PCIC Europe 2017

CYBER SECURITY TUTORIAL

ENERGY AUTOMATION AND IEC 62443
Dirk Kroeselberg, Siemens AG, Corporate Technology
Frederic Buchi, Siemens AG, Energy Management
Hans Meulenbroek, Siemens Nederland N.V.
Tutorial Agenda

Agenda

Motivation and Threat Landscape

Cyber Security Standards

Risk Driven Approach

Realization Approaches

Summary and Outlook

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Why Cyber Security?
Statements from the MIT report on the
right (issued in March 2017)

• “[..] The Internet is a legacy system

designed for non-commercial uses with
little or no need for security. Security
has chiefly been an option for end
points,[..]”
• “[..] The digital systems that control
critical infrastructure in the United Source: https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/reports/Report-
IPRI-CIS-CriticalInfrastructure-2017-Brenner.pdf
States and most other countries are
easily penetrated and architecturally
weak [..]”

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Why Cyber Security?

There is no “air gap”

• OT is interconnected with IT
− Interfaces with Enterprise/Office network
− Remote access
− USB sticks, maintenance computers

• One of the main attack vectors today is

“phishing”, also for attacks on OT
environments
• General Internet security does not
prevent phishing on its own:
− Example on the right: Number of
certificates issued for Web servers by Source: https://crt.sh
(March 2017)
“Let’s Encrypt” with “paypal” in the name

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Cyber Security: Factors for Threat Consideration

General Factors • Mix of components from different

• Critical Infrastructure, 24 h Operation, vendors with different technologies
geographically distributed • Interfaces to office networks
Functional Factors • Interfaces across unsecure
networks
• Proprietary technology
• Legacy components
• Windows/Linux standard components

Control center Remote access

Untrusted network

Station level Example:

Router Substation Automation
Service HMI
PC Station controller
PC
• IEDs
Switch
• Embedded
Field level Switch Switch
Controllers
• Standard-OS PCs
Switch Switch Switch Switch Switch
(HMI, Engineering)
IEDs
Protection and
• Network equipment
field devices • External interfaces

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Protection Goals

• High-level protection goals: prevent loss of C, I, A

Property that information is

not made available or Property of protecting the
disclosed to unauthorized accuracy and
individuals, entities, or completeness of assets
processes

Availability
Property of being
accessible and usable
upon demand by an
authorized entity
Definitions from ISO/IEC27000:2012

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Areas of Conflict

Office IT Industrial OT

Automated patching,
up-to-date patch level Frequent patching tough,
feasible conflicts with availability
Secure
Available
Performance impact of
System
Anti-Virus solution
Malware protection
is common

SW support
over long lifetime
User locked out: annoying,
but easy to recover
Operator locked out:
(regular procedures)
may harm people,
or damage plant

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How realistic are cyber security threats today?

• Wide availability of tools for automation

− Example: Shodan will tell you all publicly available IP addresses of a
specific controller, or IoT device
− Bulk searching support via API and dictionary file
− Do you know how exactly your devices are connected?

• Attack on Ukraine Power Grid

− Affecting Power Grid operators, substations, approx. 220.000 people
without power (end of 2015, follow-up attacks during 2016)

• “SAP Cybersecurity for Oil and Gas”, ERPScan Whitepaper

presented at Blackhat Europe, Nov. 2015
− IT/OT integration extends IT domain threats into the OT domain

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Basic steps of the Ukraine power grid attack

} Spearphishing, infection of an office

laptop with the “BlackEnergy” malware. „Two days before Xmas, in
the afternoon as stated by
} Network scans in the IT network an operator, the mouse
moved on the HMI and
started switching off
} Found a connection to an OT breakers remotely.
supervision platform
As the local operator
} Network scans in the OT network attempted to regain control
of the supervision
} Collect information about installed interface, he was logged
off and couldn’t login again
OT components
because the password had
been changed (figure3). “
} Install further malware components in the
IT and OT parts of the network Souce: ISA France,
ISA FLASH N°62 – Décembre 2016
} Ready to trigger the actual attack later

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But where to find good approaches to secure deployments?

