
....
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or
guardianship, or whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least
three (3) continuous months, which includes a foundling.
[358]
 DFA Order No. 11-97, Implementing Rules and Regulations for Rep. Act No.
9239 (1997), Philippine Passport Act.
[359]
 Pres. Decree No. 1986, sec. 2 provides:

Section 2. Composition; qualifications; benefits. - The BOARD shall be composed

of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all be
appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman,
and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (1) year,
unless sooner removed by the President for any cause; Provided, That they shall be
eligible for re-appointment after the expiration of their term. If the Chairman, or
the Vice-Chairman or any member of the BOARD fails to complete his term, any
person appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired portion of
the term ofthe BOARD member whom he succeeds.

No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral
character and standing in the community; Provided, That in the selection of the
members of the BOARD due consideration shall be given to such qualifications as
would produce a multi-sectoral combination of expertise in the various areas of
motion picture and television; Provided, further, That at least five (5) members of
the BOARD shall be members of the Philippine Bar. Provided, finally That at least
fifteen (15) members of the BOARD may come from the movie and television
industry to be nominated by legitimate associations representing the various
sectors of said industry.

The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the other members of the BOARD shall be
entitled to transportation, representation and other allowances which shall in no
case exceed FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) per month.
[360]
 571 Phil. 170 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
[361]
 Id. at 189-190.
[362]
 374 Phil. 810 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
[363]
 Id. at 822.
[364]
 See Lua v. O'Brien, et al., 55 Phil. 53 (1930) [Per J. Street, En Banc]; Vda. De
Laig, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 172 Phil. 283 (1978) [Per J. Makasiar, First
Division]; Baloloy v. Huller, G.R. No. 157767, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 80
[Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; and Heirs of Celestial v. Heirs of
Celestial, G.R. No. 142691, August 5, 2003, 408 SCRA 291 [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, First Division].
[365]
 Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel,
En Banc].
[366]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 5, Petition.
[367]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 4874, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[368]
 Id.
[369]
 Id.
[370]
 Id.
[371]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 4566, Annex C of the Solicitor General's
Memorandum, Certification issued on February 9, 2016 by the Philippine
Statistics Office, signed by Deputy National Statistician Estela T. De Guzman.
[372]
 CONST., art. VII, sec. 2.
[373]
 Fule v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785,797 (1976) [Per J. Martin, First
Division].
[374]
 KENNAN ON RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE 26, 31-35, as cited in In re:
Wilfred Uytengsu v. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890 (1954) [Per J.
Concepcion, En Banc].
[375]
 Id.
[376]
 Id.
[377]
 555 Phil. 115 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr, Second Division].
[378]
 Id. at 123-124.
[379]
 Id. at 601.
[380]
 Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453, 455-456 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En
Banc]; Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per
J. Kapunan, En Banc]; and Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 276 Phil. 758 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
[381]
 52 Phil. 645 (1928) [Per J. Villareal, En Banc].
[382]
 Id at 651.
[383]
 Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc).
[384]
 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 276 Phil. 758 (1991)
[Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
[385]
 Id at 792.
[386]
 Limbona v. Commission on Elections, 578 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
[387]
 73 Phil. 453 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
[388]
 Id. at 455-456, citing Nuval vs. Guray, 52 PhiL 645 (1928) [Per J. Villareal, En
Banc] and 17 Am. Jur., section 16, pp. 599-601.
[389]
 Limbona v. Commission on Elections, 578 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, En Banc]. Gender bias corrected.
[390]
 Ugroracion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 515 Phil. 253, 263 (2008) [Per. J.
Nachura, En Banc].
[391]
 Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 453 Phil. 586, 634-635 (2003) [Per J.
Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
[392]
 Ugroracion v. Commission on Elections, 575 Phil. 253, 264 (2008) [Per J.
Nachura, En Banc].
[393]
 Sabili v. Commission on Elections, 686 Phil. 649,701 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, En
Banc].
[394]
 In re Eusebio v. Eusebio, 100 Phil. 593,598 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En
Banc].
[395]
 Id.
[396]
 Id. at 598.
[397]
 Id. See also Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J.
Kapunan. En Banc].
[398]
 100 Phil. 593 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
[399]
 Id. at 598-599, citing I BEALE, THE CONFLICTS OF LAW 129.
[400]
 96 Phil. 294 (1956) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
[401]
 Id. at 300.
[402]
 J. Puno, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Macalintal v. Commission on
Elections, 453 Phil. 586, 719 (2003) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
[403]
 Romualdez- Marcos v. Commissio!l on Elections, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J.
Kapunan, En Banc].
[404]
 Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 453 Phil. 586 (2003) [Per J. Austria-
Martinez, En Banc].
[405]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 PhiL 329 (1995) [Per J.
Kapunan, En Banc].
[406]
 U.S. CONST, art. 2, sec. 1: "... No person except a natural born citizen, or a
citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall
be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that
office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen
Years a resident within the United States[.]"
[407]
 U.S. CONST, art. 2, sec. 1: "... No person except a natural born citizen, or a
citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall
be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that
office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen
Years a resident within the United States[.]"
[408]
 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 1472-
1473 (1833).
[409]
 Id.
[410]
 Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, Sections 13 - Election and Qualification of
Senators.That the members of the Senate of the Philippines, except as herein
provided, shall be elected for terms of six and three years, as hereinafter provided,
by the qualified electors of the Philippines. Each of the senatorial districts defined
as hereinafter provided shall have the right to elect two senators. No person shall
be an elective member of the Senate of the Philippines who is not a qualified
elector and over thirty years of age, and who is not able to read and write either the
Spanish or English language, and who has not been a resident of the Philippines
for at least two consecutive years and an actual resident of the senatorial district
from which chosen for a period of at least one year immediately prior to his
election; and 14 Election and Qualifications of Representatives. That the members
of the House of Representatives shall, except as herein provided, be elected
triennially by the qualified electors of the Philippines. Each of the representative
districts hereinafter provided for shall have the right to elect one representative.
No person shall be an elective member of the House of Representatives who is not
a qualified elector and over twenty-five years of age, and who is not able to read
and write either the Spanish or English language, and who has not been an actual
resident of the district from which elected for at least one year immediately prior
to his election: Provided, That the members of the present Assembly elected on
the first Tuesday in June, nineteen hundred and sixteen, shall be the members of
the House of Representatives from their respective districts for the term expiring
in nineteen hundred and nineteen.
[411]
 Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, Section 21 (a).Title, appointment,
residence.-That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive
officer, whose official title shall be "The GovernorGeneral of the Philippine
Islands." He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate ofthe United States, and hold his office at the pleasure ofthe
President and until his successor is chosen and qualified. The Governor-General
shall reside in the Philippine Islands during his official incumbency, and maintain
his office at the seat of Government.
[412]
 LOC. GOV. CODE, sec. 39 provides:

SECTION 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or,
in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the

sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of
age on election day.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component

cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day.

(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or

sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.

(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.

(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of
age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
[413]
 Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
[414]
 Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 342, 345 (2000) [Per J.
Panganiban, En Banc].
[415]
 Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453,459 (2000) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
[416]
 Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 467 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En
Banc].
[417]
 Id. at 449.
[418]
 596 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
[419]
 Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 596 Phil. 354, 369-370 (2009) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
[420]
 Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/september2015/209835.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
[421]
 Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, 434 Phil. 861 (2002) [Per J. Mendoza,
En Banc].
[422]
 Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22,
2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/september2015/209835.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
[423]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J.
Kapunan, En Banc].
[424]
 578 Phil. 364 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
[425]
 Limbona v. COMELEC, 518 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En
Banc].
[426]
 Gallego v. Vera, 13 Phil. 453,456 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
[427]
 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[428]
 Id.
[429]
 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294,298 (1956) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
[430]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En
Banc].
[431]
 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294,298 (1956) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
[432]
 Limbona v. COMELEC, 578 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J. Ynares- Santiago,
En Banc]
[433]
 276 Phil. 758 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
[434]
 Id. at 794.
[435]
 636 Phil. 753 (20 I 0) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[436]
 See Mitra v. COMELEC, 636 Phil. 753 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[437]
 596 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Chieo-Nazario, En Banc].
[438]
 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[439]
 Id.
[440]
 Id.
[441]
 See Perez v. COMELEC, 375 Phil. 1106 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza,En Banc].
[442]
 See Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, 616 Phil. 167 (2009) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago,
En Banc].
[443]
 See Dumpit-Michelena v. COMELEC, 511 Phil. 720 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc].
[444]
 See Dumpit-Michelena v. COMELEC, 511 Phil. 720 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc].
[445]
 Sabili v. Commission on Elections, 686 Phil. 649 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, En
Banc].
[446]
 Id.
[447]
 See Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Chico- Nazario, En
Banc].
[448]
 Jalover v. Osmeña, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267,
284 [Per J. Brion, En Banc], citing Fernandez v. HRET, G.R. No. 187478,
December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
[449]
 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753--815 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En
Banc].
[450]
 Id.
[451]
 Id.
[452]
 Id.
[453]
 Id.
[454]
 Id. at 772.
[455]
 Id.
[456]
 Id.
[457]
 Id. at 789.
[458]
 Sabili v. Commission on Elections, 686 Phil. 649 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, En
Banc].
[459]
 Id. at 685.
[460]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697, Vol. V) p. 3667, COMELEC Comment.
[461]
 434 Phil. 861 (2002) [Per J.Mendoza, En Banc].
[462]
 See Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En
Banc].
[463]
 Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, September 22,
2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/september2015/209835.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
[464]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697, Vol. I), pp. 236-237, Resolution of the COMELEC
En Banc dated December 23, 2015.
[465]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700, Vol. I), pp. 372-373, Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc dated December 23, 2015.
[466]
 596 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
[467]
 Id. at 369-370.
[468]
 Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22,
2015, http://scjudiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/september2015/209835.pdf
[Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
[469]
 Id.
[470]
 See Department of Foreign Affairs, Visa Guidelines/Requirements
<http://www.dfa.gov.ph/guidelines- requirements> (visited March 7, 2016).
[471]
 RONGXING GUO, CROSS-BORDER MANAGEMENT: THEORY,
METHOD, AND APPLICATION 368 (2015).
[472]
 Id.
[473]
 See Department of Foreign Affairs, Visa Guidelines/Requirements
<http://www.dfa.gov.ph/guidelinesrequirements> (visited March 7, 2016).
[474]
 Section 50(j) references or distinguishes an "immigrant" from a
"nonimmigrant." This may tempt one into concluding that an "immigrant" must be
exclusively or wholly equated with a "permanent resident." However, the concept
of a nonimmigrant, provided in Section 9, also encompasses returning permanent
residents. Thus, a line cannot be drawn between "immigrants" and
"nonimmigrants" that exclusively and wholly equates an "immigrant" with a
"permanent resident." Section 9(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
states:

SEC. 9. Aliens departing from any place outside the Philippines, who are
otherwise admissible and who qualifY within one ofthe following categories, may
be admitted as nonimmigrants:

(e) A person previously lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent
residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad to an unrelinquished
residence in the Philippines; and
[475]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697, Vol. VI), pp. 4064-4065, Petitioner's
Memorandum, citing BJ Form V-I-011- Rev, Conversion to Non-Quota Immigrant
Visa of a Former Filipino Citizen Naturalize in a Foreign Country (taken from
www.immigration.gov.ph).
[476]
 Rep. Act No. 6768 (1989), sec. 2 provides:

SEC. 2. Definition ofTerms. - For purposes of this Act:

(a) The term "balikbayan" shall mean a Filipino citizen who has been continuously
out of the Philippines for a period of at least one (1) year, a Filipino overseas
worker, or former Filipino citizen and his or her family, as this term is defined
hereunder, who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to
the Philippines;
[477]
 Rep. Act No. 6768 (1989), sec. 2(a), as amended.
[478]
 G.R. No. 207264, October 22,2013, 708 SCRA 197 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
[479]
 Coquilla v. COMELEC, 434 Phil. 861,875 (2002) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[480]
 Id.
[481]
 Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354, 369-370 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario,
En Banc].
[482]
 Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522 [Per J.
Perez, En Banc].
[483]
 Id. at 543.
[484]
 Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22,
2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/september2015/209835.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
 
[485]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), pp.151-157, Petition.
[486]
 CONST., art. VII, sec. 4, par. 3 states: "Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election or President and Vice President shall be held on the second
Monday of May."
[487]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697, Vol. VI), p. 4016, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[488]
 Id. at 4017.
[489]
 Id.
[490]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-221700), p. 254, COMELEC First Division
Resolution (SPA Nos. 15 002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15 139 (DC)).
[491]
 Article 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless
in the service of the Republic.
[492]
 Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or
by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
[493]
 CONST., art. II, sec. 14.
[494]
 TSN, February 9, 2016 Oral Arguments, pp. 101-102.
[495]
 Id.
[496]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 4026, Petitioner's Memorandum.
[497]
 Id. at 21.
[498]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221698-700), p. 254.
[499]
 Id. at 4027.
[500]
 Id. at 4028.
[501]
 G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267 [Per J. Brion, En
Banc].
[502]
 Id. at 284.
[503]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 241, COMELEC Resolution dated December 23,
2015.
[504]
 See Elena Leones vda. de Miller v. Atty. Rolando Miranda, A.C. 8507,
November 10, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/november2015/8507.pdf> (Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First
Division].
[505]
 318 Phil. 329 {1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[506]
 Id. at 380.
[507]
 Id.
[508]
 375 Phil. 1106 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[509]
 Id.
[510]
 Id.at 1117-1119.
[511]
 Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, 478 Phil. 544, 558 (2004) [Per J. Carpio
Morales, Third Division].
[512]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, sec. 4.
[513]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329, 382 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan,
En Banc].
[514]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 29, Petition.
[515]
 Id. at 290.
[516]
 Id.
[517]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 4037, Petitioner's Memorandum. Emphasis
supplied.
[518]
 Mitra v. COMELEC, 636 Phil. 753,786 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[519]
 Id. at 788.
[520]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), p. 4047-4048.
[521]
 Id.
[522]
 Id.
[523]
 Id.
[524]
 Id.
[525]
 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[526]
 Id. at 377-378.

DISSENTING OPINION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

I dissent.

Amid the complexity of the legal issues and political implications involved, this
Court, in ruling on this matter - as in every other similar matter before it - must
always harken back to its parameters of review over rulings of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). It is on this basic but resolute premise that I submit this
dissent.

I.

In Mitra v. COMELEC[1] (Mitra), it was explained that "[t]he basis for the Court's
review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is Section 7, Article IX-A of the [1987] Constitution which provides that '[u]nless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty [(30)] days from receipt of a copy thereof.' For this
reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically
applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
This Rule e"pressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition
for certiorari, subject to the exception clause- 'except as hereinafter provided.'"[2]

"The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged

tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, any resort to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues."[3]

In Miranda v. Abaya,[4] this Court held that "an act of a court or tribunal may only
be considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility x x
x. An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate
jurisdiction is not the same as 'grave abuse of discretion.' An abuse of
discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of
certiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically x x x."[5]

In this case, the COMELEC held that petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares (petitioner) made false representations in her certificate of candidacy
(CoC) for President filed on October 15, 2015[6] (2015 CoC) when she declared
under oath that she is a natural-born citizen of this country and would be a resident
thereof for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day immediately
preceding the May 9, 2016 Elections.[7] Accordingly, the COMELEC cancelled
petitioner's CoC. [8]

Finding the verdict to be "deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root
to fruits,"[9] the ponencia nullifies the COMELEC's assailed rulings,[10] and even
goes to the extent of declaring petitioner as an eligible candidate.[11]

As to its first reason, the ponencia posits that the COMELEC, in ruling on a

petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC, is restrained "from going into the
issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such
issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority."[12] Consequently,
"(t]he COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate."[13]

I disagree.

The COMELEC's power to deny due course to or cancel a candidate's CoC stems
from Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which grants it the authority
to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall" and to "[d]ecide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x."
In Loong v. COMELEC,[14] it was elucidated that:
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) ofthe Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad
power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum[,] and recall." Undoubtedly, the
text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been
niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of
our elections.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Bedol v. COMELEC (Bedol):[16]
The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole
judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; x x x.[17] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Based on the text of the Constitution, and bearing in mind the import of cases on
the matter, there is no perceivable restriction which qualifies the exercise of the
COMELEC's adjudicatory power to declare a candidate ineligible and thus, cancel
his/her CoC with the need of a prior determination coming from a "proper
authority."

Contrary to the ponencia's interpretation, the COMELEC, under Rule 25 of its

Resolution No. 9523[18] dated September 25, 2012, may disqualify any
candidate found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution:
Rule 25 - Disqualification of Candidates

Section 1. Grounds. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by
the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is confounding that the ponencia ignores the second prong of the provision and
myopically zeroes-in on the first which but procedurally reflects the COMELEC's
power to disqualify a candidate already declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of any disqualification, such as those accessory to a criminal
conviction.[19]

As edified in Bedol, it is the COMELEC which is the "sole judge of all pre-
proclamation controversies."[20] Thus, it would greatly emasculate the
COMELEC's constitutionally-conferred powers by treating it as a mere
administrative organ relegated to the task of conducting perfunctory reviews only
to spot falsities on the face of CoCs or ministerially enforce declarations from a
prior authority.

As in this case, a "pre-proclamation controversy" may arise from a petition to deny

due course to or cancel a CoC. This remedy - which is filed before and falls under
the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the COMELEC is governed by Section 78, Article
IX of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines"[21] (OEC):
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74[22] hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As worded, a Section 78 petition is based exclusively on the ground that a CoC
contains a material representation that is false. "The false representation
contemplated by Section 78 of the [OEC] pertains to [a] material fact, and is not
simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate's qualification
for elective office such as one's citizenship and residence." [23]

While there are decided cases wherein this Court has stated that "a false
representation under Section 78 must consist of 'a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible,"'[24] nowhere does the proviSion mention this requirement. In Tagolino
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tri?unal (Tagolino),[25] this Court
enunciated that:
[T]he deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one's intent to defraud, is
of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's
declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation,
jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any
deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of
whether one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What remains material is
that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on
the basis of one's ineligibility and that the same be granted without any
qualification.[26] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Albeit incorporating the intent requirement into their respective discussions, a
survey of certain cases decided after Tagolino only prove to demonstrate the "bare
significance" of the said requisite.

