Cayetano vs. Leonidas

11/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 129
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Leonidas
*
No. L-54919. May 30, 1984.
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS,

in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of
First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA,
respondents.
Succession; Due Process; Attorneys; There being a proper substitution

of attorneys where the Motion to Dismiss Opposition to reprobate of will
was filed, trial judge acted properly in hearing evidence ex parte on probate
of will in question.—We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention
that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that
Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that
after the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a
manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition
was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed,
the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn
from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn
filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the
old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the
motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted
correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other
opposition to the same.
Same; Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of

testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of
will is resolved, probate court should meet the issue.—The third issue raised
deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the
probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
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________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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VOL. 129, MAY 30, 1984 523
Same; The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies

to the intrinsic and extrinsic validity of the last will and testament of a U.S.
national and resident of Pennsylvania under whose laws a person may give
his entire estate to a complete stranger.—Although on its face, the will
appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge
should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an
American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code
which respectively provide: x x x x the law which governs Adoracion
Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law
of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does
not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the
testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should
not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
Same; Same.—It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of

the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the
Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely
applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).
Motions; Due Process; There was no denial of due process as what the
court repeatedly set for hearing was the Petition for Relief, not the Motion
to Vacate Order of Jan. 10, 1979.—As regards the alleged absence of notice
of hearing for the petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that what
was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980
was the petitioner’s petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order
of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been
led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing
to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for
hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested “for
the future setting of the case for hearing x x x” did not mean that at the next
hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of
the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a
motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
524
Succession; Jurisdiction; Probate of Will of American citizen who left

an estate in the Philippines was properly filed in the City of Manila where
estate is located.—Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion
Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where
she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time
of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United
States of America and not a “usual resident of Cavite” as alleged by the
petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule
that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction.
PETITION for review on certiorari the order of the Court of First

Instance of Manila, Br. XXXVIII. Leonidas, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order

of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the
last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte
presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her
father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private
respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C.
Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only
compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under
Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated
unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia
filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion
Campos, which was allegedly executed in
525
VOL. 129, MAY 30, 1984 525
the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the

estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American
citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix
died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with
her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime,
the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975,
according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo
Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix’ death, her
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was
appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his
appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for
the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually
distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will
was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he
has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that
the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if
pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the
same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and
injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his
counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition
(With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he “has been able to
verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same
to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion.” Hence, an
ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned
will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to
wit:
“At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C.

Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with
a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman
526

Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D); that when alive, Adoracion C.

Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b);

that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos
died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the
Philippines and in the United States of America; that the Last Will and
Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted
probate by the Orphan’s Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the
probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin, all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that
the petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification which would render
her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late
Adoracion C. Campos.
“WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.

Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and
Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of
said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in
favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the
Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979,
confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be
his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief,

praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground
that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured
through fraudulent means. According to him, the “Motion to
Dismiss Opposition” was inserted among the papers which he
signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he
executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the
withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the
special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed
to appear. He made several motions for postponement until the
hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
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VOL. 129, MAY 30, 1984 527

On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled “Motion

to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of
hearing provided:
“Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at
8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the
Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the
future setting of the case for hearing on the Oppositor’s motion to set aside
previously filed.”
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19,
1980. When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel
for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing
evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent
judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to
present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order,
respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos
died and left a will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the
respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null
and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the
executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a
motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which
was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of
the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the
rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and
forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
“1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived

the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to
Dismiss op-
528

position with waiver of rights or interests against the estate

of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for
the ex-parte hearing of the petition for the probate of
decedent will.
“2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate
(not made in a public or authenticated instrument), or by
way of a petition presented to the court but by way of a
motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the
estate—the law especially providing that repudiation of an
inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it has
issued an order for the distribution of the estate in

accordance with the rules of Court.
“3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be
divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no
provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard
of Law of Succession.
“4) He denied petitioner’s petition for Relief on the ground that
no evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief
when no Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to
prove the merit of his petition—a denial of the due process
and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
“5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact
that the Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of
Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First
Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja
vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).”
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the
allegation that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner’s
opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s
contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through
fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel
of record. The records show that after the filing of the contested
motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he
confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary
act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the
petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long
withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco
Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot,
therefore,
529
VOL. 129, MAY 30, 1984 529

maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at
the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the
respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will
ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of
the will. As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited
only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the

requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of
the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the
issue. (Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the
respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will,
Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was
reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its
reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an
American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039
of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
x x x x x x x x x
“However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.”
Art. 1039.
530

“Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.”
the law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of

Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by
the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such
law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of
the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This
was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358)
wherein we ruled:
“It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
x x x x x x x x x
“The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs
or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas
law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.”
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition

for relief, the records will bear the fact that what was repeatedly
scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the
petitioner’s petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order
of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should
have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the
petitioner’s failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief
was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process.
The fact that he
531
VOL. 129, MAY 30, 1984 531

requested “for the future setting of the case for hearing x x x” did
not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be
heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not
in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of
jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the
Rules of Court, it is provided that:
“SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is

an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be

contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.”
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was

correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she
had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the
time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a “usual resident of
Cavite” as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. v. Hon. Manuel
Lazaro, et al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
532

Aquino vs. Mariano
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ.,

concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), no part.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—For petition for certiorari to prosper, the grave abuse of

discretion committed by the Tribunal must be shown. (Ignacio vs.
Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 648.)
For certiorari to lie there must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial
prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and
common law tradition. (People vs. Vallarta, 77 SCRA 476.)
Disregard of available facts by a judge constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. (Commissioner of Customs vs. Geronimo, 80 SCRA 74.)
——o0o——
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11/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 129

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS,

Succession; Due Process; Attorneys; There being a proper substitution

Same; Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of

VOL. 129, MAY 30, 1984 523