• Source: US NCCIC (ICS-

CERT), FBI, NSA

• Percentage of ICS-CERT
FY 2014 and FY 2015
incidents potentially
mitigated by each strategy

• But this does not really

help us
• Application whitelisting is
just a tool
• Configuration, Patch
management, attack
surface reduction, are
huge areas
See: https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Seven%20Steps%20to%20Effectively%2
0Defend%20Industrial%20Control%20Systems_S508C.pdf

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Tutorial Agenda

Agenda

Motivation and Threat Landscape

Cyber Security Standards

Risk Driven Approach

Realization Approaches

Summary and Outlook

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Capabilities based on risks within the organization

Organizational Security & Processes

People, Policies, Processes, Governance

Secure Vulnerability
Organizational Secure Secure
Integration and and Incident
Preparedness Development Operation
Service Handling

Access Control Security Data

Secure System System
and Account Logging & Protection and
Architecture Hardening
Management Monitoring Integrity

Secure Malware Backup and Secure Remote

Privacy
Patching Protection Restore Access

Products, Systems, Solutions

• Common security activities need to be performed

• Common security technologies need to be implemented

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Cyber security standards target different areas and roles

Domain specific scope Role specific scope

− Focus on process industries, system • Focus on product security features:

suppliers: • IEC 62443-4-2
• WIB • Focus on system security capabilities:
− Focus on general IACS (industrial • IEC 62443-3-3
automation control system): • Focus on integration and maintenance:
• IEC 62443 • IEC 62443-2-4
− Focus on energy: • Focus on secure operation:
• NERC-CIP
• BDEW Whitepaper
• IEC 62443-2-2
• NERC-CIP
• Focus on secure development lifecycle:
• ISO/IEC 27019
• IEC 62443-4-1
− Focus on health care: • Security by Design with CMMI for Dev.
• HIPAA • ISO 27034
• DIARMF

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 Selected Key Security Standards for Energy Automation

Smart Grid Coordination

Group / Smart Grid
Information Security
Mandate M/490

Key
Standards

• IEC 62443
(System Security)
• IEC 62351
(Communication
Security)
• ISO/IEC 27001/27019
(Security Management)
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ISO 27000 Definitions

„Information Security Management System“ - ISMS

“part of the overall management system, based on a business

risk approach, to establish, implement, operate, monitor,
review, maintain and improve information security [ISO27000]

„Management System“

“framework of policies, procedures, guidelines and associated

resources to achieve the objective s of the organization

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Information Security Management System (ISMS)

ISO/IEC 27001:
Information Security Management System

Maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and availability,

whatever the form of information, values. This includes all
written, pictorial and spoken information.
ISO / IEC 27001 was developed as a model for the
development, implementation, monitoring, review, maintenance
and improvement of an information security management
system - ISMS.
ISO/IEC 27001 is process- and organization-oriented
ISO/IEC 27001 bases on continuous improvement
( Plan-Do-Check-Act )
ISO/IEC 27001 overlaps with ISO 9001.

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ISO/IEC 27000 Framework overview (selected parts)

Vocabulary 27000
standard Overview and vocabulary

27001 27006
Requirement
ISMS Family of standards

Requirements for bodies providing audit and

Information security management
standards systems - Requirements
certification of Information security
management systems

27002
27005
Code of practice for information security
Information security risk management
controls

Guideline 27003 27007

Information security management Guidline for information security mgmt
standards systems implementation guidance systems auditing

27004
Information security management -
Measurement

27019
Sector- Information security management
guidelines based on ISO/IEC 27002 for
specific process control systems specific to the
energy utility industry

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Security Standards – Structuring based on the Role

Industrial Automation and Control System

(IACS)

Asset
Owner operates and maintains Operational policies and procedures
Service
Provider Maintenance policies and procedures