For instance, in Villafuerte v. COMELEC,[27] this Court echoed precedent, when it

stated that "a false representation under Section 78" must be made "with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public
office."[28] However, this Court never looked into the circumstances that
surrounded the candidate's representation. Instead, it equated deliberateness of
representation with the materiality of the fact being represented in the CoC. Thus,
it held therein that "respondent's nickname 'LRAY JR. MIGZ' written in his COC
is [not] a material misrepresentation," reasoning that the nickname "cannot be
considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to
run for public office."[29]

In Hayudini v. COMELEC,[30] this Court, while dealing with a case that involved

material representations pertaining to residency and voter registration, did not
discuss the circumstances which would demonstrate the intent of the candidate
behind his CoC representations. It again parroted precedent without any devoted
discussion on the matter of intent.[31]

Similarly, in Jalover v. Osmeña[32] (Jalover) this Court just repeated precedent

when it said that "[s]eparate from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under Section 78 must consist of a 'deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible,"[33] but did not apply the same. In fact, a closer scrutiny of Jalover,
which cited Mitra, would lead to the reasonable conclusion that jurisprudence has
all the while presumed deliberateness of intent from the materiality of the falsity.
The quoted passage from Mitra reads: "[t]he deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of
any material falsity x x x."[34] The "separateness" of the requirement of intent from
the requisite of materiality is hence, more apparent than real. The bottom line
according to Jalover, citing Mitra, is that "a candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run."[35]

This statement therefore demonstrates that the intent requirement is but a fictional
superfluity, if not anomaly, which is actually devoid of its own conceptual
relevance. As such, its existence in jurisprudence only serves as a perplexing, if
not, hazardous, mirage.

In the more recent case of Agustin v. COMELEC,[36] this Court, while again

quoting the same passages from Mitra, upheld "the declaration by the COMELEC
En Banc" - which was, by the way, acting on a Section 78 petition- "that [therein]
petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municpality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte" on the ground that he "effectively repudiated his oath of
renunciation" by the use of his US passport and, thus, "reverted him to his earlier
status as a dual citizcn."[37]  Interestingly, this Court, consistent with the above-
cited passage from Tagolino, stated that "[e]ven if it made no finding that the
petitioner deliberately attempted to mislead or misinform as to warrant the
cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC could still declare him disqualified for
not meeting the required eligibility under the Local Government Code."[38]

Again, the plain text of Section 78 reads that the remedy is based "on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false." It pertains to a material representation that is false and not a
"material misrepresentation." In my view, the latter is a semantic but impactful
misnomer which tends to obfuscate the sense of the provision as it suggests- by
employing the word "misrepresent," ordinarily understood to mean as "to give a
false or misleading representation of usually with an intent to deceive or be
unfair"[39] - that intent is crucial in a Section 78 petition, when, in fact, it is not.

Notably, the Dissenting Opinion of former Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante
O. Tinga (Justice Tinga) in Tecson v. COMELE[40] (Tecson) explains the
irrelevance of the candidate's intention or belief in ruling on a Section 78 petition.
There, he even pointed out the jurisprudential missteps in the cases of Romualdez-
Marcos v. COMELEC[41] (Romualdez-Marcos) and Salcedo II v.
COMELEC[42] (Salcedo II) wherein the phantom requirement of "deliberate
intention to mislead" was first foisted:
[I]n accordance with Section 78, supra, the petitioner in a petition to deny due
course (to or] cancel a certificate of candidacy need only prove three
elements. First, there is a representation contained in the certificate of
candidacy. Second, the representation is required under Section 74. Third, the
representation must be "material," which, according to jurisprudence, means that it
pertains to the eligibility of the candidate to the office. Fourth, the representation
is false.

Asserting that proof of intent to conceal is also necessary for a petition under
Section 78 to prosper, Mr. Justice Kapunan wrote in Romualdez-Marcos v.
[COMELEC], thus:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
[C]onstitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification. [Italics in the original]
The Court, reiterated the Kapunan pronouncement in Salcedo II v. [COMELEC].

Adverting to Romualdez-Marcos and Salcedo II, the COMELEC En Banc ruled

that while the element of materiality was not in question the intent to deceive was
not established, not even the knowledge of falsity, thus:
Undeniably, the question on the citizenship [of] respondent falls within the
requirement of materiality under Section 78. However, proof of misrepresentation
with a deliberate attempt to mislead must still be established. In other words,
direct and substantial evidence showing that the person whose certificate of
candidacy is being sought to be cancelled or denied due course, must have known
or have been aware of the falsehood as appearing on his certificate. [Italics in the
original]
The pronouncements in Romualdez-Marcos and Salcedo II, however, are clearly
not supported by a plain reading of the law. Nowhere in Section 78 is it stated or
implied that there be an intention to deceive for a certificate of candidacy to
be denied due course or be cancelled. All the law requires is that the "material
representation contained [in the certificate of candidacy] as required under Section
74 x x x is false." Be it noted that a hearing under Section 78 and Rule 23 is a
quasi-judicial proceeding where the intent of the respondent is irrelevant. Also
drawing on the principles of criminal law for analogy, the "offense" of material
representation is malum prohibitum not malum in se. Intent is irrelevant. When the
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation
or construction, but only for application.

The reason for the irrelevance of intent or belief is not difficult to divine.
Even if a candidate believes that he is eligible and purports to be so in his
certificate of candidacy, but is subsequently proven in a Rule 23 proceeding
to be, in fact or in law, not eligible, it would be utterly foolish to allow him to
proceed with his candidacy. The electorate would be merely squandering its
votes for - and the COMELEC, its resources in counting the ballots cast in
favor of-a candidate who is not, in any case, qualified to hold public office.

The Kapunan pronouncement in the Romualdez-Marcos case did not establish a

doctrine. It is not supported bv law, and it smacks of judicial legislation.
Moreover, such judicial legislation becomes even more egregious[,] considering
that it arises out of the pronouncement of only one Justice, or 6% of a Supreme
Court. While several other Justices joined Justice Kapunan in upholding the
residence qualification of Rep. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they did not share his
dictum. It was his by his lonesome. Justice Puno had a separate opinion, concurred
in by Justices Bellosillo and Melo. Justice Mendoza filed a separate opinion too, in
which Chief Justice Narvasa concurred. Justices Romero and Francisco each had
separate opinions. Except for Chief Justice Narvasa and Justice Mendoza, the
Justices in the majority voted to grant Rep. [Marcos's] petition on the ground that
she reestablished her domicile in Leyte upon being widowed by the death of
former President Marcos.

On the other hand, the reiteration of the Kapunan pronouncement in Salcedo is

a mere obiter dictum. The Court dismissed the disqualification case on the ground
that the respondent's use of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy
is not a material representation since the entry does not refer to her qualification
for elective office. Being what it is, the Salcedo obiter cannot elevate
the Kapunan pronouncement to the level of a doctrine regardless of how many
Justices voted for Salcedo. Significantly, Justice Puno concurred in the result only.

Thus, in this case, it does not matter that respondent knows that he was not a
natural-born Filipino citizen and, knowing such fact, proceeded to state otherwise
in his certificate of candidacy, with an intent to deceive the electorate. A
candidate's citizenship eligibility in particular is determined by law, not by
his good faith. It was, therefore, improper for the COMELEC to dismiss the
petition on the ground that petitioner failed to prove intent to mislead on the part
of respondent.[43] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
I could not agree more with Justice Tinga's exposition. Truly, "[n]owhere in
Section 78 is it stated or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a
certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled." [44] At the risk of
belaboring the point, the candidate's intent to mislead or misinform on a material
fact stated in his/her CoC is of no consequence in ruling on a Section 78 petition.
To premise a Section 78 petition on a finding of intent or belief would create a
legal vacuum wherein the COMELEC becomes powerless under the OEC to
enjoin the candidacy of ineligible presidential candidates upon a mere showing
that the material representations in his/her CoC were all made in good faith. It
should be emphasized that "[a] candidate's citizenship eligibility in particular is
determined by law, not by his good faith."[45] With this, the Romulaldez
Marcos and Salcedo II rulings which "judicially legislated" this requirement
should, therefore, be abandoned as legal aberrations.

Neither is it acceptable to think that the matter of eligibility particularly, that of a

candidate for President - can only be taken up before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) after a candidate has already been voted for. The COMELEC's
constitutional mandate cannot be any clearer: it is empowered to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall" and to "[d]ecide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x."[46] As observed
by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his own opinion in Tecson:
This broad constitutional power and function vested in the COMELEC is designed
precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without
any legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen,
like Arnold [Schwarzenegger], runs for President, the COMELEC is certainly not
powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no
need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified. [47]
Verily, we cannot tolerate an absurd situation wherein a presidential candidate,
who has already been determined by the COMELEC to have missed a particular
eligibility requirement and, thus, had made a false representation in his/her CoC
by declaring that he/she is eligible, is still allowed to continue his/her candidacy,
and eventually be voted for. The proposition[48] that the matter of eligibility should
be left to the PET to decide only after the elections is a dangerous one for not only
does it debase the COMELEC's constitutional powers, it also effectively results in
a mockery of the electoral process, not to mention the disenfranchisement of the
voters. Clearly, the votes of the Filipino people would be put to waste if we
imprudently take away from the COMELEC its capability to avert the fielding of
ineligible candidates whose votes therefor shall be only considered stray. The
Filipino people deserve to know prior to the elections if the person they intend to
vote for is ineligible. In all reasonable likelihood, they would not have cast their
votes for a particular candidate who would just be ousted from office later on.

At any rate, the jurisdictional boundaries have already been set: the COMELEC's
jurisdiction ends, and that of the PET begins, only when a candidate therefor has
already been elected, and thereafter, proclaimed.[49] In Tecson, this Court explained
that the PET's jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
limited only to a post-election scenano:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

xxxx
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election
scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April
1992, would support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. -The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an

election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-
President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A
petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.

Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number
of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case
may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President," of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section
4, paragraph 7, [Article VII] of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.[50] (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, I respectfully object to the ponencia's enfeebling take on the COMELEC's
power to determine the eligibility of a candidate prior to the elections.

In fact, the ponencia's view is also inconsistent with its declaration that petitioner

is "QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local
Elections of 9 May 2016."[51] If the COMELEC had no power to determine the
eligibility of petitioner, then this Court - which is only tasked to exercise its power
of review under the parameters of a petition for certiorari and, thus, should have
either nullified or affirmed the assailed rulings - could not proceed and assume
jurisdiction outside of the context of the case before it and make this ad
hoc pronouncement. The declaration not only serves to confuse the true powers of
the COMELEC, it also distorts the manner of our review.
 II.

The central question in this case, to which the analysis of grave abuse of discretion
is applied, is whether or not the representations of petitioner regarding her
residency - particularly, that she would be a resident of this country for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months on the day immediately preceding the May 9, 2016
Elections - and her citizenship particdarly, that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in her 2015 CoC are false. Notably, a finding of falsity even as to one
representation would already be enough for the COMELEC to deny due course to
or cancel her 2015 CoC. To recount, Section 74- to which the false representation
ground under Section 78 of the OEC relates to- provides that "[t]he certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the
office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office x x x." A candidate is
eligible to run for the post of President for as long as he or she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and a resident thereof for at least ten (10) years
immediately preceding the elections, among other requirements. These citizenship
and residency requirements are delineated in Section 2, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution:
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election.
All of the requirements must concur. Otherwise, the candidate is ineligible to run
for President; and, hence, a contrary declaration therefor, already amounts to a
false material representation within the ambit of Section 78 of the OEC.

On the issue of residency, the ponencia claims that the COMELEC gravely abused

its discretion in concluding that petitioner falsely represented in her 2015 CoC that
she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 Elections as, in fact, it found her
representation to be true.[52] In so finding, the ponencia gave credence to the
voluminous and undisputed evidence which petitioner presented showing that she
and her family abandoned their US domicile and relocated to the Philippines for
good, which began on her arrival on May 24, 2005.[53] It also pointed out that
petitioner's entry in the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan should not be taken
against her since, consistent with the purpose of the law, she actually reestablished
life here.[54] Finally, the ponencia disregarded petitioner's prior statement in her
2012 CoC for Senator wherein she declared to be a resident of the Philippins for
six years (6) years and six (6) months before May 13, 2013, thus implying that she
started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006.[55]

I beg to differ.

"To successfully effect a change of domicile[,] one must demonstrate an actual

removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual."[56]
In ruling that petitioner failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines on May
24, 2005 as she claimed, the COMELEC primarily observed that all of the
evidence presented by petitioner were executed before July 2006, which is the date
of reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship. Citing the cases of Coquilla v.
COMELEC (Coquilla),[57] Jafzon v. COMELEC (Japzon),[58] and Caballero v.
COMELEC (Caballero),[59] the COMELEC pronounced that the earliest possible
date that she could have reestablished her residence in the Philippines was when
she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in July 2006.

In Coquilla, the Court ruled that an alien, such as petitioner, may waive his/her
status as a non-resident and thus, become a resident alien by obtaining an
immigrant visa under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence. Prior to this waiver, he/she is a visitor, a non-resident
alien.[60] Hence, without this waiver, petitioner remained to be a visitor or a non-
resident alien until July 2006.

On the other hand, in Japzon, the Court declared that reacquisition under Republic
Act No. (RA) 9225,[61] otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003," has no automatic impact on a candidate's domicile as
he/she only had the option to again establish his/her domicile.[62]

Meanwhile, in Caballero, this Court held that a candidate must still prove that
after becoming a Philippine citizen, he/she had reestablished his new domicile of
choice.[63]

To my mind, the COMELEC's reliance on Coquilla is apt. As the records disclose,

petitioner returned to the Philippines on May 24, 2005 under the Balikbayan
Program,[64] and therefore, only obtained the status of a temporary resident.
Specifically, Section 3 ofRA 6768,[65] as amended by RA 9174,[66] merely accorded
her the benefit of visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year:
Section 3. Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. - The balikbayan and his or
her family shall be entitled to the following benefits and privileges:
xxxx

(c) Visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year for foreign
passport holders, with the exception of restricted nationals[.] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As such, since she did not waive her status of being a non-resident alien, her stay
here upon her return on May 24, 2005 up until she reacquired Philippine
citizenship in July 2006 should only be considered as temporary.

While it is not entirely indispensable that one first acquires the status of a
permanent resident in order to reestablish his/her domicile in the Philippines, it is,
nonetheless, highly indicative of his/her animus manendi and animus non
revertendi. While it is undisputed that petitioner resigned from her work in the US
in 2004; acquired, together with her husband, quotations and estimates from
property movers regarding the relocation of all their goods, furniture, and cars
from the US to the Philippines as early as March 2005; enrolled two (2) of her
children in Philippine Schools for the school year 2005 to 2006; and purchased a
condominium unit in the Philippines in the second half of 2005,[67] petitioner never
bothered applying for permanent residency up until July 2006,[68] which is the date
when she reacquired Filipino citizenship under RA 9225, and consequently,
waived her status as a non-resident alien. This means that from her return on May
24, 2005 up until July 2006, she, despite the above-mentioned overt acts, stayed in
the Philippines only as a temporary resident. If at all, her inattention to legitimize
her so-called "permanent residence" in the Philippines in accordance with our
Immigration Laws stamps a significant question mark on her animus
manendi and animus non revertendi on May 24, 2005. Thus, the COMELEC can
hardly be blamed from reaching its ruling as petitioner's intention to permanently
reside in the Philippines and to abandon the US as her domicile on May 24, 2005
were, based on reasonable premises, shrouded in doubt.

At any rate, the overt acts on which petitioner premises her claims are insufficient
to prove her animus manendi and animus non-revertendi. In fact, same as her
failure to promptly address her permanent residency status, some of these overt
acts might even exhibit her ambivalence to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines on May 24, 2005. For instance, while she purchased a condominium
unit in the Philippines in the second half of 2005 (which period is even past May
24, 2005), records unveil that petitioner had other real properties in the US, one of
which was purchased in 1992 and another in 2008.[69] Relevantly, these dates are
before and after May 24, 2005. Likewise, petitioner's correspondence with the
property movers in the US in the first half of 2005 falters, in light of the fact that
she and her husband commenced actual negotiations for their transfer only in the
following year, or in January 2006, months after May 24, 2005.[70] Similarly, after
this date, it was only in March 2006 when petitioner's husband informed the US
Postal Service of a change of address, without even specifying their new address
in the Philippines.[71] While it is true that the visa-free entry of petitioner under
the Balikbayan Program should not automatically hinder her ability to as
the ponencia would say - "reestablish her life here," it remains that the parameters
of domicile reestablishment under the auspices of political law have not been
clearly proven. Hence, because all the overt acts prior to that time had no impact in
establishing her animus manendi and animus non revertendi, the earliest date that
petitioner could have reestablished her residence was in July 2006. The overall
conclusion of the COMELEC was therefore correct.

At this juncture, let me express my assent to the view that "[s]tronger proof is
required in the reestablishment of national domicile."[72] This is because a person
who has been domiciled in another country has already established effective legal
ties with that country that are substantially distinct and separate from ours. Such a
situation hardly obtains when what is involved is the change of domicile between
localities within the same country.

I further observe that the need for stronger proof becomes more apparent when the
person involved is one who has been domiciled in another country as part of
his/her naturalization as a citizen therein. As such, while citizenship and residency
are different from and independent of each other - this, being the key premise in
the Court's rulings in Japzon and Caballero I do believe that "one may invariably
affect the other."[73] Being still a citizen of the US at the time of her return to the
Philippines on May 24, 2005, petitioner remained entitled to the rights, privileges,
and the protection the US government extends to its nationals, including the right
to residence. In fact, from May 24, 2005 to October 20, 2010, petitioner availed of
this privilege when she returned to the US, on separate dates, significantly, for no
less than five times.[74] To my mind, the ability to enjoy the privileges of foreign
citizenship at any time, while remaining under that status, conjures a reasonable
presumption that the latter continues to avail of these privileges, which, among
others, include the privilege to reside in that foreign country. Hence, absent
compelling evidence to show that he/she had reestablished domicile in another
country, it should therefore be presumed that he/she continues to be domiciled in
the country he/she is a citizen of.