+
System designs and deploys Automation solution
Basic Process Safety Complementary
Integrator Control System Instrumented Hardware and
(BPCS) System (SIS) Software

IACS* environment / project specific

Control System
Product develops as a combination of components
Supplier Embedded Network
devices components
Host
devices Applications

Independent of IACS environment

*IACS = Industrial Automation Control System

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The IEC-62443 Framework of Security Standards: Covering all areas

IEC / ISA-62443
General Policies and procedures System Component

1-1 Terminology, concepts 2-1 Requirements for an 3-1 Security technologies for 4-1 Product development
and models IACS security management IACS requirements
system Ed.2.0
1-2 Master glossary of terms Profile of 4-2 Technical security
3-2 Security risk assessment requirements for IACS
and abbreviations ISO 27001 / 27002
and system design products

1-3 System security 2-3 Patch management in the 3-3 System security
compliance metrics IACS environment requirements and security
levels
2-4 Requirements for IACS IS* 08/2013
solution suppliers
IS* 06/15
Definitions Requirements placed on security Requirements to achieve a Requirements to secure system
Metrics organization and processes of secure system components
the plant owner and suppliers
Functional requirements Processes

*IS = International Standard

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IACS, automation solution, control system

Industrial Automation and Control System

(IACS)

Asset
Operational policies and procedures 2-1
Owner operates and maintains
Service 2-3
Maintenance policies and procedures 2-4
Provider
+
System designs and deploys Automation solution 2-4
Basic Process Safety Complementary
Integrator Control System Instrumented Hardware and
(BPCS) System (SIS) Software 3-3
IACS environment / project specific
is the base for

Control System
Product as a combination of components 3-3
develops 4-1
Supplier Embedded Network Host Applications
devices components devices 4-2

Independent of IACS environment

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IEC 62443: Product Supplier View

Secure development
process covering the
IEC / ISA-62443
product development
General Policies and procedures System Component
lifecycle
1-1 Terminology, concepts 2-1 Requirements for an 3-1 Security technologies for 4-1 Product development
and models IACS security management IACS requirements
system Ed.2.0
1-2 Master glossary of terms Profile of 4-2 Technical security
3-2 Security risk assessment requirements for IACS
and abbreviations ISO 27001 / 27002
and system design products
Functional
1-3 System security 2-3 Patch management in the 3-3 System security
compliance metrics IACS environment requirements
requirements and security
levels
to the
2-4 Requirements for IACS product components
IS* 08/2013
solution suppliers Products consider
IS* 06/15 functional system
Definitions Requirements placed on security
Provide security Requirements
requirementsto achieve a Requirements to secure system
Metrics organization and processes of
documentation, secure system components
the plant owner and suppliers
operational guidelines
Functional requirements Processes

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IEC 62443: System Integrator View

IEC / ISA-62443
General Policies and procedures System Component

1-1 Terminology, concepts 2-1 Requirements for an 3-1 Security technologies for 4-1 Product development
and models IACS security management IACS requirements
system Ed.2.0
1-2 Master glossary of terms Profile of 4-2 Technical security
3-2 Security risk assessment requirements for IACS
and abbreviations ISO 27001 / 27002
and system design products

1-3 System security 2-3 Patch management in the 3-3 System security
compliance metrics IACS environment requirements and security
levels
2-4 Requirements for IACS SolutionIS*
meets
08/2013
solution suppliers functional
IS* 06/15
Provide Security requirements
Definitions Requirements placed on security Requirements
as a wholetosystem.
achieve a Requirements to secure system
Metrics documentation,
organization apply of
and processes secure system components
secure
the policies
plant owner and
and suppliers
System components fit
procedures during secure design
Functional requirements Processes
integration

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IEC 62443: Asset Owner View

IEC / ISA-62443
Security management
General Policies and procedures
process of the asset owner System Component

1-1 Terminology, concepts 2-1 Requirements for an 3-1 Security technologies for 4-1 Product development
“Profile” of ISO
and models
27000 IACS requirements
IACS security management
system Ed.2.0
1-2 Master glossary of terms Profile of 4-2 Technical security
3-2 Security risk assessment requirements for IACS
and abbreviations ISO 27001 / 27002
and system design products

1-3 System security 2-3 Patch management in the 3-3 System security
compliance metrics IACS environment requirements and security
levels
2-4 Requirements for IACS
Solution IS* 08/2013
meets
solution suppliers
functional
Maintenance policies IS* 06/15 requirements
Definitions Requirements placed on security Requirements to achieve a Requirements to secure system
and
procedures of the as asecure
whole system.
Metrics organization and processes of system components
asset ownertheorplant owner and suppliers System components fit
service provider secure design
Functional requirements Processes

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Why such standards at all?

Cybersecurity Myths … and how to address them.

• "My industrial networks are 3-3 2-4

isolated, so I'm protected". No remote access, enterprise network, USB?
• "I use proprietary protocols and 3-3
databases, so I'm protected.“
Own crypto strong? Really hard to analyze?
• "Cybersecurity will stop me from 2-1 2-4
working the way I want to".
Tested desaster recovery procedures?
• "Cybersecurity is expensive".
3-2

Better do cyber security risk analysis?

Source: ANSSI, „Managing Cyber Security for
Industrial Control Systems“, v1.0, June 2012.

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IEC 62443-3-3 Foundational Requirements (FRs)

Foundational Requirements (FRs)

FR 1 – Identification and authentication control

FR 2 – Use control

FR 3 – System integrity

FR 4 – Data confidentiality

FR 5 – Restricted data flow

FR 6 – Timely response to events

FR 7 – Resource availability

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Detailed example: IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.1

• Requirement
• The control system shall provide the capability to identify and authenticate all human
users. This capability shall enforce such identification and authentication on all interfaces
which provide human user access to the control system to support segregation of duties
and least privilege in accordance with applicable security policies and procedures.
• Rationale and supplemental guidance
• All human users need to be identified and authenticated for all access to the control
system. Authentication of the identity of these users should be accomplished by using
methods such […]
• Requirement enhancements
• SR 1.1 RE 1 – Unique identification and authentication
• SR 1.1 RE 2 – Multifactor authentication for untrusted networks
• SR 1.1 RE 3 – Multifactor authentication for all networks
• Security levels
§ SL-C(IAC, control system) 1: SR 1.1
§ SL-C(IAC, control system) 2: SR 1.1 (1)
§ SL-C(IAC, control system) 3: SR 1.1 (1) (2)
§ SL-C(IAC, control system) 4: SR 1.1 (1) (2) (3)
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Zones and Conduits (IEC 62443-3-2)

§ Zone – Group of logical or physical assets sharing common security requirements

§ Conduit – Logical grouping of communication channels, connecting two or more
zones, that share common security requirements

§ Zones and conduits are e.g.

established by grouping assets
based on
§ functionality,
§ location,
§ responsible
organization,
§ the result of a risk assessment.

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IEC62443-2-4: Functional Areas, Topics

Functional Area Topic Functional Area Topic

SP01 Solution Staffing Training SP04 Wireless Network design
Background checks SP05 SIS Risk assessment
(e.g. trained staff,
security contacts) Personnel assignments Network design
(specific requirements for
safety-instrumented
SP02 Assurance Solution components Devices - workstations
systems and wireless)
Security tools and Devices - wireless
(e.g. security testing, software
hardening guides) User interface
Hardening guidelines
SP06 Configuration Network design
SP03 Architecture Risk assessment
Management
(e.g. secure NW design Network design
(config documentation, Devices – all
deployed, hardening, Solution components inventory) Devices - control and
Vulnerability handling)
Devices - all instrumentation
Devices - workstations SP07 Remote Access Security tools and
(secure, approved, software
Devices - network documented remote Data protection
Data protection access solution)