Moreover, the necessity of presenting stronger proof as herein discussed is

impelled by the very reason underlying the residency requirement.[75] The
discernment of pervading realities in the place where one seeks to be elected is
objectively farther from a person who has been domiciled in a foreign country.
Thus, a higher standard of proof should be applied to a candidate previously
domiciled in a foreign country for he/she has been out of touch with the needs of
the electoral constituency he/she seeks to represent.

For another, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for relying on petitioner's admission
in her 2012 CoC for Senator that her period of residence from May 13, 2013 is "6
years and 6 months," which, hence, implies that she started being a Philippine
resident only in November 2006. While it is true that "[i]t is the fact of residence,
not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the [C]onstitution's
residency qualification requirement,"[76] the COMELEC cannot be said to gravely
abuse its discretion when it considered petitioner's admission against interest as
another circumstance which militates against her claim's legitimacy. It is certainly
not patent and grave error for the COMELEC to regard a CoC as a notarized
document and accord it the presumption of regularity.[77] Also, while petitioner
may later impugn an admission against interest, the COMELEC found that her
residency declaration in her 2012 CoC could not be borne out of an "honest
mistake," in light of the following considerations: (a) the bulk, if not all, of the
evidence she presented were executed before she reacquired her Philippine
citizenship, which cannot be done in light of Coquilla, among others; (b) while she
made statements acknowledging that there was a mistake in her 2015 CoC, they
were nonetheless delivered at a time when, at the very least, the possibility of her
running for President was already a matter of public knowledge; and (c) petitioner
was a well-educated woman and a high-ranking official with a competent staff and
a band of legal advisers and is not entirely unacquainted with Philippine politics,
and thus, would know how to fill-up a pro-forma CoC in 2012. As I see it, these
reasons are not barren of any considerable merit. At the very least, they are
plausible enough to negate the finding that the conclusion amounted to grave
abuse of discretion. Besides, I believe that the falsity of the material representation
already justifies the cancellation of petitioner's CoC. As above-intimated, a
candidate's intent is immaterial to a Section 78 analysis.

III.

Neither did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that petitioner
made a false material representation in her 2015 CoC when she declared that she
was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

I depart from the ponencia's stand that petitioner's blood relationship with a

Filipino citizen is demonstrable on account of statistical probability, and other
circumstantial evidence, namely, her abandonment as an infant in a Roman
Catholic Church in Iloilo City, as well as her typical Filipino features.[78]
A run-through of the basic tenets on citizenship is apropros.

"There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen."[79]

"A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof."[80] As defined under the present
Constitution, "[n]atural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without havinto perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."[81] "On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those
who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization X X X."[82]

"[I]t is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself and
according to its own constitution and laws what classes of persons shall be entitled
to its citizenship x x x."[83] With respect to citizenship by birth, a particular
jurisdiction generally subscribes to either the principle of jus sanguinis or the
principle of jus soli, although it may adopt a mixed system with features ofboth.

"The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.

Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless
of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth." [84] In Valles v.
COMELEC, this Court held that "[t]he signing into law of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution has established the principle ofjus sanguinis as basis for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship x x x. So also, the principle of jus
sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship,  was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions."[85] Following this
principle, proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent is therefore necessary to
show that one is a Filipino citizen by birth.

In this case, petitioner has shown no evidence of blood relation to a Filipino parent
to prove that she acquired Filipino citizenship by birth under the jus
sanguinis principle. While petitioner did not bear the initial burden of proving that
she made a false material representation on her citizenship in her 2015 CoC, as
that burden belonged to those who filed the petitions to deny due course to or
cancel her CoC before the COMELEC,[86] the burden of evidence shifted to
her[87] when she voluntarily admitted her status as a foundling. Under Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which governs petitioner's case,[88] foundlings
are not included in the enumeration of who are considered as Filipino citizens:

Section 1. The following are citizens ofthe Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
A '"foundling' refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose parents,
guardian or relatives are unknown; or a child committed to an orphanage or
charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and parentage and
registered in the Civil Register as a 'foundling."'[89] The fact that a candidate's
parents are unknown directly puts into question his/her Filipino citizenship
because the candidate has no prima facie link to a Filipino parent from which
he/she could have traced her Filipino citizenship. This is why the burden of
evidence shifted to petitioner.

Without any proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent, and without any mention
in the 1935 Constitution that foundlings are considered or are even presumed to be
Filipino citizens by birth, the COMELEC's finding that petitioner was not a
natural-born citizen cannot be taken as patently unreasonable and grossly baseless
so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. As it is apparent, the COMELEC,
with good reason, relied on the plain text of the 1935 Constitution based on the
statutory construction axioms of expressio unius est exclusio alterius[90] and verba
legis non est recedendum,[91] as well as firmly abided by the jus sanguinis principle
which, as repeatedly stated, necessitates proof of blood relation, of which
petitioner presented none. Accordingly, its analysis was grounded on sound legal
basis and therefore unreflective of grave abuse of discretion.

Further, while petitioner argues that foundlings should be considered as natural-

born Filipinos based on the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution,[92] it
should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it was adopted in its final
form, never carried over any proposed provision on foundlings being considered
or presumed to be Filipino citizens. Its final exclusion is therefore indicative of the
framers' prevailing intent. Besides, in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive
Secretary,[93] this Court remarked that:
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it [is] safer to construe the constitution
from what appears upon its face."[94] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
I also find no merit in petitioner's invocation of international covenants[95] which
purportedly evince a generally accepted principle in international law that
foundlings are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. Since
the 1935 Constitution, and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions thereafter, consistently
subscribe to the jus sanguinis principle, it is axiomatic that no international
agreement or generally-accepted principle of international law  even assuming that
there is a binding one which supports petitioner's averred presumption - could
contravene the same. "Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation."[96] Thus, in our legal hierarchy, treaties and international principles
belong to the same plane as domestic laws and, hence, cannot prevail over the
Constitution.

Finally, I oppose petitioner's resort to statistical probability as basis to presume

natural-born citizenship in this case. Allow me to point out that these statistics
surfaced only in the proceedings before this Court and hence, could not have been
weighed and assessed by the COMELEC En Banc at the time it rendered its
ruling. Be that as it may, the constitutional requirements for office, especially for
the highest office in the land, cannot be based on mere probability. "[M]atters
dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied
with."[97] The proof to hurdle a substantial challenge against a candidate's
qualifications must therefore be solid. We cannot make a definitive
pronouncement on a candidate's citizenship when there is a looming possibility
that he/she is not Filipino. Also, the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
abandonment, as well as her physical characteristics, hardly assuage this
possibility. By parity of reasoning, they do not prove that she was born to a
Filipino: her abandonment in the Philippines is just a restatement of her foundling
status, while her physical features only tend to prove that her parents likely had
Filipino features and yet it remains uncertain if their citizenship was Filipino.

For all of these reasons, I dissent to the majority's ruling that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion. In the final analysis, my conscience reminds me that
the high duty demanded of me - to apply the law according to the parameters set
by our previous rulings transcends politics or controversy, popularity or
personality. It is a public trust which values nothing higher than fidelity to the
Constitution. I, therefore, vote to DISMISS the petitions.

[1]
 648 Phil. 165 (2010).
[2]
 Id. at 182, citing Pates v. COMELEC, 609 Phil. 260, 265 (2009); emphasis and
underscoring  supplied.
[3]
 Ocate v. COMELEC, 537 Phil. 584, 594-595 (2006); emphasis and underscoring
supplied.
[4]
 Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642 (1999).
[5]
 Id. at 663; emphases and underscoring supplied, citations omitted.
[6]
 See COMELEC En Banc's Resolutions dated December 23, 2015 in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 229; and in SPA Nos. 15-002
(DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC), rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, p.
356.
[7]
  See discussions in COMELEC Second Division's Resolution dated December
1, 2015 in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, P·206-211; and
in COMELEC First Division's Resolution dated December 11, 2015 in SPA Nos.
15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC), rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol.
I, pp. 251-258.
[8]
  See COMELEC En Banc's Resolutions dated December 23, 2015 in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 258; and in SPA Nos. 15-002
(DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC), rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, p.
381.
[9]
 Ponencia, p. 44.
[10]
 The assailed rulings are as follows: (a) COMELEC Second Division's
Resolution dated December 1, 2015 in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), rollo (G.R. No.
221697), Vol. I, pp. 190-223; (b) COMELEC En Banc's Resolution dated
December 23,2015 in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp.
224-259; (c) COMELEC First Division's Resolution dated December 11,2015 in
SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC), rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-
700), Vol. I, pp. 216-264; and (d) COMELEC En Banc's Resolution dated
December 23,2015 in SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC), and 15-139
(DC), rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, pp. 352-381.
[11]
 See ponencia, p. 45.
[12]
 Id. at 16.
[13]
 Id.
[14]
 365 Phil. 386 (1999).
[15]
 Id. at 419-420.
[16]
 621 Phil. 498 (2009).
[17]
 Id. at 510.
[18]
 Entitled "IN THE MATTER OF THE AMENDMENT TO RULES 23,24 AND
25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR PURPOSES OF THE
13 MAY 2013 NATIONAL, LOCAL AND ARMM ELECTIONS AND
SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS."
[19]
 "Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for
public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of
conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public
office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The
final judgment ofthe court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also
to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the
law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to

implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment
on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC
because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to '[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.' 24 The
disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code,
as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and
administration of 'all laws' relating to the conduct of elections." (Jalosjos, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 696 Phil. 601, 634 [2012].)
[20]
 Bedol v. COMELEC, supra note 16, at 510.
[21]
 (December 3, 1985).
[22]
 Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved
proceeding, a certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which
he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the
name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed
under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name
after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there
are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each
candidate, upon being made aware or (sic) such fact, shall state his paternal and
maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and
surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also
include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known
in the locality.

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
[23]
 Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, 575 Phil. 258,261 (2008).
[24]
 Jalover v. Osmeña, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267,
282, citing Velasco v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 1172, 1185 (2008).
[25]
 G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574.
[26]
 Id. at 592.
[27]
 See G.R. No. 206698, February 25,2014, 717 SCRA 312.
[28]
 Id. at 320-321, citing Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 390, 389-390 (1999).
[29]
 See Id. at 323.
[30]
 G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223.
[31]
 See id. at 246, citing Velasco v. COMELEC (supra note 24, at 1185), which, in
turn cited, among others, Salcedo II v. COMELEC (supra note 28, at 390).
[32]
 Supra note 24.
[33]
 Id. at 282, citing Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC (supra note 23, at 261-262),
further citing, among others, Salcedo II v. COMELEC (supra note 28, 385-390).
[34]
 Id., citing Mitra v. COMELEC, 636 Phil. 753, 780 (2010).
[35]
 Id.
[36]
 See G.R. No. 207105, November 10,2015.
[37]
 Id.
[38]
 Id.
[39]
 <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/misrepresent> (last visited
March 5, 2016).
[40]
 468 Phil. 421 (2004).
[41]
 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 326.
[42]
 Supra note 28.
[43]
 Tecson v. COMELEC, supra note 40, at 606-609; citations omitted.
[44]
 Id. at 607.
[45]
 ld. at 608-609.
[46]
 See paragraphs (1) and (2), Section 2, Article IX-C ofthe 1987 Constitution.
[47]
 Tecson v. COMELEC, supra note 40, at 626.
[48]
 See Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S.
Caguioa, joined by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, p. 3.
[49]
 See Rules 15 and 16 of the 2010 RULES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC dated May 4, 2010. See also
Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (Justice Del
Castillo), p. 28.
[50]
 Tecson v. COMELEC, supra note 40, at 460-462.
[51]
 Ponencia, p. 45.
[52]
 Ponencia, pp. 37-38.
[53]
 Id.
[54]
 See id. at 39-40.
[55]
 See id. at 40-41.
[56]
 Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798, 819 (1999).
[57]
 434 Phil. 861 (2002).
[58]
 596 Phil. 354 (2009).
[59]
 See G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
[60]
 See Coquilla v. COMELEC, supra note 57, at 873-874.
[61]
 Entitled "AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, As
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on August 29, 2003.
[62]
 Japzon v. COMELEC, supra note 58, at 369.
[63]
 See Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 59.
[64]
 See ponencia, pp.39-40. See also Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion's
Dissenting Opinion, p. 5.
[65]
 Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING A BALIKBA YAN PROGRAM," approved
on November 3, 1989.
[66]
 Entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 6768,
ENTITLED, 'AN ACT INSTITUTING A BALIKBAYAN PROGRAM, BY
PROVIDING ADDITIONAL BENEPITS AND PRIVILEGES TO BALIKBAY
AN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,'" approved on November 7, 2002.
[67]
 See Petitions in G.R. No. 221697, rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 18-20;
and in G.R. Nos. 221698-700, rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698 700), Vol. I, pp. 22-24.
[68]
 See Petitions in G.R. No. 221697, rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 22; and in
G.R. Nos. 221698-700, rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698 700), Vol. I, p. 27.
[69]
 See rollo (G.R. No. 221698-700), Vol. II, p. 917.
[70]
 See rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. II, pp. 778-794.
[71]
 Id. at 815-816.
[72]
 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Del Castillo, p. 59.
[73]
 Id. at 60.
[74]
 "In fact, from May 24, 2005 to October 20, 20l0, petitioner did go back to the
US no less than five times: February 14, 2006, April 20, 2009, October 19, 2009,
December 27, 2009, and March 27, 2010." See id. at 55. See also rollo (G.R. Nos.
221698 700), Vol. I, pp. 30-31.
[75]
 The purpose is "to ensure that the person elected is familiar with the needs and
problems of his constituency x x x ."(See Perez v. COMELEC, 375 Phil. 1106,
1119 [1999].)
[76]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 41, at 326.
[77]
 "[G]enerally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a
notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. In other words,
absent any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, a notarized document
enjoys the presumption of regularity and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its
contents. (See Vda. de Rojales v. Dime, G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016.)
[78]
 See ponencia, pp. 22-23.
[79]
 Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 409 Phil. 633, 646
(2001).
[80]
 Id.
[81]
 See Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution; emphases and underscoring
supplied.
[82]
 Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 79, at
646.
[83]
 Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 320-321 (1912).
[84]
 Valles v. COMELEC, 392 Phil. 327, 335 (2000); emphasis and underscoring
supplied.
[85]
 ld. at 336-337; emphases and underscoring supplied.
[86]
 "[T]he burden of proof is, in the first instance, with the plaintiff who initiated
the action." (Republic v. Vda. de Neri, 468 Phil. 842, 862 [2004].)
[87]
 "[H]e who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon
the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course
of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his [favour],
the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert
plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff." (Vitarich Corporation v. Locsin, 649 PhiL 164, 173 (2010], citing Jison
v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138, 173 [1998].)
[88]
 Petitioner was born on September 3, 1968. See Petitions in G.R. No.
221697, rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 14; and in G.R. Nos. 221698-
700, rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, p. 17.
[89]
 See Section 3 (e) of "RULE ON ADOPTION," A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC (August
22, 2002); emphasis supplied.
[90]
 See COMELEC Second Division's December 1, 2015 Resolution in SPA No.
15 001 (DC), rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 213-214.
[91]
 See COMELEC Second Division's December 1, 2015 Resolution in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, p. 393. See also COMELEC En
Banc's December 23, 2015 Resolution in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), id. at 254.
[92]
 See Petitions in G.R. No. 221697, rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 114-
116; and in G.R. Nos. 221698-700, rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, pp. 84-
86.
[93]
 272 Phil. 147 (1991).
[94]
 Id. at 169-170.
[95]
 Particularly, the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child (UNCRC), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Law (1930 Hague Convention), and the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness (UNCRS), among others, positing that it is a generally
accepted principle in international law. (See discussions in the Petitions in G.R.
No. 221697, rollo (G.R. No. 221697), Vol. I, pp. 137-144 and 151-152; and in
G.R. Nos. 221698-700, rollo (G.R. Nos. 221698-700), Vol. I, pp. 109-117 and
124-125.
[96]
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Health
Secretary Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 397-398 (2007).
[97]
 See Arnado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015.

CONCURRING OPINION

JARDELEZA, J.:

The Philippine Constitution requires that a person aspiring for the presidency must
be a naturalborn Filipino citizen zmd a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding the election.[1] The question is whether the petitioner,
as a foundling and former resident citizen of the United States (US), satislies these
requirements.

I first consider the issue of jurisdiction raised by the parties.

Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (Poe) contends that in the

absence of any matterial misrepresentation in her certificate of candidacy (COC),
the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had no jurisdiction
to rule on her eligibility. She posits that the COMELEC can only rule on whether
she intended to deceive the electorate when she indicated that she was a natural-
born Filipino and that she has been a resident for 10 years and 11 months. For the
petitioner, absent such intent, all other attacks on her citizenship and residency are
premature since her qualifications can only be challenged through the post-
election remedy of a petition for quo warranto. On the other hand, the COMELEC
argues that since citizenship and residency are material representations in the COC
affecting the qualifications for the office of President, it necessarily had to rule on
whether Poe's statements were true. I agree with the COMELEC that it has
jurisdiction over the petitions to cancel or deny due course to a COC. As a
consequence, it has the authority to determine therein the truth or falsity of the
questioned represtatations in Poe's COC.

Section 78[2] of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) allows a person to file a
verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a COC exclusively on the
ground that any of the material representations it contains, as required under
Section 74,[3] is false. The representations contemplated by Section 78 generally
refer to qualifications for elective office,[4] such as age, residence and citizenship,
or possession of natural-born Filipino status.[5] It is beyond question that the issues
affecting the citizenship and residence of Poe are within the purview of Section
78. There is also no dispute that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over Section 78
petitions. Where the parties disagree is on whether intent to deceive is a
constitutive element for the cancellation of a COC on the ground of false material
representation.