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IEC62443-2-4: Functional Areas, Topics (continued)

Functional Area Topic Functional Area Topic

SP08 Event Events - Security SP10 Malware Manual process
Management compromises Protection
(e.g. logging configuration, Events – Security (e.g. installation, Security tools and
Incident handling) related signature updates, software
Alarms & Events portable media) Devices – All

SP09 Account Accounts - User and Portable media

Management service accounts
SP11 Patch Manual process
(e.g. administration, Accounts –
Management
centralized, policy config, Administrator
documentation) (e.g. process, ensure Patch list
Accounts – Default
up-to-date system,
Accounts – User follow operator policies)
Passwords Security patch
SP12 Backup / Restore Manual process
(e.g. backup procedures, Restore
capabilities, disaster Portable media
recovery plan)
Backup

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IEC 62443-2-1

The IEC 62443-2-1 specification:

• Is based on ISO/IEC 27001:2013 and 27002:2013
• IACS – SMS: Describes implementation, management, operation of an IACS (industrial
automation control system) security management system
• Requirements largely address policies, procedures, practices, personnel

Main content:
• Additions to ISO/IEC 27001
− e.g. related to information security risk management

• Guidance for ISO/IEC 27002 controls

− Example: Clarify “teleworking” in the context of remote access to industrial
deployments

• Extended set of specific controls for industrial automation

− Example: centralized vulnerability monitoring

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Relation between IEC 62443 and ISO/IEC 27000

Standards for organizations, IT scope

ISO/IEC 27001 Standards for organizations, OT scope
ISO/IEC 27002
OT Infrastructure Operator

ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27019
Operator IT Infrastructure IEC 62443-2-1

Standards for system integrators

IEC 62443-2-4
System Integrator IT Infrastructure
IEC 62443-3-3

Standards for product suppliers

IEC 62443-3-3
Product Supplier IT Infrastructure IEC 62351
IEC 62443-4-2

Functional Procedural
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Tutorial Agenda

Agenda

Motivation and Threat Landscape

Cyber Security Standards

Risk Driven Approach

Realization Approaches

Summary and Outlook

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Goal: analyze possible attack actions, understand risks

Client / Server Network

• Misuse of credentials,
• Tamper data
• Disclose data • Misuse of credentials
• Exhause resources • Bypass of access control
• Misuse elevated privileges • Malicous input • Tamper data
• Disclose data,
• Exhaust resources
OS level access User interfaces
Network
communication
Component-to-
Physical
component
interfaces
interfaces

• Bypass of access control • Misuse of credentials,

• Disclose data • Bypass of access control
• Malicous input • Malicous input

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Security Risk Management

• Security Standards like ISO/IEC 27k and

IEC 62443 require
− establishment of a systematic security risk
management approach
− performing it as a continuous process

• Risk analysis is a key step: Implementations

of security controls need to be risk based

• Risk management procedure details are

not mandated, but best-practices are available

• Risk analysis methods for IT/OT security can

be adapted to many different types of organizations

• Risk analysis is required for all stakeholders

− Product Supplier
− System Integrator
− Asset Owner Risk management process based on ISO27005:2011

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Risk Management along the PDCA Cycle

ISMS Risk Management Steps Act Plan

Steps Check Do
Continuous Improvement

Plan • Context establishment

• Risk assessment
• Develop risk treatment / risk acceptance
Do • Risk treatment implementation
Check • Continual monitoring of effectiveness
• Review of risk
Act • Maintain and improve security risk management
process

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Definition: Threat

Threat

A potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a

system or organization.
ISO 27000

Potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a

circumstance, capability, action or event that could breach security and
cause harm.
IEC 62443

A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely

impact organizational operations and assets, individuals […] through an
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or
modification of information, and/or denial of service. NIST 800-30