The divide may be attributed to the two tracks of cases interpreting Section 78. On
the one hand, there is the line originating from Salcedo II v. COMELEC, decided
in 1999, where it was held that "[a]side from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible."[6] On the other hand, in the more recent case of Tagolino v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, we stated that "the deliberateness of the
misrepresentation, much less one's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a
Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's declaration of a material
qualification in the COC be false."[7]

To reconcile these two cases, it is important to first understand the coverage of

Section 78. The provision refers to material representations required by Section 74
to appear in the COC. In turn, Section 74 provides for the contents of the COC,
which includes not only eligibility requirements such as citizenship, residence, and
age, but also other information such as the candidate's name, civil status,
profession, and political party affiliation. Section 78 has typically been applied to
representations involving eligibility requirements, which we have likened to a quo
warranto petition under Section 253 of the OEC.[8]

Understated in our jurisprudence, however, are representations mentioned in

Section 74 that do not involve a candidate's eligibility. In this regard, there appears
to be a prevailing misconception that the "material representations" under Section
78 are limited only to statements in the COC affecting eligibility.[9] Such
interpretation, however, runs counter to the clear language of Section 78, which
covers "any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74." A plain reading of this phrase reveals no decipherable intent to categorize the
information required by Section 74 between material and nonmaterial, much less
to exclude certain items explicitly enumerated therein from the coverage of
Section 78. Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus. When the law
does not distinguish, neither should the court.[10] The more accurate interpretation,
one that is faithful to the text, is that the word "material" describes-not qualifies-
the representations required by Section 74. Therefore, the declarations required of
the candidate by Section 74 are all material.[11] In enumerating the contents of the
COC, Section 74 uses the word "shall" in reference to non-eligibilityrelated
matters, including "the political party to which he belongs," "civil status," "his post
office address for all election purposes," "his profession or occupation," and "the
name by which he has been baptized, or ... registered in the office of the local civil
registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or ... his
Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage." The
presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used in an imperative, and not in
a directory, sense.[12] The mandatory character of the provision, coupled with the
requirement that the COC be executed under oath,[13] strongly suggests that the law
itself considers certain non-eligibility-related information as material—otherwise,
the law could have simply done away with them. What this means relative to
Section 78 is that there are material representations which may pertain to matters
not involving a candidate's eligibility.[14]

It is apparent that the interests sought to be advanced by Section 78 are twofold.

The first is to protect the sanctity of the electorate's votes by ensuring that the
candidates whose names appear in the ballots are qualified and thus mitigate the
risk or votes being squandered on an ineligible candidate. The second is to
penalize candidates who commit a perjurious act by preventing them from running
for public office. This is a policy judgment by the legislature that those willing to
perjure themselves are not fit to hold an elective office, presumably with the
ultimate aim of protecting the constituents from a candidak who committed an act
involving moral turpitude.[15] In a way, this protectionist policy is not dissimilar to
the underlying principle for allowing a petition for disqualification based on the
commission of prohibited acts and election offenses under Section 68. These two
considerations, seemingly overlooked in Salcedo, are precisely why the
"consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate
from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws."[16]

Therefore, there are two classes of material representations contemplated by

Section 78: (1) those that concern eligibility for public office; and (2) those
erstwhile numerated in Section 74 which do not affect eligibility. Tagolino applies
to the former; Salcedo to the latter. This is a logical distinction once we connect
the factual settings of the two cases with the aforementioned state interests.
Ironically, Salcedo, oft-cited in Section 78 cases as authority for requiring intent in
cases involving eligibility-related representations, actually did not concern a
representation in the COC affecting the candidate's eligibility. Salcedo involved a
candidate who used the surname of her husband of a void marriage. Her COC was
challenged on the ground that she had no right to use such surname because the
person she married had a subsisting marriage with another person. We held that
petitioner therein failed to discharge the burden of proving that the alleged
misrepresentation regarding the candidate's surname pertains to a material matter,
and that it must equally be proved that there was an intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office to justify
the cancellation of the COC.[17] The rationale is that the penalty of removal from
the list of candidates is not commensurate to an honest mistake in respect of a
matter not affecting one's eligibility to run for public office. "It could not have
been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and sub :lantive
political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake."[18] Notably, a finding in Salcedo that the candidate had no intention to
deceive the electorate when she used her married name, notwithstanding the
apparent invalidity of the marriage, would have been sufficient to arrive at the
same conclusion (that is, allowing her to run) without making a sweeping rule that
only matters pertaining to eligibility are material.

By contrast, Tagolino inyolved a false representation with respect to a candidate's

residence and its subsequent effect on the substitution by a replacement candidate.
The false representation affected the one-year residency requirement impost·d by
the Constitution on members of the House of Representatives[19]—in other words,
it went into the eligibility of the candidate. "[A]n express finding that the person
committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
determination of whether one's COC should be deemed cancelled or not." [20] It is
the fact of eligibility, not the intent to del·eive, that should be decisive in
determining compliance with constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications for public office. This reading is more in accord with the text of
Section 78, which does not specify intent as an element for a petition to prosper. In
this context, the term "material misrepresentation" is a misnomer because it
implies that the candidate consciously misrepresented himself. But all Section 78
textually provides is that "any material representation ... is false." Thus, in
resolving a Section 78 petition, truth or falsity ought to be the definitive test. The
COMELEC's duty, then, is to make findings of fact with respect to the material
representations claimed to be false.

The need to apply Tagolino to the first class is highlighted by an inherent gap

in Salcedo's analysis, which failed to take into account a situation where a
candidate indicated in good faith that he is eligible when he is in fact not. It is not
inconceivable that a child, for example, born in 1977, but whose parents simubted
the birth certificate to make it appear that he was born in 1976, would believe
himself to be qualified to run for president in the 2016 elections. However, if the
simulation of birth is proved, and hospital records and family history show that he
was indeed born in 1977, then he would fall short of the minimum age
requirement prescribed by the Constitution. If Salcedo is to be followed to a tee,
the COMELEC cannot cancel his COC because he acted in good faith. This would
lead to a situation where the portion of the electorate who voted for the ineligible
candidate would face the threat of disenfranchisement should the latter win the
elections and face a quo warranto challenge. In the latter proceeding, not even
good faith can cure the inherent defect in his qualifications. Tagolino is therefore
preferable in instances involving eligibility-related representations because it fills
this gap. Indeed, the law should not be interpreted to allow for such disastrous
consequences.

In fact, in cases involving eligibility-related representations, the Court has never

considered intent to deceive as the decisive element, even in those that relied
on Salcedo. In Tecsun v. COMELEC,[21] which involved a question on the
eligibility of Fernando Poe, Jr. for the 2004 presidential elections by way of a
Section 78 petition, the Court determined whether he was a naturalborn citizen of
the Philippine. Intent to deceive the electorate was never discussed.
In Ugdoracion v. COMELEC,[22] which involved residency, the Court determined
that the candidate lost his residency when he became a US green card holder
despite his mistaken belief that he retained his domicile in the Philippines. The
candidate, invoking the legal definition of domicile, claimed that even if he was
physically in the US, he always intended to return the Philippines. The Court,
placing emphasis on his permanent resident status in the US, merely inferred his
intent to deceive when he failed to declare that he was a green card holder. Then
in Jalosjos v. COMELEC,[23] also involving residency, the Court found that the
claim of domicile was contradicted by the temporary nature of the candidate's stay.
This time, the Court simply deemed that "[w]hen the candidate's claim of
eligibility is proven false, as when the candidate failed to substantiate meeting the
required residertcy in the locality, the representation of eligibility in the COC 
constitutes a 'deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide the fact' of
ineligibility."[24]

The Court owes candor to the public. Inferring or deeming intent to deceive from
the fact of falsity is, to me, just a pretense to get around the gap left by Salcedo,
i.e., an indigible candidate who acted in good faith. I believe the more principled
approach is to adopt Tagolino as the controlling rule. The decision in Agustin v.
COMELEC[25] is a step towards that direction: "[e]ven if [the COMELEC] made
no finding that the petitioner had deliberately attempted to mislead or to misinform
as to warrant the cancellation of his COC, the COMELEC could still declare him
disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility...." Of course, Salcedo remains
applicable to cases where the material representation required by Section 74 oes
not relate to eligibility, sttch as in Villafuerte v. COMELEC,[26] which, similar
to Salcedo, involved a candidate's name.[27]

The 1987 Constitution designated the Supreme Court en banc, acting as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), as the "sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President."[28] Poe
argue·; that allowing the COMELEC to rule on the eligibility of the candidate
regardless of intent would be tantamount to the usurpation of the PET's authority
(and that of the electoral tribunals of both the Senate and the House , of
Representatives) as the sole judge of qualifications. This, however, is an incorrect
reading of the provision. The phrase "contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications" is a legal term of ati that is synonymous to "election contests." "As
used in constitutional provisions, electi, m contest relates only to statutory contests
in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to have himself
inducted into the ofl ice."[29] Thus, an election contest can only contemplate a post-
election,[30] post-proclamation situation.[31] While the power of electoral tribunals is
exclusive,[32] full, clear, and complete,[33] it is nonetheless subject to a temporal
limitation-their jurisdiction may only be invoked after the election is held and the
winning candidate is proclaimed.[34]

Notably, the Constitution neither allocates jurisdiction over pre election

controversies involving the eligibility of candidates nor forecloses legislative
provision for such remedy. Absent such constitutional proscription, it is well
within the plenary powers of the legislature to enact a law providing for this type
of pre-election remedy, as it did through Section 78.[35] In this regard, Poe's
statement that the COMELEC essentially arrogated unto itself the jurisdiction to
decide upon the qualifications of candidates is inaccurate. It is Congress that
granted the COMELEC such jurisdiction; the COMELEC only exercised the
jurisdiction so conferred. When the COMELEC takes cognizance of a Section 78
petition, its actions are not repugnant to, but are actually in accord with, its
constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
an election.[36] To be clear, the proceeding under Section 78 is not an election
contest and therefore does not encroach upon PET's jurisdiction over election
contests involving the President and Vice-President.

We have already recognized that a Section 78 petition is one instance-the only

instance-where the qualifications of a candidate for elective office can be
challenged before an election.[37] Although the denial of due course to or the
cancellation of the COC is ostensibly based on a finding that the candidate made a
rnaterial representation that is false,[38] the determination of the factual Correctness
of the representation necessarily affects eligibility. Essentially, the ground is lack
of eligibility under the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office,[39] similar to a petition for quo
warranto which is a species of election contest. "The only difference between the
two proceedings is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are
misrepresented in the COC and the proceedings must be initiated before the
elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 may be brought
on the basis of two grounds-(1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the
election results."[40] Put simply, the main distinction is the time the action is filed.
[41]
 If a pl·rson fails to file a Section 78 petition within the 25-day period
prescribed in the OEC, the election laws afford him another chance to raise the
ineligibility of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto.[42]

The reason why the COMELEC, pursuant to a valid law, is allowed to determine a
candidate's constitutional and statutory eligibility prior to the election is not
difficult to fathom. As earlier alluded to, there is legitimate value in shielding the
electoraie from an ineligible candidate. In addition, there are sound fiscal
considerations supporting this remedy. These include the more efficient allocation
or COMELEC's resources, ultimately funded by taxpayers' money, and a check on
unnecessary campaign spending, an activity with minimal economic utility. A
contrary ruling could lead to the de facto disenfranchisement of those who voted
for a popular but ineligible candidate. The possibility of a constitutional and
political crisis arising from such a result is one we dare not risk.

II

Article VII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution lays down the eligibility
requirements for the office of President:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen or the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
Citizenship is determined by the organic law in force at the time of birth. [43] When
Poe was found in 1968, the 1935 Constitution was still in effect. It enumerated the
following as citizens of the Philippines: (1) those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution; (2) those born in
the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of the 1935
Constitution, had been elected to public office; (3) those whose fathers are citizen;
of the Philippines; (4) those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines ;md,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship; and (5) those who
are naturalized in accordance with law.[44] For obvious reasons, the first two
classes are not applicable to the present controversy. I therefore limit my
discussion to the remaining three classes.

The 1987 Constitution defines "natural-born citizens" as those who are Filipino
citizens "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."[45] Children born of Filipino fathers under the 1935
Constitution fall under this category. By express declaration, the 1987 Constitution
also considered those born of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship by
age of majority as natural-born citizens.[46] On the other hand, those who become
Filipino citizens through the naturalization process are evidently excluded from
the constitutional definition. Therefore, there are two kinds of Filipino citizens
recognized under the Constitution: natural-born citizens and naturalized citizens.
[47]
 Only the former are eligible to be President of the Philippines.

Poe contends that she is a natural-born citizen because there is a presumption

under intemational law that a foundling is a citizen of the place where he was
born. She furthtr argues that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention reveal an intent by the framers to consider foundlings as Filipino
citizens from birth. In any case, she believes that she has proved, by substantial
evidence, that she is a natural-born citizen. The Solicitor General supports the s
cond and third arguments of Poe.

On the other hand, the COMELEC and private respondents maintain that because
she is a foundling whose parentage is unknown, she could not definitively prove
that either her father or mother is a Filipino. They dispute the applicability of
international conventions which the Philippines is not a party to, while those
which have been ratified require implementing legislation.
Assuming arguendo that she was a natural-born citizen, respondents are
unanimous that she lost such status when she became a naturalized American
citizen. Her subsequent repatriation under RA 9225 only conferred upon her
Filipino citizenship but not natural-born status.

I take their arguments in turn.

The power of a state to confer its citizenship is derived from its sovereignty. It is
an attribute of its territorial supremacy.[48] As a sovereign nation, the Philippines
has tlw inherent right to determine for itself, and according to its own Constitution
and laws, who its citizens are.[49] International law, as a matter of principle,
respects such sovereign determination and recognizes that the acquisition and loss
of citizenship fall within the domestic jurisdiction of each state.[50] Domestic rules
on citizenship vary greatly from sovereign to sovereign,[51] a necessary
consequence of divergent demography, geography, history, and culture among the
many states. As explained in the Nottebohm Case:
[T]he diversity of demographic conditions has thus far made it impossible for any
general agreement to be reached on the rules relating to nationality, although the
latter by its very nature affects international relations. It has been considered that
the best way of making such rules accord with the varying demographic conditions
in different countries is to leave the fixing of such rules to the competence of each
State.[52]

Thus, "[t]here is no rule of international law, whether customary or written, which

might be regarded as constituting any restriction of: or exception to, the
jurisdiction or [individual states to determine questions of citizenship]."[53] The
foregoing considerations militate against the formation of customary law in
matters concerning citizenship, at least not one directly enforceable on particular
states as advocated by Poe. Accordingly, the provisions of the 1930 Hague
Convention and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness purpmiedly
conferring birth citizenship upon foundlings, or creating a presumption thereof,
cannot be considered customary.

At this juncture, it may not be amiss to explain that another reason why we
judiciously scrutinize an invocation of customary international law based on
treaties the Philippine has not acceded to is out of deference to the President's
treaty-ratification power[54] and the Senate's treaty-concurring power.[55] The
doctrine of separation of powers dictates that, unless the existence of customary
international law is convincingly shown, courts of law should not preempt the
executive and legislative branches' authority over the country's foreign rdations
policy, including the negotiation, ratification, and approval oftreaties.[56]

In respect of international covenants that the Philippines is a party to, Poe invokes
the following which allegedly recognize her right to natural born citizenship: the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). The CRC and the ICCPR both speak of a child's "right to acquire a
nationality." A plain reading indicates that the right simply means that a child shall
be given the opportunity to become a Filipino citizen.[57] It does not by itself create
an enforceable right to birth citizenship. The obligation imposed upon states
parties is for them to either enact citizenship statutes specifically for children or to
equally extend to children the benefits of existing citizenship laws. In the
Philippines' case, the Constitution grants birth citizenship to those born of Filipino
parents and our naturalization statutes provide for derivative citizenship of
children born of non-Filipino parents.[58] The Philippines is, therefore, compliant
with this specific obligation under the CRC and the ICCPR.

The same can be said about the UDHR, even though it uses a slightly different
wording.[59] Preliminarily, it must be clarified that the UDHR is technically not a
treaty and therefore, it has no obligatory character. Nonetheless, over time, it has
become an international normative standard with binding character as part nf the
law of nations. In other words, it has acquired the force of customary international
law.[60] The "right to a nationality" under the UDHR must be interpreted as being
subject to the conditions imposed by domestic law, given the broad scope of the
declaration, i.e., it covers "everyone." A contrary interpretation would effectively
amount to an unqualified adoption of the jus soli principle, which would be
repugnant to our constitutional structure. Such interpretation would, in fact, be
contrary to the intent of the UDHR itself. The correlative state obligation under the
UDHR is for a state not to withdraw or withhold the benefits of citizenship from
whole sections of the population who can demonstrate a genuine and ef[ective link
with the country.[61] It does not purport to indiscriminately grant citizenship to any
person. Taking into consideration the historical context of the UDHR, [62] it may be
said that the right, really, is one against statelessness; and the obligation is a
negative duty not to create or perpetuate statelessness.[63] It proscribes an arbitrary
deprivation of citizenship and an unreasonable discrimination in the operation of
naturalization lawagainst stateless persons.

Finally, the CRC, ICCPR, and UDHR all refrained from imposing a direct
obligation to confer citizenship at birth. This must be understood as a deliberate
recognition of sovaeign supremacy over matters relating to citizenship. It bears
emphasis that none of the instruments concern themselves with natural-born and
naturalized classifications. This is because this distinction finds application only in
domestic legal regimes. Ergo, it is one for each sovereign to make.

The 1935 Constitution did not explicitly address the citizenship of foundlings. For
the COMELEC and private respondents, the silence means exclusion, following
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. They point to the jus
sanguinis principle adopted by the Constitution to conclude that a foundling who
cannot establish a definite blood relation to a Filipino parent is not natural-born.
For Poe and the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention indicate the intention to categorize foundlings as citizens and the
textual silence "does not indicate any discriminatory animus against them." They
argue that the Constitution does not preclude the possibility that the parents of a
foundling are in fact Filipinos.

In interpreting the silence of the Constitution, the best guide is none other than the
Constitution itself.[64] As Prof. Laurence Tribe suggests, giving meaning to
constitutional silence involves the twin tasks of articulating the relevant
constitutional norms that determine how the silence ought to be interpreted and
propounding principles of statutory construction consistent with these norms.
[65]
 There is no question that since 1935, the Philippines has adhered to the jus
sanguinis principle as the primary basis for determining citizenship. Under the
1935 Constitution, a child follows the citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of birth, although there was a caveat that if only the mother is Filipino,
the child has to elect Philippine citizenship by age of majority. Determining a
person's parentage, of course, requires a determination of facts in an appropriate
proceeding. Consequently, to arrive at a correct judgment, the fuw lamental
principles of due process and equal protection[66] demand that the parties be
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions, and for the decision-
maker to make a ruling based on the applicable quantum of evidence.

The appropriate due pn)cess standards that apply to the COMELEC, as a quasi-
judicial tribunal, anthose outlined in the seminal case of Ang  Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations.[67] Commonly referred to as the "cardinal primary rights" in
administrative proceedings, these include: (1) the right to a hearing, which
mcludes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereat; (2) not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts, but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3)
while the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disn garded, namely, that of having something
to support its decision; (4) not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial;" (5) the decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy; and (7)
the tribunal should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered.[68] The COMELEC failed to comply with the third and fourth
requirements when it first, decided the question of foundlings on a pure question
of law, i.e., whether foundlings are natural-born, without making a determination
based on the evidence on record and admissions of the parties of the probability or
improbability that Poe was born of Filipino parents; and second, by concluding
that Poe can only prove her parentage through DNA or other definitive evidence,
set a higher evidentiary hurdle than mere substantial evidence.

The COMELEC's starting position is that foundlings are not natural born
citizens[69] unless they prove by DNA or some other definitive evidence[70] that
either of their biological parents are Filipino citizens. Thus, it limited its inquiry to
the question of whether the 1935 Constitution considered foundlings as natur d-
born citizens. In effect, the COMELEC has created a conclusive or irrebuttable
presumption against foundlings, i.e., they are not natural-born citizens. This is true
notwithstanding the apparently benign but empty opening allowed by the
COMELEC. By definition, foundlings are either "deserted or abandoned ... whose
parents, guardian or relatives are unknown," or "committed to an orphanage or
charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and
parentage."[71] Considering these unusual circumstances common to all foundlings,
DNA or other definitive evidence would, more often than not, not be available. A
presumption disputable only by an impossible, even cruel, condition is, in reality,
a conclusive presumption.

In this jurisdiction, conclusive presumptions are looked upon with disfavor on due
process grounds. In Dycaico v. Social Security System, the Court struck down a
provision in Republic Act No. 8282 or the Social Security Law "because it pn
sumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In the United States, this
kind of presumption is characterized as an irrebuttabk presumption and statutes
creating permanent and irrebutable rresumptions have long been disfavored under
the due process clause."[72] The case involved a proviso in the Social Security Law
which disqualified the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to SSS
members were contracted after the latter's retirement. The Court found that this
created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS
members were sham and therefore entered into for the sole purpose of securing the
benefits under the Social Security Law. This conclusive presumption violated the
due process clause because it deprived the surviving spouses of the opportunity to
disprove the presence of the illicit purpose.

In the earlier case of Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, the

Court similarly found as unconstitutional a proviso in Presidential Decree No.
1146 or the Revised Govemment Service Insurance Act of 1977 that prohibits the
dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spc;tise
married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified: for the
pension. In finding that the proviso violated the due process and equal protection
guarantees, the Court stated that "[t]he proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly
denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent
spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited
period," and "[t]here is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard."[73]

The same considerations obtain here. The COMELEC's approach presumes a fact
which is not necessarily or universally true. Although the possibility that the
parents of a foundling are foreigners can never be discounted, this is not always
the case. It appears that because of its inordinate focus on trying to interpret the
Constitution, the COMELEC disregarded the incontrovertible fact that Poe, like
any other human being, has biological parents. Logic tells us that there are four
possibilities with respect to the biological parentage of Poe: (1) both her parents
are Filipinos; (2) her father is a Filipino and her mother is a foreigner; (3) her
mother is a Filipino and her father is a fordgner; and (4) both her parents are
foreigners. In three of the four possibilities, Poe would be considered as a natural-
hom citizen.[74] In fact, data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) suggest
that, in 1968, there was a 99.86% statistical probability that her parents were
Filipinos.[75] That Poe's parents are unknown does not automatically discount the
possibility that either her father or mother is a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed,
the verba legis interpretation of the constitutional provision on citizenship as
applied to foundlings is that they may be born of a Filipino father or mother. There
is no presumption for or against them. The COMELEC's duty under a Section 78
petition questioning a candidate's citizenship qualification is to determine the
probability that her father or mother is a Filipino citizen using substantial
evidence. And there lies the second fault of the COMELEC: regardless of who had
the burden of proof, by requiring DNA or other definitive evidence, it imposed a
quantum of evidence higher than substantial evidence.

In proceedings before the COMELEC, the evidentiary bar against which the
evidence presented is measured is substantial evidence, which is defined as such
relevant evidt nce as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[76] This is the least demanding in the hierarchy of evidence, as
compared to the highest, proof beyond reasonable doubt applicable to criminal
cases, and the intermediate, preponderance of evidence applicable to civil cases.
[77]
 When the COMELEC insisted that Poe must present DNA or other definitive
evidence, it effectively subjected her to a higher standard of proof, that of absolute
certainty. This is even higher than proof beyond reasonable doubt, which requires
only moral certainty; in criminal cases, neither DNA evidence[78] nor direct
evidence[79] are always necessary to sustain a conviction. The COMELEC's
primary justification is the literal meaning of jus sanguinis, i.e., right of blood.
This, however, is an erroneous understanding because jus sanguinis is a principle
of nationality law, not a rule of evidence. Neither is it to be understood in a
scientific sense. Certainly, the 1935 Constitution could not have intended that
citizenship must be proved by DNA evidence for the simple reason that DNA
profiling was not introduced until 1985.
Since the COMELEC created a presumption against Poe that she was not a
natural-born citizen and then set an unreasonably high burden to overcome such
presumption, it unduly deprived her of citizenship, which has been described as
"the right to have rights,"[80] from which the enjoyment of all other rights
emanates. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), in its amicus submission,
accurately described the bundle of rights that flow from the possession of
citizenship: "[it is] oftentimes the precursor to other human rights, such as the
freedom of movement, right to work, right to vote and be voted for, access to civil
service, right to education, right to social security, freedom from discrimination,
and recognition as a person before the law."[81]

The purpose of evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact.

[82]
 Evidence is relevant when it induces belief in the existence or non existence of
a fact in issue or fends in any reasonable degree to establish its probability or
improbability.[83] It is a fundamental requirement in our legal system that questions
of fact must be resolved according to the proof.[84] Under the due process clause, as
expounded in Ang Tibay, the COMELEC was duty-bound to consider all relevant
evidence before arriving at a conclusion. In the proceedings before the
COMELEC, Poe presented evidence that she is 5 feet 2 inches tall, has brown
eyes, low nasal bridge, black hair and an oval-shaped face, and that she was found
abandoned in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. There are also admissions by the
parties that she was abandoned as an infant, that the population of Iloilo in 1968
was Filipino, and that there were no international airports in Iloilo at that time.
Poe's physical features, which are consistent with those of an ordinary Filipino,
together with the circumstances of when and where she was found are all relevant
evidence tending to establish the probability that her parents are Filipinos. Thus,
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it failed or refused to consider
these. On the other hand, the private respondents presented absolutely no evidence
before the COMELEC that would tend to establish the improbability that both of
Poe's parents are Filipino citizens, and instead chose to rely solely on the
undisputed fact that Poe is a foundling. The COMFLEC's stance that "the
probability that [Poe] might be born of a Filipino parent is not sufficient to prove
her case"[85] is a blatant misunderstanding of the purpose of evidence. Tribunals,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial, do not deal in absolutes, which is why we lay
down rules of evidence. The determination of facts in legal proceedings is but a
weighing of probabilities.[86] "[A judge] must reason according to probabilities,
drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not
directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in
such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely,
according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary
facts exist?"[87] This is different from a mere "possibility" that is borne out of pure
conjecture without proof.

To my mind, the foregoing evidence, admissions on record, data from the PSA,
which we may take judicial notice of,[88] showing that 99.55% of the population of
Iloilo province 111 1970 were Filipinos[89] and that 99.82% of children born in the
Philippines in 1968 are natural-born Filipinos,[90] and absence of contrary evidence
adequately support the conclusion that Poe's parents are Filipinos and, consl
quently, that she is a natural-born citizen. If circumstantial evidence is suflicient to
establish proof beyond reasonable doubt,[91] then it should also be sufficient to
hurdle the lower threshold of substantial evidence, particuldrly in the present case
where there are a number of circumstances in favor of Poe.
 2

The COMELEC's unwarranted presumption against Poe, and foundlings in

general, likewise violates the equal protection clause. In Dycaico, the Court ruled
that the proviso in the Social Security Law disqualifying spouses who contracted
marriage after the SSS members' retirement were unduly discriminated against,
and found that the "nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague and
flimsy."[92] In Montesclaros, the Court considered as "discriminatory and arbitrary"
the questioned proviso of the GSIS Act that created a category for spouses who
contracted marriage to GSIS members within three years before they qualified for
the pension.[93]

The COMELEC's de facto conclusive presumption that foundlings are not natural-

born suffers fronT the same vice. In placing foundlings at a disadvantaged
evidentiary position at the start of the hearing then imposing a higher quantum of
evidence upon them, the COMELEC effectively created two classes of children:
(1) those who know their biological parents; and (2) those whose biological
parents are unknown. As the COMELEC would have it, those belonging to the
first class face no presumption that they are not natural-born and, if their
citizenship is challenged, they may prove their citizenship by substantial evidence.
On the other hand, those belonging to the second class, such as Poe, are presumed
not natural-born at the outset and must prove their citizenship with near absolute
certainty. To illustrate how the two classes are treated differently, in Tecson,
[94]
 which involved Poe's adoptive father, the COMELEC did not make a
presumption that Fernando Poe was not a natural-born citizen. Instead, it
considered the evidence presented by both parties and ruled that the petition before
it failed to prove by substantial evidence that Fernando Poe was not natural-born.
On certiorari, the Court sustained the COMELEC. In this case, the COMELEC
presumed that Poe was not natural-born and failed or refused to consider relevant
pieces of evidence presented by Poe. Evidently, the COMELEC's only justification
for the different treatment is that Fernando Poe knew his biological parents, while
herein petitioner does not.

I find the COMELEC's classification objectionable on equal protection grounds

because, in the first place, it is not warranted by the text of the Constitution. The
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is just one of the various rules of
interpretation that courts use to construe the Constitution; it is not the be-all and
end-all of constitutional interpretation. We have already held that this maxim
should not be applied if it would result in incongruities and in a violation of the
equal protection guarantee.[95]  The more appropriate interprei ive rule to apply is
the doctrine of necessary implication, which holds that
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation.
What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may
be inadequate to Provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in
the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction
used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed.[96]
When the 1935 Constitution referred to "those whose fathers [or mothers] are
citizens of the Philippines," it necessarily included foundlings whose fathers or
mothers are Filipino citizens. As previously discussed, the parentage of foundlings
may be proved by substantial evidence. Conversely, foundlings whose parents are
both foreigners are excluded from the constitutional provision. This would be the
case if in an appropriate proceeding there is deficient relevant evidence to
adequately establish that either of the parents is a Filipino citizen.

Another useful interpretive rule in cases with equal protection implications is the
one embodied in Article 10 of the Civil Code: "In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail." "When the statute is silent or ambiguous, this
is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience."[97] Indeed, it would be most unkind to the delegates of the 1934
Constitutional Convention to ascribe upon them any discriminatory animus against
foundlings in the absence of any positive showing of such intent. It is conceded
that the exact reason why the Convention voted down Sr. Rafols' proposal to
explicitly include "children of unknown parents" may never fully be settled. Srs.
Montinola, Bulson, and Roxas all had their respective views on why the
amendment was not necessary.[98] The parties herein have diametrically opposed
interpretations on the proposal: the respondents argue that the fact that the
amendment is defeated should be conclusive—after all, not all delegates expressed
their views—and that the deliberations were not submitted to the people for
ratification; Poe contends that the deliberations reveal that rules of international
law already considers foundlings as citizens of the place where they are found,
thus making the inclusion unnecessary; and finally, the Solicitor General
maintains that the silence may be fully explained in tenns of linguistic efficiency
and the avoidance of redundancy. These are all valid points, but I believe the only
thing we can unquestionably take away from the deliberations is that there was at
least no intent to consider foundlings as stateless, and consequently deprive them
of the concomitant civil and political rights associated with citizenship.

My second objection is that—as the Solicitor General points out—foundlings are a

"discrete and insular"[99] minority who are entitled to utmost protection against
unreasonable discrimination applying the strict scrutiny standard. According to
this standard, government action that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
a "fundamental right" or operates to the peculiar  class disadvantage of a "suspect
class" is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is
the least restrictive means ro protect such interest.[100] The underlying rationale for
the heightened judicial scrutiny is that the political processes ordinarily relied
upon to protect minorities may have broken down.[101] Thus, one aspect of the
judiciary's role under the equal protection clause is to protect discrete and insular
minorities from majoritarian prejudice or indifference.[102]

The fundamental right warranting the application of the strict scrutiny standard is
the right to a nal ionality embodied in the UDHR-properly understood in the
context of preventing statelessness and arbitrary denial of citizenship. Citizenship
has been described as "man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have
rights," and the effects of its loss justly have been called "more serious than a
taking of one's property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty."[103] It is the
individual's "legal bond [with the state] having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together
with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties."[104] Although the COMELEC
primarily argues that Poe is not natural-born, its rigid exclusionary approach,
[105]
 taken to its logical conclusion, would actually have deprived Poe of her
Filipino citizenship-natural-born or otherwise. This is an infringement of a
fundamental right that threatens to deprive foundlings not only of their civil and
political rights under domestic law but also deny them of the state's protection on
an international level.

Foundlings also comprise a suspect class under the strict scrutiny analysis. The
traditional indicia of "suspectness" are (1) if the class possesses an "immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident ofbirth,"[106] or (2) when the class
is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process."[107] Thus, in the US, suspect classes for equal protection purposes include
classifications based on race, religion, alienage, national origin, and ancestry.
[108]
 In the Philippines, the Comt has extended the scope to include distinctions
based on economic class and status,[109] and period of employment contract.
[110]
 Here, the COMELEC's classification is based solely' on the happenstance that
foundlings were abandoned by their biological parents at birth and who, as a class,
possess practically no political power.[111] The classification is therefore suspect
and odious to a nation committed to a regime of equality.[112]

Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the COMELEC failed to identify a

compelling state interest to justify the suspect classification and infringement of
the foundling' fundamental right.[113] Indeed, the Solicitor General, appearing as
Tribune of the People,[114] disagrees with the COMELEC's position. When the
Solicitor General acts as the People's Tribune, it is incumbent upon ltim to present
to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the
government although it may run counter to the position of lhe affected government
office.[115] In such instances, the Court has cousidered his opinion and
recommendations "invaluable aid[s] in the disposition of the case."[116] His opinion
that there is no compelling state interest to justify discrimination against
foundlings, while in no way conclusive upon the Court, must be afforded weight.

It may nonetheless be deduced that the interest sought to be protected by the

COMELEC is the same as the concern of John Jay, the future first US Chief
Justice, when he suggested to George Washington that it would be wise "to
provide a ... strong check into the admission of Foreigners into the administration
of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in chief
of the american (sic) army shall not be given to, nor devolve on, any but a natural
born Citizen."[117] The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens
may hold certain high public offices is to insure that the holders or these high
public offices grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines. It
flows from the presumption that, in their formative years, they knew they owed
from birth their allegiance to the Philippines and that in case any other country
claims their allegiance, they would be faithful and loyal to the Philippines. This is
particularly true to the President who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.[118] To be sure, this interest is compelling because the Constitution itself
demands it. Nonetheless, it can only be used where the issue involves the bright-
line between natural-born and naturalized citizens. It cannot be used as
justification in a case where no clear constitutional line has been
drawn, i.e., betwevn foundlings and persons who know their parents. It finds no
application in this case where there was absolutely no evidence, not even an
allegation, that Poe's parents were foreign nationals. I simply find the risk that a
Matichurian candidate[119] was planted by a foreign sovereign in the form of a
foundling too remote to justifY an en masse discrimination against all foundlings.
If the underlying premise for the natural-born requirement is that natural-born
citizens consider themselves as Filipino citizens since birth, then foundlings surely
fit into this category as well.

In any case, the COMELEC failed to adopt the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.[120] By imposing heavy burden upon Poe just because she was
abandoned as an infant with unknown facts of birth and parentage, the COMELEC
haphazardly acted without regard to the farreaching consequences to a discrete and
insular minority. Needless to say, a more narrowly tailored approach would avoid
making a sweeping presumption. The COMELEC's fixation with a scientific
application of the jus sanguinis principle, as opposed to a legal one guided by
rules of evidence, led to its discriminatory interpretation of the Constitution. It
acted with "an evil eye and unequal hand,"[121] denying foundlings equal justice
guaranteed by the same fundamental law. This is grave abuse of discretion.