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Definition: Risk Evaluation

Level of Risk

Magnitude of a risk , expressed in terms of the combination of consequences

and their likelihood ISO 27000

Risk Analysis / Risk Assessment

Input:
A list of identified relevant incident scenarios, including identification of
threats, vulnerabilities, affected assets, consequences to assets and business
processes.
Output:
List of risks with value levels assigned to all relevant incident scenarios ISO 27005:2011

Process that systematically identifies potential vulnerabilities to valuable

system resources and threats to those resources, quantfies loss exposures
and consequences based on probability of occurrence […].
IEC 62443

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Risk Assessment Methodology

Impact Rating
Risk
Impact/Consequence level
Likelihood

Impact
Asset
Threat

Likelihood rating
Product / solution Threat List Likelihood Impact Risk

Likelihood
Threat 1 Very likely Critical
Intended operational
environment
Threat 2 Possible Disastrous

Threat 3 Possible Negligible

Attacker

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Risk Treatment Options

Threat List Likelihood Impact Risk

Options to follow-up on
Threat 1 Very likely Critical risk assessment results
Threat 2 Possible Disastrous

Risk Risk Risk Risk

modification retention avoidance sharing

• Introduce or modify • Accept risk. Risk • Avoid condition • Share with another
security controls meets creating the risk party
(techn. or acceptance
procedure) criteria • Example: Remove• Example:
vulnerable Subcontractor,
• Example: • Example: component Insurance
Add firewall rule to Identified risk
block access to a below threshold
vulnerable
component

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Resulting Risk and Security Levels

• To define appropriate security controls aligned with identified risks, „levels“ can be used

Name Source Function

Organizes security requirements in
IEC62443-3-3 security levels 1 up to 4 that build
Security Level upon each other.
Assign a maturity level to an
IEC62443-2-4 organization (per requirement or
Maturity Level requirements group?)
Assign a maturity level to an
organization. Select blocks of
CMMI (different definition)
requirements in scope, depending on
Maturity Level the targeted level
Bronze/Silver/Gold, organizes security
WIB M 2784 X-10
requirements in three levels that
(predecessor of IEC62443-2-4)
Bronze/Silver/Gold build upon each other

• Such „levels“, however, can mean quite different things

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IEC 62443-3-3 Security Levels: Interrelation

Plant environment IEC 62443

Protection against casual or
SL 1 coincidental violation Risk assessment

System architecture
zones, conduits 3-2 Security risk
Protection against intentional
violation using simple means with assessment and
Target SLs
SL 2 low resources, generic skills and low system design
(work in progress)
motivation
Achieved SLs
Protection against intentional violation Automation solution
using sophisticated means with
SL 3 moderate resources, IACS specific
skills and moderate motivation 3-3 System
Capability SLs security
Protection against intentional violation Control System requirements and
using sophisticated means with Security levels
capabilities
SL 4 extended resources, IACS specific Independent
skills and high motivation of plant environment

Measures to address gaps between target and achieved

SL can be of technical or organizational nature

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How to measure process compliance

• Security Levels of IEC 62443-3-3 relate to technical capabilities

• Established approach for process / organizational evaluation: Maturity Levels

IEC 62443-2-4
Improving

Defined
(Practiced)

Managed

Initial

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability_Maturity_Model_Integration
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Tutorial Agenda

Agenda

Motivation and Threat Landscape

Cyber Security Standards

Risk Driven Approach

Realization Approaches

Summary and Outlook

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How to address IEC 62443-3-3

• The specification requirements need to be met by the control system

− “[..] it is not necessary that every component of the proposed control system support every
system requirement to the level mandated in this standard. [..]”
− Compensating countermeasures can be employed to provide the needed functionality to other
subsystems, such that the overall SL-T requirements are met at the control system level.”

• The specification does not limit realization options. It describes what is required,
but does not describe (or limit) how this can be achieved.

• Adapted requirements at component level can be found in IEC 62443-4-1 for:

− Embedded devices (e.g., PLC, IED)
− Host devices (e.g., operator workstation, engineering workstation)
− Network devices (e.g., switch, router, firewall, access point)

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Example: Substation Automation

Untrusted network

Control center Remote access

Station level
Router

Service HMI
PC Station controller
PC

Switch
Field level
Switch Switch

Switch Switch Switch Switch Switch

IEDs
Protection and
field devices

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Network Segmentation in IEC 62443-3-3

FR 5.1 – Restricted Data Flow SL 1 SL 2 SL 3 SL 4

FR 5.1 – Network segmentation a a a a
SR 5.1 RE 1 – Physical network segmentation a a a
SR 5.1 RE 2 – Independence from non-control system networks a a
SR 5.1 RE 3 – Logical and physical isolation of critical networks a
SR 5.2 – Zone boundary protection a a a a
SR 5.2 RE 1 – Deny by default, allow by exception a a a
SR 5.2 RE 2 – Island mode a a
SR 5.2 RE 3 – Fail close a a
SR 5.3 – General purpose person-to-person communication restrictions a a a a
SR 5.3 RE 1 – Prohibit all general purpose person-to-person communications a a
SR 5.4 – Application partitioning a a a a

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Security Zones with Protection at Zone Borders

Untrusted network

Control center Remote access

Station level DMZ Trusted zone

Router

HMI
Service Station controller
PC
PC

Switch
Field level Trusted zone Switch Switch

Switch Switch Switch Switch Switch

IEDs
Protection and
field devices

Introducing secure zones (SR5.1, SR5.2):

• All traffic in and out must pass through the de-militarized zone (DMZ)
• Within the substation network, one or more trusted zones (IP subnetworks) are configured
• Separation via switches (VLAN) at layer 2, and via Firewall at layer 3
• If communication through DMZ fails, substation automation will continue on its own

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Authentication in IEC 62443-3-3

FR 1 - Identification and Authentication Control SL 1 SL 2 SL 3 SL 4

SR 1.1 – Human user identification and authentication a a a a

SR 1.1 RE 1 – Unique identification and authentication a a a

SR 1.1 RE 2 – Multifactor authentication for untrusted networks a a

SR 1.1 RE 3 – Multifactor authentication for all networks a

SR 1.2 – Software process and device identification and authentication a a a

SR 1.2 RE 1 – Unique identification and authentication a a

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Places for User Authentication

Remote Access
Infrastructure
Untrusted network

Control center Remote access

Station level DMZ Trusted zone

Router
Terminal
Server HMI
PC Station controller
VPN
termination

Switch
Field level Trusted zone Switch Switch

Switch Switch Switch Switch Switch

IEDs
Protection and
field devices

Remote access introduces additional users:

• Authentication can theoretically be realized in different places:
externally, in the DMZ, or directly at the substation devices (e.g. HMI)
• Unique user authentication can be enforced locally by a terminal server in the DMZ

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Centralized User Authentication

Remote Access
Infrastructure
Untrusted network

Control center Remote access

Station level DMZ Trusted zone

Router
Terminal Auth
Server Server HMI
PC Station controller
VPN
termination

Switch
Field level Trusted zone Switch Switch

Switch Switch Switch Switch Switch

IEDs
Protection and
field devices

Centralized user management:

• For unified and centralized management of accounts and account-related security policies, an
authentication server (e.g. Active Directory Domain Controller for Windows) can be used.
• Accounts for network devices can be managed through RADIUS.
• Not mandatory, but improved security and reduced management effort as soon as more than a
few machines need to be covered
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Tutorial Agenda

Agenda

Motivation and Threat Landscape

Cyber Security Standards

Risk Driven Approach

Realization Approaches

Summary and Outlook

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Summary and Outlook

• Cyber security threats are real. Threats need to be addressed by

implementing both organizational and technical capabilities that are
appropriate and effective.

• It is important for all stakeholders to establish security risk management

procedures that ensure appropriate realizations that implement security
controls.

• Appropriate realizations vary based on the actual system and its operational
environment. However, they need to consider the state-of-the-art. Hence,
appropriate realizations will evolve over time.