The COMELEC and private respondent Amado Valdez both argue that even
assuming that Poe was a natural-born citizen, she forever lost such status when she
became a naturalized American in 2001. Her repatriation in 2006 only restored her
Filipino citizenship, but not her natural-born status. They cite as legal basis the
Constitutional definition of natural-born citizens, i.e., those who are citizens from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship.[122] Poe and the Solicitor General refute this by invoking the Court's
ruling in Bengson III v. HRET,[123] where it was held that the act of repatriation
allows a former natural-born citizen to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

The COMELEC and Valdez, without stating it directly, are asking for a
reexamination of Bengson. Valdez, on the one hand, frames his argument by
differentiating RA 9225 from Republic Act No. 2630 (RA 2630), the old
repatriation law in effect at the time Bengson was decided. He argues that RA
9225 had a more tedious process than RA 2630. On the other hand, the
COMELEC points to the text of RA 9225 noting that it only mentioned
reacquisition of citizenship, not reacquisition of natural-born status. These are, of
course, thin attempts to differentiate this case from Bengson. But the problem is
that they never diredly question the legal soundness of Bengson. And, to me, this
half-hearted challenge is insufficient justification to depmi from stare decisis.

Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
in which the facts are substantially the same. Absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.[124] The reason why we
adhere to judicial precedents is not only for certainty and predictability in our legal
order but equally to have an institutional safeguard for the judicial branch. As
articulated by the US Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior
Courts. If that limit should be exceeded, disturbance of prior rulings would be
taken as evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to
drives for particular results in the short term. The legitimacy of the Comt would
fade with the frequency of its vacillation.[125]
In the Philippines, using as reference the cited US case, we have adopted a four-
point test to justify deviation from precedent, which include the determination of:
(1) whether the older doctrine retained the requirements of "practical workability;"
(2) whether the older doctrine had attracted the kind of reliance that would add a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling it and "add inequity to the cost
of repudiation;" (3) whether the related principles of law have developed in a
different direction so as to render the older rule "no more than the remnant of an
abandoned doctrine;" and, (4) whether the contextual facts of the older doctrine
have so changed as to deprive the old rule of "significant application or
justification."[126] Thus, before we could venture into a fullblown reexamination
of Bengson, it was necessary for respondents to have shown, at the first instance,
that their case hurdled the foregoing test.

III

It is well settled in election law that residence is synonymous with domicile.

[127]
 Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.[128] To establish domicile,
three elements must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there (animus manendi); and (3) an intention to abandon
the old domicile (animus non revertendi).[129]

There is no question that Poe has complied with the first requirement. She has
been residing in the Philippines together with her children since May 24, 2005,
save for brief travels abroad. The point of contention between the parties is
whether Poe satistied the concurrent requisites of animus manendi et non
revertendi. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, Poe presented evidence that:
she and her husband enrolled their US-based children in Philippine schools in June
2005; they purchased a condominium in the second half 2005 which was intended
to be used as the family abode; they made inquiries with property movers as early
as March 2005 and actually relocated household goods, furniture, cars, and other
personal properties to the Philippines during the first half of 2006; she secured a
Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue in July 2005; her
husband notified the US Postal Service that they will no longer be using their
former US address in March 2006; they sold their family home in the US in April
2006; her husband resigned from his work in the US to join the family in May
2006; and her application for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship and her
application for derivative citizenship of her minor children, which were
subsequently approved on July 18, 2006. The COMELEC, however, relied on the
declaration in her 2013 COC for Senator, where she stated that she was a resident
for 6 years and 6 months, which would peg her residency in November 2006. Even
if the previous COC was not controlling, the COMELEC determined that the
earliest Poe could have established domicile here was when the BI approved her
application to reacquire her Filipino citizenship on July 18, 2006. It emphasized
that when Poe enlered the Philippines in May 2005, she did so as a foreign
national availing of a balikbayan visa-free entrty privilege valid for one year. In
other words, she was a temporary visitor. Citing Coquilla v. COMELEC,[130] the
COMELEC ruled that Poe should have either secured an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence or reacquired Filipino citizenship to be able to waive her non-resident
status.

Unlike residence which. may be proved by mere physical presence, animus

manendi et non revertendi refers to a state of mind. Thus, there is no hard and fast
rule to determine a candidate's compliance with the residency requirement. [131] Its
determination is essentially dependent on evidence of contemporary and
subsequent acts that would tend to establish the fact of intention. Although the
apprer iation of evidence is made on a case-to-case basis, there are three basic
postulates to consider: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is
arquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a time.[132] In addition, the
Court has devised reasonable standards to guide tribunals in evaluating the
evidence.

In Mitra v. COMELEC,[133] the Court recognized that the establishment of domicile

may be incremental. The Court considered the following "incremental moves"
undertaken by Mitra as sufficient to establish his domicile: (1) his expressed inknt
to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a
provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves; (3) the transfer of registration as a
voter; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; (5) the purchase of a lot for
his permanent home; and (6) the cunstruction of a house on the said lot which is
adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion of his house.

In Fernandez v. HRET,[134] the Court held that the transfer of domicile must

be bona fide. In ruling in favor of the petitioner whose residency was challenged in
a quo warranto proceeding, the Court found that there are real and substantial
seasons for Fernandez to establish a new domicile in Sta. Rosa, Laguna for
purposes of qualifying for the May 2007 elections. The ruling was based on a
finding that: (a) Fernandez and his wife owned and operated businesses in Sta.
Hosa since 2003; (b) their children attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since
2005; (c) although ownership of property should never be considered a
requirement for any candidacy, Fernandez purchased residential properties in that
city even prior to the May 2007 election; and (d) Fernandez and his spouse
subsequently purchased another lot in April 2007, about a month before election
day, where they have constructed a home for their family's use as a residence.

In Japzon v. COMELEC,[135] also involving residency, the Court ruled

that residence is independent of citizenship. The Court found that although
respondent Ty did not automatically reestablish domicile in the Philippines upon
reacquisition of citizenship under RA 9225, his subsequent acts proved his intent
to establish new domicile in the Philippines. The Court based its finding on the
following circumstances: (a) he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his
application that his residence in the Philippines was in General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (b) for the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the
local tax jurisdiction of General Macarthur by paying community tax and securing
CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his local address; (c) thereafter,
Ty applied for and was registered as a voter in the same municipality; and (d) Ty
had also been bodily present in General Macarthur except for short trips abroad.

In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,[136] one of the issues presented was an

apparent mistake with regard to the period of residency stated in the COC of
Imelda Marcos, which would have made her ineligible. In finding that Marcos was
eligible, the Court held that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificatof candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the [C]onstitution's residency qualification
requirement."[137]

Guided by the foregoing, it is clear to me that Poe has adequately established

her animus manendi et non revertendi by substantial evidence. There are real and
substantial. reasons for her establishment of domicile in the Philippines. Her father
died on December 2004, which Poe claims, was crucial in her decision to resdtle
in the Philippines for good. She and her family then began the incremental process
of relocating by making preparatory inquiries with property movers as early as
March 2005. She then entered the Philippines in May 2005 and enrolled her
children in Philippine schools for the academic year starting in June 2005. It
cannot be overemphasized that it defies logic that one would uproot her children
from US schools and transfer them to schools in a different country if the intent
was only to stay here temporarily. The intent to stay in the Philippines
permanently is further reinforced by the purchase of real property to serve as the
family abode and relocation of household goods, furniture, cars, and other
personal properties from the US. The sale of their family residence in the US and
her husband's arrival in the Philippines to join the family all but confirmed her
abandonment of her US domicile and a definitive intent to remain in the
Philippines. Poe has also been physically present in the Philippines since May
2005, and the fact that she returned after short trips abroad is strongly indicative
that she considers the Philippines as her domicile. Her subsequent ace of acquiring
Filipino citizenship for herself and her minor children, renouncing her US
citizenship, and holding public office are all consistent with the intent formed as
early as 2005. Although these acts are subsequent to May 2005, they are relevant
because they tend to prove a specific intent formed at an earlier time.[138] Taken
together, these facts trump an innocuous statement in her 2013 COC.

The facts that Poe did not renounce her US citizenship until 2010 and used her US
passport between 2006 and 2010 do not affect her establishment of domicile in the
Philippines. The circumstance that Poe, after leaving the US and fixing her
residence in the Philippines, may have had what is called a "floating intention" to
return to her former domicile upon some indefinite occasion, does not give her the
right to claim such former domicile as her residence. It is her establishment of
domicile in the Philippines with the intention of remaining here for an indefinite
time that severed the respondent's domiciliary relatinn with her former home.
[139]
 This is consistent with the basic rule that she couid have only one domicile at a
time.

I now discuss the effect of the fact that Poe entered the country in May 2005 as an
American cil izen under the balikbayan visa-free program. There is no dispute
among the parties that citizenship and residence are distinct concepts. A foreign
national can establish domicile here without undergoing naturalization. Where
there is disagreement is whether Poe could have established her domicile in the
Philippines in May 2005 considering that her entry was through the balikbayan
program, which is valid for one year. Respondents, on the ont· hand, believe it was
not possible because of the temporary nature of her sLty. For them, Poe should
have first secured an Immigrant Certificate of Residence or repatriated earlier than
July 2006. On the other hand, Poe contends that to require either would be to add a
fourth requisite to the establishment Hf domicile.
In principle, I agree with the COMELEC's proposition that "a foreigner's capacity
to establish her domicile in the Philippines is ... limited by and subject to
regulations and prior authorization by the BID."[140] This appears to be based on
rulings of US federal courts, which distinguish "lawful" from "unlawful" domicile.
[141]
 The requisites for domicile remain the same, i.e., physical pn sence, animus
manendi, and animus non revertendi. But "[i]n order to have a 'lawful domicile,'
then, an alien must have the ability, under the immigration laws, to form the intent
to remain in the [country] indefinitely.[142] The basis for this is the sovereign's
inherent power to regulate the entry of immigrants seeking to establish domicile
within its territory. It is not an additional requisite for the establishment of
domicile; rather, it is a precondition that capacitates a foreigner to lawfully
establish domicile. This is tht· import of the statement in Coquilla that "an alien
[is] without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws
may have allowed him to stay."[143]

The point of inquiry, therefore, is if, under our immigration laws, Poe has the
ability to form the intent to establish domicile. In resolving this issue, the analysis
in the US case Elkins v. Moreno[144] is instructive. In Elkins, the US Supreme Court
resolvt·d the question of whether a holder of a "G-4 visa" (a nonimmigrant visa
gr:mted to officers or employees of international treaty organizations and members
of their immediate families) cannot acquire Maryland domicile because such a visa
holder is incapable of demonstrating an essential element of domicile-the intent to
live permanently or indefinitely in Maryland (a "legal disability"). In resolving the
issue, the US Court analyzed federal immigration laws and found that where the
US Congress intended to restrict a nonimmigrant's capacity to establish domicile,
it did so expressly. Since there was no similar restriction imposed on G-4 aliens,
the US Court considered the legislature's silence as pregnant, and concluded that
the US Congress, while anticipating that permanent immigration would normally
occur through immigrant channels, was willing to allow non-restricted
nonimmigrant aliens to adopt the US as their domicile.[145]

In the Philippines, the· primary immigration law is Commonwealth Act No. 613
(CA 613) or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. In defining certain
nonimmigrant classes, Congress explicitly limited the purpose tor entry into the
Philippines. For example, a nonimmigrant student's entry is "solely for the purpose
of study."[146] In other instances, it uses language that identifies ;t specific purpose
and the transient nature of the nonimmigrant's entry.[147] Hy including such
restrictions on intent, it may be deduced that Congress :limed to exclude aliens
belonging to these restricted classes if their real purpose in coming to the
Philippines was to immigrate permanently. This. is further supported by Section
37(d) of the Act which provides as ground for deportation the nonimmigrant's
violation of any limitation or condition tmder which he was admitted.

But Congress made no such clear restrictions in Republic Act No. 9174 (RA
9174), which amended Republic Act No. 6768 (RA 6768).[148] The law
allows balikbayans who hold foreign passports to enter the Philippines visa-free
for a period of one year, except for those considered as restricted nationals. [149] It
defines a balikbayan as "a Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the
Philippines for a period of at least one (1) year, a Filipino overseas worker, or
former Filipino citizen and his or her family, as this term is defined hereunder,
who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the
Philippines."[150] Unlike the restricted classes of nonimmigrants under the
Immigration Act, there was no definite restriction on intent or purpose imposed
upon balikbayans, although there was a temporal restriction on the validity of the
visa-free entry. Taken alone, the one-year limit may be interprded as an implied
limitation. However, RA 9174 expressly declared that one of the purposes of
establishing a balikbayan program is to "to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country."[151] To this end, the law instructs government agencies to "provide the
necessary entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programs and marketing
assistance to a balikbayan, including his or her immediate family members, who
shall avail of the kabuhuvan program in accordance with the existing rules on the
government's reintegration program."[152] This is a clear acknowledgement by
Congress that it is possible for a balikbayan to form the intent needed to establish
his domicile in the Philippines. Notably, there are no qualifications, such as
acquisition of pennanent resident status or reacquisition of Filipino citizenship,
before a balikbayan may avail of the kabuhayan program. Applying the well-
established interpretive rule that a statute must be so construed as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible,[153] the one-year visa-free
entry does not create a legal disability which would prevent balikbayans from
developing animus manendi.

The amendments introduced by RA 9174 to RA 6768 differentiate the present case

from Coquilla. In that case, decided prior to the enactment of RA 9174, the Court
concluded that a visa-free balikbayan visitor could not have established domicile
in the Philippines prior to a waiver of his nonresident status. This is because under
RA 6768, the only declared purpose was "to attract and encourage overseas
Filipinos to come and visit their motherland." Coupled with thtone-year visa-free
limit, this most likely led to the Court's interpretation that a balikbayan's entry was
merely temporary. However, with the amendmeuts introducing the reintegration
provisions, a balikbayan is no longer precluded from developing an intent to stay
permanently in the Philippines. Therefore, Poe, who entered the Philippines after
the effectivity of RA 9174, had the ability to establish a lawful domicile in the
Philippines even prior to her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to GRANT the petitions.

[1]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered yoter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
[2]
 OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on
the ground that anv material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the tiling of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days betore the
election.
[3]
 OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, Sec. 74 par. l. Contents of certificate of
candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filin it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city m district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiant, thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
pennanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposnl
by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that the facts-stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best
of his knowledge.
[4]
 Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447,
458; Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851, April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA
231, 239; Lluz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 456,
471; Tala, v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 196804 & 197015, October 9, 2012, 683
SCRA 197, 234.
[5]
 Tagolino v. House of Representatives Elcdoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202,
March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574, 596; Gonzalez v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 192856,
March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 781; Salcedo II v. COMELEC, supra at 457-459.
[6]
 Supra at 459.
[7]
 Supra at 592.
[8]
 Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179695 & 182369, December 18, 2008, 574
SCRA 782, 792-794.
[9]
 This can also be traced to Salcedo, supra at 458: "the material misrepresentation
contemplated by section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office."
Yet, Salcedo left open the possibility that a candidate's stated name in the COC
may fall within the coverage of Section 78, supra at 459: "The use of a
surname, when not intended to mislead of deceive the public as to one's
identity, is not within the scope of the provision." (Emphasis added)
[10]
 Ejercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014, 742 SCRA 210,
299; Yu v. SamsonTatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 421,
428; People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164185, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 449,
459).
[11]
 The form of the COC prescribed by the COMELEC contains items not
enumerated in Section 74, such as "nickname or stage name," "name to appear in
the ballot," and "gender." It is with respect to these items that a distinction
between material and nonmaterial is proper.
[12]
 Codoy v. Calugay, G.R. No. 123486, August 12, 1999, 31 SCRA 333,
342; Gonzales v. Chavez, G.R. No. 97351, Pebruary 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 816,
837; Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, G.R. Nos. L-23482, L-23767 & L-24259, August
30, 1968, 24 SCRA 837, 848.
[13]
 OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, Sec. 73 par. (I). Certificate of candidacy. - No
person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files
a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis added)
[14]
 The statement of the Jaw in Fermin v. COMELEC, supra at 792, is thus more
accurate:
[T]he denial of due cowe to or the cancellation of the COC is not based on the lack
of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation
that is false, which may [or may not] relate to the qualifications required of the
public office he/she is running for.
[15]
 "The crime of perjury undisputedly involves moral turpitude." Republic v. Guy,
G.R. No. L-41399, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 244, 254.
[16]
 Salcedo II v. COMELEC, supra at 458.
[17]
 Id at 458-460.
[18]
 Id. at 458.
[19]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 6.
[20]
 Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202,
March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574, 592.
[21]
 G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634, 161824, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277.
[22]
 G.R. No. 179851, April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 231.
[23]
 G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 507.
[24]
 Id. at 516-517.
[25]
 G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015.
[26]
 G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014, 717 SCRA 312.
[27]
 The foregoing analysis is limited to the interpretation of Section 78 in relation
to Section 74. It is not intended to affect the existing doctrine involving the penal
provisions of the OEC, specifically Section 262 vis-a-vis Section 74, as enunciated
in Lluz r. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 456.
[28]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 4 par. (7).
[29]
 Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, August 11, 1946, 77 Phil. 192, 209.
[30]
 Tecson v. COMELEC, supra at 325.
[31]
 Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. DX831-32, 179120, 179132-33, April,
2009, 583 SCRA I, 33.
[32]
 Gonzalez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192851, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA
761,790-791.
[33]
 Veloso v. Board (Canvassers, G.R. No. 15620, July 10, 1919, 39 Phil. 886, 888.
[34]
 The word "sole" was originally used to liar either House of Congress (and the
courts) from interfering with the judgment of the other House (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936, 63 Phil. 139, 162):
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause I
of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each
House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, ...." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified
this provisiun by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective members, ... " apparently in order to
emphasize the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon House of the
Legislature over the particular cases therein specified.
[35]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 1. See also Occeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-
52265, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 755.
[36]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1).
[37]
 Gonzalez v. COMELEC, supra at 777; Aznar v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 83820,
May 25, 1990, 185 SCRA 703,708.
[38]
 Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179695 & 182369, December 18,2008,574
SCRA 782,792.
[39]
 Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 193237, 193536, October 9, 2012, 683
SCRA 1, 45 (Brion, J., dissenting) citing Fermin v. COMELEC, supra.
[40]
 Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1358gb, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447,
457.
[41]
 Fermin v. COMELEC, supra at 794.
[42]
 Loong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93986, December 22, 1992, 216 SCRA 760,
768-769.
[43]
 Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. Nos. 47616 & 47623, September 16,
1947, 79 Phil. 249, 258.
[44]
 1935 CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, Sec. I.
[45]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, Sec. 2.
[47]
 Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001,357 SCRA 545 557-558
[48]
 PAUL WEIS,NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 101 (1979).
[49]
 Roa v. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. 1011, October 30, 1912, 23 Phil., 315,
320-321, citing US v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 US 649 (1898).
[50]
 HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 374-375
nd
(2  ed. 1979, Tucker rev. ed. 1967); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (5th ed. 1998).
[51]
 GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: INTRODUCTION
TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (1965).
[52]
 Nottehohm Case (Second Phase) (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala). Judgment, 1955
I.C.J., 4, 23 (April 6).
[53]
 League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of
International Law, Nationality, 20 AJIL 21, 23 (1926).
[54]
 Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October
10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 494-495.
[55]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 21.
[56]
 For an incisive analysis on the constitutional status of international law
principles as interpreted by the Supreme Court, see MERLIN M. MAGALLONA,
TlfE SUPREME COURT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).

Dean Magallona argues that "... in cases where State sovereignty is at stake, the
Court could have been a decisive factor in reshaping it along the contours of
integrity of the Filipino nation." Id. at iii. "The heavy burden of judicial
interpretation in problents of international law lies in the involvement of the
sovereign integrity of the Philippine Republic and in the modality by which the
will of the national community finds juridical expression." Id. at 119.
[57]
 Notably, both the CRC and ICCPR speak of children in general, not just
foundlings; they apply to Filipino children, foreign children domicilnl in the
Philippines, and foundlings alike. This only highlights that the conventions could
not have contemplated an automatic grant of citizenship without imposing the jus
soli principle on all state-parties.
[58]
 See Commonwealth Act No. 473, Sec. 15; Republic Act No. 9225. Sec. 4.
[59]
 UDHR, Art. 15(1). Everyone has the right to a nationality.
[60]
 MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 255-258 (2005).
[61]
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, THE STATE OF THE
WORLD'S REFUGEES: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA, available
at http://www.unhcr.org/3eb7ba7d4.pdf.
[61]
 Id. The UDHR was precipitated by citizenship issues arising from large-scale
population movements and formation of new states after World War I. It is in this
context that the "right to a nationality" should be understood. Notable events
include the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman empires
leading to the establishment of new states, such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Yugoslavia, the restoration of the former state of Poland, and the simultaneous
adjustment of many international borders in the area directly or indirectly affected
by the conflict. "Some five million people were moved, ... which evidently
required the states concerned and the international community as a whole to
address some complex citizenship questions." Then in the 1940s, there was the
decolonization and partition of India in 1947 and the subsequent movement of
Hindus and Muslims between India and Pakistan; the conflict over Palestine and
the creation of Israel in 1948. creating a Palestinian diaspora in the Middle East
and beyond; and the Chinese revolution of 1949, which led to the establishment of
a communist government on the mainland and a nationalist government on the
island of Taiwan.
[63]
 Commission on Human Rights, Memorandum (As Amicus Curiae Submission),
p. 10, citing Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Other Documents Considered
During the 48th Session, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 126, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1(Part 1).
The right to a nationality as a human right, is conceivable as a right of an
individual vis-a-vis a certain State, deriving, under certain conditions, from
international law. As the case may be, it is the right to be granted the nationality
of the successor State or not to be deprived the nationality of the predecessor
State. The obligation not to create statelessness, however, is a State-to-State erga
omnes obligation, conceivable either as a corollary of the above right to a
nationality or as an autonomous obligation existing in the sphere of inter-State
relations only and having no direct legal consequences in the relationship between
States and individuals. (Emphasis added)
[64]
 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statufum (The best interpreter of a
statute is the statute itself). Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January
2008, 542 SCRA 224, 245.
[65]
 Laurence Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of
Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J.515, 531 (1982).
[66]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1.
[67]
 G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940, 69 Phil. 635.
[68]
 Id. at 642-644.
[69]
 COMELEC En Banc Resolution, SPA Nos. 15-002, 15-007 & 15-139, p. 17:
The fact that Respondent was a foundling with no known parentage or blood
relative effectively excluded her from the coverage of the definition of a natural-
born citizen" (at p. 15). "To reiterate, naturalborn citizenship is founded on the
principle of jus sanguinis. Respondent is a foundling. Her parentage is unknown.
There is thus no basis to hold that respondent has blood relationship with a
Filipino parent. This Commission therefore cannot rule or presume that
Respondent possesses bluod relationship with a Filipino citizen when it is certain
that such relationship is indemonstrable.
[70]
 COMELEC First Division Resolution, SPA Nos. 15-002, 15-007 & 15-139, p.
25:
To be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, however, Respondent must be able
to definitively show her direct blood relationship with a Filipino parent and-
consistent with Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution-demonstrate that no
other act was necessary for her to complete or perfect her Filipino citizenship.

TSN, February 9, 2016, pp. 64-65:

J. JARDELEZA: Now, [] when you say that the petitioner has only one type of
evidence that can prove her pacentage and that's only DNA[?]

COMM. LIM: Seemingly for now ...

J. JARDELEZA: And what is the meaning of "seemingly for now"?

COMM. LIM: That is what a reasonable mind could possibly approximate,

because we have a situation where a child is of unknown biological parents. From
the premise that the parents are biologically unknown it cannot admit of proof that
parentage exists, identity wise that is otherwise the pan its would be known. So in
a situation such as this, Your Honor, it is our respectful submission that some
other modality other than the surfacing of the parents, other than evidence of
family relations, one plausible evidence would be what Justice Carpio suggested,
DNA. And although we did not discuss that in our decisions not being necessary
anylllore to a disposition of the issues before us, this humble representation
accepts that suggestion to be very sound. Because in all fairness,  foundling status
need not be attached to a person forever.
[71]
 Rule on Adoption, A.M. No. 02-6-02-St (2002), Sec. 3(e).
[72]
 Dycaico v. SSS, G.R. No. 161357, November 30, 2005, 476 SCRA 538, 558-
559 citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 US 628 ( 1974); US. Department of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 US 508, 37 ( 1973): Vlandis v. Kline, 412 US 441
(1973). See Clevelond Board of Education v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) which
involved school board rules that mandated maternity leaves for teachers beginning
their fifth or sixth month of pregnancy and prohibited reemployment prior to a
semester at least 3 months after delivery. The US Supreme Court found that the
mandatory leave requirement conclusively presumed "that every pregnant teacher
who reaches the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy is incapable of continuing,"
while the 3-month delay conclusively presumed the teacher's untitness to work
during that period. This conclusive presumption is "neither 'necessarily [nor]
universally true,' and is violative of the Due Process Clause." In his concurring
opinion. Justice Powell applied an equal protection analysis and found the school
board rules "either counterproductive or irrationaly overinclusive" and therefore
violative of equal protection. See also GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 888-897 (1975).
[73]
 GSIS v. Montesclaros, G.R. No. 146494 July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 441,449.
[74]
 If she tails under the third category, her acts of obtaining a Philippine passport
and registering as a voter may be considered as election of Filipino citizenship. (In
re FlorencioMallare, A.C. No. 533, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 45, 52. Art IV,
Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that those who elect Filipino citizenship
are deemed natural-born.)
[75]
 OSG Memorandum, Exhibits C & D.
[76]
 Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 664,683.
[77]
 Salvador v. Philippine Mining Service Corp., G.R. No. 148766, January 22,
2003, 395 SCRA 729, 738.
[78]
 People v. Cabigquez, G.R. No. 185708, September 29, 2010, 631 SCRA 653,
671.
[79]
 Zabala v. People, G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015, 748 SCRA 246, 253.
[80]
 Go v. Bureau of Immigration, G.R. No. 191810, June 22, 2015, (Velasco, J.,
dissenting) citing CJ Warren's dissenting opinion in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44,64 (1958).
[81]
 Commission on Human Rights, Memorandum (As Amicus
Curiae Submission), p. 12.
[82]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Sec. 1.
[83]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Sec. 4.
[84]
 US. v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934).
[85]
 Rollo, p. 180.
[86]
 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Sec. 4; Rule 130, Sec. 51, par. (a)(3); Rule
133, Sec. I.

In filiation cases, Sec. 3(f) of the Rule on PNA Evidence (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC)
refers to the "Probability of Parentage". It is "the numerical estimate for the
likelihood of parentage of a putative parent compared with the probability of a
random match of two unrelated individuals in a given population."

"Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,

means probability of the truth." Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150284,
November 22, 2010, 635 SCRA 508, 515-516. (Emphasis added)

"Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting

conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs." Sea Power Shipping
Enterprises, Inc. v. Salazar, G.R. No. 188595, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 233,
251.
[87]
 Joaquin v. Navarro, G.R. Nos. L-5426-28, May 29, 1953, 93 Phil. 257, 269
citing 1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.
[88]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.
—A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or
are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. See Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
176970, December 8, 2008, 573 SCRA 309.
[89]
 Poe Memorandum, p. 205.
[90]
 OSG Memorandum, Exh. C
[91]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 4.
[92]
 Dycaicu v. SSS, G.R. No. 161357, November 30, 2005, 476 SCRA 538, 553.
[93]
 GSIS v. Monlesclaros, G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 441, 453.
[94]
 G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 & 161824, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277.
[95]
 Chua v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992, 206
SCRA 65, 77.
[96]
 Id.; Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. United Planners
Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015.
[97]
 Padilla v. Padilla, G.R. No.48137, October 3, 1947, 74 Phil. 377, 387.
[98]
 Sr. Montinola saw no need for the amendment because he believed that this
was already covered by the Spanish Code. Sr. thought that it would be best to
leave the matter to the hands of the legislature. Sr. Roxas believed that foundlings
are rarcc cases and that it would be superfluous to include them in the Constitution
because, in his view, this was already covered by international law.
[99]
 First coined by Justice Stone in the famous "Footnote Four" in U.S v. Carotene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 ( 1938), where the US Supreme Court established that
state-sanctioned discriminatory practices against discrete and insular minorities are
entitkd to a diminished presumption of constitutionality. Cited in Central Bank
Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Baugko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December
15, 2004, 446 SCRA 299, 488 (Carprio-Morales, J, dissenting); White Light Corp.
v. City  of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20,2009, 576 SCRA 416, 436;
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618
SCRA 32,87-99 (Puno C.J, concurring); Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June
25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 447-451 (Leonardo-De Castro, J, concurring).
[100]
 Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014, 716
SCRA 237, 301.
[101]
 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 ( 1974); In one article, Justice Powell,
although not in entire agreement with the theory of Footnote Four, summarized
many scholars' formulation of the theory as follows:
The fundamental character of our government is democratic. Our constitution
assumes that majorities should rule and that the government should be able to
govern. Therefore, for the most part, Congress and the state legislatures should be
allowed to do as they choose. But there are certain groups that cannot participate
effectively in the political process. And the political process therefore cannot be
trusted to protect these groups in the way it protects most of us. Consistent with
these premises, the theory continues, the Supreme Court has two special missions
in our scheme of government:

First, to clear away impediments to participation, and ensure that all groups can
engage equally in the process; and

Second, to review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical to discrete and

insular minorities who are unable to protect themselves in the legislative process.
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., "Carolene Products" Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087,
1088-1089.
[102]
 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 169 (1989).
[103]
 Fedorenko v. U.S., 449 U.S. 490, 522-523 (1981),
[104]
 Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment,
1955 I.C.J., 4, 23 (April 6).
[105]
 "Neither will petitioner (Poe) fall under Section I, paragraphs 3, 4, and 5."
COMELEC Memorandum, p. 56.
[106]
 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 686 (1973).
[107]
 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
[108]
 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, supra at 93, (Puno, C..J., concurring).
[109]
 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
supra at 391.
[110]
 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009,
582 SCRA 255, 282.
[111]
 Only 4,483 individuals were registered since 1950. Poe Memor ndum, Annex
B.
[112]
 CONSTITUTION, Preamble; Art. II, Sec. 26: Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
[113]
 TSN, February 16, 2016, p. 29:
J. JARDELEZA: x x x Under strict scrutiny analysis, the government has to meet
a compelling interest test. Meaning, the government has to articulate a compelling
State interest why you are discriminating against the foundling. ... So, state for me
in your memo what is the compelling State interest to make a discrimination
against the foundling." COMELEC did not address this in its memorandum.
[114]
 The Solicitor General's discretion to appear as Tribune of the People is one
undoubtedly recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. See Orbos v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, 189 SCRA 459; Gonzales v.
Chavez, G.R. r o. 97351, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 816; Martinez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-112387, October 11, 1994, 237 SCRA 575; Pimentel, Jr. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 126394, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 586; City Warden of
Manila v. Estrella, G.R. No. 141211, August 31, 2001; Constantinp-David v.
Pangandaman-Gania, G.R. No. 156039, August 14, 2003, 409 SCRA
80 ; Salenga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174941, February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA
635.
[115]
 Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, supra at 466. Indeed, the OSG is expected
to look beyond the narrow interest of the government in a particular case and take
the long view of what will best benefit the Filipino people in the long run. As we
explained in Gonzales v. Chavez, "it is the Filipino people as a collectivity that
constitutes the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of the
OSG is the people themselves x x x." This is but an affirmation that the privilege,
and at times, even the duty, to appear as Tribune of the People springs from the
constitutional precept that sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority, including that of the Solicitor General, emanates from them.
[116]
 Id.
[117]
 Neal Katyal & Paul Clement, On the Meaning of "Natural Born Citizen," 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 161, available at http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/on-the-
meaning-of-natural-born-citizen/.
[118]
 Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 11•1434, 161634, 161824, March 3, 2004,
424 SCRA 277, 422 (Carpio, J, dissenting).
[119]
 RICHARD CONDON, THE MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE (1959). A
political thriller novel about the son of a prominent US political family, who was
brainwashed as part of a Communist conspiracy. It was twice adapted into a
feature film (1962 and 2004).
[120]
 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra at 278.
[121]
 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886) cited in People v. Dela Piedra, G.R.
No. 121777, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 163, 181.
[122]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, Sec. 2.
[123]
 G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, 357 SCRA 545.
[124]
 Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 144705, November
15, 2005, 475 SCRA 65, 75-76.
[125]
 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
[126]
 Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, March 31 , 2009, 582 SCRA 694, 707-
708.
[127]
 Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, September 2015; Umbona v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 210,
246; Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995,
248 SCRA 300, 323.
[128]
 Asistio v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010, 619 SCRA 518, 529-530.
[129]
 Caballero v. COMELEC, supra.
[130]
 G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 607.
[131]
 Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 572,
576.
[131]
 Id.
[132]
 G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
[134]
 G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
[135]
 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331.
[136]
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248
SCRA 300.
[137]
 Id. at 326.
[138]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence.—Evidence
that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that
he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge; identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like. (Emphasis added)
[139]
 Tanseco v. Arteche, G.R. No. 36300, September 13, 1932, 57 Phil. 235.
[140]
 COMELEC Resolution dated December 23, 2015, p. 23
[141]
 Castellon-Contreras v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 45 F.3d 149
th
(7  Cir. 1995); Melian v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 987 F.2d 1521
(11th Cir. 1993); Lok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 681 F.2d 107, 109
(2nd Cir. 1982).
[142]
 Castellon-Contreras v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra.
[143]
 G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 607, 616.
[144]
 435 u.s. 647 (1978).
[145]
 Id.
[146]
 CA 613, Sec. 9(1). See also 9(c) "A seaman serving as such on a vessel
arriving at a port of the Philippines and seeking to enter temporarily and solely in
the pursuit of his calling as a seaman"; and 9(d) "A person seeking to enter the
Philippines solely to carry on trade between the Philippines and the foreign
state of which he is a national, hi' wife, and his unmarried children under twenty-
one years of age, if accompanying or following to join hilli, subject to the
condition that citizen of the Philippines under similar conditions are accorded like
privileges in the foreign state of which such person is a national." (Emphasis
added)
[147]
 Id., Sec. 9(a) "A temporary visitor cotning for business or for pleasure or
for reasons or health"; (b) "A person in transit to a destination outside the
Philippines." (Emphasis added)
[148]
 An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program (1989).
[149]
 RA 6768, as amended by RA 9174, Sec. 3(c).
[150]
 Id., Sec. 2(a).
[151]
 Id., Sec. 1.
[152]
 Id., Sec. 6.
[153]
 Uy v. Sandiganhayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001, 354 SCRA 651,
672-673.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur. The Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled the
petitioner's certificate of candidacy.

At the outset, this discussion is necessarily framed in the context of the nature of
the petitions brought before the COMELEC and the resultant scope of this Court's
review.

The Omnibus Election Code ("OEC") positively requires an aspiring candidate to

formally manifest his·or her intention to run through the filing of a certificate of
candidacy.[1] Section 74 of the OEC enumerates the information required to be
stated by a candidate in his or her certificate of candidacy, thus:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized cit:f or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post orfice address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; thai he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificaty of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

xxxx
Under Section 78, a certificate of candidacy can be denied due course or cancelled
in case of false material representation therein. The jurisprudential requirements
for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC are
clear: (1) that a representation is made with respect to a material fact, (2) that the
representation is false, and (3) that there is intent to deceive or mislead the
electorate.[2]

The Assailed Resolutions were issued by the COMELEC disposing of Petitions

for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy filed by the
respondents against the petitioner. Treating all petitions filed as Section 78
Petitions, the Assailed Resolutions held that (1) the representations made by the
petitioner with respect to her citizenship and residence were false, and (2) she
intended to deceive or mislead the electorate as to her qualifications to run for
office. In determining the existence of false material representation, the
COMELEC declared that the petitioner cannot claim that May 24, 2005 was the
starting point of her period of residence, and that she is not a natural-born citizen.
Consequently, her certificate of candidacy was cancelled.