• The IEC 62443 security standards framework provides security requirements

that address all involved stakeholders along the lifecycle. Integration with
ISO/IEC 27000 is possible.

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Sources for further information

• ISA-99 62443 document overview with draft versions:

http://isa99.isa.org/ISA99%20Wiki/WP_List.aspx
• CEN-CENELEC-ETSI, Smart Grid Coordination Group, “SG-CG/M490/H_Smart Grid Information Security”,
December 2014.
• SG-CG/M490/D_ Smart Grid Information Security
ftp://ftp.cen.eu/EN/EuropeanStandardization/HotTopics/SmartGrids/Security.pdf
• ISO/IEC 27001: Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management systems —
Requirements
• ISO/IEC 27002: Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security
management
• ISO/IEC 27005: Information technology — Security techniques — Information security risk management
• ISO/IEC TR 27019: Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management
guidelines based on ISO/IEC 27002 for process control systems specific to the energy utility industry
• IEC 62443-2-4: Security for industrial automation and control systems - Network and system security - Part 2-4:
Requirements for Industrial Automation Control Systems (IACS) solution suppliers
• IEC 62443-3-3: Security for industrial automation and control systems, Part 3-3: System security requirements and
security levels
• IEC 62443-4-2: Security for industrial automation and control systems, Part 4-2: Technical Security Requirements for
IACS Components
• IEC TC 57 WG 15, IEC TS 62351 suite, see http://www.iec.ch/dyn/www/f?p=103:7:0::::FSP_ORG_ID:1273
• IEC TC 57 WG 15, TS 62351-12, “Resilience and Security Recommendations for Power Systems with DER”, under
development.

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Sources for further information

• Bulletin d’Information d’ISA France, ISA FLASU no. 62, Patrice Bock et al, “A forensic analysis of the cyber-attack on
the Ukrainian power”, December 2016.
• German IT security law, BSI Information (German language only):
• https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Industrie_KRITIS/IT-SiG/it_sig_node.html
• A. Polyakov, M. Geli, “SAP Cybersecurity for Oil and Gas”, ERPScan Whitepaper presented at Blackhat Europe,
Nov. 2015

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Authors

• Dirk Kroeselberg received a diploma degree in Mathematics and Computer Science from the University of Giessen,
Germany, in 1997. He worked for Siemens and Nokia Siemens Networks on a broad range of security topics and
technologies, including smartcards, and mobile telecommunication networks. Joining Siemens Corporate Technology
in 2011, he currently works as principal key expert in the field of security in industrial environments, critical
infrastructures, and energy automation.
dirk.kroeselberg@siemens.com

• Frederic Buchi received an engineer degree in Communication Engineering from ESSTIN (Ecole Supérieure des
Sciences et Technologies de l'Ingénieur de Nancy/France) in 2000. Following a first position at Alcatel, his
involvement with power utilities started in 2003 as a Technical Project Manager for turn-key communication networks
at Alstom. Since 2008 he works at Siemens' HQ in Germany in the areas of product lifecycle management, business
development and is currently responsible for Siemens Cyber Security solutions for protection and control system in
Digital Grids Systems, where he passionately addresses this dynamic topic, both within Siemens and customers,
especially focusing on defining and implementing challenging cyber security measures on the OT side to comply with
international and industry standards..
frederic.buchi@siemens.com

• Hans Meulenbroek graduated in 1985 from the HTS Hilversum, the Netherlands with a bachelor degree (Ing.) in
Electrical Engineering. From 1987 he worked for Rossmark Water Treatment as process automation engineer and
manager process automation department. In 1997, he joined Eaton Electric in the role of application
engineer/SCADA specialist, followed by Product Manager responsible for LV Switchgear & MCC, Motor
Management Systems and Smart Grid Automation solutions. In 2014 he joined Siemens as Proposal Expert Energy
Automation.
hans.meulenbroek@siemens.com

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