In these Consolidated Petitions for certiorari, the petitioner ascribes grave abuse

of discretion to the COMELEC for, among others, ruling on her qualifications in
·a Section 78 petition. In other words, the extent of the COMELEC's jurisdiction
in a Section 78 petition should have been to check the accuracy of the material
representations made in a certificate of candidacy and to determine the existence
of an intent to mislead - only for the purpose of deciding whether the certificate of
candidacy should be denied due course or cancelled.

The limited scope of this Court's review on certiorari of a judgment, final order or
resolution of the COMELEC under Rule 64 is well-defined. Time and again, this
Court has held that the extent of its review is limited to the determination of
whether the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, or committed grave abuse of
di,scretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[3]

"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has been described in a number of
cases as the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjointd by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been
done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discreti(·m must be patent and
gross.[4] This Court has also previously held that wrong or irrelevant considerations
in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint COMELEC's action with grave abuse of
discretion, and that in exceptional cases, when the COMELEC's action on the
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the
point of being grossly unreasonable, this Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene.[5]

The question in these C nsolidated Petitions is whether or not the Assailed

Resolutions of the COMELEC are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. If the COMELEC committed grave
abuse, then it becomes this Court's bounden duty to strike down the assailed
judgment. Moreso in this case, when the right of an individual to run and be voted
for public office and the right of the electorate to choose their leader are at stake.

Necessarily, therefore, this Court's jurisdiction and its exercise neither hinge on
nor require a final determination of the petitioner's qualifications. Keeping in mind
the narrow confines of this Court's certiorari jurisdiction as invoked, and the
principle of judicial restraint, I confine my views only to those matters that are
absolutely necessary to resolve the Petitions, and accordingly leave the resolution
of the questions of her qualifications to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal if and
when such a petition is filed before it.

With this framework, I proceed to examine whether the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
cancelled petitioner's certificate of candidacy.

The COMELEC acted with grave

abuse of discretion when it cancelled
the petitioner's certificate of
candidacy.

I believe that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by (1)

misinterpreting the jurisprudential requirements of cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78, and (2) for placing the burden of proof upon the
petitioner to show that she complies with the residency and citizenship
qualifications for the position of President.

The COMELEC grossly misinterpreted the law in the manner it treated the
jurisprudential requirements of cancellation under Section 78. Specifically, it
gravely abused its discretion by failing to determine the existence of petitioner's
intent to deceive separate from the determination of whether there were false
material representations in her certificate of candidacy.

In Mitra v. COMELEC,[6] this Court elucidated on the nature of the element of

intent to deceive, thus:
[T]he misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere
innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is
patently absent, or where no deception of the electorate results. The deliberate
character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the
consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; x x x.
Proceeding from this statement, this Court found in that case that Mitra did not
commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy.
Moreover, this Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its
appreciation of the evidence which led it to conclude that Mitra was not a resident
of Aborlan, Palawan. The COMELEC, too, failed to critically consider whether
Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would
otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor ofPalawan.

In Jalover v. Osmeña,[7] the requirement of intent to deceive was restated, thus:

Separate from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section
78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact,
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, if must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the wot1ld-be candidate's
qualifications for public office. x x x
These cases show that there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Therefore,.the
requirement of intent cannot be disposed of by a simple finding that there was
false representation of a material fact; to be sure, there must also be a showing of
the candidate's intent to deceive as animating the making of the false material
representation.[8]

In the case of petitioner, apart from the finding that there were false material
representations in the petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC relied
mainly on the representation previously made by the petitioner in her 2012
certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator, and that she is a foundling, to
support the inference that the petitioner intended to mislead the electorate into
believing that she has the requisite residency and natural-born status. The
existence of intent to mislead is not a question of law - and I find that the
petitioner has adduced substantial evidence to show, contrary to any intent to
mislead, that she honestly believed herself to have the requisite qualifications to
run for President. Her evidence should have been directly met by the respondents.
As it was, her evidence was not considered by the COMELEC. On this ground, its
judgment was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Moreover, contrary to the rules of evidence, the COMELEC shifted the burden of
proof to the petitioner, ascribing to her the onus of showing that she had the
qualifications to run for President, instead of requiring the respondents to prove
the three elements that furnish the grounds for denial of due course or cancellation
of certificate of candidacy.

Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.[9] This Court has consistently held, and it is an established rule, that the
burden of evidence may shift depending upon the exigencies of the case in the
course of trial;[10] however, the burden of proof remains with the party upon whom
it is originally imposed[11] - he who seeks the affirmative of an issue. In this case,
as with other election cases, the burden of proof is placed upon the parties seeking
the denial of due course or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. [12]

In this case, this shifting of burden of proof to the petitioner unfairly skewed the
analysis and resulting conclusions reached by the COMELEC in the petitions for
cancellation against the petitioner. It would appear that the COMELEC relied
merely on its judgment being based on substantial evidence, without considering
the effect upon the petitions for cancellation of the: (1) respondents' claims and
evidence being met by those of the petitioner, and (2) evidence or both parties at
equipoise. This erroneous consideration similarly taints the judgment with grave
abuse of discretion.

Consequent to the finding that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion, this
case falls within the exception whereby this Court can examine the factual
conclusions of the COMELEC.

There was no intent to deceive.

A. With respect to residency

Mitra, while admittedly not on all fours with this case, shares enough similarities
to this case on a conceptual level that the analysis used therein can be applied by
parity of reasoning. Inasmuch as we held in Mitra that the establishment of a new
domicile may be an incremental process and that the totality of the evidence
should he considered in determining whether or not a new domicile was
established, the same disquisition applies to the instant case.

The totality of evidence presented by the petitioner points to a decision and action
to establish a new domicile of choice in the Philippines as early as 2005. Stated
difl.erently, my considered appreciation of the totality of all these overt acts done
by the petitioner is that she had believed in good faith that when she filled up her
certificate of candidacy she was correctly reckoning the period of her residency
from the time that she had taken concrete steps to transfer her domicile. Using the
standard of Section 74 of the OEC, petitioner filled in the certificate of candidacy
to "the best of her knowledge". To impute intent to mislead upon a person who
represents what she knows to the best of her knowledge and belief to be true, as
supported by the evidence, is to commit grave abuse of discretion.

The petitioner did not fab;ely represent her length of residence.

All told, the evidence of petitioner preponderantly shows that she (1) has been
physically present in the country from 2005; (2) had intended to remain in the
Philippines, and (3) abandoned her domicile in the United States.

Actual physical presence

The petitioner sufficiently established that after she came to the Philippines in
2004 to support her father's campaign, she returned in 2005 with a more
permanent stay in mind and had been physically present in the country since; that
she had brought her children to the Philippines in mid-2005.

Animus manendi and animus non revertendi

Similar to evidence showing physical presence, the petitioner sufficiently showed

that since 2005, she and her entire family had taken steps to permanently relocate
In the Philippines. Petitioner showed that as early as March 2005, her husband had
begun the process of transporting and disposing of their household belongings in
the United States. By the middle of 2005, the petitioner and her hildren had arrived
in the Philippines; the children, enrolled in Philippine schools by June 2005. The
next year, they began the construction of a home and acquired a condominium unit
to stay in until the construction is completed.

Her travel documents also show that whenever she left the country, she returned to
the Philippines. By July 2006, she had taken her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of rhe Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.
Her husband had also formally notified the United States Postal Service of their
change of address. The entire process culminated in her acceptance of the Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board ("MTRCB") Chairmanship and
her renunciation of her American citizenship in 2010.

To an unbiased mind, all these overt acts would show that the intent and
demonstrative acts to transfer to or establish a new domicile of choice began in
2005. The evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the conclusion that the
petitioner's physical presence, animus manendi and animus non revertendi had
concurred by clear overt acts obtaining as early as 2005. While admittedly, the last
acts that foreclose any other conclusion were done in 2010, more than substantial
evidence is present to support her claim that she had established a new domicile of
choice in the Philippines from May 24, 2005. As in Mitra,[13] the transfer was an
incremental process, nowhere near completed in 2005, but already existing then. I
submit that these facts lead to no other conclusion than that the petitioner had
already determined to permanently reside in the Philippines.

On this point, I quote with approval the Separate Opinion[14] of Commissioner Luie
Tito F. Guia:
To prove her claims, Respondent presented, among others, the following: a) E-
mail exchanges from 18 March 2005 to 29 September 2006 with Victory Van
Corporation and National Veterinary Quarantine Service Bureau of Animal
Industry of the Philippines indicating respondent and her husband's plan of
relocating all their movable properties from the United States to the Philippines; b)
Official Transcripts, Permanent School Records and Registrar Certification
showing the enrolment of her school aged children in Philippine schools before
June 2005; c) her Philippine Bureau of Internal Records [sic] or Tax Identification
Number 239-290-513-000; and d) Condominium Certificate Titles, Declarations
of Real Property and a Transfer Certificate of Title indicating acquisitions of
different real properties in the country.

It is clear from the foregoing that Respondent was physically and actually present
in the Philippines sint:e May 2005. This is one of the requisites for an effective
change of domicile. It is also evident that, independent of her still being a US
citizen at that time, Respondent had already intended to change her domicile from
the US to the Philippines. All her acts and conduct points to her intention to
transfer her residence to the Philippines.

xxxx

From the substantial evidence on record, I find that there is no misrepresentation

in Respondent's CoC in so far as her period of residency in the Philippines is
concerned. It is an error for the Commission to cancel Respondent's CoC on this
ground.

xxxx
To my mind, there can be no clearer manifestation of the earlier concurrence of the
petitioner's animus manendi and animus non revertendi with her physical
presence in the country than when she brought her children to the Philippines in
the middle of 2005 and enrolled them in the same year in Philippine schools. To
any parent, this is a very big decision that is not lightly made. To uproot teens
from the world they know, and to displace them from the environment in which
they grew up, is, to say the least, a very significant decision for any parent to
make. Indeed, as a parent, the petitioner is presumed to be acting in the best
interest of her children. And that petitioner did this convinces me that petitioner's
decision to permanently reside in the Philippines was already made at the time, or
just before, the children were brought to the Philippines to stay with her and to
study, in the middle of 2005.

Given the totality of evidence presented by petitioner, the inaccuracies with

respect to the period of her residency can be considered an honest mistake. The
petitioner had admitted to making a mistake in determining the precise date of the
start of her residency when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Senator in 2012. The filing of the 2015 certificate of candidacy is the earliest
opportunity that the petitioner had to correct her previous representation - the very
fact that she changed her period of residence, on its own, cannot be the basis of a
finding that there was deliberate intent to mislead as to her residency.

As for the 2015 certificate of candidacy, even assuming that the representation that
her period of residence began on May 24, 2005 is false, the petitioner had
sufficiently shown that the effective transfer of domicile occurred in 2005. Even in
an effect-based analysis, therefore, there should not have been a finding that there
was intent to mislead. By fact and law, she complies with the residency
requirement, and no deception of the electorate as to her qualification ensues by
virtue of her representation.

What is more, she has in her favor substantial evidence to show that she had been
physically present and had taken overt actions demonstrative of her animus
manendi and animus non revertendi from the time of her claimed period of
residence on May 24, 2005.[15] In fine, the evidence presented preponderated in
favor of the petitioner. And even if we were to assume arguendo that the evidence
of the parties is at equipoise, still, the COMELEC should have ruled against the
party with the burden of proof—the respondents.

This application of burden of proof can be seen in one of the holdings in Tecson v.
COMELEC, thus:
[B]ut while the totality of the-evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-hom citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderat·e in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not ther(has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful."[16]
B. With respect to citizenship

On this point I deviate from the majority opinion when it proceeded to rule on the
question of the petitioner's citizenship. Keeping in mind the nature of this Court's
limited certiorari review, I believe that this Court need not have made a definitive
nding on petitioner's status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

I concur, however, that the COMELEC grossly misappreciated the evidence when
it found that tle petitioner deliberately intended to mislead the electorate when she
stated that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, knowing full well that she is a
foundling. The COMELEC would have us believe that the petitioner knew that she
was not a natural-born citizen at the time that she accomplished and filed her
certificate of candidacy, and knowing this, deliberately attempted to deceive the
electorate by claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The question of petitioner's citizenship as a foundling is subject to legal

interpretation. Any conclusion reached on this point is necessarily a legal
conclusion. If one needs proof to show how intricate and susceptible to several
interpretations her real status is as a foundling, one needs only to look at the
different interpretations advanced by the members of the COMELEC and of this
Court.

The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the
basis of good faith.[17] In Kasilag v. Rodriguez,[18] this Court, citing Manresa,
recognized the possibility of an excusable ignorance of or error of law being a
basis for good faith:
We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded
upon an error of law. When the acquisition appears in a public document, the
capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by competent authority, and
even established by appeals taken from final judgments and administrative
remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is
remote under such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even
verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, and while no one
should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to
know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and
truly unexcusable ignoranct is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and
another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from complex
legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.

But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still,
ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the
intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and
appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of
doubtful doctrines.
If indeed a mistake was made by petitioner as to her real status, this could be
considered a mistake on a difficult question of law that could be the basis for good
faith. In this regard, good faith is presumed.[19] In the same vein, it is presumed that
a person is innocent of a crime or wrong, and that the law was obeyed. [20] Without
more, the legal conclusion alleged by the respondents in the petitions for
cancellation, and thereafter reached by the COMELEC, that the petitioner was not
a natural-born citizen simply because she is a foundling is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the petitioner made the representation as to her
citizenship in good faith.

Even assuming that these presumptions cannot be considered in the petitioner's

favor, the lack ofil.;tent to deceive is fully supported by evidence tending to show
that she fully discharged the burden of her oath in the certificate of candidacy that
her status as a natural-born Filipino is true and correct to the best of her
knowledge. The evidence submitted by the petitioner tends to more titan
adequately establish that before her naturalization as an American citizen, she
consistently comported herself as, and was deemed, a Filipino citizen, even by the
government. Though this by no means determines her real status, it cannot be
gainsaid that any reasonable person can be led m believe that he is how he was
deemed or treated, i.e., a natural born citizen. Given what the petitioner believed
of her status, the claim that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen is far from
groundless or deceptive. It is credible that she believed in good faith that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and that this fact is true and correct to the best of her
knowledge-as she so swore in her certificate of candidacy.

In the final analysis, even assuming falsity in her representation as to her

citizenship similar to her residency, this fact alone should not have led to an
automatic finding of intent to mislead and deceive the electorate, and ultimately to
the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy under Rule 78.

A final word. The function of this Court's review in this Petition does not
absolutely require an examination of the petitioner's qualifications, but only to
determine whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled the petitioner's
Certificate of Candidacy. This is in keeping with the limited scope of review in
this certiorari petition. By applying the standards that have been previously set,
this Court can dispense justice without presuming to make that determination.

For these reasons, I vote to GRANT the consolidated Petitions.

[1]
 OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,  Sec. 73.
[2]
 Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015; See
also Villafuerte v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, February 25,2014, 717 SCRA
312, citing Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377 (1999).
[3]
 Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, 698 Phil. 548, 559 (2012); Laurena, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 553 Phil. 210, 217 (2007), citing Manzala v. COMELEC, 551 Phil.
28, 35 (2007).
[4]
 Alliance for Nationalism and Democrucy (ANAD) v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206987, September 10, 2013, 705 SCRA 340, 344, citing Beluso v.
COMELEC, 635 Phil. 436, 443 (2010); Velasco v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 1172,
1183 (2003), citing Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 252 Phil. 253,262
(1989); Lalican v. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485,495 (1997).
[5]
 Sabili v. COMELEC, 686 Phil. 649 (20 12), and Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No.
209286, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267, citing Mitra v. COMELEC, 648
Phil. 165 (2010).
[6]
 636 Phil. 753, 780 (2010).
[7]
 Supra note 5, at 282.
[8]
 In Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 706 Phil. 534, 551
(2013), a case that dealt with the question of whether a disqualified candidate
whose certificate of candidacy was not cancelled could be substituted, the Coun
ratiocinated:
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation,
much less one's intent to defraud, is ofbare significance in a Section 78 petition as
it is enough that the person's declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be
false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person
committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
determination of whether one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What
remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny" due course to and/or
cancel the CoC on the basis of one's ineligibility and that the same be granted
without any qualification.
However, cases on cancellation of certilicate of candidacy under Section 78
(which were promulgated after Tagolino) retained the element of
intent: Villafuerte v. COMELEC, supra note 2 and Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 207900, April 22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223.
[9]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 1.
[10]
 Bautista v. Sarmiento, 223 Phil. 181, 186 (1985); See also De Leon v. Bank of
the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 184565, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA
443; Vitarich Corporation v. Losin, 649 Phil. 164 (2010).
[11]
 Bautista v. Sarmiento, id. at 185.
[12]
 Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522 the
same discussion repeated in the Resolution dated October 22, 2013; Tecson v.
COMELEC, 468 Phil. 421 (2004).
[13]
 Supra note 5.
[14]
 In the Consolidated Petitions docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-
007 (DC), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC).
[15]
 The amount of evidence presented by the petitioner sufficiently distinguishes
her case from the cases of Coquilla v. COMELEC, 434 Phil. 861
(2002), Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 2 and Reyes v. COMELEC, supra
note 12, wherein this Court was constrained to either closely link or reckon the
period of residence to the reacquisition of citizenship for sheer dearth of evidence.
[16]
 Supra note 12, at 488; citations omitted.
[17]
 Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890 (1999); Kasilag v. Rodriguez, G.R.
No. 46623, 69 Phil. 217 (1939).
[18]
 Id. at 230-231, citing Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code,
Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.
[19]
 GSIS v. Sps. Labung-Deang, 417 Phil. (,62 (2001); Bermudez v. Gonzales, 401
Phil. 38, 47 (2000).
[20]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3, pars. (a) and (ff).

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